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FOREWORD
The

International

War College in

Law

Studies "Blue Book" series was initiated by the Naval

1901 to publish essays, treatises and articles that contribute to the

broader understanding of international law. This, the seventy-fourth volume of
the series, publishes The Tanker

K. Walker, Professor of Law,

War 1980-88: Law and Policy,

Wake

written by George

Forest University School of Law. Professor

Walker has served as the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the
Naval

War College

(1992-93) and

is

a retired Captain in the U.S.

Naval Reserve.

This volume provides an in-depth analysis of the legal issues surrounding the

"Tanker War" between Iran and

Iraq, with a focus

on law of the

sea, the

armed conflict, the UN Charter, and environmental issues. In addition
ing the legal aspects of the conflict, there

is

a

summary of the factual

Tanker War and

a general prologue of the history of the

Walker's work

a significant contribution to the literature

is

meticulous and thorough research ensures

it

will

law of

to discuss-

record of the

Arabian Gulf. Professor

on

this subject.

His

be a standard reference for

its

While the positions and opinions expressed in this volume are those of the
author and are not necessarily those of the United States Navy or the Naval War
study.

College, the

work provides valuable

insights into international law developments

experienced in the Iran-Iraq War.

The Tanker War was brought to publication with the assistance of the Naval War
College's

Oceans Law and Policy Department. Professor Emeritus Jack Grunawalt

provided invaluable service by volunteering his time as editor.
Secretary of the

Navy and

the Chief of Naval Operations,

I

On

behalf of the

extend to Professor

Walker and the others who participated in the development of this publication my
gratitude and thanks.

aSc.

CEBROWSKI

Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval

War

College

PREFACE
The Tanker
sor of Law,

War 1980-88: Law and Policy, written by George K. Walker, Profes-

Wake Forest University School of Law, is the culmination of a process

that began over ten years ago. Professor

book while maintaining

Walker conducted research and wrote the

a schedule as a full-time law professor, in addition to his

many other personal and professional obligations. He brings an extensive international law

background

field of international

to this subject. Besides his teaching responsibilities in the

law and admiralty at Wake Forest, he served as the Charles H.

Stockton Professor of International
1992-93 academic year.

He

also

was

Law

at

the Naval

War

a participant in the

College during the

development of the San

Remo Manual, a contemporary restatement of the law applicable to armed conflicts
at sea. The Oceans Law and Policy Department of the Center for Naval Warfare
Studies, Naval War College is indebted to Professor Walker for the superb scholarship exhibited in this volume.

The

War

International

Law

Studies "Blue

Book"

series is

published by the Naval

College and distributed throughout the world to academic institutions,

li-

and both U.S. and foreign military commands. The Tanker War will greatly
enhance the series by presenting an insightful work on a topic previously not fully
braries,

addressed.

Thank you again

to Professor

Walker and the others who

assisted in the devel-

opment and publication of this volume. We also extend our sincere thank you to
Dr. Alberto Coll, the Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, for his support
of the "Blue Book" series.

Dennis Mandsager
Professor of Law

Chairman, Oceans

Law

and Policy Department

—
Chapter

I

INTRODUCTION
This book has taken better than

a

decade to research and write. Soon

Iran-Iraq conflict began in 1980,

ended

in 1988,

and

it

began

I

to

study the war. That conflict

was succeeded by the Gulf War, whose active

gan in August 1990 and ended in early 1991, although

may be

like the 1980-88 conflict,

after the

hostilities be-

final resolution of that war,

decades in coming.

Factual accounts of the Iran-Iraq war, and

its

maritime component, the Tanker

War, were scattered among many sources. Unlike wars

in

which the United

States

or other States that are open societies are belligerents, access to primary accounts

from either Iran or Iraq were
pants

The

difficult to find.

large

number of

partici-

—ranging from the UN Security Council and Secretary-General through

multinational organizations to individual countries and nongovernmental organizations,

find

whose pronouncements, although

— also made building

lication of The Iran-Iraq

Tanker Wars that
consulted.

Media

books and the

(1980-1988) and the

were often

difficult. It

Law

difficult to

was only with pub-

of Naval Warfare

and The

could be sure that a relatively complete factual record could be

I

and summaries appeared soon

reports

first

foundation

a solid factual

War

critical,

round of analysis required

after events,

but these

a cross-check for accuracy

and com-

pleteness.

The law itself was

also in transition. Protocol I to the 1949

was signed in 1977, and today it

is

Geneva Conventions

virtually universally applicable as treaty law, aln

though the United States has not
Convention and

its

ratified

it.

Protocols were signed, and today have

including the United States for
i

most part do not apply

to

war

all

9

at sea,

Sea (LOS)

universal acceptance, with an

States as parties,

»

but they restate principles

—applying

Law of the

many

Weapons

but one of its Protocols. These treaties for the

tion, proportionality, necessity

vention on the

In 1980 the Conventional

to all warfare.

LOS

UN Con-

moving toward

protocol, to replace the 1958

ventions; thus far the United States has not ratified

including the United States, accept the

it is

•

discrimina-

In 1982 the

was signed, and today

amending

e.g.,

LOS

Con-

However, many countries,

it.

Convention navigational

articles as

restatements of customary law.

Important secondary sources also matured during the war and are now generally available. In
it

may have

1987 the Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations was published, and

influence like

Warfare Publication
sion of the

its

predecessor Restatement (Second).

(NWP) 9 was also published;

US Navy's law of war manual since NWIP

it

was the

first

In 1987 Naval

complete revi-

10-2, first published in 1955.

Capping nearly a decade of conferences, the San Remo Manual, the

first

of its kind

8

The Tanker War

2

since the 7973 Oxford Manual on the law of naval warfare,

Besides these sources, the
1

therefore

at least for the

book useful
I

hoped

treaties generated

could while carrying a

University and coping with post-Vietnam
ple effects for a decade.

val

after service as

War

main

full

it

through

a

semester of aca-

academic schedule

at

Wake Forest

War tumult in academia, which had rip-

completed most of the basic research and writing during

I

Law at the Na-

Charles H. Stockton Professor of International

College, Newport, R.I., truly an outstanding experience, for

which

I re-

grateful.

Chapter

II

B summarizes

the factual record of the Tanker

logue of the history of the Persian Gulf precedes

may govern during

Chapter

III

war,

V

Chapter

II

A. Chapter III ap-

summary

a short

of other factors
is

in

LOS issues that applied during the war, e.g.,

issues affecting the Persian

A general summary and conclusion

Gulf environment

follows in Chapter VII.

some

cases the prior

been published, and in most situations references are given

to prior publi-

Parts of this
text has

Chapter

a general pro-

examines law of armed conflict (LOAC) issues in the

Tanker War. Chapter VI explores
during the war.

in

War;

the impact of armed conflict on treaties,

e.g.,

D. Chapter IV focuses on

straits passage.

it

UN Charter to the conflict;

plies the law of the

that

to

readers.

began research on the war in 1980, continued
I

comparable

more complete factual record and,
more stable format of international law will make this

and academic

for general

as

17

that a combination of a

time being, a

demic leave and

and

commentaries

on the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

Pictet's respected series
It is

new

was published in 1995.

book have appeared

in other publications. In

cations.

Part A.

Acknowledgments

There are many who have helped with the thinking, research and writing oiThe
Tanker
land,

21

War 1 980-88: Law and Policy. John Donne rightly wrote that no one is an isand

this applies to this book's preparation.

My first and greatest debt is owed my wife, Phyllis, and our children, Charles
and Mary Neel, who endured many times when

I

was engrossed in thinking,

re-

search and writing during graduate study and absences at libraries, carrels, offices

and elsewhere. Part of the personal experience

for preparing

The Tanker War was

duty with the US Navy, with which I was privileged to serve with Atlantic Fleet de-

Naval Reserve (1957-59, 1962-89). From 1966

stroyer forces (1959-62)

and

until retirement in

my family supported absences for Naval Reserve duty as a

1

989,

line officer that took

in the

me away

other times than they or

I

at least

would

two weeks

like to

a year

and more weekends and

remember.

My father, J. Henry Walker, never saw active military service. He held an Army
commission

young

for a

time after World

for the First

World War and

War

I

He was

too

World War. In

the

and before World War

too senior for the Second

II.

3

Introduction

family tradition, he was active in Civil Defense during

World War

II

and taught

Army Air Force cadets while teaching premedical studies at the University of Alabama. He had been prevailed upon by the President of the University to
stay on and teach future doctors for that war. He encouraged my brother, Lieutenant Commander Rufus H. Walker, USNR, and me to seek naval commissions and
physics to

my brother chose a naval career and I

was never more proud of his sons than when

remained in the active reserves through the Cold War.
sights that

grew more meaningful

sion to enter academic
service stories

added

life.

to

as

I

matured
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and

I

remain grateful

for his supporting

me toward

its

thoughts for this book.

history, politics

my interest in

and diplomacy, and unconsciously directed

an eventual career in the law. These included John F. Ramsey, one of

the truly great teachers and mentors for

annual student award
sor

my deci-

my brother in mid-career, but his sea

Cancer claimed

At the University of Alabama several great teachers quickened
the larger world,

for his in-

is

many at

the University and for

given to this day; Captain Hubert E. Mate,

whom

an

USNR, profes-

and College of Arts and Sciences assistant dean, an academic and Navy mentor;

Commander John S. Pancake, USNR, professor of history and another Navy mentor who introduced me to diplomatic history; and Walter H. Bennett, a demanding
member of the political science department, who immersed me in political theory.
At Duke University Harold T. Parker, who with William Newton supervised

my history master's thesis on

the Franklin Roosevelt

-

Winston Churchill

corre-

spondence, 1939-41, taught me how history moves and insisted on the highest aca-

demic standards

in researching the thesis.

Many years later, another Duke faculty

member encouraged my study of the law of naval warfare. Rear Admiral Horace B.
Robertson, Judge Advocate General's Corps,
the Navy, later a

USN and Judge Advocate General of

Duke law faculty member and vice dean, has my special thanks.

From my Vanderbilt

University law school experience,

grounding that Professor and Dean John W.

now

colleague and friend Harold G. Maier encouraged

my

remember

my study of international

academic career since then.

I

Vanderbilt's great teacher of conflict of laws, Elliott E. Cheatham,

grandfather

this

mention

who knew my
a superin-

He opened my eyes to thinking factorially in ways reflected in

book, particularly Chapter VI.

Service as

US

yer with what

is

John D. Butzner, Jr., now Senior US
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and as a trial law-

District Court law clerk to

Circuit Judge for the

US

today the law firm of Hunton

& Williams in Richmond, Virginia,

was probably the best postgraduate education

Freeman,

who saw
the

also

when he practiced law in Georgia and my grandfather was

tendent of schools.

the excel-

Wade gave me. My teacher and

lent

law there and has supported

I

Jr.,

who had

distinguished

active naval service

World War II

Supreme Court of the United

could have asked

on U.S.S. Wasp; Lewis

service

States;

I

and was

later

for.

George C.

F. Powell,

Jr.,

an Associate Justice of

H. Merrill Pasco, General of the

Army
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George C. Marshall's
F. Brooks, were

aide;

Lewis T. Booker, later promoted Brigadier; and Robert

among the outstanding lawyers with and for whom I worked. With

that kind of leadership

by example, excellence was the expected norm.
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A decision and commitment to legal education led me to the University of Virginia School of Law, and

I

am grateful for the wonderful intellectual growth expe-

rience the Master of Laws program gave me.

I

express thanks to great teachers and

of whom

became good friends and colleagues: A.E. Dick
Howard, White Burkett Professor of Law and Public Affairs; Richard B. Lillich,
late Howard W. Smith Professor and a Stockton Professor of International Law at
the Naval War College; and John Norton Moore, director of the graduate program
research supervisors,

all

and Walter L. Brown Professor. The Virginia law library supported my masters in
law and later research, and I remain grateful to the late Frances Farmer and her
staff for

support they gave.

At the Yale Law School while on sabbatical

came

I

know W. Michael

to

Reisman. Michael, then Wesley N. Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence, and today

Myres

S.

McDougal

through the years.

I

Professor of International Law, has supported

also

my work

remain grateful for the comments and support of Myres

S.

McDougal, Sterling Professor of Law Emeritus, and for a particular insight that
Eugene F. Rostow, Emeritus Dean and Sterling Professor of Law, gave me. My uncle,

Rufus C. Harris,

later a

law dean and university president, always reflected the

broad base of J.S.D. work he did
veteran,
Lastly,

and

I

and

his experience

remain grateful

at

Yale after returning as a wounded World

and example were reasons

for the facilities of the

Yale

I

wanted

War I

Law and

to research there.

Sterling Libraries

their support.

To

recount names of those within the sea services

who influenced my thinking

during 32 years of enlisted and commissioned service would
learned great truths from, or was inspired by, those with

fill

a

volume. Often

whom

I

served,

who

I

led

whom I was privileged to lead. Two must be mentioned. Captain J. Ashley
Roach, Judge Advocate General's Corps, US Navy (Ret.), and I met just after my
me, or

time at Yale.

He suggested the developing Middle East situation would be interest-

ing research, and so

it

was.

During

my

1992-93 appointment as Charles H.

Law at the Naval War College, I gained Richard J. Grunawalt, Captain, Judge Advocate General's Corps, US Navy, (Ret.), and
now Emeritus Professor and former Director of the Oceans Law and Policy DeStockton Professor of International

partment of the College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS), as a great colleague and friend.

I

remain grateful for his positive leadership, encouragement and

insistence on the highest standards of scholarship. Jack was principal editor of this

volume.

He was

ably assisted by Lieutenant Colonel James E.

Meyen, U.S. Ma-

rine Corps.

Three Naval War College Presidents are owed a special debt of thanks. Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser,

US Navy, was

President during

my

Stockton year.
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Admiral Strasser solidly supported

my

teaching and research at the College; he

cared about people as he led the College. His leadership will not be forgotten. Rear

Admiral James R. Stark,

US

Navy, who succeeded Admiral Strasser

as President,

has also supported the College's law program. Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski,

US Navy, succeeded Admiral Stark and wrote the Foreword for this book. Within
comments,

insights, research suggestions

and

corrections of Professors Grunawalt and Dennis Mandsager, current Oceans

Law

the College,

I

remain grateful

for

Wood, former Dean
of the CNWS, has my thanks for his research suggestions, comments and insights.
and Policy Department Chairman, and his staff. Dr. Robert

I

also express thanks to

for reading

Hugh Lynch,

Captain

S.

USN (Ret.), of the CNWS

faculty,

Chapter II for factual accuracy. The Nation remains in good hands, due

in part to the administrative, academic, military and

moral leadership of these ded-

icated people.

Wake Forest University generously gave me leave to attend Yale, to accept the
Stockton appointment, and for research.

I

express special thanks to a good friend

and colleague, Edwin G. Wilson, Emeritus Provost and Professor of English,

me a Reserve destroyer officer (but separated by a few years in

time of service,

though shipboard experiences we shared were remarkably alike).
for the support

and counsel of Dean and Professor J. Donald

like

I

al-

remain grateful

Scarlett,

who laid the

foundation of the reputation the law school enjoys.

Other libraries besides those at Yale helped with research. At Wake Forest University, Professor

Thomas M.

Steele

and the staff of the Worrell Professional Cen-

Library that houses the law library deserve thanks for support and unfailing

ter

help in obtaining unusual sources that were so important.
resources of the University's Reynolds and

War College Robert E.

I

Army ROTC

am also grateful for the

Libraries.

At the Naval

Schnare, Director of its Library, and his staff deserve equal

Dean Wood helped me obtain

summers after the
Stockton appointment, which enabled me to continue my studies. The Redwood
Library, Newport, and the Winston-Salem - Forsyth County libraries lent books.

thanks.

a carrel for research

Behind every academic there is a wonderful secretary. Peggy W. Brookshire has
been

my mainstay for so many years

and so many projects that we have given up

counting. Besides voluminous correspondence,

work with me on editing

several

books, public service projects with bar associations, appellate briefs, class assign-

ments, and similar papers, she prepared sheafs of correspondence, fitness reports

and other documents when
drafts

has

it,

I

commanded Naval Reserve

and helped prepare the manuscript
"Bravo Zulu."

College
Lautieri

25
I

As the

She typed many
sea service signal

also express thanks to the secretarial staff at the

who helped with my
is

Naval War

research manuscripts there, particularly Virginia

and Lucy Dunlea.

Truly, no academic

for this book.

units.

an island.
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Part B.

A Note on Sources

US Senator Hiram Johnson said in

1917 that the first casualty of a war is truth.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
28

word is the skin of a living thought, and that a page of history is
29
r
worth a volume of logic. My good friend, the late Myres McDougal, emphasized
These truths
that a writer's observational standpoint must be taken into account.
are important in this book. Recent history is difficult to research and write. Only
after a decade has separated the end of the war have more complete and relatively
balanced accounts begun to appear. Many contemporary reports appear to be misdated, misstated, or sometimes wrong, and this at times applies to government
sources. Another problem is the language and availability of sources. I am not
versed in Farsi or Arabic, and many sources may be only in those languages. Many
critical sources lie hidden in government archives, to be revealed only after several
decades, if at all. Even when fundamental documents, e.g., treaties, will be pub31
The
lished is less than clear, owing to publication lags and national security.
32
same can be said for deducing custom and objections to claims. More has been
written from Iran and Western sources; whether the archives of Iraq and the former USSR will ever be available is less than certain. Even readily available and reliable sources, e.g., the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), appear only after
decades to protect national security, and they are necessarily selective. The same
can be said for the digests; the 1980-88 Digest of the Reagan Administration is only
States, said that a

in its third volume.

The factual account, and the history of foreign and domestic policies, are therefore necessarily less than absolutely complete or accurate.

rhetoric

and

bias but

may not have

always succeeded.

I

have tried

to distill out

My own intellectual bias as

my cultural bias as an American, my prior experiences, e.g., as
may have afa serving line officer in the US Navy and later as a Naval Reservist,
an academic lawyer,

fected the story of the war in Chapter II

Nevertheless,

I

hope

and succeeding chapters of legal analysis.

that this analysis will be helpful.

Part C. Citation Format: Recurring Citations, Abbreviations,

Although

this

volume conforms generally

citations, abbreviations

ences

(e.g.,

LOS

to

and acronyms replace

for law of the sea;

another "bluebook,"
full citations for

States, e.g., the

the United States (US); international organizations,

breviated to

UN);

short form

recurring refer-

LOAC for law of armed conflict);

(CMI, Comite Maritime Internationale);

Acronyms

institutions

United Kingdom (UK) or

e.g.,

the United Nations (ab-

or, occasionally, agencies, e.g., the International

Committee of

the Red Cross (acronymed ICRC). For short form citations listed below, references
to

published sources have been omitted; to conserve space, periods have been

omitted from commonly used citations. For example,

a

"bluebook" citation,
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United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea, Dec.

Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 1833

UNTS

10, 1982, art. 311(1),

U.N.

21 I.L.M. 1261, 1327

3, reprinted in

LOS Convention, art. 31 1(1). A treaty not listed below might be
cited as, e.g., Treaty on Protection of Artistic & Scientific Institutions & Historic
Monuments, Apr. 15, 1935, arts. 1-3, 49 Stat. 3267, 3268-70, 167 LNTS 289, 290
(1982), appears as

Acronyms and abbreviations are parenthetically defined when
first used, unless meaning is obvious. Acronyms and abbreviations in quotations,
or words in quotations that would otherwise be subject to acronyming or abbrevia(Roerich Pact).

tion,

have not been changed, except to include an explanatory parenthetical where

meaning

not obvious.

is

Most treaties not listed below
the article or other material cited, preceded by a note where they

Certain citation formalities have been shortened.
are referenced to
first

appear, rather than repetitive citation

Letters,

do not follow the "from

e.g.,

.

.

of, e.g.,

"UST at

to" rubric,

.

37

.

,"

or

.
.

"UNTS at.

.

..".

"letter" follows the writer or

Government officials' titles have been abbreviated; e.g., the
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations is cited as "US UN
Permanent Representative." Treaty titles omit superfluous articles and substitute
"&" for "and." 38
the writer's

title.

Reference signals, supra,
possible.

39

printed in.
rial

infra

and

Material cited to a reprint source

e.g.,

"n.

II. 2,"

from Chapter
"nn."

is

designated as

as

in" instead of "re-

When cited within the same chapter, notes to previous or future mate-

'

are cited, as, e.g., "n. 2 or Part B". If cited

read,

have been eliminated insofar

hereinafter,

meaning the second note

II will read, e.g.,

The word

from another chapter, a reference will

"Part

"at," interposed

B".

II

in Chapter

II.

Similarly, a Part cited

More than one note

is

abbreviated to

between note numbers and page numbers, has

been deleted except where needed for clarity. Book titles and authors are printed in
large

and small caps. Article titles and like material

jective is to

combine information with

brevity,

Part D. Short

Abbreviation or

ADIZ

AFP

110-31

Form

are printed in

any

style

The ob-

italics.

manual's goal.

Citation

Acronym

Full Citation

Air Defense Identification Zone.

United States Department of the Air Force,
International

Law

—The Conduct of Armed

Conflict and Air Operations:

AFP

110-31

(1976).

AGL

Above ground

AJIL

American Journal of International Law.

level.
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AJIL Supp.

American Journal of International Law,
Supplement.

Alexandrov

Stanimar A. Alexandrov,
Self-Defense Against the Use of
Force in International Law (1996).

AMC

American Maritime Cases.

American Foreign Policy

American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents (year follows abbreviated
citation).

ASIL

Proc.

Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law;
year of annual meeting precedes citations;
publication dates omitted.

AWACS

Airborne Warning and Control System.

Benedict

Benedict on Admiralty
Frank L. Wiswall,

(7

th

ed. rev.,

ed. 1999),

Jr.,

volumes

6-6F.

Bevans

Charles

I.

Bevans, Treaties and Other

International Agreements of the United
States of

America 1776-1949 (13

v.

1968-76).

BFSP
Birnie

British Foreign

& Boyle

&

State Papers.

& Alan E.
International Law and the
Patricia W. Birnie

Boyle,

Environment (1994).

Bothe et al

Michael Bothe et ai, New Rules for
Victims of

Armed Conflict (1982).

Bowett, Self-Defence

D.W. Bowett, Self-Defence in
International Law (1958).

Bowman & Harris

M.J.

Bowman &

Harris,
Multilateral Treaties: Index and
D.J.

Current Status

(1984; 11 th

Cum. Supp.

1995).

Brierly

J.B.

Brierly,

The Law of Nations

(Humphrey Waldock

Brown

ed., 6 th ed. 1963).

Brown, The International Law
OF THE Sea (2 v. 1994). Volume 1 supplies
E.D.

analysis;

volume

2 reprints

documents;

unless otherwise indicated, citation to

Brown

refers to

volume

1.

Introduction

9

Brownlie, International

Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public

Law

International

Brownlie, Use of Force

Ian Brownlie, International Law and
the Use of Force by States (1963).

BSFHV

Bochumer Schriften zur Friedenssicherung
und zum Humanitaren Volkerrecht.

Bulletin

Department of State

BYBIL

British Yearbook of International

Law (4 th ed.

1990).

Bulletin.

Law.

Cable

James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy
1919-1991 (3d ed. 1994).

CENTCOM

US

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations.

Chubin & Tripp

Shahram Chubin & Charles Tripp, Iran
and Iraq at War (1988).

1969 Civil Liability Convention

Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973
UNTS 3, supplemented by Protocol, Nov.

Central

Command.

ILM 617

19, 1976, in 16

Coll & Arend

(1977).

Alberto R. Coll & Anthony C. Arend,
The Falklands War: Lessons for
Strategy, Diplomacy and
International

Law (1988).

John Colombos, The International
Law of the Sea (6 th rev. ed. 1967).

Colombos

C.

COLREGS

Collision Regulations, the short form of
rules of the nautical road

found in

treaties

Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, July 15, 1972, 28 UST
3459, 1050 UNTS 16.
like, e.g.,

Continental Shelf Convention

Convention on the Continental Shelf. Apr.
29, 1958, 15 UST 471, 499 UNTS 311.

Convention on Maritime

Convention on Maritime Neutrality, Feb.

Neutrality

20, 1928, 47 Stat. 1989, 135

Conventional Weapons
Convention

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on Use of Certain Conventional Weapons

Which May Be Deemed
Injurious or to
Oct. 10, 1980,

LNTS

187.

Excessivily

Have Indiscriminate

TIAS

,

1342

Effects,

UNTS

137.
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2

CORDESMAN & WAGNER

2

H. Cordesman & Abraham
Wagner, The Lessons of Modern

Anthony

R.

War (1990).
3

CORDESMAN & WAGNER

3

Cordesman & Abraham
Wagner, The Lessons of Modern

Anthony

R.

H.

War (1990).
Covenant on

Civil

&

Political

Rights

International Covenant

Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,

UNTS
Covenant on Economic, Social

&

Cultural Rights

Civil

&
,

Political

999

1.

International Covenant on Economic,
Social

&

UNTS
CTS

on

TIAS

Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993

3.

Consolidated Treaty Series, publishing
treaties between 1648 and 1920, the start of

LNTS.
Cultural Property Convention

Convention

CYBIL

Canadian Yearbook of International
Law.

DE GUTTRY & RONZITTI

Andrea de Guttry & Natalino
Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War
(1980-1988) and the Law of Naval
Warfare (1993).

Definition of Aggression

Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314,
GAOR, 29 th Sess.,
Doc. A/Res/3314
(1974). Because of a reprint error in the

for Protection of Cultural
Property in Event of Armed Conflict &
Protocol, May 14, 1954, 249 UNTS 215.

UN

UN

Resolution, art.3(d), 69 AJIL 480, 482,
reprint citation is to the draft version in
General Assembly Special Committee on

UN

the Question of Defining Aggression,
Report of the Working Group,
Doc.

UN

A/AC.134/L.46 (1974),

in 13

ILM

710

(1974).

Dekker & Post

Ige F.

Dekker & Harry H.G.

Gulf War of
Digest

Post,

The

1980-88 (1992).

Digest of United States Practice in
International Law; published since the
annual volume for 1973; successor to

WHITEMAN. Year covered precedes citation.
The rule for citing this digest has not been
followed with particularity. 42
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Dinstein

Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and
Self-Defence (2d

Dispatch
1972

Dumping Convention

US Department

ed. 1988).

of State Dispatch.

Convention on Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes & Other
Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26

UNTS

ENMOD Convention

1

UST 2403,

1046

120.

Convention on Prohibition of Military or
of Environmental
Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31

Any Other Hostile Use

UST 333,
Environmental Protection

First

Convention

1108

UNTS

152.

Glen Plant, Environmental
Protection and the Law of War: A
"Fifth" Geneva Convention on the
Protection of the environment in
Time of Armed Conflict (1992).
Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded & Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST
3114, 75

UNTS

31.

Fishery Convention

Convention on Fishing & Conservation of
Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29,
1958, 17 UST 138, 559 UNTS 285.

FON

Freedom of navigation, an acronym used

in

naval operations.

Fourth Convention

Convention Relative
Civilian Persons in

1949, 6

UST

to Protection of

Time

3516, 75

of War, Aug. 12,

UNTS 287.

Fragments Protocol

Protocol on Non-detectable Fragments
(Protocol I), Oct. 10, 1980, TIAS
,
1342 UNTS 168.

Franklin

Carl M. Franklin, The Law of the
Sea: Some Recent Developments (Nav.

War C. Int'l L.
FRG

Stud.,

v. 53,

1961).

Federal Republic of Germany, now part of
Germany; see Walker, Integration and
Disintegration 8-9,
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Friendly Relations Declaration

Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations &

Co-Operation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 25 th Sess.,
Supp. No. 28 , UN Doc. A/8028 (1970), in 9
ILM 1292 (1970).

FRUS

Foreign Relations of the United
STATES (preceded by year number and
volume number bracketed if more than one
was issued

for that year; publication dates

omitted).

1971

Fund Convention

Convention on Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation
Oil Pollution

G.A. Res.

Damage, 1110

UNTS

for

57.

UN General Assembly Resolution, for
UN Document numbers have been

which

generally omitted. Resolutions have been
cross-referenced to reprint sources,

e.g.,

ILM.

GCC

Gulf Cooperation Council, formed in 1981
by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE.

Geneva Gas Protocol

Protocol for Prohibition of Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, &
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June
17, 1925, 94 LNTS 65, with US no-first-use
reservation, Dec. 16, 1974, 26 UST 571-72.

Gilmore & Black

Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black,
Jr., The Law of Admiralty (2d ed. 1975).

Goodrich et al

Leland F. Goodrich et al., Charter of
the United Nations (3d ed. 1969).

Green

L.C. Green,

the Contemporary Law of

Armed Conflict
Grunawalt

Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping
(Nav.War C. Int'l L. Stud., v. 65,
Richard

Hackworth

(1993).

J.

Grunawalt

ed. 1993).

Green H. Hackworth, Digest of
International

Law (7 v.

1940-43).

rule for citing digests has not

with particularity. 43

The

been followed

13

Introduction

1899 Hague

II

Hague Convention (II) with Respect to
Laws and Customs of War on Land, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803.

1899 Hague

III

Hague Convention (III) for Adaptation to
Maritime Warfare of Principles of the
Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864, 32
Stat. 1827.

Hague

II

Hague Convention (II) Respecting
Limitation of Employment of Force
Recovery of Contract Debts, Oct.
36 Stat. 2241.

Hague

III

for

18, 1907,

Hague Convention (III) Relative to
Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2259.

Hague IV

Hague Convention (IV) Respecting Laws
and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2227.

Hague

V

Hague Convention (V) Respecting Rights
and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2310.

Hague VI

Hague Convention (VI) Relating to Status
of Enemy Merchant Ships at Outbreak of
Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, 205

Schindler & Toman
Hague VII

305,

Hague Convention (VII) Relating to
Conversion of Merchant Ships into
War-Ships, Oct.

Schindler
Hague VIII

CTS

791.

18, 1907,

205

CTS

319,

& Toman 797.

Hague Convention

(VIII) Relative to

Laying Automatic Submarine Contact
Mines, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332.

Hague IX

Hague Convention (IX) Concerning
Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of
War, Oct.

Hague

X

18, 1907,

36

Stat.

Hague Convention (X)

for

2351.

Adaptation to

Maritime Warfare of Principles of the
Geneva Convention, 36 Stat. 2371.

Hague XI

Hague Convention (XI)

Relative to Certain

Restrictions with Regard to Exercise of the

Right of Capture in Naval War, Oct. 18
1907, 36 Stat. 2396.
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Hague XIII

Hague Convention

(XIII) Concerning

Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in
Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415.

Hague Air Rules

Commission of Jurists

Consider and
Report Upon the Revision of the Rules of
Warfare, Hague Rules for Air Warfare, Feb.
19,1923, in

Hague Radio Rules

to

Schindler

Commission of Jurists

& Toman 207.

Consider and
Report Upon the Revision of the Rules of
Warfare, Hague Rules for Control of Radio
in

Time

to

of War, Feb. 19, 1923, in

Naval Warfare

LAW OF

367.

&

Harvard Draft Convention on

Harvard Draft Convention on Rights

Agression

Duties of States in Case of Aggression,
1939, 33 AJIL 819 (Supp. 1939).

Harvard Draft Convention on
Naval & Aerial War

Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and
Duties of Neutral States in Naval & Aerial
War, 1939, 33 AJIL 16 (Supp. 1939).
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Chapter

II

THE TANKER WAR,

w

1988 and early 1989, to negotiate a

as of late

ith Iran's willingness,

1

1980-88

on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 598, an initial
conclusion might be that the end of hostilities in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war also
ended US and European security interests in the Persian Gulf. France withdrew
ceasefire

The

the aircraft carrier Clemenceau and other naval units in September 1988.

United States adopted a more wait-and-see attitude but also began to reduce its na-

commitment by stopping convoying while remaining in the Gulf to provide a
"zone defense." Kuwaiti tankers' "deflagging" began in early 1989, and in March
1990 the last US Navy minesweepers were brought home. "[RJeturn of the wooden
ships was in response to a reduced mine threat and will not affect continuing
opval

.

erations

by US naval

aimed

vessels

at

.

maintaining freedom of navigation and the

May

through the Persian Gulf," a press release said in

free flow of oil

.

1990.

Despite these encouraging trends, that war's end did not terminate security interests in the Gulf, particularly for the

United

States,

Western Europe and Japan.

The war was but a warmer chapter in the struggle of national security interests for
control or influence in Southwest Asia

The Gulf area
cent.

and petroleum, that region's vital resource.

has a very large proportion of world

Two years later, the 1990-91

oil reserves,

about 54-60 per-

Gulf War between Iraq and the Coalition again

demonstrated the relationship between

and national security

oil

8

interests.

This Chapter begins with an historical overview, followed by analysis of
great-power involvement, particularly that of the United States, in the Iran-Iraq

war

at policy

and

strategic levels.

This work cannot consider in depth other aspects of the war's impact on other
national security interests

Iraq condemned;
eral relations

e.g.,

a Soviet port

from the Shah's

which Iraq also condemned,

11

the

USSR

incursion into Afghanistan,

arrangement with Syria in 1988; Iran-US

fall

in 1979 through the

1

Gulf.

—

all

12

bilatcrisis,

the rise of Is-

OPEC as an influence; the land war,

with renewed use of poison gas and missile attacks on
the time

embassy hostage

to claims in the Iran-Contra Affair;

lamic fundamentalism, particularly in Iran ;

tional law to the contrary;

which

cities,

despite interna-

or even an apparent shift in Soviet foreign relations at

of which (and more) impacted the war and security interests in the

These additional

factors are recited,

without extended analysis, to confirm

the point that national security interests in one vital area cannot be seen in a

vacuum.
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Part A. Prologue

There have been many actors

17

in the Persian Gulf: France, introduced to the

Middle East in 1916 after the Sykes-Picot agreement, when Syria became a French
o

1

Great Britain, whose influence dates from the early nineteenth cen-

mandate;
tury; Iraq,

independent since 1932

I;

Iran, formerly Persia
20

time as a British mandate and free of Brit-

having been part of the Ottoman Empire before World

ish influence since 1954,

War

after

and more or

less

independent during the

last

two

whose oil companies have had interests there during this century and which assumed the mantle of providing naval security when
British forces withdrew in 1971; and countries that formed the Gulf Cooperation
centuries;

the United States,

Council (GCC) in 1981,
Arabia

21
i.e.,

Bahrain,

22

Kuwait,

23

and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The

Oman,

UAE

is

24

Qatar,

25

Saudi

a federation of the

—Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras-al-Khaimah,
Sharjah, Umm-al-Qawain — and came into existence December
1971, when

former Trucial States

1,

Britain

left

the Gulf.

27

Before World

over some territories that became the

was protector of others,
1.

e.g.,

War

Ottoman Empire was sovereign

GCC States, e.g.,

Saudi Arabia, while Britain
States.

UK Interventions and Reactions.

Britain's strategic interests evolved

later

the

Kuwait and the Trucial

The United Kingdom and France;

tated defense

I

around

and foreign relations policy

oil

to Iraq

and

air routes to India;

it

dic-

and western shore Gulf States,

GCC members, except Saudi Arabia, which with Iran were always outside the

UK orbit. Britain exercised considerable influence over Iran, however. 28 In July
1946, for example, H.M. S. Norfolk

and Wild Goose were ordered to Basra, Iraq, after

USSR-backed Tudeh Party fomented rioting at the UK-owned oil refinery at
Abadan, Iran. In August 1946 UK troops landed in Basra. Although intervention
in Iran was not necessary, the "eventual outcome was satisfactory to British interthe

ests

and entailed a setback

to the

growth of Soviet influence" in

Iran.

29

On June 26,

195 1 several Royal

Navy warships were ordered to Abadan, Iran, to protect British

subjects during a

UK

dispute with Iran over nationalization of an

these ships conducted an evacuation October

3,

1951.

30

oil refinery;

In 1961 Britain landed

Royal Marines and troops, with a naval concentration offshore, to help deter an
Iraqi invasion of

newly independent Kuwait. Arab League troops

later replaced

UK ground forces. Still later Iraq recognized Kuwaiti independence.

For

a cen-

tury and a half, the Gulf had been a "British lake," but times were changing.

France continued to have close

Evidence of the

rise

ties

with Iraq, however.

33

of other forces in the area was demonstrated in 1969

Iranian warships successfully escorted an Iranian

when

merchantman from Khorramshahr

in the Shatt al-Arab to the Gulf, defying Iraqi threats to stop
sel

32

any Iran-flagged

from sailing through Iraq-claimed waters. In 1961 Iran had bowed

ves-

to a similar

The War, 1980-88

threat,

now secured her purposes.

but naval action

threat diminishing to her north, she

began

to focus

As Iran perceived the Soviet
on her security interests in the

Iran began to assert offshore rights to areas where

Gulf.

35

oil reservoirs

were

known to exist and pushed territorial sea claims outward into the Gulf. Eventually
agreements were reached, except in the upper Gulf, where Irani, Iraqi and Kuwaiti
After diplomatic interventions in Lon-

claims remained unresolved until 1975.

don and

Bahrain overwhelmingly rejecting union with Iran, Iran

a plebiscite in

dropped sovereignty claims

to Bahrain.

strip,

Saudi Arabia has asserted

disputed with Qatar. Occasionally these disputes would

into adjacent Gulf waters,

e.g.,

when an Iranian gunboat approached and
Company (ARAMCO) crew on an oil rig

claimed to be on the Iranian side of waters said to be Iran's for
der a Iran-Saudi tentative agreement.

interests

began with

oil

oil

exploitation un-

38

The United States; Preliminary Gambits

US

over

spill

in 1968

detained an Arabian-American Oil

2.

territorial

UAE member, and Dhofar, part of Oman, and the

claims to parts of Abu Dhabi, a

Khufu

37

in the Gulf.

investments in the area, particularly an exclusive

concession in Saudi Arabia, later shared with the Saudis, that became

ARAMCO.

War II US and others' investments gave returns in billions of US dolannually; US Gulf area concessions stood at half the total of arrangements

After World
lars

there.

39

In the 1970s, however, Saudi Arabia nationalized

foreign holdings. Following on

United States built an

airfield at

ARAMCO

and other

World War II cooperative arrangements, the
Dhahran (1945-62) and homeported its minus-

Middle East Force, under US Central Command (CENTCOM) during the
Tanker War, in Bahrain. Britain's 1971 withdrawal, while minimal in terms of
cule

UK security forces and interests, had a profound impact on western Gulf States:
[UK] withdrawal from the Gulf was more

substantial in political terms since

it

necessitated the formulation of an independent political framework for the small

emirates along the Arab

littoral,

but the real impact was

served as judge, arbiter, administrator, and

.

.

.

.

.

.

psychological. Britain had

protector of this littoral for well over a

century. Departure in 1971 was tantamount to removal of the safety net.

.

.

.

[CJurrents of nationalist and modernist sentiments and ideas had begun to circulate
along the shores of the Gulf even before the influx of oil revenues. 42

Some local
support,

rulers did not favor

and perhaps

The United

UK withdrawal,

to fend off neighbors.

States did not rush into

and responding

to a

for the obvious reason of losing

4

power the vacuum. Reeling from Vietnam

USSR-Iraq friendship

treaty,

the

Nixon Administration

developed the Twin Pillars policy of military assistance to Saudi Arabia and Iran
to protect

common

regional security interests as part of the

Nixon Doctrine. The

United States would no longer assume direct responsibility for preserving

36
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worldwide security but would strengthen regional actors
assuring stability. "Benign inaction" characterized

United Kingdom saw the Iraq-USSR treaty
France adhered

view closer

to a

US

policy, 1971-79.

more apparent than

as

to that of the

primary role

to play a

United

real,

48

in

The

although

49

States.

In the northern Gulf, there was no benign inaction. Iran-Iraq relations were

and water boundaries

strained, 1970-75, but in 1975 treaties to confirm land

Thus matters stood until Iran's Shah fell in

seemed to patch up differences.

1979.

Perhaps an omen for the future had occurred in 1971, the day of British withdrawal,

when

Iran occupied Greater

and Lesser Tunb islands belonging

UAE's Ras Al Khaimah principality. That same day, pursuant to treaty,
Abu Musa island, belonging to the UAE's Sharjah principality, was given
for a military base in return for a grant to the Sharjah ruler. Sharjah

share

oil

concession revenues. All three islands

lie at

the

to the

part of
to Iran

and Iran would

mouth of the

Gulf, near

the Strait of Hormuz. Iraq retaliated against Iranian interests, and Libya retaliated
against Britain,

3.

which did not intervene

as in 1961.

The Soviet Union.

The USSR was

seen as "eager to exploit the opportunities created by the

[1980-88] war [when

it

came] and the perception of faltering

US

— a region in which their presence

themselves into the Gulf

52

been limited and marginal.""
tion in the

A

Soviet naval

flotilla

Gulf since March 1968, two months
J

quitting the area.

The USSR and

.

.

interest to insert

[had] traditionally

had been on permanent

after the

.

UK's

notice that

it

sta-

was

Iraq had signed a Treaty of Friendship

&

Co-Operation in April 1972, but Soviet relations with Iraq, 1972-80, have been
characterized as "cordial but far from a patron-client arrangement."

Worldwide Dependence on Persian Gulf Oil and Foreign-Flag Shipping.
This shift in political balances was accompanied by increasing worldwide dependence on Gulf oil and, for the United States at least, relying on lift of oil in ships
flying other nations' flags. At the beginning of the Gulf War Europe imported

4.

(France, 70 percent; Italy, 60 percent; and other States smaller

about half of its

oil

percentages).

While

US

1973-85 Gulf

oil

ciencies, domestic oil production peaked,

United States in

a

import percentages

and by 1985

US

through

effi-

companies saw the

oil

dangerously vulnerable position vis-a-vis

fell

OPEC

oil.

Western

Europe received 20-40 percent, and Japan about 60 percent, of its oil from the
56
Gulf.
By 1987 US dependence on Gulf oil had doubled from 1985, Western Europe's

consumption of Gulf oil was about 33 percent of its

percent, and Turkey's and Japan's nearly 66 percent.

US

total,

Greece's was 50

domestic

oil

production

continued to decline. Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, had tremendous
advantages in

oil

reserves

and surplus production

capacity.

57

Saudi

oil

supplied

half of France's needs, and other European States had large investments in the

The War, 1980-88

When

country.

the war began Iraq supplied considerably

Germany and

France,

Italy

than Iran.

58

Even

end,

at war's

37

more

oil to Britain,

when

oil-dependent

countries had begun to tap other sources, the Gulf supplied a fourth of petroleum

moving

in international

commerce. Thirty percent of Western Europe's, and 65

percent of Japan's,

oil

came from the

pendent on foreign

oil

sources, but only

Gulf.
1

The United

was 50 percent de-

States

8 percent of that or 9 percent of total con-

sumption, came from the Gulf.

By

1986, US-flag foreign trade tankers were almost nonexistent; their role

been taken by other nations'

vessels, particularly those flying flags of convenience

but often beneficially owned by
look was then also poor.

US

business interests.

In 1985

its

The US

Contrasted with the US-flag

growth of flags of convenience, the State-run
rise.

had

steady demise and

fleet's

USSR merchant

tonnage was well ahead of that of the United

foreign trade out-

continued

fleet

States.

With

to

Soviet

and clients counted, the USSR was third in world shipping tonnage (25
million), behind Liberia, Panama and Greece and ahead of the United Kingsatellites

The Suez Canal

dom.

prompted building

closure during the Arab-Israeli wars

which could be operated more cheaply than smaller ones, but
which might have greater economic consequences and effects for the environever larger tankers,

ment, if a ship were damaged or sunk in a grounding or collision, or in a storm.

The

same result would obtain if these huge ships were damaged during armed conflict.
5.

The Environment.

The environment became another important

factor.

The

UN

Environment

Programme, developed after the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Envi-

many regional treaties, among them the Kuwait Regional
Convention and Protocol (1978). By 1981 it was in force for eight Gulf States,
Iran and Iraq among them. The UN LOS Convention, negotiated during the decade before signature in 1982, restated many principles of the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, added new terms and published maritime
environmental standards. The Gulf is particularly environmentally sensitive because of heavy tanker traffic and offshore petroleum production activity. The
ronment,

resulted in

Gulfs currents are slow, there
little

6.

is

only a gradual exchange of water, and therefore

purgation of pollution once

it

happens.

Geography of the Persian Gulf.

The Persian Gulf, known as the Arabian Gulf to Gulf coastal

States, is a shallow

extension of the Indian Ocean between the Arabian Peninsula to the west and Iran
to the east. It

extends northeast 614 miles from the Gulf of

Oman

in the Indian

Ocean, through the Strait of Hormuz to the Shatt al-Arab in the north. Iran borders

it

on the northeastern shore; Iran, Iraq (which has only

and Kuwait are on

its

a 10-mile coastline)

northwest shores, and the island State of Bahrain, Kuwait,

The Tanker War
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UAE border the Gulf on its southwestern shore and

Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the

around Oman's Musandam Peninsula

to the

Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean.

The Gulf is 24 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point in the Strait and about 200
miles across at

its

widest point. Like the Baltic and Black Seas the Gulf is shallow

with an average depth of 130-260

Omani

feet,

with greatest depths of 700

of Hormuz. There

territorial waters in the Strait

is

feet

no deep seabed

Gulf, whether considered from a geographic or law of the sea analysis.

lowest areas, less than 120

displacement,

i.e.,

miles offshore.
tively

nearly

The

all

Strait,

deep (210-270

feet, are

along the

UAE, where
can safely

of today's tankers,

only about 24 miles wide

feet) in its

at its

within
in the

The

shal-

vessels over 5000 tons
sail

no

closer than five

narrowest point,

navigational channels. However, the Strait

is rela-

is

dot-

Qeshen (Iran), Larak (Iran) and
and Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser

ted with islands claimed by littoral countries,

Quoin Islands (Oman) at its narrowest point,
Tunbs, occupied by Iran. Bahrain is an island nation, and there are other offshore islands around the Gulf, e.g., Bubiyan (Kuwait) and Kharg (Iran). Several
Gulf States, e.g., Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have numerous offshore
oil rigs or pumping stations. At the head of the Gulf, the Shatt al-Arab (formed by
confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers) flows through a marshy delta into
the Gulf. There are also shallow estuaries elsewhere along the Gulf, where a pearl
CO

industry flourished for centuries.

The

puted, between Iran and Iraq. Kuwait

Shatt has been a boundary, albeit dis-

lies just

around the corner of the Gulf from

the Shatt marshes and Iran and Iraq. Like the Baltic and Black Seas, there
tively little outflow or inflow

Sea, but a pollution

problem

from or

is rela-

to the Gulf. It is not as stagnant as the

in the Gulf,

Black

whether deliberate, e.g., petroleum dump-

ing during war or a terrorist attack, or accidental,

e.g.,

in collisions or

during war,

can have longterm consequences for the Gulf environment, not to mention

dom
7.

free-

of navigation.

Vital Shipping Chokepoints.

Yet another, and critically enduring, factor is that waters enclosing the Arabian
Peninsula have three of the world's most economically and strategically important
waterways: the Strait of Hormuz, entry for the Gulf; the Suez Canal and Bab El

Mandeb

Red Sea, through which 10 percent of
world commerce flows. Suez and Bab El Mandeb cut transit time dramatically for
merchantmen or naval forces moving between the Mediterranean Sea and the InStrait, entries

dian Ocean;

70

and

exits for the

closing the Canal during the Arab-Israeli wars forced travel around

Africa and promoted building larger petroleum tankers to supply the world.
.

.

.

Gulf

.

.

.

with the Strait of Hormuz, which gives access to

it

"The

from the Gulf of

Oman and the Indian Ocean, might well be described as an international oil highway"

71

or "the West's lifeline," and a collision or terrorist attack in the Strait could

The War, 1980-88

have serious consequences.
73

daily.

The number
Part B.

The

is less

72

More than 80

tankers passed through

39

Hormuz

today.

The Course

precipitating event for

of the

US

War and

Others'

Responses

involvement in the 1980-88 Gulf War was the

USSR invasion of Afghanistan and danger to the Gulf because of a power vacuum
there.
US President Jimmy Carter's January 23, 1980 State of the Union Address
treated the Gulf area as a vital

respond with force

American

if necessary:

he said the United States would

interest;

"Let our position be absolutely

clear:

An attempt

Gulf region will be regarded as an
by any outside force to gain control of the
sault on the vital interests of the United States
and such an assault will be
.

.

.

.

.

,

asre-

75

by any means necessary, including military force." US naval task forces
7ft
were already in the Indian Ocean because of the Hostage Crisis; they remained
there. The Carter Doctrine, as this point in the Address came to be called, propelled

moted a basic rationale for prepositioning ships with stores for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) at Diego Garcia, a British Indian Ocean
77
dependency, and preparing for possible RDJTF deployment.
RDJTF was not
78
then a strong or mobile enough force to make it a serious US policy instrument,
although its "jurisdiction" stretched over 19 countries, from Pakistan to Egypt to
Kenya, an area twice as large as the continental United States with nearly impossible lines of communication

and some of the most inhospitable terrain on Earth.

79

The other, unstated goal was protecting Saudi Arabia. The United States would respond "positively"
region.

Activist Iraqi
Iraq's

to requests for assistance

from "non-belligerent friends" in the

80

Muslim

Shiites, the

dominant

sect in Iran, tried to assassinate

deputy premier in April 1 980. Iraq began rooting out these activists, bombed

an Iranian border town, expelled Iranian residents and Iraqis of Iranian descent,

and called on Iran to vacate Abu Musa, Lesser and Greater Tunb, occupied by Iran
and formerly

UAE territory. Iran began training infiltrators, and Iraq supported
who

tried to

topple the Iranian government. Iraq sought and received backing from

Kuwait

important members of the Shah's government resident in Baghdad,

and Saudi Arabia, fearful of Iranian antimonarchial policy; according to Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia signed secret agreements on September 12 to boost

oil

out-

puts considerably and to contribute sales revenues to Iraq's war effort. (Saudi

Arabia had signed an agreement with Iraq in February 1979, reportedly including

mutual security arrangements.) After border clashes in the summer of 1980, Iran
began shelling Iraqi towns in early September. Iraq demanded territorial cessions,
purportedly part of the 1975 settlement.

81
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1.

1980: Opening Moves; First Efforts at Ending the War.

On

September 22 Iraq invaded

support, including arms bought from

82

Two days later Jordan offered Iraq total
the USSR and Western powers. Jordan also

Iran.

gave Iraq access to the Port of Aqaba and land and

air facilities for

imports and ex-

The war had begun.

ports.

On

September 21 and 24 Iraq declared the 1975 agreement demarcating the

Shatt abrogated,

asserting

it

would exercise

sovereignty over the Shatt.

full

Iraq required Iranian ships using the Shatt to engage Iraqi pilots and fly the Iraqi

ensign

at

tember 22 claiming self-defense,
clared waterways near

its

88

87

When Iraq had invaded Iran on Sepan Iranian Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR) de-

the truck. Iran refused to do this.

war zone, announced new shipping lanes

coast a

after

Hormuz, disclaimed responsibility if vessels did not follow the lanes,
89
refused access to Iraqi ports, thereby closing the Shatt, and warned of retaliation
ships passed

if Gulf States

gave Iraq

90
facilities.

Refusal of access to Iraqi ports was later charac-

terized as a "blockade" of the Iraqi coast.

91

There were

shipping in the Shatt in the early days of the war.
tion into the

92

also sporadic attacks

Whether this

on

resulted in pollu-

Gulf cannot be determined; undoubtedly there was spillage from

bunkers, tankers and damaged

terms of concerns,

if

facilities.

Attacking States' motivation and care, in

any, for the environment

is

not known.

On September 23 the European Community (EC) endorsed an Arab League appeal for a ceasefire

and "emphasize[d] the

vital

importance for the entire interna-

community of freedom of navigation in the Gulf, with which it is imperative
93
not to interfere."' From the beginning of the war until near the end, however, the
EC made no effort to harmonize policy, due to lack of internal cohesion and a clash
94
of cultures.
Several Arab States, Libya and Syria among them, had supported
tional

Iran in the League; Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organization and South

Yemen had boycotted the meeting.

Five days later the

curity Council's Resolution 479 called for ending hostilities.
territorial

valid

Iraq,

UN Se-

denying

ambitions, accepted the Resolution; Iran considered the 1975 treaty

and demanded condemnation of Iraqi aggression.

97

Although the resolution

had not mentioned freedom of navigation, Japan and the United
that principle's primary importance.

98

States stressed

Resolution 479 also supported the

UN Sec-

retary-General's efforts to settle the dispute through mediation or conciliation,

and in November he appointed former Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme as mediator; Palme's efforts

On

October

notice.

On

1

were largely unsuccessful.

99

Iran declared the Shatt closed for

October

5 a

US

all

maritime

NOTMAR announced Iran

craft until further

had warned that

"all

coastal waters [were] battle areas. All transportation of materials to Iraqi ports

[was] prohibited." After passing

designated points.

The

Hormuz, merchant

traffic

should stay south of

Shatt estuary should be avoided, and mariners were cau-

tioned to be alert to unusual, abnormal or hostile actions while in the Gulf.
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Iran's rationale for its

fensive nature.

trusion

.

.

by ships

.

war zone declaration was twofold, "the

Iran was [concerned with] protecting]

.

.

.

.

.

.

[F]oreign ships

to request prior authorization

countr[y] bordering the

[a]

.

.

.

Gulf were,

being of a de-

coastline against in-

likely to present a risk to national security.

wishing to pass through the zone had
ing at a port in

its

first

41

—

Ships

call-

for obvious security

reasons, subject to stricter regulations," being required to contact Iran's naval

headquarters 48 hours in advance. "Iran's second concern was to guarantee the
safety of international shipping

[T]he zone could be dangerous to shipping due

Without going so

to warlike events likely to take place there.

cess to the zone, Iran

.

.

.

shipping lanes outside

recommend

far as

forbidding ac-

foreign ships to avoid the zone

by following

thereby disclaiming responsibility for any damage

it,

which might be incurred on passing through the zone. Thus warned
which persisted

.

.

.

did so at their own risk."

Zone (GMEZ),

lower Gulf.

to the

103

tion."

.

.

.

The United

would remain open.

its

to

ference on the
tion

an Iranian commentator,

war zone to

States

Despite lapses in

its

.

.

.

Hormuz and, on 22

threats to close the Strait,

parent use of others' territorial sea for naval maneuvers,
to the contrary of a

ships

,

.

commitment to keeping the Strait open to navigalater welcomed belligerents' assurances that Hormuz

reaffirmed a

,

.

Iran began shuttling merchant con-

According

"contrary to allegations, Iran never extended

October

.

down her coast, through Iraq's Gulf Maritime Exclu-

voys under naval protection
sion

102

107

there

is

or

its

ap-

clear evidence

commentator's view that Iran's position in the Third UN Con-

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) that produced the 1982 LOS Conven-

"remained

faithful to

monarchical Iran's worldview regarding the navigation

regime of the Gulf, most notably, opposition of a special regime for
international navigation

.

.
.

,

as well as insistence

straits

used for

on prior authorization of war-

ships intending to exercise innocent passage through the territorial sea."

108

On October 7 Iraq declared the Gulf north of 29 degrees 30 minutes North latitude "a prohibited war zone;" this was the Tanker

War arena

until 1984.

109

This

war zone declaration was reportedly reprisal, or retaliation, for the Iranian "block-

By far the most severe blow to the Iraqi economy was Iran's successful clo-

ade."

sure of the Gulf, soon after hostilities began, to Iraqi oil exports.
coast

and Iranian bombing of Iraqi oil terminals forced Iraq to use pipelines to Ku-

waiti, Saudi, Syrian

and Turkish ports

to export oil to finance the war, or to export

or import war-sustaining goods by other means,
result was that

i.e.,

nearby third-State ports. The

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia sold oil and turned over at least part of the

proceeds to Iraq as loans. They also

made cash grants to Iraq.

and Kuwaiti financial aid range from $25

Kirkuk (Iraq)-Tripoli (Lebanon)-Banias
fall,

Estimates of Saudi

billion to $65 billion.

ing sided with Iran early in the war, Syria allowed Iraqi

the

Closing Iraq's

oil

Although hav-

exports through the

(Syria) pipeline until 1982.

114

During

"as reprisal for Kuwaiti assistance to Iraq," Iranian warplanes attacked

The Tanker War
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Kuwaiti border posts and bombed the Um-Aish

oil refineries,

25 miles below the

Iraqi border.

Whether these were arms-length

bargains, or these States acted out of fear of a

than

powerful neighbor, or otherwise,

is less

maintained

although two

strict official silence,

Al Khaimah, which
I

other $1 billion.

o

117

UK

'

UAE

UAE principalities (including Ras

lost islands to Iran in 1971)

end of 1981, Abu Dhabi loaned $500 million
1

Bahrain, Qatar and the

clear.

a year

loaned Iraq $1-3 billion by the

by 1983, and Qatar loaned an-

intelligence discovered Iraqi helicopters

and troops

in

Oman preparing to invade and occupy Abu Musa and the Tunbs; the UK and US
governments successfully pressed Oman to scuttle the Iraqi plan. Later, Saudi
Arabia persuaded Iraq to abandon the plan.
nearly

all

Gulf littoral States supported, or

and military imports. According
base.

at least tilted

to Iran,

bombardment

toward, Iraq. Jordan had

leaned toward Iraq.

of Iraqi Gulf ports early in the war
121

air

for survival of the Iraqi regime, be-

its oil

made

Iraq effec-

exports had dwindled from

Turkey
Nevertheless, perhaps 10 percent of Turkey's exports went

million barrels a day.
122

Although

during the war and another 10 percent to Iraq.

Iraq and

for Iraqi civilian

r

landlocked country. By the end of 1980
1

beginning of the war

Jordan also permitted Iraqi use of an

This support was probably necessary

over 3 million to

to Iran

at the

•

cause Iranian
tively a

Thus,

opening the Port of Aqaba on the Red Sea

solidly supported Iraq,
120

119

may have augmented

the Iraqi

officially neutral,

123

Egypt sold weapons

army with mercenaries and volunteer

to

de-

tachments. Egyptian pilots took part in air raids on Iran.
Officially neutral, the

was

United Kingdom improved relations with

also neutral, but its policies favored Iraq.

tries

125

Iraq.

France

Private contractors in both coun-

signed deals with Iraq, and other States' arms dealers went through Iraq's
1

yf:

customers to supply Iraq arms and spares.

At the beginning of the war the

United States did not have diplomatic relations with either belligerent;
tions with Iran were

oil

bad because of the ongoing Hostage Crisis.

US

rela-

On the other hand,

the USSR had relations with both and was in a less strained position with respect to
Iran, for

which there had been

By the end of the war the USSR had provided $8.8 to 9.2 bil128
military assistance, most of it coming through Aqaba.
The initial Soviet

$1 billion in 1980.
lion in

historic Russian interest. Soviet aid to Iran stood at

127

response to the invasion was strong disapproval, despite the 1972 Iraq-USSR
friendship treaty, and

United

States.

Italy's

under pressure when
then deliver

may have

129

1 1

it

resulted in beginning Iraqi overtures to the

previously solid economic relations with Iraq were put

declared neutrality; Italy's Fincantieri shipyard could not

warships Iraq ordered as part of a $1.1 billion contract. Italian ex-

port licenses granted in 1981 lapsed because of the government's decision to ban
military exports to the belligerents. Iraq then refused to pay on
Italy. Italian

companies and

projects; this kept Italy

from

Italian nationals also
a

high diplomatic

its

$2 billion debt to

worked on Iranian construction

profile. Italian businesses

operated

.
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with both belligerents.

FRG

The

maintained

a

43

more evenhanded approach.

Smaller northern European States not dependent on Gulf oil looked to the United

Nations to resolve the war. Spain and Greece, Gulf oil dependent, got
needed.

The

of it they

all

130

Islamic revolution

better educated

more skilled,
production declined, and foreign ex-

Iran in poor financial condition. As

left

and wealthy people

fled, oil

How-

change reserves dwindled from $14.6 billion in 1979 to $1 billion in 1981.

had military spare parts

ever, Iran

supplied

its

war machine

USSR-made arms to Iran;

for awhile. Syria

rea,

East

USSR,

its

133

stocks

Iran, airlifting

Israel sold Iran

and got others from European sources. North Ko-

eager to

buy

oil,

The

sold Iran military supplies.

may have

linked closely with Iraq,

sold war goods to Iran as
i

well, but Iraqi reverses in 1982

USSR was

caught

with Iraq, an

among

official

these

Some private arms deal-

toward Iraq sold supplies to Iran.

Germany and Cuba,

officially

and Libya supported

Syria provided intelligence.

ers in States officially leaning

arms and spares from

reserves, a legacy of the Shah's rule;

132

prompted promises of Soviet aid

three conflicting foreign policy issues:

-in

The

to Iraq.
its

relationship

amicable stance toward the Iranian revolution, and an inter-

national atmosphere marred by the Afghanistan invasion and tense US-Iran relations after the Hostage Crisis.

the war, however.
late 1980,

and

138

The Soviet Union had declared its neutrality early in

The USSR appeared dissatisfied with Iraqi military action in

flirted

with Iran and

its

friends, inter alia signing a Friendship

Treaty with Syria in October. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did not totally aban-

don Iraq. Iraq, perhaps petulently, rejected arms from the USSR this time. Warsaw
Pact countries

—Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland— increased arms

sales to Iraq.

Early in the war Iran rebuffed a Soviet arms offer. Iran did get satellite information

on impending

Iraqi attacks, however.

139

Iran was determined to be militarily

on the other hand,

self-sufficient as part of the Islamic revolution. Iraq,

creasingly on Gulf State financial subventions,

up

to

relied in-

$18-20 billion by the end of

came to rely on the superpowers diplomatically too.
In November Iranian NOTMARs directed ships entering or leaving Iranian

1981. Iraq also

ports to get coordinates for Gulf travel from

its

navy and to inform the relevant Ira-

nian port of their position hourly. Inbound ships had to give estimated time of arrival at

Bandar Abbas and be

Early in 1981 a
carriers

cleared. If not cleared, they

were

to

anchor there.

NOTMAR directed all very large crude carriers or ultra large crude

(VLCC

or

ULCC), not inbound

for Iranian ports

and intending

to cross

the Iranian restricted zone, to contact Iranian naval headquarters with travel in-

formation 48 hours before departure,

ostensibly for ship safety reasons.

"Although neither Iran nor Iraq declared contraband lists, the fact that both nations attacked neutral crude oil carriers, loaded

regarded

band,

oil

oil as

and

in ballast, indicated both

.

.

contraband. Whether classified as absolute or conditional contra-

and the armaments which

its sale

or barter on international markets

.
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[would] bring, were absolutely indispensable to the war efforts of the

No

erents."

published

prize courts were established until the

its rules,

which did not include

States provided

it

and other western navies

Patrol operations to the lower Gulf,

.

bellig-

end of the war, when Iran

contraband

list.

up

to

Gulf

Logistics sources limited

facilities.

40 miles north of Dubai, and outside war

UK merchantmen steaming to Kuwait were not protected northward.

zones;

guided missile cruiser was ordered

wanted

a naval task force

60 Australian, French,
the

.

UK Armilla Patrol was deployed in the Gulf from the beginning;

The

US

a

.

oil

to the

presence to keep

A

Gulf in October; President Carter

Hormuz open.

By October

1

5 at least

UK and US warships were in the Indian Ocean to protect

route; 29 Soviet vessels were also there.

149

US

overall policy

had these

themes:

(1)

United States neutrality

(2)

American expectation of neutrality and non-interference by other nations;

.

.

particularly the U.S.S.R.
(3)

Defense of United States
(a)

(b)

vital interests including:

Preservation of freedom of navigation to and from the Gulf,

Prevention of the war's expansion in ways that would threaten the

re-

gion's security.
(4)

A desire for the immediate cessation of hostilities and solution of the dispute
by diplomatic means.

These derived from
States

US goals of peace and preventing a wider war.

had imposed economic sanctions on Iran when the Hostage

Some controls were revoked in
force,

and more controls were imposed again

islation to

When

in 1987 because of Iran's actions

The United Kingdom had passed special leg-

permit Orders in Council to limit contracts related

this legislation also

Crisis began.

1981 after the hostages' return, others remained in

against US flag vessels in the Gulf.

and

The United

remained

in effect during the war.

to Iran in early 1980,

152

the war began 70 neutral-flag vessels were trapped in the Shatt. Despite

UN good offices in October 1980, including a plea for a ceasefire to allow them to
leave under a UN
or Red Cross flag,
Iraq refused to allow
citing its "full"
it,

Iran had accepted the proposal.

sovereignty over the Shatt.

mained
2.

in the

waterway

March 1981

ships re-

GCC.

the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) offered the bellig-

erents a peace plan; they rejected

vember, had failed by April.

Between

The

for the rest of the war.

1981: Efforts at Settlement; the Gulf States Organize the
In

'

157
it.

UN

mediation, which had begun in No-

158

May and November

1981 Bahrain, Kuwait,

Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia

and the UAE established the Gulf Cooperation Council under Saudi leadership with
French and

UK

advice, to effect coordination, integration

and interconnection

The War, 1980-88

between member States

45

among them. GCC members moved

to achieve unity

to-

ward economic integration and defense and security coordination between 1981
159
The Council initially stressed economic and social planand the end of the war.
ning, as is evident from its Charter, but security issues eventually emerged as the

The Council "consistently supported Iraq and repeatedly

GCC's primary focus.

called for cease-fire in the war, fully endorsing Security Council resolutions."

Although the

GCC tried to underline its neutrality, Iran may have seen its estab-

lishment as a step against

it

However, one member,

and the Islamic revolution.

UAE, pursued its special relationship with Iran; the GCC secretariat approved it to
maintain open, friendly communication with Iran. Even here there was ambiva1

Abu Musa and

lence because of Iran's occupying

though basically supporting

Kuwait

Iraq,

felt

r-3

the Tunbs.

Similarly, al-

pressure from Iran because of

its

geographic proximity.

GCC was weak, relative to the belligerents, except the Saudi air

Militarily, the

force; the other five States

GCC was

mustered only 100,000 in their armed

never totally unified,

at least early in the war.

forces.

The

For example, Qatar, be-

Khufu strip, withdrew forces from Peninmodest GCC combined exercise. This action,

cause of a Saudi-Qatar dispute over the
sula Shield

I,

the

first relatively

according to an Iranian commentator, reportedly "followed a succession of other

blows to attempts
insula Shields

at

(II,

constructing a

1984;

III,

posed

aimed

a threat to

at

GCC

GCC

all

end

structure. In 1984 its Council decided

territories.

result

on

successful.

For the

Later Pen-

first

time in the

States participated in cooperative mili-

defending their

States, the

defense arrangement."

more

1987), were

Twentieth Century, forces from
tary activities

common

was

Although the war

initially

more unified

military

a stronger,

a rapid intervention force for

peacekeep-

ing operations in the Gulf area; in 1987 the Council approved a comprehensive security strategy,

which may amount

i

to a collective defense pact.

fn

Nevertheless,

most Western analysts concluded during the war's early years that the narrow
military significance of any GCC measures
bers,

even

ture to

if they

acted in

would remain marginal. Council memunison, were seen as lacking manpower and infrastruc-

mount an adequate defense

against a determined aggressor. Although the

GCC States could not stop a Soviet attack, they could increase the political and military costs of aggressive
1

serve as a deterrent.

nty arrangements

summit

in

conflicts

moves by regional

States,

e.g.,

Iran or Iraq, and thereby

CO

to

GCC States also negotiated a web of bilateral internal secu169
combat subversion and terrorism.
The May 1981 GCC

Abu Dhabi

declared that the Gulf should remain free of international

and expressed fear of foreign intervention.

Its

November Riyadah confer-

ence expressed hope that efforts coming from the ICO, non-aligned States, and the

United Nations, would be successful. Thus the GCC came
a

mediator between the belligerents.

to

emphasize the ICO

Thus, early in the war, the GCC's

cance and the emerging regional security framework was seen

as

signifi-
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an information-sharing network for

as

.

.

.

containing]

.

.

.

internal subversion

and

violence; as a wholly indigenous and domestically palatable framework for serious

and routine consultation with a view toward enhancing members' diplomatic
initiatives and deterrent capabilities against external aggression; and as a possible
venue for establishing more realistic, efficient, and compatible industrial plans in an
era of reduced income.

Much would depend on
Also in 1981,

Arabia

to

icy.

Saudi request,

On

USSR

as the

171

US Air Force AWACS aircraft deployed to Saudi

enhance surveillance capabilities.

tion saw the
173

at

events in Iran and Iraq, however.
172

The incoming Reagan Administra-

major threat in the Gulf,

a

purported

US

pol-

Saudi advice, the Administration sent a special emissary to Baghdad in

US

April 1981, and Iraq announced in July that the head of the

would be

shift in

US

treated as a de facto ambassador.

interests section

military presence was to be in-

Navy-Marine Corps task force, Army
creation of the RDJTF, and efforts to get access to Indian

creased, including assets prepositioning a

and Air Force exercises,
175

Ocean

facilities.

A May

27

US

NOTMAR

repeated previous warnings and

Iran's revised shipping guidelines.

May

In

bound

1981 Iran seized a Kuwaiti survey ship and a Danish vessel, Elsa Cat,

for the

UAE

and Kuwait and carrying military equipment

protested Elsa Cat's seizure. Both vessels were

let go.

to Iraq; Iraq

Iran was careful at this time to

avoid provoking neighbors or major Western powers, being dependent on trans-

shipments from the UAE and food imports through the Gulf.

1

77

In October an Ira-

damaged Kuwaiti Umm Aish oil installations. Beginning in 198 1 and
continuing through 1984, Iraq attacked commmercial vessels in the northern
Gulf, usually tankers and cargo ships calling at Bandar Khomeni or Bushire, Iran
178
In March 1982 it was
after being convoyed through Iranian territorial waters.
reported that Iraq had mined the Bandar Khomeni - port of Bandar Mashahr channian

air raid

nel to the
1

mines.

79

open

sea.

An

Iranian tanker had been lost in February, probably to

There are apparently no published reports of oil

and pollution,

spillage

or pollution from other cargoes or bunkers from these or later attacks, except for

the 1983

Nowruz

1

80

attack.

However,

it is

safe to infer that there

therefore pollution of harbors and offshore sea areas; the extent

was

is

spillage

unknown. The

minelayers' motivation and care in conducting these and later attacks

known. In April 1982 Syria had shut off Iraq's
nean; Iraq could
pipeline.

181

now

only export

oil

oil

and

is

also un-

pipeline access to the Mediterra-

through Saudi Arabia and

a

trans-Turkey

In 1984 the Turkish line was expanded; in 1987 a second leg was built.

Oil was also trucked across Jordan to the Port of Aqaba. This network, which

included a spur pipeline to

from 650,000 barrels

a

Yanbu in Saudi Arabia, increased Iraqi export capacity

day in 1982, the low point during the war, to

barrels a day in 1987, or close to prewar output.

1

8?

2.5 million

Iran also realized the danger of
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through Gulf ports and planned

lifting its oil

the Indian Ocean.

3.

In

May

at

Peacemaking; Iraq's Maritime Exclusion Zone.

1982 Iraq tried to invoke the Arab League mutual defense treaty to get

military aid from League

lined

a 1200-kilometer pipeline to Jask in

183

More Efforts

1982:

47

up with

Iraq, Syria

members. Syria warned that if Egypt, a League member,

would go with Iran. The result was a political

standoff.

Algerian attempts to mediate the dispute almost resulted in a breakthrough.

184
185

The Gulf Cooperation Council's emergency meeting in April had declared support
for efforts to

end the war, and its May emergency meeting had adjourned until May

30 to allow efforts, including those of the ICO, to end the war.

When this effort col-

GCC called on Iran to respond positively to Iraq's peace initiatives. For
the first time, the Council identified Iran as the intransigent party. The GCC re-

lapsed, the

peated this

call in

July 1982. This year

ing its security responsibilities

marked the GCC's awakening

more forcefully.

comprehensive cooperation in security
1984, a result of these decisions.

to shoulder-

GCC defense ministers authorized
Peninsula Shield

affairs.

II

was held

in

187

In June 1982 the GCC had offered a peace plan ceasefire, withdrawal to the 1 975
:

borders and negotiations on other issues.

188

In July and October Security Council

Resolutions 514 and 522 called for a ceasefire.

1

89

The

UN

Secretary-General re-

ported Iraq was ready to cooperate in implementing Resolution 514, which also
called for

UN observers to supervise a ceasefire and withdrawal. 190 Iran was not;

the next day (July 13,1 982) Iran launched the first of many offensives into Iraq, the
first real

invasion of its adversary.

191

In September the Arab League urged ending

the war and complying with Council resolutions.
plan, sponsored

by Saudi Arabia; Iran rejected it,

192

193

Iraq subscribed to this peace
•

<*

f

demanding $1 50 billion in in-

Even Saudi Arabia's private offer to pay $50 billion to Iran in indem195
nity was refused.
Israel's invading Lebanon in June also helped blow these
efforts off course. By late 1982 all Gulf States had policies of strict neutrality because of fear of Iran except Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which strongly favored Iraq.
Kuwait was fearful of its northern neighbor as well; Iraq continued to demand a
lease of Kuwait's Bubiyan Island at the Shatt's mouth. Saudi Arabia agreed to pay
demnity.

for five

Super Etendard fighters, sold by France to Iraq, in Saudi

oil

money. Ku-

wait and Saudi Arabia also guaranteed performance of foreign companies' defense

Observers claim Iraq could not have sustained its war effort

contracts with Iraq.

without the French deliveries.

197

The United States authorized sale of 60 helicop1

ters for "agricultural

purposes" and $460 million of credits for American

Q8

rice.

On August 1 2, 1 982 Iraq had announced its GMEZ, advising it would attack any
ship within the zone
nationality,

and that tankers docking at Iran's Kharg Island, regardless of

would be targets. Kharg was Iran's main export terminal.

nouncing the

GMEZ

and "blockade" of Kharg, Iraq stressed that

199

When an-

its

war zones

The Tanker War
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were designed

to

cope with difficulties in distinguishing between vessel nationali-

On

the Gulf.

ties in

August 29 Iran responded, declaring

it

would protect

foreign shipping, began escorting foreign shipping, and deployed ships with surface-to-air missiles at

Kharg. Iran began giving naval protection to shuttle convoys

of Iran-flagged and neutral flag

Gulf ports

GMEZ

its

"ask[ing]

to those farther

down

all

lifting oil

from Iranian northern

shore for world export. Iraq attacked ships in

GMEZ

was modified

where the

was redefined

to

all

ships in

initiative lay

.

its

.

.

zone."

GMEZ.

with Iraq.

201

202

November, Iraq

203

"

In general, however, up to

March

This aspect of the war was the only

The US freedom

of navigation policy

keeping Gulf access open for nonbelligerents.

the United States increased, and in 1982 the United States
list

in

companies and owners of oil tankers that their vessels [would] be sub-

1984, Iraq attacked
theater

its

through September. The

danger upon entering the

ject to

merchantmen

of States supporting international terrorism,

205

Contacts with

removed Iraq from

its

thereby opening a door for

more Iraq-US contacts, e.g., intelligence information and business.
The USSR
by now had receded from its initial disapproval of Iraq's invasion and began to increase supplies to Iraq, to the point where the Soviet Union underwrote most of
Iraq's 1987 defense effort.
vival;

The USSR was

primarily concerned with Iraq's sur-

an Iranian military victory was not considered

best interests.

to

be in the Soviet Union's

207

The November

1982 Bahrain Gulf Cooperation Council summit focused on Ira-

nian complicity in a failed coup in Bahrain, and "More than any other event,

[it]

molded the GCC's view on how to react toward Iran." Although Saudi Arabia
failed to convince GCC members to help Iraq financially, it succeeded in identifying the Iranian Islamic Revolution as a threat to the GCC. After the summit GCC
defense ministers and others conferred to coordinate contingency plans for containing the war,

i.e.,

to prevent spillover into their territories.

These officials asked

Iran to respond to the ICO,

UN and other peace missions; there was no response.

Given these

GCC

rejections, the

decided to officially support Iraq.

208

In January

1983 Iran, Libya and Syria issued a "Damascus Communique," condemning Iraq

and expressing support

Communique

ing the

for Iran.

GCC foreign ministers sent a strong rebuke, say-

did not serve Arab unity and would not help end the war.

The 1983 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit urged

a ceasefire

appealing to

the United Nations to consider a peacekeeping force at the belligerents' borders.

4.

209

1983: Assault on the Environment; The

On March 2,
mense

UN Supports Freedom ofNavigation.

bombed Iran's Nowruz offshore oilfield, causing an imit had bombed Kharg facilities.

1983 Iraq

slick; previously

Efforts to arrange a cease-fire ... to allow anti-pollution activities were unsuccessful,

and the persistent

oil slick in a level

of pollution which

some experts believed would

7
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cause permanent damage to the Gulf ecosystem; ... by early June
plants in Saudi Arabia had to be closed, while
3

June that

it

had [imposed

a

ban] on

all

.

.

.

desalination

Dubai [one of the UAE] announced on

imports of fish from neighbouring Gulf

countries after the discovery that existing stocks had been contaminated by

In

some

areas the oil

was reportedly two

were threatened, since

many

discounted. Strong winds blew

it

oil.

shipping lanes

feet thick. International

vessels use sea water for cooling

fresh water. Early reports that the slick

49

and

distilling into

had equalled the area of Belgium were later

offshore and partially dispersed

it.

Iraq rejected

Iran's request for a partial truce so that oil cappers could try to stop the 2000 to 5000
210
(A merchantman's allision with a well on January 27 had
barrels a day flow.

caused part of the

211
spill.

get the spill capped.

212

)

The United

States

may have been involved in

helping

Ku-

Iran characterized the attack as a clear violation of the

wait Regional Convention organization regulations which "strictly prohibited]
military attacks on oil installations."

"ha[d] no effect in

.

.

.

armed

213

Iraq countered that the conventions

The London-based War

conflict."

Committee raised marine cargo insurance rates
215
of Iraqi attacks on Gulf shipping.

in 1982

and again

Risks Rating

in 1984 because

In October the Security Council called for a ceasefire. Resolution 540 "Con-

demn[ed]

all

violations of international humanitarian law, in particular

Geneva Conventions of 1949 in all their aspects, and call[ed]

for the

.

.

.

the

immediate ces-

sation of all military operations against civilian targets, including city and residential areas[.]"

The Resolution

and commerce in international waters,
on
all
States
to
respect
this
right
and
also call[ed] upon the belligerents to
callfed]
cease immediately all hostilities in the region of the Gulf, including all sea-lanes,
navigable waterways, harbour works, terminals, offshore installations and all ports
with direct or indirect access to the sea, and to respect the integrity of the other
.

.

.

Affirm[ed] the right of free navigation

littoral States.

The Council "Call[ed] upon both parties to refrain from any action that may endanger peace and security as well as marine
to

approve Resolution 540, the

life

in the region of the Gulf."'

USSR made

it

clear that

it

In voting

would firmly oppose

armed intervention in the Gulf for any reason, including freedom of navigation.

21

The Gulf Cooperation Council's fourth summit endorsed the resolution. The GCC
thus went on record, for the
Gulf.

first

time, to support freedom of navigation in the

218

On

US Central Command (CENTCOM) had been established to replace the RDJTF to plan and coordinate US military operations in the
January

1,

1983 the

more effectively. France and Britain continued to maintain a substantial
Indian Ocean naval presence, with ships regularly sent there.
The USSR also
region

continued

its

Indian Ocean presence. President Reagan had reaffirmed and

The Tanker War
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expanded the Carter Doctrine

to include

US

interest in dealing with threats to

Saudi Arabia and readiness to keep the Strait open

US

there.

flow to Iran.
to

Iran tried to stop shipping

Operation Staunch sought to curtail the arms

buildup continued.
721

if

US policy had changed in

following Iraqi

late 1983,

officials' visit

Washington, where they advised the United States that closing the Gulf to

oil

exports had hurt the Iraqi

cost of the

war

economy and

Iraqi

would have to increase the
222
end it.
In December 1983 Iran

that Iraq

to Iran in order to press Iran to

sought to revive the Regional Cooperation for Development Agreement with Pakistan

and Turkey that the Shah had established

received the overture cordially.

5.

1984: Attacks on Tankers

in the 1960s. Pakistan

and Turkey

223

and Other Shipping; Responses.

Perhaps presciently, the United States published this Notice

(NOTAM) and NOTMAR in January

1984:

A. U.S. naval forces operating in international waters within the

Hormuz and

the Gulf of

Oman

terrorist threats. Aircraft at altitudes less

five

.

.

.

Gulf, Strait of

are taking additional defensive precautions against

than 2000

not cleared for approach/departure to or from

approaching closer than

Airmen

to

NM

a

ft

AGL [above ground level]

.

.

.

regional airport are requested to avoid

[nautical miles] to U.S. naval forces. It

NM

is

also

and maintain radio
contact with U.S. naval forces on [designated frequencies]. Aircraft which approach
within five
at altitudes less than 2000 ft AGL whose intentions are unclear to
U.S. naval forces may be held at risk by U.S. defensive measures.
requested that aircraft approaching within five

establish

NM

B. This notice

is

published solely to advise that hazardous operations are being

conducted on an unscheduled

any individual or

State.

basis;

it

does not affect the freedom of navigation of

^24
.

.

.

Iran protested this and later "cordon sanitaires"

and

craft,

US Navy

225

around

US

warships and

iv

ships transiting Iran's territorial sea during the war.

United States rejected the protests, asserting

a right of self-defense.

l

l

air-

The
These

claims were seen as a hardening of positions between Iran and the United States.

The US

official position

was that Iran was refusing

to

end the war, and not

GMEZ,
By now 19 US war-

which had accepted Resolution 540, and that Iraq attacked shipping
while Iran was hitting neutral vessels in international waters.
ships, including a carrier, were in the

velope around
In

its

March 1984

Armilla Patrol.

Gulf area.

228

Iraq,

in

its

Britain decided not to use an en-

229

the United States reportedly tried to persuade

some Gulf States

by letting the United States use their military facilities and to allow
military supplies prepositioning in Bahrain, Oman and the UAE. The United
to avoid a crisis

States

had coordinated contingency plans with Great Britain

and providing

air

for escorting tankers

cover in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

US

plans also

.
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reportedly included blockading

commando

raids

on Iranian

Kharg

mining Iranian Gulf ports and

Island,

However, the United

bases.

mission came to naught.

States insisted that

it

be

must involve Western allies. The

invited into the region and that any arrangement
730

51

Part of the background for the

US initiative may have

been Kuwait's claim that Iran had attacked Bubiyan Island, owned by Kuwait, and
Kuwait's complaint of Iranian hospitality to terrorists who hijacked a Kuwaiti

and escaped

liner

to Iran.

In February 1984 the Iraqi

GMEZ had been extended to 50 miles around Kharg

Island; Iraq warned that ships approaching

sunk.

737

Bandar Khomeni or Bushire would be

Bandar Khomeni approaches had been mined the previous October.

Britain protested a March

Khomeni
The war was

Iraqi attack

1

233

on a convoyed cargo ship, The Charming, in

the Bandar

approaches; Indian and Turkish vessels were also

tacked.

creeping

tacks

air-

231

down

at-

the Gulf. Tankers were hit in Iraqi air at-

on Kharg, and Iraq destroyed Saudi tankers outside its GMEZ. Iran attacked

Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers, including a supertanker, Yanbu Pride, for the first time

and

in April

May

1984.

235

had effectively bottled up
its

Iraqi attacks

were airborne, since the Iran "blockade"

Iraq's relatively

weaker naval

forces.

Iraq had shifted

anti-shipping campaign focus in an effort to attack the weak link in Iran's war

economy and to arouse world interest in the conflict,
states,

237

perhaps to "draw in other

the Western powers in particular, in the hope that they would support Iraq

and help

to

bring about a peaceful settlement."

rupting Iranian

oil exports; its attacks

238

Iraq had

promoted third

protect their nationals' commercial interests.

239

some

success in dis-

State measures designed to

In attacking mostly neutral-flag

tankers sailing independently,
Iraq appears to have devoted

minimal

target before [launching missiles;]

.

.

.

obtaining visual identification of the

effort to

accidents

.

did occur. Iran does not appear to

.

.

have begun attacking commercial shipping until Iraq commenced

campaign

—

Since there was no sea

traffic

its

anti-tanker

with Iraq, Iran attacked neutral merchant

shipping destined to and from neutral ports

presumably ... to persuade Iraq's
financial backers, the other Gulf States, to dissuade Iraq from its campaign against
the Kharg Island tankers. Iran's attacks on merchant shipping were less numerous
and, in general, less costly in lives and property
[being] conducted with rockets
,
.

.

.

,

.

.

.

.

.

instead of missiles.

.

.

.

Iran devoted

Iran did not conduct

more

attacks in declared
were ... in neutral territorial waters. 240
Iraq.

.

.

.

than did

effort to target identification

its

.

.

.

zones[,]

and some

.

.

.

attacks

This expansion of the Tanker War led the United States to grant a Saudi request to

buy Stinger short-range

air

defense missile systems.

with weapons, consistent with

its bilateral

The USSR

supplied Iraq

friendship and cooperation treaty, and

same time Soviet weaponry may have found its way to Iran through North
Korea and the PRC.
Soviet arms sales seemed to follow the fortunes of the battle-

at the

field

and Soviet failure to achieve influence within

Iran.

France was becoming a

.
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heavy supplier

and

to Iraq

which may have found
but mostly to Iran

way to Iraq.
through middlemen

a

arms

Sweden began

their

Thailand and Yugoslavia.
nated by

in 1984 sold $4.5 million in

Saudi Arabia,

to

selling

arms

to

Bahrain

in Austria, Brazil, Ecuador, Singapore,

Among these sales were 40 "pleasure cruisers," as desig-

Swedish manufacturer, to the Iranian coast guard. At the same time the

UN Secretary-General chose a Swedish politician who later became prime minisOlaf Palme, as mediator between the belligerents.

ter,

The Tunis May 9-10 Arab League Summit Conference strongly condemned at248
The Soviet Union was concerned that Iratacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers.
nian attacks on the tankers would result in a major regional war on

US

a possibility of

intervention. Although the

its

borders and

USSR negotiated with Iran in June

1984 concerning Soviet military support of Iraq,

little

changed in Soviet behavior,

which was becoming increasingly pro-Iraq, partly due to Iranian purges of pro-So•

groups in TIran.

viet

249

In April an Iraq-laid

mine had damaged

Saudi tanker, and in

a

ated a retaliatory policy against Arab shipping.

250

On May 2 1

the

May Iran

initi-

GCC States com-

plained to the Security Council about Iranian "acts of aggression on the freedom of

navigation" to and from their ports, asserting that "Such acts of aggression constitute a threat to the stability
for international peace

and security of the area and have serious implications

and

251

security."'

Iran justified the attacks on reaction

against aid to Iraq by States in the region, and "indivisibility of security in the

Gulf."

252

get States

on Iran.
.

.

.

Although

this

argument concededly had no basis

hoped

in law, Iran

.

tar-

253

would pressure Iraq, whom they had been supplying,
to stop attacks
During Council meetings many States addressed freedom of navigation.

Norway

.

.

expressed regret that ships had been attacked in international waters

.

outside the declared war zones, and stated that free and safe navigation should be

Kuwait said that attacks against
two
of aggression committed against

secured for international shipping in the area.

Saudi and Kuwaiti tankers were acts
countries

.

.

.

not parties to the

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

conflict, carried out in violation of

according to which the high seas [were] open to

all

.

.

.

.

.

conventions

countries. This view was shared in

Oman, [UAE] and Saudi Arabia.
denounced those attacks aimed against tankers belonging to States
not parties to the conflict. The importance of
free navigation and free commerce
was further stressed by
Ecuador, [FRG], India, Jordan, Liberia, Morocco,
Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan[.]
Council to take action to
Panama called on the
ensure that the right of free navigation and trade in international waters might be
effectively exercised by all
[T]he Netherlands pointed out the legal aspects of the
attacks on shipping in the Gulf, recognizing that under international law belligerents
may
restrict shipping to and from ports of
belligerents, and that such measures
do of necessity affect the rights of third States under whose flags such shipping is
conducted;
deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against merchant shipping in
any part of the Gulf were to be considered absolutely outside the scope of the
permissible use of armed force. The Soviet Union,
restating that any foreign
general terms by other Gulf States such as Bahrain,

Yemen

also

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.
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Gulf was inadmissible, no matter what the pretext,
freedom of
down in general maritime law and in binding treaty obligations.

armed intervention

in the

.

.

.

asserted that international law demand[ed] strict observance of

navigation, as laid

The other permanent members

of the

.

.

.

.

^

Secretary General also invited the Council to take appropriate

measures to protect navigation in the region and
sea lanes

.

Council reaffirmed in rather general terms

.

the legitimate rights and interests of third States. 2

The Arab League

53

Many

and channels.

their registries, perhaps

ensure safety of international

to

States addressing the Council

had

vessels

under

under flags of convenience (e.g., Liberia, Panama), or were

major carriers, in the Gulf trade. Many had been or would be major naval players in

The

the Tanker War.

.

.

.

upon

Call[ed]

all

resulting Resolution 552 (June

1984)

States to respect, in accordance with international law, the

right of freedom of navigation;

international waters

1,

and

.

.

Reaffirmed] the right of free navigation in

.

sea lanes for shipping en route to

and from

upon

all

State to respect the territorial integrity of the States

.

.

.

ports and

all

installations of the littoral States that are not parties to the hostilities;

.

.

.

Call[ed]

not parties to the

Condemned] the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and
from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia;
Demand[ed] that such attacks should
cease forthwith and that there should be no interference with ships en route to and
hostilities ...;...

.

.

.

from States
not parties to the hostilities;
Decide[ed], in the event of
non-compliance with the present resolution, to meet again to consider effective
measures
commensurate with the gravity of the situation ... to ensure the freedom
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

of navigation in the area

.

.

.

.258

A GCC draft resolution would have named Iran as an aggressor.

ICQ

A week later the

London Economic Summit of major Western powers and Japan
.

.

.

expressed

damage and

[its]

deep concern

at

mounting toll

the

in

human suffering, physcial

bitterness that this conflict has brought;

and

at

the breaches of

international humanitarian law that have occurred.

.

.

.

The hope and

.

.

.

We also considered the implications for world oil supplies

desire ... is that both sides will cease their attacks on each other
and on the shipping of other States. The principle of freedom of navigation must be
respected. We are concerned that the conflict should not spread further and we shall
do what we can to encourage stability in the region.

market has remained relatively
will

stable.

.

.

.

[T]he world

oil

[T]he international system has both the

and the capacity to cope with any foreseeable problems through the continuation

of the prudent and realistic approach

Almost simultaneously Saudi
fighter over the

.

aircraft,

.

.

being applied. 2

with

^

US AWACS help, downed an

Gulf after two warnings; there was

a dispute as to

Iranian

whether it was

in

international or Saudi airspace, but in any event Iran appeared unwilling to
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challenge the Saudis.

Two

weeks

later

Saudi Arabia established an Air Defense

Zone (ADIZ), the Fahd Line, beyond Saudi territorial sea limits.
This allowed Saudi interceptors, guided by US AW ACS and refuelled by US air
Identification

tankers, to engage other aircraft, primarily Irani, threatening shipping.

Arabia also proclaimed a 12-mile safety corridor within the
sea. It

was intended

to

Saudi

GCC States' territorial

provide security for neutral shipping carrying

oil

from Ku-

wait and other supporters of Iraq.

At the same time, however, pragmatists within Iran
breakthrough for Iran came a year

States; a diplomatic

the Saudi foreign minister paid an official State

exchanges between Iran and

attacks

it

tried to resolve differences

1985,

also high-level

through

more than

a year

Kuwait

bilateral negotiations.

The

between the Gulf Arabs and

was an Iraqi war policy. Iraq controlled the timing and intensity of

and weapons, Iran had
countries, Iran

when

There were

visit.

to diplomatic solution

on Iranian shipping and

rying Kuwaiti

May

Oman and the UAE. The one area where diplomatic

Tanker War was not amenable
Iran, because

GCC

later, in

progress eluded Iran was the tanker war. Even here, for

and Saudi Arabia

tried to reassure

oil

to

oil installations;

with fewer operational aircraft

choose when and against

whom to respond. Tankers car-

became

had the

special targets of Iranian attacks because of all the

least friendly relations

GCC

with Kuwait, which was far weaker

militarily than Saudi Arabia.

During the summer of 1984 mines detonated

in the

Gulf of Suez and the

Strait

Mandeb, choke points for the Red Sea to the west of Saudi Arabia, damaging several ships. Although Iran and Libya were accused of laying the mines, Iran
of Bab

el

denied the charges;
exercised

and

its

a half

right

it is

thought that the Libyan cargo ship Ghat

under the Constantinople Convention

laid

them. Egypt

to inspect all shipping,

dozen navies cooperated in locating and destroying the mines. Saudi

Arabia received

US

assistance in sweeping

its

ports of Jidda and Yanbu.

A UN-sponsored ceasefire in the land war supposedly lasted from June
The

1984 to

March

1985.

ters.

Iran proposed that the truce include Gulf shipping as well, and Iraq in-

sisted that
ties.

belligerents agreed to stop attacks

civilian population cen-

any agreement must allow it to repair or replace its Gulf oil export facili-

Kuwait

Impasse resulted.

mine-hunting ships;
parts.

on

a

also negotiated with the

Netherlands to buy

UK order had forbidden export of small boats and boat

268

The UN Secretary-General report mandated by Resolution 552 included States'
concerns over incidents since June 4. The report, later supplemented, expressed
International Transport
escalation of attacks

the war.

Workers Federation (ITF) "deep concern" over "serious

on innocent and neutral merchant ships and

The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) chair and

their crews" in

the President of

the International Shipping Federation (ISF) also declared that merchant shipping
attacks

"had led

to

much

loss of life

and

to the destruction

and damage of many

The War, 1980-88

vessels; they appealed to the Secretary-General

end the

attacks."

The

1985:

War of the

to

continue efforts to

Secretary-General brought these concerns and Resolution

552 to the belligerents' attention.

6.

and the [UN]

55

269

Renewed; The Tanker War Continues;

Cities

Heightened Responses.
In 1985 the truce was broken; the War of the Cities was renewed.

270

In April Eu-

ropean heads of State issued a declaration asking for the war to end and for
belligerents to stop using chemical weapons; at the

ments of European arms began arriving
tacks

in Iraq.

same time, however, large ship-

271

Iraq successfully renewed

on Kharg and Iranian tankers; Iran restarted

tankers with less success.

272

By the end

a

at-

campaign against neutral

of 1985 "the tanker war had [become] the

most important feature of the Iran-Iraq War."

773

In June 1985 Iran had inter-

cepted and detained A l-Mu haraq, a Kuwaiti-flag ship Kuwait

bound but suppos-

edly carrying "5 tonnes of merchandise clearly intended for Iraq." Iraq had been

using Kuwait as an entry port for goods since the beginning of the war.
only in late 1987 and early 1988 that Iran enacted a prize law;
legislation

was

...

was

this ex post facto

and search procedures, looking

visit

(It

and other Kuwait-bound

justification for seizure of Al-Muharaq

In September Iran's

ships.)

275

for strategic

materials for Iraq, were stepped up. Although Iran could not (or chose not to try
277
to)

shipping

had

.

.

.

Hormuz by military action, Iran might succeed in scaring off enough
to make a difference,
since oil sales financed Iraq's war effort, and it

close

to ship

through the Gulf, being denied Mediterranean Sea pipeline access ex-

cept through Turkey.

from Kharg to

279

Iranian crude was

Sirri Island in the

now being

lower Gulf, where

it

ferried in Iranian tankers

was stored in "mother" ships

for transfer to customers' tankers. Iranian tanker shuttles also operated between
280
Kharg and Lavan Island in the lower Gulf.
Iran also established a helicopter

base on

was

also

its

offshore Reshadat oil platform 75 miles from the Qatari coast.

beginning to

feel

Iran

the pinch of seriously depleted stocks of replacement

parts, particularly for its air force.

282

The August 1985 Casablanca Arab League summit supported prior resolutions
favoring Iraq. "It was against this background that Baghdad mounted its effective
283
air strikes against Kharg oil terminal."
Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, South Yemen
and Syria boycotted the meeting;
gic Alliance Treaty.

in

June 1985 Libya and Iran had signed

These moves were seen

Arab world over the war.

284

as evidencing

Turkey continued

US-Iraq trade became three times (at $1
links

between the
785

lished.
Iran.

US embassy

in

growing division

to support Iraq, the

had formally restored diplomatic relations with Iraq

in

November

billion), that of the

a Strate-

in the

United States
1984,

and the

USSR with Iraq. Direct

Baghdad and the United

States

were estab-

France continued as a major supplier for Iraq, although she also supplied

China was

Iran's

major supplier through North Korea, but

it

too supplied
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Iraq,

through Egypt. Iran was becoming more

time Soviet sales to Iraq increased, the
strapped Iran.

At the same

however.

isolated,

USSR reduced oil imports from financially

287

Because of the belligerents' actions, the United States published

NOTMAR

this

Special Warning in September 1985:
1. U.S. Mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution when transiting the
Gulf which are becoming increasingly dangerous due to continued attacks on vessels
outside the military zones declared by Iran and Iraq.
2. In view of recent Iranian visit, search, and in some cases seizure of vessels of
.

third countries within the

.

.

.

Strait of Hormuz,

are advised to exercise extreme caution

conditions, including hostile actions,
3.

.

.

.

Iran

.

shipping in the

.

.

.

and the Gulf of Oman, U.S. mariners
be

to

hazardous

alert to possible

transiting these waters.

has issued guidelines for the navigational safety of merchant

.

.

.

and

when

.

Gulf, the relevant portions of which are

— After transiting

.

.

.

.

.

.

:

Hormuz, merchant ships sailing to non-Iranian ports

should pass 12 miles south of Abu

Musa

Island; 12 miles south of Sirri Island;

south of Cable Bank Light; 12 miles south of Farsi Island; thence west of a line

connecting the points 27-55N, 49-53E, and 29-ION, 49-12E.; thereafter south
of the line 29-ION, as far as 48-40E.

—All Iranian coastal waters are war zones.
— All transportation of cargo
ports
— Iran
bear no responsibility
to Iraqi

.

.

.

.

.

will

.

comply with the above
4.

Deep

5.

.

.

.

.

.

has warned that

and

prohibited.

for

merchant ships

aware of shoal waters south of Farsi Island.

has stated that the area north of 29-30N

.

it

east of a line

failing to

instructions.

draft shipping should be

Iraq

is

will attack all vessels

appearing within

prohibited war zone.

a

is

zone believed

a

to

It

be north

connecting the following points: 29-30N, 48-30E, 29-25N, 49-09E,

28-23N, 49-47E, 28-23N, 51-00E.

.

.

.

warned

Iraq ... has further

that

all

tankers

docking at Kharg Island regardless of nationality are targets for the Iraqi Air Force.
6. In view of continued hostilities between Iran and Iraq and recent acts of
interference or hostility against vessels of their countries, U.S. mariners are advised,
until further notice, to avoid Iranian or Iraqi ports

and

coastal waters

and

to

remain

outside the areas delimited in paragraphs 3 and 5 above.

The NOTMAR added

that the

United States did not recognize the validity

in law

TOO

"While the United

of any foreign rule, regulation or proclamation so published.
States obviously recognized provocations

by both

sides

.

.

.

,

it

.

.

.

regarded Iranian

attacks against neutral shipping as the major problem. [US] policy regarding the

war was

to avoid military involvement, if possible, while providing friendly Gulf
289
States with [means] ... to defend themselves."
For example, while asserting
•

freedom of the seas and

straits transit

work with the GCC and to help
was access

it

to suitable facilities.

passage policies, the United States offered to

militarily if aid

was requested publicly and there

At about the same time GCC-Iran

relations
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appeared to be improving.

291

Individual

GCC

members'

57

policies continued as

and Kuwait aided Iraq with $4 billion in 1984, and
that year Iranian aircraft penetrated the Saudi ADIZ and hit a Kuwait-bound

before, however. Saudi Arabia
late

There was an assassination attempt on the Kuwaiti emir

freighter.

in

May

1985,

292

*•

The United Kingdom announced a $3-4
293
The UAE mostly continued to
billion sale of combat aircraft to Saudi Arabia.
support Iran, with $1 billion in trade between them. The UAE was concerned
about its offshore oil facilities, which pumped two-thirds of its oil. Moreover, 20
said to have been

fomented by

Iran.

percent of its population were Shiites.

294

In October 1985 France began defending French-flag merchantmen.

warship positioned

itself between

the Ville d 'Angers and an Iranian warship, warn-

ing the Iranian that it would use force if the Iranian tried to intercept

French

on neutral merchant ships; the

men-of-war.

result

was

a

drop in attacks near French

295

1986: Boarding of Merchant Ships; Attacks on Shipping

On January
vessel.

Ville d'Angers.

ROE declared that French warships would fire on forces refusing to break

off attacks

7.

A French

296

12,

and Port Facilities.

1986 Iran boarded and searched the President Taylor, a US-flag

The United

acknowledged

States

a belligerent's right to

board and

search but cautioned about overstepping rights and norms, "and even violence, in-

herent in

all

interceptions

and seizures of

297

month the UK justified Iranian
298
The
UK-flagged merchantmen as self-defense.

ship search incidents."

Later that

Netherlands recognized the right of visit and search but only for ships proceeding
to

and from belligerents' ports.

warship off what

US

flag

299

may have been

a

In April 1986 a

US destroyer warned an Iranian

planned boarding oiS.S. President McKinley,

merchantman.

In February 1986 Security Council Resolution 582 called for a ceasefire;
plore[d] the escalation of the conflict, especially territorial incursions, the

it

"De-

bombing

of purely civilian population centres, attacks on neutral shipping or civilian
craft,
flict

a

air-

the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws of armed con-

and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to

That month Iraq extended

Protocol."

Kuwaiti

territorial waters.

301

its

.

.

.

the Geneva Gas

exclusion zone up to an area close to

Also in that month, the United States concluded

agreement with the United Kingdom for use of Diego Garcia as

a naval

support

its

fa-

302
cility.

In May, after

commitment

to

more Iranian

strikes

on shipping, the United States reaffirmed

Saudi self-defense, freedom of navigation, free flow of

open access through Hormuz.

303

That day Iran warned

that

its

attack

US

which

tried to interfere with Iran's interception procedures.

oil,

a

and

naval forces would

warships escorting or convoying cargo ships carrying cargo for Iraq or

NOTMAR advised:

A US May

14
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1.

U.S. naval forces operating in international waters within the

Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian

.

.

.

Gulf, Strait of

Sea north of twenty degrees north are

taking additional defensive precautions against terrorist threats. All surface and

subsurface ships and craft are requested to avoid closing U.S. forces closer than five
nautical miles without previously identifying themselves. U.S. forces especially

when

remain mindful of navigational
considerations of ships and craft in their immediate vicinity. It is requested that radio
contact with U.S. naval forces be maintained on [designated frequencies] when
approaching within five nautical miles of U.S. naval forces. Surface and subsurface
ships and craft that close U.S. naval forces within five nautical miles without making
prior contact and or whose intentions are unclear to such forces may be held at risk by
operating

confined

in

waters,

shall

U.S. defense measures.
2.

These measures

through

.

.

Hormuz

.

and when operating

when

will also apply

or
in

when

U.S. forces are engaged in transit passage

in innocent passage

through foreign

territorial waters

such waters with the approval of the coastal

State.

The Notice was published "solely to advise that measures in self-defense will be exercised by US naval forces
[and] will be implemented in a manner that does not
impede the freedom of navigation of any

vessel or State."

30S

bombed Iran's Sirri oil terminal for the first time;
Hong Kong-owned tanker was badly damaged. By that month

In August Iraq
tered,

five of the

Larak

oil

shuttle tankers operating between

1 1

terminals were

bombed

later that year. In

ships fired on, stopped and searched a

bound with arms

307

UK-regis-

Iraq

Sirri. Iran's

had

hit

Lavan and

September 1986 Iranian war-

USSR merchantman, Pyotr Emtsov, Kuwait
During 1985-86 Iran inspected

ultimately destined for Iraq.

over 1000 vessels.

In October Security Council Resolution 588 called for com-

pliance with Resolution 582.

Bukhosh

Kharg and

a

308

In

off-shore oil installations.

production considerably; a

fall

in

November Iraq bombed the UAE Abu
The 1986 Iraqi attacks reduced Iranian

al-

309

world

oil

prices aggravated Iran's

oil

economic

310

•

straits.

A November

20

US

International

NOTAM

reported Iranian airspace was

closed to US-flag aircraft and that
U.S. Naval Forces in the

.

.

.

Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian

Sea (North of 20 Degrees North) are taking additional defensive precautions against
terrorist threats. Aircraft at altitudes less

than 2000

ft.

AGL which are not cleared for

approach/departure to or from a regional airport are requested to avoid approaching
closer than 5

It is

nm

to U.S.

Naval Forces.

requested that aircraft approaching within 5

nm

of U.S. Naval Forces

and maintain radio contact with U.S. Naval Forces on [certain frequencies].
Aircraft which approach within 5 nm at altitudes less than 2000 ft. AGL whose
intentions are unclear to U.S. Naval Forces may be held at risk by U.S. defensive
establish

measures.

.

.

.^U
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In that

month

shipping.

UK naval presence increased due to increased attacks on neutral

312

Iraq began to default on foreign loans, but

France, Japan and Turkey

By 1986

59

Iraq's pipeline

its

leading creditors

—the FRG,

—rescheduled debts, along with India and Yugoslavia.

through Saudi Arabia was in operation, and another

through Turkey was under construction. Oil sales from these conduits would reas-

The USSR began a massive military support program of $4.9 bil-

sure creditors.

compared with $4 billion for the previous year, for Iraq. However, in
August Saudi Arabia had to abandon its price-war strategy at the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which helped its relations with Iran.
lion for 1986,

The
new

policy toward the war, resolving to ending

tacts

with Iran. Nevertheless

Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership, appeared to begin a
it

by expanding diplomatic con-

USSR arms sales to Iraq continued until the end. 315

By the next year the Soviet Union was in effect underwriting much of the Iraqi de2
fense effort.
Although not known at the time, US arms sales to Iran through Is317
rael in what came to be known as the Iran-Contra affair began about then.
A
Danish-flag vessel, Else-HT, made voyages with these goods on board in May and
June from Eilat, an Israeli port on the Gulf of Aqaba and near Jordan's Port of
318
Aqaba, to Bandar Abbas.
After an Iranian attack on a UK merchantman in Sep1/:

tember, Britain closed Iran's military procurement office in London. Britain was
Iraq's

second largest nonmilitary supplier.

and parts
8.

too.

319

UK

companies helped with tools

320

1987: Escalating

US Involvement; Reflagging and Convoys;

Attack on U.S.S. Stark.
In late January 1987 the
eral call for

ing.

ICO met in Kuwait and heard the UN

Secretary-Gen-

an international panel to determine war guilt. Iran boycotted the meet-

The United States moved six warships, usually based in Bahrain, to the upper

Gulf to provide naval cover for the meeting.

371

About then an

Italian yard deliv-

ered two corvettes and a support ship to Iraq; they sailed for Alexandria, Egypt, en
route to

Umm Qasr, an Iraqi port. Warned of a possible Iranian Silkworm attack,

they returned to

322
Italy.

March 1987 the United States expressed concern over Iran's testing 1100pound warhead, 85 kilometer range, PRC-manufactured Silkworm missiles in the
Gulf. Kuwait became increasingly concerned about Iranian attacks on its tankers
In

and requested Soviet and
was "exactly what

[Iran]

The war had entered

a

US

protection. Internationalization of the

wanted

new

to avoid,
373

phase.

(A

but

.

.

.

that

is

precisely

US congressman

Tanker War

what happened."

also suggested

mining

374.

Iranian ports to force

it

to stop its attacks in the Gulf.)

In April Iran delivered a

note through Algeria concerning the right of transit passage through the Strait of

Hormuz. The US response

rejected an Iranian claim that

LOS

Convention
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60

principles were contractual

and not customary in nature, saying the

represented longstanding customary law.

tion

jected].

.

.

any claim by Iran of a right

to interfere

The United

LOS Conven-

States also "re-

with any vessel's lawful exercise

of the right of transit passage in a strait used for international navigation."

May Kuwait and the United States completed negotiations leading to trans-

In

owned by Kuwaiti

fer of 11 tankers

Oil

shipping company, from the Kuwaiti to

which had

Tanker Co. (KOTC), the Kuwaiti State
the US flag. This preempted the USSR,

to settle for chartering three tankers to

Kuwait; these charters were

The Soviet Union was "deliberately vague on the ques327
protection."
The UK position, stated in Parliament after the

renewed into 1 988.

later

tion of military
first

325

US convoy sailed, was that vessel owners were free to reregister their vessels as

long as national requirements were met, and that with reregistration went an obli328
Three
to defend these vessels.
329
kept its arrangement
The
later reregistered in Britain.

gation for the Royal

KOTC tankers were

Navy

USSR

with Kuwait in

much greater
USSR, both con-

perspective; a rapid Soviet naval buildup in the Gulf might prompt a

US

naval presence and might provoke

trary to Soviet interests.

USSR had

330

GCC concerns about the

In June 1 987 a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister said the

no intention of increasing

its

Although

naval force in the Gulf.

as-

some quarters, most commentators felt US reflagging comported with in332
Iran tried to pursuade Kuwait to stop the reflagging process;
ternational law.
when this failed, Iran declared that Kuwait had practically turned itself into an
sailed in

"

Iraqi province with its resources at the disposition of France, the

United
beef up

States. Iran said
its

it

could not allow Iraq to receive guaranteed

war machine through Kuwaiti tankers flying other

At about

this

USSR and
oil

the

income

to

333
"
flags.

time an Iranian patrol boat fired on and damaged a Soviet mer-

chantman, Ivan Koroteav. In mid-May

a Soviet tanker chartered to

Kuwait, Mar-

mine which the USSR said Iran laid. A second Kuwait-bound
tanker was mined on June 19. Mines were detected in approaches to the channel
leading to Kuwait's Mina Ahmadi terminal.
Mines began appearing throughout the Gulf. Iranian small boats, Revolutionary Guards crewed, laid them just before a preselected vessel arrived in the area.
The Saudi and US navies took a
336
month to clear the channel to Kuwait and its approaches.
A Soviet response to
337
attacks on its merchantmen was to deploy three more minesweepers to the Gulf.

shal Chuykhov, hit a

"

*

"'

~

On May
Stark,

17 two Iraqi fighter-launched Exocet missiles hit the frigate U.S.S.

presumably unintentionally. There were deaths and injuries among its crew

and severe damage
339

tack.)
fuel; this

to the ship.

338

US

claims for the Stark

There is no report of the extent of pollution resulting from

state of alert

between

and revised

US and

its

to

at-

loss of bunker

appears to be true for later attacks on naval vessels in engagements.

United States added three ships

tions

(In 1989 Iraq paid

The

MIDEASTFOR, ordered its forces to a higher

Rules of Engagement (ROE) for possible interac-

Iraqi forces

and anyone

else displaying hostile intent or

The War, 1980-88

committing hostile

UN

acts.

Charter, Article 51,

61

UK ROE continued to reflect Britain's view that the
governed UK responses.
"The rules of engagement

[were] intended to avoid escalation, although the varied nature of potential threat

and the

and the inherent

possibility of surprise attack [were] recognized

self-defence of Royal
tion, is not

Navy

ships or British merchant vessels under their protec-

circumscribed or prejudiced."

ing questions"

if a

British-crewed ships.

UK

The result would have posed "interest-

warship could have defended

One

right of

"practical solution"

UK

merchantmen

or

might have been that attack on

merchant ship "might reasonably [have been] perceived

as

a

an attack on the war-

ship as well. In that situation, the warship [would] be able to defend itself and in

The nature of other na-

doing so defend the merchant vessel accompanying it."
val participants'

ROE have not been published, but undoubtedly they reflected, or

were limited by,

States'

views on the scope of self-defense, national policies, and

defense capabilities.

The US ROE had their complement in a July 1 987 US NOTAM and NOTM AR:
A. In response to the recent attack on

.

.

.

Stark and the continuing terrorist threat

in the region[,] U.S. naval vessels operating within the

Gulf of Oman and the Arabian
defensive precautions.

It is

.

.

.

Gulf, Strait of

Hormuz,

Sea, north of 20 degrees north, are taking additional

requested that aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters)

approaching U.S. naval forces establish and maintain radio contact with U.S. naval
forces

on [designated frequencies]. Unidentified

unclear or

who

aircraft

are approaching U.S. naval vessels

may be

whose intentions

are

requested to identify

themselves and state their intentions as soon as they are detected.

.

.

.

[T]o avoid

inadvertent confrontation, aircraft
including military aircraft may be requested to
remain well clear of U.S. vessels. Failure to respond to requests for identification and
intentions or to warnings and operating in a threatening manner could place the
aircraft at risk by U.S. defensive measures. Illumination of a U.S. naval vessel with a
weapons fire control radar could result in immediate U.S. defensive reaction.
.

.

.

The notice was published "solely to advise that measures in self-defense are being
exercised by US naval forces in this region." The NOTAM/NOTMAR closed:
"[T]hese measures will be implemented in a manner that does not unduly interfere
with the freedom of navigation and overflight[.]

."
.

.

This Notice was revised in

September 1987:
In response to the recent attack on

.

.

.

Stark and the continuing terrorist threat in

the region, U.S. naval vessels operating within the

Oman, and

.

.

.

Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of

the Arabian Sea, north of 20 degrees north, are taking additional

defensive precautions. Aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters) operating in these areas

should maintain

a listening

watch on [certain frequencies]. Unidentified

aircraft,

whose intentions are unclear or who are approaching U.S. naval vessels, will be
contacted on these frequencies and requested to identify themselves and state their
intentions as soon as they are detected.

.

.

.

[T]o avoid inadvertent confrontation,
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aircraft

.

.

may be

including military aircraft

.

respond

vessels. Failure to

requested to remain well clear of U.S.

and intentions, or

to requests for identification

to

warnings, and operating in a threatening manner could place the aircraft

... at risk by
weapons fire
immediate U.S.

U.S. defensive measures. Illumination of a U.S. naval vessel with a

control radar will be viewed with suspicion and could result in

defensive reaction. This notice
self-defense are being exercised

be implemented in

a

manner

navigation and overflight.

U.S. naval forces in the

.

.

.

.

.

is

published solely to advise that measures in

by U.S. naval
that does not

forces in this region.

unduly

The measures will

interfere with the

freedom of

.

Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea

(North of 20 Degrees North) are taking additional defensive precautions against
terrorist threats. Aircraft at altitudes less

approach/departure to or from
closer than

It is

5nm

than 2000

ft

a regional airport are

AGL which are not cleared for

requested to avoid approaching

to U.S. naval forces.

requested that aircraft approaching within

5nm of U.S.

naval forces establish

and maintain radio contact with U.S. naval forces on [designated frequencies].
Aircraft approaching within 5nm at altitudes less than 2000 ft. AGL whose
intentions are unclear to U.S. naval forces
^46
measures.
.

This was
lier.

a

may be

held

by U.S. defensive

at risk

.

much

stronger statement of intentions than the Notice of a year ear-

"In the wake of the Kuwaiti reflagging, it was (perhaps deliberately)

clear as to
for

.

how far the [US]

protective umbrella was to extend." Promises of escort

US- flagged ships would "depend

shipping in certain cases.

348

...

The US

on the situation"

reaction

Swedish-built "pleasure boats."

Guards

partly due to

to attack

US

media

ships in fast

349

US Navy began convoying

reflagged tankers.

United States "had found intermittent convoys an
action. Indeed, Iran refrained

as well as for foreign flag

may have been

reports of Iran's training 20,000 Revolutionary

In July the

un-

left

350

Previously the

effective deterrent to Iranian

from harassing ships carrying other flags when they

sailed in the vicinity of US warships."

Only a small percentage of tankers plying
the Gulf were convoyed, however.
Reflagged tankers carried no contraband to
or oil from Iraq.
On July 24 the reflagged Bridgeton and on August 10 the Texaco
Caribbean, under charter to a US company, hit mines; the Navy began providing
352

"'

mine protection.
Kuwait, the Navy
the return

volunteers

trip.

(Although

US Navy destroyer types had escorted Bridgeton to

outfitted Kuwaiti

commercial tugs with minesweeping gear

When civilian tug crews refused to undertake minesweeping, Navy

manned the tugs for the return.

355

"[T]he [Bridgeton] incident opened a

chapter of direct US-Iran naval confrontation in the Gulf."
deliberate Iranian decision or Iranian Revolutionary

appearing
of

all

for

356

Guard

Whether a result of

fervor,

mines began

over the Gulf and outside the Gulf, in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf

Oman, and

in

Kuwaiti and Omani

territorial waters.

French and

UK

naval
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operations expanded to meet the threat in the latter areas.

357

63

In late August U.SS.

Guadalcanal rescued an Iraqi fighter pilot downed by an Iranian air-to-air missile
in international waters.

He was repatriated through Saudi Red Crescent Society of358

no record of Iranian consent or protest.
The UK Armilla Patrol began "accompanying" but not escorting or convoying

ficials.

There

is

UK merchantmen; one result was that foreign vessels were attracted to UK regiswhere there were new mine

try to gain protection, at least in the lower Gulf,
threats. British vessels

posed arming.

were not armed against attacks;

opposed

Italy

it

as a

UK

matter of policy too.

seafarer unions op-

After Iranian forces

attacked a French flag cargo ship, Ville d'Anvers, France broke off diplomatic relations.

However, even with reinforced naval presence, it could not organize convoy

US model and relied on a policy of accompanying French flag
ships.
The USSR sent a Krivak class frigate to escort four Soviet ships carrying
arms from the Strait of Hormuz to Kuwait for ultimate destination in Iraq, a signal
36?
Some merchantto belligerents that the USSR would protect Soviet-flag ships.
men began to carry chaff canisters to confuse incoming missiles; others were re-

protection on the

painted dull, non-reflective gray for the same reason. Although most merchant
ships remained unarmed, a
a

Greek

US helicopter reported coming under missile fire from

ship. Iran reportedly

ports said Iran's air force

completed testing

had established

chant shipping like the World
three days of naval

War

II

its

Silkworm

a suicide plane

missiles. Press re-

squadron

Japanese kamikazi

to attack

mer-

Iran began

flights.

maneuvers in the Gulf, dubbed Exercise Martyrdom, which in-

ramming a speedboat loaded with exploSome Iranian naval maneuvers were in Saudi

volved firing a shore-to-ship missile and
sives into a

dummy naval target.
365

territorial waters.

for visit

and

Besides traditional boardings, Iran began using helicopters

366

search.

crowded the arena

The Gulf was becoming a more dangerous place as actors
and employed new techniques for old methods and new

technologies.

Two US

warships' Sparrow missiles shot at a radar target suspected of hostile

intent missed,

and warning shots were fired across two dhows' bows

The US Navy, claiming a
Iran Ajr caught laying
lost at sea,

right of self-defense, captured the Iranian landing ship

mines in September.

and the United

Red Crescent auspices

368

Three Iranian crew

crewmen

States repatriated 26

to Iran

five days later. Shortly thereafter they

whether Iraq consented or objected to these arrangements.
self-defense could only be claimed in response to an

aggression.

It also

died, two

were

through Omani

were turned over

Iranian officials, along with the remains of the three who had died.

370

367

in August.

It is

not

known

369

Iran asserted that

armed attack and that this was

promised revenge and gave an "explicit warning" that

would soon be engaged on another

371

front.

halted Iranian minelaying for six months."
helicopters, small boats

However, the

37?

to

US

it

attack "effectively

But by mid- 1987 Iranian

aircraft,

and warships had attacked over 100 ships of 30 nationalities.
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owned

Iraq had attacked over 200 vessels, mostly Iranian

May

1987 the

trolled the
374
ships.

or chartered.

373

In late

USSR had sent three minesweepers to join two frigates that had pa-

Gulf since 1986;

this

was in response

to Iranian

mining of Soviet-flag

The June 1987 Venice Economic Summit had "agree[d] that new and concerted

War

international efforts [were] urgently required to bring the Iran-Iraq

to

an

end." Besides calling upon the belligerents to end the war and supporting the

United Nations, the Summit "reafflrm[ed] that the principle of freedom of navigation in the Gulf is of paramount importance for us
held.

The

free flow of oil

and other

unimpeded." The Summit pledged
goals effectively.

375

traffic

bombing of purely

UN

for others

through the

on ways

to consult

In July unanimous

and

Strait

.

.

and must be up.

must continue

pursue these important

to

Security Council Resolution 598

on neutral
shipping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and
other laws of armed conflict, and
use of chemical weapons contrary to
the 1925
Demand[ed that belligerents]
observe an immediate
Geneva Gas Protocol,
cease-fire [and] Call[ed] upon all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to
refrain from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict
Deplor[ed]

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

civilian population centres, attacks

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

The Resolution also declared for the first time during the war that there had been a
breach of the peace and that the Council was acting under the UN Charter, Articles
39-40.

376

On September 3 the 12-mem-

Iraq accepted Resolution 598 on July 23.

ber European

Community supported Resolution

598, "strongly

cent attacks on merchant ships in the Gulf and reiterating]

fundamental principle of freedom of navigation, which
tance to the whole international community."

On

August

3 Iran

had announced

it

is

.

.

.

condemning]

re-

firm support for the

of the utmost impor-

378

planned naval maneuvers in

its territorial

waters in the Gulf and in the Gulf of Oman, warning all vessels, commercial or military, against
rial

approaching these waters. Iraq protested, noting that Iranian

territo-

waters included part of the Strait of Hormuz and waters between the Tunb and

Forur islands, claiming that under the 1982

LOS

Convention, Article 38(1),
380

and the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article

16(4),

pend passage through international

that the International

straits,

and

that Iran could not sus-

Organization (IMO) had declared shipping lanes passing close to
Forur.

By

379

Maritime

Tunb and

381

the end of July

US Navy

escorts

had been receiving informal cooperation

from France and Britain and support and assistance from Saudi Arabia and other

GCC States. 382 In July and August France ordered its aircraft carrier Clemenceau to
the Gulf; France's prime minister declaring,

"We

have no aggressive intentions,

but we want to be respected and we will be respected."

383

In August, Britain

384

and
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France agreed to send minesweepers to the Gulf, and by September Italian,

65

Bel-

gian and Netherlands ships, the latter to operate jointly with Armilla Patrol pro-

were on the way. Saudi Arabia committed

tection,

clearance operations.

387

its

four minesweepers to

On August 20, the Western European Union (WEU)

de-

clared Europe's vital interests required that freedom of navigation in the Gulf be
QOO

assured at

all

The

times.

capacity of

WEU members to consult on this policy

"was all the more important[,] given a previous record of disunity."

389

By now Iran

had lost the international diplomatic leverage it had been cultivating for the previ390

ous three years.

On October 8, Iranian speedboats fired on US helicopters; in accordance with
US self-defense principles and ROE, the helicopters returned fire, sinking one
boat and damaging others. Iran claimed the US helicopters fired first and vowed a
391
"crushing response." Some argued it was a "carefully calculated reprisal."
US
Navy personnel rescued six Iranian Revolutionary Guards boat crew members; two
died aboard U.S.S. Raleigh. Survivors and remains were returned to Iran through

Omani Red Crescent auspices.
to repatriation.

responded
territorial

Rostum

to

392

Later that

not

known whether Iraq consented or objected

month

the United States, claiming self-defense,

It is

an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Silkworm attack in Kuwaiti

waters on a

US

flag tanker,

Sea

Isle City,

by destroying the Iranian

offshore oil platform in the southern Gulf. Sea Isle City's master, a

national,

was blinded

was not under

in the attack.

US Navy convoy;

territorial waters.

Rostum was

a

When

the attack on Sea

Isle City

US

occurred,

convoying ceased when vessels reached Kuwaiti

Guards gunboat communications base and was

not directly involved in the Silkworm strike. Those
evacuate before the attack began.

manning it were given time to

Rostum apparently was not engaged

in oil

production; therefore, the attack did not create a threat to the environment.

The US

strike

was stated

to

it

be in specific response

to the

Sea

393

Isle City attack;

connection with an Iranian attack on the Sungari, which had occurred a day before

Sea

Isle City

was

hit,

was avoided. Although Sungari was beneficially

was Liberian flagged.

394
'

US owned, it

Iran claimed the platform attacks were aggression and

armed attack.

39S

(US import
controls on Iranian goods were said to be a reason for the attacks.
There is some
evidence Iran was aiming at oil tankers in the Kuwaiti port of Al-Hamadi, where
Kuwaiti and Saudi oil donated to Iraq was being lifted to pay for ammunition
that self-defense could only be asserted in response to

396

shipped to Iraq through the Port of Aqaba.)

Silkworm
this

attack,

397

US

response for the Sea

Isle City

and not for the Sungari attack, established some precedent that at

time the United States did not consider open registry ships, even

if owned

by

US interests, to have enough connection to merit protection. This view changed as
the war deepened, at least where US nationals were in the crew.
There were no
more confrontations with the United States for the next six months as a result of
the US response on Rostum.
Iranian Guards speedboats continued to harass

.
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unprotected shipping;
attack, Iran hit the

that this action

US

three days after the

response to the Sea

Kuwaiti deep-water Sea Island Terminal.

was intended

as retaliation for the

Rostum

Iran

Isle

City

made it clear

attack.

This exchange of blows was notable because of Iran's care not to attack the US
[T]he most Iran did was to probe the extent
directly but to target its regional allies

—

and scope of the

US commitment ...
when

over-reach itself

it

to find the

weak

was caught red-handed

links, the grey areas.

Yet

it

did

in minelaying, thus unwittingly

providing ammunition to those who argued that it was Iran that constituted a menace

freedom of navigation.

found the impulse to defy the United States,
whatever the consequences, irresistible, providing the [Iranian Islamic] revolution
with the high drama that it so cherished, even at the risk of diverting from the
Iranian leaders were confident that the US
principal] issue the land war.
to the

.

—

presence could not

[I]t

.

.

.

.

last forever, that

the distraction of other issues

.

.

.

.

sooner or later the expense of the enterprise and

would

see a withdrawal of the

US

fleet.403

Future events would prove this assessment to be incorrect. By the end of 1987

Western naval presence in the Gulf appeared more durable than might earlier have
been expected. However, for the time being Iran continued
ing

off,

weakening US credibility with

Gulf allies, exasperating its

its

drawing the United States from impartiality

.

.

.

procrastination in accepting

.

.

the Resolution and implement

community

it in toto.

.

."

at [Iran's] intransigence,

The Summit "condemned

.Resolution 598

and

Summit "expressed anxiety at the

indignation

cations and threats to the Arab Gulf States."

military,

messy partisanship.

to

In November, an Arab League Extraordinary

continuation of the war and voiced

to see its strategy pay-

.

.

.

provo-

Iran's

.

.

and] called on Iran to accept

[,

The Summit asked

the international

to "shoulder its responsibilities, exert effective international efforts

and adopt measures adequate

to

make

[Iran]

respond

to the calls for peace." Iraq's

accepting Resolution 598 and positive response to peace initiatives was appreciated. It

confirmed support for Iran's defending its territory and "legitimate rights"

but declared solidarity with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as to Iranian threats, aggression and violations of holy places.

three tankers carrying Saudi
refrain

from hitting

days later Iranian speedboats shot up

but Syrian pressure succeeded in getting Iran to

targets in Kuwait.

tions to discuss a peace plan.

1988.

oil,

A few

However,

Iran's president visited the

United Na-

UN diplomatic activity was to stop by early

Nevertheless, the Secretary-General continued to press Iran to accept the

UN proposal.

It

was only in October 1987 that Iran and Iraq formally broke off

diplomatic relations,

During that month

a further sign of polarization.
a

US

warship fired on a

UAE fishing vessel, resulting in a

death and three injured crew; the United States said

it

fired in self-defense but ex-

pressed regret over the incident, which had occurred between the

UAE coast and

Abu Musa, from which Iranian speedboats carried out Gulf shipping raids.

The

United States was particularly concerned about small boats; Iran had been
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conducting naval maneuvers in

its

67

exclusion zone and territorial waters, including

simulated speedboat attacks on suicide runs.

In

December a US warship helped

rescue a Cypriot crew after an Iranian gunboat attack set their tanker ablaze.

Tanker masters began

tailing

convoys or simulating them during night steam-

During that month H.M.S.

ing.

Scylla

and York protected merchant ships from

Iranian speedboat attacks.

On December
early

and

full

11,

NATO Council "Ministers underlined the importance of an

implementation of [Resolution] 598. They also recalled the impor-

tance of freedom and security of navigation in the Gulf.
ate follow-up action ... to resolve these problems."

They call[ed] for appropriLate in December a GCC

conference confined itself to expressing "deep regret at 'the destructive war'

urging the

.

.

.

and

UN Security Council to implement. Resolution 598 as soon as possible."

Omani and UAE opposition, caused by the geography that
compelled Oman and Iran to patrol Hormuz jointly, and the UAE's financial affiliation with Iran. The growing risk to neutral shipping increased trade through the
UAE, where goods would be shipped overland. Sentiment against an arms emPart of this was due to

bargo directed toward Iran was the same in the

GCC

and the Security Council.

December GCC Summit approved a comprehensive security
strategy that may have amounted to a collective self-defense pact.
However,
some governments, notably China, France, the FRG and the USSR, were persuaded that Iran's not rejecting Resolution 598 meant Iran might be genuinely interested in a negotiated settlement to end the war. Permanent Security Council
members (China, France, USSR) would veto any US-sponsored resolution to imNevertheless, the

pose sanctions.

Iran claimed naval presences from States outside the Gulf vio-

lated Resolution 598, Article

Meanwhile, the

417
5.

USSR and the United States continued to support Iraq, the So-

Union through military supplies, the United States by $961 million in agricul41 R
tural commodity credits in 1987.
The USSR and its Eastern European satellites
continued to send negligible amounts of military equipment to Iran, but there was
419
no question about the USSR's priorities.

viet

9.

End Game: Intensity of Responses; Collapse and Ceasefire.
A January 2, 1988 US NOTMAR reflected the intensity of the situation:

1988:

1.

U.S. mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution

when

transiting the

.

.

.

and the Gulf of Oman, due to hostilities between Iran and
Iraq. Mariners are further advised to avoid Iranian or Iraqi ports and coastal waters
and to remain outside the areas delimited in paragraphs 2 and 3 below until further

Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz,

notice.
2.

Iran has stated:
A. Iranian coastal waters are war zones.
B. Transportation of cargo to Iraqi ports

is

prohibited.

.

68

The Tanker War

C. Guidelines for the navigational safety of merchant shipping in the
Hormuz, merchant ships sailing to non-Iranian
Gulf are
after transiting
ports should pass 12 miles south of Abu Musa Island; 12 miles south of Sim
Island; south of Cable Bank Light; 12 miles south of Farsi Island; thence west
of a line connecting the points 27-55N. 49-53E. and 29-10N. 49-12E.;
.

.

.

.

.

:

.

.

.

.

thereafter south of the line 29-10N. as far as 48-10E.

D

Iran disclaims any responsibility for merchant ships failing to comply

with the above instructions.
E. Iranian naval forces patrol the

the Strait of

Gulf of Oman up

to

400 kilometers from

Hormuz.

Iraq has stated:

3.

A.

The

B.

It

area north of 29-30N.

is a

prohibited war zone.

will attack all vessels appearing within a

east of a line

zone believed

to

be north and

connecting the following points: 29-30N. 48-30E., 29-25N.

49-09E., 28-23N. 49-47E., 28-23N. 51-00E.
C. All tankers

docking

at

Kharg Island

regardless of nationality are targets

for the Iraqi Air Force.

damage from moored or

mines in the
Gulf. U.S. mariners should exercise caution in navigable waters throughout the Gulf
region and particularly in the following areas where moored mines have been
4.

Several vessels have suffered

floating

.

.

encountered:
A.

and

its

B.
5.

The Mina Al Ahmadi/Mina Ash Shu'aybah Channel

(28-56N. 48-53E.)

approaches.

The shipping channels south and west

of Farsi Island.

Mariners should be aware that Iranian naval forces

visit,

search and in

some

cases seize or divert to Iranian ports vessels of non-belligerents in the Persian

Gulf/Gulf of Oman region.

The United States took no position on the zones' legal validity.
belligerents

had attacked 178 merchantmen.

At the end of January 1988 Iran promulgated
clared the following to be

(a) All

war

a prize law, article 3 of which de-

prizes:

goods, merchandise, means of transport and equipment belonging to

war with
Iran.
Merchandise and means of transport

State or to States at
(b)

During 1987 the

.

.

a

.

.

.

.

belonging

to neutral States or their

nationals, or to nationals of the belligerent State if they could effectively contribute to

increasing the combat power of the
via intermediaries,
(c)

is

a State at

enemy or their final destination, either directly or

war with

.

.

.

Iran.

Vessels flying the flag of a neutral State as well as vehicles belonging to a

neutral State transporting the goods set out in this article.
(d)

Merchandise, means of transport and equipment which

being transported to enemy

.

.

.

Iran forbids from

territory."* 22

The Law provided that property listed in Article 3(a), i.e., property of a State at war
with Iran, would become the property of Iran; Article 3(b) and 3(c) property, i.e., of
neutrals

would be confiscated and adjudicated. Article

3(d)

means of transport

The War, 1980-88

would "become the property
stances.

Any person

of.

.

.

contesting this

69

Iran or be confiscated according to circum-

must appear before the

[prize] Tribunal."

The
on tankers resumed February 10, 1988, after a month's lull.
War of the Cities began again on February 28, 1988; Iran shelled Basra after Iraq
bombed an oil refinery near Tehran. Iraq hit Halabja, an Iraqi town captured by
Iraqi attacks

Iran, with chemical

weapons

buying 1600-mile CSS-2

in

March. Later that month Saudi Arabia confirmed

ballistic missiles

from the PRC.

On March

30 Iranian

gunboats fired on a Kuwaiti military base on Bubiyan Island.
In early 1988 the United States noted willingness to consider a
force, if a collective action

not support a

concept was spelled out clearly; the United States would

UN force replacing US and US-aligned forces.

The United KingThe Sobut Italy and the USSR supported the idea.

dom was unenthusiastic,
viet

UN Gulf naval

Union wanted

to replace the large

Western naval presence with

a

UN

428
flotilla

During this time there were clashes involving US naval forces, several with Iran
429
and one with Iraq.
On April 14 U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts, a frigate likeStark, hit a

mine

in a field Iran laid in shipping lanes in international waters 70 miles east of

Bahrain.

In response, on April 18, the United States engaged Iranian warships

and neutralized two Iranian

oil

platforms that had conducted or supported attacks

on neutral shipping. Occupants of the two oil platforms (Sassam and Sirri, both

lo-

cated in the lower Gulf) were first given the opportunity to evacuate. Sirri had been

responsible for about eight percent of Iran's oil exports. Iran saw the

(which represented an escalation in

US

US

response

military action) as siding with Iraq, per-

haps because Iraq reconquered al-Faw near Basra the day of the Sassan/Sirri attack.
Several Iranian naval units, including two frigates, were destroyed or

damaged

This engagement, dubbed Operation Praying Mantis,

during that operation.

was the largest combined air and surface engagement in war-at-sea for the US Navy
since

World War

II.

United States rejected the protest.
an

oil rig in

the

The

Iran protested the platform attacks as aggression.

A few days later Iranian speedboats attacked

UAE Mubarak oil field, operated by US interests, 30 miles north

of Sharjah, and a tanker and freighter that were nearby. While thus engaged the
boats were hit

by

US

air strikes.

Shipping and

for

temporarily halted.

Some commentators

in the southern

trace the turning point in the

war

to

when Iran lost the Fao peninsula to Iraq and their warships to the US

April 17-18,

Navy.

commerce

UK- and French-accompanied convoys were

Gulf virtually stopped

two days.

oil

436

By now

five

NATO

nations besides the United States

France, Italy, the Netherlands

—had sent over 25 warships

and mine suppression duty. The FRG, constitutionally
forces there,

augmented

its

Mediterranean Sea

— Belgium,

to the

Britain,

Gulf for escort

restricted

from sending

NATO presence with

four ships.

Norway sent a minesweep to NATO Channel Command; Luxembourg, which has
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no navy, backed the Belgian-Dutch commitment financially. Australia and Japan,
the latter also constitutionally limited, installed precise navigation transmitters in

the Gulf and dispatched diver and

mine

disposal teams.

The Netherlands Navy

collaborated very closely with the Royal Navy. Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands

probably would not have deployed forces except for

French

mand

forces, reflecting France's

438

com-

WEU framework. 439 Italy followed the same pol"

London

to discuss the

Even the USSR and US navies occasionally cooperated

evolving threat.

in find-

At about the same time Hans Dietrich

ing and destroying Iranian mines.

Genscher, the

NATO

'

but cooperated with other navies,

WEU naval experts convened regular meetings in

icy.

political cover.

longterm withdrawal from the

structure, operated independently

agreeing to consult within the

WEU's

FRG foreign minister, was emerging as representing Iranian interA A

ests in efforts to

end

hostilities

T

through mediation.

However, "the unprece-

dented international concern and focus on the war in the United Nations and in
the Gulfs waters, with the extraordinary and unprecedented participation of

many European NATO States in an 'out of area' operation, ushered in a new phase"
The multinational maritime naval operation was not, however, unof the war.
C
der the command of any State or States.
A A

After Iranian gunboats attacked a Saudi-owned tanker off Dubai on April 24,

on April 29 the United

States

announced

it

would begin

assisting "friendly, inno-

cent neutral vessels flying a nonbelligerent flag outside declared war exclusion

zones that are not carrying contraband or resisting legitimate
.

.

.

visit

and search by a

Following a request from the vessel under attack, assistance

Gulf belligerent

US warship or aircraft if this unit [was] in the vicinity and
its mission permitted] rendering such assistance."
This incremental US escalation, partly in response to requests from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and US oil ship[would] be rendered by a

pers navigating under foreign nags,

was

than Britain had announced in February,
tecting foreign flag ships having a clear

a

more generous protection promise

UK policy shifted to permit promajority UK interest in ownership.
when

This did not include Armilla Patrol protection

Although

were employed.

was

a distinction

officially

for ships

on which British seamen

more conservative than the US

without a difference, since

sistance to neutral vessels after an attack

policy,

it

UK warships gave humanitarian as-

and were prepared

to interpose

between

an attacker and a target ship. The interposing warships were prepared to assert
self-defense if attacked while helping a foreign vessel. France pursued a similar,

perhaps more forward-leaning interposition policy. French warships were "available to assist [merchantmen] according to circumstances."

ships

would do

in a confrontation

but these have not been published.

chantmen, although
hostile act; the

Italian

is less

than clear; French

What French

war-

ROE stated options,

Italian escort was limited to Italian-flag

mer-

ROE promised response if a belligerent committed a

ROE did not contemplate "repressive acts" directed toward bases of
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NATO countries agreed to provide mutual support and cooperation

operation.

in keeping international

separate

71

although France operated

waterways free of mines,

mine clearance

and

Italy

had separate

bilateral

arrangements for the

work.

May

In

1988 Iraqi

Hormuz. Seawise

Giant, Liberian registered

was among five ships damaged.

crippled as the United States had said.

oil

terminal in the Strait of

and the world's

Iran began a

the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, to

The

Larak

air strikes hit Iran's

1

0-day combined forces exercise in

show that its maritime power was not as

458

July 3 Airbus tragedy arose in the context of Iraqi speedboat attacks and

concern over possible

air attacks

on

US warships, or its supply barges anchored in

Kuwaiti waters, perhaps to coincide with the Fourth of July.
nearby Bandar Abbas airport, also used by

commencing

attacks

459

In April 1 988, dur-

Iranian military aircraft had taken off from the

ing Operation Praying Mantis,

close to

largest supertanker,

on

US

civil aviation.

aircraft

These

aircraft

appeared

Other Iranian

but did not.

aircraft

had exhibited "targeting behavior" while observing Praying Mantis events from
afar,

apparently to provide radar information,

On

planes to targets.

i.e.,

to possibly vector closer

July 2-3 Iranian speedboats positioned themselves at the

western approach to the Strait of Hormuz to challenge merchant ships, a tactic that

had been

a

During the evening of July

prelude to attack.

gomery had responded to a distress

call

from

Other F-14s were known

U.S.S. Halsey.

gomery heard challenges over the radio and
ing a Pakistani

merchantman on July

investigate the

Montgomery

small boats, which "were

Two

Bandar Abbas

minutes

for

3,

radio warnings,

ules

to

be

at

Bandar Abbas.

was

fired

on by Iranian

Vincennes opened fire on

Iran Air Flight 655, a civil airliner, took off from
a flight

path through the area of the

Seven minutes

to Vincennes'

later

and

after repeated

preoccupation with the ongoing surface

and misinterpretation of electronic information and commercial
Vincennes'

surface melee,

approach-

U.S.S. Vincennes was sent to the area to

Dubai, across the Gulf, on

and owing

After Mont-

many speedboats were seen

deemed to have hostile intent."
later,

on board, Vincennes

When

Danish tanker under Iranian speed-

report. Vincennes' helicopter

on-going naval battle near Hormuz.

action

U.S.S. Elmer Mont-

That same day two Iranian F-14s came within seven miles of

boat attacks.

the boats.

a

2,

air

sched-

fired surface to air missiles that destroyed Flight 655.

commanding

officer

gave the order to

fire,

in the

middle of the

he "believed that the Vincennes and the Montgomery were the subject

of a coordinated sea

and air attack involving [Iranian] Revolutionary Guard speed-

boats and an F-14 aircraft."

The United

States claimed a right of self-defense for

US

ship-based helicopters attacked Iranian

Af.9

the mistaken attack.

A

week

after the

gunboats that had

Airbus tragedy,

set afire a

nationals in the crew,

Panama-registered, Japanese-owned tanker with

thus implementing the

US

new US policy of defending other
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merchantmen upon

countries'

the end of the war the

Other navies were

Gulf.

a

and consistent with other

US

opera-

commitments.

tional

By

their request

US Navy had

also

conducted over 100 convoys in the

engaged in numerous escort operations.

On the diplomatic front, Saudi Arabia broke relations with Iran April 27, 1988,
few days after US actions against Iranian warships and speedboats.
Perhaps

more importantly, during that year

a pipeline

Saudi Arabia was completed, allowing Iraqi

from Al-Zubair in Iraq

oil to

flow to Yanbu, where

shipped to South Africa for hard currency or arms.

Turkey

pleted a smaller pipeline to

have boosted

its oil

Yanbu

it

in

could be

may have also comthe Yanbu line would

Iraq

which with

exports to 3.2 million barrels a day, about the prewar peak

This may have been a counterpoint to Iran's economic cooperation accord

level.

of the previous

summer with the Soviet Union, by which the USSR agreed to build

a pipeline to carry Iranian oil to the

was

that year,

to

A

settled.

Iran's

foreign exchange reserves

was due to

A shipping route in the Caspian Sea

second connection between airline and railway systems was also

However,

planned.

Black Sea.

Iraqi

economy was

left,

bombing in

after

the

in a shambles, with only $1 billion in

an upswing the year before. Part of this erosion

first

quarter of 1988, which reduced

oil

production

considerably.

Summit reaffirmed its 1987
European Community and the GCC issued a

In June 1988 a second Arab League Extraordinary

On June
Ju

stand
ind on the war.

15 the

joint political declaration:

.

.

.

trade

They explicitly emphasized
is a

that

freedom of navigation and unimpeded flow of

cardinal principle in international relations and international law. In this

context, they call

upon the international community

to safeguard the right of free

navigation in international waters and sea lanes for shipping en route to and from
ports and installations of the [Gulf] littoral States

.

.

.

all

not parties to the hostilities. 47 ^

The June 20 Toronto Economic Summit supported Resolution

598,

condemned

use of chemical weapons, deplored proliferation of ballistic missiles in the region,

and "renew[ed the Group of Seven] commitment
tion in the Gulf."

tions with Iran.

hostage
billion

crisis,

arms

to

uphold

.

.

.

freedom of naviga-

By mid-June Britain and France had restored diplomatic rela(The United States had severed

relations with Iran during the

and these were not restored.) Saudi Arabia announced

deal, including six to eight

1600-mile ballistic missiles from China.

a $12-30

minesweepers, with Britain and bought
481

Iran announced acceptance of Resolution 598 on July 17;

482

on August

UN Secretary-General announced a ceasefire effective August 20.

483

8 the

The next day

the Council approved the Secretary-General's report on the war and decided to establish

UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)

process.

485

Withdrawal from occupied

territories began,

to help the

peace

but the 1990-91 war
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UNIIMOG

ended UNIIMOG's mandate.
well during

short commission.

its

487

seemed

to

have worked reasonably

Negotiations between Iran and Iraq with re-

spect to their disputed border began simultaneously with the ceasefire

ued

488

These discussions broke down over

thereafter.

73

and contin-

Iraq's insistence that

it

should control the entire Shatt al-Arab waterway; neither side was prepared to

and both refused

However, two

compromise on

this issue,

weeks

invaded Kuwait in 1990, Iraq conceded most Iranian demands,

after Iraq

a political solution.

agreeing to revert to the 1975 treaty providing for joint sovereignty over the Shatt

and

(POWs). These concessions had been Iranian peace
489
No major exchanges of
the 1980 Iraqi invasion.

to return prisoners of war

conditions stated soon after

POWs, mostly

captured ground forces but undoubtedly including naval person-

came until 10 years later.
Iran announced on August 20

nel,

ceasefire; this

was

The commitment

it

would continue inspecting

a largely theoretical gesture,

491

vessels during the

although Iraq protested

492
it.

of the European naval force was extended to clear 2000 mines

from the northern Gulf and the Shatt al-Arab

after the ceasefire.

Operation

Cleansweep has been hailed as the "culmination of a major pioneering landmark in

European naval co-operation." There had been no coordination of merchant ship
protection

among WEU navies, however.

493

The United States announced the end

of escorted convoy operations in the Gulf in October 1988, although

would be positioned
this

was replaced by

US Navy minesweepers came home.

Gulf, resulting in over 100 convoys,

497

Increased

US

Western

States,

skeptical relief, at the

In

March 1 990 the

naval presence in the

was considered an "unqualified success;"

other participating States gave their operations high marks.
to several

forces

to act if US-flagged vessels were directly threatened.
Later
495
a monitoring system.
In January 1989 "deflagging" proce-

dures for reverting the tankers to the Kuwaiti ensign began.
last

US

499

498

Iraq, deeply in debt

Japan and the USSR, declared victory, and Iran

felt

end of hostilities.
Part C. Conclusions

"The Iran-Iraq conflict was a major war, not a small war. For the only time since
World War II, deliberate and sustained operations were carried out against merchant ships" by the belligerents.
tury, with a million casualties,

It

was

also

mostly in the land campaigns.

every Iraqi family lost a son, brother or father,
casualties.

begun

An

503

or

entire generation lost a decade of its

to face the social costs

it

would have to pay.

illusionment and moderation in
dead.

one of the longest wars of the cen-

its

1

502

Perhaps virtually

50,000 killed

life,

among 400,000

and the country had only

For Iran, the war brought

dis-

Islamic fundamentalism and perhaps 300,000

Direct and indirect economic costs of the war to Iran and Iraq came to

about $1 .2

trillion,

cost of the

plus another $1.1 trillion to rebuild their economies.

war exceed[ed] the

oil

"The total

revenue of the two States throughout the
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twentieth century.""

Iraq's

opment may have been
to

set

slow economic recovery.

booming prewar economy and rapid economic devel-

back two decades, and
507

Iraq's foreign debt stood at $65 billion in 1985,

perhaps half owed GCC States;
Iraq's only positive gain
five times larger
its

was due

aircraft.

manpower, mostly

in its

armed

at the war's

Nearly

all

forces; its

at

the war's end.

ground forces were

end; by 1988 Iraq had doubled

of the increase in military hardware

Counting reserves, Iraq had nearly all the working popuunder arms.

lation of the country

war.

may have been

to Soviet aid.

tanks, artillery

had ballooned to $100 billion

509

and

with
cr\o

it

with 955,000 effectives

available tanks

non-Arab debt remained

a large

ground

in

Iran also increased

but

forces,

its

mechanized

its total

units,

active military

combat

aircraft,

and naval power were reduced considerably by the last years of the

512

was

It

war

.

.

changed

that resolved nothing,

none of the underlying

settled

.

a

toppled neither regime, and

little,

issues.

[Tjhis [was] a war worthy of a place of honour in Barbara

Tuchman's March of

example of the power of an individual's blind
to lead a people towards disaster and thereby to

Folly. It will be cited as a classic

dogmatism

in totalitarian states

change history. This occurrence could well repeat itselfj,] especially in the prevailing
instability presided over by autocratic regimes in the Middle East. 514

The

1990-91 Gulf War, beginning with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, began two years

later

and proves the point; there may be repetitions in the future. The key lesson

to

be learned from the war, according to Chaim Herzog, then President of Israel,

was that no State can survive militarily

in isolation.

"The nations of the world

are

interdependent, and a major element in any middle and small nation's military capability

The

.

.

.

must

... be based

on

international economic and political standing.

its

War proved that this must be a major and vital consideration in the defence

of any country."

The war

at sea,

than the land,

air

while relatively

less costly in

and missile campaigns

terms of

life

and

less

in terms of people involved,

important

was

a signifi-

cant part of the conflict.

1.

The Tanker War.

The Tanker War was
conflict.

517
It

was the

the most important aspect of naval warfare during the

largest loss of merchant ships

and mariners'

lives since the

Second World War:
Throughout the
commercial

eight year

vessels, almost all

.

War, Iran and Iraq
of which were neutral
.

.

more than 400
ships. Over 200

attacked

.

.

.

State flag

resulted in excess of 40
merchant seamen
lost their lives.
[T]he attacks
million dead weight tons of damaged shipping. Thirty-one of the attacked merchants
were sunk, and another 50 [were] declared total losses. For 1987 alone, the strikes
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.
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against commercial shipping

numbered

75

178, with a resulting death toll of 108. In

by the end of 1987, write-off losses in the Gulf War stood at nearly half
[S]hips
the tonnage of merchant shipping sent to the bottom in World War II
permanent members of the
of more than 30 different countries, including
relative terms,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Security Council, [were] subjected to attacks.

Only about one percent of Gulf voyages involved

all

518

Neverthe-

terms of percentages of losses due to maritime casualties worldwide, the sta-

less, in

tistics

attacks, however.

were staggering. During 1982, the first year of the Tanker War, 47 percent of

Liberian-flag tonnage losses due to maritime casualty worldwide occurred in

more than 90 percent, and the

the Gulf. In 1986 the figure was 99 percent; in 1987,
final percentages

may have gone higher due to marine insurance underwriters' late

declaration of constructive total losses. Flags of convenience were flown

Gulf tankers,

a third

tion chartered

by

being owned by

US

nationals.

The

US

nationals, with another substantial por-

financial loss to

substantial. Insured losses declared by underwriters

lion in

by most

US

interests

was therefore

were heavy, reaching $30 mil-

one month, with resulting tremendous increases in war risk premiums. The

total cost

of conducting the war, and the direct and indirect

was nearly $1.2

trillion. If

damage caused by

it,

there were

any good things that could be said of this conflict, they [were] that the Gulf War
[became] the principal factor in reducing the overtonnage of the world oil tanker fleet
and in aiding a recovery of the tanker market, and
tremendous advances in marine
firefighting equipment and techniques [were] directly attributable to recent
.

.

.

experience in the Gulf.

To

a

US government

cloud."

519

expert, "this [was] too thin a silver lining to justify the

Iran attacked ships of

more than 32

national flags, while Iraq mostly

concentrated on vessels flagged or chartered by Iran. Iraq concentrated on attacking ships within Iran's war zone, while Iran mostly attacked vessels in the lower
Gulf, outside

its

or Iraq's zones. Iraq tended to shoot

first

and identify later, while

Iran conducted careful vessel reconnaissance and specific vessel identification.
Iraq used aircraft for

its strikes,

copters, surface combatants

Guard forces.
its

520

while Iran employed conventional

and small

boats, the latter

aircraft, heli-

manned by Revolutionary

Iraq never caused a major interruption in Iran's exports to finance

war.
Several warships

—US

frigates

Samuel B. Roberts and Stark, and major units of

the belligerents' navies as well as smaller craft like Iran Ajr

aged or sunk.

Some

losses resulted

—were severely dam-

from opposing belligerents' attacks, some oc-

curred through mistake, and some through self-defense responses by States not
party to the conflict. There were deaths and injuries
neutrals lost air crews through

combat

personnel

and other

at

offshore terminals

among crews. Belligerents and

losses or accidents.
oil facilities.

There were

These

facilities,

losses of

including
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some

in territories of neutral States,

were also damaged. Attacks on

resulted in deaths, injuries, and material destruction.

caused 290 deaths.

campaigns.

522

These

losses

The

oil

platforms

Vincennes tragedy

do not include those incurred during the land

523

One interesting result of the war was reduced use of the
oil lifeline to

Strait of Hormuz as

an

the West. While tankers lifted nearly 20 million barrels a day through

the Strait in 1978, this had been reduced to 6.4 billion in 1985. Oil discoveries outside the Gulf, pipelines
dis'

from Iraq through Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and the Sau-

construction of an east-west pipeline with capacity of 3.2-5 million barrels a

day may be "insurance

—in case the

Strait ... is closed."

inhibit skyrocketing oil prices if there are

Yet another factor

the region.

is

These developments may

more political-military developments in

increased production from other

oil fields, e.g.,

the North Sea.

2.

The Marine Environment.
The environment was also

Nowruz attack.
ties

caused

527

Nowruz

a loser, a

major casualty to the Gulf being the 1983

Undoubtedly attacks on other terminals and offshore oil

spills.

ships in ballast

bunkers.

525

facili-

And undoubtedly attacks on loaded tankers and other vessels,

and warships, resulted in

loss of cargoes, primarily
528

Aircraft losses likely spread sheens

on the Gulf.

petroleum, and

Apart from the

no indication that States considered the impact of military
529
activity on the environment or the developing law protecting it.
Completion of
spill,

overland

oil

there

is

pipelines

530

may reduce risk

pipelines are vulnerable to attack by any
close to the shore) during

of pollution at sea in the Gulf, but these

number

war or accidents

at

of methods (particularly

if laid

any time. Pipeline construction has

only shifted the environmental risk to the land.

3.

The Role of the United States and the Soviet Union.
In terms of US policy, it has been said that
By playing a leading role

in the

Gulf as well

as in the

United Nations, the United

States unquestionably helped bring Iran to the negotiating table ... U.S. policy

helped reestablish U.S. credibility among the Gulf Arab States by demonstrating that
the United States could sustain a low-key, politically sensitive, and consistent
military policy

U.S. military planners were quite pleased with the

they enjoyed from Gulf States normally reluctant to be so forthcoming

Gulf

cooperation

—

.

.

.

U.S. policy

any significant operational sense, while U.S.
policymakers nonetheless worked successfully with the Soviets in the United
"kept the Soviets out of the

in

Nations in forging Resolution 598. All these produced

.

.

.

satisfaction

among

U.S.

diplomats involved in the year's [1988's] events.
.

.

.

[T]he United States shared credit for bringing the cease-fire into

effect

with a

wide range of factors. Iraq's extended bombing campaign, of which the tanker war
was but a minor part, slowly ground Iran's economy down to crisis levels by the end of
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1987, and Iran's efforts to deal with

among competing

economy only exacerbated deep

its

77

fissures

Tehran. Economic deprivation combined

political factions in

—

The "war of the
war weariness across Iran
to produce
provoked confusion and fear out of all proportion to the relatively meager
In some sense, Iraq can be said to have won its war with Iran.
physical damage
with battlefield stalemate

.

.

.

cities"

Luck

Other factors that might be mentioned,

also played a role.

at least in the

context of the Tanker War, included cooperation of the Gulf States and

and other

allies

States affected

by the war's dislocations and

attacks

US NATO

on

their ship-

The overwhelming supply of arms and other goods to Iraq also was a major
However, "[i]t should now be clear that US involvement in the Gulf durfactor.

ping.

ing the

.

.

.

War, particularly during the

.

.

.

'tanker war'

ing continuum of American foreign policy."

The USSR tried to achieve several goals:

.

.

.

was part of a long-stand-

533

preserving

its

influence in Iraq, gain-

ing influence in the GCC and Iran, and reducing US influence in the region, e.g., by
chartering tankers to Kuwait.

The war bolstered Soviet standing in the region. At

war's end Iraq could not afford to alienate the
viet
to

arms

supplies. Iran

USSR or end its dependence on

So-

would have to improve its relations with the Soviet Union

encourage the USSR to moderate its support of Iraq. While the Gulf States were

much less dependent on the Soviet Union, they were not anxious to see the USSR
leave the Gulf after the war; Soviet presence

was seen

as useful to

keep the United

States concerned about the region. Soviet post-war gains were therefore not significant.

With the war over,

there were fewer opportunities and greater obstacles for

The USSR's disof whatever gains it had made

extending Soviet political and military influence in the Gulf.
integration three years later of course

during the war. Iraq

lost

meant

loss

an arms supplier, Iran

other Gulf States lost a makeweight.

The

lost a

whipping boy,

Soviet Union's demise

of US policy, and just in time for the 1990-91 Gulf War.

4.

535

meant

a

and the
triumph

536

The Role of International Organizations.
The United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, emerged from Cold

War gridlock to a more active role in peacemaking. Its resolutions affirming freedom of navigation are particularly important for this analysis. 537 The Arab
League, at first gridlocked because of divisions among its members, some of whom
(e.g.,

Syria) supported Iran

and others Iraq

gether at the end of the war.
tions, e.g., individual

538

(e.g.,

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia), came

to-

States in other established international organiza-

NATO members, cooperated together more or less under the

WEU with Persian Gulf States to support freedom of navigation. WEU's revital539

Tanker War shipping threat.
These European
States, while following a Western political strategy, were able to distinguish themselves from US policy. They made separate, if not radically different, definitions of
Western interests in the Gulf. Deployment of European naval power to the Gulf
ization has been traced to the
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improved the

status of

European

States with

many Gulf Cooperation

Council

members, particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

The European Community, evolving into the European Union during the war
years, and the Economic Summits lent diplomatic pressure to end the conflict.
Nevertheless,

appeared likely that although the

it

EU will harmonize policies in

Europe, European States will muddle through with individual policies in the Gulf
in the future.

However, the most impressive development during 1980-88 was the organization of the

Gulf Cooperation Council of other Gulf States in 1981, which by war's

They

end could "have good reasons for being pleased and confident
fully

.

.

.

success-

weathered the Iranian revolution, eight years of Iran-Iraq fighting, and a

whole range of direct or covert Iranian

efforts to

undermine them. They

[could]

reasonably argue that the future [could] not be worse than the recent past."

It

has been correctly predicted that

.

.

.

[T]he

GCC

states will strive to

turmoil spreading from one state to the

path between Iran and Iraq

... to

maintain their unity to limit the chances of
rest.

Together, they will try to hew a middle

achieve a balance of power in the Gulf and limit the

opportunities for super-power intervention .... Because the
attain an

focused

even mildly formidable

on diplomacy.

cooperation
the weaker

.

.

.

.

states

is

properly

closer

security

defense posture, their attention

Nevertheless,

practical

steps

toward

can never

can serve to deny the attractions of outside meddling in the

.

members

GCC states are
For the United

.

GCC

affairs of

of the community, and put the larger powers on notice that the

determined

to act together to preserve their political integrity.-544

problem could be military equipment purchases from

States, a

other countries, thereby lessening dependence on America while increasing de-

pendence on other
5.

States.

The Ensuing Chapters.

From any perspective

the Tanker

War was

costly in terms of people, property,

pollution of the environment, and perhaps international law.
follow analyze the war in the context of the

The Chapters

UN Charter, and in particular the in-

herent right of individual and collective self-defense in Article 5 1 ;
sea in the context of the Persian Gulf;
ter considerations, at stake in the

that

the law of the

the law of naval warfare, apart from Char-

Tanker War;

and the law of the

the maritime environment, and the law of naval warfare.

sea, the

law of
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CLAIMS TO MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC

ORDER ON THE OCEANS
Chapter II demonstrates that attempting to preserve minimum public order
Gulf during the Tanker

in the

War

involved

many participants

with vary-

ing (sometimes multiple) perspectives in different arenas and situations with

numerous coercive and persuasive strategies at their command. This and succeeding chapters examine claims to authority in the effective power process as part
of the ongoing global social process. As McDougal and his associates have noted,
international law as the effective global power process is subject to claims by participants to optimize their goals in that process.

are part of the civic order,

i.e.,

In

some instances these claims

private orderings or private claims, as opposed to

norms or claims to public order. But civic order claims, as will be
seen, may have serious and strong impact on public order claims and claimants.
For example, attacks on merchant ships caused phenomenal increases in insurance rates; these in turn affected global oil prices, and rising oil prices undoubtedly influenced government decisionmakers. By the same token, decisions of

public order

governments, based in their perception of law, undoubtedly influenced their considerations
parties

on assisting one or both belligerents and

who had

dealings with belligerents.

The

tilt

their attitudes

toward private

toward supporting Iraq that

grew throughout the war, and a corresponding decline in support of Iran, although
there were cross-currents the other way,

Although Jessup argued

for

an

Lowenfeld has made the point,

is

an example of this interrelationship.

interstitial transnational law,

as

more

recently

law of war manuals have for a sliding scale of

o

conflict

between war and peace, that there

is

a sliding scale relationship

between

public law and transnational law that governs matters between private actors and

between private actors and
o

times another nation.
centrates

States,

sometimes an

actor's

own country and some-

And while the Chapter III-VII analysis in this volume con-

on public law

analysis, the incidence of civic order relationships,

by transnational law, must be borne

transactions governed

Because of the Charter's trumping effect on treaty law

on customary norms,

and because

in

mind.

and its strong influence

several participants in the

Tanker War,

France and the United Kingdom, believed that the Charter and not the
governed,

12

i.e.,

e.g.,

LOAC

analysis begins with study of Charter- related claims, particularly

sues of self-defense

law of treaties and

and
its

neutrality.

is-

This Chapter ends with an examination of the

relationship with crisis

and armed

conflict.
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UN

Part A.

The

and record of negotiations, have
The general contours of practice under the Charter have

history of the Charter, and

been well-documented.
also

lows

This

been chronicled.
is

Charter Norms; Related Issues

is

its

drafting

not the place to mine anew these lodes.

a statement of provisions of the Charter, followed

and counterclaims

What

fol-

by summaries of claims

under the Charter and related
relat(
sources of law, with conclu

sions (outcomes) as to the current state of the law.

/.

Norms Stated in

the Charter

Five parts of the Charter are relevant to the Tanker War:

and Principles; self-defense and related concepts
under the Charter;

pacific settlement of disputes;

its

Preamble, Purposes

in the Charter era;

lawmaking

and action under the Charter to
and

deal with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace,

acts of aggression.

A half

century of practice under the Charter has developed in some instances. In other
cases pre-Charter

a.

norms

still

have

force.

The Preamble, Purposes and Principles of the Charter. The Charter Preamble

initially expresses

to save

Member

States' determination:

succeeding generations from the scourge of war[;]

fundamental human

rights, ... in the equal rights of.

.

.

... to reaffirm faith in

nations large and small

[;]

to

under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from
and other sources of international law can be maintained [;] and to promote
progress and better standards for life in larger freedom.

establish conditions
treaties

social

To

achieve these goals,

UN Members have pledged:

good neighbors, and to unite
our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be
used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for
[promoting] economic and social advancement of all people[.] 16
to practice tolerance

All Persian Gulf States,

and

and

live together in

all

peace

... as

countries that were Tanker

War

participants,

al-

though perhaps as States not parties to the conflict, are UN Members. Iran and Iraq
are original

Members.

17

Little use of the Preamble's statements

have been made since 1945.

example, however, occurred during the Tanker

War

itself,

when

One recent

the Security

Member States pledged together to live together in peace with
18
one another as good neighbors in accordance with the Charter. ." The Preamble
Council noted "that

.

in other cases "reinforces, without being essential to, the propositions [founded

other parts of the Charter] being advanced"

19

on
r

There have been occasional uses of
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the Preamble in other Council and General Assembly resolutions relevant to this

The General Assembly's Uniting for Peace (UFP) Resolution dis20
cussions in 1 950 referred to the Preamble. The General Assembly's Friendly Re21
also employed Preamble language. To the extent that
lations Declaration of 1 970
study, however.

by practice, e.g., by subsequent General
22
Assembly-recommended peacekeeping operations under a UFP precedent, or
these resolutions have been incorporated

have been incorporated by reference in

later resolutions

nouncements, the Preamble has had added

23

or authoritative pro-

vitality.

In any event, the drafters intended that all Charter provisions "being
ible as in

(a)

.

.

indivis-

any other legal instrument, are equally valid and operative." Each provi-

must be construed and applied

sion

.

The "Preamble"

together.

introduces the Charter and sets forth the declared com-

mon intentions which brought us together in this Conference and moved
us to unite our will and efforts, and

made us harmonize, regulate, and or-

ganize our international action to achieve our
(b)

The "Purposes"

common

ends.

constitute the raison d'etre of the Organization.

the aggregation of the

common ends on which our minds met;

cause and object of the Charter to which

member

They are

hence, the

States collectively

and

severally subscribe.
(c)

The chapter on

same order of ideas, the methods
and regulating norms according to which the Organization and its members shall do their duty and endeavor to achieve the common ends. Their
"Principles" sets, in the

understandings should serve as actual standards of international conduct. 24

Thus

the Preamble

ideas

and purposes," although

ideas

and purposes can be, and have been, used

is

an integral part of the Charter as
it

does not define

ries of pledges,

statement of "motivating

UN Members' obligations. These

to evidence the Charter's ideas

purposes in considering the articles of the Charter. In
25

a

effect,

the Preamble

is

fulfillment of which are in the Charter's Purposes, Principles

and
a se-

and

constitutive provisions.

i.

Purposes of the Organization: Articles

as

contemplated under the Charter

is

1(1), 1(2).

Although the United Nations

"a multipurpose organization,

.

.

.

mainte-

nance of [international] peace and security is the primary purpose of the Organization

and takes priority over other purposes." The order of

listing the

UN's

Purposes, Charter article 1(1) stating the goal of international peace and security
first,

supports this view:

The Purposes
1.

of the United Nations are:

To maintain

measures for

and

and to that end: to take efthe prevention and removal of threats to

international peace

fective collective

security,
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the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches

of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity

with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or

ment of international disputes or situations which might lead
of the peace.

the United Nations

i.e.,

and remove threats

breach

to a

27

Goodrich and his collaborators note the difference between Article
guage,

settle-

may

"take

effective collective

1(1 )'s lan-

measures" to prevent

to the peace, to suppress aggression or other breaches of the

peace, the "measures" language of Articles 39, 41 and 42, Article 50's "preventive

or enforcement measures," Article 5's "preventive or enforcement action" and the

"enforcement measures" Article 2(7) mentions. This language difference has been
cited as authority for the

UFP Resolution;

the Council might have a duty to take

"measures" or action, but the General Assembly's responsibility and powers under
Article 10 should be determined

by Article

l(l)'s

twofold injunction for "effective

collective measures" to maintain or restore peace.

28

Article 1(1) also assumes that

resolution of a dispute or situation will be in accordance with international law

and "justice," a provision inserted to protect small
eign equality of all

UN Members.

30

States,

29

Implementing Article

a corollary to

the sover-

terms of

1(1), at least in

the Charter language, has been through Articles 2(3), 2(4), and Chapter VI-VIII.
31

Therefore, analysis of the use of Article 1(1) will be deferred until

Another of the UN's Purposes

is

"to develop friendly relations

later.

among

nations

based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,

and

to take other appropriate

analysis has focused

measures

to strengthen universal peace."

on elevating self-determination

times in mutilateral conventions,

to a

and often invoked

human

32

33

right,

in efforts to

Most
some-

end colonial-

ism, the Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and

Peoples being a watershed.

35

rr
has been
A collateral effect

developing the idea that

self-determination includes permanent sovereignty over natural resources
State's right to freely dispose of its natural

wealth and resources.

Assembly and Council interpretations of Article
in naval matters after

sembly referred

World War
to

played a background role

In the Algerian Civil

to "the right of the Algerian

France gave Algerians the right
after the

II.

1(2)

War

(1957-59) the As-

people to self-determination"

determine their status.

French interdiction campaign

and a

37

39

38

after

The resolution passed

and had no impact on claims of legality

of that operation. Assembly Resolution 1514, declaring all peoples including those

under colonial rule have self-determination
in Council resolutions

rights,

on Rhodesia (1965-80).

was incorporated by reference

In this case the Royal

Navy

forced Council-directed interdiction of Beira-bound tankers loaded with

en-

oil in-

voiced to Rhodesia.
Article

an

issue.

1

(2)

played no stated role in the Tanker War; self-determination was not

However, the issue of "the inalienable right" of

all

States "freely to
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was behind the desires of States

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to export petroleum, part of their "natural wealth,"
through their ports and all sea lanes. Shipping flagged under other States was engaged in lifting petroleum from these ports and otherwise in legitimate trade
like

The Council condemned hostilities in "sea-lanes, navigable wa-

within the Gulf.

terways, harbour works, terminals, offshore installations

or indirect access to the sea

.

.

The Council

.."

and

all

ports with direct

later reaffirmed "the right of free

navigation in international waters and sea lanes for shipping to and from

and

installations of the littoral States

.

.

all

ports

not parties to the hostilities[.]" Iran had

.

To

attacked commercial shipping en route to and from Kuwaiti and Saudi ports.

the extent that these attacks frustrated the rights of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and

other Gulf States not parties to the war to dispose of their natural wealth, attacks on

shipping carrying these exports could be seen as a violation of Article 1(3) as interpreted by the Assembly and the Council.

ii.

Principles in the Charter: Articles 2(3), 2(4).

cle 2(3) is a logical corollary

The principle expressed in Arti-

of the principle of Article 2(4), which prohibits threat

or use of force against a State's territorial integrity or political independence, or in

any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. Article 2(3)
quires

UN

Members

to settle their international disputes

that international peace

and

from the League Covenant
in

many international

parallel policies,

48

security,

era, the

agreements.

first

justice, are

Its

A

legacy

substance, mingled with Articles 33-36's

many UN

resolutions, including Security

down one of the basic principles

incorporating by reference Article

Members

not endangered.

Council action in the Iran-Iraq war.

Article 2(4) of the Charter "lays

Nations,"

by peaceful means so

language of Article 2(3) has been incorporated

has been restated in

Council Resolution 479, the

and

re-

l's

Principles

shall refrain in their international relations

force against the territorial integrity or political

of the United

and declaring, "All

from the threat or use of

independence of any

state,

any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

or in

Article

must be interpreted in the context of other Charter norms; i.e., it may be tempered by other rights (e.g., of self-defense) under the Charter or general interna2(4)

under

tional law

a

number of theories.

52

The

point of difference

is

the relative

scope of the right of self-defense and the extent to which the right of self-defense
qualifies Article 2(4),

self-defense

and related

Definition of terms
ticle 2(4),

an analysis deferred for consideration in the context of

which

issues.

lies

beneath the problem of interrelationships between Ar-

at least restates a

customary

rule,

and other claims.

Two views

have developed on what "threat or use of force" means: Does "force" mean only

"armed force," or does it include economic or political pressure?

Most commentators say force means only armed force and does not include economic or political
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Recent treaty negotiations support

pressure.

a

narrow definition of "force."

States have negotiated separate provisions prohibiting coercive
ical

methods.

57

Proponents of a clause

to include

economic or polit-

economic coercion with military

coercion as a ground for voiding a treaty, failed in the Vienna Convention on the

Law

of Treaties negotiations.

Between

58

The Vienna Convention on

the

Law

of Treaties

and International Organizations or Between International Organi-

States

zations also lacks such a provision.
resolutions calling

upon

59

Although the General Assembly has adopted
from economic or political coercion,

States to refrain

nei-

ther the Assembly nor the Council has determined that such coercion equates with

use of force under Article 2(4).

The Assembly may have come close with the 1970

Friendly Relations Declaration, but analysis reveals that the line has not been
crossed.

Other examples are consensus approval of a definition of aggression

and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (NIEO).

US position that aggression "cannot be so comprehensive as to in-

Similar to the

clude

all

cases

.

.

.

and cannot take into account the various circumstances which

might enter into the determination of aggression

in a particular case[,]"

olution definition of aggression parallels Article 2(4): "Aggression

armed

by

force

is

the Resthe use of

a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political in-

dependence of another

State, or in

any other manner inconsistent with the Char-

ter ..., as set out in this Definition."

A

State's first use of

armed

force in violation of the Charter

is

prima facte

evi-

may determine that,
has been committed. The Defini-

dence of an act of aggression, although the Security Council

under the circumstances, no

act of aggression

tion considers the following as acts of aggression

whether or not there has been

war declaration:
(a)

The invasion or attack by the armed
State, or

forces of a State of the territory of another

any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such

in-

vasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;
(b)

Bombardment by
State or

armed forces of a State against the territory of another
the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another
the

State;
(c)

The blockade

of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another

State;
(d)

An

(e)

The use

attack

and

by the armed forces of a

air fleets

State

on the land,

sea or air forces,

marine

of another State;

of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another

State with the

agreement of the receiving

State, in

contravention of the condi-

tions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such

beyond the termination of the agreement;
its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of
territory

(f)

The

action of a State in allowing

aggression against a third State;

a
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(g)

The sending by

or on behalf of a State of

armed bands, groups,

113

irregulars or

mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to
therein.

amount

involvement

to the acts listed above, or its substantial

67

/TO

The

list is

strategies:

not exhaustive.

"No

nomic need cannot
strategy

is

the only direct reference to economic

consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic,

may

military or otherwise,

nomic

Article 5(1)

serve as a justification for aggression."

but that does not

justify aggression,

"No

may use

State

or encourage

sures to coerce another State

ereign rights."

70

solid opposition,

...

...

to obtain

Because of the vote on

NIEO

Article 32 proclaims

economic, political or any other
.

.

.

...

mea-

subordination of the exercise of its sov-

NIEO

71
it is

(118-6-10) and developed States'

unlikely that Article 32 recites custom. State prac-

under the Vienna Convention confirms

One

that a coercive eco-

and NIEO's status as not being a first measure of codification and

progressive development,
tice

eco-

aggression.

is

As with the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration,
that

mean

Thus

issue, for

this view.

72

which there are no clearcut answers

in Charter practice,

is

whether the "territorial integrity" phrase in Article 2(4) includes the "floating territory" of a vessel flying a State's flag.

73

The Corfu Channel Case settled the issue for

warships; the judgment included an award for damage to the

UK ships and for per-

Security Council resolutions affirmed freedom of navi-

sonnel injured or killed.

7S

gation in the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict

and in the Tanker War;

other resolutions approved interdiction of Beria-bound
sanctions action against Rhodesia.

77

The freedom

lf\

in the past

merchantmen

as part of

of navigation resolutions con-

firmed vessels' right to be free of belligerent interference; the Rhodesia interception resolution can be seen as a derogation
integrity" in the sense of Article 2(4).

Even

if a

on

a right of "floating territorial

78

ship might not be considered part of a State's territory and therefore

not subject to Article 2(4), attacks on individual merchant ships are acts of aggression

and are subject

to self-defense response(s)

particularly relevant for the

Although Article

Members from
mary

This issue was

51.

Tanker War.

2(4) does not cite aggression specifically,

acting "in any other

manner inconsistent with

it

does prohibit

the Purposes of the

-11
-i
maintaining international peace and security through

United Nations" in their international
79

under Article

relations. Article 1(1) states the

UN's

pri-

•

Purpose

as

tive action to "suppress

Therefore,

UN

.

.

.

acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace

Members have an

against other States.

And,

collec-

as also

."
.

.

.

obligation to refrain from acts of aggression

developed under the self-defense analysis,

80

the

Nicaragua Case adopted the broader French-language version of the Charter, Article 51. Article 51's

English language version reads:

.
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Nothing

in the

.

.

.

Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or

collective self-defense if

an armed attack occurs against

Member

a

of the United

Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain

Members

international peace and security. Measures taken by

in the exercise of this

Council and shall not in
and
responsibility
of
the
any way
Council under the
Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary ... to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
affect the authority

The French

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

version reads:

Aucune

disposition de

la

.

.

.

Charte ne porte atteinte au droit naturel de legitime

ou un Membre des Nations Unies est
ait pris les mesures
neccaires pour maintenir la paix et la securite internationales. Les mesures prises par
des Membres dans l'exercice de ce droit de legitime defense sont immediatement
defense, individuelle ou collective, dans

le

Pobjet d'une agression armee, jusqu a ce que

portees a

qu'a

le

connaissance du Conseil

la

Conseil, en vertu de la

.

.

.

.

.

.

cas

le

et n'affectent

right of self-defense,

tack,"

there

en nen

paix et

la

however defined,

82

la

arises

la

moment

Charte, d'agir a tout

judge necessaire pour maintenir ou retablir

The

Conseil de Securite

pouvoir
de

la

et le

devoir

maniere

qu'il

securite internationales. 81

when

there

is

an "armed

at-

under the English language version, or under the French version when
is

an "agression armee" which connotes

a

broader range of activity or situa-

tions triggering a right of self-defense.

Both versions and those
equally authentic.

84

in the Chinese, Russian

However, since the languages

in

and Spanish languages

are

which the drafting was done

were English and French, Goodrich and his associates argue that more weight
should be given the English and French texts and, if there is a discrepancy between
the two, the interpretation most likely to be correct would be that based on the lan-

Under this

guage of the text that was originally adopted.
the result of a

UK, i.e.,

English language, proposal,

view, since Article 5 1

is

the "armed attack" phrase of

the English language version should prevail.

Linnan has advocated using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
guide analysis of the relationship between Articles 2(4) and

87

51.

The same

to

ap-

proach might be taken for the situation of equally authoritative texts where words

chosen for versions in differing languages have different meanings. The Vienna
Convention,

1.

article 33, provides in pertinent part:

When

a treaty has

been authenticated in two or more languages, the

equally authoritative in each language.
3.

The terms

.

text is

.

of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each au-

thentic text.
4.

[W]hen a comparison of the authentic text discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning
.

.

.

.

.
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which best reconciles the
treaty, shall

texts,

having regard

to the object

115

and purpose of the

be adopted.

and 32 of the Convention provide:

Articles 31

31. General rule of interpretation

A

1.

good

treaty shall be interpreted in

meaning

to

faith in

accordance with the ordinary

be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light

of its object and purpose.

The context for

2.

text,

including

.

.

its

.

interpreting]

... a treaty shall

preamble and annexes[.]

.

comprise, in addition to the

.

There shall be taken into account, together with the context
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between

3.

.

.

the parties.

A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the par-

4.

ties so

intended.

means of interpretation
be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
32. Supplementary

Recourse

may

preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion,
the

... to

confirm

meaning resulting from the application of article 3 1 or to determine the meaning
,

when

the interpretation according to article 31:

meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 88

(a)

leaves the

(b)

leads to a result

There have been several theories

for interpreting treaties,

89

but Jimenez de

Arechaga says Vienna Convention principles declare existing law.
other approaches have appeal,

91

90

Although

the Convention's mainstream approach will be

the principal path of analysis.
Article 31(1) "establishes
treaty

its

.

ordinary meaning in

.

.

its

the 'golden rule' of interpretation [:]"

92

Give a

context and in the light of its object and purpose.

Article 3 1 (2) further defines the context to include the treaty preamble.

Along with

the context these are relevant, for this purpose: subsequent practice establishing

the parties' agreement as to

its

interpretation, Article 31(3)(b);

and relevant

appli-

meaning to a term if
task is to examine in-

cable rules of international law, Article 31(3)(a); and a special

the parties agree to such, Article 31(4). Therefore, the
trinsic evidence; the

second

a gradual progression

is

first

from

this center to

ripheral evidence, with a concession to parties' specific intent "if it

convincingly, "that the parties
apply, since the
there

is

problem

lies

.

.

.

intended" such.

is

more

pe-

established,"

The last qualification does not

with the meaning of Article 51's wording, for which

no terminological consensus.

The problem in terms of Vienna Convention

—

—

.
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Article 31 analysis boils

down

to

plicable international law rules.

The most
tack"

an issue of subsequent practice and relevant, ap-

95

recent authoritative pronouncement on the

armee" in Article 51

"agression

meaning of "armed

the Nicaragua Case.

is

The ICJ

at-

accepted the

broader French-language Article 51 version, stating in dictum that the Definition
of Aggression Resolution, Article 3(g), stated a customary rule; sending armed

bands, irregulars or mercenaries across a border would be armed attack justifying

(The Court went on

self-defense.

logistics across a

border was not aggression and that therefore a

defense claim under Article
"agression"

—

is

however, that supplying arms or other

to say,

5

used in Article

imported into Article

was not admissible.)

1

1(1)

and Article

1(1) as incorporated

96

97

51,

US collective self-

And since the same word

the

by reference

same meaning should be
in Article 2(4).

The narrow question is whether there can be armed aggression against ships.
The Definition of Aggression Resolution, Article 3, declares: "Aggression is
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political

independence of another

Charter

98

... as set

Although

out in this definition."'

torial integrity" in Article

1

any other manner inconsistent with the

State, or in

and

airspace, although

tive statement. Article
cal coercion;

it

1

could be argued that

"terri-

includes the "floating territory" of ships, the negotia-

tors did not address this possibility; they voted
territorial sea

it

down amendments

one State (Indonesia) added

it

to refer to the

by interpreta-

only covers armed aggression, and not economic or politi-

does not cover threat of force, as distinguished from use of force.

99

Article 2 declares a first use of force in violation of the Charter to be prima facie evi-

may determine

dence of aggression, but that the Security Council

that

no aggres-

sion has occurred, perhaps because the act(s) or consequence(s) are not that

The

serious.

2's first-use

Definition also recites certain per

and de minimis principles,

se principles,

in Article 3,

subject to Article

which provides

in part:

Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in
accordance with the provisions of article
(d)

2,

qualify as an act of aggression:

An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine
and

air fleets

of another State

.

.

Article 3(c) says that blockading coasts or ports

by armed

forces

is

aggression.

The ICJ has stated that article 3(g), denouncing sending armed bands across a border, states

custom; one commentator says

although others disagree.

An

ambiguity remains

The

all

Article 3

as to the

of Article 3 probably restates custom,

list is

nonexclusive.

phrase "marine and

air fleets."

Does

this in-

clude a single merchantman flagged under a target State's flag? Article 3(d) covers
attacks on a warship, a warship formation, or a group of

fishing

fleet.

Attacking

a single neutral

warship

is

merchantmen,

never permitted in

e.g.,

a

territorial

—
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and by well-established custom on the high

waters,

Choice of the

seas as well.

expression "fleets" for article 3(d) was done "advisedly,

...

117

from the pur-

to exclude

view of the Definition the use of force [by an attacking State] against a single or a
few commercial vessels

.

.

.,

especially

tion," according to Dinstein,

produced the Definition.
(in the

107

who

cites

enter [attacking State] jurisdic-

UN

Broms, chair of the

committee that

Dinstein concludes that "A reasonable degree of force

may be

form of search and seizure)

ships even on the high seas."
generally; he

when they

108

legitimate against foreign merchant

However, Broms did not

and the Committee referred only

refer to

merchant ships

to fishing vessels

and

109
fleets.

Dinstein's view appears inconsistent with what the Committee actually decided.
is

engaged in legitimate policing of their coastal wa-

also clear that coastal States,

ters

territorial sea,

(e.g.,

when they

article 3(d)
110

It

contiguous zone,

EEZ) do not commit

aggression under

pursue, and possibly attack, merchant ships for viola-

dons.

The Dinstein view is inconsistent with what the UN Committee actually decided. The UK Committee delegate pointed out during negotiations that Article
3(d) would not impugn coastal State action "in accordance with international law for
the legitimate enforcement of
State rights

authority."

its

had been omitted from Article

risk that such a clause

might be taken

to

A

saving clause describing coastal

Including

3(d).

would

it

imply that any vessel

.

.

.

which ventured

within the jurisdiction of another State might be subjected to any degree of force

even an armed attack

own
Thus,

authority,

— that the State might choose

which was not the

.

.

.

to inflict

on

it

in the exercise of its

Committee's intention. 111

from indicating that attacks on independently-sailing merchant ships

far

could not trigger a self-defense response, the Committee was trying to avoid the

problem of unlawful attacks

in the first place.

There is no indication that the Com-

mittee even considered self-defense in this context.
to

The Committee did not intend

exclude attacks on independently-steaming merchantmen from the Definition,

which

for

self-defense or other legitimate response(s)

As incidents
tacks

like the

Mayaguez seizure demonstrate,

on merchant ships can

response

is

result in

1 1

7

to say that

an aggression claim justifying

not

all at-

a self-defense

dangerous business indeed. Even as a self-defense response that

proportional can become aggression,
ing

might be appropriate.

is

not

not every attack on an independently-sail-

merchantman should be shielded from an aggression

ships, e.g., passenger liners, are forbidden targets in

claim.

any case;

Some merchant

even with modern

commercial shipping's highly automated nature, and the resulting relatively low
size of crews, a deliberate attack

people's lives.

on

The liner exception

a single cargo

merchantman can involve many

does not cover the situation of other vessels car-

rying hundreds of passengers, e.g., ferries or work-boats transporting employees of
offshore drilling rigs, nor does

it

cover a

common

situation of cargo vessels with a

The Tanker War

118

small passenger manifest. Moreover, the reality of merchant traffic on the seas

merchant

that no

company.

and tows, ever sail

ships, unless they are fishing vessels or tugs

is

in

A view that all independently-sailing merchant ships could be attacked

without the attacking State risking being branded an aggressor would mean that

no merchant ship would be
Presumably an

ently.

safe,

under any circumstances, since

all-out,

independ-

simultaneous, world-wide attack on

would qualify

flagged under the target State

all sail

for Dinstein,

all

ships

but that hypothetical

lacks reality.

The

"fleets" expression does not follow the principles of prior treaty law,

whether

ratified or not.

ships as

enough

These agreements point

to coverage of attacks

to trigger a risk of a charge of aggression if the act or its conse-

quences are serious enough, under the Definition Resolution formula.
era State practice buttresses this conclusion.
•

a qualifiedper se instance of aggression.

do not
still

on single

117

The Resolution

As

includes blockade as

a practical matter,

try to avoid interception in groups. If it

is

assumed

Charter

blockade runners

that the law of blockade

includes an ultimate right to attack and destroy merchant vessels trying to

evade blockade, and

blockade includes the
aggression.

And

submitted that this remains the case,

it is

illegal

if such

118

that illegal destruction of a single

merchantman,

Even
.

.

if
.

it is

use of

likewise true

sailing independently,

likewise susceptible to condemnation, if the situation

under Article 3(d)'s "marine

illegal

destruction of blockade runners as part of unlawful

be true in the context of blockade, then

the Resolution formula.

then

is

serious enough,

would be
119

attacking a single merchant ship does not

fleets" principle, prior treaty

under

come

law and State practice

since 1945 points toward a strong potential of a finding of aggression for such an
attack.

120

The
1945

is

record of treaties negotiated before the Charter era and immediately after

mixed

as to

whether attacks on shipping constitute aggression; no recent

Some multilateral and bilateral
121
agreements categorize them as acts of aggression;
many do not. 122 For purposes
agreements have been concuded on the

issue.
•

'

of this analysis, however,

it is

most

'

significant that Iran

bound

itself twice,

and

Iraq once, to multilateral agreements specifically defining attacks on "vessels or
aircraft of another State" as acts of aggression.

men

as well as State ships?

Contemporary

tions, similar to the Definition list

123

Did "vessels" include merchant-

USSR proposals

without the

spoke of "knowingly attacking the naval or

latter's

air forces

in the

nonexclusivity clause,

of another State."

plying general principles for interpreting ambiguous treaty terms,
that the

it

merchantmen

faith in

their context

vessels,

i.e.,

The Vienna Convention on the Law
customary rule: "A treaty shall be interpreted

as well.

Treaties, Article 31(1) restates a

Ap-

would seem

unmodified words, "vessels" or "ships," meant not only State

warships, but

good

League of Na-

of
in

accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given the terms ... in

and in the

light of its object

and purpose."

125

The ordinary meaning

World Public Order

of "ship" or "vessel," unadorned by an adjective,
ing conveyance, military or commercial. This
era.

The USSR,

a

is

is

just that

—

it

connotes

119

all

seago-

reinforced by the context of the

primary promoter of an aggression definition, was

a socialist,

command economy, in which the State owned all commercial ships through
At the time the

ing companies.

immunity,

1

USSR claimed

an absolute theory of sovereign

jn

as distinguished

restricted forms of

immunity.

from
128

capitalist countries' acceptance of modified,

Although the

more narrow theory for aggression in League

USSR

debates,

might have advocated

129

to cover all ships.

certainty, but

Comments

commentators,

was broaden

Other countries' positions cannot be determined with

to the

Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of

States in Case of Aggression, proposed exclusively
130

a

when treaties were nego-

tiated with other, often capitalist, States, these conventions' coverage

enough

trad-

by US (and therefore capitalist)

support a view that "vessel" or "ship" meant

regardless of relationship with a registry State.

131

all

vessels or ships,

Moreover, including attacks on

merchantmen within a definition of aggression would further the treaties' policies
in

minimizing opportunity

for legally-sanctioned violence.

Language of multilateral agreements contemporaneous with the Charter were
inconclusive or would appear to have drifted toward a view that only attacks on

warships would constitute acts of aggression; however, examples given were
132

Thus there is some support in treaties for a view that States have
considered attacks on single merchantmen an act of aggression; this is particularly
non-exclusive.

true for Iran

and Iraq, whose treaty record is clearer than

that of most States.

1

33

"

To

be sure, the law of treaties says that treaties cannot create rights for third States unless these States accept

State practice since
to aggression.

an Italian

1

them, but treaty rules can

state

custom.

945 supports a view that attacks on single ships can amount

During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Syrian navy seized Romantica,

liner, later released

upon the Italian ambassador's

of the neutral Venus Challenger, sunk with

all

hands

intervention.

as a victim of an

135

Indian missile
1

during the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict, has been severely

Loss

36

criticized.

The

United States protested and responded with force

to

US-flag Mayaguez in 1975, claiming self-defense.

A US Court of Appeals found

Cambodia's seizure of the

Argentina liable for its attack on Liberian- flag Hercules outside a declared war zone
during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War.
If today

138

diminished in value because of failure of ratification

or acceptance

of the final text, draft multilateral treaties or single-action proposals carry

weight as

a

some

secondary source because of their authors' eminence as scholars.

These sources support a view that "vessels" include merchantmen sailing alone. In
this regard the 1933

on another

USSR proposal is interesting; it would have said the first attack

State's "naval or air forces"

Committee's 1933 draft Act Relating
this to the first attack

on another

was an

act of aggression.

to the Definition of the

State's "vessels or aircraft,"

The full League
Aggressor changed

some indication of

120
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accepting a broader definition of targets that could trigger a claim of aggression.

The 1939 Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression says that a single merchantmen,

Few

gression.

Charter

if

attacked, could trigger a claim of ag-

commentators

era

have

expressed

view,

a

independently of the "fleets" expression in Definition of Aggression, Article
3(d),

perhaps because

now

it is

obvious that an

If we

chant ship, traveling alone, can be an act of aggression.
ity

of the 1977 Hague Recueil

Tanker War began, the legal

on

initial attack

a neutral

mer-

presume availabil-

Baghdad and Tehran when the
rationale for destruction and loss of life may be predior

its

equivalent in

cated on this view, at least in part.

Although the record of claims and counterclaims

Appraisal.

submitted that an attack on

merchant

a

is

not clear,

ship, steaming independently

it is

on lawful

purposes, can be an act of aggression that can merit a self-defense response.

An

at-

tack on a man-of-war, sailing alone, can also be an act of aggression. Attacks on a

formation of warships, or on a

of merchantmen

fleet

a fleet of fishing trawlers)

(e.g.,

can be aggression that will support a self-defense response. As McDougal and
Feliciano and others have shown,
self-defense response,

any event.

tional in

149

and

148

not every "attack"

a self-defense response

serious

enough

to merit a

must be necessary and propor-

A target State may choose to make no response, or to counter

with retorsions or non-force reprisals,
measures. Moreover, some attacks
152

perhaps in connection with self-defense

may be

subject to defenses,

e.g.,

mistake, as in

Any proportional self-defense response to an assault

the Stark and Airbus cases.

perceived at the time

is

as an aggressive

armed

attack

is

legitimate.

Thus, the logical corollary of the principle in Article 2(4), prohibiting the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State,
or in any

manner

inconsistant with the

UN's purposes,

is

the principle ex-

Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice,

pressed in Article 2(3): "All

are not endangered."

A legacy from the League Covenant era, Article 2(3)'s lan-

guage has been restated in
Article 2(3),

The

international agreements.

commingled with the parallel

ticles 33-36,

b.

many

policies of the Charter,

substance of

Chapter VI, Ar-

has also been restated in the Friendly Relations Declaration.

The Inherent Right of Self-Defense Under Article 51; Other Concepts. As noted

above, Article 51's French language version (agression armee) connotes a broader

meaning than the English language phrase, "armed
along with the other
analysis

may

official

158

attack."

languages, are equally authentic but a commentator's

point to the English language version as the one to follow.)

other difference in meaning between Article 51's two versions

guage phrase, "inherent right of
naturel,"

i.e.,

(Both versions,

.

.

.

self-defense,"

which

the connotation of "natural right."

Thus

in

is

159

An-

the English lan-

French becomes "droit

there

is

an "inherent" or

—
World Public Order

"natural" right to self-defense by a State whenever there

The problem

against that State.

armed aggression

is

compounded by use of English

is

121

in important

treaty negotiations for 20 years before the Charter negotiations.

During negotiations leading

to the Pact of Paris,

which outlaws war

US Secretary of State Frank B.

strument of national policy,

cal notes to participants, stating that the draft

as

an in-

Kellogg sent identi-

Pact did nothing to "restrict or

impair in any way the right of self-defense inherent in every sovereign State and
implicit in every treaty." Self-defense was characterized as "inalienable"

"natural right," which "[e]very nation

"noted" the

US

free at all times

as

had other

and regardless of treaty

interpretation

Ultimately

States.

when

all

parties accepted or

the Pact was signed August 27, 1928.

About a year earlier the PCIJ had decided the Lotus

which strongly recog-

Case,

nized States' sovereignty to act as they chose in the absence of law.
eignty, although occasionally assailed

of international law.)

Under Lotus,

the law of self-defense as

it

by some,

(State sover-

remains a fundamental principle

States should

have been

as free to act within

then stood when their sovereignty was threatened by an

act of war that was a violation of law;
it

a

Great Britain had expressed a similarly broad view of

provisions" to exercise.
the matter earlier,

is

and

i.e.,

there was

no law to support the act. Thus if

be assumed that the self-defense gloss on the Pact of Paris carries over into the

UN Charter drafting less than a generation later, there is at least the possibility of a
latent ambiguity, if Article 51's English or

French version

carries with

it

a differ-

ent and broader right of self-defense than the other, a right extending back into

The same issue lurks

pre-Charter understandings of the scope of the right.
difference between
sault

— and

"armed attack"

"aggression

—with

its

in the

connotation of actual, physical

armet" "armed aggression," connoting

a

as-

lower threshold

for triggering a right of self-defense.

We have seen how Linnan's analysis, employing interpretation methods in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, was helpful in determining the meani

ing of "armed attack"
at stake

The most
right"

armee" in Article 5 1

fn

.

Since the same issues are

with respect to the point on the "inherent right"

omy, that method
-

"agression

will

-"droit naturel" dichot-

be employed to determine the meaning of this phrase.

recent authoritative

"droit naturel" in Article 5

pronouncement on the meaning of "inherent
1 is

the Nicaragua Case, where the ICJ accepted

the broader French version of Article 5 1 to state that the right of individual or collective self-defense is a matter of customary international law, as

Friendly Relations Declaration interpretation of Article

5

1

.

evidenced in the

Sohn has convinc-

ingly noted the similarity of language between the understandings to the Pact of
Paris

and the

"droit naturel"

language of the French text of Article 5 1

169
.

The Court

accepted the broad view of "inherent right" advocated by Bowett and others.

With respect to the "armed attack" the Definition of Aggression

171

"aggression armee" issue, the

170

Court agreed with

that sending armed bands, irregulars or mercenaries
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across a border was aggression,

regular forces.

172

where

The Case involved

amounted

this

73

an actual armed attack by

incursions across land borders, but

sonably clear that the Court accepted the French
1

to

text's slightly

it is

rea-

broader defini-

may be inferred that other forms of armed attack listed in the
also declare customary law. And if this is so,
Definition, e.g., naval blockade,
75
there may be other forms of aggression that customary law now defines as such
in a particular context to justify a self-defense response. The Court did hold, howtion.

Therefore,

it

1

ever, that cross-border assistance to rebels in providing weapons, logistics, or other

support was only a threat of use of force or perhaps intervention into the

of

affairs

another State, and therefore not enough to be characterized as an aggression so as
to justify action

by the target State in

Two dissents pointed out that

self-defense.

some situations involving logistics might be characterized as an armed attack, i.e.,
aggression.
parties

177

The Court declined to consider anticipatory self-defense issues;

had agreed

it

was not an

issue.

Although the Court's opinion
value in the

common-law

sense,

ever, entitled to great respect.

the

178
is

a

179
its

secondary source and has no precedential
recitation of

customary principles

is,

how-

Other Charter era instances of customary claims

for

national self-defense, particularly in the context of naval warfare, are ambiguous.

The
fense:

Definition of Aggression does not enlarge or contract the right of self-de-

"Nothing

ing the scope of the Charter, including

use of force

is

lawful."

States

other appropriate means,

There
parties.

is

183

recourse to

Convention Article 32

is

its

.

.

.

enlarging or diminish-

provisions concerning cases in which the

may respond

181

no evidence of a

Thus

be construed as

in this definition shall

to aggression in self-defense or
•

•

retorsion or nonforce reprisals.

e.g.,

by

182

meaning given Article 51 by the intent of the
supplementary means of interpretation under Vienna
special

necessary,

i.e.,

examining preparatory works. To be

sure,

use of preparatory works should not be considered as a second phase or as a resort

...

184

when ambiguity or obscurity remains,
but they do assume increased imporjoe
tance when Vienna Convention Article 31 analysis yields mixed results.
The Charter drafters negotiated against a background of the League of Nations
Covenant and the interwar years. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Charter
1

had no equivalent
that

to Article 51,

oz:

and the negotiating history of the conference

produced the Charter stated in part that "The unilateral use of force or similar

coercive measures is not

authorized or admitted.

defense remains admitted and unimpaired."

187
'

The

use of arms in legitimate self

(The Nicaragua Case

ished the opposing argument, that the right of self-defense
Article 51

which preempts any customary norm.)

If the right

is

188

has demol-

wholly confined to

189

remains "admitted and unimpaired," reference must be had

to the

latest

major agreement before the Charter concerned with the issue, i.e., the Pact of

Paris

still

in force with about 69 parties as of January

190
1,

1998,

and negotiations,

including general understandings, before signature and ratification.

There

1
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were no reservations concerning self-defense attached to the Pact; diplomatic correspondence constituting part of that
tions,

i.e.,

understandings.

Law

Convention on the

192

treaty's preparatory

works were interpreta-

Resort to analysis by analogy under the Vienna

of Treaties

193

confirms that the diplomatic correspon-

on the Pact contained understandings, not reservations. The Vienna

dence

Convention, Article 2(1 )(d), says a reservation

"a unilateral statement, however

is

phrased or named, made by a State when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving
or acceding to a treaty,

whereby it purports

modify the

to exclude or to

of certain provisions ... in their application to that State."
spective parties were transmitted June 23, 1928, two
Ratifications were exchanged

the Pact.

fense was not

much

The US

legal effect

notes to pro-

months before signature of
Moreover, since

later.

mentioned in the Pact, the diplomatic notes, even

if they

self-de-

might oth-

erwise be considered reservations, could not "exclude or modify the legal effect of
"

the treaty

In

effect, then,

the notes were "clarification[s] of the State[s'] posi-

tion," or "declarations of a purely explanatory character."

position of two

US

Secretaries of State

197

The contemporary

was that the self-defense corollary

Pact was an understanding, not a reservation.

to the

198

The Nicaragua Case confirms that a separate customary norm for
199
self-defense may exist alongside the Charter recitation in Article 5 1
Article 5
Appraisal.

•

•

.

says the right of individual

and collective self-defense is "inherent," the same word

used in the reservations

Such being the

for the Pact of Paris.

Article 5 1 applies to a situation, or whether a customary

the same.

The

right of individual

and

case,

whether

norm applies, the result is

collective self-defense as understood

and

practiced before ratification of the Charter continues unabated, subject to application of conditioning factors, e.g., developing custom, perhaps stated in resolutions

(the Definition of Aggression
law,

202

comes

including jus cogens norms.

to

mind);

treaties,

and other sources of

If the right of individual

self-defense has risen to the status of a jus cogens

and

collective

norm, as some have claimed, e.g.,

it

norms like Charter provisions not having;ws cogens
If another/ws cogens norm, e.g., the right to territorial integrity and politi-

takes priority over other treaty
205

status.

cal

independence recited in Charter Article

self-defense

i.

2(4), is involved, a jus cogens right of

must be balanced against the other jus

Individual Self-Defense.

tation through treaty

cogens norm(s).

When commentators' views and Article 51 's interpre-

canons analysis are considered,

207

self-defense has developed. "U.N. practice in Art. 51,

a relatively

composed

as

broad right
it is

to

of scanty,

vague and contradictory elements, says nothing, or at least nothing clear, about the

grounds for self-defense."

70S

Besides maritime conflicts, only a handful of situa-

tions have involved published self-defense claims

by a participant. In one of these,

the Security Council rejected Israel's anticipatory self-defense claim for

an Iraqi nuclear reactor.

its

raid

on

3

1
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In the Corfu Channel Case, referred to the ICJ by the Council,

second passage of UK warships, ready for action
to

oppose passage, was not

illegal

resulting loss of British lives

proving

if Albania

the Court said a

again tried to use force

because of Albania's prior Channel mining and

and

21

ships.

Waldock

interpreted the Court's ap-

UK readiness for Albanian attack as legitimate preparation for imminent

threat of attack.

(The case
self-help,

212

Using force

to

also decided that the

i.e,

defend the formation would have been

71

legal.

United Kingdom could not invoke forcible

necessity, to justify use of force; this

was held not legitimate in the

The decision did not mention Article 5 1
probably because Albania was not a UN Member when the Court's jurisdiction was invoked.
The
Charter

era.)

,

decision was based entirely on customary law. Although this aspect of the case was
little

noticed, Corfu Channel predicted the Nicaragua Case result three decades

later,

when the case confirmed a parallel customary self-defense norm, in the latter

decision coterminous with Article 51.

217

In 1948 the Security Council heard Jewish Agency for Palestine claims, before

became a State, that Transjordan and Egypt were guilty of aggression.
Transjordan (now Jordan) and the Arab League claimed self-defense to protect
Jordanian and Arab nationals and to restore peace, security and law and order. Belgium raised self-defense in the Council. Council resolutions did not mention
self-defense.
This was also true for Indian and Pakistani self-defense claims in
219
the 1948 Jammu and Kashmir dispute.
The beginning of the Korean War in 1950 again illustrates the point, in the colIsrael

lective security context.

Although Council resolutions condemned North Korean

aggression as a breach of the peace and called upon
forces

and refrain from

assisting

North Korea,

220

UN

Members

to assist

UN

the Council did not mention the

right of self-defense. Similarly, the General Assembly's Uniting For Peace Resolution, passed

when

the USSR's return to the Council and subsequent Soviet vetoes

made Council decisionmaking impossible, does not mention
ticle 51

acted.

fine

221

(Ar-

provides for a right of collective as well as individual self-defense, and the

United States ordered its forces
cil

self-defense.

222

to

come to the aid of South Korea before the Coun-

Hence, the Council could have, but did not, approve, disapprove or de-

South Korea's self-defense rights and other

States' self-defense efforts for

South Korea.)
In 195 1 , the Council rejected Egypt's self-defense claim for closing the Suez Canal to,

and

and asserting

a right of visit

a half years after hostilities

and search

of, Israeli

merchantmen over two

had ceased. The resolution

also noted that restric-

tions of passage of goods through the Suez Canal to Israeli ports were denying

valuable supplies to nations not connected with the conflict, and that these restrictions, together

with Egypt's sanctions on ships that had visited Israel ports "rep-

resent[ed] unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas

and

to trade freely

with one another, including the Arab States and

223
Israel[.]"
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(Commentators debate whether

a right of visit

125

and search during an armistice

ex-

l

there were more seizures and proThe resolution was not supported;
Five years later the
The USSR vetoed a second Council resolution.
tests.
United Kingdom justified its Suez Canal intervention on self-defense, to protect
its nationals; France, who combined with Britain in the sea-land operation, did
not do so. The justification seemed to lack factual foundation; it has been said Genists.)

eral
its

Assembly rejection of the UK argument "cannot be regarded

validity in law."

as conclusive to

228

From February- April 1957, however, US destroyers patrolled the Gulf of Aqaba
and the

Straits of Tiran to successfully prevent

Egyptian interference with

US flag

merchantmen bound for Israel; other US warships evacuated US citizens and
"friendly nationals" on a space-available basis from Haifa, Israel, and Alexandria,
During 1958-59 UK warships escorted and protected British fishing
Egypt.
trawlers in waters Iceland claimed as territorial sea.
ally

The United Kingdom eventu-

withdrew from the "Cod War," and diplomacy resolved the

230
issue.

In 1960

Belgium claimed a right to use force, but not based on self-defense, to extract its nationals

from the

strife-torn

During the Algeria

civil

Congo.

231

war France's self-defense claim

for intercepting

and

boarding or diverting vessels whose cargoes were suspected to be bound for Algerian rebels was protested vigorously by States whose flag the ships flew. France had

declared a 20 to 50 kilometer

(1

1-28 mile) customs zone off Algeria, but high seas

interception occurred off Algeria; 45 miles off Casablanca, Morocco; in the Atlantic

Ocean; and in the English Channel.

It is

not clear whether protests were di-

rected at interceptions wherever occurring, or for those outside the zone, i.e., in the

Atlantic and the Channel. Although a large-scale operation (4775 ships visited,

whose cargoes were seized
were smuggling arms to the rebels. Although arms were imported from the sea off
the Algerian coast, others were brought overland through Libya, Morocco or Tunisia, and then across the Algerian border, perhaps through a third State, e.g., Tunisia. Sometimes bogus shipping documents were used. Fishermen smuggled in
1330 searched, 192 rerouted,

arms.

232

1

arrested in 1956), ships

The Council did not pass

a resolution related to the matter.

In 1964 no Council resolution responded to a

of Tonkin (Maddox-Turner Joy) incident.
pects of the

Vietnam War were actions

733

US

From

self-defense claim in the

the

US

Gulf

perspective, other as-

in collective self-defense.

No Council decisions were in resolutions related to Israeli actions against Syria
(1964, 1966) and Jordan (1966).
(1966,

236

1969

237
)

235

Israel

and Lebanon (1968- 82

lutions were presented, the Council took

War.

was condemned for attacks on Jordan
238
),

however.

239

Although

no position during the 1967 Six-Day

During that war Egypt's submarines sank innocent Greek freighters in the

Mediterranean Sea, one off Alexandria and another further west.

warned

draft reso-

it

would

Britain

join other States to assure Straits of Tiran right of passage.

A UK
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group and the

carrier

nean, and a second

US

Sixth Fleet were concentrated in the Eastern Mediterra-

UK carrier was in the Red Sea, but nothing came of the show of
warship on the high seas in the eastern Mediterranean mon-

force. U.S.S. Liberty, a

itoring Israeli transmissions during the Egyptian phase of the war, was

an

Israeli

PT

for loss of life,

damaged in

boat and aircraft attack. Israel later compensated the United States

crew injuries and damage to Liberty, without admitting fault. Liberty

US ensign, was painted haze
grey like all US warships in the Mediterranean, and had traditional US white pendant numbers on the bow and stern. The attack occurred during daylight. US

was configured

forces

like a

merchant cargo ship but flew

were not allowed

to retaliate. Israel

a

had declared an imprecise exclusion

zone, warning ships to keep away from "the coasts of Israel during darkness."

what coasts (e.g., conquered territory also?), the warning was less than
formal private warning also had been given the United States.
claims were raised.

The Liberty

Israeli destroyer Eilat,

sumption of hostilities

a.

attack

An in-

self-defense

might be compared with the sinking of the

belligerent warship steaming

in

No

clear.

As to

on the high

during

seas,

re-

October 1967 Eilat was destroyed by Styx missiles fired

from an Egyptian patrol boat

in Port Said harbor.

Eilat attack occurred during a period of hostilities,

The

difference was that the

whereas the Liberty incident

came out of the blue.
In 1968 North Korea seized U.S.S. Pueblo, another electronic reconnaissance
warship, on the high seas, outside of claimed territorial waters. The crew was returned 11 months later. Other than diplomatic overtures, there was no US response,
and the United Nations did not act.
In the 1965 India-Pakistan conflict, Pakistan declared war, published

lists

of

absolute and conditional contraband, and established a prize court, asserting these

measures were lawful exercises of self-defense. India's position was ambivalent;

responded with an absolute contraband

acknowledged existence of

but

a war. Since India

it is

not clear as to whether India

responded with

its

contraband

this at least indicated that India considered itself an object of an

lists,

tack

list,

(if Pakistan

would be considered the

kistan's actions, if the latter

is

it

armed at-

aggressor), or entitled to respond to Pa-

taken as a self-defense response to Indian actions.

Late in 1 966 the General Assembly called on the belligerents to observe the rules of
warfare.

The

Apparently there were no self-defense claims.
1971 India-Pakistan war was over in two weeks;

sulted in attacks on
vessels

this conflict also re-

and destruction of innocent merchantmen. After dark, neutral

were not allowed

to

approach the Pakistan coast closer than 75 miles. The

Indian Navy sought to capture or destroy Pakistani merchant ships.

More than

neutral ships were inspected; India diverted neutral vessels to Calcutta

115

if they car-

ried cargo of military significance after India discovered that ship markings

and

names had been changed. Three Pakistani merchantmen were captured; a Liberian and a Spanish ship were also sunk. Two merchantmen were destroyed by
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Indian surface to surface missiles while

at

anchor in Karachi roadstead, and the

by

neutral inbound Venus Challenger was hit and sunk

Karachi. All hands were

lost.

lenger

was probably the

The

the bottom that

cause of destruction of Venus Chal-

missiles' "capricious behavior"

quate operation of guidance systems.
the Bengal

a missile 26.5 miles off

A Pakistani destroyer also went to

night, the target of a Styx missile attack.

127

and malfunction or inade-

A week after destruction of Venus Challenger,

Chamber of Commerce published its 40-mile dawn to dusk warning.

248

Again, apparently there were no self-defense claims.

Yom

Kippur War, international shipping was
warned about entering the region of conflict, which first comprised Egyptian and
Israeli territorial waters, but later further parts of the sea plus Egyptian, Libyan

During the 1973 Arab-Israeli

and Syrian

ports. In

October the Syrian navy captured and diverted a Greek

liner,

Romantica, which was released the next day after the Italian ambassador's intervention.

No

further such incidents occurred, perhaps because of international

protests, although

Egypt regularly stopped, visited and searched neutral mer-

chantmen. Third

States' reactions varied. African countries unilaterally sus-

pended or ended diplomatic relations with Israel; Arab countries boycotted oil
exports to Israel and the United States. Britain embargoed arms, and this largely
affected Israel; except for Portugal, other Western European nations refused to allow use of their
adopted a

territories for

supplying or assisting any belligerent. Arab navies

tactic of sheltering beside

missiles at Israeli warships.

merchant ships

in their harbors after firing

Egypt declared a blockade in the Red Sea and attacked

but missed an Israel-bound tanker. In the Gulf of Suez Egypt acted to blockade the

Abu Rudiers-Eilat route used by Israeli-chartered tankers carrying oil from the Israeli-occupied Sinai fields to Eilat. Responding to Egypt's blockade of the Straits

of Bab

el

Mandeb, Israel counter-blockaded the area.

249

Protests regarding Syria's

attack on Romantica are an indicator that States considered the attack a delict

perhaps also subject to self-defense reaction by Greece

spond with proportional

if Greece

had chosen

and

to re-

force.

UK fishing boat's trawl
wires. A UK frigate deployed outside the zone. The next year UK frigates entered
the zone after continued Icelandic harassment. Incidents involving UK and GerIn 1972 Iceland asserted a 50-mile fishing zone and cut a

man trawlers continued through

1973. In 1972 Britain

had sued Iceland

in the In-

ternational Court of Justice, the Court indicated interim measures in 1973,

and

in

1974 the Court held that Iceland could not bar Britain from historic waters. The
parties

were admonished

to negotiate differences.

At about the same time

US

fishermen experienced seizures of boats and crews, mostly off Latin America's
west coast and in the Gulf of Mexico, by States claiming territorial seas or eco-

nomic zones beyond those claimed by the United States. The US reaction was an
insurance system to secure crews' and boats' releases, coupled with US diplomatic
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251

protests.
252

waters.

Some

Western Hemisphere

countries' fishing boats were attacked in

There were no claims of self-defense

US

in responses.

Yom

Kippur War,
Libya declared the Gulf of Sidra below 32 degrees 30 minutes North latitude (the
In 1973, responding to

assistance to Israel during the

"Line of Death") as Libyan internal waters. The United States and other countries
protested; only a few States have recognized the claim since then.
States

The United

began challenging the claim by warships' use of the Gulf, establishing a

mal Freedom of Navigation (FON) program
two Libyan

cise,

253

air force jets

in 1979.

During a 1981

launched missiles against Navy

dodged the missiles and downed the Libyan planes. The United

for-

FON exerwhich

aircraft,

States asserted a

US warships and praised terrorists who hijacked the Italian liner Achille Lauro in 1985. Further US FON exercises were undertaken in the Gulf, including one below the Line of Death. US
right of self-defense. Libya escalated threats against

NOTMARs

and

NOTAMs

published these exercises. In 1986, after Libyan

land-based missiles were launched against
airspace but below the Line,
area, the

yan

aircraft flying in international

and Libyan aircraft penetrated an announced exercise

FON force commander declared any Libyan military forces leaving Lib-

territorial

missile patrol

would be considered
boats headed toward US forces,

target acquisition radars

were activated "with the evident

when Libyan

and Libyan shore-based
object of firing

The

US

waters or airspace and threatening

hostile. Thereafter,

aged.

Navy

upon U.S.

aircraft," the boats

boats were not attacked

forces

and radars were destroyed or dam-

when seeking

refuge alongside a neutral mer-

chantman or engaging in search and rescue operations. The United
a right of anticipatory self-defense.

States claimed

255

Although the United States notified the Security Council of its self-defense
sponses in the 1975 Mayaguez incident,

Libyan

aircraft over the

responded

to

Gulf of Sidra in

when US naval aircraft were attacked by
1981, and in 1986 when the United States

Libyan patrol boat advances, the Council passed no resolutions on

the situations.

In 1981

re-

756

US

257

forces operated

under the recently revised Peacetime Rules of En-

gagement (ROE), which provided "word picture[s]" giving commanders

listings

when

of military indicators of hostile intent to consider in self-defense,

i.e.,

was

response in an-

a

demonstration of a hostile intent to attack that could

ticipatory self-defense.

Although

ROE

justify

might authorize units

to

respond

there

to the

limits of principles of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, reaction in
a given situation

of self-defense.

might not

To

commanders

other responses. Although
that

responses under the law

the extent permitted by law, national policy and operational

plans and orders, force

monly known

rise to the line of permissible

US

US ROE

force

also

have discretionary judgment

have been classified in most cases,

commanders always have the

their unit(s). Failure to observe restrictive national

to

it is

make
com-

obligation to defend

ROE in protecting a unit under
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a legitimate claim of self-defense

the law of self-defense.

claim of self-defense;
self-defense

258
if

cannot result in

a

counterclaim of a violation of

In other words, ROE-based responses

the

ROE

response

is

129

more

may

articulate a

than the law of

restrictive

might permit, practice under the ROE cannot be interpreted as setting

ROE and the law of self-defense are therefore independent variables, although ROE cannot exceed the boundaries of the law.
the boundaries of self-defense.

During the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war, although the United Kingdom based
its military operation on Art. 5 1 no Council resolutions passed on the conflict took
,

a clear position

on the point.

259

On April 7,

1982 the United

Kingdom

200-mile Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ), to be effective April

shipping around the Falklands/Malvinas.
lished a Defensive Sea Area

auxiliaries

would be

Argentine

12, for

On April 23 the United Kingdom estab-

(DSA) or "defensive bubble" around

warning that approach by Argentine

declared a

On May

1,

task force,

warships or naval

civil or military aircraft,

dealt with "appropriately."

its

when

fighting started

MEZ was changed to a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) for ships
supplying the Argentine war effort. MEZ coverage was extended May 7 to sea areas
in the islands, the

more than 12 miles off the Argentine coast. Argentina had declared a 200-mile Defense Zone (DZ) off its coast and around the Falklands/Malvinas on April 1 3, after
having protested the UK action. MEZ enforcement capability came on the day it
?6ft

was

Presumably Argentina could have enforced

effective, April 12.

chose to do

so,

DZ if it

but after the cruiser General Belgrano sinking, Argentine naval

forces, except land-based naval aviation

the war.

its

and possibly submarines, did not figure in

On May 1 1 Argentina declared all South Atlantic Ocean waters a war zone,

threatening to attack any

UK vessel therein. Apparently the only neutral-flag ship

attacked by Argentina in the war zone was Hercules, a Liberian-flag,

US

inter-

ests-owned tanker in ballast. Although the USSR belatedly protested lawfulness of
the

UK TEZ,

UK TEZ.

it

did apparently not object to the Argentine

The United

owned by US

interests,

States

e.g.,

had published warnings

Hercules,

later the

US

two days before she was

1982, active hostilities in the war ended, but the

were continued. Ten days

to

DZ and observed the

TEZ

was

vessels
762

hit.

and ships

On July

12,

UK TEZ and economic sanctions
lifted,

but the United

Kingdom

warned Argentina to keep military ships and aircraft away from the islands, declaring a 150-mile Protection Zone.

Argentina succeeded in

airlifts to

The TEZ was

relatively successful,

although

the islands until the last days of the war. Appar-

ently Argentine sealift efforts failed.

In the Iran-Iraq war, although the Security Council recognized the right of free-

dom

of navigation and called for protection of the marine environment

context of belligerent and other States' self-defense claims,
cil

266

there was

war or exclusion zones,

in a

no Coun-

action to take charge of the conflict by decision, as the Charter provides.

belligerents declared defense,

265

267

Both

and aside from Council

resolutions calling for recognition of freedom of navigation rights

and protection
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of the environment,

269

the Council did not purport to regulate these.

No Council

resolution explicitly determined the validity of the self-defense claims of Iran or
Iraq.

Thus,

at least in

1986 when Combacau's analysis was published on Security

Council practice in defining self-defense, "whatever the

haps the

legal situation, the international

and

fore 1945: in the state of nature;

there."

270

The

latter part

.

.

.

community

is

.

of Combacau's conclusion

ried forward into Article 5 1
to the

271
.

The

.

back where

and per-

it

was be-

makes no sense

overblown, for we

is

as its concepts

may

were

at

car-

1990-91 Gulf War, the most serious challenge

Council since the Korean conflict, shed no light on the issue. Council Reso-

lution 661 merely confirmed the right of individual
stated in the Charter.

272

•

As Combacau

and powers of Charter

intimates,

institutions. Action

permanent members' concurrence,
Cold

.

the notion of self-defense

draw upon the understandings of the Pact of Paris,

least

ture

official pretence,

273

and collective self-defense

much

r

of this

is

due

when

allies,

and the Soviet veto was

friends or interests were involved.

the "sovereign equality of [UN]

.

.

.

Members,"

to the struc-

by the Council must be taken with

275
it is

r

a regular feature of

War politics. However, other countries (including the United

resolutions

as

States) vetoed

Mindful of this, and

no wonder that self-defense

has not figured strongly in Council resolutions, which nearly always have been

nonmandatory recommendations or

calls for action.

The General Assembly record is also relatively meager. Except for certain competences not relevant here, the Assembly's function

is

recommendatory and sub-

ordinate to the Council on matters related to international peace and security.
Article 12(l)'s requirement, that the

Assembly cannot make a recommendation on

a matter relating to international peace
it,

277

and security while the Council

is

seized of

explains the Assembly record in part. Usually States will complain to the Coun278

While the Council debates the matter, the As-

cil first, as

the Charter provides.

sembly

impotent. If the Council

is

acts,

even through nonmandatory

calls for

action or recommendations instead of binding decisions under Articles 25 and 48,
it

remains seized of the matter.

If vetoes stop

Council action on a particular crisis, it
279

may still remain seized of the matter, depending on its prior resolutions. On the
other hand, if the matter comes to the Assembly first, the Assembly may make recommendations

until the Council takes

it

up.

The Assembly's nonmandatory resolutions may recite, and therefore strengthen,
customary and treaty norms, or may lead to development of new norms, howCertain of these resolutions have asserted claims relative to self-defense.

ever.

General Assembly Resolution 378 (1950), companion to the Uniting for Peace
Resolution passed during the Korean War, recites these recommendations:
(a)

That
it

if a

take

State

all

becomes engaged

in

armed

conflict with another State or States,

steps practicable in the circumstances

and compatible with the right
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of self-defence to bring the armed conflict to an end at the earliest possible

moment;
(b)

In particular, that such State shall immediately, and in any case not later than

twenty-four hours after the outbreak of the hostilities,

a public state-

ment wherein it will proclaim its readiness, provided that the States with
which it is in conflict will do the same, to discontinue all military operations
and withdraw all its military forces which have invaded the territory or territorial water of another State or crossed a demarcation line, whether on terms
agreed by the parties to the conflict or under conditions to be indicated to the
United Nations;
parties by the
That such State immediately notify the Secretary-General, for communication to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations, of the
statement made in accordance with [(b)]
and of the circumstances in which
.

(c)

make

.

.

.

.

.

the conflict has arisen;
(d)

That such

State, in its notification to the Secretary-General, invite the appro-

priate organs of the United Nations to dispatch the Peace Observation

mission to the area in which the conflict has arisen,

if

the

Commission

Comis

not

already functioning there;
(e)

That the conduct of the States concerned in relation to the matters covered by
the foregoing recommendations be taken into account in any determination
of responsibility for the breach of the peace or act of aggression in the case un-

der consideration and in

all

other relevant proceedings before the appropriate

organs of the United Nations[.]

281

That same year the "Peace through Deeds" resolution "reaffirm[ed]
gression ...

is

the gravest of

all

prompt united action be taken

that

.

.

.

any ag-

crimes against peace and security" and "That

to

meet aggression wherever

282
it

arises[.]"

The

1970 Friendly Relations Declaration again condemned the threat or use of force,
declared a war of aggression to be a crime against peace, and added that "States

have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force." The Declaration added, however, that

or diminishing in any
cases in

"Nothing in

[its

terms should] be construed as enlarging

way the scope of the provisions of the Charter concerning

which the use of force

lawful,"

is

i.e.,

in self-defense.

Specific situations occurring in the Charter era offer little additional guidance
285

meaning of self-defense. The 1 950 UFP Resolution has been discussed.
In
1966 the Assembly belatedly called upon India and Pakistan to observe the rules of

to the

warfare, but only as the

war wound down.

Afghanistan invasion in 1982

Thus

it

statements,
tice,

might be
e.g.,

said, apart

it

and

US

The Assembly condemned the USSR
action in Grenada the next year.

from occasional forays into the

788

field or general

the Friendly Relations Declaration, that General Assembly prac-

even during the

UFP Resolution era occasioned by permanent Council mem-

ber vetoes, has been spotty.
as

787

The result is that the definition of self-defense remains

was in 1 945 when the Charter was negotiated in the context of the Pact of Paris

and other midcentury agreements.
analysis of commentators,

We are thus left with arguments from history,

and rhetoric from some of the

latter.
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ii.

Collective Self-Defense. Article 51 of the Charter permits collective self-de-

fense under the

same terms

as the right of individual self-defense. Certain aspects

of collective self-defense differ from the issue of individual self-defense. However,
if

the foregoing analysis for the right of individual self-defense

ultimate resort to the context of the Charter's drafting
analysis

is

is

is

correct,

i.e.,

that

necessary, then similar

necessary to appraise collective self-defense.

Unlike individual

States' right of self-defense,

which

is

of ancient lineage, the

notion of collective self-defense in the sense of the Charter began with the Congress of Vienna system (1815) established at the

continues on a parallel path to this day.

end of the Napoleonic wars and

Although there have been numerous

concluded since 1945, none of these were

di-

Tanker War. North Atlantic Treaty countries operated

to-

collective self-defense agreements
rectly at issue in the

289

meant they

gether during the conflict, but the territorial limits of the Treaty

operated under principles of "informal" self-defense, analyzed below. Similarly,

ANZUS Pact members, Australia 291 and the United States, were Tanker War
292
participants; ANZUS did not apply, covering only Pacific area defense.
Warsaw
two

Pact countries were participants, the

USSR

through naval deployments, aid and

diplomacy and other Soviet Bloc nations through weapons

sales to belligerents,

but there was no perceived direct threat to or attack on any Pact party except for
tacks on USSR-flag

League

States

merchantmen, and the Pact was not invoked.

were involved in the war, but

within the League,

at least at the

a

League seems

to

its

beginning of the Tanker War,

a treaty.

298

pointed only toward outside ag-

The Arab

as a regional

arrangement

and security pursuant

to Article 52

there has been no formal publication of this ar-

The strategy can be viewed as an example of informal collec-

tive self-defense, also permissible

The Charter thus

and an apparent

late in the

to a collective self-defense pact,

rangement as

295

Tanker War the Gulf Cooperation Council
comprehensive security strategy that some have said amounts

Although

Summit approved a

Many Arab

not being invoked against either belligerent.

that attempted to maintain international peace

of the Charter.

296

have functioned during the Gulf War

297

"contains the

under the Charter.
first real

299

attempt to reconcile the imposition of

duties to maintain international peace and security with the problem posed

freedom which each sovereign State normally would have[,]

how such a duty may be fulfilled."
cle 5

1

at-

combination of internal dissension

interpretation that this regional defense treaty

gressors resulted in

294

293

to decide

by the

when and

Given the context of the preparation of Arti-

while the Act of Chapultepec was going forward to signature,

McDougal

and Feliciano are correct in saying that the essence of the right of collective self-defense

lies in

maintaining international peace and security through collaborative

arrangements among

States.

302

1
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Other Regional Organizations: Article 52 of the Charter.
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The structure of the Charter

and practice since 1945 confirm theMcDougal-Feliciano view. Article 52(1) of the
Charter provides:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements
or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international
peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations.

Thus, "the Charter basis of collective self-defense arrangements in Article 51 does
not exclude the possibility that other provisions of the treaties and activities of the
agencies in question

came under

Article 52."

leading up to the approval of the Charter,
in connection with the

.

.

.

303

Indeed, "[fjrom the discussions

regionalism was considered primarily

maintenance of international peace and security."

Although formed for other purposes in 198 1, the Gulf Cooperation Council had

moved from

its initial

stated goal of cooperation to protect internal security to a

policy of cooperating in economic and defense security by the end of the war.

the end of the war

GCC members

305

By

were cooperating among themselves for mine

suppression and other measures, and with other States with navies in the Gulf.

The Arab League also partook of a collective defense treaty and economic cooperation system.

II.

307

Practice During the Charter Era; "Informal" Collective Self-Defense. Prior practice

confirms the view that a right of informal self-defense, besides Article 51's confir-

mation of the inherent right of collective self-defense,

Although there was some objection
308

to the

exists in the Charter era.

concept of regional defense arrange-

number of these agreements, articulating the principle that an attack
309
on one member is an attack on all, have been concluded and remain in force.
ments,

a

State practice has also confirmed regional arrangements,

sometimes ad hoc,

to deal

with threats to the peace, aggression or other forms of breaches of the peace. There

have also been bilateral or multilateral assertions of collective self-defense, often
without formal prior treaty arrangement.

Lack of a definition of self-defense by the Council or the Assembly
rean

War has been noted.

rected) after Soviet vetoes

310

If it is

assumed

that

in the

UN operations (primarily US di-

began in 1950 could not have been grounded in the UFP

Resolution, since General Assembly resolutions have no binding effect,

theory of the multilateral operations in Korea after the

USSR veto

is

collective self-defense, i.e., cooperating countries pooled forces to resist
rea's

continued aggression and the

contemporaneous

US

Ko-

naval

PRC

incursion.

operations

one

"informal"

North Ko-

The same might be

between

31

said for

Taiwan and the China

8
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mainland.

312

For the United States and South Korea or Taiwan,

treaties replaced informal

The
after

1951

bilateral defense

arrangements in 1953 and 1954 respectively.

ANZUS Pact was memorialized Australia-New Zealand-US practice

World War

II

and during the Korean War, another example of informal

col-

lective self-defense.

OAS

In 1962,

countries,

under

US

leadership, relied on Charter Article 52,

which permits regional organization resolution of disputes,
quarantine around Cuba during the Missile Crisis.

to enforce a naval

The US proclamation

lishing the quarantine, besides citing the Rio Treaty, also relied on a

estab-

US Congres-

The proclamation was specific as to
missiles, bombs, bomber aircraft, warheads, and support

sional resolution recognizing the threat.

cargoes to be halted,

e.g.,

equipment, "and any other classes of material hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense [to] effectuate" the proclamation.

foodstuffs

and petroleum, and declared neutral

It

exempted other cargoes,

rights

e.g.,

would be respected. No

blockade was declared, and the proclamation limited use of force to situations

where directions under the quarantine were disobeyed

made

if

reasonable efforts were

communicate directions to an interdicted vessel, "or in case of self-de(The Rio Treaty authorized "partial or complete interruption of economic

to

fense."

relations or of

.

.

.

sea

communications; and use of armed

measures, parallelling Charter Articles 41-42).
the proper claim,

317

and others

force[,]"

among

other

While some said self-defense was

later asserted that the

Nicaragua Case would have

held the quarantine action a matter of anticipatory self-defense,

1962 claim was based on Article 52 and not Article 51.

31

the

The point is

OAS-US

that Article 52

organizations can organize for informal collective self-defense in situations threat-

ening regional security without benefit of an Article 51 collective self-defense
treaty.

The

Missile Crisis thus might arguably be further precedent for informal

under the Charter.

self-defense

The 1964

attacks

on U.S.S. Maddox and Turner Joy (the Gulf of Tonkin

Inci-

319

The conflict connecting these incidents, the Vietnam
War, is an example of a claim of informal collective self-defense. The US position
during the Vietnam War was that it and South Vietnam (RVN) were jointly resistdent) have been analyzed.

ing North Vietnamese aggression and therefore were acting in self-defense. (There

were other views; e.g.,
eration

it

was a civil war.)

370

r

During the conflict, patrol areas for Op-

Market Time, which sought to deny seaborne supplies

was extended

to 30 miles off the

South Vietnamese

to

RVN opponents,

coast. Initially

Market Time

operations took place in a 12-mile defensive sea area. North Vietnam used small
coastal fishing vessels to support military logistics in the South.
coastal traders

were allowed to pass when on legitimate business.

Fishermen and

321

In

1

972

a

mine

quarantine program in North Vietnamese waters sought to seal North Vietnam
377

RVN's attempted quarantine to stop sealifted
supplies coming to the Viet Cong through the Gulf of Siam and the Mekong Delta.

ports.

Its

antecedent had been the
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A RVN destroyer sank a North Vietnamese trawler, believed to be carrying ammunition, in 1972 during these operations.

323

During the war the United States used Military Sealift Command vessels, US
flag charters and occasionally foreign-flag vessels to deliver war material. Several
ships were hit; two were sunk by Viet Cong attacks while in South Vietnamese
coastal waters.

The Viet Cong seem not to have discriminated between vessels car-

rying war material and civilian-oriented cargoes,

e.g.,

rine protection was given high value ships, e.g., troop carriers.

claimed
feet, its

US

cement.
325

antisubma-

While some have

SEATO may have applied, and its formal treaty obligations remain in efsupporting organization had been dismantled by 1975,

and US

assis-

tance to South Vietnam might be characterized as another example of informal
collective self-defense.

On the face of it, the Tanker War was a bilaterial conflict. However, as analyzed
above,

377

some

States or groups of States acted to favor

one (or in some cases both)

of the belligerents throughout the war. As in the case of the Falklands/Malvinas

War (1982) and unilateral US help for Britain and the multilateral EC embargo on
Argentine goods,

328

this

kind of participation arguably could be said

an interim state of nonbelligerency in the Charter era.
participation

329

to recognize

The same sort of informal

and influences or attempted influences came through organizations

common defense
interests elsewhere (NATO), common economic interests (the EC and the Group
330
of Seven), and ethnic or religious commonality (the ICO and the Arab League).
aligned along geographic lines (the Gulf Cooperation Council),

States also

had informal arrangements among themselves.

clearing agreements are an example.

was available

to third-State

ments permitted,

is

331

Italy's bilateral

The US statement that US Navy protection

merchantmen, upon request and

another.

332

The

mine

clearest

if

US naval commit-

example of informal self-defense

ar-

rangements was the December 1987 comprehensive security strategy adopted by
the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The belligerents

also

333

made arrangements

that did not rise to the level of a for-

mal Article 51 self-defense agreement or an Article 52 regional arrangement,
least

on the public record.

war through petroleum
tries.

at

A notable example was the belligerents' financing their

sales

Arms and other sales

and

their importing

to belligerents

war goods through third coun-

might be seen

as

another example

of an informal arrangement. Below these governmental efforts were the effects of
organizations,^., the General Council of British Shipping, seafarers' unions, and
the marine insurance industry.

No formal agreements like the multilateral or bilateral defense treaties of the Cold War era were involved in the Tanker War. How-

III.

Appraisal for the Tanker War.

ever, as with prior conflicts since 1945,

of States aided one side or the other.

e.g.,

Falklands/Malvinas, States or groups

When

States that

were not belligerents
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concerted together, these amounted to informal collective defense assistance

rangements, sometimes with a belligerent and sometimes

among

ar-

other countries

not party to the conflict. There was precedent for this action before and during the

Charter

337
era.

It is

arguable, for example, that the 1990-91 coalition assembled

against the Iraqi invasion of
self-defense, to the extent that

Kuwait was governed by principles of informal
there were no formal collective self-defense treaties

among coalition countries, before the Security Council authorized force in November
1990.

338

After and to the extent the Council became seized of the matter, coalition

actions were governed by Security Council decisions.

Whether claims of informal

339

amount

collective self-defense

to a resurgence of

the pre-Charter concept of an interim legitimate stage of nonbelligerency, between

belligerency and neutrality,

is

neutrality or belligerency.

nonbelligerency

It

an open question.

Many

would seem, however,

may have crept in through

States recognize only

that

it

is

possible that

the door of practice under the Charter

between 1945 and 1988, before the end of the Cold War. Whether this will continue
with revitalization of the Security Council since 1989 and the USSR's collapse

is

only a guess. If the Council continues relatively powerless, by the veto or adoption
of nonbinding recommendations or calls for action, or

cedure

is

if

the

UFP Resolution pro-

revived with a veto-paralyzed Council, that door remains open.

would seem, however, that a distinction between belligerency and neutrality
can be retained by referring to informal collective self-defense for some situations,
Whether
e.g., US and EC support of Britain during the Falklands/Malvinas War.
informal collective self-defense can sustain actions in all situations must be left to
speculation. The problem lies in a definition of the contours of the doctrine. It is
It

fairly clear, for

example, that there is a customary right for formal treaty partners to

consult before action, and that consultation can include preparation for anticipatory collective self-defense.

It is

also fairly clear that the inherent right to collective

self-defense includes a right of anticipatory self-defense,

however that might be

limited by principles of necessity, proportionality and admitting of no alternative

Presumably informal collective self-defense includes a

in a particular situation.

right of consultation, but does

it

include a right of anticipatory response? If the re-

cord of informal collective self-defense is sparse in the Charter era, claims to a right
of anticipatory response appear to be even
in the century

and a half of prior practice;

maritime arena since 1914,
point.

Lack of media

There

is

one

scarce.

may have

There are few reports of it

there may be many, particularly in the

but the record of State practice

interest, space considerations

gests of national practice like

tional security,

more

Whiteman,

resulted in

critical difference

lack of

and

is

relative

not clear on the

importance in

commentary by

di-

scholars, or na-

no or only episodic reportage.

between collective self-defense claims, whether

anticipatory or otherwise, published in treaties and those asserted under a right of

informal self-defense. Today most treaties are published, perhaps

first

in informal
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sources, e.g., International Legal Materials, but nearly always later in national series,
e.g.,

United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, and perhaps in the

United Nations Treaty Series, although International Legal Materials
publication and the latter two

may be

ments are never published, due

is

decades behind in printing.

selective in

Some

agree-

and these

to national security considerations,

may often deal with defense issues. However, at least for published treaties, there is
perhaps qualified or explained by practice. By
some public notice of their terms,
definition, there
tive self-defense

no similar method of notice by publication of informal collecarrangements, except what might be deduced from government
is

notices or the media.

It

would seem, however,

that to avoid claims of unprovoked

aggression under Article 2(4) of the Charter, States should notify informal collective

arrangements except where security considerations militate against publicity.

Notices to Mariners.
ing the Tanker

(NOTMARs) and Airmen (NOTAMs) were employed

War to publicize defense, war or exclusion

self-defense action.

day,

e.g.,

Even

as a

dur-

zones and warnings of

requirement of treaty publication

is

qualified to-

States in informal collective

for national security considerations,

self-defense arrangements should consider publishing their terms.

iii.

Reporting Self-Defense Measures to the Security Council. The Charter also

requires that "Measures taken

by Members in

[the exercise of this right of] self-de-

fense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council

and

any

shall not in

way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Council under the
Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
.

international peace and security."

350

.

.

.

.

.

There is little ambiguity in this requirement,

which is not part of customary international law, according to the Nicaragua Case,

which added

that failing to report

"may be one

of the factors indicating whether

the State in question was itself convinced that it was acting in self-defense."

351

The

question might be raised, particularly in view of the Court's position that a parallel

customary law of self-defense has developed alongside Charter
352

51,

how reporting could be

reporting requirement

is

fense" in Article 51

a "factor" for a

criteria in Article

customary law of self-defense

if

the

not a part of customary law. Use of "this right of self-de-

underscores requiring reporting only in Article 51 -gov-

erned situations. Whether an Article 51 reporting requirement applies in cases of
informal collective self-defense, also permissible under the Charter,

known and perhaps depends on whether a
tive self-defense

is

not

State claims a right to informal collec-

under Article 51 or under customary

law.

In any event, the Article 51 reporting requirement appears to have been hon-

ored more in the breach.

355

A commentator has argued, however, that failure to re-

port at least indicates that measures taken are not defensive in nature.

356
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iv.

Anticipatory Self-Defense.

The

right of anticipatory self-defense,

Caroline Case
a target State

i.e.,

the classic statement of the

is

may

resort to self-defense be-

armed attack where the necessity for that defense is "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." The
action then taken must not be unreasonable or excessive, i.e., it must be proportional to the threat; it must also be necessary. The Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals
fore an actual

recognized a right of anticipatory self-defense, holding the Netherlands could rely

on

it

to justify attack

could not rely on

it

on Japan before

to justify attack

a

formal war declaration but that

on Norway.

Germany

357

Does the right of anticipatory self-defense carry forward into the Charter era, or

must a

State "take the first hit" before responding in self-defense, i.e.,

tive" self-defense permitted?

Commentators

on the issue. Commentators

and countries

fense, anticipatory or reactive,

is

except to say that

appropriate.

•

and countries

359

is

only "reac-

divide sharply

may also divide on when self-deThe Charter is silent on the point,

UN Members retain the "inherent" right of individual and colSome com-

The Nicaragua Case did not rule on the issue.

lective self-defense.

and undoubtedly some

mentators,

358

States,

have seemed

to

change views. Others

have taken no clear position.
If the
5

1

methodology of treaty interpretation

has been ambiguous. Bowett notes the

report,

which said

rity

employed, practice under Article

UN Atomic Energy Commission's initial

a right of self-defense

arms treaty committed

is

would

where

arise

a party to a nuclear

He also cites

a "grave" violation of the treaty.

the Secu-

Council discussion over the Kashmir invasion, justified by Pakistan on antici-

patory defense grounds, where only India argued against the view.

367
'

In 1952 the

UN Sixth Committee heard four States argue that a State threatened with impending attack might be justified to respond in self-defense.

2f.Q

The Definition of Aggression resolution includes specific examples not involving armed attack on a State but which are nevertheless considered aggression un-

der the Charter: blockade of ports or coasts which,

if

complied with,

results in

no

use of force, merely a threat of use of force; "use" of armed forces of a State, within a
host State's territory by the host's agreement, but contravening conditions in the

agreement
sult

initially entitling the visiting

armed forces

to

when such forces are "used" in nonforce situations.

exclusive

370

be there, which might

re-

The enumeration is not

and could include other circumstances involving

threat of force that

could trigger a potential for self-defense response. If acts of aggression can justify a
proportional self-defense response,

it is

implicit in the Assembly's approval of

these as per se acts of aggression by which an anticipatory self-defense response

could be triggered.

The case of blockade
State,

to

no armed attack

is illustrative.

When blockade is declared against a target

will occur if there are

no ships

to intercept.

There

is

no way

determine the blockade's effectiveness until interceptions occur or ships

.

World Public Order

goal

— intercepting and possibly destroying
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end the blockade before

successfully evade blockade. If a target State acts to

target State ships

—occurs,

—

its

a target

would be exercising anticipatory self-defense. Thus if armed aggression
371
includes blockade as custhe French version of "armed attack" in Article 51
372
then target State action to end a blockade may include anticipatory
tomary law,
State

—

self-defense.

The

and countries on admissibility of anticipatory

division of commentators

self-defense as an option has been recited.

373

Dinstein offers an intermediate posi-

tion of "interceptive" self-defense, permitted if a State "has

committed itself to an

armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way. Whereas a preventive strike [i.e. ,2mticipatory self-defense] which is merely 'foreseeable' (or even just 'conceivable') an
interceptive strike counters an armed attack which is 'imminent' and practically
'unavoidable.'
He cites a scenario based on the Japanese task force ordered to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941:
[h]ad

[it]

been destroyed on

its

way

to Pearl

Harbor, this would have constituted

not an act of preventive war but a miraculously early use of counter-force

[P]ut

.

.

another way, the self-defence exercised by the United States (in response to an

armed

incipient

attack)

would have been not anticipatory but interceptive

in

nature.^
Dinstein thus

opening

fire in

the 1967 Arab-Israeli con-

The hypothetical interception to end a naval war in

flict.

ter era, is

return
to the

justifies Israel's first

1941, before the Char-

undoubtedly true today, if the Japanese task force was past the point of no

(i.e., it

could not be recalled) and

United States

at the time.

377

it

was reasonably clear from

facts available

The same can be said of Israel's 1967 attack on

Egypt.
Dinstein's analysis does not mention Israel's 1981 raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor,

condemned by the

during

a

Security Council and others, arguing that the raid

continuing state of war between Iraq and

378
Israel,

came

nor does he mention

tactical aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Israeli attack on the U.S.S.
379
Liberty, and destruction of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by missiles.
Liberty was a

two

US warship operating in international waters of the Mediterranean Sea, gathering
intelligence for the United States, when it was attacked by Israeli aircraft and PT
boats.

The

attack clearly violated international law and, as an act of aggression,

could have subjected Israel to
Eilat's loss, also

US

on the high

proportional self-defense responses.

seas,

due

to

an Egyptian gunboat's Styx missiles

launched in Port Said harbor occurring during
trates the

a

resumption of the

change in naval warfare between 1941 and 1967.

not raise the self-defense issue, since

it

occurred during

380

conflict, illus-

(This attack could

hostilities, rather

than

at

the beginning of hostilities.) Rather than a battleship and carrier formation steam-

ing at 20-30 knots to a position off Hawaii where

it

could launch raids flown by
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aircraft

with top speeds of 400 miles an hour, thus giving days or at least hours for a

target State to anticipate

and deliver an interceptive strike, missile attacks from the

same range come in minutes. Moreover, a missile attack is nearly always fatal. One
can compare Eilat's loss in 1967, the sinking of Venus Challenger and a Pakistani destroyer during the 1971 India-Pakistan war,

ships during the Falklands/Malvinas war,
383

381

382

losses

oiH.M.S.

and U.S.S.

Sheffield

and other

Stark's near loss during

many ships during the World War II
Kamikazi attacks, where hundreds of manned Japanese suicide planes crashed US
warships. Aside from aircraft carriers and battleships, World War II men-of-war
were smaller and equally fragile, yet they took many hits before sinking, and most
the Tanker War,

survived.

384

with survival of

New occasions

national law

treaty regime.)

new

remain credible,

is to

(That, of course,

teach

is

it

duties

must

and

responsibilities,

385

and

if inter-

parallel technical developments.

the function of custom as opposed to a potentially rigidified

387

Dinstein's interceptive defense theory seems but another phrase for anticipatory self-defense in the Pearl

Harbor attack hypothetical.

He

is less

than clear

about the situation of an anticipated attack on an independently-steaming warship
before armed conflict begins. However, as events in the Tanker
incidents demonstrate,
fense

/.

388

some

States have asserted a right of anticipatory self-de-

or interceptive defense as Dinstein

Libya-US

lustrate the

War and previous

would formulate

it.

Libya-US confrontations from 1973 through 1986

Confrontations.

il-

two views of the scope of self-defense.

In 1973, responding to

US

assistance to Israel during the

Yom

Kippur War,

Libya declared the Gulf of Sidra below 32 degrees 30 minutes North latitude (the

"Line of Death")

as

Libyan

territorial waters.

The United States challenged the claim by warships' use of the Gulf of Sidra, establishing a formal Freedom of Navigation (FON) program in 1979. In 1981, during a FON exercise, two Libyan air force jets launched missiles against Navy
aircraft, who dodged the missiles and downed the Libyan aircraft with missiles.
Under anyone's view of the right of self-defense, the Navy aircraft had a right to
fire in

response to the prior Libyan missile attack;

it

was an example of reactive

self-defense.

Tensions again mounted in 1985-86. Libya escalated threats against
ships and praised the terrorists

who had

US

war-

hijacked the Italian liner Achille Lauro.

New US FON exercises were ordered off Libya, including one below the Line. US

NOTMARs

and

NOTAMs

land-based missiles against

publicized the operations. After Libya launched

Navy

aircraft flying over international waters

below

the Line, and Libyan aircraft penetrated the announced exercise area in international waters, the

FON

force

commander

declared that Libyan military forces

leaving Libyan territorial waters or airspace and constituting a threat to

US

units
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would be considered hostile. Thereafter, when Libyan missile patrol boats headed
toward US forces, and Libyan target acquisition radars activated with a likely object of firing on US aircraft, the Libyan boats and radars were attacked and damaged or destroyed. In these cases the

US

claim was anticipatory self-defense,

taking action to protect ships or aircraft after hostile intent
in an attack profile or illuminating

US

aircraft

(e.g.,

closing

US

i.e.,

ships

with target acquisition radar) was

US

manifested. There was, of course, no obligation for

forces to attack or desist

from attacking the Libyan vessels or aircraft, but there was the option to do so, subject to limitations

forces did not fire

side a neutral
tions,

which

of self-defense, i.e., necessity and proportionality.

390

Indeed,

US

on Libyan missile patrol boats when they sought refuge along-

merchantman or were engaged in legitimate search and rescue operaillustrate these principles.

US Navy and Air Force planes bombed terrorist operations centers in Libya after two US citizens were killed in a Berlin disco terrorist bombing.
The US hard evidence was that Libya was responsible for the disco bombing and
was planning further terrorist attacks on US military and diplomatic facilities in
In April 1986

Europe.

The United States claimed self-defense conditioned by necessity and pro-

portionality as the basis for the operation. French,
curity Council resolution

condemning the

II The Tanker War. The Tanker
self-defense,

i.e.,

raid.

UK and US vetoes blocked a Se-

391

War produced numerous

examples of reactive

self-defense after an initial attack, as well as anticipatory self-

defense, both individual and informal collective self-defense.
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Iraq responded to Iran's shelling of Iraqi towns in 1980 with a three-front invasion of Iran, claiming self-defense.

393

If it is true that the shelling

sive to Iraqi invasions, Iraq's claim of self-defense

hand,

was

if

was legitimate.

a proper self-defense response

Charter Article

2(4).

by

Iran,

and the

the other

latter situation, the

Iraqi invasion could not be

invasion was a clear violation of

Use or threat of use of force

in response to legitimate self-

defense action cannot be claimed as self-defense. Since
lution 479 was a "call" for cessation of hostilities,
a strong political, but not a legal, obligation

Both belligerents declared war zones.
its

On

Iranian shelling responded to prior Iraqi acts of aggression, the shelling

claimed as self-defense. In the

was

was not respon-

coasts a

war zone, closed the Shatt

396

al

UN Security Council Reso-

and not a "decision,"
on the belligerents

to

there

comply.

After the Iraqi invasion, Iran declared

Arab, refused access to Iraqi ports, and

warned of retaliation if other countries gave Iraq facilities. Iran said the zone declaration was for defense and for safety of shipping. Iraq's war zone was north of
29-30N in the Gulf and was reportedly reprisal, or retaliation, for the Iranian war
zone declaration.
Iran's

war zone declaration was legitimate

its territory.

397

for Iran's coasts,

which were part of

Although the Shatt al-Arab and Iraqi ports were part of the area of
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had occupied the area or they were

conflict, unless Iran

vital to its defense, Iran

could not lawfully announce their closure to States not party to the conflict.
less

could Iran issue a generalized warning of retaliation against these States

gave Iraq

facilities,

aggressor. Since Iraq

member,

arrangement

this treaty

had withdrawn from the Baghdad Pact,

to assist Iraq as the

398

and was not a GCC

Iran could not claim that these regional arrangements were assisting

was

Iraq. Iraq

if they

unless States were parties to a collective defense agreement or

arrangement with Iraq and employed
399

Still

States, to the

a party,

with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other Arab

and it may have been

Arab Joint Defense Treaty,

rangement that Iran directed its warning.

It

to this

Treaty ar-

would have been entirely legitimate, if

Iran committed aggression by shelling Iraqi communities, for the Treaty States to

have collaborated with Iraq in collective self-defense.

Although Iran could warn

of retaliation, this did not deprive the Treaty States of their right to assist Iraq with
collective self-defense responses.
e.g.,

by bombing raids on

The Treaty

States

their territory if they did, but they could not be deprived

of their treaty obligation by the Iranian warning.
aggressor,

e.g.,

by invading

On the other hand, if Iraq was the

Iran, the Treaty States could not aid Iraq pursuant to

Under no circumstances could

the Treaty.

might have paid consequences,

Iran claim a right of retaliation

against States not party to any defense treaty or other similar arrangement with
Iraq,

States

e.g.,

the Gulf,

United

e.g.,

whose shipping

sailed the Gulf, or

France, Liberia, Panama,

USSR,

whose shipping

the United

interests used

Kingdom, and the

States.

Whether the

Iraq

war zone declaration was

terms of area, duration,

Chapter V.

If Iran

etc., is

addressed later in this chapter

was the aggressor when

Iraq war zone, later

named

a legitimate reprisal, or

it

and

was

legal in

in Part

F of

shelled Iraqi communities, then the

the Gulf Maritime Exclusion

Zone (GMEZ), was

gitimate self-defense measure, subject to proportionality,

etc.,

a le-

considerations.

The same is true for the zone's extension, again subject to the same limitations.

On

the other hand,

were not

if

Iraq was the aggressor, then the war zones, and the

legal self-defense

1981, with a goal of coordinating, integrating and

interconnecting, inter alia self-defense,

among

its six

western Gulf

was legitimate under Charter Articles 51-52, even though

littoral

its

ment.

mem-

self-defense

terms were never spelled out like most collective defense treaties. This too

ample of

GMEZ,

measures.

The GCC's establishment in
bers,

"

is

an ex-

a legitimate "informal" multilateral collective self-defense arrange-

Similarly,

it

was legitimate

for Saudi

Arabia to request

US

Air Force

AWACS aircraft surveillance, and for the United States to agree to the operation,
in 1981.

rangement.

This

is

an example of a legitimate informal bilateral self-defense

ar-

In neither case, however, could these informal arrangements be

used to aid an aggressor.
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The shuttle convoys carrying oil as part of Iran's warfighting, war-sustaining effort down Iran's Gulf coast and through the Iraqi zone were given Iranian naval
These vessels were entitled to self-defense protection by Iran. If Iran

protection.

was correct in asserting that

it

was

a target of Iraqi aggression, these fleets of ves-

Even if they sailed alone,
perhaps with naval escort or perhaps independently, these vessels would be conif Iraq is deemed to have been the aggressor
sidered targets of Iraqi aggression,
at the beginning of the war. If, on the other hand, Iran was the aggressor, the atsels, if attacked

by Iraq, were also targets of aggression.

tacks were subject to the law of naval warfare.

The same
tacks

analysis applies for Iranian visits, searches

and diversions

or

at-

on vessels bound for Iraq with military equipment, e.g., the Danish flag vessel
or from Iraq with warfighting or war sustaining cargo

Elsa Cat,
if Iraq

was the aggressor. Similarly, if Iraq was the aggressor, and

sisting Iraq,
fort, it

and

if, e.g.,

a

Kuwaiti survey vessel

was properly subject

self-defense.

(i.e.,

aboard,

oil)

if Kuwait

was

as-

was assisting the Iraqi war

ef-

to search, seizure or detention as part of Iranian

These ships were also subject to search, seizure or detention as part of

the law of naval warfare

if

Iran was the aggressor.

Security Council Resolutions 514, 522 and 540 of 1982 and 1983, calling for a
ceasefire, refraining

from any action that might endanger peace and

security, ces-

sation of military operations against civilian targets, observing humanitarian law,

and affirming the right of freedom of navigation, were not Council decisions pursuant to Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter.
sue.

The

effect

They did not speak to the self-defense is-

of incorporation of humanitarian law,

etc.,

by reference

in these

them to Charter law. At least insofar as conflicts between treaties and the resolutions and practice under them, and perhaps insofar as there was a
resolutions elevated

difference between

macy.

418

custom paralleling the

The same is

treaties, the

true of other resolutions; they

Charter practice held pri-

may have condemned action,

advocated observance of the LOAC, freedom of navigation, or protection of the en-

vironment, but in no case did they remove a State's right of self-defense, which under the Charter trumped any treaty law and perhaps also customary norms.

In January 1984 the United States announced

warships in

new

419

defensive measures for

its

NOTAMs and NOTMARs. These procedures, a "defensive bubble" or

"cordon sanitaire"

around the ship(s)

for a stated distance

on the surface of the

sea

and above the vessel(s) in the air, were justified on self-defense grounds when Iran

The UK Armilla Patrol, deployed in

protested.

the lower Gulf since the begin-

ning of the war, never published use of a defensive envelope.
fense, the

US

In terms of self-de-

cordon sanitaire was legitimate; although other navies' warships did

not have benefit of a defensive bubble declared by their governments, they could
take self-defense measures if threatened or attacked. If a

US warship proceeded in-

dependently or in formation without an announced cordon sanitaire, which was the
situation early in the war, that ship

and the formation could

also take self-defense
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measures.

422

The US

cordon sanitaire's validity in terms of area, duration,

etc., is

considered separately.

The Armilla Patrol accompanied UK flag merchantmen in the lower Gulf from
the beginning of the war; these merchantmen were on their own as they proceeded
In October 1985 France began defending French-flag merchant-

northward.

A French warship positioned itself between the Ville d 'Angers and an Iranian

men.

warship, warning the Iranian that

warship would use force
warships would

fire

to

on forces refusing

to intercept Ville d'Angers, the

to break off attacks

in attacks near

ROE declared French

on neutral merchantmen

French men-of-war.)

In Janu-

Kingdom stated that a right of visit and search of neutral mer-

chantmen, believed carrying cargo
self-defense

attempted

prevent the interception. (French

under attack; the result was a drop
ary 1986 the United

if it

to or

from

a belligerent port,

under Article 51 of the Charter.

In

March 1986

was an aspect of

the United States

recognized a basis in international law for belligerent searches of neutral mer-

chantmen.

Nevertheless, in April 1986 a

ship off what

may have been

merchantman.

428

a

US

destroyer warned an Iranian war-

planned boarding of President McKinley,

a

US

flag

When the Soviet flag Pyotr Emtsov, bound for Kuwait with arms

ultimately destined for Iraq, was fired upon, stopped and searched by an Iranian

warship in September 1986, the

USSR protested. 429

The apparent divergence of views among States depends on

the law

plicable to the interception, or the interpretation of it. If Article 5 1
in general applied,

and

if

deemed ap-

and Charter law

Iraq was the aggressor, Iran could intercept, search

and under some circumstances attack

third-flag State

unarmed merchant

ships

bound for Iraq, and believed to have warfighting or war-sustaining goods aboard as
a self-defense measure. Treaty law to the contrary

The only

ter.

applying to

general treaty

struction of merchantmen

is

the

London

would be trumped by the Char-

visit,

Protocol,

search and diversion or de-

which provides

in Article 22

that

.

.

.

The

(1)

following are accepted as established rules of international law:

In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to
the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subject.

(2)

In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly

summoned,

or active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface

vessel or submarine,

may

not sink or render incapable of navigation a mer-

chant vessel without having

first

placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in

a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers

and crew

is

assured, in the

and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence
of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board. 433
existing sea

The Tanker War belligerents were party to the treaty, and among naval powers operating in the Gulf, Belgium, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, USSR, the United
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Kingdom and

other

GCC

States

were

Although the London Protocol bound many naval powers in the Tanker

party.

War,

No

the United States were also parties.
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and

could not supersede the Charter

it

particularly if Article 5 1 states a. jus cogens
ciples similar to

it,

its

Article 51 self-defense norms,

However, the Protocol, or prin-

norm.

could inform the content of self-defense under Article 51.

Whether the Protocol applies as customary law or has been superseded by practice
since 1936, at least insofar as an unqualified duty to place those aboard a merchant-

man

in safety

ments,

439

concerned, has been debated by commentators and govern-

is

and since the Charter does not address the issue of custom conflicting

with a Charter provision, the question arises as to whether practice
offset specific
parallel,

London Protocol

Merchant
.

.

The

sufficient to

issue also arises if there

is

a

and different, customary self-defense standard to be applied, the situation

in the Nicaragua Case.

.

rules as custom.

is

(f)

The San Remo Manual would

vessels flying the flag of neutral States

otherwise

may

restate the rule:

not be attacked unless they:

make an effective contribution to the enemy's military action, e.g.,

by carrying military materials and it is not feasible for the attacking forces to first
place passengers and crew in a place of safety. Unless circumstances do not permit,
they are to be given a warning, so that they can re-route, off-load, or take other
precautions.

The Manual permits

attacks

objective

they "otherwise mak[e] an effective contribution to military

if,

inter alia,

on enemy-flag merchantmen

action, e.g., [by] carrying military materials."

as a legitimate military

Whether flying an enemy flag or

enemy because of its activity, e.g., carrying
war materials to aid the enemy, both classes of merchantmen are subject to rules of
flying a neutral flag but characterized as

discrimination, military objective and proportionality.
e.g.,

442

Certain merchant ships,

exempt from attack unless they lose exemption by aidThis standard, whether observed in the context of informing the

coastal fishermen, are

ing the enemy.

content of self-defense or as a law of naval warfare norm, is appropriate.
realities

It

balances

of modern technologies available to merchant ships, which might decide

to advise the State

whose war cargo it carries of an

attacker's presence, entitling an

attacking platform to treat a ship as directly aiding the
destruction on that account,

enemy and subjecting it to

and Protocol humanitarian considerations.

If Charter law did not apply to a State's actions, the

applied as the law of armed conflict.

same rules should have been

This would be the case for Iraq,

the aggressor; even though perhaps guilty of aggression, Iraq was
the

LOAC in prosecuting its actions. If the reverse is true,

sor

and Iraq properly asserted

i.e.,

if Iraq

bound

shipping, and Iran was required to apply the

its

to apply

Iran was the aggres-

self-defense, the result is the same. Iraq

governed by the law of self-defense as applicable to

was

would be

actions against merchant

LOAC even though it might be guilty

of aggression. If neither party was entitled to claim self-defense for these actions,
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i.e.,

LOAC

because Charter law including the law of self-defense did not apply,

Depending on the view of the Tanker

principles applied to both belligerents.

War by States not party to the conflict, i.e., whether the Charter applied or not,
these States were also required to apply the

LOAC

as incorporated into

law, if they perceived that the Charter applied, or the

Charter

LOAC if their view was that

the law of armed conflict, and not Charter law, applied.

These principles apply
seas that
for the

was destined

United States

merchantmen,

for other

than belligerents' ports.

to organize

for

France

to interpose its

was therefore legitimate

If Iran

to escort single

accompany

to

UK flag mer-

warships against belligerents' threat-

ened hostile action against these merchant ships
sustain a belligerent's war effort.

It

shipping on the high

convoys of reflagged tankers or

France and the United Kingdom

for

chantmen, and

to States' protection of their flag

if they

were not carrying goods

to

had attacked escorted or convoyed mer-

chantmen as it threatened,
convoying or escorting men-of-war could have responded in self-defense. It was legitimate self-defense for these States to operate,
individually or perhaps informally as a collective group,

move the mine menace from
United States

to

the high seas of the Gulf.

remove the Iran Ajr

as a

The United

It

was legitimate

alike, as

damage to

States attacked Iranian platforms used as a

gunboat

ama-flag, Japanese-owned tanker with

US

nationals

among

with

Isle City

and Iranian gunboats that had attacked

nationals in the crew,

l

U.S.S. Samuel B.

base in response to the Iranian missile attack on the US-flagged Sea

US

for the

minelaying menace for this reason;

mines threatened merchantmen and warships
Roberts attests.

to protect against or re-

a

Pan-

This

the crew.

followed from the policy behind thel986 Libya raid, mounted to destroy State-

supported terrorist bases in Libya after two
If the

disco.

attack

US

view

is

The Sea Isle

nationals were killed in a Berlin

correct, that self-defense

American nationals

defense.

US

is

lawful, these

measures against those who

were legitimate excercises of

City response, like the response to the Berlin disco

self-

bombing,

was anticipatory self-defense, in that more threats from these sources could

rea-

sonably be expected in the future. The reactive response to the Panama-flag vessel
attack

was
sel,

and the Sea Isle

US flagged.

City response involved

US

nationals aboard, and Sea

The United Kingdom committed

although foreign flagged, had more than half

eign-flag vessels could request

to a similar

response

UK beneficial ownership.

were in the area and operational commitments allowed

it.

if a ves458

For-

US

forces

This too was a

legiti-

US protection, which would be given
459

Isle City

if

The request and
acceptance was enough to complete a collective self-defense arrangement.
However, the practice of some masters in tailing convoys or simulating a convoy
mate exercise of self-defense, i.e., informal

would not have

collective self-defense.

entitled those vessels to self-defense protection

other nations unless

it

had been agreed upon.

by warships of

World Public Order

Warship protection was
and individual

also subject to the law of self-defense.

States' responses to

and other countries' warnings

mines has been noted.

val forces to cooperate,

perhaps informally as the

other navies for mutual protection.

spond to attacks on

its

seaborne helicopters,

possible threat to

Isle City as a

flag tanker shot at

it,

UK

a

US

returned

fire

was proper

US

for

sanitaire

proper for Gulf na-

Armilla Patrol did, with

for the

United States

and

to the

to re-

on Sea

to the platform-based attack

combatants in the Gulf,

Although

tack on Samuel B. Roberts.

Greek

its

It was also

was proper

It

collective

bubble or cordon

to declare a defensive

around their warships to respond to attacks on them.

It

The
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mining

helicopter did not return fire

at-

when

might have been appropriate

if

that

would have been necessary and proportionate under the circumstances, which
less

a

are

than clear from the record.

There were

several examples of mistaken fire in the

Gulf War. The

was the

US forces fired on several small boats or dhows after the defensive

Stark attack.

The reason for these latter errors can be attributed to

bubbles were announced.

the real and continuing threat of Iranian small boat attacks on

The

warships.

first

U.S.S. Vincennes mistakenly shot

down

merchantmen and

Iran Air Flight 655.

In the Stark and Airbus cases claims were paid and settled without admitting

The United

bility.

compensated
aircraft
ity is

States expressed regret over the other losses

for injuries, loss of life

and damage.

lia-

and probably

Whether the attacking

Iraqi

observed proper qualifying principles of discrimination and proportional-

unknown;

therefore,

whether

this

was

a proper exercise of self-defense is

Whether US forces observed discrimination or proportionality principles in firing on the small boats is likewise not clear from the record; certainly if the commanders reasonably believed that these were Iranian
Revolutionary Guard speedboats, they were correct in opening fire to protect their
ships. The same is true for the Airbus tragedy.
However, if these were reasonsealed in Baghdad's archives.

ably perceived threats, the attacking platforms could

other hand,

if the targets

were reasonably perceived

to

fire in self-defense.

On

the

be carrying warfighting or

war-sustaining goods, they were legitimate targets under the law of naval warfare.

476

The Tanker War

thus strengthens the case that a right of anticipatory self-de-

fense exists in the Charter era as before.
this position,

but at the

least

To be

under the principle of sovereignty

to the use of anticipatory self-defense

unanimous

sure, States are not

States adhering

may continue to advocate it until

authoritative decision to the contrary. This

is

particularly true

in

if,

above, Iran had a right of visit and search as a means of self-defense.

there

is

an

as analyzed

4.78

If Iran

had

the right to stop and search a ship under a self-defense theory to check for

warfighting/war-sustaining goods that might not be used for some time against
Iran, this could only be

under

a theory of anticipatory self-defense, as distin-

guished from reactive self-defense.

The same can be said for Iraqi attacks on ships
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carrying warfighting/war-sustaining goods for Iran. These interceptions were subject to self-defense limitations, e.g., necessity

be the

case,

And

and proportionality.

if

such

then those States protecting, escorting, accompanying or convoying

these ships also

had

including anticipatory self-defense,

a right of self-defense,

if

Iran or Iraq chose to attack instead of visiting and searching merchantmen not car-

These

rying warfighting/war-sustaining goods to a belligerent.
also

had

units.

States'

warships

a right of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, of their

481

The Tanker War strengthens the precedent for informal collective self-defense
among States opposed to the belligerents' sink-on-sight policies. Gulf naval forces
developed these ad hoc coalitions to clear mines,
protect

merchantmen

482
'

to protect

each other,

483

and to

flagged by States other than their own.

The foregoing has proceeded on a theory that the Charter governed these interactions.

As will be seen

in

Chapter V,

if certain

aspects of the

governed by the law of the Charter, e.g., Iranian

visit

Tanker War were not

and search procedures, those

procedures were strengthened through practice.

v.

Necessity. As noted above,

the anticipatory defense

whether

a response

Necessity

is

485

mode

with force

is

a criterion for

invoking self-defense, whether in

or in the reactive
necessary,

i.e.,

mode

after

armed

attack,

admitting of no other alternative.

an accepted principle of international law conditioning the right of

self-defense.

It

war

applies to

gamut from nonforce
diplomatic initiatives,

488

reprisals,
491

Alternatives to self-defense run the

at sea.

retorsions,

489

diplomatic protests

use of an adjudicative strategy,

ing at the time, to await a more propitious

moment

492

490

or other

or perhaps doing noth-

perhaps

for asserting a claim,

along with others, in a general adjudicative, diplomatic or other resolution.
difficulty
tial

with these choices

is

that an inappropriate signal

actor or other participants in the world

ternatives to

Today

it,

may be used

the general principle

is

may be sent to

alone, in combination,

and

the ini-

norms

by other means,

i.e.,

only

if a

violated in the initial

at-

is

justified

"[FJorce should not be

considered necessary until peaceful measures have been found wanting or
they clearly would be futile."

The

495

The

in varying degrees.

that self-defense through force

tack cannot reasonably be achieved

493

community. The strategy of force, or al-

goal of compelling compliance with international

As the San Remo Manual expresses

when

it,

and proportionality] is that the State
armed attack is entitled to resort to force against the attacker
but only to the extent necessary to defend itself and to achieve such defensive goals as
repelling the attack, recovering territory and removing threats to its future

which

effect of these principles [of necessity

is

is

the victim of an

security. 496
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Commentators

differ

on whether Charter self-defense norms apply

However, since

gins.

the same,

and

war be-

after

LOAC and Charter law necessity principles are virtually

LOAC principles may inform Charter standards if the principles
the analysis assumes that

or if Article 5 1 states;'ws cogens norms,

are in a treaty
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standards are the same, or should be, in any case.

Brownlie and Dinstein advance a hypothetical case of a target State's submarine
depth-charged by another State's destroyer on the high
permits immediate counterattack by the submarine.

seas, stating that necessity

The same would be true for a

destroyer against whom a submarine fires a torpedo, and for neutral

merchantmen

attacked while under individual or collective defensive warship protection,

e.g.,

while convoyed or steaming independently and being accompanied or escorted,
the Tanker

War situations.

502

On the other hand, if a destroyer drops a hand gre-

and not an
— reasonably perceived by submarine an unfriendly
attack — or
submarine hull with sonar
an unfriendly but
nade

a

if

irritant

as

if a frigate tickles a

nonthreatening
opposite token,
tive,

act,

as

503

no right of self-defense by a submarine would

if a frigate indicates hostile

arise.

intent to a submarine, e.g.,

By the

by using ac-

attack-mode sonar and maneuvers demonstrating reasonable probability of

submarine behaves similarly,

attack, or if a

e.g.,

by

setting

up

a firing solution

flooding torpedo tubes and opening torpedo tube doors, the target could take im-

mediate self-defense action as a matter of necessity.

These hypothetical cases

illustrate necessity in a case of anticipatory self-de-

fense and are similar to Dinstein's hypothetical, justifying interceptive self-defense to destroy the Japanese task force headed toward Pearl Harbor.
Israel's 1981 raid

issue

is

on the Iraqi nuclear reactor,

the qualification of necessity.

where no weapon has been
easy cases, and

fall

into the

fired

when

a critical anticipatory self-defense

The submarine-destroyer
self-defense action

same category as

As with

is

hypotheticals,

taken, are relatively

situations involving missiles, includ-

ing the over-the-horizon variety. If anticipatory self-defense (or interceptive
self-defense as Dinstein has

it) is

a principle of international law, then target

ship(s) can respond if necessary for self-preservation.

The Japanese

task force, as Dinstein recites

it

hypothetically,

may or may

not

have been subject to destruction in self-defense. Other alternatives, e.g., interposing a superior
targets

US fleet between it and Hawaii at a point beyond flying range of its

on the high

seas,

might be considered

the 1941 context. If the task force,

known

to

a reasonable alternative, at least in

be bound for an attack on Hawaii,

would have proceeded onward after warning, the US
ing in destroying
tions were not

it

fleet

would have been

in anticipatory self-defense. If the Japanese task force inten-

known

or there was no reason to believe that attack on Hawaii was

planned, there would be no necessity for anticipatory self-defense.
tions

justify-

When its inten-

became known, e.g., through positive intelligence, and there was no reasonable

The Tanker War
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alternative to forestall attack, the

US

fleet

would have been

justified in acting in

anticipatory self-defense.

The

fleet

hypothetical also articulates the problem of national, as opposed to

unit, self-defense.

Although beyond the scope of the Tanker War

problem of national survival
ample)

may

(as

call forth different

analysis, the

distinguished from survival of a destroyer, for exconsiderations of necessity.

507

Nations' survival,

because of their need for Gulf oil, was a policy behind the Carter Doctrine.

508

De-

struction of single tankers could not be pegged on national survival, but necessity

could be predicated on a need to save
509

tacks.

human

Accumulating these "pinpricks"

life

endangered during

to justify a

illegal at-

massive attack on a belliger-

ent might have provoked claims of disproportionality.

What

distinguishes one situation from another in the context of the necessity

component
e.g.,

is

considering

all

relevant factors

participants, their perceived goals,

known

to the target at the time,

methods of attack and response, conditions

512

"The most important condition ... is the degree of necessity as that necessity is perceived and evaluated by the target-claimant
and incorporated in the pattern of its expectations which, in the particular inat

the time, and probable effects.

—

stance, impels the claimant to use intense responding coercion,"

i.e.,

military

The necessity standard — "great and immediate," "direct and immediate,"
or "compelling and instant" — has been carried over from customary law into the
force.

Charter

era.

The Tanker War

illustrates several

examples of necessity in the self-defense

context.

US announcements of a defensive bubble or cordon sanitaire
tative necessity.

The warning

were cases of pu-

announcement that unidentified
warnings and threatening US warships were

area was advance

vessels or aircraft not responding to

subject to being destroyed out of necessity for a ship's self-protection.

Applying the principle of self-defense

to Iranian visits

and searches of mer-

chantmen suspected of carrying warfighting or war-sustaining cargoes for Iraq is
another example of necessity. It was necessary for Iran to visit and search on the
high seas

if

the offending goods were to be seized; once the cargo was ashore,

would be difficult to stop
Iraq might have resulted

its

delivery to Iraq. Attempts to

in collateral destruction

than in a properly executed

visit

and search.

sorted to air attacks on shipping

Iraq,

bomb

truck convoys in

and more deaths and

which had no

it

injuries

effective navy, re-

moving Iranian warfighting or war-sustaining

The choice was to permit the cargoes to arrive or to attack on the high seas.
A case can be made that the Iraqi attacks were necessary. The same can be said for
cargoes.

Whether the belligerents exercised proper
target discrimination or proportionality is another issue.
Whether viewed from
a self-defense or LOAC perspective, the standards were the same as under the
LOAC for visit and search or attacks.
Iranian attacks on Iraq-bound cargoes.
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Convoying and other protective measures for innocent merchantmen were also
necessary, in view of repeated belligerent attacks

on these ships, regardless of cargo

or flag.

Another example of necessity was the US capture and destruction of Iran Ajr.
Given repeated

mining

illegal

have continued to lay mines.
mines, Iran Ajr.

The same

Gulf shipping

in

lanes,

it is

clear that Iran

would

A sure way to end the problem was to end a source of
mine clearance opera-

considerations justified States'

517

remove the mine menace, regardless of origin.
Operation Praying Mantis, the destruction of Iranian frigates employed in attacks on neutral merchantmen and of offshore oil platforms serving as a base for
tions, necessary to

speedboats preying on merchant shipping and warships, was also a case of necessity. If the frigates

would continue

were allowed to continue their deprivations, merchant shipping

to suffer attacks,

would have continued

as a

and

haven

if the oil

platforms were not destroyed, they

for the boats.

518

Likewise, firing on attacking

speedboats engaged in shooting up merchantmen was necessary. If there had been

no such response,

it is

ludicrious to think that other action by naval powers

verbal radio warnings)

would have stopped an ongoing

would have availed nothing

tests,

often long after the fact,

men,

restore a burnt-out hull, or raise a

Given evidence of a strong
tional attack

on

US

tragically

mistaken in

US

ships,

responses
strated,

vi.

Diplomatic pro-

to resurrect

dead crew-

ship.

possibility of an Iranian suicide plane or conven-

was necessary from

at

the time, Vincennes' de-

a self-defense perspective, if

result.

US responses to Libyan attempts to forcibly inter520
or to shoot down US aircraft.
It takes little logic to justify force

The same might be
cept

sunken

warships engaged in self-defense

struction of Flight 655

attack.

if missile

said for

have been deployed, or hostile intent has been clearly demon-

under the circumstance of Libya's challenges

to

freedom of navigation.

Proportionality. In both anticipatory self-defense and self-defense after

attack (reactive self-defense) response
(I)

Introduction.

The

self-defense response
522
fare.

armed

The

(e.g.,

armed

must be proportional.

limiting principle of proportionality, like necessity, in a

is

well established in custom.

521
It

applies to naval war-

proportionality principle applies whether self-defense responds to

armed aggression, or whether self-defense measures are animminent armed attack or other armed aggression. However, "re-

attack or other

ticipatory to

sponsibility
resort to

...

for a

war of aggression may be incurred by the target

comprehensive force in over-reaction

State,
523

to trivial incidents."

should

This

is

it

a

decisionmaker dilemma when confronted with an event that reasonable evaluators

would say

is

The problem is
act may be rolled

an act of aggression.

view that a single so-called

trivial

further

compounded by

a

into a collection of other

pin-pricks, with the result that a self-defense response against the

sum

of them

all
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may

be proper.

Responses with force that seem disproportionate

to a present

pin-prick carry a risk that the target of the response might argue that the response

armed reprisal, and is therefore an armed attack
"Genuine on-the-spot reaction [would have closed the]
by the responding State.
cor
incident"
and may be a preferable course in many, if not most, situations. "The
effect ... is that a State which is the victim of an armed attack is entitled to resort to
force against the attacker but only to the extent necessary to defend itself and to
achieve such defensive goals as repelling the attack, recovering territory, and re527
moving threats to its future security."
is

disproportionate,

is

in effect an
525

'

The analysis for necessity, i.e., whether Charter self-defense principles and limitations

on them govern throughout

a war, or

whether the

LOAC applies once a

war has begun so that different standards are then employed,

also applies to pro-

portionality issues. If proportionality principles are in treaties, the Charter's

norms are;ws cogens, they
trump custom or treaty based proprotionality norms. Whether a customary proportionality norm can supersede a Charter norm is not clear. Customary and treaty
based proportionality norms can, and should, inform any binding Charter or jus
528
cogens norms.
This analysis takes the position that proportionality norms limiting a right of self-defense and those developed under the LOAC should be the
clause

paramount provision trumps them.

If self-defense

same.
(II)

The Elements or Indicia of Proportionality

self-defense measure's relative position

on

.

The

foregoing

a time-line

comments on

a

between attack (or immi-

nence of attack, for anticipatory self-defense) and the defensive measure(s) taken is
but one index of whether the action

Another major
sides the

now

factor

is

is

proportional under the circumstances.

the methodology and intensity of the coercion.

529

Be-

threadbare (and refuted) argument that a massive conventional

tack cannot be

met by

a

be response in kind,

non-conventional

(e.g.,

nuclear) response,

there are finer gradations of the problem.

IranAjr in response to Iranian minelaying in shipping lanes
the source of the illegality and eliminating

it

—

is

i.e.,

there

at-

must

US destruction of

— in

effect,

going to

one example. Another example is

platforms from which Iranian speedboats had operated.

532

destruction of the

oil

There need not be

identical or even similar response to satisfy the proportionality

requirement.

Moreover, such proportional response,

as

Ago and

need not necessarily be proportional in response

to force

others have pointed out,

used in the

initial aggres-

sion or attack.

The requirement

of the proportionality of the action taken in self-defence

concerns the relationship between that action and
never be repeated too often

purpose, namely

—and

this

.

.

can

— that of halting and repelling the attack or even, in so

far

from occurring. It would be
think that there must be proportionality between the conduct

as preventive self-defence

mistaken, however, to

its

.

is

recognized, of preventing

it
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armed attack and the opposing conduct. The action needed to halt
and repulse the attack may well have to assume dimensions disproportionate to those
constituting the

of the attack suffered. 533

Put another way, force used in self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense,

must be "strictly confined to the object of stopping or preventing the infringement
[of the target State's rights] and reasonably proportionate to what is required for
war, once a war has started,

"it

can be fought to the finish.

may lose its appetite for continuing
be accommodating."

536

comments

Or, as Dinstein

achieving this objective."

.

.

.

hostilities,

in a context of full-scale
535
.

but the defending State need not

may carry responses

Individual or collective self-defense

to the source of the aggression,

An aggressor State

.

.

beyond driving the aggressor back

(whether geographic or theoretical) until there

is total

victory

537
if

to the line

necessary to

achieve proportional response in the sense of achieving the objective of ending the

source of aggression.

Thus,

it

538

was proper under pre-Charter law,

ditional surrender.

539
It

was likewise proper

for

US insistence on Japan's uncon-

for the Netherlands,

which declared

war on Japan on December 8, 1941 as anticipatory defense with invasion of the
Dutch East Indies imminent,
to also insist on Japan's unconditional surrender.
It

would have been proper

for Iran, if invaded

by Iraq

in 1980 to start the war, to

have carried the war to the complete destruction of Iraq,
tional response necessary to force Iraq to

with respect to Iraqi responses to Iran,
it,

if this

The same is true

comply with the law.

if Iran

were a propor(As events had

was the aggressor.

both sides agreed to a UN-sponsored ceasefire, effectively ending the conflict,

including

its

Tanker War

Proportionality applies to

aspects.)

tensities of conflict or potential conflict,
545
i
to general war.

O'Connell and Greenwood advance

a

levels

all

from anticipatory response

and

in-

to pin-pricks

view that self-defense must occur in the

theater of operations generating the claim. In a regional confrontation, a target
State

would be limited

to

responding there. For example, in the Falklands/

Malvinas War, Britain would have been limited to attacks on military units in the

South Atlantic Ocean; a lone Argentine
attacked unless

it

frigate in the Pacific

could not have been

The US Navy

gave clear evidence of launching an attack.

could not have responded to North Korea's Pueblo seizure except by attacking

North Korean

assets in

Korean waters.

Under this view, Iran could not have at-

tacked the Iraqi frigates in the Mediterranean Sea, or perhaps the Atlantic and Indian Ocean off South Africa

if after

being launched in Italy

548

they had sailed

through the Mediterranean and either through Suez or around Africa.

This

thesis,

while appealing in simplicity and symmetry, lacks

sure, proportionality

ventive

(i.e.,

reality.

To be

means an amount of force necessary

to achieve a goal of pre549
anticipatory) self-defense or repulsing attack.
hypothetical case

from the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas

A

War

illustrates the fallacy of the position.
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If a

UK warship encountering an Argentine frigate in the Pacific, thousands of

miles from the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas

War

theater of operations, in terms of

—

would have stopped the Argentine as USSR menof-war might have during the Cold War from tailing the other and firing later
(e.g., after dark or in bad weather), when the UK warship could not sense a potenship-to-ship combat, what

—

tial for

To

attack?

world view,

take the other extreme, from either antagonist's geopolitical

a frigate represented a potential asset,

ing (and perhaps enlarging) the conflict.

be attacked when

it

was apparent

it

wherever located,

might be argued the

It

was proceeding

for prolong-

frigate could only

The

to contribute to the war.

how that could be determined, since most belligerents do not willingly hand over intelligence, or they may distribute disinformation; recall the
cruise of the Goeben into Turkish waters during World War I. The second is a
surveillant power's problem: Must it follow the frigate once located across the Pacific to be sure it does not reappear at the scene of hostilities? To borrow a phrase,
question

first

"Use

it

is

or lose

it"; if

ordnance

(and the frigate) will be
ellite

lost,

is

not used on the frigate in hand, the opportunity

only to reappear in a theater of operations. Despite

and similar reconnaisance advantage

States),

not

all

States are so

equipped

for

for certain countries

the United

(e.g.,

worldwide tracking, and

sat-

in a

world of

smaller navies and nations less attuned to alliances and friendships, such a State

(even

if it is

the victim of aggression in the

worse than Britain's attempt

wounded Leviathan

like

first

War

II.

And

and

I

if targets

—be limited?

It is

II

or a

should be

how can other military aspects of proportionality

graphical scope, weapons used, etc.,

—geo-

incongruous that worldwide

— some of which had

economic sanctions were asserted against Argentina
reprisal overtones

World Wars

to locate surface raiders in

Bismarck during World

limited in a full-scale war,

may find itself in a situation

place)

— and yet military options would be limited

clear

territorially

un-

der the proposed analysis.

The third practical aspect deals with the nature of wars as belligerents have seen
them. Most since 1945 have been symmetrical, two-State affairs where belligerents

had about the same quality and quantity of
have not been wars of national survival.
itary perspective, arises

when some

or

552

forces.

Most

conflicts sincel945

A problem for proportionality, from a milall

of these conditions do not exist.

What

may be a routine, middle to low-level conflict for one belligerent may be a war for
national survival for the other, particularly
forces are

opposed

to

one

State's forces,

if

two or more middle-level

which might have been able

with some but not all opponents. For the sole State, the war
flict;

for its opponents,

it

may be low

or

medium

to

States'

contend

a high-intensity con-

is

intensity.

During the Korean

War, given other States' overt and covert relationships with North and South Korea,
it

was

initially a

Israel, nearly

ters

war of national survival

for the South,

and then

always surrounded by opponents, has claimed

of national survival;

it is

doubtful whether

its

its

for the North.

wars

were mat-

opponents always perceived

—

The

thus.

was

war of national

pared with,

survival, or nearly so, for

sons

War was

a part,

—perhaps because of

—would validly consider

it

was involved in

sides.

These might be com-

war of national

a

arrayed against

allies

was fighting

it

both

or the India-Pakistan conflicts,

Falklands/Malvinas,

e.g.,

neither side seriously considered

one side
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1980-88 Iran-Iraq conflict, of which the Tanker

them
a
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a

it,

where

survival. If

or for other valid rea-

war of national survival where de-

a difference, would this mean
557
one side could shoot on
that in the hypothetical of the frigate in the Pacific,

stroying every warship of opponent(s) would

make

would have to wait for evidence of imminent attack, because it had a low-intensity conflict on its hands? The
sight because

situation

is

it

had

to

do so

to survive, while the other

even more egregious

and would have

to await

if the

another

force-heavy State was a target of aggression

"first hit"

from

a State initially in the

wrong.

In terms of international law, the theater of operations view may be correct from
a perspective for force proportionality, but if proportionality is considered in
558
i.e., righting the wrong, then the analysis is askew. If rectifyterms of the object,

ing the situation

i.e.,

inducing end

to aggression

— means destroying the Pacific

Ocean frigate, then the frigate is fair game for that reason alone. In terms of a war of
national survival by a target State, proportionality with respect to the object

sought

—maintaining

sovereign States,

all

political

independence and

Charter Purposes

559

territorial integrity

—necessarily

rises to

of equal,

an ever-higher level

of permitted violence to preserve these Charter goals for the State affected. Moreover, in a collective self-defense context, the level of military coercion the Charter

permits

is

that necessary to assure survival of a State threatened with annihilation

by aggression. Thus
United

States,

it

in the 1990-91

Gulf War self-defense agreements with the

was the force necessary to assure Kuwaiti survival, not survival

of the United States, Kuwait's alliance partner.

There is no precedent for the theater of operations argument.

Iran could have

way to Iraq through the
Red Sea and Indian Ocean or the Atlantic and

attacked the Iraqi warships, once launched and on their

Mediterranean Sea and either the

Indian Oceans. Conversely, Iraq could have attacked Iranian military assets wherever it found them.

During the last year of the Tanker War, Iranian speedboats and

military aircraft operated in the lower Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, near the Ara-

bian Sea, a part of the Indian Ocean. Iraq could have attacked these platforms in
the Indian Ocean as well as striking
Gulf.

oil facilities

near the entrance to the Persian

562

The proportionality principle was demonstrated during the Tanker War.
Announced US defensive measures that could be expected if an unidentified
aircraft or ship

portional.

area

— up

ventured within the defensive bubble for US warships

The only

object of response

to five miles

would be the intruder, and the warning

on the surface and relatively low altitude

be sure, there were mistakes, e.g., when

were pro-

—was minimal. To

US ships fired on small boats that wandered
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into the bubble, but if they appeared to display hostile intent, the

The United

proportional under the circumstances.

US response was

States expressed regret over

these accidents and undoubtedly offered compensation.

merchantmen suspected of carrying
proportionate, in that the ship would be re-

Iranian visit and search procedures for

cargo for Iraq's war effort were also
leased

if

no offending goods were found. However,

it is

not clear whether ad-

judicatory procedures were established for detained vessels until late in the war.

Whether Iran could detain ships after the ceasefire
depended on terms of the
ceasefire and practice under it. For detained ships, the response may not have been
proportionate in terms of time.
firing at or

On the other hand, the belligerents' indiscriminate

mining merchantmen and neutral warships

helicopters,

where there was no evidence that they were aiding the enemy, lacked

any semblance of proportionality.

567

on ships in neutral

territorial waters or neutrals' oil facili-

were clear violations of the Charter.

Either the littoral State or the State

Belligerents' attacks
ties

alike, or neutral military

of the vessel's flag could respond proportionally in self-defense.

could respond proportionally for attacks on
Belligerents' attacks

on their opponent's

coastal petroleum facilities in self-defense
sales financed the war.

whether some

571

Nowruz)

(e.g.,

State

its facilities.

oil

tanker convoys,

oil

platforms and

were legitimate, since belligerents'

However, attacks had
572

The coastal

570

to

be proportional;

it is

oil

doubtful

were.

US destruction oilranAjr and the offshore oil platforms were also proportional.
IranAjr was caught laying mines, and
illegal action.

573

its

destruction eliminated a source of Iran's

Oil platforms supported the Iranian speedboats attacking mer-

chantmen; while the response may not have destroyed the same platforms that
supported

a particular attack or

mode

of attack in the case of their destruction in

response to the Silkworm attack on Sea

mate;

it

was confined

to the

Isle City,

this response

was

also legiti-

kind of platform that could have launched the attack

and was in response to attack on only that tanker. Proportionality contemplates responses parallel in intensity to an

initial

aggression and designed to discourage fu-

ture attacks. If the launch platforms were destroyed, there could be
attacks from them.

There was no need

launched the attack on Sea

to

respond

no future

to the particular platform that

575
Isle City.

Defense against Iranian speedboats or warships attacking merchantmen,
military helicopters or

US

US warships was also proportional. As in the case of the an-

nounced defense measures, the only targets were the attacking craft or their bases,
576

The United States was not required to respond, as it chose not
577
to do in the case of the Stark attack.
Any response to the Stark attack would have
had to have been proportional in nature, however. From a self-defense perspective,
the

oil

platforms.

laying aside the mistaken identity issue, Vincennes' destruction of Flight 655

578

—
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was proportional. The perceived threat was an
an F-14; only the

aircraft

Responses to the Libyan

mistakenly thought to be

aircraft,

was targeted, and only the
aircraft that fired at

157

aircraft

US

was brought down.

aircraft, or electronically

locked on to them, and to Libyan missile boat forays, were also proportional. Only
those aircraft or boats were targeted and hit. Similarly, the 1986 raid on Libyan terrorist bases

bombing

was proportional. To be sure, there was

operation, but the targets were the terrorist

the Berlin disco bombing.
(Ill)

579

Forbidden Targets: Per Se Disproportionality

hello) certain targets are

580

under the circumstances.

that the general principle of
strait

with resultant loss of

tempted

straits transit

flict situations,

Under the law of warfare (jus in

if proportional

how proportionate

armed reprisal is appropri-

The Corfu Channel Case

authoritatively stated

humanity condemned mining of an international

life

passage

and

582

UK

in a

naval vessels

nonwar

warfare has developed a relatively concrete
583

.

forbidden objects of attack, no matter

the response in other respects, and even
ate

damage as in any
operations that had caused

collateral

there has been

little

context.

581

when

these ships at-

Although the law of naval

of forbidden targets for armed con-

list

Charter era practice for immunity claims

for these targets in the self-defense (anticipatory or otherwise) context.
less,

Neverthe-

the Corfu Channel principle should apply to deny amenability of these objects

as legitimate targets regardless of how proportional or necessary a self-defense re584
sponse might otherwise be.
The
should inform the law of self-defense

LOAC

under these circumstances.
vii.

"No Moment

585

for Deliberation." Anticipatory self-defense, unlike reactive

self-defense, carries a third requirement,

from the Caroline Case: there can be no

co/r

moment for deliberation.
Tanker War illustrates the

US

This principle

often

is

lumped with

necessity; the

difficulty of application as a discrete concept.

defensive measures announcements and actions under

tively straightforward examples.

Given the

them

587

are rela-

relatively high speed of aircraft or

small boats, whether carrying shipkilling missiles or on a suicide mission, and a

high risk to a warship of small boats carrying Exocets or the
that there can be

command
Where

no time for deliberation

i.e.,

like, it is

careful consideration

easy to see

up a chain of

—before action must be taken.
analysis begins to break

self-defense

is

down under

in the situation of Iranian visits

current views of anticipatory

and searches.

588

If "no

moment for

means time for investigation by other means, then the concept slides
semantically into necessity. On the other hand, if the phrase means no other means
for investigation, the result is the same. The same comments could be made as to
deliberation"

States that ordered or accepted (acquiesced in)
589

tion,

if that is

convoying or other forms of protec-

considered anticipatory self-defense.
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The

Vincennes incident,

trates the

weakness (or

Vincennes'

commanding

"deliberation"?

to

if considered

officer

it

an anticipatory self-defense case,

illus-

of the concept as a separate requirement.

elasticity)

had

five

He never knew, due

true identity; he thought
to deliberate,

590

minutes

to deliberate,

erroneous information, about Flight 655's

to

was an F-14 homing on his

but only enough time to decide that

it

ship. In a sense,

he had time

was imperative, i.e., necessary,

defend the ship. Under this analysis, there was no

and Vincennes' downing Flight 655

but was that real

moment

for deliberation,

satisfied the third principle of anticipatory

self-defense.

Thus
tion," if

the third principle of anticipatory self-defense, "no
it

exists as a separate concept,

was met

moment for delibera-

in these incidents of the

Tanker

War.
viii.
(e.g.,

Rules of Reprisal; Retaliation. Reprisals,

economic coercion) otherwise

conduct

(e.g.,

illegal to

i.e.,

use of force or other methods

confront a State engaging in

aggression) to force compliance with international norms, has been

characterized as a kind of self-help

591

or sanction.

592

Most say

that reprisals in-

volving force where States are not engaged in armed conflict are

illegal.

593
'

1945 practice tends to confirm this view. Anticipatory reprisal using force
bidden.

illegal

Postis for-

594

The Corfu Cannel Case dismissed
ance of an international

strait

the

was an

with massive reprisals against Syria for

UK argument that directing mine clear-

act of lawful self-help.
its

595

Israel

responded

repeated armistice violations. These too

were condemned.

The 1970 Friendly
frain

from

Relations Declaration stated that "States have a duty to re-

acts of reprisal involving the use of force," which the Resolution as597
declaratory of international law.
"Subject only to the proviso that
.

serted was
'force' ...

be taken to mean military force, the Western States [agreed] on the ques-

tion of reprisals."

598

Even massive economic coercion does not
to the majority view.

tions or

599

justify a force response,

On the other hand, nonforce reprisals (e.g.

,

"economic warfare") remain legitimate in the Charter era.

collective nonforce

economic

reprisals, like those the

posed during the Falklands/Malvinas war.
tionals aided

according

economic sanc-

There can be

European Community im-

Although many States or their na-

one belligerent or the other, or both, there was no apparent declared

system of economic reprisals during the Tanker War.

Even if justified, reprisals cannot be inflicted against third States. The Cysne ar-

Germany might have been justified in
during World War I, Germany could not destroy

bitration held that although

reprisals

against Great Britain

a neutral

Portuguese vessel carrying goods covered by the reprisal declaration to Britain.

—
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All reprisals are subject to three requirements, carried forward from the

pre-Charter era and stated in the Naulilaa Arbitration and the Cysne Case: previ-

ous deliberate violation of international law by the other State, an unsuccessful de-

mand for redress, and the reprisal must be proportional to the injury suffered.
Some objects cannot be an object of reprisals, whether economic or otherwise;
commonly these are considered in

the context of the

However, such

be analyzed in that situation.

LOAC (jus in bello) and will

reprisals are be subject to the gen-

eral principles of humanity in the context of "peacetime" reprisals, discussed here,

on the same theory that these objects are barred

as self-defense targets.

Security Council decisions can, at least in theory, go beyond customary limitations for sanctions

A State not injured by illegal actions

amounting to reprisals.

of another state might be directed to apply sanctions. Sanctions that some might
perceive as disproportionate to an illegal action might be imposed. Third States

might be harmed by Council decisions, although Charter Article 50 allows

a State

confronted with special economic problems arising from carrying out those mea-

The

sures a right to consult with the Council for solution of those problems.

Council can be informed by humanity principles and other sources of law, but
can override treaties to the contrary, and

norm.

its

it

resolution might state a jus cogens

608

Sanctions against South Africa, which began in 1977, are an example of the po-

The

tential for overriding general reprisal sanction principles.

sian embargo,

which had law of naval warfare overtones,

earlier

Rhode-

another example. In

is

1965-66, as part of the governance transition from Southern Rhodesia to inde-

pendent, majority-rule Zimbabwe, the Council passed a series of resolutions, de-

nouncing the white Rhodesian government
refrain

as illegal,

from assisting the white minority regime and

and

on States

calling

to institute

an

oil

to

embargo.

One resolution requested that the United Kingdom enforce the embargo. Because
the resolution only spoke in terms of embargo and did not authorize blockade or
similar measures, the Royal

Navy could not order

tankers inbound for the

Mozambican port of Beira, Rhodesia's access to the sea, to divert. A later resolution
specifically authorized diversion, and the Royal Navy ordered diversion when
other tankers tried to call at Beira.
While the oil interdiction operation had an
entirely laudatory purpose, if it

is

assumed that Rhodesia had no additional petro-

leum sources, and there were essential needs of the civilian population
line for

ambulances, diesel

oil for

hospital

emergency generators, etc.,

—

e.g.,

gaso-

a violation

of humanitarian law principles might have occurred, and interdictions might be
said to have

The

gone beyond customary

LOAC rules.

1990-91 Gulf War, which erupted after the Tanker War ended,

uation where Council sanctions overrode customary law.
rized Coalition interception of vessels

August

15, 1990,

bound

for Iraq or

is

a third sit-

Resolution 665 autho-

occupied Kuwait on

without reciting humanitarian exceptions.

A month

later,

The Tanker War

160

embargo but permitted food and medical supplies
shipments, subject to Council supervision.
At least in theory, the Council could
Resolution 670 imposed an

air

be said to have overridden humanitarian principles denouncing deprivation of the
civilian population of food

665.

(It

was partly cured

a

and medical supplies

month

by the omission

in Resolution

by Resolution 666, permitting foodstuffs

later

shipments under certain conditions, but the Resolution said nothing about medical supplies.)

ix.

The Temporal Problem: When Does

Liability Accrue?

Convictions

at

Nuremberg and Tokyo were based on what the defendants knew, or should have
known, when they made decisions to invade other States.
Since then there has
been no authoritative statement on whether

makers knew, or should have known, when
tory self-defense.

Commentators seem

on evidence available

least in part,
619

to

liability accrues

a state

on what decision-

responds in reactive or anticipa-

have been tempted to

justify opinions, at

after a self-defense decision,

perhaps years

later.

The developing law for jus
cating liability

operation

is

is

in hello

confirms that the appropriate time for predi-

what a decisionmaker knew, or should have known, at the time an

authorized. Hindsight can be 20/20; decisions at the time are often

clouded with the fog of war

or crisis.
f\~)

Four countries' declarations of understanding

f\7~?

1

to Protocol

I

to the 1949

Geneva Conventions state that as to protection of civilians in Article 51,
and precautions

tion of civilian objects in Article 52,

to

protec-

be taken in attacks,

commander should be liable based on a commander's assessment of information available at the relevant time, i.e., when the decision is
taken.
Two of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention's four protocols
have similar terms, i.e., a commander is only bound by information available when
stated in Article 57,

a

a decision to attack is

Protocol

I,

with

its

made.
understandings, and the Conventional

Weapons Convenno

These treaties'
way to wide acceptance among States.
common statement that commanders will be held accountable based on informaon

tion are well

tion they

had

at

portional has

recognized
the 1954

it

their

the time for determining whether attacks are necessary and pro-

become

as the

a nearly universal

norm. The San Remo Manual has

standard for naval warfare, and in 1999 the Second Protocol

Hague Cultural Property Convention also adopted this standard.

be said with

fair

confidence that this

is

it

It

to

can

the customary standard for jus in helium.

should be the standard for jus ad helium.
response, whether

629

It

A national leader directing a self-defense

be reactive or anticipatory in nature, should be held

to the

same standard. That leader should be held accountable for what he or she, or those
reporting to him or her, knew or reasonably should have known, when a decision
to

respond in self-defense

is

made.

World Public Order

There

no public record of what those who

is

whether in reaction

known,

as

to
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initiated self-defense measures,

an attack or in anticipation of one, knew or should have

was the case in the Nuremberg or Tokyo

Therefore, there can

trials.

be no appraisal of whether the temporal standard was met during the Tanker War.

2.

Related Issues

and S elf-Preservation in the Charter Era. State of necessity
and the now-outmoded concept of self-preservation have often been confused,
sometimes with the notion that necessity as a component of self-defense or the

a.

State of Necessity

LOAC may be so intense that in a situation involving survival of the State that necessity overrides all other factors to

permit any action by the target

claim of self-preservation, or self-help,

is

This

State.

now inadmissible. A state may, however,

respond in self-defense.

There is, however,

a separate, distinct concept of necessity, apart

from

a similar

term that is a conditioning factor for self-defense or the LOAC, in that in a separate
claim of state of necessity, a State against whom action

committed no wrong against

is

taken ("a third State") has

a State that takes the action (an "acting State"),

and

an acting State does not consider itself the third State's target. In self-defense, a tar-

by a country in the position of a third
State of necessity can be invoked "to preclude the

get State seeks to defend against aggression
State,

i.e.,

the aggressor.

wrongfulness of conduct adopted in certain conditions

... to protect

an essential

interest of the [target] State, without [the latter's] existence being in

threatened.

f.3'2
"

There remain cases "where a

.

.

.

[right] of a [third] State

rificed for the sake of a vital interest of the [target] State

any way

can be sac-

which would otherwise be

obliged to respect that right."

Not
ever,

all

commentators agree on the

LOS

state

of necessity doctrine today.

How-

Convention, Article 221 allows States "to take [proportionate] mea-

sures, in accordance with international law,

beyond the

limits of the territorial

sea" to protect their coastline "or related interests, including fishing, from grave

and imminent danger" from pollution or the threat of pollution. The Intervention
Convention
action in

is

to the

same

bombing the

grounded

effect.

"

These provisions would have vindicated

derelict Torrey

Canyon

UK

after that Liberian-registered vessel

off Britain, threatening the English coast

and

its

population.

"

Al-

though frequently decided on other grounds, ICJ decisions and international arbitrations have recognized the doctrine in

many contexts.

The record of State practice and other sources is thus less than clear, but the International

Law Commission

Special Rapporteur summarizes state of necessity

and its scope today, provided a target State invoking state of necessity acts proportionally to a peril:

.

.
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Article 33. State of necessity

1

A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act of that State not in conformity with an international obligation of the State unless:

(a)

means of safeguarding an essential interest of the
grave and imminent peril; and

the act was the only
State against a

impair an essential interest of the State

(b) the act did not seriously

to-

wards which the obligation existed.
2.

In any case, a state of necessity

may not be invoked by a

State as a

ground

for precluding wrongfulness:

(a) if the

which the act of the State is not in
out of a peremptory norm of general international

international obligation with

conformity arises
law; or

(b) if the international obligation

conformity

laid

is

down by

with which the act of the State

a treaty

is

not in

which, explicitly or implicitly,

excludes the possibility of invoking the state of necessity with

re-

spect to that obligation; or
(c) if the State in

question has contributed to the occurrence of the state

of necessity.

The Commission draft also says: "[Wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that State
tutes a lawful

measure of self-defence taken

Tanker War participants did not claim

is

precluded

if

the act consti-

in conformity with the Charter.

state of necessity for their actions,

639
.

but they

could have.

The primary example

is

US and

other States' protecting third-State crews

from attacks by Iranian speedboats and

aircraft. Self-defense

permitted protect-

ing vessels flagged under the ensign of a covering warship or aircraft or protection of nationals of the

have

same

State and,

upon

request, third-State crews.

a general obligation to act to preserve life at sea,

States

independent of an ongoing

armed conflict.
This obligation carries with it a right to engage in necessary
and proportionate response, in the nature of self-defense, with respect to such
ships and personnel. The right to respond could also be based on a theory of state
of necessity.

A clearer case involved the Nowruz oil slick created by Iraqi attacks in
Although the

slick dissipated

1983.

without any State's having taken action,

littoral

countries threatened with loss of coastal fisheries or desalination plants could have

acted proportionally with force to eliminate the leakage from Iranian platforms.
Similarly, if petroleum leakage from vessels hit

on the high

seas of the Persian

Gulf

World Public Order

was serious enough and threatened

a coastal State's shore or other interests, that

State could have acted to intervene. Precedent for this

US

1990-91 war,
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aircraft, as a defensive

measure,

bombed

is clear.

oil

During the

manifolds

at termi-

Kuwait opened by Iraq. Besides risk to coalition warships, there
Kuwaiwas risk to western Gulf coastal fisheries and desalination plant intakes.
ti permission was undoubtedly given, but if it had not, the strikes could have been
nals in occupied

justified

b.

by the

Retorsion.

state of necessity doctrine.

A retorsion, or retortion, is a lawful but unfriendly response of a tar-

get State to another state's unfriendly practice or act whether illegal or not, to co-

Commentators agree

erce the latter to discontinue that practice or act.

that a

must be proportional.
During the Tanker War, the US defensive bubble or cordon sanitaire warnings in
NOTAMs or NOTMARs may have seemed unfriendly acts, but they were legitimate warnings of the right of self-defense if an aircraft or vessel came within
range.
Accompanying, escorting or offering protection to merchantmen not
retorsionary response

carrying warfighting or war-sustaining goods to belligerent ports, including out-

bound cargoes of Kuwaiti or Saudi petroleum, may have seemed unfriendly,
gal, acts to

the belligerents, particularly Iran.

territorial sea

were legal,

Iran's naval

maneuvers

but they may have seemed unfriendly acts to

its

if le-

in its

neigh-

bors or to some navies. These retorsions were proportional.

Part B.

UN Mechanisms

If there has

Breaches of the Peace, Threats
Peace, and Aggression
for

to the

been uneven development of Charter norms as a coherent body of

law for States' individual or collective responses to breaches of the peace, threats to

UN record as an Organization has been even less clear.
This Part first examines the methodology of UN lawmaking and then sketches the
organizational framework for UN lawmaking and in other groups permitted by the
the peace, or aggression, the

Charter in the context of situations involving the law of naval warfare.

/.

Making the Rules and Stating the Principles: The

Security Council

Aside from General Assembly competence for UN Membership, the budget and
trust territories,

curity Council.

the only source of positive, primary-source

norms

is

the Se-

Under Charter Articles 25 and 48, Members agree to carry out "de-

cisions," particularly those related to action to maintain international peace
security. *"

However, the Charter

nonbinding "recommendations"

also gives the

Council authority to make

for pacific settlement of disputes,

mendations" on issues involving breaches of the peace, threats
gression.

It

peace or not,

and

and "recom-

to the peace or ag-

may "call upon" parties to resolve a dispute, whether it threatens the
and it can "call upon" Members for measures to assist in enforcing
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Recommendations and authority to "call upon" Members for action
nonbinding, although "call upon" connotes a stronger prescriptive principle

decisions.

are

than recommendations;

A

binding.

if a call for

action

is

coupled with

further restriction on Council practice

a decision, the call is

that Article 25 decisions

is

can only be taken under Chapter VII, dealing with breaches of the peace, threats to
the peace and aggression,

and with an Article 39 determination

to that effect.

Thus although Article 25 appears in the Charter just before Chapter VI, stating the
Council role in pacific dispute settlement,

it

has been used along with Article 48

Chapter VII decisions.

for

The narrow problem

is

whether the Council has made

a decision.

The Namibia

opinion declared principles of resolution interpretation; there must be reference
to

"terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to

ter provisions

mining the

the Char-

invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in deter-

legal

consequences of the resolution

Council resolution
analysis,

it,

when

a

binding decision?

what appears

is

to

be

a

."
.

In other words,

.

when

is

a

more important for this
binding decision nothing more than a
Or, perhaps

nonbinding recommendation, although not so styled?
Analysis of Council decisionmaking

word

— reveals

a trend

— in the broad, nontechnical sense of the

toward establishing norms affecting law of naval warfare

standards.

a.

The Korean War. Bailey has aptly summarized Council actions

War: "The

.

.

.

Council decisions on military enforcement

.

.

.

for the

Korean

were not binding and,

indeed, were only possible because of the fortuitous absence of the Soviet Un-

Resolution 82, calling for ceasing hostilities, calling upon North Korea to

ion."

withdraw north of the 38th parallel and calling upon Members
Nations,

to assist the

was recommendatory, being issued under Articles 39-41.

retary-General

felt

United

The

Sec-

there had been only a threat to the peace, the United States

charged aggression had occurred, and the Council toned down the Resolution
later,

recommend-

South Korea "to repel the armed attack and

to restore in-

find a "breach of the peace."

ing that

Members

ternational peace
peace.

assist

to

Resolution 83 followed two days

and security in the area," finding North Korea had breached the

Besides welcoming assistance given South Korea, and "Recommend[ing]"

Members make forces and assistance available to the United States as head of a
unified command, Resolution 84 followed the pattern.
The only decision of the
that

war was a Council invitation to the PRC to be present for its discussion of a UN Korean
cil,

b.

command special report.

With the USSR's return and its veto in

UN lawmaking potential shifted to the Assembly.

Arab-Israeli Conflicts.

the Coun-

f."jr\

The Arab-Israeli conflicts generated positive lawmaking

before and after the Korean War.

.
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After hortatory resolutions based on Articles 39 and 40,
called

upon Governments and

terial into or to Palestine,

or

Yemen

were
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Resolution 50 (1948)

authorities to stop importing or exporting

war ma-

Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan

during a recommended ceasefire.

It

"Decide[d]" that

rejected, or later repudiated or violated, "the situation

.

.

.

if this

resolution

[would] be recon-

sidered with a view to action under Chapter VII," i.e., for possible measures involv-

This, the Council's

ing force.

first

attempt to define and regulate warfighting/

was only recommendatory. The only decision was

war-sustaining material,

for

further action if the parties rejected the resolution's terms. Later resolutions "Or-

der[ed]" a cease-fire, "Decide[d]" the belligerents' responsibility under the ceasefire,

After a recommendatory call

and "Decide[d]" on an armistice.

upon the

belligerents for a ceasefire late in 1948, the Council "Reaffirm [ed]" its prior "or-

der" for ceasefire and obeying armistice agreements.
ture.

When fighting broke out again in

ceasefire,

67S

These were binding in na-

1951, the Council called

reminding them of Chapter VI obligations

to settle disputes

In September 1951 Resolution 95 "not[ed]

means.

upon

.

.

.

parties for a

by peaceful

present practice of

[Egypt's] interfering with the passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for

and "[found] further that such practice [was] an abuse of the exercise of the

Israel"

right of visit, search

and

seizuref.]"

The Resolution "Further

practice in the prevailing circumstances cannot be justified

necessary for

self- defence [,]"

[found] that the

on the ground that it is

and noted that

on the passage of goods through the Suez Canal to Israel ports are
no time connected with the conflict in Palestine valuable
supplies required for their economic reconstruction, and that these restrictions
together with sanctions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel
.

.

.

restrictions

denying

to nations at

ports represent unjustified inferference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas

and

to trade freely

with one another, including the Arab States and

Israel[.]

The Resolution concluded by "Call[ing] upon Egypt to terminate

the restrictions

on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez
Canal wherever bound and to cease

all

interference with such shipping

beyond

that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of.

.

upon
Egypt under Article 40, the Resolution could not be considered binding. However,
conventions in force."

Because

it

ended with

a

recommendatory

"call"

the Resolution declaration that seizures in the Canal abused traditional rules had

evidentiary weight as to a norm.

Resolution 101 (1953) similarly "[found] that

the retaliatory action at Qibya taken by

.

.

.

Israel

on 14-15 October 1953 and

all

such actions constitute^ violations of the ceasefire, the armistice] and the Charter

" Israel

was censured.

679

In 1955 Israel was

tack as inconsistent with [the armstice]

year an attack on Syria was

"Condemned]

and under the

"Condemned]"

after Israel

.

.

.

for a similar at-

Charter."

The

next

experienced interference
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cg

I

using Lake Tiberias by Syria in violation of the armistice.

changes of

between Syria and

fire

Governments

...

to

comply with

In 1962, after ex-

Resolution 171 "call[ed] upon the two

Israel,

their obligations

under

.

.

.

the Charter by refrain-

The Council reaffirmed its prior res-

ing from the threat as well as the use of force."

condemning retaliatory breaches of the armistice, and determined that
Israel's attack on March 16-17 was "a flagrant violation of that resolution."
A
"grave Israel military action" in southern Hebron against Jordan in 1966 earned
olution

Israel a censure.

and

tolerated

The Council "Emphasize[d]

that, if

more effective steps
such

.

as

.

.

repeated, the

.

.

.

.

.

.

that

.

.

.

military reprisal cannot be

Council [would] consider further and

envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of

acts.

When
ceasefire

War.

the 1967 war broke out, the Council called

upon the

belligerents for a

and ceasing military activities, on the model of the opening of the Korean

Later resolutions "Demand[ed]" a ceasefire and observance of it.

lution 237 only

Reso-

"Recommend[ed]" compliance with the Third Convention,

Resolution 242 "Affirm[ed]

.

.

.

the necessity

.

.

.

[f]or

but

guaranteeing freedom of navif\R7

gation through international waterways in the area[.]"

'

Resolutions 248 and 256

condemned the "large-scale and massive" or "large scale and carefully planned" attacks

on Jordan

in response to Jordanian violations of the ceasefire in 1968.

1969 resolution condemned similar "preplanned"

Israeli air attacks

A

on Jordanian

population centers as a "flagrant" violation of the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions. It repeated a previous resolution's

again "to consider further and

warning, that the Council would meet

more

ensure against repetition of such

effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to
689
attacks."

The 1 973 war precipitated a Council call for ending hostilities and a ceasefire.
In 1981, while Iraq was heavily committed in

its

war with

Iran, Israeli aircraft

struck an Iraqi nuclear facility near Baghdad. Israel claimed a right of anticipatory
self-defense in that the facility

was manufacturing nuclear weapons

to

be used

Upon Iraq's complaint, the Council cited Charter Article 2(4)
and "[sjtrongly condemned] the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the
Charter
and the norms of international conduct." The Council called upon Isagainst Israel.

.

.

.

rael to refrain

from any such

acts or threats in the future

entitled to "appropriate redress, responsibility for

by

Israel."

and stated

that Iraq was

which has been acknowledged

693

In 1982, the Council "[d]emand[ed] that
of the city of Beirut

... to

.

.

.

Israel lift

immediately the blockade

permit the dispatch of supplies to meet the urgent needs

of the civilian population and allow the distribution of aid" by

UN agencies and

nongovernmental organizations, particularly the ICRC. The resolution referred to
other resolutions citing the 1949 Geneva Conventions and "regulations attached
to the

Hague Convention of 1907."

694
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Rhodesia: 1965-79. The Rhodesia decolonization process, which included em-

bargo and maritime interdiction before Zimbabwe independence was assured, be-

gan with General Assembly action. Assembly resolutions noted "a threat

to

freedom, peace and security in Africa," and called upon States to refrain from rendering assistance to Rhodesia.

and the Assembly

695

Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence,

"[i]nvite[d]" the

resolutions

and "Recommend[ed

as a matter

»696
r
of urgency.

United Kingdom

that] the

.

.

.

implement the Assembly

to

Council

.

.

.

consider [the] situation

Condemning the independence declaration, the Council first "[d]ecide[d] to
call upon all States ... to refrain from rendering any assistance to this illegal re697
Resolution 217 called upon the UK Government to quell the rebellion
gime."
and "to take

other appropriate measures which would prove effective in elimi-

all

nating the authority of the usurpers
sist

from providing arms

an embargo on

.

.

."

The Council also called upon States to de-

Rhodesia and to break economic

to

relations, "including

and petroleum products." Continuance of the rebellion was de-

oil

termined to be "in time a threat to international peace and security."
the United

Kingdom

declined to intercept Beira-bound tankers.

698

699

Thereafter

The Council

then passed Resolution 221, which "[c]all[ed] upon" Portugal to deny pier and

pumping

facilities

and

"[c]all[ed]

ably believed to be carrying
Beira."

The Council

the use of force

carrying

oil

there.

if necessary,

V upon

.

.

.

.

may be en route for
United Kingdom "to prevent, by

.Rhodesia which

upon" the

the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be

Rhodesia." Specific authority was given to arrest and

.

departure from Beira

The United Kingdom

blockade runners.

States" to divert their vessels "reason-

all

destined for

also "[c]all[ed]

destined for

detain Joanna

oil

upon

upon

acted

if

she discharged petroleum cargo

this resolution, stopping possible

701

A month later the Council, "Acting in accordance with

Articles 39-41" of the

Charter, determined the Rhodesia situation was a threat to international peace and
security.

(a)

The Council "Decid[ed]

that

.

.

.

Members

.

.

.

shall prevent:"

The import into their territories of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar,
tobacco, copper, meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather origi-

nating in

.

.

.

Rhodesia and exported therefrom

after the date of the present

resolution;
(b)

Any

activities

by

their nationals or in their territories

which promote or are
Rhodesia and
any of these commodi-

calculated to promote the export of these commodities from

any dealings by their nationals or in their
ties

originating in

.

.

.

territories in

Rhodesia and exported therefrom

.

.

.

after the date of the

present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to
for
(c)

such

.

.

.Rhodesia

activities or dealings;

Shipment
nating in

in vessels
.

resolution;

.

.

.

.

.

of their registration of any of these commodities origi-

Rhodesia and exported therefrom

after the date of the present

.
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(d)

Any

activities

which promote or are
Rhodesia of arms, ammunimilitary vehicles, and equipment and mate-

by their nationals or

in their territories

calculated to promote the sale or shipment to
tion of all types, military aircraft,
rials for the

.

.

.

manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in

.

.

.

Rhodesia;
(e)

Any

by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are
calculated to promote the supply to
Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor
vehicles and of equipment and materials for the manufacture, assembly, or
activities

.

.

.

maintenance of aircraft and motor vehicles
vessels

.

.

and any

are calculated to

(f)

.

.

.

.

Rhodesia; the shipment in

of their registration of any such goods destined for

.

.

.

.

.

.

Rhodesia;

which promote or
promote the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor ve-

activities

hicles in

in

by their nationals or

in their territories

Rhodesia;

Participation in their territories or territories under their administration or in

land or air transport

facilities

or by their nationals or vessels of their registra-

tion in the supply of oil or oil products to

.

.

.

Rhodesia; notwithstanding any

contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of the present
resolution[.]

Members were "[r]emind[ed]"
upon" them

"[c]all[ed]

of obligations under Article 25; the resolution also

to carry out "this decision of the

Resolution 253 followed in 1968; "[reaffirming
situation in

.

.

.

Rhodesia constitute[d]

(a)

.

.

.

Council.'"

.

determination that the

its

.

.

.,"

.

peace and security

the Council "[d]ecide[d] that

and products originating

into their territories of all commodities

Rhodesia and exported therefrom

.

after the date of this resolution

(whether or not the commodities or products are for consumption or processing in their territories, whether or not they are imported in bond and whether
or not any special legal status with respect to the import of goods

is

enjoyed by

the port or other place where they are imported or stored);
(b)

Any

by their nationals or in their territories which would promote
or are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or products
from
Rhodesia; and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in
any commodities or products originating in
Rhodesia and exported thereactivities

.

.

.

.

.

.

transfer of funds to
from after the date of this resolution, including
Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;
The shipment in vessels ... of their registration or under charter to their naRhodesia and extionals
of any commodities or products originating in
.

(c)

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

ported therefrom after the date of this resolution;
(d)

The sale or supply by their nationals or from
ties

their territories of any

commodi-

or products (whether or not originating in their territories, but not in-

cluding

supplies

intended

for

strictly

medical

purposes,

educational

equipment and material for use in schools and other educational institutions,
publications, news material and, in special humanitarian circumstances,
food-stuffs) to any person or body in
Rhodesia or to any other person or
.

.

.

.

.

shall prevent":

.

The import
in

.

a threat to international

[and ajcting under Chapter VII of the Charter

Members

702

.

.

.

.
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Rhodesia, and any
any business carried on in or operated from
by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply;
of their registration, or under charter to their naThe shipment in vessels
tionals,
of any such commodities or products which are consigned to any
person or body in
Rhodesia, or to any other person or body for the purposes
Rhodesia[.]
of any business carried on in or operated from

body

for

.

.

.

.

.

.

activities

(e)

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Members were again reminded of Article 25
a

Committee

to receive reports

.

the

all

UK

The Council

obligations.

and obtain information.

"[d]ecide[d]," in accordance with Article 41, "that

sever

.

703

established

In 1970 the Council

Members would

inter alia,

trade and transportation ties with Rhodesia; the Council" "[r]equest[ed]"

government

"[R]equest[ed]" that
the Charter

[i.e.,

to rescind all trade,

etc.,

agreements with Rhodesia and

Members "take all possible further action under Article 41

options not involving the use of force],

.

.

.

not excluding any

.

of
.

measures provided in that Article[.]"
In 1972 Resolution 314 deplored the failure of States to abide by the embargo
sanctions and declared that any national legislation to the contrary "would under705

mine sanctions and would be contrary to the obligations of States."
In 1973
Resolution 333 "[c]all[ed] upon" States to enact legislation "providing for the imposition of severe penalties" for evasion or breach of sanctions.

5.

Requested] States, in the event of their trading with South Africa and Portugal, to

provide that purchase contracts with those countries should clearly

stipulate, in a

of

.

.

.

manner legally

enforceable, the prohibition of dealing in goods

Rhodesian origin; likewise,

sales contracts

with these countries should

include a prohibition of resale or re-export of goods to
6.

.

Rhodesia;

.

.

Call[ed] upon States to pass legislation forbidding insurance

from covering air flights into and out of
cargo carried on them;

their jurisdiction

dividuals or air
7.

It also

.

.

.

companies under
Rhodesia and in-

Call[ed] upon States to undertake appropriate legislative measures to ensure

that

all

valid marine insurance contracts contain specific provisions that

goods of

.

.

.

Rhodesian origin or destined

to

.

.

.

Rhodesia

shall

no

be covered by

such contracts;
8.

Call[ed] upon States to inform the

Committee established in pursuance of reso-

lution 253 (1968) on their present sources of supply and quantities of chrome,
asbestos, nickel, pig iron, tobacco,
ties

meat and sugar, together with the quantiRhodesia before the application of

of these goods they obtained from

sanctions.

.

.

.

706

The economic noose was tightened further in 1976 by Resolution 388, decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, that Members would ensure that their nationals
and persons

in their territories did not insure:
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Any commodities or products exported from

(a)

present resolution in contravention of

(b)

.

.

.

.

.

.

Rhodesia

after the date of the

resolution 253 (1968)

which they

know or have reasonable cause to believe to have been so exported;
Any commodities or products which they know or have reasonable

cause to

believe to be destined or intended for importation into

after the

.

.

.

Rhodesia

date of the present resolution in contravention of resolution 253 (1968);

Commodities, products or other property in
industrial or public utility undertaking in

(c)

.

.

.

.

.

.

Rhodesia of any commercial,

Rhodesia, in contravention of

resolution 253 (1968)[.]

The Council
.

.

.

also decided that

Member

States shall take appropriate measures to prevent their nationals

and

persons in their Territories from granting to any commercial, industrial or public
utility

undertaking in

.

.

.

Rhodesia the right

to use

any trade name or from entering

into any franchising agreement involving the use of any trade

name, trade mark or

registered design in connexion with the sale or distribution of any products,
commodities or services of such an undertaking^] 707

The same approach

(graduated embargo, Committee reporting system) under

Chapter VII of the Charter was employed with respect
Majority rule came in 1979, and the sanctions were

to

South Africa.

lifted that year.

708

709

The General Assembly also played a role in the transition to Zimbabwe. Besides
passing nonbinding

710

resolutions within

sembly's prior law-declaring resolutions,

dependence
d.

to Colonial

e.g.,

sphere,

711

the Council cited the As-

the Declaration on Granting of In-

Countries and Peoples.

712

The 1965 naval war was part of a renewed conflict beThe Security Council, as in other situations, "[c]all[ed]"

India-Pakistan: 1965, 1971.

tween India and Pakistan.

upon the belligerents
issue.

713

The

to take steps for a cease-fire

and

to respect the frontier line at

1971 war was over so quickly that Council Resolution 307 only noted

the Pakistani agreement to a cease

e.

its

Falklands/Malvinas: 1982.

fire

Two

and "[d]emand[ed]" compliance with it.

Council resolutions impacted this relatively

brief conflict. Resolution 502 was stronger than

many initial

responses to a

crisis.

Finding "a breach of the peace," the Council "[d]emand[ed]" immediate cessation
of hostilities and withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands/Malvinas and
"[c]all[ed]

on

.

.

.

Argentina and the United

Kingdom ...

and to respect fully the purposes and

to seek a diplomatic solu715
The secprinciples of the Charter."

tion

.

ond

resolution "[u]rge[d]" parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General's good

.

.

offices efforts.

/.

The Iran-Iraq Conflict and the Tanker War, 1980-88. As Charter era

went, the Iran-Iraq war was a long, eight-year

affair

with heavy losses

conflicts

all

around.
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Security Council action was relatively minimal: 17 resolutions
Several bear

upon the Tanker War and the law of naval
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in that time.

warfare.

Resolution 479 (September 23, 1980, issued shortly after the war began)

upon" the

"[c]all[ed]

and

belligerents to refrain immediately

to settle the dispute

718

from further use of force

"by peaceful means and in conformity with international

law," echoing Charter Article 33.

The resolution"[w]rg£[<i]" Iran and Iraq to accept

mediation, conciliation, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other
peaceful means.

It "[c]all[ed]

upon" States to exercise restraint and to refrain from

anything to further escalate and widen the conflict.
to suggest

good

offices

navigation, Japan
principle.

720

was supported.

and the United

719

Although

The

Secretary-General's offer

it

did not mention freedom of

States stressed the

primary importance of that

Iraq accepted Resolution 479, denying

it

had any

territorial

ambi-

721

demanding condemnation of Iraqi aggression.
In October, however, Iraq rejected a UN good offices offer to allow 70 merchantmen
trapped in the Shatt al-Arab by the war to depart under a UN or perhaps an ICRC
tions; Iran rejected

flag;

it,

Iran accepted the proposal.

Nearly two years

later,

722

Resolution 514 again

ligerent forces' withdrawal.

The Council

u

[c]all[ed]for"

2l

ceasefire

"[d]ecid[ed] to dispatch a

and

bel-

team of [UN]

observers to verify, confirm and supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal." Con-

tinuing Secretary-General mediation efforts was "[u]rge[d]." Other States were
again asked to abstain from action that might contribute to continuation of the
723

conflict.

An

October

4,

1982 resolution was in the same vein, and welcomed a

"part[y's]" (Iraq's) acceptance of Resolution 514's terms

and

"call[ed]

upon the

other [Iran] to do likewise[.]"

Resolution 540 (1983) deplored mutual destruction of civilian
property and economic infrastructures.

lives, cities,

The Council condemned violations of hu-

manitarian law, particularly that stated in the First through the Fourth Conven-

and called

tions,

for "cessation of all military operations against civilian targets,

including city and residential areas[.]" Resolution 540 "[a]ffirm[ed]"

.

.

.

the right of free navigation and

States to respect this right

all

immediately all

and

commerce

in international waters, call[ed]

also call[ed]

hostilities in the region of the Gulf,

upon the
including

on

belligerents to cease
all

waterways, harbour works, terminals, offshore installations and

sea-lanes, navigable
all

ports with direct

or indirect access to the sea, and to respect the integrity of the other littoral States[.]

It also

"[c]a//[^]

upon both

parties to refrain

from any action that [might] endan-

ger international peace and security as well as marine
Gulf."

life

in the region of the

725

In June 1984 Resolution 552 responded to a letter from the
rain,

Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,

UAE)

GCC

States (Bah-

77 ft

complaining of Iranian

acts of

aggression on the freedom of navigation to and from their ports. Although Iran

,
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justified its attacks

on reaction against aid

by

to Iraq

States in the region

and on

other bases, the Council heard States and the Arab League's complaints concerning ship attacks and the right of freedom of navigation,
552.

The

727

and passed Resolution

Council,

Member

Noting that

good neighbours

States pledged to live together in peace with

in accordance with the Charter

Reaffirming the obligations of

Member

.

.

one another

as

.

and

States with respect to the principles

purposes of the Charter,
Reaffirming also that
relations

all

Member States are obliged to refrain in their international

from the threat or use of force against the

independence of any
Taking

State,

into consideration the

and security and

territorial integrity or political

its vital

importance of the Gulf region

role to the stability of the

to international peace

world economy,

Deeply concerned over the recent attacks on commercial ships en route
Convinced that these attacks constitute
area

and have serious implications

1.

to

and from

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,

the ports of

Call[ed] upon

all

and

a threat to the safety

for international peace

and

stability of the

security,

States to respect, in accordance with international law, the

right of free navigation;
2.

Reaffirmed] the right of free navigation in international waters and sea lanes
for shipping en route to

States
3.

.

.

.

and from

ports and installations of the littoral

all

not parties to the hostilities;

Call[ed] upon

all

States to respect the territorial integrity of the States

parties to the hostilities

from any

and

to exercise the

which may lead

act

utmost restraint and

to a further escalation

.

.

not

.

to refrain

and widening of the

conflict;
4.

Condemned] the recent attacks on commercial ships en route
ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia;

5.

Demand[ed] that such attacks should cease forthwith and that there should be
not parties to the
no interference with ships en route to and from States
.

.

to

and from the

.

hostilities;
6.

Decide[ed] in the event of non-compliance with the present resolution, to meet

again to consider effective measures

.

.

.

commensurate with the gravity of the

situation ... to ensure the freedom of navigation in the area[.l

The Council requested the Secretary-General to report on progress in implementing the resolution.

728

Resolutions 540 and 552 had no lasting
"[d]eplore[d]

.

.

.

effect.

In February 1986 Resolution 582

escalation of the conflict, especially

.

.

.

attacks

on neutral shipping

or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws

of armed conflict and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to

Geneva Protocol."

It

also "[c]all[ed]

upon

cease-fire, a cessation of all hostilities

their forces

.

.

.

.

.

.

the

Iran and Iraq to observe an immediate

on land,

at sea

and

in the air," to

behind their borders, and called upon the belligerents

conflict to mediation or other peaceful settlement methods.

to

withdraw

submit the

The now-familiar
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provision, calling upon other States to refrain from escalating or widening the conflict,

was also included.

729

Resolution 588 (October 1986) expressed alarm over the

continuing and intensifying conflict and called upon the belligerents to imple-

ment Resolution

730

582.

Resolution 598 (July 1987) again "[d]eplore[d]
civilian aircraft, the violation of international

.

.

.

attacks

on neutral shipping or

humanitarian law and other laws of

the
armed conflict and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to
1925 Geneva Protocol[.]" Citing Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter, the Council
Iran and Iraq observe an immediate cease"[a]ct[ed]" "[d]emand[ing] that.
"
fire
Other States were admonished not to escalate or widen the war. The Secretary-General was requested to explore, in consultation with the belligerents, entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and a
731
This was the first time the Council cited Chapter VII of
report to the Council.
.

.

.

.

.

the Charter (threats to the peace, etc.) during the war. Iraq accepted Resolution 598

almost immediately.

732

GCC

countries and the

The European Community,

the Arab League,

passed resolutions supporting Resolution 598, the

urging the Security Council to implement

it.

The US

a

733

UN naval force was discussed; Italy and the United States had

supported the idea, the United
States

GCC

Secretary of State and other

foreign ministers referred to the binding nature of Resolution 598.

During 1987

NATO

was willing

to consider

it

Kingdom was

but only

unenthusiastic, and the United

if a collective

action concept was spelled

The United States would not support a UN force replacing US and
US-aligned forces. The idea got nowhere.
735
Resolution 612 again condemned chemical warfare in May 1988.
Iran acout clearly.

cepted Resolution 598 in August 1998, and a ceasefire ended hostilities.

736

Subse-

quent resolutions, 1988-91, condemned use of chemical weapons, called upon
States to control export of such to the belligerents, established the

Military Observer

UNIIMOG in
g.

Group (UNIIMOG)

UN Iran-Iraq

and disbanded

to supervise the ceasefire,

1991 with intensification of the crisis over Kuwait.

737

Appraisal of Security Council Lawmaking. Security Council intervention with

binding or recommended norms affecting war
limited.

There are several reasons

at sea

has been episodic and often

for this.

Use of the veto, at first largely by the USSR and later by other permanent Coun738

members (France, Great Britain, United States),
has affected lawmaking for
some maritime conflicts. Permanent members filed vetoes on these maritime inci-

cil

dents or wars: Corfu Channel, 1947; Korean War; Arab-Israeli conflicts; IndiaPakistan, 1971; Rhodesia; Falklands/Malvinas.

739

In

some

cases,

Council agenda

items have been withdrawn, or the problem has disappeared with time.
has been a critical factor in some, but not

all,

modern

Time

conflicts; the Arab-Israeli

Six-Day War and the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict are two examples where military

.

1
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action was over within weeks.
to function continuously,"
facilities,

Even though the Council may be "organized
perhaps with the most modern telecommunications
.

.

the relatively rapid pace of events can outstrip deliberation, debate and

resolution negotiations and drafting.

Whether the Council can consider a matter depends on discretion of UN Members (whether Council members or not), countries that are not UN Members, the
General Assembly, or the Secretary-General, in bringing matters involving inter-

The Council can initiate its

national peace and security to the Council's attention.

own investigation, but that involves discretion before acting on a resolution.
The Secretary-General could perhaps report through his or her inherent power as
And while this list may seem impressive, there is
head of the UN Secretariat.
nothing

to stop individual States

from attempting

to settle a dispute

by means

other than Council action, perhaps by negotiations with agreement that the issue

not be presented to the Council, or referral to a regional organization, the latter of

which occurred during the Cuban Missile

The
tions.
ture.

Crisis.

may have influenced the relative strength of resoluKorean War resolutions were only recommendatory in na-

implications of a veto

For example, the

More

recently, however, the Council has demonstrated the capacity to

approve decisions under Articles 25 and 48,
"7

concur with the action, must abstain,

A

at least

where permanent members

O

*7

A

C\

The latter has oc-

or choose to abstain.

curred occasionally in situations related to armed conflict or the potential for
750

armed conflict.
A more serious problem has been the language of resolutions. Obviously, if a
resolution recommends certain action, that course is optional with UN Members.
751
There have been many affecting the law of naval warfare.
Equally obviously, if
the Council "decides" that a State "shall" take certain action, that resolution

mandatory. There have been few of these.

752
Is a

resolution "calling

bers mandatory? Respectable authority has differed on the point,

of compliance

upon

is

mixed. For example, the United

to interdict tankers

753

upon"

is

Mem-

and the record

Kingdom complied when called

during the Rhodesia transition,

but the record

is

equally clear that Iran largely ignored Council calls during the Tanker War, per-

haps until forced to comply by outside pressures.
olution 598 after prior Iraqi acceptance of

it,

755

(To be sure, Iran accepted Res-

with a resulting

"acceptance" record of these resolutions was better,

757

756
ceasefire.

Iraq's

but "accepting" them con-

noted their nonmandatory nature to the belligerents. In the near term, immediately after passage of a call for action, about the only sure

States

do with the call

for action

method is to observe what

and whether they appear to respond out of a sense

of legal obligation. This choice, like Council decisions that are clearly mandatory

under the Charter,

is

not an option for a military commander.

must await the executive decision
for action

to

comply with the

call,

758

A commander

and how Council

calls

and decisions will be implemented, since they are frequently imprecise,
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so, as

the Council

is
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addressing a congery of over 180 countries

with widely varying resources.
Since the UN's earliest days Council resolutions have been involved with

maritime and law of naval warfare

759

issues.

Although nearly

tions have not carried the binding authority of decisions

all

of these resolu-

under Articles 25 and 48,

they do have a sort of "soft law" weight, which when implemented over an undeter-

mined amount of time, may ripen
7f>0

Moreover,

law.

into custom, the oldest source of international

to the extent that the

Council can act in relative concert and in

confidence that there will be no veto threat, the future

may

see

more strongly

worded resolutions that are nonmandatory in nature, or decisions that bind all UN
Members. The result in the future is that these resolutions, general as they often

may dictate the content of naval warfare in the case of Council decisions, or be
informed by it, much as self-defense considerations may be informed by the conare,

tent of naval warfare.

2.

Making the Rules and Stating the Principles: The General Assembly
The Charter gives the General Assembly only recommendatory powers

in the

international peace and security arena, and then only to the extent that the Council
is

not seized of a matter.

Two practices have developed: recommendations un-

der the Uniting For Peace (UFP) Resolution, and concurrent action with the Security Council.

a.

The

UFP Resolution. When the Soviet Union returned to the Council and be-

gan vetoing

resolutions connected with the

UN Command in Korea's prosecut-

ing that war, the United States led passage of the

UFP Resolution, which provides

that if the Council,

because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members,

fails to

exercise

its

primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security
where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression, the
Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to
making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures,
.

.

.

.

.

.

including, in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed
force

when

necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The Resolution

also established a Collective

port to the Assembly.
cil

Measures Committee (CMC)

On at least five occasions after the Korean War, the Coun-

resolved to call emergency Assembly sessions, or refer claims to

nationalizing the Suez Canal (1956), revolt in

the

Congo

crisis (1960),

to re-

Hungary

(1956),

and the India-Pakistan war (1971).

765

it.

Lebanon

Although

it

Egypt's
(1958),

was

ar-

gued that UFP was not legitimate under the Charter, most find for its legality; East

.
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and West have invoked
bly.

it

in referring disputes

from the Council

to the

Assem-

766

UFP was employed

Assembly Resolution 498 found the PRC
Resolution 500 recomhad committed aggression during the Korean War.
mended a weapons and strategic materials embargo directed at the PRC and North
in several cases.

HC.Q

Resolution 997, voted by the Assembly during Britain, France and

Korea.
rael's

Is-

1956 Suez Canal intervention, did not determine that a threat to or breach of

the peace had occurred but did note that these States' forces had penetrated, or

were operating against, Egyptian

and cease

hostilities.

They were urged

territory.

to

withdraw forces

769

Castenada, Higgins and others have analyzed these situations, along with those in

Hungary and

the Congo.

770

Castenada argues for development of a new customary

law arising from acquiescence of

amount

conflict can

to a

UN Members. 771 Whether these five examples of

new found custom

is,

Castenada formulates this system of rules from the

arguments
1.

.

.

.

Council, having determined that there

ment measures, including

is

a threat to the peace, a

may recommend

of the peace, or an act of aggression,

breach

the adoption of enforce-

the use of armed force, on behalf of the United Na-

and directed against

tions,

UFP experience; it is typical of

Assembly lawmaking:

for

The

of course, highly debatable.

states or

de facto governments, without following

the procedures and observing the requirements established in Chapter VII of
the Charter for

.

.

.

armed

This means that members can make available

force.

Council armed forces in accordance with procedures different from the

to the

special agreements contemplated in Article 43; that plans for the use of such

armed

forces

Committee,

armed

forces

need not be drawn up with the assistance of the Military Staff
as

provided in Article 46; and that the strategic direction of

made

available for enforcement action need not necessarily be

the responsibility of the
2.

.

.

.

Committee,

as set forth in Article 47.

Assembly can recommend, when there is lack of unanimity among the
Permanent Members ., and when there has arisen in the Assembly's opinion

The

.

.

.

.

.

the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the adoption of

a threat to

armed atof aggression, on behalf of the United Nations and directed

enforcement measures, including
tack or an act

.

.

.

armed

force in the event of an

against states or de facto governments, also without observing the procedures

and requirements of Chapter VII for
armed force.
Both the
Council and the
Assembly may decide, without
.

3.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

a

previous de-

termination that a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression exists, to

create a United Nations military force to carry out

functions, without complying with

and they may recommend

.

.

.

nonenforcement

Chapter VII for the use of armed force;

—but may not

legally require

— that members con-

tribute contingents to establish it. The functions of a United Nations Force
may range from mere observation and supervision to the undertaking of typically military operations, such as

engaging in battle with armed groups for

destroying them as combat units, as occurred in the Congo.

.

.

^
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Up to the present [1969]

there has not been a single instance in the practice of the

United Nations that could serve

Assembly

to

recommend

177

as a legal basis for a

the use of

armed

force,

new

rule authorizing the...

without the legal support of the

Uniting for Peace Resolution, even for nonenforcement purposes.

The legal effect of the new rule, per se, is the broadening of the competence of both the
Council and the Assembly to act in a manner different from that originally
contemplated in the Charter. The degree to which this competence was enlarged is
indicated by the three principles suggested above.

It is

possible to speak of a legal

effect because there has been a modification of a pre-existent legal situation,

although, from a different point of view, the change in the competence of the organs
constitutes not the effect but the very content of the

new rule created by

the practice

of the Organization.

The second

effect is of a diverse nature. Actually,

a question

it is

here of a legal

by the resolutions adopted by the
Council or
Assembly
on the basis of the customary rule created by their practice, rather than a direct effect
of that rule as such. This effect consists in the temporary suspension of the Charter
obligation of members to refrain from the use of force against any state, in conformity
with Article 2(4). That certain Council or Assembly recommendations concerning
effect directly produced

.

.

.

.

.

.

the use of force should have as an effect the suspension of the Charter obligation not
to use

While

it, is

a

consequence of the new rule created by the practice of the organs.

this statement is useful,

First, it

remains clear

it is

submitted that Castenada errs in two respects.

after the 1990-91

Gulf War that the Council

cide" on the use of force and authorize

—

its

agent

— the

may also

"de-

Coalition in the Gulf

773

War to proceed.
Moreover, it is highly questionable whether the Assembly
may "decide" in the sense of the Charter, Articles 25 and 48 on anything, such

—

—

commands.
If the Castanada view is
accepted, that States' acquiescence is enough to create a customary norm, that may
775
be true.
However, that is not what the Charter says, and any international agreements that conflict with the Charter are trumped by the latter.
Treaties, of
that States

would be compelled

to

obey

its

course, have been a regular feature of peacekeeping operations, whether under

UFP authority or the Council. 777
Moreover, most commentators and courts have said recommendatory resolutions can only restate or evidence customary law.

declaratory resolutions.

778

Even Castenada has this view for

The Assembly has promoted many LOAC-related

norms through the years; some state rules of law, some do not (at least according to
779
some countries), and some are purely aspirational.
b.

Concurrent Action with the Council. In several cases the Assembly and the

Council have issued resolutions during crises or conflicts.
•

•

781

7X0

Where a Council

de-

norm stated in an Assembly or Council recommendation, it becomes a binding rule of law. Where a nonbinding Council resolution adopts such a
cision

norm,

it

adopts a

is

further evidence of customary law, unless, of course, the original
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resolution declared custom, in

customary

c.

which case the Council resolution

also restates a

782
rule.

Appraisal for the Tanker War. The Council was seized of the Iran-Iraq war from
702

the beginning; therefore, the Assembly had no jurisdiction over the conflict.

However, countries involved in

a Council-seized conflict

may try to bring matters

before the Assembly, which should reject consideration of them.

The Assembly did promote projects whose
War, notably the Third

LOS

UN

subject

Conference on the

is

Law

784

applicable to the Tanker

of the Sea

(UNCLOS

III)

785

The same procedure was followed for the
Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols, a product of ICRC conferences.
The Council, by citing and incorporating by reference freedom of naviga-

which created the

tion, the

Convention.

law of armed conflict, and occasionally specific

Geneva Gas Protocol or the 1 949 Geneva Conventions,
dence of these agreements or customary law

as

787

treaties, e.g., the

1925

thereby gave further evi-

norms. Since no binding Article 25

or 48 decisions incorporated them, these bodies of law did not

become mandatory

norms, but Council citation increased the strength of their applicability. Although

may have clarified the debate as to
the status of Article 40-based resolutions calling for action, which may be binding
the issue

if the

3.

is

not free from doubt, Resolution 598

views of the US Secretary of State and other foreign ministers are correct.

788

The Constitutive Process of Decisionmaking in the Charter Era.
Sub-Parts B.l and B.2 of this Chapter have sketched development of norms of

conduct by the Council and the Assembly. This Sub-Part examines the methodol-

ogy of implementation of these norms by the Organization and by regional organizations, also contemplated

a.

by the Charter.

Implementation: Original Intent and Trends. The Charter contemplates that

UN Members will agree to make armed forces, assistance and facilities, including
rights of passage, available to the Council so that

peace and security.

789

when

•

the Council directs.

bers' chiefs of staff
791

posal.

Owing

agreements, the

Committee (MSC)

Cold

MSC

The

and would have

to the

can maintain international

consists of

sia,

The

/->

Charter

applying armed

permanent Council memCouncil

dis-

other factors such as the lack of Article 43

792
793

or implemented.

the "agency" principle, by which the Council has requested a State or a

group of States
behalf.

790

strategic direction of forces at

War and

MSC atrophied.

to plan for

Alternatives to the Charter system have been suggested

One was

•

These agreements have not materialized.

also provides for a Military Staff

force

it

to take leadership

The United

and a Coalition

States

had

and command of an operaton on the Council's

this role in Korea, the

in the 1990-91

Gulf War.

United Kingdom

for

Rhode-

UFP-based operations have used a
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Collective Measures

Committee

for data reporting

and dissemination.

795
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Some

peacekeeping operations have been given to the Secretary-General for leader796

In interdiction/embargo operations for Rhodesia, South Africa, and Iraq

ship.

in the 1990-91
cesses.

Gulf War, the Council appointed a Committee

to review these pro-

797

No

peacekeeping forces were active in the Gulf area during the 1980-88 war;

UNIIMOG served after the ceasefire and until the 1990-91

Gulf War.

798

The

Sec-

retary-General reported on the conflict, at Council direction, but did not administer
799
forces.

r

Neither the Council nor the Assembly authorized forces' intervention

similar to the situation in Korea, Rhodesia or Kuwait.
its

The Iran-Iraq conflict and

Tanker War component were governed by traditional

inter-State relations

and

the law of self-defense.

b.

Regional Arrangements Under the Charter. Article 52 permits regional arrange-

ments or agencies

to deal

with matters relating to maintaining international peace

and security "appropriate for regional action." Members of these arrangements or
agencies should

"make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes"

through these institutions before referring claims to the Council. The Council

must encourage developing
institutions,

whether

a matter is referred to the

The Council can

first.

der Council authority.
plation"

by regional

pacific settlement of regional disputes

through these

Council or a regional institution

use these arrangements or agencies for enforcement un-

801
It

must be kept informed of action taken "or in contem-

institutions, as distinguished

required in self-defense situations.

from post-attack reporting

802

What constitutes an Article 52 regional arrangement or agency has not been resolved; the

(OAU)

Arab League,

80S

the

OAS

and the Organization of African Unity

8ft6

Not all regional organizations are Article 52 dispute resolution agencies; those whose function is self-defense get authority from Article 51 's
807
inherent right of collective self-defense provision.
There has been use of Article
52 as an alternative to Council or Assembly dispute resolution. For example, the
United States referred the Cuban Missile Crisis issue to the OAS, obtained a resolution denouncing introduction of the missiles, and proceeded with quarantine.
808
As Article 54 requires, the Council was notified.
A regional organization resolu809
tion was also used in the Grenada crisis.
810
Four organizations, one with Article 52 status (the Arab League),
the GCC,
811
812
813
which may have that status,
theWEU, and the ICO, which may also have
qualify.

Tanker War. Although hampered from time to
dissension, the Arab League Summits' resolutions condemned

that status, were involved in the

time by internal

freedom of navigation violations and urged resolution of the conflict by the
parties.

The Arab League

governor-general appeared before the Council in con-

nection with debate on Council Resolution 552, brought by the

GCC

States,
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complaining of attacks on freedom of navigation

to

and from their

814

ports.

The

GCC played an active role in the war, evolving from an internal security organiza815
tion to promoting joint action for mutual security.
The WEU, concerned with
European

security,

ICO attempted

was cover

for several States'

Gulf maritime operations.

to serve as a mediator, particularly

Other regional organizations that could be said
bility today,

e.g.,

the European

Community,

818

GCC support.

through

to

81

ft

The

817

have dispute resolution capa-

passed resolutions but were not in-

volved because the Tanker War occurred outside their geographic competence.

Other governmental organizations not enjoying Article 52
Seven, also passed resolutions in connection with the war.

819

Group of
None of these made

status,
820

e.g.

the

law for the conflict, but their "soft law" status further evidences the strength of
claims they advanced,

e.g.,

freedom of navigation

in the Gulf.

The Work ofNongovernmental Organizations and the Tanker War. The principal nongovernmental organization contributing to the law of the Tanker War was

c.

the International Committee of the

sponsored conferences leading

to

Red Cross (ICRC),

1977 Protocols

I

and

a Swiss corporation that

II to

the 1949 Geneva Con-

821

The ICRC also sponsored conferences leading to adoption of the Con822
ventional Weapons Convention and its protocols in 1980.
The Security Council
ventions.

cited to the law of armed conflict generally
oil

the work of the

cally,

and to the Geneva Conventions specifi-

ICRC was cited in a Council resolution.

874.

Iran accepted and Iraq rejected a proposal to move, under the
flag,

70 ships caught in the Shatt by opening

ICRC-sponsored

hostilities.

had impacted norms applicable

Early in the war

Red Cross or UN
The standards of

to the war, regardless of

by the Council.

citation

The

treaties

875

'

International Transport

Workers Federation (ITF), International Cham-

ber of Shipping (ICS) and the International Shipping Federation (ISF) expressed

concerns over attacks on merchant shipping, and these were transmitted
belligerents

by the

UN Secretary-General.

Part C. Maritime Neutrality

"There

is

to

827

in

the Charter Era

nothing new about revising neutrality;

it

828

has undergone an almost

constant
istant process
pi
of revision in detail," Jessup concluded in 1936.

829

He

also be

lieved that

.

.

.

nothing could be more fallacious than the attempt

to test the application of

by the principles of logic. Since they are products of compromise
and of experience, logic has found practically no place in their development and
rules of neutrality

cannot properly be used in their application. 830

Over half a century into the Charter

era, little

would change these observations.

Oil

New considerations have appeared,

including the Charter

itself;

the process of

World Public Order

181

analyzing the law of neutrality defies a straightforward, positivist, black-letter approach. Indeed, principles of neutrality for maritime warfare have been seen to be

from an

less rigid,

historical perspective, than those for air or land warfare.

832

833

A major reason, acSome assert that neutrality is in "chronic obsolescence."
cording to those who say that future applications of the law of neutrality will be
minimal,

is

the argument that the Charter has ended the rights and duties of the

old law of neutrality.

834

Another argument

therefore there can be

war,

law of neutrality.
Paris (1928),

no

is

state of war,

that since the Charter has outlawed

and therefore there

is

no need

for a

(The latter position might be considered in light of the Pact of

which outlawed aggressive war.

837

World War

II

began

a

decade

later.)

Many

others, reflecting State practice

and claims

in the Charter era, have

maintained that the law of neutrality continues to exist. The San Remo Manual recognizes maritime neutrality.

838

ferences received reports from

1998

ILA

The 1992-96
its

International

Law Association Con-

Committee on Maritime

Neutrality,

conference accepted the Committee's final report.

839

and the

Individual re-

searchers assert that neutrality remains a valid legal concept, albeit modified

by

the impact of the Charter and other considerations.

Like the reports of Mark Twain's passing, accounts of the demise of neutrality
in the Charter era

have been greatly exaggerated, as the ensuing analysis

demonstrates.

The law of neutrality before World War II and the Charter era has been traced in
841
detail by Jessup, his associates and others,
more analysis is needlessly repetitive.
However, two groups' research during 1919-39
their collection

and summary of State

State practice as the

practice.

is

worthy of note, particularly

They had

for

considerable impact on

war widened but before it became global

in 1941 with entry of

the United States and other American countries into the war.

1.

Neutrality, 1928-41,

and in

the Charter Era; "Non-Belligerency"

In 1928 the Pact of Paris was concluded. Subject to later agreements such as the
Charter, the Pact remains in force today.

842

The understanding concerning the in-

herent right of of self-defense under the Pact applies in the Charter era and can be

claimed today, subject to principles of necessity, proportionality, and for anticipatory self-defense, a situation admitting of no other alternative.

843

Neutrality prin-

ciples also carried forward into the Charter era, subject to modification

by Charter

law and the usual processes of change in the law Jessup saw in 1936.

The

Pact did not address the neutrality issue, although other agreements

contemporaneous with

it

stated the term without defining

845
it,

except for the Ha-

vana Convention on Maritime Neutrality, with eight American countries party,
including the United States,
847
ity,

and the

five-State 1938

not a formal treaty but published in the

Nordic Rules of Neutral-

LNTS series. 848

—
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The ILA 1934 meeting approved the Budapest Articles ofInterpretation of the Pact
of Paris. They provide in part:
(1)

A

signatory State cannot, by denunciation or non-observance of the Pact, re-

lease itself

from

its

obligations thereunder.

(2)

A

(3)

A signatory State which aids a violating State thereby itself violates the Pact.

signatory State which threatens to resort to armed force for the solution of

an international dispute or conflict

(4)

is

guilty of a violation of the Pact.

In the event of a violation of the Pact by a resort to armed force or war by one
signatory State against another, the other States may, without thereby committing a breach of the Pact or of any rule of International

Law, do

all

or any of the

following things:
(a)

Refuse to admit the exercise by the State violating the Pact of belligerent
rights,

(b)

such

Decline

to

as visit

and search, blockade,

etc.;

observe towards the State violating the Pact the duties pre-

scribed by International Law, apart from the Pact, for a neutral in relation to a belligerent;
(c)

Supply the State attacked with financial or material assistance, including
munitions of war;

(d) Assist with
(5)

forces the State attacked.

The signatory States are not entitled
torial or

(6)

armed

to recognise as acquired

terri-

A violating State is liable to pay compensation for all damage caused by a violation of the Pact to any signatory State or to

(7)

de jure any

other advantages acquired de facto by means of a violation of the Pact.

The

its

nationals.

Pact does not affect such humanitarian obligations as are contained in

general treaties....

Although some

States

849

850

and commentators

proved that no State had adopted them

851

said

when

the Articles were ap-

as policy, in 1941 the

US

Congress heard

former Secretary of State Stimson's testimony on the pending Lend-Lease Bill; he
interpreted the Articles as an authoritative statement of the law.

852

He

echoed

views of Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Attorney General Robert H. Jackson

on the point, that since Axis nations had breached the Pact of Paris, the United
States could resort to self-defense.
cles

853

Besides self-defense, under the Budapest Arti-

States could adopt a status of nonbelligerency, i.e., decline to observe neutrality

toward a Pact violator. States could supply a State that was a target of a Pact violator
with "financial or material assistance, including munitions of war."
differently, Pact parties could
ties

854

(Put

engage in reprisals involving force or other modali-

or retorsions. In the Charter era, reprisals involving use of force by States not

party to a conflict are inadmissible.

In the pre-Charter era assisting victims of

aggression or armed attacks was styled as nonbelligerency, an intermediate step

between neutrality and belligerency.)

The Lend-Lease Bill was enacted.
context, can be said to have stated
ticles

as part of that practice. It is

Congress, by enacting Lend-Lease in this

US practice at that time,

857

and the Budapest Ar-

submitted that when the Allies and other neutrals
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accepted Lend-Lease through bilateral agreements, they ratified and accepted this
oco

practice.

The 1940 UK-US destroyers-for-bases agreements

859

were also exam-

Qf.r)

pies of the

United

States'

assuming nonbelligerent status.

only bilateral arrangements, although the

US

These, however, were

general pro-Allied stance was then

apparent.

The United
1 .5

to

assume

a nonbelligerency pos-

For example, Norway's November 1939 charter arrangement

ture during 1939-45.
for

was not the only country

States

favored the United

million tons of tankers with Britain

Kingdom against

the Axis. Others officially or unofficially adopted policies tending to favor one side
or the other, sometimes before

Germany, or American

States participating in

declaring war)

and

erent status

Spain).

(e.g.,

becoming belligerents

War

which supported

US Lend-Lease agreements before

in other cases staying out of the

This World

Italy,

(e.g.,

II

war but keeping nonbellig-

practice tends to add support for

recognizing nonbelligerency as an intermediate position, under international law,

between neutrality and belligerency.

The ILA was not

the only group of scholars in the interwar years with a view

that there could be gradations or stages between belligerency

1939 draft Harvard Aggression Convention differentiated
fending and co-defending States, entitled to

and

among

neutrality.

aggressors; de-

and "sup-

rights of self-defense;

all

The

porting States," entitled to discriminate against an aggressor by other than armed

A supporting State was entitled to "rights which, if it were neutral, it would

force.

have against

a belligerent."

An

aggressor retained

its

duties to those entitled to

Other States would have had these rights under Articles 12 and

neutrality status.
13:

A

State

which

not an aggressor, a defending State, a co-defending State, or a

is

supporting State, does not, in
if it

were neutral,

rights which, if

Subject to

.

.

.

it

it

its

would have

were

relations with the aggressor, have the duties which,

to a belligerent, but, against the aggressor,

a neutral,

Article 7

and

8, a

it

would have against

State

which

is

co-defending State, or a supporting State, has, in

co-defending State or

a

has the

a belligerent.

not an aggressor,
its

it

a

defending State, a

relations with a defending State, a

supporting State, the duties which,

if it

were neutral,

it

would

have to a belligerent; and has against those States the rights which, if it were a neutral,
it

would have against

a belligerent. 86 ^

The Comment to the "supporting State" definition elaborates on the term in the
Draft Convention:

.

to a

.

.

"[Supporting State"

is

used in

a special

way.

A "supporting State" might give

defending State even greater assistance than was given by

a

"co-defending State"

would do so without use of armed force.
The action taken by a supporting State to assist a defending State would take the
form of some kind of discrimination against the aggressor or in favor of the defending

but

it
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State.

The

may take such

State

but presumably

action and assume such status for a variety of reasons

reasons will include a desire to deter, restrain or even perhaps to

its

punish an aggressor. The discriminatory action may take the form of economic or
financial embargoes directed against the aggressor. It might be restricted to a
withdrawal of diplomatic and consular representatives from that State or
participation in the determination that the State violated

its

to

obligation not to resort

might not take the form of any measures directly against an aggressor but
might rather be in the form of aid financial, economic or otherwise to the
to force. It

—

defending

—

State.

Recitations of State and League of Nations practice demonstrates that there was

support

among

States, great

comes

for the

form of nonbelligerency not involv-

In effect, the Draft Convention's definition of supporting

ing direct use of force.
State

and small,

armed

close to the

neutralities of the Seventeenth

when

Centuries and the Napoleonic Wars

and Eighteenth

neutrals cooperated to get cargoes

9.f\l

through.

This was also almost precisely the circumstance of the United States in

the destroyers-bases deal,

its

convoy operations

869

in the

North Atlantic before en-

870

and Lend-Lease.
World War II,
It was the US posture during the
871
Tanker War when it convoyed neutral merchantmen to and from Kuwait.
The
same was true for States other than belligerents that accompanied or escorted merchantmen flying flags of States other than the belligerents, regardless of who was
try into

the aggressor during the Tanker War.

872

At

least

one commentator has stated that

the Budapest Articles principle of aid against an aggressor, or

its

correlative of sup-

porting State action under the Draft Convention, applies in the Charter

Most recent commentators say
ligerency and neutrality,

i.e.,

there

there

is

is

no

873
era.

no intermediate position between

bel-

perhaps need, for

legal foundation, or

nonbelligerency. Unlike the Harvard Draft Convention view, nonbelligerents can

claim no rights from that status.

874

However, the problem may lie more in defining

neutrality, according to Tucker. If neutrality
hostilities,

is

defined as non-participation in

as a belligerent or nonbelligerent, a non-participant neutral incurs

i.e.,

belligerent responses only

when, and

to the extent, favoritism

ents can respond by non-force reprisals or retorsions.

is

875

If

it is

shown. Belliger-

assumed that the

United States and others connected with Gulf commerce in the Tanker
vored one belligerent over the other,

(e.g.,

War

fa-

Iraq over Iran), Iran could impose pro-

portional non-force reprisals after due notice and opportunity for correction

necessary in the situation. Iraq could do the same, and either could employ
Iran could not, even under this theory of neutrality,

retorsions too.

move

straightway, without notice, to forcible response, e.g., attacks on and destruction of
neutral shipping.

Besides the

877

US position before entry into World War II and its stance during the

Iran-Iraq war, nearly every conflict of reasonable duration during the Charter era

has involved situations of nonbelligerency in maritime warfare. This was true for
the Korean War,

878

with

its

UN law overtones. It was also true for the Arab-Israeli
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conflicts.

The

•

India-Pakistan conflicts were less clear on the point.

880

185

The

United States materially assisted the United Kingdom in the Falklands/Malvinas
war, supplying fuel and intelligence; the United States and other countries,

through economic sanctions, also indirectly assisted the United Kingdom.

881

Moreover, if the view is taken that negative preferences for one belligerent over another, e.g., cutting off arms supplies to

one side as opposed to aiding one belligerent

while embargoing the other, amounts to nonbelligerency, during the Tanker

many

States

had nonbelligerent

USSR. The United Kingdom, with
spite its asserting

gory.

most of the Arab

status: France,
its

States,

War

and the

1987 export credit agreement with Iraq de-

even-handed strict neutrality, might be said to fall into this cate-

882

Regardless of the commentators' position, the record of armed conflicts since

World War II has been that if the confrontation is of any length, States may declare
and practice

nothing, perhaps ignoring (or being unaware
trality

has been applied in the Charter era, perhaps not consistently, and claims for

a right to act as a nonbelligerent,

pense of others,
Is

and

act as nonbelligerents, or do
883
of) the situation.
The law of neu-

strict neutrality, declare neutrality

i.e.,

favoring one or

more

belligerents at the ex-

persist.

nonbelligerency a violation of the law of neutrality, or a status without legal

standing between the traditional roles of neutrality and belligerency?

sponse today

lies

The

re-

not in the traditional analyses, stretching back centuries, but in

norms under the Charter. The old principles of neutrality have
884
been modified by the advent of the Charter.
The same is true for nonbelligerency, where an overlay of Charter law helps define these situations and can give
them legitimacy, not as an exception to traditional rules of neutrality, whether
the developing

stated in treaties or custom, but as application

Responses
force

to aggressors

and interpretation of the Charter.

885

can include proportional reprisals not involving use of

and retorsions, and States that are not belligerents whose interests have been
oo/r

damaged by belligerent action can invoke these, along with state of necessity.
These alternatives remain as options in the Charter era, and taking such actions
could demonstrate favoritism for one belligerent because of actions taken against
the other. In effect, the actor State would have the appearance of being a nonbelligerent

by so

acting.

Examples from recent

conflicts illustrate the point.

Malvinas War, States in Europe attempted

most

to isolate

likely in violation of international obligations.

During the Falklands/

Argentina economically,

These

justified against the aggressor in that war. If actions of the

reprisal actions

were

United States and other

countries supplying economic assistance, intelligence and other information to

the United

Kingdom would be deemed unlawful,

priate nonforce reprisals

887

those actions were also appro-

under Rio Pact mutual security for Argentina's violation

of territorial integrity. Governments' actions to convoy, escort or offer protection

The Tanker War

186

to neutral ships not carrying warfighting/war-sustaining goods to belligerent ports
888
during the Tanker War
were retorsionary in nature. These were unfriendly acts

directed toward a belligerent thought to have violated international law.

In essence, the principles of law applicable to the intermediate status between
belligerency and neutrality need not necessarily depend on development of a cus-

tomary practice recognized

as law

however the trend may seem

to

have been since

upon resolution of the debate among
the commentators. The Charter-governed norms apply to fill the void to permit
non-force reprisals and retorsions by neutrals that might have evoked claims of
1939 and continuing into the Charter

era, or

nonbelligerency before 1945, neutrals that retain an inherent right of self-defense.

Moreover, principles of treaty-based informal self-defense arrangements, which
also continue in the Charter era, permit responses

involving use of force, provided other criteria,
are met.

889

One problem

to a

country which

aggressor

may

take. If the

is

to a conflict

necessity and proportionality,

with informal self-defense arrangements, like the prob-

lem of aid
target

e.g.,

by States not party

is a

target of aggression,

is

the stance the purported

purported aggressor says, rightly or wrongly, that the

the aggressor, then the aiding State

may subject itself to claims, and worse,

of aiding the aggressor. Another problem with relatively clandestine material aid,
or with informal self-defense,

not published,

is

notice.

many are, and all can

see

Although security

treaties

sometimes are

who is aligned with whom. This is not the

case with clandestine aid to a target or informal collective self-defense agreements.

These kinds of transactions carry with them the same kinds of risks of misinterpretation

and accusations when

States act

other States of the reasons for their actions. States so
into account

2.

when

them without notifying
acting must take these factors

pursuant

to

assisting target States pursuant to these modalities.

The Law of Neutrality in the Context of UN Action Under the Charter
Sub-Part C.l has demonstrated that neutrality, primarily as practiced

Nineteenth Century, has been modified in the Charter

era,

in the

although the general

The further question is the impact that UN actions,
particularly by the Security Council, may have on this corpus of law. As recited earconcept of neutrality remains.

lier,

decisionmaking options under the Charter, and practice under the Charter,

demonstrate that there has been and will be ample room for claims of neutrality or
nonbelligerency.
First,

may make legally-binding decisions under Articles
and therefore may obligate UN Members under Articles

although the Council

25 and 48 of the Charter,

41-42 to take action that might be inconsistent with traditional neutrality principles, the

may make nonbinding "call[s] upon" Members under ArtiIt also may make nonbinding recommendations under Articles 39-40.

Council also

cles 40-41.

These recommendations have no more force of law, unless they

restate custom,

—

—
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general principles or treaty-based norms, than General Assembly

under Articles 10-11, 13 and

tions

Thus, Council decisions

187

recommenda-

890
14.

may compel

a State to

ditional neutrality practice, either in requiring

behave inconsistently with

tra-

what would otherwise be belligerOQ1

ent acts or in restricting rights traditionally enjoyed by neutrals.

Article 50,

invoked by the Council for States affected by the Council-directed embargo of Iraq
during the 1990-91 Gulf War,

892

allows

it

to consult with States finding themselves

with "special economic problems" arising from carrying out Council-decided preventive or security measures.

have

lost

some

or

all

Thus even

if

Jordan and like-status States would

of their rights and duties as neutrals through initial Council

decisionmaking in that war, an Article 50 reprieve could have restored some or all
of these rights and duties. Council action under Article 50 could result in greater
rights, or lesser duties,

than under the traditional law of neutrality.

Second, Council decisions

would, in
air

effect,

when

first

taken

may

include exemptions that

allow reversion to traditional neutrality law. For example, sea and

embargoes against Iraq in the 1990-91 war and against the former Yugoslavia

beginning in 1991 had exemptions for medical supplies, humanitarian supplies,

and foodstuffs notified to the Council's Sanctions Committee, which includes representatives from

all

Council members.

893

To that extent, and except when other-

wise controlled by other effects of Council decisions
traditional law of neutrality

would apply

to

e.g.,

to

calls for, or decisions on,

Committee

embargo only

petroleum, weapons or military equipment

mendations on,

the

— the

such shipments. This exception has

been most apparent when the Council has decided

modity

e.g.,

894

a single

com-

—followed by recom-

enforcement. In that situation the law of

the resolution would apply to selected commodities, while neutrality rules would

be in force

as to other

has not arisen.

goods

if

armed

conflict

is

involved.

Thus

far that situation

The classic case was Rhodesia ( 1 965) which did not involve interna-

armed conflict, and only selective enforcement as to one commodity, petroleum.
As to commodities not stated in a selective Council decision, neutrality
principles would apply. If Article 42 measures approve use of force for some circumstances but not for others, and use of force is appropriate in those other cirtional

895
y

cumstances, the law of neutrality will apply in those circumstances.

example,

if the

896
y

For

Council decides on an air-land campaign against an aggressor, with

no decision on maritime aspects of the crisis, the maritime law of neutrality applies
to

maritime aspects of the situation to the extent that the Council decision's impact

does not overlap into maritime issues.

An example might

seas. If an air-land related resolution is in force, it

to

and from the

be

air flights

would apply to ocean

over the

overflights

affected State, except as to purely maritime-oriented flights,

e.g.,

helicopter resupply from ship to ship.

The third point is the relative infrequency of application of mandatory Council
decisions. Of the hundreds of crises since 1945 that have involved a potential for
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armed

and which could be said

conflict or actual conflict

peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,"

have governed only a handful.
sea, six crises

898
'

897

to risk a "threat to the

mandatory Council decisions

In terms of the potential for or actual warfare at

have produced Council decisions: Rhodesia (1965), the Gulf War

Angola (1992), Liberia (1992)
Even the Korean War evoked only Council calls or recom-

(1990-91), the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991),

and Haiti

(1993).

899
'

USSR vetoes, and thereafter General Assembly
To be sure, some calls for action
recommendations under the UFP Resolution.
mendations for action before the

and recommendations were well-supported,
decisional law.

901

but they did not carry the force of

When the Council approves other than decisions, resulting resolu-

tions,

although confessedly highly persuasive and authoritatively stated from po-

litical

and policy perspectives, are nonetheless recommendatory as

In the latter case
date
ate.

matter of law.

— the overwhelming bulk of resolutions the Council has voted

— there has been and

will

be

Widespread compliance with

tually

a

mature into custom, but

opportunity for the law of neutrality to oper-

full

calls for action

it is

to

or recommendations could even-

doubtful whether State practice under them

902

assuming States accept the action as law. (Sancwould be of sufficient duration,
tions practice against Iraq and the former Yugoslavia may be candidates for congealment into custom, however.) In any event, neutrality principles would exist
between the precipitating event,

breach of the peace, and Council action.

e.g.,

903

Even if the Council decides on action, the enforcement mechanism has not been
the Military Staff Committee and special forces the Charter contemplates.
Rather,

it

respond

has often used an agency principle, choosing a State or group of States to

to the crisis,

United States

with one nation perhaps chosen for a leadership role

for Korea, the
905

United Kingdom

for Rhodesia,

and a coalition

— the

for the

In these situations agent State(s) might be involved in en-

1990-91 Gulf War.

forcing the law of neutrality, even though there are overarching Council resolutions.

Such was the case

where the US-declared blockade involved

for Korea,

observing neutral vessel rights to visit nearby USSRports and a right of USSR warships to proceed to North
tions, the

Korean

ports.

Council has not designated

In recently-ordered embargo opera-

a leader, resulting in confusion.

907

The Security Council's Tanker War resolutions fell into the first and third categories of exceptions,

i.e.,

no

State including the belligerents

Council resolution, except through
tions.

Thus

calls for action,

was obligated to obey a

demands, or recommenda-

the principles of neutrality had full potential play for that war. Other

conflicts, particularly the

ongoing situation that began with the Gulf

War

of

1990-91 and disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, demonstrate that gaps in

Council decisions, or
ties for

its

methodology of taking action, leave copious opportuni-

applying neutrality principles. These principles

as those before the

Charter

may well

era, since actions in individual

and

not be the same
collective self-

defense must be factored in, but neutrality as a concept continues to

exist.

7

1
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Moreover, the Council appears to have approved sub silentio the concepts of neu-

and perhaps nonbelligerency as well. International agreements concluded
since 1945, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the most widely accepted
trality

multilateral treaties of any,

908

have continued to use the terms "neutral" and, more

909

These conventions were cited by the Council during
The Council referred
the Tanker War, and again during the 1990-91 Gulf War.
rarely, "nonbelligerent."

to "states not party to the hostilities" in

more, there

is

Tanker War Resolution

91

Further-

nothing in practice under the Charter to indicate that earlier con-

ventions dealing with neutrality are invalid under the Charter.
that earlier treaties have crystallized into custom,

valid source of law.

3.

552.

913

912

To

they exist in that

the extent

mode

as a

914

Appraisal of Neutrality in the Charter Era
Undeniably neutrality as a general concept has

as

much vitality today as in

the

The claim, that there is a customary right to assert an intermediate
status of nonbelligerency between traditional neutrality and belligerency, may
have been strengthened since 1945. The precedents in some cases are almost iden-

pre-Charter era.

tical

with those in the

serted as a customary

last

two centuries. Even

if

nonbelligerency cannnot be as-

norm, the overlay of principles of retorsion,

reprisals not

involving use of force, and state of necessity, apply to support actions at variance

with a practice of strict neutrality in the traditional sense. Because of options under the Charter for nonbinding resolutions by the Security Council and perforce
the General Assembly, the potential for exceptions even with a binding Council
decision,

and the

relative scarcity of Article 25/48

Council decisions, the opportu-

—perhaps modified by the new nonbelligerency of the
Charter era— remains
"Far from being moribund, these traditional rights
neutrality and self-defense] apply logically in conditions of limited wars" — the
—"even more rigorously than
type of
that have beset the planet since 1945
nity for claims of neutrality

large.

[of

conflicts

in conditions of total war."

915

Part D. Sources of the Law, Principles of the

Law

of Treaties

and

Treaty Succession
This Chapter has integrated Charter interpretation principles, notably the su-

premacy of the Charter over

pies of law contrary to the Charter,

may

restate jus cogens

the problem of custom or general princi-

treaties,
91

and the possibility that

norms, however that concept

may be

parts of the Charter

defined.

918

examines principles of the law of treaties and treaty succession, with
view of the

LOS

effect of

war on

treaties generally,

Convention and the law of armed

This Part

a closer re-

and the relationship between the

conflict.

190

/.
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Principles of the

Law of Treaties and Treaty Succession

Principles of treaty interpretation,

or objection to custom

921

919

•

treaty succession,

920

and acquiescence

in

have been noted. The possibility of coercion, e.g., threat

or use of force contrary to Article 2(4) of the Charter, to which might be added vari-

ous forms of error or corruption,

922

•

has been cited.

923

(If a treaty is negotiated in

connection with a State's aggression in violation of the Charter, i.e., an armistice or
surrender by the aggressor, coercion principles do not apply.
cion,

e.g.

924

Economic

sanctions imposed as nonforce reprisal or retorsion, does not invalidate a

treaty either.

925

If the Security

Council decides on sanctions, or

calls for

Charter law also trumps a target State's economic coercion claims.)

Other assertions of the inapplicability of treaties can
material breach,

cumstances.

929

927

•

•

impossibility of performance,

Desuetude

view of some, unequal

930

and

r

be suspended, part

•

arise because of claims of

or fundamental change of cir931

may vitiate

terminated,

may remain

Part of it

all

may be suspended, or

nated, depending on the nature of the treaty's terms.

a treaty. In the

in force, part
all

may be

should be observed.
haps because a State
principle of law.

935

is

Moreover, even though

not a party to

it, it

approach for sources of law.

of circumstances, apply to a given situation,
the executive and not the courts.

is

—

treaties

not be in force, per-

in addition to the factoral

doctrines,

e.g.,

fundamental change

determined in the United States by

i

In general, a military

these matters to an operational law specialist,

2.

termi-

may restate a customary rule or a general

Whether these
937

may

a treaty

These analyses must be considered
936

may

933

Against these must be balanced the principle of pacta sunt servanda
934

them,

926

can also negate a treaty's effectiveness.

treaties

may be

928

state of necessity

A treaty may be subject to severability.

ity;

coer-

who

r

commander should refer

can check with higher author-

however, commanders should be aware of these doctrines' implications.

War and

Termination or Suspension of Treaty Obligations

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties takes no position on the effect of
war on treaties;

938

the issue

is left

to

customary rules.

claim of fundamental change of circumstances,

939
"

War might possibly raise a

or perhaps other bases, e.g., im-

possibility of performance.

Treaties establishing an international organization, such as the United Nations, are not affected

operation

by

conflicts of the parties.

941

States

may suspend

a treaty's

when they exercise the inherent right of individual or collective self-de-

fense in accordance with the Charter.

942

If

complying with

a

Council resolution

dealing with action on threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression conflicts with a treaty or a treaty requirement, States

may suspend or end the

treaty's operation to the extent treaty performance is incompatible with the resolu943
tion.
The Institut de Droit International has stated that an aggressor shall not

terminate or suspend operation of a treaty

if it

would benefit thereby.
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when or which treaties continue in operation durA treaty may be subject to severability in this context, i.e., all
ing armed conflict.
of it may remain in force, part may be suspended, part may be terminated, all may
Treaties may provide for continued opbe suspended, or all may be terminated.
There is no general rule as

to

eration during war; the Chicago Convention explicitly says so.

947

Because of their

nature or purpose, some treaties are regarded as operative during armed conflict,
•

i

•

•

those governing humanitarian law or neutrality being prime examples.

948

In other

Rome or NAFTA, a treaty may be suspended during armed
949
A treaty may deState's vital national interests are at stake.

cases, e.g., the Treaty of

conflict or
clare

it

when

a

does not apply during war.

950

As noted above, these principles may well be

subject to the Charter's clause paramountcy.

3.

The LOS Conventions and

the

951

Law ofArmed Conflict:

952
"Other Rules " Clauses
953

The 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions

include clauses, sometimes over-

looked in analysis or commentary, stating the rights under these treaties are subject to

"other rules of international law"

convention. For example,

LOS

954

as well as terms in the particular

Convention, Article 87(1), which declares high

"Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law." The
overwhelming majority of commentators including the International Law Commission, a UN General Assembly agency of international law experts
has
stated that the Conventions' other rules clauses refer to the law of armed con956
flict,
a component of which is the law of naval warfare. Provisions such as Artiseas freedoms, adds that

—

88 of the 1982 Convention state a truism,

cle

peaceful purposes.

957

However, high

Article 87(l)'s other rules clause

is

—

i.e.,

the high seas are reserved for

seas usage can be subject to the

LOAC, when

read with Article 88. As in the case of the 1958

Conventions,
That provision does not preclude
use of the high seas by naval forces. Their use
which would
violat[e]
Article 2(4) of the Charter
is
forbidden as well by Article 88 [of the 1982 Convention]. See also LOS Convention,
Article 301, requiring parties, in exercising their rights and p[er]forming their duties
under the Convention, to refrain from any threat or use of force in violation of the
.

for aggressive purposes,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

.

.

Charter. 958

This analysis
the

LOS

is

buttressed by the Charter's trumping clause; no treaty, including

conventions, can supersede the Charter.

The

peaceful purposes lan-

guage in Article 88 and other Convention provisions cannot override Charter

norms, such

as those in Article 2(4),

right of individual

and

but also those in Article 51,

collective self-defense.

not involved in armed conflict

Of course,

i.e.,

the inherent

naval forces of States

may use the oceans for military purposes, although
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may be

some maritime zones, e.g., the territorial sea.
The other rules clauses in the LOS conventions come into force for States engaged
in armed conflict.
To the extent that the LOS conventions recite customary norms and such is
962
and the LOS Convention's navigational
the case for the High Seas Convention
these forces

restricted in

—

— the other rules clauses are part of custom and are therefore in force

articles

for

countries not party to one or the other of the Conventions. For those States party to

the 1958 Conventions or
clause

is

doubly in

gaps in the

force.

LOS Convention, the customary status of the other rules
The LOS conventions may inform,
give content to
i.e.,

LOAC, much as the law of self-defense may be informed by the LOAC.

The law of the sea also can inform the content of Charter law, e.g.,
resolutions.

The conclusion

is

inescapable that the 1958 Conventions' other rules clauses,

carried forward into the 1982 Convention,
ject to the

the

means that these treaties' terms are sub-

law of armed conflict, of which the law of naval warfare

a part. Since

is

High Seas Convention, parts of the other 1958 Conventions and the 1982 Con-

vention's navigational articles are part of customary law,
is

Security Council

965

also part of

the other rules clause

customary law governing oceans law during armed

over, the other rules clauses can also inform,

i.e.,

give content

to,

conflict.

More-

Charter law,

e.g.,

Council resolutions and the law of self-defense.
Part E. Conclusions

The

UN Charter has been invoked in many armed conflicts since the Charter

was signed

in 1945. In

some ways

this has

changed options available

to States.

Un-

der the majority view, a State cannot use reprisals involving use of force during

The

time of peace.

deems necessary

doctrine of necessity,

for self-preservation,

may be

Article 103 of the Charter declares that

tomary law

is

i.e.,

a State

is

take

what action

of questionable validity today.

all treaties

equally subject to the Charter

may

are subject to

open

to question.

it;

it

969

whether cus-

970

The Charter

condemns armed attacks and aggression, and Article 51 permits self-defense
971
This permits reagainst armed attacks and aggression armee, in the French text.
sponses for attacks on merchant ships at sea, including those sailing independently, as

most

do.

972

also permits the Security Council to make
973
Members.
The Counthe force of treaty law for

The Charter

binding decisions that have

UN

cil

and the General Assembly may

it;

these resolutions have no intrinsic force but

them may develop
Article 5

1

into custom.

II.

States

upon

States for action, or

recommend

may restate law, and practice under

974

preserves the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense;

these options have the
975

also call

same content and scope today as they did before World War

may respond

long as the response

is

in individual or collective anticipatory self-defense, so

necessary, proportional

and admitting of no other option, as

—
World Public Order

perceived by the decisionmaker at the time of response.

976

may

States

193

also react,

individually or collectively, in self-defense to attack or aggression, i.e., after the
tack or aggression has occurred, so long as the response
977

States also

tional.

lawful, or they

may respond with retorsions, i.e.,

may reply with

necessary and propor-

action that

981

multilateral treaties, but nothing in the Charter forbids
If Article 5

norm

1

more informal arrange-

supersedes, through Article 103, treaty norms,

the law of armed conflict, any Article 51 response should receive
the

LOAC.

983

of the right to

980

The right to self-defense may have;ws
Collective self-defense may be asserted through bilateral or

self-defense exists alongside Article 51.

ments.

Rather than

979

Besides Charter standards, an independent, customary

982

unfriendly but

978

may also employ regional organizations

maintain international peace and security.

cogens status today.

is

reprisals not involving use of force.

requesting Security Council action, States
to

is

at-

its

e.g.

those in

content from

By parity of reasoning, any self-defense claims based on custom and

not on Article 51 as part of a treaty,
content based on the

LOAC.

i.e.,

the

UN Charter, should also receive their

984

Besides the appealing symmetry of logic behind this approach, there are practical policy reasons for following

claim.

These are

illustrated

law of armed conflict standards in any self-defense

by the Tanker War.

both Iran and Iraq claimed the other was guilty of aggression and that

First,

therefore the response was in self-defense.
States

through their reactions that Iran was the aggressor, the issue remains unre-

solved,

and may remain unresolved

consequences flowing from the

merchant ships
observe,

i.e.,

gression,

The

Even today, despite the opinion of some

for a long time.

initial acts

—had impact on third

the

LOAC.

and only one

aggressor was

by these

States,

However, the peripheral
States in 1980

e.g.,

legal

attacks

on

who had only one known standard to

Ultimately, only one State, Iran or Iraq, was guilty of agState, Iran or Iraq,

LOAC

bound by

could legitimately claim self-defense.

standards.

985

Since the issue was and

doubt, the only standard for measuring self-defense was the

is

in

LOAC. This was how

the United States behaved with respect to destruction of Iran Ajr and the

oil plat-

forms and in convoy operations. The Iran Ajr crew was repatriated, following humanitarian law standards;

oil

platforms occupants were warned and given an

opportunity to leave, parallelling Hague IX.

Second, this approach
fore the Charter, that

main

is

congruent with the longstanding rule, in place long be-

humanitarian law

in effect during war.

986

987

As

treaties or those

governing neutrality

a theoretical matter, given

re-

Charter supremacy

under Article 103, a State could act under Article 5 1 independently of these norms.

The

Security Council held the view that these standards should be observed, re-

gardless of who
attacks

on

had

a legitimate self-defense claim, in its resolutions

civilian centers,

condemning

merchant ships and in citing the Geneva Conventions

and the Geneva Gas Protocol.

988

Any self-defense claim should be conditioned by

The Tanker War
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LOAC

standards and humanitarian law standards in particular, whether that

self-defense claim

it is

grounded

in

The policy, public relations and practical considerations are obvious; that

custom.
is

based on Article 51 as treaty law or whether

is

what States and people expect today, regardless of the niceties of legal analysis.
Third, observing

self-defense claims

LOAC treaty norms in the context of Article 51, treaty-based

is

consistent with the policy of pacta sunt servanda, itself a policy

of the Charter, Article

The law

989
2(2).

of neutrality remains in

full force

and vigor

in the Charter era, albeit

perhaps conditioned by Charter law in given situations. For example,
Council decision could
since

World War

alter traditional

II calls to

mind

contraband

990
rules.

a Security

Practice of States

the historic claims for the intermediate state of

nonbelligerency, between neutrality and belligerency, although whether this has

ripened into custom
in

some

is

an open question.

It

could be said that this practice amounts

cases to informal collective self-defense,

which

is

permitted under the

Charter. In other situations a debate remains as to whether international law rec-

ognizes an intermediate status between belligerency and neutrality. Most countries,

including the United States, say that there

non-belligerency.

is

no intermediate stage of

991

Charter considerations apart, decisionmakers must continue to take into ac-

count traditional principles of sources of law, treaty interpretation including the

impact of war, and treaty succession.

mean

992

The LOS conventions' other rules clauses

that the conventions are subject to the law of

armed

993
conflict.
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economic coercion by reservation or declaration;
59.

Compare Vienna Convention,

this has

Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties Between

52, with

art.

International Organizations, Mar. 20, 1986,

art. 52,

been opposed vigorously. Sinclair 65-68.

25

ILM

threat of force in violation of the Charter's international law principles).

customary law in some respects. Brownlie, International

McDougal &

60.

Goodrich

61.

See n. 69 and accompanying text; Jordan

International Peace, 68
62.

49-50;

et al.

AJIL 410 (1974) seem

RCADI
63.

Charter of Economic Rights

Economic Order

President Harry

(1950), in 5
65.

RIFAAT, n.23,ch.

Law

The latter treaty is not in force but may restate

11-13;

1

Oppenheim §§ 9

at 28, 10 at 33.

Feliciano 194-95 nn.165-69.
J.

&

Paust

Albert Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon

710 (1974);

see also 2

Stone, Conflict,

15;

—A

Threat

to

have a contrary view.

to

Benjamin B. Ferencz, Defining International

n.

23;BengtBroms, The Definition ofAggression, 154

299, 315-87 (1978).

International
64.

ILM

Definition of Aggression, 13

Aggression 1-53(1976);

&

States

543, 572 (1986) (voiding treaties procured by force or

Whiteman

S.

& Duties, G.A. Res.

ILM

Note, 13

is

in

69 AJIL 484 (1974) (also referred

to as

New

Truman, U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report to Congress for the Year 1950,
Goodrich et al. 44-45; 298-99, citing Russell & Muther, n. 13, 670-72.

at

107

740. See also

Compare Definition of Aggression,

groups of States and

3281 (1974),

NIEO).

or

n. 62, art. 1, 13

ILM

712, with

UN

used without prejudice to recognition issues or whether

Charter,

art. 2(4).

"State" includes

UN Member. Explanatory

a State is a

713.

66.

Definition of Aggression, n. 62,

67.

Id,

art. 3,

13

ILM 713-14.

68.

Id., art. 4,

13

ILM

69.

Id., art. 5(1),

ILM 713.

714.

ILM

13

13

art. 2,

714.

Id., art. 7,

ILM

13

at 714, says

nothing in the Definition prejudices the right to

The latter does state, inter alia:
"No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State
self-determination, freedom and independence in the Friendly Relations Declaration.

.

to obtain

from

it

the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from

ILM 1295 (1970). Although id.

Friendly Relations Declaration, 9

Charter

.

coercion

.

.

is

embodied
a

11

3,

ILM

9

Charter principle

is

open

to question particularly

when

it

are not binding in

Goodrich

et al.

and of themselves.

125-27, 144;

1

UN

Charter,

§ 16;

arts. 10-11, 14;

Restatement (Third)

70.

Compare NIEO,

71.

Texas Overseas Petrol,

72.

See

73.

Charter practice supports either argument. Higgins,

74.

Corfu Channel

75.

S.C. Res. 242 (1967), in

76.

S.C. Res.

n.

Libyan Arab Repub., 17

60 and accompanying

(UK

540 (1983),

territorial integrity of States
77.

v.

v. Alb.),

in

law.

ILM

1,

,"

.

whether economic

text.

§

103(2)(d)

& r.n.2;

Law-stating

Assembly resolutions

Brownlie, International

69 AJIL 493, with Friendly Relations Declaration, 9

n. 63, art. 32,

.

accompanying

no more than evidence of a source of international

Oppenheim

.

had been rejected by the Vienna Convention

negotiators and by subsequent practice under that Convention. See n. 59 and
resolutions, e.g., Friendly Relations, are

"The principles of the

1297, declares that

in this Declaration constitute basic principles of international law

.

advantages of any kind."

it

Law

14, 698-99;

Simma 236-40.

ILM

1295.

28-31 (Arb. 1978).

text.

1949 ICJ

The Development,

n. 56, 207-08.

3, 36.

Wellens

669; see also Walker, State Practice 133-38.

Wellens

451; S.C. Res. 552 (1984), in

not party to conflict);

S.C. Res. 221, HH 4-5 (1966), in

Wellens

see also

Wellens 473

(also calling

on

States to respect

nn. 11.216-18, 250-59 and accompanying text.

127; see also Walker, State Practice 142-43.

World Public Order

Definition of Aggression,

78.

territory,

but the catchall

n. 62, arts. 1,3, 13

Restatement (Third) §§ 402, cmt. h

20 and accompanying

79.

See

80.

See nn. 96-97 and accompanying

81.

UN Charter, art.

82.

See nn. 207-88 and accompanying

83.

Sohn, The International Court,

n.

with aggression against land

714, covers floating territorial jurisdiction situations. For discussion of the

art. 4, id. at

"floating territorial" principle, see

ILM 713-14, is largely concerned

199

&

r.n.4; 502(2),

cmt. d

&

r.n.3.

text.
text.

French language versions; emphasis added).

51, 59 Stat. 1031, 1076. (English,
text.

n. 11, 872-73.

Linnan, Self-Defense,

n. 51,

69 n.56, characterizes the language

variance as "slightly different." Aggression can connote actions that do not involve force or the threat of the use of
force,

while "armed attack" has only one meaning.

84.

UN Charter, art.

85.

Goodrich

et al.

651;

86.

Goodrich

et al.

343.

87.

Linnan, Self-Defense,

apply to
is

treaties,

i.e.,

111.

Simma 32-33, 1197-98

n. 51,

79-84; but see

from

differs

Simma

30.

this position.

The Convention can only be

a guide, since

the Charter, ratified before the Convention went into force. Vienna Convention,

true for Vienna Convention

on Law of Treaties Between States

it

art. 4.

does not

The same

& International Organizations, n. 59, art. 4, 25 ILM

548.
88.

Vienna Convention,

89.

Sinclair

90.

Jimenez de Arechaga,

91.

E.g.,

1

arts.

31-32.

14-15, listing three schools of thought.

Myres

S.

n. 10, 42.

McDougAl et al., Interpretation of Agreements and World
Woe

Public Order (1967); but

see

Simma 35 says that "The interests and
intentions of the founders remain secondary. Instead, the organizational purpose and the interests of the actual
members gain the constitutive and decisive legal power and are the primary means for the solution of textual
Gerald Fitzmaurice, Vae

Victis, or

to the Negotiators,

65

AJIL 358

(1971).

divergences."
92.

Jimenez de Arechaga,

93.

Id.

94.

See nn. 207-88 and accompanying

95.

Vienna Convention,

96.

Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 102-03.

97.

Compare

98.

"State" can

n. 10, 43.

43-44.
text.

arts. 31(3)(b), 31(3)(c).

UN Charter, art.

1(1),

59

Stat. 1068, with id., art. 51,

mean a group of States and

States that are not

59

Stat.

1076 (French version).

UN Members. Definition of Aggression, n. 62 art.

& explan. note, 13 ILM 713. For analysis of the Resolution, see generally Dinstein ch. 5;
Rifaat, n. 23; Stone, Conflict, n. 23; Broms, The Definition,
99.

1-2

Ferencz, Defining,

1

n. 62;

n. 62, 299.

Some Nuremberg judgments characterized the threat of force as an act of aggression. 2 Ferencz, n. 62, 27-30,
von Weizsaeker (Ministries Case), 14 Tr. War Crimes Before Nuremberg

citing inter alia Case 11, United States v.
Milit. Trib.

100.

Under Control Council L. No.

Definition ofAggression,n. 62, art.

10, at 314, 332;
2, 13

Broms, The Definition,

n. 62, 341-44.

ILM 71 3; see also 2 Ferencz, n. 62, 3 1-33; Broms, The Definition, n. 62,

344-47 (prima facie culpability rule a compromise).
101.
id.

Definition of Aggression, n. 62,

with versions in 69
102.

art. 3,

13

ILM at 713. Some reprinted versions of art. 3 omit art. 3(d); compare

AJIL 482 (1975) and Rifaat,

n. 23,

324; see also n. 23 and accompanying text.

Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 103, citing Definition of Aggression,

authority but saying art. 3
restates custom.

Broms

is

codified custom);

chaired the

UN

Broms, The Definition,

art. 3(g),

n. 62,

ILM 713; Dinstein

13

committee that drafted the Definition.

2 Ferencz, n. 62, 50-53, does not

suggest that Article 3 has passed into customary law. Definition critics argue that

Stone, Conflict,

n. 23, ch. 9.

130 (citing no

385-88, writing earlier, did not say Article 3

it

does not state custom. See,

Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind,

art.

12,

e.g.,

adopted

UN

Definition principles in 1988, but Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fortieth Session,
Doc.
A/43/10 (1988), in 1988 Y.B. Intl L. Comm-n 1,71-73 (1990), says inter alia that Article 3 was "an instrument intended

.
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200

to serve as a

guide" to the Security Council. There was no agreement on what might be included in

be, therefore, that Dinstein

undoubtedly
James

E.

103.

are.

may be wide of the mark in

including

For commentary on the Nicaragua Case and

Definition of Aggression, n. 62, art.

"invasion or attack

ILM

.

.

.

impact on the

its

a

It may
Many provisions

penal code.

as custom.

art. 3,

LOAC, see W. Michael Rhisman &

4,

1

3

ILM 714. Dinstein 195-96 notes use of "armed attack" in the Hostage

713, or the expression in

nonenumerated

id.

292 (Schwebel,

J.,

dissenting). Unless the language,

of the territory of another State, or any military occupation," in Definition of Aggression,

another State" (US Marines were
a

of Definition,

Baker, Regulating Covert Action 78-98 (1992).

Case, n. 11.12, 1980 ICJ 29, 42; see also Nicaragua Case, 1986

3(a), 13

all

id., art.

ILM

3(d), 13

713, concerning "attack ... on the land

.

.

art.

forces ... of

.

among the US nationals held) includes this situation, assault on the US embassy, was

act of aggression

contemplated by

id., art.

ILM

4, 13

714. Rifaat, n. 23, 267, doubts

whether the

Council, charged by the Definition with defining acts of aggression, could denounce acts not involving use of force

under the Definition, since Art.
also act

See

1

is

restricted to acts involving the use of force. It

on situations not involving use of force

UN Charter, arts. 25, 3

1

-42, 48, 50, 103;

is

submitted that the Council

that are threats to the peace or breaches of the peace

Stone, Conflict, n. 23,144; see also nn.

10,

65 1 -62 and accompanying text.

104.

The

105.

However, unless they have surrendered, enemy warships may be attacked on the high seas and

drafters

meant

waters of their flag State, belligerent

on

Broms, The

to include this at Japan's insistence.

allies

Parts IV.B.l, IV.B.4, IV.C.4, IV.D.l, IV.D.3, IV.D.5, V.C.I, V.J.3,

warship has
106.

a right

of self-defense

if

Definition, n. 62, 350-51, 365.

or the enemy. See Definition of Aggression,

may

supporting the view that neutral warships

the... sea... forces"),

art. 3(d),

1

3

in territorial

ILM 713 ("attack.

.

not be attacked in territorial waters; see also

which

inter alia recite

the principle that a neutral

attacked in neutral waters or on the high seas.

However, unless they have surrendered, enemy warships may be attacked on the high

waters of their flag State, belligerent

may

under the Charter.

allies

seas

and

in territorial

or the enemy. See Parts IV.B.l, IV.B.4, IV.C.4, IV.D.l, IV.D.3, IV.D.5,

V.C.I, V.J.3, which inter alia recite the principle that a neutral warship has

a

right of self-defense if attacked in neutral

waters or on the high seas.
107.

Dinstein 197-98, citing Broms, The Definition,

108.

Dinstein 198, citing W.J. Fenrick, Legal Limits on

CYBIL

Enforcement, 18

n. 62, 351.
the

Use of Force by Canadian Warships Engaged

US

113, 125-45 (1980). Dinstein adds that a

self-defense claim in the

misplaced, citing Jordan J. Paust, The Seizure and Recovery ofthe Mayaguez, 85

Yale

L.J. 774,

Law

in

Mayaguez seizure was

791,800(1976). But seen.

137 and accompanying text.
109.

Compare Dinstein 197-98 with Broms, The

110.

Rifaat,

23;

1

Brown

111.

n. 23,

272; Stone, Conflict, n. 23, 166; see also

135-38,258-59; 3 Nordquist

UN GAOR,

Definition, n. 62, 350-51, 365.

6th

Coram, 1477th

111

11 1.1-1 11.9(i); 2

mtg.,

UN

LOS Convention, art. Ill; High Seas Convention, art.
Law of the Sea 1075-93 (hot pursuit).

O'Connell,

Doc. A.C.G.SR.1477,

at

71 (1974) (remarks of Mr. Steel,

UK

delegate); see also Stone, Conflict, n. 23, 117.
112.

Compare Dinstein 198; Paust,

were not

justified.

aggression] occurs

n. 108,

Dinstein 184 seems

795, 800, asserting

to contradict

beyond the boundaries of all States

US

self-defense measures after Mayaguez's seizure

himself by saying, "At times, an armed attack
[as

when a]

.

.

.

high seas." In 1965 Burundi characterized unjustified boarding and seizing of ships as aggression.
at 3 (1965), cited in

an act of

[i.e.,

battleship sinks a vessel [type unspecified]

on the

UN Doc. A/AC. 914,

Bengt Broms, The Definition of Aggression in the United Nations 83 (1968). See also n.

108.

113.

Dinstein 129; Rifaat,

114.

Besides liners, which are protected under customary law, so long as they are not carrying warfighting or

n. 23, 270.

war-sustaining goods or persons, e.g., troops, these classes of merchant ships, even

if flying

an enemy

flag, are

likewise

protected: hospital ships; small craft used for coastal rescue operations and other medical transports; cartel ships;
vessels

on humanitarian missions; ships carrying cultural property under

special protection; scientific research or

environmental protection vessels; coastal traders; coastal fishing ships; vessels designed or adapted exclusively for
response to pollution incidents in the marine environment; ships that have surrendered;

may

lose protection if not

intentionally

used in their normal

role,

do not submit

to identification

life rafts

and

life

boats.

They

and inspection when required,

hamper combatant movements or do not obey orders to stop or move out of the way when required.
8.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated H 8.2.3; San Remo Manual 1111 47-48; see also Parts V.B.I, V.C.I,

NWP 1-14M Annotated

11

V.J.2, V.J.3.

115.

For an example of how worldwide communications route and reroute merchant ships

independently,
116.

see

Dominant Navig.

Ltd.

Definition of Aggression, n. 62,

v.

Alpine Shipping Co., 1982

arts. 2, 4,

13

ILM 713-14.

AMC

1241 (Bauer, Arnold

&

as

they

sail

Berg, arbs.).

World Public Order

13
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ILM 713.

117.

Id., arts. 2, 3(c),

118.

NWP1-14M Annotated HI! 7.7.4, 7.10; NWP9A Annotated HH7.7.4, 7.9; SanRemoManual 1111146(f), 151.

119.

For analysis of blockade,

120.

Definition of Aggression,

121.

E.g.,

n. 62, art. 4, 13

ILM 714.

Convention for Definition of Aggression, July 3, 1933, art.

international conflict shall

Convention

ratified;

see Parts V.E., V.J. 3.

.

.

be

.

.

.

.

the

first to

.

.

.

attack

.

.

.

the

.

.

for Definition of Aggression, July 4, 1933, art. 2(3), 148

Definition of Aggression, July

1933, Lith.-USSR,

5,

art. 2(3),

148

Protocol-Annex, 153 id. 153, 157; see also Broms, The Definition, n.

Thomas

2(3), 147

LNTS 67, 71-73 ("the aggressor in an

vessels or aircraft of another State"),

.

id.
1

Balkan Entente, Feb.

79, 83 (same);

12, 26-27;

which Iran

211, 215 (same); Convention for

id.

Rifaat,

91-93;

n. 23,

& A.J. Thomas, The Concept of Aggression in International Law 19-20 (1972); Broms,

9,

1934,

Ann Van Wynen
The Definition,

n.

62,312-14.
122.

LNTS

See,

e.g.,

Treaty of Non-Aggression

& Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Jan. 21,

393, 396-97 (general policy statement). League of Nations Covenant,

without defining

it,

Saavedra

as does

Broms, The Definition,

n. 112,

Lamas

art. 10,

1932, Fin.-USSR,

art. 1(2),

157

denounced aggression generally

Treaty, Oct. 10, 1933, 49 Stat. 3363, 3375, 163

LNTS

393, 405; see also

23-25; Rifaat, n. 23, 91-93; Broms, The Definition, n. 62, 312-14, for analysis of these

and similar agreements.
123.

Compare Saadabad Pact, July 8, 1937, art. 4, 190 LNTS 21, 25 ("The following shall be deemed acts of
on
vessels or aircraft of another State"), to which Iran and Iraq were original parties, with
attack

aggression:

Convention

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

for Definition of Aggression, July 3, 1933, art. 2(3), n.107, to

Broms, The Definition,

n. 112, 27;

Rifaat,

which Iran was an

original party; see also

n. 23, 91-92, 94-95.

124. Stone 34, quoting 5 League of Nations Records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of
Armaments, Ser. D, at 31 (1933); compare Definition of Aggression, n. 62, arts. 3-4, 13 ILM 713-14. The 1933 USSR
proposal was reintroduced during the UN study and is part of the Definition of Aggression preparatory works.
McDougal & Feliciano 144, 168; Stone 46-47, 111, 115; Stone, Conflict, n. 23, passim; Thomas & Thomas, The

Concept,

n. 121, 34.

& cmts.

125.

Vienna Convention,

126.

See generally A.N. Yiannopoulos, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Arrest of State-Owned Ships: Need for an

art.

31(1);

Restatement (Third)

Admiralty Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 57
127.

325(1)

a,

b; Sinclair 119-26.

L. Rev. 1274, 1286, 1289-90 (1983).

Letter of US Department of State Acting Legal Adviser Jack B. Tate to Acting Attorney General Philip B.

Perlman,
128.

Tulane

§

May

Id..

19, 1952,

In 1920 the

26 Bulletin 984, 985 (1952) (Tate Letter).

US

Congress passed the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46

USC

§§ 741-52 (1994), allowing suits

against the government for claims arising out of US
§§

owned or operated commercial vessels; the Public Vessels Act, id.
781-90 (1994), allowing claims for damage done by Navy or Coast Guard ships, followed in 1925. Congress enacted

the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28

id.

§§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1

of foreign government-owned ships and superseding case law and the Tate Letter, in
since then. See generally

Schoenbaum

115 and accompanying

See

130.

Harvard Draft Convention on Aggression, 33 AJIL Supp. 819, 827

131.

Id., art. 1(c),

33

AJIL

(1994), declaring immunities

1

976; the Act has been

amended

§§ 17-1, 17-3.

129.

n.

1

text.

n.l (1939).

Supp. 827 (defining aggression without elaborating examples);

Supp. 827 (defining vessel to include aircraft). Although the

Comment to art.

1(h)

is

1(h), 33

AJIL

art. l(c)'s

citing

id., art.

unenlightening,

of some of the agreements, nn. 121-22, shows the Harvard drafters were aware of the distinction and chose a broad
"vessel" definition to include

merchantmen. Draft Convention internal evidence supports

this view. See,

Comment, 33 AJIL Supp. 886 ("hostility" to warships); art. 3, Comment, id. 886-87 ("warship"
art. 10, Comment, id. 902 (capture of "ship," further reference to "battleships").
132.

99; but

Act of Chapultepec, Mar.
see, e.g.,

6,

1945, Part 1(3), 60 Stat. 1831, 1839; Rio Treaty, n. 47,

Treaty of Brotherhood

appearing to take the prewar

&

Alliance, Apr. 14, 1947, Iraq-Transjordan,

USSR position; see also

nn. 121-22 and accompanying

133.

See nn. 121-23 and accompanying

134.

Vienna Convention, arts. 34-38; Brownlie, International

at 32-36; 583; 589;

135.

62

id.

1702, 21

UNTS

UNTS

147, 156-58,

Oppenheim§§

10, at 28; 11,

art. 5,

23

text.

text.

626-27; Restatement (Third) §§ 102(3)

Walker, State Practice 137.

art. 9,

e.g., art. 2,

capture of "vessel");

Law

& cmts.

f, i;

11-15,622-25;

1

324; Sinclair 98-106.
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136.

O'Connell, Influence of

Law

86-87, 87-86; 2

O'Connell,

Law of the

Sea 1099.

137. 1975 Digest 13-15, 423-26, 766, 777-83, 879-86; Thomas E. Behuniak, The Seizure and Recovery of the S.S.
Mayaguez.A Legal Analysis of United States Claims, 82 Mil. L. Rev. 41 (1978), 83 id. 59(1979); Christopher Greenwood,
Comments in Dekker & Post 212, 214; Eleanor McDowell, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 69 AJIL 861-63,874-79(1975); U.S. Recovers Merchant Ship Seized by Cambodian Navy, 72 Bulletin
719 (1975); Walker, State Practice 146. Greenwood 214, analogizes The Red Crusader (Den. v. UK), 35 ILR 485

(Comm'n

same category

of Enquiry, 1982) in the

however, in that the

as the

Mayaguez

seizure.

The

Crusader case facts are different,

UK flag trawler was fired on, hit and visited, and crewmen were detained briefly, on grounds of its

fishing on the Danish side of a

Denmark-UK

treaty line, for

which Denmark conceded

liability.

Denmark withdrew

charges of interference by H.M.S. Troubndge in the Danish warship's returning Crusader crew to their trawler; the

Commission of Enquiry found that the Royal Navy made every effort to avoid recourse to violence between the Danish
ship and the trawler, such "attitude and conduct [being] impeccable." 35 ILR 500. There was no self-defense claim,
but as Greenwood notes, the incident is some evidence to support a view that States may use force to defend individual
merchantmen even single small fishing ships flying their flag.

—

138.

—

US interests beneficially owned Hercules, a tanker. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed Amerada

Hess Shipping Corp.

US

v.

Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 42 1, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1987) on sovereign immunity grounds. 488

428 (1989). See also Walker, State Practice 153-55. Although cases have secondary source or evidentiary status

deriving international law, they can restate or reinforce customary norms. ICJ Statute,

Law

International

19-24;

Oppenheim

1

Restatement (Third)

§ 13;

RCADI

and Custom, 129

139.

Richard R. Baxter,

140.

ICJ Statute, art. 38(1); Brownlie, International

141.

Stone

142.

Stone 211, quoting

143.

See nn. 130-31 and accompanying

144.

Bowett, Self-Defence,

34,

NICHOLAS NYIRI,

CoNCEPT,n. 121;

quoting

Treaties

5

League of Nations,
draft

Act Relating

ch. 11;

n.

for

Brownlie,

arts. 38(1), 59;

§ 103.

25, 99-101 (1970).

Law 24-25; Oppenheim H
1

124; see also n. 122

14;

Restatement (Third) H

and accompanying

103.

text.
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deemed

i,

text.

force July 24, 1929; the

Other Treaty Points, 33

48

1

art. 38(1);

text.

text.

Restatement (Third), §§

102-03.

text.
to

Self-Defense, 3

ILSA J.

Int'L

& Comp.

L. 767,

823-27 (1997).

Restatement (Third), §§

206.

Cf

207.

See nn. 79-95, 167-79 and accompanying

208.

Jean Combacau, The Exception of Self- Defence

ICJ Statute,

art. 38(1);

Regulation of the Use of Force

9,

102-03.

text.
in

U.N. Practice,

in

Anthony

Cassesse,

The Current Legal

25 (1986).

Wellens 441 Commentators continue to debate the legitimacy of Israel's anticipatory
e.g., Alexandrov 159-65; Timothy L.H. McCormack, Self-Defense in
International Law: The Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor ch. 10 (1995); Combacau, n. 208, 17, 34 n. 23.
209.

S.C. Res. 487 ( 198 1 ), in

self-defense claim for the raid. See,

.

World Public Order

Wellens

210.

S.C. Res. 22 (1947), in

211.

Corfu Channel

212.

Waldock, The Regulation,

213.

Alexandrov

214.

Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 34-35;

(UK

v. Alb.),

34.

1949 ICJ

4, 30-31.

n. 52, 500; see also

Alexandrov

5,

122-23; Brownlie,

Use of Force

285.

123; Brierly 424.

Alexandrov

see also

Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International

RCADI

205

123-24; Brierly 424-27;

Law

McCormack,

n. 209, 133-34;

Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 95

172 (1957); Waldock, The Regulation, n. 52, 500-02.

215.

Alexandrov

216.

Albania entered the United Nations in 1955. Cf. S.C. Res. 109 (1955),

217.

See nn. 168, 189 and accompanying

218.

See generally S.C, Res. 42-44, 46, 48-50, 53-54, 56-57, 59-62, 66 (1948); 72-73 (1949); 89 (1950), in

632-45;

122.

Alexandrov

220.

S.C. Res. 82-85 (1950), in

221.

UFP

Wellens

Wellens

Wellens 415-20; Alexandrov

127-29.

325-26.

Resolution, n. 20; see also Castenada, n. 22, 81-116, tracing the Resolution's influence in Assembly

practice; Juraj Andrassy, Uniting for Peace, 50

AJIL 563

(1956).

See generally HdwinC Hoyt, The United States Reaction to the Korean Attack: A Study ofthe Principles ofthe United

Nations Charter as a Factor in American Policy-making, 55
S.C. Res. 95 (1951), in

Combacau,
224.

847.

125-27.

See generally S.C. Res.38-39, 47, 51 (1948), in

223.

Wellens

text.

219.

222.

in

n. 208, 21;

Higgins,

Wellens

648; see also

AJIL 45

(1961).

Alexandrov

130-31; Higgins,

The Development,

n. 56, 213;

Walker, State Practice 133-35.

The Development, n.

56, 213-15; 2

Oppenheim,

§

231, at 547;

Stone 643-44. The issue arose during

the Tanker War; see nn. 11.491-92 and accompanying text. See also Parts V.E., V.J. 5.
225.

US

226.

See generally 3

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles news conference remarks, Feb. 5, 1957, 36 Bulletin 306 (1957).

AJIL

Ships, 51

Whiteman

1

092-94;

Leo Gross, Passage Through the Suez Canal ofIsrael-Bound Cargo and Israel

530, 538-40, 559 (1957).

Whiteman

1092; Gross, Passage, n. 226, 561.

227.

3

228.

Alexandrov

190-91; see also Bowett, Self-Defence 15, 104; Brownlie,

229.

Cable

Edwin

186;

1

B.

Hooper

et

Use of Force

297.

The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict

al,

351 (1976);

Walker, State Practice 134.
230.

In 1958 Iceland unilaterally extended

Limits Off Iceland, June 30, 1958, quoted in 4

announcing they would continue

on July 4. Id.

trawlers if necessary

protect

UK

trawlers

its

zone limit from 4

Whiteman

1157-58.

to fish in the 8-mile belt. Britain said
at

1

it

would send armed escorts

160, quoting N.Y. Times, July 21 , 1958, 12.

in Icelandic

Waters 5-13 (June 1959), quoted in 4

voluntarily withdrew from the disputed area in 1960 pending the ongoing
174, citing US

1960,

2.

Handy, How Wide
settled the

231.

1163-69.

Franklin

304.

UK trawlers

Geneva conference on the law of the sea. Id.
1

3,

1960, 3;

Exchange of Notes, Mar.

11, 1961,

id.

Aug.

12,

&

Leonard R.

Ice.-UK, 397

UNTS 275,

up, disagreeing over breadth of the territorial sea. Robert D. Powers

the Territorial Sea?, in

UK flag

Ministry of

limit. Iceland

Whiteman

UK Embassy dispatch to US State Department, Apr. 29, 1960; N.Y. Times, May

The conference broke

to protect

The Royal Navy began to intervene to

and crews, although other fishermen stayed outside the 12-mile

Foreign Affairs, British Aggression

1

Regulations Concerning Fishing

to 12 miles.

A 7-nation conference including Britain protested,

Cod War.

Alexandrov

191-92; Brownlie,

Use of Force 297-98.

O'Connell, The Influence 38-39, 123; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 805-06; 4 Whiteman 1157-58,
US Ambassador to France Amory Houghten to Secretary of State Dulles, Jan. 26, 1958; US Embassy to
France telegram to Dulles, Nov. 6, 1959; Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 28, 1960, 2; 10 Keesing 15277 (1956); 1 1 id.
232.

reprinting

16080, 16184 (1957);

Anna van Zwanenberg, Interference with

Ships on the High Seas, 10

ICLQ

785, 791 (1961); 2

von

Heinegg, 100-01; Walker, State Practice 141; Robert C. F. Reuland, Note, Interference with Non-National Ships on

High Seas: Peacetime Exceptions

to the

Exclusivity Rule of Flag-State Jurisdiction, 22

Vand.

J.

(1989).

233.

Combacau,

n. 208, 19, 27, 35 n.36,

37 n.83;

see also

Walker, State Practice 145-46.

the

Transnat'L L. 1161, 1218

The Tanker War

206

234.

See nn. 289-302, 308-26 and accompanying

235.

Combacau,

236.

S.C. Res. 228 (1966), in

Wellens

237.

S.C. Res. 265 (1969), in

id.

238.

S.C. Res. 262 (1968);

text.

35 n.39, 37-38 nn.84-90.

n. 208, 27,

658.

673.

270 (1969); 279-80, 285 (1970); 313, 316-17 (1972); 332, 337(1973); 347 (1974); 425

(1978); 509, 515-18, 520 (1982), in

id.

755-62, 764, 766-68.

239.

See generally Combacau,

240.

Id. 19,

241.

Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement: October

242.

Agreement Concerning Claims Arising from Damage

Israel-US, 32

n. 208, 23.

35 n.35.

UST 4434,

1268

UNTS 33;

Cable

1973, at 263-64 (1975).
to

United States Ship "Liberty," Dec. 15

31, 75, 119, 194-95;

O'Connell, The Influence 127; Walter L. Jzcobsen, A Juridical Examination of the Israeli Attack on
L. Rev.

1

17, 1980,

the Liberty,

36Nav.

(1986).

O'Connell, The Influence 70-71,

243.

&

James Ennes, Assault on the Liberty (1980);

83, 127-29.

See generally Trevor Ambrister, A Matter of Accountability: The True Story of The Pueblo Affair
Edward Brandt, The Last Voyage of the Pueblo (1969); Cable 25-32, 34, 63, 69, 86,195-96; Daniel V.
Gallery, The Pueblo Incident (1970); O'Connell, The Influence 5-7, 65; F. Carl Schumaker, Jr. & George C.
Wilson, Bridge of No Return: The Ordeal of the U.S.S. Pueblo (1971).
244.

(1970);

245. See generally D.K. Palit, The Indo-Pakistan
Maritime Conflict, 1965: A Legal Appraisal (1970);

War
2

1971, at 145 (1972); P. Sharma,

von Heinegg,

Panel, n. 11.84, 171 (Lagoni remarks), referring to G.

246.

A

The Indo-Pakistan

30; Walker, State Practice 143-44.

Res. 2162 (1966),

UN GAOR, 21

st Sess.,

UN Doc.

A/6316 (1967).

Fred Greene, The Indian-Pakistan War and the Asian Power Balance, 25

247.

NWC Rev. 16(No. 3, 1973). AUSNavy

US nationals from Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, arrived after hostilities were
over. Palit, n. 245, 144-50; 2 von Heinegg, n. 11.177, 31; Walker, State Practice 145. The task force may have been
deployed to deter India from "pushing to extremes" its victory over Pakistan. The USSR deployed an anti-carrier
task force to facilitate evacuating

group. Cable 198-99.
248.

O'Connell, The Influence 86-87;

249.

The United

250.

Fisheries Jurisdiction

States resupplied Israel

(UK

v. Ice.),

2

O'Connell,

by

air.

Law of the

Cable 200;

2

Sea 1099; Walker, State Practice 144-45.

von Heinegg 29; Walker,

1972 ICJ 12 (interim measures); 1973

id.

3;

State Practice 137.

1974

id.

4 (merits); Cable

199-200.

Theodor Meron, The Fishermen's Protective Act: A Case Study in Contemporary Legal Strategy of the United States,
The efficacy of the Act, 22 USC §§ 1971-80 (1994), is limited by a broader view the United States
has taken of offshore jurisdictional claims, e.g., for the EEZ through the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act,
251.

69 AJIL 290 (1975).

16

id.

§§ 1801-02 (1994), unless a seizure otherwise violates international law as recognized by the United States.

further proviso

71

AJIL 740

may broaden Act coverage. See

(1977).

44

BYBIL

18, 73-75 (1970).

D.P. O'Connell, International

253.

Roach

254.

Dennis Mandsager, The U.S. Freedom ofNavigation Program: Policy, Procedure, and Future,

&

Smith

79.
in

Liber Amicorum

My destroyer, U.S.S. Hyman, sailed these waters duringa 1960-61 Mediterranean Sea deployment; the territorial

sea limit then

was generally 3 miles, and we were close enough

sandy shores of World
255.

A

Law and Contemporary Naval Operations,

252.

113.

A

Steven J. Burton, The 1 976 Amendments to the Fishermen's Protective Act,

Cable

War II

152, 206, 209;

to Africa to

have the Commanding Officer point out the

Tobruk).

battles (Benghazi,

Casper Weinberger, Fighting for Peace 124-25 (1990); D.R. Neutze, The GulfofSidra:

Legal Perspective, 108 Proceedings 26 (No.

Robert E. Stumpf, Air War with Libya,

id.

256.

See nn. 112-15 and accompanying

257.

Combacau,

n. 208, 15-16, 19.

1,

1982);

42 (No.

W. Hays

Parks, Crossing the Line, 112

id.

40 (No.

11, 1986);

8, 1986).

text.

See nn. IV.360 and accompanying text for analysis of Fon in the Los context.

.

World Public Order

258.

Navy Rules,

See generally Hayes,

Grunawalt, TheJCS,

n. 11.341;

O'Connell, Influence oh

Roach, Rules ofEngagement,

n. 11.341;

341-49, 391, 452-53 and accompanying text for descriptions of Tanker
259.

S.C. Res. 502, 505 (1982), in

Law

169-80;

Duncan,

n. 11.341; Shearer, Rules of Engagement, n. 11.341.

207

n. 11.341;

See nn.

Wellens 594-95; see also Combacau, n.

208, 19, 35-36 n.48;

James

F. Gravelle, The

Falklands (Malvinas) Islands: A n International Law A nalysis of the Dispute Between A rgentina and Great Britain, 1 07
L. Rev. 5 (1985);Walker, State Practice 153-55.

An OAS

II.

War ROE.
MIL.

resolution urged belligerents to cease hostilities within the

region the Rio Treaty, n. 47, defines, and to refrain from any act that might affect inter- American peace and security.

The OAS advocated
28, 1982,

OAS

a truce

OAS Resolution I, Serious Situation in the South Atlantic, Apr.
ILM 669 (1982). The European Community

and peaceful settlement.

Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.20, Doc. 28/82

rev. 3 (1982), in 21

suspended imports from Argentina. E.C. Council Regulation 877/82 Suspending Imports of All Products Originating

(L 102)

in Argentina, Apr. 16, 1982 O.J.

1,

E.C.S.C. Council Decision 82/228/ECSC Suspending Imports of All

Products Originating in Argentina, Apr. 16, 1982,

in id.

547-48 (1982), extended

United States suspended military exports, security assistance and export credits
Assistance to and Sales

to

Argentina,

682-84.

id.

May

18, 1982, id. at 549-50.

The

to Argentina. Statement Concerning

An OAS resolution took an anti-UK and US position on May 29, 1982. Id.

The EC and US measures were rescinded in June and July 1982. Id. 1210. See also John Norton Moore, The
Inter-American System Snarls in Falklands War, 76 AJIL 830 (1982), arguing the OAS action was ultra vires. For accounts
of the war, see 3 Cordesman & Wagner 283-361; Harry D. Train III, -<4n Analysis of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands
672-74.

Campaign, 41
260.

3

NWC Rev. 33 (No.

Cordesman

1988).

1,

& Wagner 242-44; Max Hastings & Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands 105, 119,
Martin Middlebrook, Operation Corporate: The Falklands War 97-98, 126

124-25, 133, 143, 147, 157 (1983);
(1985).

261.

Hastings

& Jenkins, n.

260, 147, 157;

Middlebrook,

Fenrick, The Exclusion, n. 11.109, 109-12;

n. 260, 151;

Howard S. Levie, The Falklands Crisis and the Laws of War, in Alberto R. Coll & Anthony C. Arend, The Falklands
War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law 64-65 (1988); Levie, Means and Methods of Combat
at Sea, 14

Syracuse J. Int'l L.

& Com. 727, 735-38 (1988); Vojtech Mastny, The Soviet Union and the Falklands

War, 36

NWC Rev. 46, 49 (No. 3, 1983).
262.

See Argentine Republic

v.

(2d Cir. 1987); Sally V. Mallison

Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 US

428, 431-33 (1989), rev'g 830 F.2d 421, 423

& W. Thomas Mallison, Naval Targeting: Lawful Objects ofAttack, in Robertson 241,

269.

263.

3

Cordesman

& Wagner 260;

264.

3

Cordesman

& Wagner 250-51, 334, 336.

265.

S.C. Res. 549 (1983), in

266.

See nn. 11.88, 200, 227, 298, 303-05, 344-49, 368, 370, 391-95, 410, 451, 469-70, 522 and accompanying

267.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 51. S.C. Res. 598 (1987), in Wellens 454, invoked UN Charter, arts. 39-40 and called

on

parties to

end the war;

it

414-18, 454, 479, 482, 489,
268.

2

O'Connell,

Wellens

Law of the

451.

was hortatory, not mandatory

III.

651-62 and accompanying

as a decision

would have been. See

text.

also nn. II. 376-78, 405,

text.

See nn. 11.89, 102-03, 109-10, 141-42, 199-201, 240, 255, 288, 301, 411, 420, 447, 520 and accompanying

For further analysis of these and other wartime zones,
269.

Sea 1112.

S.C. Res. 540, 552 (1984), in

Wellens 451, 473; see also

text.

V.F, V.J.6.

see Parts

nn. 11.216-18, 251-59 and accompanying text; Chapter

VI.
270.

Combacau,

271.

See nn. 160-63, 190-206 and accompanying

272.

S.C. Res. 661 (1990), in

273.

UN Charter, art. 27; see also Goodrich et al.

274.

See generally Goodrich

275.

UN Charter, art. 2(1); see also n.

276.

UN

nn.

n. 208, 32.

et al.

528; see also Walker, Crisis Over Kuwait 30-34.

227-29; Simma 463-67.

2 1 5-3 1

30 and accompanying

text.

Charter, arts. 33(1) 36-41; compare the effects of mandatory decisions under

—and accompanying

277.

Wellens

text.

text.

UN Charter, arts.

10-12, 14; see also n. 69

and accompanying

text.

id., arts.

25, 48; see also

.

The Tanker War

208

UN Charter, art.

278.
12(l)'s

primacy

Goodrich

rule.

35(1), authorizing States to bring a dispute to the

The Assembly may

Assembly's attention, subject

270-77; Simma 527-31.

et al.

This occurred during the 1990-91 Gulf War. The Council had been seized of the

279.

invasion.

Cf

S.C. Res.

the matter before

in

it

crisis since the

August 1990

660 (1990), in Wellens 527. The Assembly steering committee rejected Iraq's attempt

November

1990. Walker, Crisis Over

69 and accompanying

280.

See

281.

G. A. Res. 378,

282.

G.A. Res. 380 (1950),

283.

Friendly Relations Declaration, 9

284.

Other aspects of the Declaration are

n.

to id., art.

also bring disputes to the Council's attention. Id., art. 11(3). See also

Kuwait

to bring

34.

text.

n. 20.

Key Resolutions,

in

ILM

10.

1292 (1970).

in similar vein,

e.g.,

"Nothing

in the foregoing paragraphs [relating to

nonintervention] shall be construed as affecting the relevant provisions of the Charter relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security." States have a duty to "co-operate with other States in the maintenance of
international peace and security."

The

Declaration elaborates on the territorial integrity and sovereign equality of

by reciting a disclaimer, "Nothing

States, closing

in this Declaration shall be construed as prejudicing in

any manner

the provisions of the Charter or the rights and duties of [Members] under the Charter or the rights of peoples under the

Charter taking into account the elaboration of these rights in this Declaration.

embodied

.

.

.

The

in this Declaration constitute basic principles of international law[.]" Id., 9

principles of the Charter

ILM

.

.

1295-97.

See n. 281 and accompanying text. The Assembly has approved measures related to self-defense, e.g., its 1951
embargo on war materials and petroleum shipped to the PRC during the Korean War, but there was no attempt
to define, expand or limit the concept except by inference. Practice under this resolution, if the embargo had
continued long enough, could have ripened into custom. Restatement (Third), §103 & cmt. c. On the embargo, see
Howard J. Taubenfeld, International Actions and Neutrality, 47 AJIL 377, 393-94 (1953).
285.

call for

Panel

286.

I,

n. 11.84, 171

(Lagoni remarks), referring to G.A. Res. 2162 (1966),

UN GAOR, 21

st Sess.,

UN Doc.

A/6316 (1967).
G.A. Res. 37/37 (1982),

287.

from Afghanistan,

G.A. Res. 38/7 (1983),

288.
this

was

a lawful

Standard, 78

in

83 Bulletin 80 (Jan. 1983);

see also

Jeane

J.

Kirkpatrick, Call for Soviet Withdrawal

id. 78.

UN GAOR, 38 th Sess., Supp. No. 47, UN Doc. A/38/47 (1985;. The United States said
UN Charter, art. 52. See John Norton Moore, Grenada and the International Double

action under

AJIL

145, 154-59 (1984); see also Christopher C. Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion,

id.

131,

135-37,142(1984).
289.

George K. Walker, Anticipatory

Amicorum
290.

ch. 15, 31

North Atlantic Treaty,

11.437, art. 2, 3

291.

Cornell Intl

See

UST 44,

n. 11.437

126

n. 11.437, arts. 5-6,

UNTS

What

Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era:

L.J. 321 (1998) analyzes these

63

Stat, at

the Treaties

Have

Said, Liber

developments.

2243-44, 34

UNTS

at 246, as

modified by Protocol,

n.

350; see also n. 11.437 and accompanying text.

and accompanying

text.

UST 3420, 3423, 131 UNTS 83, 86 (ANZUS Pact), Suspended for New
ANZUS in Crisis (1988); Frank P. Donni, ANZUS in Revision
1,
(1991); Thomas Durrell- Young, Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations, 1951-1986
(1992); W. David McIntyre, Background of the ANZUS Pact, chs. 9-10 (1995); Michael C. Pugh, The ANZUS
Crisis, Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence (1989); Trevor R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand and the United
States: A Survey of International Relations, chs. 2, 4 (1969); J.G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance (1965);
TIF 350; W. Keith Jackson & James W. Lamare, The ANZUS Conflict and New Zealand Politics, in International
292.

Security Treaty, Sept.

Zealand Sept.

Crisis

1951,

art. 4, 3

and Domestic Politics 53 (Lamare

National Self-Perceptions,

Relations

in

the

Relationships in a

293.

1,

1986; see also Jacob Bercovitch,

in

ANZUS

More Benign World:

Reflections on

Jock Phillips,

New

Zealand and

the

ANZUS Alliance:

Changing

American Orientations Toward ANZUS,

in id. 203.

See nn. 11.52-54, 84, 127-29, 133, 135-39, 207, 220, 242-43, 249, 285, 287, 306, 315-16, 326-27, 330-31, 350, 362,

374, 418-19, 427-28, 442, 475, 534-35 and
294.

ed. 1991);

New

Zealand, and the United States: Internal Change and Alliance
States 183 (Richard W. Baker ed. 1991); James N. Rosenau, Peripheral International

Australia,

Warsaw

accompanying

UNTS

Neil Fodor, The Warsaw Treaty Organization: A
Documentary Study of the Warsaw Pact 1-39 (1973);
Union and Eastern Europe: Spheres ofInfluence, in Ngaire Woods, Explaining International

Pact, n. 47, arts. 3-4, 219

Political and Organizational Analysis (1990);

Mark Kramer, The Soviet

text.

28; see also

J. P.

Jain,

World Public Order

Relations Since 1 945

Cum. Supp.

ch. 5

( 1

996).

The Pact dissolved in 1 99 1

.

Protocol, Mar. 3 1 , 1991 , in

Bowman & Harris

1

96 ( 1 1 th

1995).

See nn. 11.93-95, 184-85, 192-94, 248, 256, 283-84, 405, 478, 538 and accompanying

295.

209

text.

296. Arab Joint Defence Treaty, n. 11.31, to be distinguished from the treaty establishing the Arab League, Pact of
League of Arab League States, n. 11.31; see also n. 11.31 and accompanying text.

297.

See nn. 303-07 and accompanying

298.

Simma706.

299.

See nn. 308-36 and accompanying

300.

Bowett, Self-Defence

301.

See Walker, Anticipatory, n. 289, Part

302.

McDougal & Feliciano 248-53, in effect adopting the second theory of Bowett, Self-Defence 202-05; id.
The Law, n. 189, 792; and Stone 245 believed the right of collective self-defense did not extend to a

text.

text.

205.
III.

205-07; Kelsen,

State wishing to associate itself in defending a State already acting in self-defense. Bowett's first theory, that the right

of collective self-defense is based on the right of a "protector" of a group, i.e., a family, perhaps family servants, was also
rejected

by him. Bowett 200-02. Nevertheless, the theme has been seen in

has been used. Cf. Walker,

Crisis

UN practice where the "agency" principle

Over Kuwait 49.

303.

Goodrich

304.

Id.

305.

See nn. 11.21-27, 159-72, 187-88, 192, 208-09,218, 248, 251-59, 262-63, 290-94, 315, 330, 382,415,478, 508, 534,

356;

et al.

see, e.g.,

357.

Russell

543-45 and accompanying

& Muther, n.

text.

nn. 11.382, 386 and accompanying text.

306.

See,

307.

See also n. 11.31 and accompanying text.

e.g.,

13, 102-09, 229-34, 472-76, 555-56, 693-706.

UN General Assembly committee and plenary session meetings.
309. E.g., Rio Treaty, n. 47, art. 3, 62 Stat, at 1700, 21 UNTS 95; WEU Treaty, n. 11.388, art. 4, 19 UNTS 57, as
modified by WEU Protocol
n. 11.437, art. 3, 211
346; North Atlantic Treaty, n. 11.437, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2249, 34
308.

Goodrich et al. 357,

citing early

I,

id.

UNTS 246; Arab Joint Defence Treaty, n. II. 31, art. 2, 1 57 BFSP 669-70, 49 AJIL Supp. 51 (1955); ANZUS Pact,n. 292,
art. 4, 3 UST at 3423, 131 UNTS 86 (no explicit statement, see also sources n. 292); Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty, with Protocol, Sept. 8, 1954, art. 4, 6 UST 81, 83, 209 UNTS 28, 30 (SEATO Treaty); Warsaw Pact, n. 47, art. 4,
219 UNTS 30, abrogated by Protocol, Mar. 31, 1991, Bowman & Harris 196 (1 1th Cum. Supp. 1995). The Arab Joint
Defence Treaty, nominally covering the Gulf area, was never invoked because of internal dissension and perhaps
other reasons. See nn. H.93-99, 184-85, 192-93, 248-58, 283-84, 405, 477, 538 and accompanying text.

The Seato Treaty

was defunct by 1980, as was Pact for Mutual Co-operation, Feb. 24, 1955, 233 UNTS 199 (Baghdad Pact). Iraq
withdrew from the Pact before 1980. Leszek Buszynski, Seato: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy chs. 1-2
(1983);

Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Baghdad Pact: Origins and Political Setting

SEATO;

1956); Starke, n. 292, 221-26; George Modelski,

Its

Studies 8-45 (1964); Brian Holden Reid, The "Northern Tier" and

Churchill's Peacetime Administration 1951-55,

at

(Feb.

Function and Organization, in Modelski, Seato: Six

Baghdad

the

159-74 (John

Pact, in

W. Young

ed.

The Foreign Policy of

1988); Margaret

Muryani

Manchester, The Tangled Web: The Baghdad Pact, Eisenhower, and Arab Nationalism chs. 1-3 (1994) (unpublished

Ph.D. dissertation, Clark University) (on

file,

Naval

310.

See nn. 220-22, 281-84 and accompanying

311.

UN Charter, arts.

312.

See nn. 284-85 and accompanying

10-12, 14; see also n. 69

War

College Library).

text.

and accompanying

text.

text.

Mutual Defense Treaty, Oct. 1, 1953, Repub. of Korea-US, 5 UST 2368, 238 UNTS 199; Mutual Defense
2, 1954, Repub. of China-US, with US reservations, 6 id. 433, 248 UNTS 213, which the United States
denounced in 1979 when the PRC was recognized. See generally Goldwater v. Carter, 444 US 996 (1979); J.A.S.
313.

Treaty, Dec.

Grenville

& Bernard Wasserstein, The Major International Treaties Since
nn. 292, 309 and accompanying text.

314.

Starke,

315.

See nn. 802-20 and accompanying

316.

Proclamation No. 3504, 3

n. 292, 98-99; see also

1945, at 109-13 (1987).

CFR

text.

232 (1959-63), referring to

October 23, 1962 resolution passed under Rio Treaty,

S.J.

n. 47, arts. 6, 8,

62

Res. 230, Pub. L. No. 87-733, 76 Stat. 697;
Stat. 1701, 21

UNTS 97, 99. See also Abram

The Tanker War

210

The Cuban Missile Crisis (1974); Robert W.

Chayes,

Divine,

The Cuban Missile Crisis (197 1); Louis Henkin, How

Nations Behave 279-306 (1979); Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1969);
10 Whiteman 8-20, 874; Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 Foreign Aff. 550 (1963); Carl Q. Christol & C.R.
Davis, Maritime Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated Material

W. Thomas

525, 527 (1963);

Defense Claims Valid Under International Law, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 355, 387-88 (1962);

A

to

Cuba, 1962, 56 AJIL

Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction: National and Collective

Law

W. Thomas Mallison & Sally

2, 1976); Brunson
MacChesney, Some Comments on the "Quarantine" of Cuba, 57 AJIL 592, 593 (1963); Joseph B. McDevitt, The UN
Charter and the Cuban Quarantine, 17 JAG J. 71 (1963); Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and
Self-Defense, 57 AJIL 557 (1963); McNeill, Neutral Rights, n. II. 354, at 633: John A. Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and

V. Mallison,

the

Survey of the International

Law, 57 AJIL 515 (1963); William O. Miller

1970); Miller, Lawof Naval Warfare,

id.

,

of Blockade, 102 Proceedings 44, 49-50 (No.

Collective Intervention

and

the

Law of the

Charter,

NWC Rev. 71 (Apr.

Covey C. Oliver, International Law and the Quarantine of Cuba:

35 (Feb. 1972);

Hopeful Prescription for Legal Writing, 57 AJIL 373 (1963); Walker, State Practice 141-42; Quincy Wright, The Cuban
Quarantine, 57

AJIL

546, 554-56 (1963).

317.

E.g.,

McDougal, The Sovwt-Cuban,

318.

A. V.

Lowe, The Commander's Handbook on

n. 316.

Law of Naval Operations and the Contemporary Law of the Sea,

the

in

Robertson 109, 128, 137.
319.

See nn. 233-34 and accompanying

320.

North Vietnam and some commentators maintained the

text.

conflict

was

a civil war.

See generally Stanley

A

History (1983); Henkin, How, n. 316, 303-12; Richard R. Baxter,Jui in Bello Interno: The
Present and Future Law, in Law and Civil War in the Modern World 518 (John Norton Moore ed. 1974); Office of

Karnow, Vietnam:

Legal Adviser,

Vietnam

US Department

War and

of State, The Legality of United States Participation

International

Law

in the

Defense of Vietnam, in

1

The

583 (Richard A. Falk ed. 1968).

321. Republic of Viet-Nam, Decree on Sea Surveillance, Apr. 27, 1965, 4 ILM 461 (1965), published the original
Market Time defense zone. 2 Edward J. Marolda & Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the
Vietnam Conflict 518 (1986); 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1097-99, 1122-23; O'Connell, The Influence 176-77,

325; Fenrick, Legal Aspects, n.II 501,256; Fenrick, Military Objective, n. 11.202, 18; James A.
the

Gulf of Thailand,

Vietnam, 1950-1970, in
traffic;

the

Frank Uhlig, Vietnam: The Naval Story 308

in

id.

274, 280-7.

RVN also operated a Junk

RVN and US

naval forces interdicted southbound North Vietnamese military

Force, not part of

military tasks and in 1965 was incorporated into the
322.

US

In 1965 the

belligerent act. 2

its

RVN

The Force performed other
Marolda & Fitzgerald 118-20, 228-30, 309.

navy, to assist the operation.
navy. 2

Joint Chiefs of Staff had considered and rejected a blockade of North

Marolda & Fitzgerald, n.

Interdiction of Seaborne

Commerce

321,

1

as a Viable Sanctioning Device, 27

Traditional Principles of Blockade in

JAG J.

Modern

Practice: United States

Marolda & Fitzgerald,

being

a

JAG

J.

160 (1973); Ulrik Luckow, Victory Over

NWC Rev.

17 (No.

1,

Mining of Internal and

1982);

Frank

Territorial

B. Swayze,

Waters of North

321, 320-25; 18 Keesing 25338 (1972).

2

324.

Lane

325.

O'Connell, The Influence 110; Fenrick, Military

326.

Bowman & Harris

327.

See,e.g.,

328.

as

143 (1977).

323.

C. Kendall,

nn.

and accompanying

Vietnam

18-20; Bruce A. Clark, Recent Evolutionary Trends Concerning Naval

Ignorance and Fear: The U.S. Minelaying Attack on North Vietnam, 35

Vietnam, 29

Hodgman, Market Time in
Naval War in

(1986); R.L. Schreadly, The

II.

n.

US. Merchant Shipping and

Vietnam, in Uhlig, n. 321, 482, 491, 499-500.

196; Buszynski, n. 309, ch.

Objective, n. 11.202, 256.

6.

81,95, 112-40, 159-71, 182, 194-98,242-47,249,263,267-68,284-87,294,319-20,419-20,475-78

text.

This war was not the only example of unilateral or multilateral assistance without a formal defense treaty. E.g.,

there was unilateral
249, 253, 259 and

US aid to Israel and other countries' assistance to Arab States during the Arab-Israeli wars. See nn.

accompanying

text.

329.

See nn. 828-89 and accompanying

330.

See nn. 11.21-27, 60, 84, 93-94, 157, 159-72, 186-88, 192, 208-09, 218, 248, 251-60, 262-63, 271, 283-84, 290-94,

text.

315, 321, 330, 375, 378, 382, 405, 415, 437, 477-79, 508, 534, 538, 541-45

and accompanying

331.

See

332.

See nn. 11.447, 470 and accompanying

333.

Simma 706;

n. 11.456

see also

text.
text.

nn. 11.167, 415 and accompanying text.

and accompanying

text.

World Public Order

334.

See,

e.g.,

nn. 11.112-14, 313, 475-76 and accompanying text.

335.

See,

e.g.,

nn. 11.83, 124, 126-28, 196-98, 242-47, 285-87, 316-20, 418-19; See also

Investigate Covert

Arms Transactions with

House

Select

211

Committee

to

Iran and Saudi Arabia, H.R. Rep. No. 433, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987);

Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition,

S.

Rep. No. 216 (1987);

Report of the President's Special Review Board (Tower Commission Report) (1987).
336.

See nn. 11.269, 360, and accompanying

337.

See nn. 308-28 and accompanying

338.

See generally Walker,

later Security

text.

text.

Over Kuwait (agreements negotiated by

Crisis

339.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 51,

340.

See generally San

341.

E.g.,

342.

See

343.

See generally Walker, Anticipatory, n. 289.

344.

See generally

345.

E.g.,

NWP

n.

US

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney,

Council resolutions).

Remo Manual

text.

68; Walker, Maritime Neutrality 142-48.

n 7.1-7.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated Ml 7.1-7.2.2 (US position).

1-14M Annotated

259 and accompanying

id.,

and accompanying

103; see also nn. 10, 350-56, 652-62

text.

Parts I-III for examples uncovered in research

on

treaties

from 1815-1945.

Cable reports hundreds of maritime incidents since 1914; the actors most assuredly had other nations'
The historical record, 1815-1914, must have more. Many are shrouded in

informal backing in some of these.
diplomatic reports, e.g.,

FRUS, or in detailed historical accounts; other recent examples probably are unpublished due

to national security considerations.

346.

While the Covenant of the League of Nations,

required League

art. 18,

Members to submit all agreements for

publication, this requirement was soon ignored. Ferrell, n. 163,54-61. Countries,

e.g.

the United States, not League

Members, were under no

international obligation to submit treaties for League publication or to publish

national series, although,

e.g.,

most of

the United States did publish

Large or the Executive Agreement

Series.

Most League Members

its

did, but there

were exceptions, particularly

clouds loomed in the late Thirties, and the League collapsed. See Walker, Anticipatory,
102 admonishes

Members to submit treaties for registration;

treaty cannot be

invoked before

a

12a(b) (1994). National legislation

international agreements. See
347.

"engine
not

all

.

.

.

II.

Restatement (Third)

§

id §

reports

Governments publish
e.g.,

as

war

an unregistered
610-14; Simma
1

USC

§

legislature of all

112b (1994).

The Struggle for Mastery

in

so, their

Europe: 1848-1918,

terms were leaked
at

264 (1954).

agreements between 1648 and 1920 have been reprinted in the Consolidated Treaty
I

in

UN Charter, art.

312 r.n.5 (1987). See also

may require publication of agreements or notifying the national

of publicity." A.J. P. Taylor,

navigation hazards,

as

an

Many but

Series.

Walker,

some of the few omissions.

NOTMARs

and

NOTAMs

for

many

purposes, including routine warnings of

floating derelicts, extinguished navigation aids, ere, besides warnings of high seas military

exercises; war, exclusion or defense zones;

that

Part

for nonfulfilment is that

Before the coming of the Covenant, treaties were often not published. Even

Anticipatory, n. 289, Part

348.

e.g.,

consequence

n. 289,

UN organ, e.g., the Security Council or the ICJ. See Goodrich et al.

1103-16. Security agreements are often not published.
1

a

them

international agreements in the Statutes at

warnings of other countries' proclamations of zones; or self-defense actions

might be taken upon approach of aircraft or ships,

as the

United States and other nations published them during

the Tanker War. See nn. 11.89-90, 101, 141-42, 176, 224, 288, 305, 311, 346-48, 420, and accompanying text.

348 and accompanying

349.

See

350.

UN Charter, art.

351.

Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ

352.

Id. at 96-99.

353.

UN Charter, art.

354.

See nn. 308-22 and accompanying

355.

Combacau,

356.

Higgins,

357.

United States

n.

51; see also

text.

Simma 676-77.

at 105, 121.

51.
text.

n. 208, 15-16.

The Development,
v.

Araki,

n. 56, 207.

Judgment of

Int'l

Judgment: The International Military Tribunal

Mil. Trib. for the Far East (Nov. 4-12, 1948), in

for the

1

The Tokyo

Far East (I.M.T.F.E.) 29 April 1946-12 November 1948,

at

382

The Tanker War

212

&

1 Tr. Maj. War Crim. Before Int'l Mil. Trib. 208,
US Secretary of State Daniel Webster letter to UK Ambassador Lord
Alexander B. Ashburton, Aug. 6, 1 842, 2 Moore 41 1- 1 2; Webster letter to UK Minister Henry S. Fox, Apr. 24, 1843, in
The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers 58, 67 (Kenneth E. Shewmaker ed. 1983) (Caroline Case); see also
R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AJIL 82 (1938); Walker, A nticipatory, n. 289, Liber Amicorum

(B.V.A. Roling

Nuremberg Judgment,

C.F. Ruter eds. 1977);

218-22, 41

AJIL

385-86, 31

Cornell

205, 207 (1947), citing

Int'l L.J. 357-59. Treaties negotiated from 1815 through 1945 had recognized a right of

anticipatory self-defense. See

366-81, 31

id.

Cornell

Int'l L.J. 325-51.

J., dissenting); Alexandrov 296; Bowett,
Hans Kelsen, Collective Security Under
International Law 27 (Nav. War C. Int'l L. Stud., v. 49, 1957); McCormack, n. 209, 122-24, 238-39, 253-84, 302;
McDougal & Feliciano 232-41 1 Oppenheim § 127; Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice
152-55 (1991); Julius Stone, of Law and Nations: Between Power Politics and Hopes 3 (1974); Thomas & Thomas,
The Concept, n. 120, 61-65; George Bunn, International Law and the Use of Force in Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have to

358.

Compare,

Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 347 (Schwebel,

e.g.,

Self-Defence 187-93; Broms, The Definition,

n.

127;

112,

;

Take

the First Hit?, 39

NWC Rev. 69-70 (May-June

1986); Christopher

Greenwood, Remarks,

160-61; Linnan, Self-Defense, n. 51, 65-84; Lowe, The Commander's, n. 318, 127-30; James

in

Panel

I,

n. 11.84, at

McHugh, Forcible Self-Help

Law, 25 NWC Rev. 61 (No. 2, 1972); Rein Mullerson & David J. Schefter, Legal Regulation of the Use of
Beyond Confrontation: International Law for the Post-Cold War Era 93, 109-14 (Lori Fisler
Damrosch et al. ed. 1995); John F. Murphy, Commentary on Intervention to Combat Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, in
Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer, Law and Force in the New International Order 241 (1991); W.
Michael Reisman,/4 llocatmg Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War World: Practices, Conditions, and Prospects,
in id. 25, 45; Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Contemporary International Law: Relevant to Today's World?, 45 NWC Rev. 89, 101
in International

Force, in

(Summerl992); Robert
Aggression in the

F.

Turner, State Sovereignty, International Law, and the UseofForcein Countering Low-Intensity

Modern World,

C. Int'l L. Stud.,

v.

in

Legal and Moral Constraints on Low-Intensity Conflict 43, 62-80 (Nav.

67, Alberto Coll

et al.

Waldock, The Regulation,

ed. 1995);

n. 52,

War

496-99 (anticipatory self-defense

permissible as long as principles of necessity observed); Walker, Anticipatory, n. 289 (anticipatory collective
self-defense), with,

self-defense under

e.g.,

Charter,

but there

art. 51,

may be

right

a

under customary international law); Henkin,

A Modern Law, n. 54, 166-67; O'Connell, The Influence 83, 171;
Simma 675-76; Tom Farer, Law and War, in 3 Cyril E. Black & Richard A. Falk, The Future of

International Law,
RiFAAT,n. 23, 126;

Brownlie, Use of Force 257-61, 275-78, 366-67; Dinstein 182-89 (no right of anticipatory

UN

n. 165, 121-22; Jessup,

the International Legal Order 30, 36-37(1971); YuriM. Kolosov, Limiting the Useof Force: Self-Defense, Terrorism
and Drug Trafficking, in Beyond Confrontation 233, 235; Kunz, Individual, n. 189, 878; Rainer Lagoni, Remarks, in
Panel, n. 11.84, 162; Tucker, The Interpretation, n. 189, 29-30; see also Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense, 66

(1972) (States

may respond only

exists; see nn.

374-377 and accompanying

after

AJIL 586

being attacked). Dinstein 184-90 says a right of "interceptive" self-defense
text.

359. E.g., the United States claims a right of anticipatory self-defense. NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 4.3.2-4.3.2.1;
NWP 9A Annotated HH 4.3.2.-4.3.2.1. Iran recognized a right of reactive self-defense during the Tanker War; this was

the

USSR view.

360.

See n. 11.370 and accompanying text; Kolosov, Limiting, n. 358, 234.

Compare,

e.g.,

Alexandrov 296 (although anticipatory self-defense appropriate, Israel could not claim it in
McCormack, n. 209, 1 22-44, 238-39, 253-84, 302 (anticipatory self-defense appropriate,

Iraqi nuclear reactor raid) with
Israel rightly

361.

claimed

Compare,

n. 209, 122-44,

e.g.,

it

for raid).

Israel's

the United States.

Cf

UN Charter, arts.

NWP 1-14M Annotated
The US

claim of a right of anticipatory self-defense for the raid,

Alexandrov

296;

McCormack,

238-39, 253-84, 302, with S.C. Res. 487 (1981),m Wellens441-42, adopted unanimously, i.e., including

vote to

1H1

condemn

4.3.2-4.3.2.1;

meant

Israel

23(1), 27.

The United

NWP 9A Annotated

States adheres to a right of anticipatory self-defense.

1111

4.3.2-4.3.2.1; see also n.

that although anticipatory self-defense

was

359 and accompanying

a legitimate

text.

response, the Israeli

action was not an appropriate exercise of that right under the circumstances.
362.

UN Charter, art.

363.

The

364.

Compare,

51; see also nn. 158-206

parties declared
e.g.,

1

it

was not an

issue.

and accompanying

text.

Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 103.

D.P. O'Connell, International

Law

25 (1970) (favoring anticipatory self-defense) with

O'Connell, The Influence

83, 171 (then-current naval thinking

Kelsen, Collective,

27 (anticipatory self-defense permitted), with Kelsen,

n. 358,

was leaning toward the reactive view). Compare

The Law,

n. 189,

791-93 (only

reactive self-defense permitted).
365.

Comm'n
with

Cf,

e.g.,

Goodrich et al. 342-53; Addendum

13, 66-70,

a reactive

UN Doc.

view because of a statement

straddling the fence. San

to the

Eighth Report on State Responsibility, 1980 2(1) Y.B. Int'l L.

A/CN.4P318/ADD.5-7. McCormack,

Remo Manual

in

H 3,

id.

353, but reading

Commentary

n. 209, 122, says

id.

342-53 for

3.2 says the

Goodrich etal. are among those

UN Charter, art. 51, seems to have

Manual

takes

no

position.

id.
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UN Doc. AEC/18/Rev.

366.

Bowett, Self-Defence

187, citing

367.

Bowett, Self-Defence

187, citing General

368.

Id.

369.

Definition of Aggression,

370.

Id., art. 4,

371.

See nn. 80-86 and accompanying

372.

Dinstein 130 says

blockade.

Not

all

13

ILM 714; see also nn.

all

13

arts. 3(c), 3(e),

far.

See

24 (1946).

Assembly debates.

ILM

713.

98-152 and accompanying text for further analysis of the Resolution.

text.

of Definition of Aggression,

would go so

1, at

n.

art. 3,

13

102 and accompanying

ILM 713, may be custom, and this would include

text.

Many

have considered blockading coasts

aggression in the League and Charter eras. Treaties listing acts of aggression include blockade. See,

LNTS 67, 256-57;

for Definition of Aggression, July 3, 1933, art. 2(4), 147

July 4, 1933,

art. 2(4),

148

id.

Convention

e.g.,

as

Convention

for Definition of Aggression,

211, 215; Balkan Entente, Feb. 9, 1934, Protocol-Annex, 153

id.

153, 157;

Convention

for

Definition of Aggression, July 5, 1933, Lith.-USSR, art. 2(4), id. 79, 83; Saadabad Pact, July 8, 1937,art. 4, 190 id. 21, 25.

UN

Charter,

art.

42, lists blockade as

an option the Security Council

inadequate, an inference being that blockade
approval. Blockade was consistently in the

and World Order

is

not open to

USSR

drafts

may choose

UN Members

enumerating

if

nonforce alternatives are

unless in self-defense or with Council

acts of aggression. Julius Stone,

Aggression

34-35, 46-77 (1958); Stone, Conflict, n. 23, chs. 2-3.

373.

See nn. 358-361 and accompanying

374.

Dinstein 190, citing Joyner

375.

Dinstein 190.

376.

Id.

&

text.

Grimaldi, n.

659-60.

1 1,

190-91. Stone, Conflict, n. 23, 58, 199 n.3; Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of Western States Toward Legal

Aspects of the Use of Force, in Cassesse, n. 208, 435, 443, characterize Israel's action as anticipatory self-defense.
377. Dinstein 191; see also Ben Cheng, General Principles of
Tribunals 90 (1983); nn. 617-30 and accompanying text.

Wellens

378.

Compare

379.

See also nn. 242-43 and accompanying

380.

See

381.

See nn. 243, 248 and accompanying

382.

See nn. 259-64 and accompanying

383.

See nn. 11.338-41 and accompanying

384.

The same

n.

S.C. Res.

243 and accompanying

is

true for

missiles; Sheffield may

Cf

385.

487 (1981),

in

Law

as Applied by International

Courts and

441, with Dinstein 47, 186-87.

text.

text.

text.

text.
text.

some missile attacks. Eilat sank

after

two waves of them, and Stark survived two Exocet

have been lost more due to her construction than the missiles. See nn. 11.338-42, III. 243, 259-64.

Philip C. Jessup, Should International

Myres

Law

Recognize an Intermediate Status Between Peace and War?, 48

McDougal, Peace and War: Factual Continuum with Multiple Legal Consequences, 49 id. 63
(1955); see also James Russell Lowell, The Present Crisis (1844), in 1 James Russell Lowell, Poetical Works 185, 190

AJIL 98

(1954);

S.

(1890).

Horace B. Robertson, Modern Technology and

386.

New

Technologies

legislate

387.

and Armed

Conflicts at Sea, 14

weapons control through

treaties

the

Law ofArmed Conflict at Sea,

in

Robertson 362; Robertson,

Syracuse J. Int'L L. 699 (1988) argues persuasively that

it is

because treaties will nearly always be irrelevant before the ink

Custom, although perhaps uncertain in parameters, has inherent

flexibility

and

is

likely to be a

is

futile to

dry.

dominant

W. Michael Reisman, The Cult of Custom in the Late 20th Century, 17 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 133 (1987);
see also TheodorMeron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law 3-10 (1989). The law of naval
warfare is mostly custom-based. San Remo Manual 61-62. Moreover, custom is not subject to treaty rules of
future source of law.

construction, e.g., breach, fundamental change of circumstances, impossibility, etc. See nn. 927-29 and accompanying
text.

388.

See nn. 357-65 and accompanying

389.

Id.

390.

See nn. 485-96, 521-28 and accompanying

text.

text.

The Tanker War
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391.

UN Acting Permanent Representative Herbert S. Okun letter to President of UN Security Council, Apr.
UN Doc S/18016/Rev. (1986), quoted in 80 AJIL 632 (1986); Feature: U.S. Exercises Right of SelfDefense

US

14, 1986,

1

M. Levitt, Intervention to Combat Terrorism and Drug
Commentators differed on the legality of the strikes, as

Against Libyan Terrorism, 86 Bulletin 1-23 (June 1986); Geoffrey
Trafficking, in

Damrosch & Scheffer, n.

358, 224, 226-27, 230.

&

they had on the Vietnam War. Mullerson

Scheffer, nn. 358, 99.

B

392.

Although

393.

See

394.

S.C. Res.

395.

UN Charter, arts.

396.

For analysis of war zones, defensive sea zones and similar ocean areas in terms of area, duration, notice, etc., see

specific events are cited, refer to Part

n. 11.88

and accompanying

479 (1980),

in

II.

for the full factual context.

text.

Wellens

449; see also n. 11.96 and accompanying

652 and accompanying

25, 48; see also n.

text.

text.

Part V.F; see also nn. 11.89, 103-04, 109-10, 141-42, 199-201, 240, 255, 288, 301, 411, 420, 447, 520 and accompanying
text.

397.

LOS

LOS Convention, art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, art.

1; see also

Parts IV.B.4 and V.D.3 for analysis in the

context.

309 and accompanying

398.

See

399.

See nn. 11.21-27 and accompanying

400.

See nn. 11.31,

n.

III. 309

text.
text.

and accompanying

401. Arab Joint Defence Treaty,
accompanying text.

text.

n. 11.31, art. 2,

157

BFSP

669-70, 49

AJIL

Supp. 51; see also nn. 309, 400 and

402.

UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 5

403.

See nn. 591-616 and accompanying

text.

404.

See nn. 485-585 and accompanying

text.

405.

Id.

406.

See nn. 11.21-27, 84, 159-72, 186-87, 192, 208-09, 218, 248, 251-59, 262-63, 290-94, 315, 330, 415, 478, 508, 532,

543-45 and accompanying

1

;

Definition of Aggression, art. 3(0,

See nn. 308-36 and accompanying

408.

See

409.

See nn. 308-36 and accompanying

410.

See nn. 11.103, 201 and accompanying

text.

411.

Definition of Aggression,

art. 3(d),

ILM

412.

Definition of Aggression,

art. 4,

413.

See Parts V.C.3, V.C.5, V.J.3.

414.

Iraq's

Italy,

visit

80 and accompanying

ILM 714; nn. 50-

1

57 and accompanying

text.

text.

text.
text.

13

13

713; see also nn. 98-152 and accompanying

ILM 714; see also

navy was bottled up in the Shatt al-Arab

where they had been

3

text.

407.

n. II.

1

built. See n. 11.130

and search operations. Iran had

a

text.

nn. 103, 116, 120 and accompanying text.

for the duration of the war; her

and accompanying

text.

navy that was significant in

new frigates

sat out the

war in

Iraq could not conduct traditional maritime

size for

Gulf operations. Both belligerents had

land-based air attack capability.
415.

See

n. 11.177

and accompanying

text.

416.

See

n. 11.177

and accompanying

text.

417.

See Parts V.B.-V.D and V.J.2-4.

418.

UN Charter, art. 103; S.C. Res. 514, 522 (1982), 540 (1983), in Wellens 450-51; see also nn. 11.189, 216-17, III.

10 and accompanying text.
419.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; S.C. Res. 479 (1980), 552 (1984), 582, 588 (1986), 598 (1987), 612, 619-20 (1988), 631,

642 (1989), 651, 671, 676 (1990), 685 (1991),
455, 486, 487,
420.

III.

10 and

The United

accompanying

in

Wellens

449-50, 452-60, 473-74; see also nn. 11.96, 258, 300, 308, 377,

text.

States published the warnings within days after releasing

its

report on the

US Marine

headquarters building bombing at Beiruit International Airport in 1983. See nn. 11.224-27 and accompanying

text.
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421.

See

n. 11.229

and accompanying

text.

The United Kingdom had

215

declared a similar defensive bubble during

the Falklands/Malvinas War. See nn. 259-64 and accompanying text.
422.

UN Charter, arts.

423.

See Parts V.F.l.b-V.F.l.c, V.F.5, V.J.6.

424.

See

425.

See nn. 11.295, 361 and accompanying

426.

See

427.

See nn.

428.

See

n.

11.299

and accompanying

text.

429.

See

n. 11.306

and accompanying

text.

430.

This was the

War

n. 11.360

n. 11.298

51, 103; see nn. 10, 158-288

and accompanying

and accompanying

II. 296-97

and accompanying

text.

text.
text.

text.

and accompanying

text.

UK and apparently the French view. Other States, including the United States, saw the Tanker

as a traditional war, to

which

431.

UN Charter, art.

432.

Nyon Arrangement, H1I

LOAC principles applied. See n.

103; see also n. 10
1,4-7,

merchantmen by submarines and

and accompanying

11.84

and accompanying

text.

text.

and Nyon Supplementary Agreement,

1111

2-3,

which

also addressed attacks

on

surface ships, applied only to the Mediterranean Sea during the Spanish Civil War.

The Nyon treaties permitted attacks on ships that attacked or might attack neutral merchant vessels and said nothing
about the attacking ship's duties, referring to the London Protocol for standards. To that extent the Nyon treaties
might be said to repeat whatever customary norms are in the London Protocol.
433.

London

Protocol,

art.

22; see also Parts V.C.I, V.C.5, V.J. 3 for analysis of the Protocol in the law of naval

warfare context.
434.

TIF 429-30; Schindler & Toman

885.

435. Turkey acceded to the Protocol in 1937, Schindler & Toman 885, long after the predecessor State, the
Ottoman Empire, had been stripped of its Gulf territories through the League of Nations mandate system. The law of
treaty succession could not apply to the GCC States; when Turkey became a Protocol party, these countries were not

part of Turkey.
436.

UN Charter, art.

437.

See

438.

The San Remo Manual does not consider the Charter supremacy issue, noting some participants challenged a

n.

103; see also n. 10

205 and accompanying

and accompanying

text.

text.

view that the Charter applies during armed conflict, arguing that/ws adbellum rules apply only until outbreak of an

armed

"Once

conflict.

a State

became engaged

in

armed

conflict,

it

was argued, that State was subject only

to the

[LOAC] This is because the [LOAC] contains its own principles of necessity and proportionality," citing NWP 9 A,
Annotated H 5.2. San Remo Manual 4, Commentary 4.3. All Manual participants accepted that "the fact that an act
may be a necessary and proportionate measure
cannot justify it if it involves a violation of the laws of armed
11

.

.

.

Commentaries 4.2(b), 4.3. If this means a Charter-based norm can be superseded by a norm based on a
treaty governing the LOAC, however laudatory and beneficial to humanitarian standards the intention might be, the
conflict.''/^. U 4,

Commentary appears not to have taken UN Charter, art. 103 into account. If San Remo Manual, 4, Commentaries
4.2(b), 4.3 mean the LOAC recited in treaties should be the same as a norm developed under UN Charter, art. 5 1, much
11

as necessity

and proportionality are customary limitations on the inherent right of

accompanying

Manual

self-defense, nn. 485-585

and

Whether the Charter as a treaty can supersede custom is
debatable, and to that extent the ManualIs also correct. See n. 10 and accompanying text. If, on the other hand, Article
51 restates a jus cogens norm, n. 205 and accompanying text, then LOAC norms can inform but cannot supersede it. See
n. 10 and accompanying text.
439.

text,

the

Commentators continue

is

correct on the point.

to debate the point.

Compare,

e.g.,

Mallison 106-23 (Protocol still

a valid principle);

Howard S. Levie's Paper: Submarine Warfare: With Emphasis on the 1936 London Protocol, in
Grunawalt 78, 83-84 (same); Howard S. Levie, Submarine Warfare: With Emphasis on the 1 936 London Protocol, in id. 28,
59 (same, but States will find reasons to justify noncompliance); Sally V. Mallison & W. Thomas Mallison, The Naval
Practices of Belligerents in World War II: Legal Criteria and Developments, in id. 87, 99-102 (Protocol still valid law,
enhanced by Fourth Convention, art. 18[1] duty to search for survivors after battle at sea); Edwin I. Nowogugu,
Commentary, in Law of Naval Warfare 353, 363-64 (Protocol still valid law); Horace B. Robertson, Jr., U.S. Policy on
Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping: Bridging the Gap Between Conventional Law and Practice, in Grunawalt 338, 343,
352-53 (same, but inapplicable in most circumstances) with, e.g., Stone (Protocol violated in World War II, apparently
Dieter Fleck, Comments on

,

The Tanker War

216

no longer the
Naval

Tucker 63-73

law);

(same); W.J. Fenrick, Comments on Sally V. and W. Thomas Mallison's Paper: The

World War

Practices of Belligerents in

unworkable but should be incorporated

war

effort);

Alex Kerr, International

in

II:

Legal Criteria and Developments,

in

Grunawalt 110, 116-18 (Protocol

new principle of allowing attacks on neutral merchantmen

Law and

the Future of

if part

of enemy

Submarine Warfare, 81 Proceedings 1110 (Oct. 1955)

(Protocol defunct); O'Connell, International Law, n. 252, 52 (Protocol no longer effective); James Service, Targeting

Weapons Systems and Capabilities,

Realities: Platforms,

Protocol compliance unworkable;

if observed,

Grunawalt 231, 238-40 (modern weapons systems make literal

in

Protocol would in effect prolong a war).

technology, and

enemy merchantmen may be attacked and destroyed with

enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort and compliance with the
subject the surface warship to

imminent danger

these principles to submarine attacks, but

enemy

NWP 9A Annotated H 8.2.2.2,

8-12 says the Protocol continues to apply to surface ships but must be interpreted in light of current

at 8-10,

character

orders, charter,

if

id.

.

.

or without warning

if "integrated

into the

Protocol would, under the circumstances

.

.

.
.

or otherwise preclude mission accomplishment." Id. H 8.3.1 applies

H 8.4 does not as to air attacks. Id.

1111

7.5.

1

-7.5.2 say neutral ships acquire

they take direct part in hostilities on an enemy's side or operate directly under

NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 7.5. 1-7.

employment or direction. See also

5. 2, 8.2. 2.2, 8.3.

enemy

control,

1,8.4; Parts

V.D,

V.J.4.

UN

See Nicaragua Case, 1986 1CJ at 92-93.

440.
states

.

.

.

not

Members

... act in

accordance with

Charter,

art. 2(6)

requires the United Nations to "ensure that

[the] Principles [of the Charter] so far as

may

be necessary for the

maintenance of international peace and security." Although the Security Council and the General Assembly have not
referred to Article 2(6), their resolutions have declared law applicable to

does not bind non-Members to Charter law. Vienna Convention,

Kelsen, The Law,

n. 189, 107. Article 2(6) is

notable exception, are
parallel

almost

a

dead

custom means

letter today, since

442.

n. 10

San Remo Manual HH

and accompanying

60(g), 67(f); compare

countries, Switzerland being a

If the

may be

a different

customary norm

independent norm has jus cogens

status,

it

may

text.

NWP

1-14M Annotated HH

8.2.2.2, at 8-10, 8-12;

NWP

9A

61, 68, referring to

id.

HH 38-46; compare

NWP

1-14M Annotated

11

8.1.1;

NWP 9A

H 8.1.1.

443.

San Remo Manual HH 47-52.

444.

Id.

NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 7.5.1-7.5.2; 8.2.2.2, at 8-12; NWP 9A Annotated,

HH 60(c), 60(g), 67(d); compare

HH 7.5.1-7.5.2;
445.

all

8.2.2.2, at 8-10, 8-12.

San Remo Manual HI

Annotated

nearly

that, unless Article 51 is given jus cogens status, there

negate the Charter norm. See
441.

Most commentators say Article 2(6)
Goodrich ef al. 58-60; Simma 134-39; contra,

all States.

38;

UN Members. However, the Nicaragua Case recognition of the possibility of an independent,

competing with, and perhaps offsetting, the Charter-based norm.

AnnotatedHH

art.

8.2.2.2, at 8-12.

Protocol

I,

preamble; San

Remo Manual,

powers had the view that the Tanker War was
naval warfare

is a

part, applied. See n. 11.84

Chapter V addresses

a

H 6

war

& Commentary

6.1.

The United

in the traditional sense

and accompanying

text.

Chapter

III

nn. 11.97, 192 and accompanying text.

446.

Cf

447.

See nn. 11.97, 192-93 and accompanying

448.

See,

449.

See

450.

See nn. 207-88, 308-36 and accompanying

451.

See,

452.

See 11.368-70 and accompanying

453.

See

454.

See nn. 11.393-399 and accompanying

455.

See

n. 11.469

456.

See

n.

457.

See nn. 11.394-96, 469 and accompanying

458.

See

n. 11.449

and accompanying

text.

459.

See

n. 11.447

and accompanying

text.

e.g.,

n.

text.

nn. 11.295, 344, 346-49, 350, 359, 361 and accompanying text.

n. 11.146

and accompanying

text.
text.

nn. 11.384, 437-40, 442, 454-56 and accompanying text.

11.430

and other Gulf naval

LOAC, of which

the law of

concentrates on Charter principles;

LOAC principles. See Parts V.A.-V.D., V.F.2, V.F.5, V.G, V.J.1-V.J.4, V.J.6-V.J.7 for analysis of

these attacks.

e.g.,

States

and that the

and accompanying

and accompanying

391 and accompanying

text.

text.
text.

text.

text.
text.
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460.

See nn. 308-36 and accompanying

461.

See

462.

See nn. 308-36 and accompanying

463.

See

464.

See nn. 308-36 and accompanying

465.

See nn. 11.391-92 and accompanying

466.

See

n. 11.393-95

467.

See

n.

468.

See

n. 11.363

469.

See nn. 11.338-40 and accompanying

470.

See nn. 11.367 (warning shots), 11.410 and accompanying

471.

See nn. 11.364, 373, 391, 400, 406, 410-13, 434, 446, 463-64, 468-70, 472, 520 and accompanying

472.

See nn. 11.459-68 and accompanying

473.

See nn. 11.339, 468 and accompanying

474.

See,

475.

Necessity, proportionality and other qualifications of the right to self-defense are analyzed at nn. 485-590 and

n. 11.412

n. 11.386

and accompanying

and accompanying

accompanying

text.
text.

text.

text.

and accompanying

II.430and accompanying

e.g.,

text.

and accompanying

n. 11.410

text.

text.

text.
text.

and accompanying

text.
text.

text.
text.

text.

text.

476.

See Parts V.A.-V.D., V.F.2, V.F.5, V.G, V.J.1-V.J.4, V.J.6-V.J.7

477.

UN

Charter,

accompanying

art. 2(1); S.S.

Lotus

(Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ, Ser. A,

No.

10, at 4, 18; see also n.

30 and

text.

478.

See nn. 272-76, 282, 292 and accompanying

479.

See nn. 485-590 and accompanying

480.

Id.

481.

Id.

482.

See nn. 11.437-42, 454-56 and accompanying

483.

See nn. 11.437-41 and accompanying

484.

See nn.

485.

See

n.

text.

II.

text.

446-53 and accompanying

357 and accompanying

text.

text.

text.

text.

text.

NWP 1-14M
NWP 9A Annotated H 4.3.2; Restatement (Third) § 905(1 )(a) & cmt. c, r.n. 3; San Remo Manual
3 & Commentary 3.3. NWP 1-14M Annotated 1 4.3.2.1 departs from NWP 9A Annotated, stating that in today's
486.

Legality of Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 (1) ICJ 226, 245; Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 94;

Annotated, H 4.3.2;
11

world of modern lethal weapon systems, the Caroline Case formula for necessity,

n.

357 and accompanying text, is too

Commentators have criticized the Caroline Case formula as outmoded. See, e.g., McDougal & Feliciano
217-18; Lowe, The Commander's, n. 318, 127-30; Mallison & Mallison, Naval, n. 261, 263; Abraham D. Sofaer,
Terrorism, The Law, and the National Defense, 126 Mil. L. Rev. 89 (1989). Others continue to espouse this aspect of
anticipatory self-defense, however. See generally nn. 356-57 and accompanying text. For this reason, and because NWP
restrictive.

1-14M Annotated was not published

until after the

Tanker War, analysis proceeds on the basis

that the Caroline Case

formulation of necessity was part of anticipatory self-defense requirements for the conflict.
487.

San Remo Manual H

488.

See nn. 591-616 and accompanying

489.

See nn. 646-49 and accompanying

490.

Many States protested belligerents' actions during the Tanker War, and the belligerents protested actions by

their

opponent or third

491.
11.339,

E.g., the

4.

text.

text.

States. See, e.g., nn. 11.177, 225, 234, 333, 379, 432-33,

United States settled with Iraq

468 and accompanying

text.

for the Stark claims

492 and accompanying

and with Iran

for the

text.

Airbus tragedy. See nn.
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The United

492.

States invoked ICJ jurisdiction to resolve the Iran hostage situation,

Iran claimed against the United States for the

468 and accompanying

11.395, 432-34,

493.

E.g., a State

could keep

[for]

-4 1979(2)( 1 ) Y.B. Int'L L.

Comm.

1

and the Airbus tragedy, the

to

Eighth Report on State Responsibility,

armed

incident." Id. 214. This

is

being

n. 11.12,

and

settled. See nn.

in

UN Doc. A/CN.4/318 & Add.

69-70 (1981). Responding with force in self-defense that seems disproportionate

3,

to the latest prick carries a risk that a target of the response or others

therefore an aggressive

Hostage Case,
latter

an aggression of pin-prick attacks" and respond proportionally to all

the future. Dinstein 226; Roberto Ago, Addendum
1

attack

text.

"ledger

a

Rostum

may argue

attack by the pricked State. Dinstein 225.

the response

is

disproportionate and

"Genuine on-the-spot reaction

[closes] the

wiser than accumulating them for future action, as Israel appears to have announced for

SCUD attacks on it during the

1990-91 Gulf War.

Whether

a State collects

such hurts for future action, or whether

it

approves immediate response, notice must be given clearly to the other State and the general international community
to avoid

counterclams of aggression,

etc. If a

response could be construed to apply to more than one prick, and

is

intended for a particular harm, that too should be underscored. The United States did this in thcSea Isle City response.
See nn. 11.394-98 and accompanying
494.

E.g., the

1979-80 hostage situation involved several strategies: judicial and military

Hostage Case,

raid),

text.

n. II.

1

2,

1

980 ICJ

3;

(i.e.,

Concerning Commitments and Settlement of Claims by the United States and Iran with Respect
Crisis Arising

Out of Detention of 52

TIAS

20

,in

strategies

from

Tehran

the aborted

diplomacy and claims resolution through arbitration, Declarations of Algeria

U.S. Nationals in Iran, with Undertakings

to Resolution of the

& Escrow Agreement, Jan.

19, 1981,

ILM 224 (1991); economic,*:/ Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 US 654 (1981). Dames also shows that

may be

carried out in different arenas.

judicial strategies in the ICJ

The

case was litigated in the

Hostage Case, and by different

US

national courts, as distinguished

levels of participants,

i.e.,

private litigants invoking

US courts' jurisdiction to attach Iranian assets, some in private hands and some State-owned. States were parties in the
Hostage Case.
495.

Cf.

ICJ Statute,

art. 34.

Oscar Schachter, The Right of States

202-03 who, id. 244-45, would inject

to

Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1620, 1635 (1984);

reflecting Definition of Aggression, n. 62, art. 3(g),

appropriate to counter such aggression,
496.

San Remo Manual

497.

Id. H 4,

498.

Cf.

Commentary
citing

id.,

3,

11

1

3

see also

Dinstein

armed bands crossing a border, perhaps
ILM 714, cautionary language. Even if a heightened standard is

"beyond reasonable doubt" standard

a

for

not a requirement for responding to other acts of aggression.

it is

Commentary

3.3.

4.3.

NWP 9A

Annotated

military tribunals have applied the

same

11

5.2, restating

LOAC

standards. See also

id.

11

S6.2.5.2,

rules for a military necessity defense to individuals

which says US

and nations. Military

necessity allows measures necessary to compel an enemy's submission but does not permit destruction of

property beyond the necessities of war. See 3
5.2;

Stone

499.

norms

Hyde

§

655;

life

and

McDougal& Feliciano72, 528; NWP 1-14M Annotated H

352.

UN Charter, art.

103; see also n. 10 and

accompanying

text, particularly as to the potential role

of customary

in superseding the Charter.

205 and accompanying

500.

See

501.

Brownlie, Use of Force 305 Dinstein 214; see also Nyon Arrangement; Nyon Supplementary Agreement.

502.

See nn. 11.348, 350-52, 359, 361-62, 382, 393, 435, 437, 446-53, 471, 494, 498 and accompanying

503.

These acts might

n.

text.

;

violate incidents at sea

See nn. IV. 19, IV.22 and accompanying

agreements (INCSEA), however, and give

rise to a

text.

diplomatic claim.

text.

nn. 374-77 and accompanying text.

504.

Dinstein 190;

505.

See

506.

See Bunn,

507.

See Stone 352-53.

508.

See nn. 11.74-80 and accompanying

509.

See nn. 11.143, 178-79, 201-03, 215, 234-40, 248-60, 263, 269, 272-74, 288-89, 295, 300, 312, 323-24, 337, 343,

n.

see also

378 and accompanying

text.

n. 358, 69-70.

text.

362, 364, 373, 376, 378, 386, 93-94, 400, 403, 406, 412-13, 420-21, 429, 434, 446-53, 463-64, 470, 520-21 and

accompanying

text.

493 and accompanying

510.

See

511.

See nn. 617-30 and accompanying

n.

text.

text.
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Feliciano 230.

McDougal & Feliciano 231-41, citing inter alia T.J. Lawrence, The Principles
1 John Westlake, International Law 300(1904); NWP 1-14M Annotated
5.2; San Remo Manual
5.2; NWP 9A Annotated
3, Commentary 3.3; 4, Commentary 4.3; Georg
Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 RCADI 195, 334 (1955). McDougal &
513.

Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 94;

of International

Law 118 (2d ed.

1897);

1111

11

It

Feliciano continue analysis by criticizing commentators' narrow views,
self-defense's scope in the Charter era, but regardless of a position taken

e.g.,

Kunz,

Individual,

on scope, necessity

189,

n.

on

qualifies all self-defense

claims.
514.

See nn. 11.224-27, 305, 345-47 and accompanying

515.

See nn. 521-85 and accompanying

516.

See nn. 11.368-72 and accompanying

517.

See nn. 11.264, 336, 354-55, 357, 374, 384-87, 437-42, 454-56 and accompanying

518.

In 1992 Iran sued the United States in the ICJ for the attacks on the oil platforms; in 1997 the Court held for

jurisdiction. See nn. 11.432-34
n. 11.459-76

text.

text.
text.

and accompanying

and accompanying

519.

See

520.

See nn. 253-55 and accompanying

521.

Legality of Threat of Nuclear Weapons,

text.

text.

text.

text.

1

996

whatever their view on anticipatory self-defense or

(1 )

if

ICJ 245 ; Nicaragua Case, 1 986 ICJ 94. Commentators agree,

the restrictive Caroline Case formulation of necessity

is

a

component of anticipatory self-defense. See, e.g., Bowett, Self-Defence 269; Broms, The Definition, n. 1 12, 129-30;
Dinstein 202-03; McDougal & Feliciano 241-44; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 4.3.2; NWP 9A Annotated H 4.3.2;
Rifaat, n. 23, 127; Restatement (Third) § 905(l)(b) & cmt. d, r.n. 2; San Remo Manual 3 & Commentary 3.3; Ago,
n. 493, 69-70; Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence and the Conduct of International Armed Conflict, in International
Law, n. 11, 273, 274; Waldock, The Regulation, n. 52, 463.
11

522.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

523.

Dinstein 129;

524.

Dinstein 225-26; Higgins,

525.

Dinstein 225-26; Rifaat,

526.

Dinstein 215.

527.

San Remo Manual

528.

UN Charter, art.

529.

McDougal &

530.

Id.

531.

See nn. 11.368-72 and accompanying

532.

See nn. 11.429-333 and accompanying

244; San

see also

11

NWP 9A Annotated

4.3.2;

San Remo Manual

H 3,

111 3,

The Development,

11

4.3.2;

Commentary
n. 55,

San Remo Manual
3.3; 4,

4.

11

Commentaries

4.1, 4.4-4.5.

201; Ago, n. 492, 69-70.

n. 22, 270-71.

Commentary

3.3.

103; see also nn. 10, 205

and accompanying

text.

Feliciano 228, 241-44.

Remo Manual

11

3,

Commentary

3.3.

text.
text.

McDougal & Feliciano 242; Christopher Greenwood, Report II:
Law of Naval Warfare 15-16 (1991), unpublished paper presented
Institute of Humanitarian Law Round Table, Bergen, Norway, Sept. 1991 (copy in author's file).
533.

Ago,

n. 493, 69; see also

United Nations Charter on the

534.

Waldock, The Regulation,

535.

Dinstein 232.

He

adds

a parenthetical "(despite
.

.

.

any ultimate lack of proportionality)"

what matters

and not the terms, substance and strength of the action

itself),

is

Dinstein 232 cannot be understood
is

that the key

response in terms of reaction force(s) but proportionality in terms of result achieved,

Ago

69;

536.

Dinstein 233.

537.

Id.

538.

Accord, San

234, citing

Waldock, The Regulation,

Kunz,

after

id.

Since he

the result to be achieved by the 'defensive' action

war proportionality goes overboard. What he undoubtedly means

infringement."

at International

n. 52, 464.

follows with Ago, n. 493, 69 ("It would be mistaken

all-out

The Effects of the

i.e.,

is

to

mean

that in

not proportionality of

"stopping or preventing the

n. 52, 464.

Individual, n. 189, 876.

Remo Manual,

11H 3,

Commentary

3.3; 5,

Commentary

5.

1

;

but see

id.

11

5,

Commentary

5.2.
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539.

Dinstein 234.

540.

McDougal & Feliciano 231-32

,

citing Judgment of International Military Tribunal for the Far East 964-66,

976-78, 994-95; see also n. 357 and accompanying text.
541.

Dinstein 234, citing S.H. Amin, The Iran-Iraq

542.

Cf.

UN

accompanying

Charter,

art.

Conflict:

ICLQ

Legal Implications, 31

2(4), requiring respect for States' territorial integrity; see also

See nn. 11.97, 192 and accompanying

544.

See nn. 11.378, 484-502 and accompanying

545.

Cf.

546.

Greenwood,

547.

O'Connell, The Influence 65;

548.

Iraq had ordered frigates in Italy; they were being built there as the war started.

549.

nn. 47-157 and

text.

543.

n. 11.130

167, 186 (1982).

text.
text.

0'Connell,TheInfluence65; Greenwood, Self-Defence,
Self-Defence, n. 521, 277; see also nn. 259-64

and accompanying

see also n.

n.

521,273; Greenwood, .Report, n. 533, 20-27.

and accompanying

244 and accompanying

text.

text.

They sat out the war there. See

text.

McDougal & Feliciano 242; Ago, n. 493, 69; Greenwood, Report,

n. 533, 16;

Waldock, The Regulation,

n. 52,

464.

259 and accompanying

550.

See

551.

See nn. 591-616 and accompanying

552.

The Korean War and

n.

310-13 and accompanying

text.

text.

the 1990-91 Gulf

War

are notable exceptions. See nn. 11.501-14, 111.220-22, 281-84,

text.

553.

See nn. 220-22, 281-84, 310-13 and accompanying

554.

See nn. 235-43, 249 and accompanying

555.

See nn. 259-64 and accompanying

text.

556.

See nn. 245-48 and accompanying

text.

557.

See

558.

See nn. 533-38 and accompanying

559.

UN Charter, arts. 2(1), 2(3); see also nn.

560.

See Walker,

561.

San Remo Manual HH

562.

See

563.

See nn. 11.224-17 and accompanying

564.

See nn. 11.367 (warning shots), 410 and accompanying

n.

550 and accompanying

n. 11.457

Crisis

text.

text.

Over Kuwait 30
3,

text.

text.

47-157 and accompanying

text.

n. 27.

Commentary

and accompanying

30,

3.3 refutes this view; see also nn. 546-51

and accompanying

text.

text.
text.
text.

The United States had concerns over attacks from

Iranian speedboats. See nn. 11.364, 373, 391, 400, 406, 410-11, 434, 446, 463-64, 468-70, 472, 520 and accompanying
text.

565.

See nn. 11.144, 177, 274-78, 422-23 and accompanying

566.

See nn. 11.491-92 and accompanying

567.

Cf

text.

text.

nn. 11.178, 201-02, 234-40, 248,250-59, 263-64, 269, 272, 288-89, 295, 300, 304, 319, 334-35, 338-40, 355-58,

364, 368, 373-74, 376-78, 391-92, 400, 406, 412-13, 420-21, 424, 429-31, 434, 446, 459-64, 468, 469, 518-23

accompanying

and

text.

568.

See nn. 11.115-16, 178, 231, 258, 309, 334, 336, 358, 393, 401, 406, 434 and accompanying

569.

UN Charter, art. 2(4); see also nn. 45-157 and accompanying text.

570.

UN Charter, art.

571.

See nn. 11.92, 103, 111-15, 121, 143, 178-83, 207, 210-14, 216, 232-35, 239-40, 279-80, 288, 306, 310, 313,457,

51; see also nn. 158-288

473-76 and accompanying
572.

and accompanying

text.

See nn. 11.210-14 and accompanying

text.

text.

text.

World Public Order

221

573.

See nn. 11.368-72 and accompanying

574.

See nn. 11.393-402 and accompanying

575.

See nn. 546-51 and accompanying

576.

See nn. 11.391-92. 429-33, 459-68 and accompanying

577.

See nn. 11.338-40 and accompanying

text.

578.

See nn. 11.459-68 and accompanying

text.

579.

See nn. 546-51 and accompanying

580.

See nn. 591-616 and accompanying

581.

Corfu Channel

582.

Now restated inter alia in LOS Convention, art. 38;5£etf/sonn.IV.522-619,V.70-71 and accompanying text.

583.

See generally,

584.

Protocol I, preamble; San Remo Manual, 11 6

585.

UN Charter, arts. 51,103; see also n.

586.

See n. 357 and accompanying

587.

See nn. 11.224, 305, 345-47, 391-92, 429-33,

(UK v.

e.g.,

text.
text.

text.

text.

text.
text.

Alb.), 1949 ICJ 5, 22.

San Remo Manual HH 47-66;

see also Parts

& Commentary 6. 1

;

V.D and V.G.

see also

nn. 485-579 and accompanying text.

10 and accompanying text.

text.

said about anticipatory self-defense incidents in

III. 420-23, 464, 514 and accompanying text. The same might be
Libya-US confrontations. See nn. III. 389-91 and accompanying text.

588.

See nn. 414-17 and accompanying

589.

See nn. 11.277, 282, 288, 295, 297, 306 and accompanying

590.

See nn. 11.459-68,

591.

Higgins, The Attitude, n. 376, 444.

592.

Ago,

III.

V.C,

text.

text.

475, 519, 578 and accompanying text.

n. 493, 39.

Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. V. Slovak.), 1997 ICJ 7, 54; Nicaragua Case, 1986 id. 127; Friendly
Use of Force 281; Goodrich et al.
340-47; Higgins, The Development, n. 56, 217; 2 Oppenheim §§ 43; 52a, at 152-53; Simma 105; Stone 286-87; Ago, n.
593.

E.g.,

Relations Declaration; Bowett, Self-Defence 13; Brierly 401-02; Brownlie,

D.W. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed
cf. NWP 1-14M
Dinstein 215-26; Lawrence T. Greenberg et al., Information

493, 42; Roberto Barsotti,Armed Reprisals, in Cassesse, n. 207, 79;
Force, 66

AJIL 20

Annotated

11

6.2.3;

(1972); Higgins, The Attitude, n. 376, 444; Tucker, Reprisals, n. 358, 586-87;

NWP 9A Annotated H 6.2.3; contra,

Warfare and International Law

26-27 (1997).

594.

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 6.2.3.1, at 6-18; NWP 9A Annotated H 6.2.3.1, at 6-19.

595.

Corfu Channel
Higgins,

596.

(1956),

(UK

v. Alb.),

1949 ICJ 35;

The Development,

n. 56, 7-18;

see also

Higgins,

The Development,

n. 55, 216-17.

Higgins, The Attitude, n. 376, 444-45; see

also, e.g., S.C.

Res. Ill

mWELLENS 653.

597.

Friendly Relations Declaration,

598.

Higgins, The Attitude, n. 376, 445.

599.

Id., citing inter alia

Economic Coercion and

Economic Order 73
600.

1

n. 69.

Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 221-27 (1970); Richard B. Lillich,
Legal Order, in Lillich, Economic Coercion and the New International

the International

(1979); Paust

&

Blaustein, n. 61.

Air Service Agreement Between France & United States (Fr. v. US), 1 8

UNRI AA 41 7, 446 (Arb. 1978); Ago, n.

493, 43.
601.

See nn. 259-64 and accompanying

602.

Responsibility of Germany for Acts

(Port. v. Ger.), 2

603.

Committed After

31 July 1914

& Prior to Portugal's Entry into the War

1037, 1047, 1056-57 (Arb. 1930) (Cysne Case); Ago, n. 493, 45-46.

Ago, n. 493, 41, citing Responsibility of Germany for Acts Committed in Portuguese Colonies in the South of

Africa (Port.
n.

UNRIAA

text.

v.

602; see also

Ger.) (Naulilaa Arbitration), 2

UNRIAA 1012, 1025-26 (Arb. 1928) (Naulilaa Arbitration); Cysne Case,

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 6.3.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated

Naulilaa Arbitration.

11

6.2.3.1;

Higgins, The Attitude,

n. 376, citing

3
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604.

See Parts V.A.I, V.C.I, V.E.I, V.F.l.b, V.F.2, V.G.2-V.G.3, V.J.I, V.J.3, V.J.5-V.J.7.

605.

See nn. 580-85 and accompanying

606.

UN Charter, arts.

607.

UN Charter, art. 50, invoked by Jordan and other States during the 1990-91 Gulf War. See Walker, Crisis Over

Kuwait 37-38. See

Goodrich

also

608.

UN Charter, art.

609.

Ago,

n. 493,

25, 48, 103;

44

et al.

text.

Ago,

n.

493, 43-44; see also n. 552 and accompanying text.

341-42; Simma 659-61.

103; see also n. 10

and accompanying

n. 194; see also, e.g., S.C. Res.

text.

418 (1977), 558 (1984), 569 (1985), 591 (1986),

227-28, 230 (embargo on arms sales to South Africa, followed by prohibition on

arms, etc.;

Members urged

restricting sports

to

in

Wellens

adopt measures, e.g., suspending new investment, prohibiting South African coin

and cultural

relations,

98,

UN Members' buying South African

suspending guaranteed export loans, prohibiting new contracts

sales,

for nuclear

sales to South African army, police, etc.). A US response, after issuing executive
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22USC§§ 5001-51 17 (1988). See also Nico Schrijver, The Use
of Economic Sanctions by the UN Security Council: An International Law Perspective, in International Economic Law
facilities

and computer equipment

orders, was

and Armed Conflict
610.

Cable

123, 131-32 (Harry

H.G. Post

ed. 1994).

63, 107-09, 193, noting an initial General

174-75, referring to S.C. Res. 221 (1965), 232 (1966), in

became independent,

S.C. Res.

460 (1979),

in

Wellens

Assembly resolution; O'Connell, The Influence 137-38,
127-28; 16 Keesing 22525 (1968). After Zimbabwe

Wellens

restrictions. US executive
US chrome ore exports, which under the US

ended the embargo and other

148,

orders complied with Council resolutions, but Congress later exempted
later-in-time construction rule took priority over Council resolutions

CFR

243 (1967 Compil.); Diggs

Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465-67

v.

and executive orders. Exec. Order No.

(D.C

Cir. 1972). Later legislation, 22

1 1

USC

322,

§

287c

(1994) and Act of Mar. 18, 1977, 91 Stat. 22, conformed the United States to the Council resolutions by removing the

chrome ore exception. See
611.

also Schrijver, n. 609, 129-30.

UN Charter, art. 103, allows overriding agreements, e.g., Fourth Convention, art. 23, if

through inference from Corfu Channel
analysis of contraband

and blockade

(UK

it

had applied, perhaps

and accompanying

text.

For

Liber Amicorum 393, 31 Cornell Int'l

L.J.

Alb.), 1949 ICJ 15; see also nn. 580-85

rules, see Parts V.C.4,

V.D.3-V.D.4, V.E, V.J.3-V.J.5.

Over Kuwait 30-40.

612.

See generally Walker,

613.

S.C. Res. 665 (1990), in

Wellens

614.

S.C. Res. 670 (1990), in

id.

615.

Cf.

616.

S.C. Res. 666 (1990), in

617.

This Sub-Part

Crisis

530.

534.

Fourth Convention, cited

first

v.

in S.C.

Wellens

Res. 670 (1990), in

id.

534.

532.

appeared as Walker, Anticipatory,

n. 289,

370-74.
618.

Nuremberg Judgment, n. 357,218-22,41 AJIL 207; United States v. Araki,n. 357, 382; see a/so McCormack,n.
Amicorum 385-86, 31 Cornell Int'l L.J. 358; n. 357 and

208, 254-56; Walker, Anticipatory, n. 289, Liber

accompanying
619.

E.g.,

text.

Alexandrov 163 appears

to support his

view that the 1981

Israeli raid

on the Iraqi nuclear reactor could

not be supported by self-defense because of a 1994 debate on imposing sanctions on North Korea rather than using
force because of the danger of nuclear weapons.

McCormack,

n. 209, 98-99, derides a

claim Israel had been given a

necessary guarantee of security under the US Star Wars program, developed later in the Reagan Administration, was a

reason

why

it

may

not have been necessary for Israel to

event occurred after the 1981 raid.
1994, or security-covered Star

bomb

the reactor. In both cases the supposed precipitating

Of course, there may have been security-guarded debates over North Korea before

Wars discussions in 1981 or earlier, but this is what the public record reveals as to these
The same kind of error-laden, after-the-fact justification or criticism can occur

apparently anachronistic statements.

in self-defense situations, especially for anticipatory self-defense issues.

620.

Carl Von Clausewitz, On

621.

Restatement (Third),

§

War 1 17-21

(Michael

Howard &

Peter Paret ed.

& trans.

1976).

313 cmt. b analyzes declarations and understandings:

When signing or adhering to an international agreement, a state may make a unilateral declaration that does
not purport to be

a reservation.

Whatever

it is

called,

it

constitutes a reservation in fact if

it

purports to

exclude, limit, or modify the state's legal obligation. Sometimes, however, a declaration purports to be an

"understanding," an interpretation of the agreement in a particular respect. Such a

.

.

.

declaration

is

not a

1

World Public Order

may challenge the

reservation if it reflects the accepted view of the agreement. But another contracting party

expressed understanding, treating

it

which

as a reservation

it is

not prepared to accept.

In relation to a multilateral agreement, a declaration of understanding
is

acceptable to

all

contracting parties, they need only acquiesce.

may be

or accept the understanding but others do not, there

whether the declaration

is

223

If,

may have complex consequences.

If it

however, some contracting parties share

a dispute as to

what the agreement means, and
means for resolving that

in effect a reservation. In the absence of an authoritative

might create an agreement

dispute, the declaration, even if treated as a reservation,

at least

between the

who agree with that understanding. See [Restatement (Third), § 3 13(2)(c), dealing
However, some contracting parties may treat it as a reservation and object to it as such,

declaring state and those

with reservations]

and there

will

remain

a dispute

See also Vienna Convention,

accompanying
622.

arts. 19-23,

ILC

Rep., n. 192, 189-90; Bowett, Reservations, n. 197, 69; nn. 192, 197 and

States

may

ratify Protocol II,

but the Reagan Administration expressed serious reservations to

and did not ask Senate advice and consent for

I

what the agreement means.

as to

text for reservations to multilateral agreements.

The United

Protocol

between the two groups

it.

President Reagan transmittal letter to

US

Senate, Jan. 29,

1987; Secretary of State George P. Schultz letter of submittal to President Reagan, Dec. 13, 1986, in Message from the

President of the United States Transmitting the Protocol

Relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational

Treaty Doc. 100-2, 100th Cong.,
623.

Protocol

1-14M Annotated UU
Annotated

1111

51. Id., art. 51(2)

I, art.

such as those civilians

1st Sess. (1987), in

who

ILM

26

II

Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and

Armed Conflicts, Concluded at Geneva on June

and 51(5) prohibitions on attacks on

take up arms, restate customary law.

6.2.3.2 (noting protections also

6.2.3.2 (same),11.2 n.3, 11.3;

10, 1977, S.

561 (1987).

AFP

civilians,

110-31 ch. 14;

under Fourth Convention,

4 Pictet 224-29; San

Remo Manual

absent other considerations

Bothe et

al.

&

299

H 39;

NWP
NWP 9A

n.3;

art. 33), 11.2 n.4, 11.3;

Stone 684-732; Matheson,

Remarks 423, 426; William G. Schmidt, The Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts: Protocol I Additional to
the

Geneva Conventions, 24 Air Force L. Rev. 189, 225-32 (1984); Waldemar A.

Soli, Protection of Civilians Against the

Law and Under Protocol I, 1 AM U.J. Int'L L. & Pol. 117, 130-31
(1986). Civilians may not be used as human shields, nor may they be a subject of attacks intended to terrorize them,
although otherwise legitimate attacks that may terrorize them are permissible. Specific intent to terrorize gives rise to

Effects of Hostilities

liability.

Under Customary International

NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 11.2 (noting protections under Fourth Convention, arts. 28, 33), 11.3; NWP 9A

Annotated

111

11.2 (same), 11.3; Hans-Peter Gasser, Prohibition of Terrorist Attacks in International Humanitarian

1985 Int'L Rev.

Red Cross 200; Hague Air Rules, art. 22; Matheson 426; Schmidt 227.

necessity and proportionality, with the concomitant risk of collateral

custom. Bothe

et al.

Law,

Article 51 rules of distinction,

damage inherent in any attack, generally restate
on the Waging of War 99-100 (1987);

309-11, 359-67; Frits Kalshoven, Constraints

McDougal & Feliciano 525; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 5.2 & n.7, 8.1.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated HH 5.2 & n.6, 8.1.2.1;
39-42 & Commentaries; Stone 352-53; W.J. Fenrick, The Rule ofProportionality and Protocol I in
San Remo Manual
1111

Conventional Warfare, 98 Mil. L. Rev. 91, 125 (1982) (questioning whether proportionality

is

an accepted customary

norm); Matheson 426; Results of the First Meeting of the Madrid Plan ofAction Held in Bochum, F.R. G., November 1 989,

BSFHV

170-71 (1991); Schmidt 233-38; Solf 131; G.J.F. van Hegelsom, Methods and Means of Combat

BSFHV

Warfare, 8

1,

in

Naval

18-19 (1992).

I, art. 52, states a general customary norm, except the prohibition on reprisals against civilians in art.
which there are two views. See generally Bother al. 320-27; Colombos §§ 510-11, 524-25, 528-29; NWP
1-14M Annotated 1111 6.2.3 & n.36, 6.2.3.2 (protection for some civilians from reprisals under Fourth Convention, art.

624.

Protocol

52(1), for

33), 8.1. 1

& n.9, 8.1.2 & n.12; NWP 9A Annotated UU 6.2.3 &n.33, 6.2.3.2 (same), 8.1. l&n.9, 8. 1.2 &n.l2 (US view that
new law"); 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea

05-06; 4 Pictet 131; Pilloud,

Commentary

IH 1994-2038; Matheson, Remarks 426; Frank Russo, Jr., Targeting Theory in the Law ofNaval Warfare, 30

N AV. L. Rev.

Protocol I, art. 52[ 1] "creates

1,

17 n.36 (1992) (rejecting Protocol
625.

Protocol

collateral

I, art.

57,

damage inherent

Constraints,

Annotated

11

whose
in

n. 623, 99-100;

8.1.2.1

I, art.

1 1

52(2) applicability to sea warfare); Solf, Protection, n. 623, 131.

rules of distinction, necessity

any attack generally

and proportionality, with concomitant

restate custom. See generally

Bothe

et al.

risk of

309-11; Kalshoven,

McDougal & Feliciano 525; NWP 1-14M Annotated 8.1.2.1 & nn. 19-20; NWP 9A
San Remo Manual UU 39-42 & Commentaries; Stone 352-53; Fenrick, The Rule, n.
11

& nn.19-20;

623, 125 (questioning whether proportionality accepted as custom); Matheson, Remarks 426; Results, n. 621, 170-71;

Schmidt, The Protection,
626.

n. 623, 233-38; Solf, Protection, n. 622, 131;

Belgium Declaration,

May 20,

1986, in Schindler

712; the Netherlands Declaration, June 26, 1977, in

Bothe etal.
627.

279-80, 310, 363;

NWP 1-14M Annotated

& Toman 706, 707;

II

8.1.2.1

n. 622, 18-19.

Italy Declaration, Feb. 27, 1986, in

id.

UK Declaration, Dec. 12, 1977, in 717; see also
& n.19; NWP 9A Annotated H 8.1.2.1 & n.19.

713, 714;

id.

van Hegelsom,

id.

Mine Protocol, Oct. 10, 1980, art. 2(4), as amended May 3, 1995, art. 2(6); Incendiary Weapons Protocol, Oct.
The United States has ratified the Convention, Fragments Protocol, and the Mine Protocol; the

10, 1980, art. 1(3).
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Incendiary Weapons Protocol

May

3,

ILM

1995, 35

is

not yet in force for the United States.

1218 (1996) has been negotiated;

id.

TIF 452.

Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons,

and Fragments Protocol have no such provisions.

Mine and Incendiary Weapons Protocols say little about these provisions; they state the
M. Carnahan, The Law of Land Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons, 105 Mil. L. Rev. 73 (1984); W.J. Fenrick, Comment, New Developments in the Law
Concerning the Use of Conventional Weapons in Armed Conflict, 19 Cybil 229 (1981); Howard S. Levie, Prohibitions and
Commentators

for the

obvious. See generally Burrus

Restrictions on the

Use of Conventional Weapons, 68 St. John's L. Rev. 643 (1994);

Weapons Convention: Arms Control or Humanitarian Law?, 105 Mil. L. Rev.

J.

Ashley Roach, Certain Conventional

Willam G. Schmidt, The

(1984);

1

Conventional Weapons Convention: Implication for the American Soldier, 24 Air Force L. Rev. 279 (1984).

The United

would not sign the Convention on Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production & Transfer of
Anti-personnel Mines & on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 ILM 1507 (1997). See generally William J. Clinton,
States declared

it

Remarks on Landmines and an Exchange with
Convention by 2006, but only

if

the Pentagon

Korea. Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Agrees
628.
lists

Table A5-1, States Party

to the

148 States party to Protocol

I

to

Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1356-59 (1997). Other States'
The Clinton Administration pledged the United States will sign the

Reporters, 33

actions indicate the Convention will go into force.

comes up with an

Land-Mine Ban,

but

alternate

Not

weapon, particularly

N.Y. Times,

Yet,

May

NWP1-14M

Geneva Convention and Their Additional Protocols,

as of Oct. 15, 1997.

countries party to the Conventional

The United

Weapons Convention

States

as of Jan.

is

not a party;
1996.

1,

for land

Most

mines in

22, 1998, A3.

see n.

622

.

Annotated, 5-24

TIF 452 lists 56
its Mine and

are parties to

Incendiary Weapons Protocols.
629.

San Remo Manual

630.

See

11

& Commentary 46.3;

46(b)

McDougal &

377, 90; Dinstein 191;

618 and accompanying

n.

Second Protocol,

art. 1(f); see also

Ben Cheng, General,

n.

Feliciano 220.
text.

631. Corfu Channel (UK v. Alb.), 1949 ICJ 35; Bowett, Self-Defence 10; Brownlie, Use of Force 46-47; 1
Oppenheim § 126; Higgins, The Development, n. 56, 216; Ago, n. 493, 15-17. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996(1) ICJ 263, 266 (8-7 adv. op.), citing UN Charter, art. 51, could not decide whether a threat or use of
nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, where a State's very survival
is at stake. Legality of Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, id. 66, 84 declined to rule on a World
Health Organization advisory opinion request on the same subject. Judge Schwebel, dissenting in the Threat or Use
case, wrote: "[F]ar from justifying the Court's inconclusiveness, contemporary events rather demonstrate the legality
of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in extraordinary circumstances." citing inter alia a 1990-91 Gulf War situation.
Id. 311, 323. For analysis of the opinions and governments' reactions, see generally Ved P. Nanda & David Krieger,
Nuclear Weapons and the World Court chs. 6-8 (1998).

632.

Ago,

633.

Id. 17, citing

634.

Ago,

n.

Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental,

n. 493, 18.

Corfu Channel
1351-52

493, 15.

(UK

n. 512, 192, 343.

See also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.

v. Alb.),

1949

id.

M/V

35;

Saiga (St. Vincent

&

v.

Slovak.), 1997 ICJ 40-44 (customary law);

Grenadines

Equat. Guinea), 38

v.

Tribunal for L. of Sea 1999) (customary law); Bowett, Self-Defence

(Int'l

10;

ILM

1323,

Brownlie, International

Law 46-47; Higgins, The Development, n. 56, 2 1 6; Helsinki Principle 2.1; International Law Commission, Report of
Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-Second Session, State Responsibility, art. 33, in 1980 (2)(2) Y.B. Intl L.
Comm'n 26, 34(1981); 1 Oppenheim § 126; 2 id. § 326; San Remo Manual 22; Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental, at
the

11

343.

635.

Compare,

Ben Cheng, n.
n. 15, 354.

e.g.,

Bowett, Self-Defence

10;

Brownlie, Use of Force 42-48 (no such doctrine exists), with,

However, in view of the ICJ and the

LOS Tribunal opinions, n.

e.g.,

Oppenheim §§131
634, it is fairly clear that there is a customary

377, 31,69; Ago, n. 493,48-49; Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental, n. 513, 343; cf

1

doctrine of necessity today.
636.

LOS

O'Connell,
637.

1

Convention,

Law of the

Oppenheim

§

art.

221; Intervention Convention,

354; Ago, n. 493, 28-29. Brownlie,

in this situation. See also 4 Nordquist

accompanying
638.

art. 1(1); see also

Sea 1006-08; nn. VI. 163-72 and accompanying

11

221.2; 2

4 Nordquist

1IH

221. 1-221. 9(h); 2

text.

Use of Force 376-77, 432 apparently approves intervention
Law of the Sea 1006-08; nn. VI. 163-72 and

O'Connell,

text.

Russian Indem. (Russ.

v.

Turk.),

Rhodope (Gr. v. Bulg.), 3 UNRIAA 1405

Hague

Ct.

Rep. (Scott) 297 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1912); Forests of Central

(Arb.), modified

by parties' statements before League of Nations Council, 15

UNRIAA 285, 353

League of Nations

O.J.,

(Arb. 1902); Oscar

Chinn (UK v. Belg.), 1934 PCIJ, Ser. AB, No. 63, at 89, 1 12-14 (dictum) (Anziolotti, J., sep. opin.).

No.

1 1

(Part

1), at

1432 (1934); French Co. of Venez. R.R. (Fr.

v.

Venez.), 10

World Public Order

Law Commission,

compare Ago, nn. 493, 51.

639.

International

640.

See nn. 11.348, 412, 447-52, 469-70 and accompanying

641.

Third Convention, arts. 12-13; Convention

Between Vessels,
States

is

n. 634, 34, 52;

Sept. 23, 1910, arts. 8, 11,212

not a party to this treaty. See also

accompanying

text.

for Unification of Certain Rules of Law

CTS

178, 183, not applicable to warships

NWP

225

1-14M Annotated

with Respect to Collision

and State vessels. The United

H 3.2.1; 3 Pictet 128-42; n. IV.816

and

text.

642.

See nn. 11.210-14 and accompanying

643.

See nn. 424-25 and accompanying

644.

See,

645.

Brierly 399; William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law § 1 20 ( A.Pearce Higgins ed., 8th

1924); 2
ed.,

e.g.,

Walker, Oceans

Law

text.

text.

185-86.

Hyde § 588; Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals 27 ( 197 1 ); 7 Moore §

5th ed. 1904); Restatement (Third) § 905

Close reading of these sources indicates there
illegal acts

act,

& r.n. 8; Simma 104; Stone 288-89; Waldock, The Regulation, n. 52, 458.
is

ambiguity in use of the term; there

is a

view that retorsion includes

Restatement (Third), and that retorsion can only mean an unfriendly
and by inference not to a prior illegal act, see Kalshoven. The former kind of

responding to prior illegal

response to a prior unfriendly

ed.

1090, citing Hall 367 Q.B. Atley

acts, see

responses, i.e., proportional illegal responses to a prior illegal act, have been included under reprisals. See nn. 591-616

and accompanying text. Kalshoven'S limitation seems unfortunate and not in keeping with

a

Charter philosophy of

means other than law violation (e.g., nonforce reprisals) or use of force. See UN Charter, art. 33;
n. 655 and accompanying text. Allowing a State to respond to a potentially illegal aggressive pin-prick, rather than
condemning the respondent to use of force in proportional self-defense, would also be in line with the necessity
requirement. See nn. 493, 510 and accompanying text. In a given situation it might only be necessary to invoke a
resolving disputes by

retorsion

(e.g.,

a high seas naval demonstration, 2

Moore

Hyde § 588, at 1659) rather than using force m,e.g., the territorial sea.

646.

Hall,

647.

See nn. 11.224-27, 305, 345-48 and accompanying

648.

See nn. 11.147, 295, 348, 350-55, 359, 361-62, 437-41, 446-56, 469-71, 494-95, 498 and accompanying

649.

See nn. 11.365, 379-81 and accompanying

n. 645, § 120; 7

violated the law of the sea

§

1090; 2 Oppenheim § 135.
text.
text.

text. However, Iran's maneuvers in neutral territorial waters
and those States' rights under UN Charter, art. 2(4); see n. 11.365 and accompanying text and

Parts IV.C and IV.D.3.
650.

UN Charter, arts. 4(2), 16-17, 25, 85(1); see generally Goodrich e/ a/. 85-96, 514-18; Simma 165-70, 293, 295-317,

961-62; Namibia, 1971 ICJ 16, 37-38.
651.

ICJ Statute,

The Charter is a

38(1)

art.

treaty,

59

and Restatement (Third)

Stat. 1031, as

amended Dec.

§

102

list treaties

17, 1963, 16

UST

as a

primary source for international law.

1134, 557

UNTS

5450; Dec. 20, 1971, 24 id. 2225, and principles flowing from Council decisions pursuant to

103 are treaty law binding on
in the

United Nations, 87

all

AJIL

143; Dec. 20, 1965, 19

id.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48,

UN Members that override all treaties. W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis

83, 87 (1993).

652. See generally Goodrich et al. 207-1 1, 334-37; Simma 410-15. Decisions must be approved by 9 of the 1 5 Council
members, including all permanent members, i.e., those holding veto power, e.g., the United States. UN Charter, arts.

Goodrich et al. 192-94, 215-31; Simma 394-95, 434-67. UN Charter, art. 37(2) gives the Council
recommend action to resolve a dispute endangering international peace and security; see also
284-87; Simma 553-56.

23(1), 27(3). See also

authority to decide on or

Goodrich

et al.

UN Charter, arts. 36(1), 37(1), 38; see also Goodrich et al. 277-89; Simma 538-41, 547-52, 561-65.
654. UN Charter, arts. 39-40; see also Goodrich et
293-310; Simma 606-21. It may encourage dispute resolution
by a regional arrangement or agency. UN Charter, art. 52(3); Goodrich et al. 360-64.
655. UN Charter, arts. 33(2), 40; see also Goodrich et al. 263-65, 302-10. Under Article 40 the Council may state
653.

al.

provisional measures and call
656.

upon countries

to

comply with them.

UN Charter, art. 41; see also Goodrich et al.

311-14; Simma 625.

657. Sydney D. Bailey & Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council 18-21, 236-37 (3d ed. 1998);
Castenada, n. 22, 78-79; Goodrich et al. 263, 306; Simma 546, 560, 564, 614, 620, 623-28,513, contra, Kelsen, The Law,
n.

189,929.
658.

UN Charter, arts. 39-51.
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&

Daws,

659.

Bailey

660.

UN Charter, arts.

661.

n. 657, 268-71;

Simma 612-14.

33-38; see also nn. 653-55 and accompanying text.

Namibia, 1971 ICJ 16, 52-54; see also Bailey
88-95 and accompanying text.

& Daws, n. 657, 268-69; compare Vienna Convention, arts. 31-32;

see also nn.

&

Daws,

some of the

662.

Bailey

663.

Sydney J. Bailey, The Procedure of the UN Security Council 246 (2 nd ed.
The Law, n. 189, 932.

n. 657, 263-67, discusses

possibilities.

1988); see also Castenada, n. 22,

78-81; contra, Kelsen,

Wellens

664.

S.C. Res. 82 (1950), in

665.

See nn. 653-55 and accompanying

666.

S.C. Res. 82 (1950), in

667.

S.C. Res. 83 (1950), in id. 325.

668.

S.C. Res. 84 (1950), in

id.

324.

669.

S.C. Res. 88 (1950), in

id.

326.

Res. 90

( 1

95 1 ), in

id.

Wellens

324.
text.

324.

Although

it

"Resolve[d]" to remove the Korean matter from the agenda, S.C.

327, was probably a decision. S.C. Res. 85(1 950), in

id.

326,

was recommendatory

in its concern for

civilian suffering in Korea.

763 and accompanying

670.

See

671.

E.g., S.C. Res. 43, 46,

672.

S.C. Res. 50 (1948), in

n.

49 (1948),
id.

Cf. San Remo Manual 1111
V.B-V.E and V.J.2-V.J.5.

673.

Parts

text.

in

Wellens

633, 635.

636.
60(g), 67(f);

NWP

Wellens

674.

S.C. Res. 54, 56, 62 (1948), in

675.

S.C. Res. 66 (1948), 73 (1949), in

676.

The only

id.

1

-14M Annotated

11

8.2.2.2;

637-38, 641.

642-43.

decisions confirmed the right of Arabs removed from their

returned to their homes. S.C. Res. 93, 95 (1951),

in id.

S.C. Res. 95 (1951), in

id.

678.

Restatement (Third)

§

679.

S.C. Res. 101 (1953), in

Wellens

680.

S.C. Res. 106 (1955), in

id.

651.

681.

S.C. Res. Ill (1956), in

id.

653.

682.

S.C. Res. 171 (1962), in

id.

657, referring to S.C. Res. Ill (1956), in

683.

S.C. Res. 228 (1966), in

Wellens

684.

Compare S.C. Res. 233 (1967),

685.

S.C. Res. 234-36 (1967), in

id.

686.

S.C. Res. 237 (1967), in

id.

668.

687.

S.C. Res. 242 (1967), in

id.

669.

688.

S.C. Res. 248, 256 (1968), in

689.

S.C. Res. 265 (1969), in

690.

S.C. Res. 338-39 (1973), in

691.

Introductory Note,

692.

Cf

693.
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G.A. Res. 1514,

Wellens

in id.

1401 (1968).

n. 35.

427-30; see also nn. 245-46 and accompanying text.

UNIIMOG (UN

Gulf War, and dealing with post-ceasefire

text.

Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group), continuing

issues.

There were

less

it

than a dozen Security Council

resolutions passed during the war, 1980-88.
718.

By then

the Arab League and the European

Iraq for a ceasefire.
art. 51,

The Arab League

and the other

as a regional

is

Community,

regional organizations, had appealed to Iran and

structured in two treaties, one for collective self-defense under

arrangement under

Wellens

719.

S.C. Res. 479 (1980), in

720.

See

n. 11.98

and accompanying

text.

721.

See

n. 11.96

and accompanying

text.

722.

See nn. 11.153-56 and accompanying

449; see also

text.

id., art.

52.
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S.C. Res. 582 (1986), in

Wellens

452; see also

730.

S.C. Res. 588 (1986), in

Wellens

453; see also n. 11.308 and accompanying

731.
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See n. 585 and accompanying

762.

UN Charter, arts.

763.

See Bailey

764.

UFP Resolution, n.

765.

See S.C. Res.

766.

Bailey, n. 663, 209, 264-65, (noting

unable to fulfil

III.6,

9 and accompanying text.

text.
text.

text.

10-14; see also n. 69

text.

20.

19-20 (1956), 129 (1958), 157 (1960), 303 (1971),

1

UN Charter, art.

in

768.

G.A. Res. 500 (1951),

31, 36, 69, 73, 432.

UK objections but saying sponsors' intention was that if the Council was
to recommend

enforcement measures," not

nonmandatory Assembly recommendations); Castenada, n. 22,
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The Origins xiii-xiv

Francis Deak, Neutrality:

Nils orvik,

5;

The Decline of Neutrality

(1935).

1914-1941 ch. 6(2ded. 1971);

LOAC. More conventional
Useof FoRCEpassim Erik Castren, The Present Law
of War and Neutrality ch. 3 (1954); Colombos chs. 16-21; Dinstein, chs. l.D, 6.D; Jurg Martin Gabriel, The
American Conception of Neutrality After 1941 (1988); Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare
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n. 22,

a

multifactor approach to neutrality law and
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analyses include, e.g., Bowett, Self-Defence ch. 8; Brownlie,
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Hyde,
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W. Tucker

ed. 1967);
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;

n. 358, 154-71;

Kelsen, Principles of International

1-14M Annotated,

ch. 7;
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9A Annotated,

ch. 7; 2

John F.L. Ross, Neutrality and International
Sanctions: Sweden, Switzerland and Collective Security (1989); Stone chs. 13-19, 21; Tucker chs. 6-12; Michael
Bothe, Neutrality at Sea, ch. 6 in Dekker & Post; Bothe, Neutrality in Naval Warfare: What Is Left of Traditional Law}, in
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead 387 (AstridJ.M. Delisson& Gerard J. Tanjaeds. 1971);
Deak, Neutrality, n. 10, 137; Andrew Gioia, Neutrality and Non-Belligerency, in International Economic Law, n. 609,
51; Gioia & Natalino Ronzitti, The Law of Neutrality: Third States' Commercial Rights and Duties, ch. 7 in Dekker &
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of the Sea ch. 30; 2 Oppenheim, Part

Mark W. Janis, Neutrality,

Post;

International

Law, 80

RCADI

McNeill, Neutral Rights,

Robertson; Titus Komarnicki, The Place of Neutrality

in the

395 (1952); J.F. Lalive, International Organizations and Neutrality, 24

M. Norton, Between

n. 11.354; Patrick

Harv. Int'l

Neutrality, 17

ch. 6 in

III;

the Ideology

and

249 (1976); Dietrich Schindler, Transformations

L.J.

Humanitarian Law 367; Wiswall, Neutrality,

n. 11.295. 7

Hackworth

ch. 24; 11

the Reality:
in the

Law

Modern System of

BYBIL

72 (1972);

The Shadow of the

Law

of

of Neutrality Since 1945, in

Whiteman

ch. 33 give
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digest treatment.

Castren,

832.

56,

1

831,427.

Janis, n. 831, 148, citing

833.
v.

n.

NeillH. Alford, Jr., Modern Economic Warfare 326 (Nav.

967); see also Norton, n. 831, 249, citing Richard R. Baxter, Humanitarian

War C. IntlL. Stud.

Law or Humanitarian Politics? The 1974

Conference on Humanitarian Law, 16 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1,2 (1975) (Neutrality has had a "juridical half-life" since

War

World

II.)

834.

Janis, n. 831, 148, citing C.G.

835.

Cf

836.

Gabriel,

837.

Pact of Paris, n. 160, arts.

838.

See San

Fenwick,

UN Charter, preamble, arts.
n. 831, 69; see also

1

Remo Manual 68,

46

a Term of Present Law?, 63

2(3)-2(4); see also nn. 47-157

Orvik,

-2,

Is Neutrality Still

and accompanying

AJIL 102

(1969).

text.

n. 831, 251-56.

Stat, at

2345-46, 94 LNTS at 63; see also nn. 160-63 and accompanying text.

Ml 13(d), 14-26, 29-32, 34-36, 67-71, 74-75, 86-88, 92-94, 99, 106, 109, 111,113-16,

118-20, 122-24, 126-27, 130, 132-34, 146-58.
839.

Law

International

Association, International Committee on Maritime Neutrality, Neutrality and Naval

International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Fifth Conference: Cairo, Egypt
Law Association, International Committee on Maritime Neutrality, Neutrality and Naval
Warfare (Michael Bothe, rptr.) in International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Sixth Conference: Buenos Aires,
Argentina 570 (1994); International Law Association, International Committee on Maritime Neutrality, Neutrality
and Naval Warfare (Michael Bothe, rptr.; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, alt. rptr.), in International Law Association,

Warfare (Michael Bothe,

rptr.), in

163 (1993); International

Report of the Sixty-Seventh Conference: Helsinki, Finland 367 (1996); Helsinki Principles, completed

ILA meeting
840.

E.g.,

in Taipei,

Colombos

Taiwan. For
§

759;

Neutrality at Sea, n. 831, 205;

a critique of the

McDougal &

Thomas

is

Jr.,

specious); Gioia

Even commentators arguing

at the

1998

Walker, Maritime Neutrality.

Submarine Mines

Law of the Sea

in International

Law,

in

1141-42; Bothe,

Robertson 351, 352

& Ronzitti, n. 831, 223; Lowe, The Commander's, n. 318,

134-38; McNeill, Neutral Rights, n. 11.354, 642-43; Ronzitti, The
Neutrality, n. 11.295, 619.

see

Feliciano 197-436; 2 O'Connell,

A. Clingan,

(argument that neutrality no longer exists

Cairo report,

Crisis,

6-12; Williams, n. 22, 47-48; Wiswall,

that the force of the law of neutrality has been greatly

diminished do not say it has disappeared in the Charter era. See, e.g., Alford, n. 833, 326; Janis, n. 83 1, 1 53; Norton, n.
831,311.
841. See, e.g., Jessup, Neutrality, n. 829; Jessup & Deak, n. 830; W. Alison Phillips & Arthur H. Reede,
Neutrality: The Napoleonic Period (1936); Edgar Turlington, Neutrality: Its History, Economics and Law
(1936).

UN Charter, art.

842.

See Pact of Paris, n. 160;

843.

See nn. 160-63 and accompanying

844.

See

n.

829 and accompanying

text.

text.

103;
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430-31; nn. 160-63, 837 and accompanying

text.
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845.

Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, arts. 69-70, 72-73, 77, 47

E.g.,

LNTS

2053-57, 118

343, 385-86, superseded by Third Convention, arts. 4(b)(2), 10.
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Stat.

202 1,

The 1929 Convention

also

continued usage of the term as well as referring to "non-belligerents."
846.

Convention on Maritime Neutrality; TIF 434. See also Convention Regarding Rights of Neutrals

22, 1854, 10

1105,

id.
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in force
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Nicaragua, Russia and the United States.

847.

Stockholm Declaration.

848.

Ove Bring, Commentary,

849.

Budapest Articles ofInterpretation: Final Text,

in

Law of Naval Warfare 839,
arts. 1-7, in

at Sea,

July

TIF 431.

841.

International

Law Association, Report of the 38th

Conference 67-68 (1935).
850.

E.g.,

Lord Chancellor Viscount Sankey, in 95

H.L. (5th

Pari. Deb.,

ser.) cols.

1007, 1043.

Secretary of State Stimson took the opposite view then. See Stimson, The Pact, n. 161,
851.

852.

and

Jessup, Neutrality, n. 829, 121-23; Hersch Lauterpacht, The Pact of Paris

Interpretation,
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On the other hand,

vii-viii.

the

Budapest Articles of

20 Trans. Grotius Socy 178 (1935).

Secretary of

War Henry

L. Stimson testimony, Jan. 29, 1941, Hearings Before the House Committee on

Foreign Affairs on H.R. 1776 Regarding the Lend-Lease Bill, 77th Cong., IstSess. 89-90(1941). Stimson, ThePact, n. 161,
vii-viii,

expressed the same view in 1932; Quincy Wright, The Transfer of Destroyers

685-89 (1940),

made an analogous argument after

to

Great Britain, 34

AJIL

680,

the 1940 destroyers-bases deal, citing Budapest Articles, n. 849, and

the Harvard Draft Convention on Aggression, n. 130.
853.

US

Secretary of State Cordell Hull testimony, Jan. 15, 1941, in

Inter-American

Bar Association, 35 AJIL 349

id.

9-10; Robert H. Jackson, Address

854.

Budapest Articles,

855.

See nn. 396-417 and accompanying

856.

Lend-Lease Act,

857.

Brownlie, International

849, 67.

arts. 4(b)-4(d), n.

text.

ch. 11, 55 Stat. 31.

Law

agreements were not formalized until

5, citing

after the

between the United States and countries

at

The

Scotia, 81

US

United States was

at

(5 Wall.) 170, 181-82 (1872).

war with the Axis, but

at least

Most Lend-Lease
two were in force

war with Axis States before then. Lend-Lease Agreement, Aug.

Neth.-US, 10 Bevans 140; Lend Lease Agreement, Nov. 21, 1941, Ice.-US, 58

Stat. 1455.

1433-34. See also Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense, in Liber

referring to

informal
858.

Amicorum 379,

Robert H. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: an Intimate History

UK-US

9,

1941,

Informal arrangements had

undoubtedly already begun, e.g., with Great Britain. See Preliminary Agreement, Feb. 23, 1942, UK-US,
id.

to the

(1941).

31

arts. 1-2,

Cornell Int'l

56

L.J. at 347,

308, 310-11 (1950 rev. ed.)

and an

defense arrangement.

Brownlie, International Law

older custom that had not died out.

5; 1

Oppenheim

§ 10, at 28. 2 id. §

292Aa, 639 says

US practice was resurrected

The United States negotiated Lend-Lease agreements with States not at war with

went to war. To the extent that these agreements benefited the United States after it was at war, and
became a nonbelligerent. Examples of nonbelligerent provisions
included reciprocal commodity pledges and pledges to supply the United States with "defense articles, strategic or
critical materials, or defense information." See, e.g., Lend-Lease Agreement, Oct. 1, 1941, Brazil-US, 5 Bevans 905,
906-07. The United States had Lend-Lease agreements with 36 countries, including the USSR. See \3>id. 64. As citing
Bevans indicates, some agreements were not published and were perhaps not available for consideration as practice
the Axis before

it

before the other State declared war, the other State

until 1968-76,

when

1-13

id.

were published.

UK-US, 54 Stat. 2405, 203 LNTS 201, supplemented by Agreement
UK-US, 55 id. 1560. Bowett, Self-Defence 166 characterizes
Lend-Lease and the destroyers-bases deal as violating international law in 1958 when he wrote. When viewed in the
context of trends, particularly the law of self-defense as then stated, his view is not the law now, and Bowett might
859.

Exchange of Notes,

Sept. 2, 1940,

Relating to Defense of Newfoundland, Mar. 27, 1941,

have concluded differently in 1958

accompanying

if all

Lend-Lease agreements had been published then. See

text.

860.

McDougal &

861.

ORViK,n. 831, 194-215.

862.

Id. 587.

863.

See nn. 857-58 and accompanying

Feliciano 425.

text.

n.

589 and

.

The Tanker War

234

864.

Castren,

n. 831, 450-51, listing Bulgaria,

China, Hungary,

Italy, Portugal,

Romania, Spain and Turkey

besides the United States, which pursued these policies, without stating which side Spain favored. Although

Francisco Franco's Spain played both sides, throughout the war

it

supported the Axis, primarily Germany, providing

ports for submarine support, infra-red, radar and sonar listening stations, the Blue Division for the

USSR

front,

Germany, war material, credits and other services. These countries signed a Treaty of Friendship on
March 31, 1939, and a Secret Protocol on February 12, 1943, which was not implemented; US Department of State,
The Spanish Government and the Axis (1946); Paul Preston, Franco: A Biography, chs. 13-21. Italy later joined the
civilian labor in

Axis as a cobelligerent.
865.

Harvard Draft Convention on Aggression,

866.

Id.,

Comment,

AJIL

33

arts. 1-2, 6, 10, 12-13.

Supp. 879-85 (1939). See also

Self-Defence 161 says the Convention principles are de
867.

id.,

Comment,
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AJIL

Supp. 902 (1939).

Bowett,

lege ferenda.

Jessup, Neutrality, n. 829, 7, 160-62, 181, referring to Jessup

& Dear, n.

830, 44, 109, 117, 160; Phillips

&

The United States was among the maritime powers recognizing the 1780 armed neutrality; that of
1 800 collapsed with the Danish fleet's defeat. Colombos § § 700-0 1
2 Oppenheim § 290. Bilateral treaties, no longer in
force, restated these principles during the 19th century. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce &
Navigation, Dec. 12, 1828, Brazil-US, art. 22, 8 Stat. 390, 395; TIF 29.
Reede, n. 841, ch.

4.

;

868.

Wright, The

accompanying
869.

Transfer, n. 852, 689, cited the

Convention

See generally

1

857 and accompanying

1943, at 56-113(1947).

870.

See

871.

See nn. 11.350-56, 447, 470-71 and accompanying

872.

See nn. 11.359-62 and accompanying

873.

Castren,

874.

Tucker 199 n.5, citing Stone 383; Castren, n. 831,452; Dezk, Neutrality,
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n.

859 and

Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations During World War

The Battle of the Atlantic: September 1939-May

II:

for legitimacy of the destroyers-bases deal, n.

text.

n.

text.

text.

text.

831,434,651.
n. 10, 153;

Josef Kunz, Neutrality and

European War 1939-1940, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 747-54 (1941).

875.

Tucker 199

876.

See nn. 591-616, 646-49 and accompanying

877.

See nn. 593-94 and accompanying

878.

E.g.,

n.5.

McDougal &

text.

Feliciano 492, 499 (indirect aid to North Korea, PRC, the subjects of Security Council

and General Assembly resolutions); Norton,
879.

Norton,

n. 831, 257-62, 295-97,

880.

Norton,

n.

881

E.g., E.C.

831, 262-63.

882.

Gioia

883.

For

Castren,

n.

The

n. 831,

263-67, 294.

298-301, 304-05; Ronzitti, The Crisis

4.

short duration of the conflicts was a factor.

Council Regulation,

Sales to Argentina, n. 259; 3

text.

n.

259; E.C.S.C. Council Decision, n. 259; Statement Concerning Assistance to and

Cordesman & Wagner 260-63, 270, 280-8 1, 331 -32; see also n. 259 and accompanying text.

& Ronzitti, n.

831, 226-31.

a record of other conflicts

through 1975,

see

Norton,

n. 830,

268-75 (Vietnam, 27

civil wars); see also

831,452.

To the extent that these older treaty obligations conflict with Charter obligations, the Charter prevails. Deak,
UN Charter, art. 103. The later in time rule states the same principle for newer agreements
to assist an aggression victim with aid. Vienna Convention, art. 30. To the extent that the Charter, and action pursuant
884.

Neutrality, n. 10, 143, citing

to

it, is

considered customary law, or perhaps jus cogens, later custom or;us cogens would trump an inconsistent earlier

customary obligation or perhaps an older
69 and accompanying

treaty.

885.

See

886.

See nn. 591-649 and accompanying

887.

See n. 259 and accompanying

888.

See nn.

889.

See nn. 485-590 and accompanying

n.

II.

See

n.

10 and accompanying text.

text.

text.

text.

147, 295, 348, 350-55, 361-62, 437-41 , 446-56, 469-7 1 , 494-95, 498,
text.

III.

648 and accompanying text.
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Lalive, n. 831, 78-81; see also Castren, n. 831, 434; nn. 69, 651-52
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text.

UN Charter, art. 2(5); Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War and the Law of War, 47 AJIL 365, 371-72 (1953).
UN action. Gabriel, n. 831, 132-33 (Swedish, Swiss economic aid

891.

Permanently neutral countries have supported
and/or support during Korean War); Ross,

(Swedish, Swiss actions against Rhodesia).

Jordan was the chief applicant, but 20 other States invoked

892.

Walker,

also

n. 831, chs. 7-9

Crisis

UN Charter, art. 50. Schrijver, n. 609, 149-50; see

Over Kuwait 37-38.

Wellens 528, with S.C. Res. 757, 760 (1992), in 31 ILM 1453,
( 1 990), in Wellens 530, called for enforcing the Iraq embargo.
S.C. Res. 670 (1990), in id. 534, directed an end to civil air commerce with Iraq, except for humanitarian cargoes. S.C.
Res. 787 (1992), in 31 ILM 1481 (1992), expanded on S.C. Res. 724 (1991), in Wellens 51, and called on States to use
Compare

893.

1

46 1

(1

S.C. Res. 661 (1990) (Iraq embargo), in

992) (former Yugoslavia embargo). S.C. Res. 665

individual and collective measures to halt inbound and outbound shipping to or from the former Yugoslavia.
Economic sanctions have been imposed for the Angola, Haiti, Liberia, Libya and Somalia crises. A Sanctions
Committee was appointed in all cases except Liberia. Schrijver, n. 609, 132-43, 151-54.
S.C. Res.

894.

724 (1991),

in

Wellens

51, decided

on

a limited

South Africa. S.C. Res. 418 (1977), 569 (1985), 591 (1986), in

were also imposed in the Angola, Haiti and Libya

embargo.

218, 228, 230.

id.

The same procedure was followed for
Arms and other commodity embargoes

crises. Schrijver, n. 609, 129-32, 146-47; n.

708 and accompanying

text.

Rhodesia also

895.

illustrates the interplay of

General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. See generally

O'Connell, The Influence 137-38, 174-75; Schrijver,

accompanying

n. 609, 129-30;

Walker, State Practice 142-43; nn. 695-707 and

text.

896.

Castren,

897.

UN Charter, art. 39; see also nn. 651-56 and accompanying text.

898.
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rule

— The

n.

831,435.

situation [contemplated

by the Charter

originally anticipated interstitual situation in

under the Charter has arisen

...

in every international

for applying the

law of neutrality has] bec[o]me the

which assumption of a neutral status might be permissible

armed conflict of the last three decades[, 1945-75]." Norton, n.

831,252.
135-44; nn. 695-708, 893-95 and accompanying text.

899.

See Shrijver,

900.

See nn. 763-73 and accompanying

n. 609,

text.

Williams, n. 22, 15, seems to overemphasize importance of the

Resolution process as a law-promulgating mechanism; see also
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See Taubenfeld, International,

n. 285,

McDougal &

UFP

Feliciano 429-35.

393-94 (relative success of General Assembly call for embargo against the

PRC).
902.

North Sea Continental Shelf (W.Ger.

Cases); Brownlie, International

Law

5; 1

v.

Den., W.Ger.

Oppenheim

Neth.), 1969 ICJ 4, 43 (North Sea Continental Shelf

v.

§ 10, at

30-31;

Restatement (Third)

§

102 cmt. b

& r.n. 2.

903.

Castren,

904.

UN Charter, arts. 43-47. The MSC was a Cold War casualty. See nn. 789-96 and accompanying text.

905.

Walker,

906.

Malcolm W. Cagle & Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea 28 1 -83, 299-300, 304, 353-57, 370-73 (1957);

n. 831, 433-34.

Crisis

Over Kuwait 48-50.

James A. Field, Historyof United States Naval Operations: Korea 42, 54, 58-59, 61, 126, 158, 349, 395, 444 (1962);
Walker, State Practice 126.
907.

See,

e.g.,
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R Gordon, In Test of Serbia Embargo, U.S. Presses

Seize a Ship, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1993.

to

UN command center for peacekeeping operations has been relatively spartan, running on a shoestring budget
from the UN New York headquarters, although that could change. Nevertheless, when compared with modern

The

national

command centers, the Organization

has a way to go and

is

likely to rely

on the agency concept

Gioia, Neutrality, n. 831, 14, says the Council cannot delegate powers to a single State.

The

in the future.

record of Council practice

appears to be otherwise.
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908.

Cf.
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First
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I, arts.

see also

1

Pictet 86-98; 2
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2(a), 9(2), 22(2), 30(3), 37(l)(d), 39(1), 64(1) consistently uses phrases,
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The Tanker War

236
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II

armistices and other settlements. See,

Armistice Agreement in Korea, July 27, 1953, H

Supplementary

to

18, 1962, 14
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id. 1

in post- World

in Korea, July 27, 1953, arts. 36-50, 4

Agreement on Ending the War
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234, 248-53;

e.g., Agreement
Temporary Agreement

346; Declaration on Neutrality of Laos, July
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& Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, Jan. 27, 1973, art. 20, 24 uf.
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130.

S.C. Res. 764,

780 (1992),
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Norton,

1907

686 (1991), in Wellens 451, 454, 531, 534-39,
The Council also cited to them during the Yugoslavia crisis. See, e.g.,

S.C. Res. 540 (1984), 598 (1986), 666, 670, 674, 678 (1990),
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540-42; see also Walker, Crisis Over Kuwait 36-37.
in 31

ILM

1465, 1476 (1992).

552 (1984), in Wellens. 473.

n. 831, 256,

analyzing

UN Charter, art.

103, points out that the then current 1976

Hague Conventions, replete with citations to neutrality,

unless expressly superseded by later treaties. This
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United States has ratified, and which

that the
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World War II. See Law of Naval Warfare 93-95, 111-13, 129-30, 149-50, 173-74, 193-94, a compilation during the
Tanker War. State succession to treaties may mean the Conventions have more applicability than the Law of Naval
Warfare lists would suggest. See generally Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ

913.

91-135; see also North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 ICJ 28-29, 36-45;
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the continued vitality of the concept. See also Brownlie, International
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ICJ Statute,

918.

See

919.

Vienna Convention,

920.

See generally Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
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accompanying
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1973 ICJ 14; Brownlie, International
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text.
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641, at 1292; Walker, Integration and

Disintegration 63.

925.

Elias, n. 10, 172-75; Sinclair 177-81; Kearney

& Dalton, n.

58,532-35; Walker, Integration and Disintegration

63.

926.

UN Charter, art.

927.

The breach must be material and go to the heart of the agreement. Vienna Convention, art. 60, reciting special

103; see also nn. 58-59 and

rules for multilateral agreements; see also

accompanying

text.

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. V. Slovak.), 1997 ICJ 39 (art. 60 a
v. Pak.), 1972 id. 46, 67; Namibia, 1971 id. 4, 47; Brownlie

customary norm); Jurisdiction of ICAO Council (India

International

Law 622-23;

Restatement (Third)
928.

§

1978 Digest

741, 767;

ILC Report, n.

191, 253-55;

McNair ch. 36; 1 Oppenheim § 649;

Impossibility of performance can be invoked where the destruction of a certain object of the treaty occurs.

Vienna Convention,

art.

61 ; see also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.

norm); Brownlie, International

Oppenheim
65-66.

§ 4,

335; Sinclair, 20, 166, 188-90.

§

650;

Restatement (Third)

McNair 685

might be cited

Law 619;

does not recognize

as such.

Some

§

Elias, n. 9, 128-30;

336

& cmt. c, r.n.

a separate doctrine,

treaties, e.g.,

3;

ILC

v.

Slovak.), 1997 ICJ 39 (art.

1

a

customary

Rep., n. 192, 255-56 (noting rarity of practice);

1

Sinclair 190-92; Walker, Integration and Disintegration

but some of his examples are impossibility situations and

Treaty of Rome,

n. 819, arts.

225-26, 298

UNTS

at 88-89, require
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renegotiation
at 137; n.

929.

if unusual

and unforeseen circumstances arise; see also Consolidated Version, n. 819, art. 299, in 37 ILM

819 and accompanying

text.

Fundamental change of circumstances under the Vienna Convention is different from the older rebus sic
Vienna Convention, art. 62; see also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovak.), 1997 ICJ
62 a customary norm); Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Ice.), 1973 ICJ 3, 18 (same); Brownlie, International

stantibus doctrine. See

39

(art.

Law 620-21;
192, 257-58;

ArieE. David, The Strategy of Treaty Termination
1

Oppenheim

651;

§

Restatement (Third)

Fundamental Change of Circumstances, 146

AJIL 895

RCADI

change of circumstances, e.g., Treaty of Rome,

930.

ILM

137; n. 819

ch.

1

(1975); Elias, n. 10, 119-28;

ILC

Rep., n.

Gyorgy Haraszti, Treaties and the
Treaties and Changed Circumstances, 61

336; Sinclair 20, 192-96;

(1975); Oliver J. Lissitzyn,

and Disintegration 66-68. Some

(1967); Walker, Integration

n. 819, arts. 298-99, in 37

1

§

n. 819, arts. 225-26,

and accompanying

treaties

298

have terms contemplating fundamental

UNTS at 88-89; see also Consolidated Version,

text.

Desuetude is the discontinuance of use of a treaty through an extended period of time. Mere time passage does

not vitiate treaty obligations, however; treaty relationships have lasted for centuries. Brownlie, International
617-18;

McNair

516-18; Sinclair 163-64 (International

Law Commission

view that Vienna Convention,

covers desuetude); Richard Plender, The Role of Consent in the Termination of Treaties, 57

Walker, Integration and Disintegration 72. For a
Robertson, Jr., Commentary,

US

practice example, see 5

BYBIL

Hackworth

§

art.

Law

54[b]

133, 138-45 (1986);

506, at 302. Horace B.

Law of Naval Warfare 161, 169-70 considers Hague IX, analyzed in Part V.G.I, to be

in

in desuetude except for its military objective principles. Similarly, Hague Declaration (XIV) Prohibiting Discharge of
Projectiles

& Explosives from Balloons, Oct. 1 8, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439, might be considered in desuetude. Both remain in

force for the United States.

TIF 433-34.

931. The amorphous state of necessity doctrine, akin but different from military necessity, or the necessity
component of self-defense, is similar to a claim of fundamental change of circumstances or impossibility; it focuses
more on circumstances affecting existence of a State claiming excuse from nonperformance of a treaty. Walker,
Integration and Disintegration 71; see also nn. 485-520, 631-44 and accompanying text.
932.

Law

Brownlie, International

Treaties 28-34(1974);

1

Oppenheim

§

Lung-Fong Chen, State Succession Relating to Unequal

615-16;

641, at 1292;

Proc. 90-91; Ingrid Detter, The Problem of Unequal

Newly Independent States on

the

Ramond

L. Buell, The Termination of Unequal Treaties, 1927 Asil

ICLQ

Treaties, 15

1069 (1966);

Binding Quality of International Law, 14

id.

S.

Prakash Sinha, Perspective of the

121, 123-24 (1965); Walker, Integration

and

Disintegration 63-64.

933. Vienna Convention, art. 44; Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Restatement (Third) § 338 cmt. e; Walker, Integration and Disintegration 70.

934.

UN

Charter,

art. 2(2);

Petrol. Co. v. Libya, 17

ILM at

Vienna Convention,

art.

n. 922, art. 35(c), at 665;

26; Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ at 135-42;

Texaco Overseas

Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug.

19;

23, 1978,

UN Doc. A/CONF.80/31 (1978), preamble, in 17 ILM 1488 (1978); Brownlie, International Law 616; ILC Rep., n.
Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law 216 (Max Knight

trans. 1967); 1 Oppenheim § 584; Restatement
Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses of "General Principles" in the Development of Law, 57 AJIL 279, 281
(1963); Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, n. 922, art. 20, at 661; Tariq Hassan, Good Faith in Treaty
Formation, 21 VJIL 443, 480-81 (1981); Walker, Integration and Disintegration 58.

192, 211;

(Third)

§

321;

935.

Brownlie, International

936.

ICJ Statute,

937.

Trans World Airlines

art. 38(1);

938.

13-14;

5,

1

Oppenheim

Restatement (Third)

§ 10, at

28;

Restatement (Third)

Vienna Convention,

art.

73;

&

ILC

Rep., n. 192, 267. Attempts to insert a provision failed during the

940.

Restatement (Third)

941.

Institut de Droit International, The Effects ofArmed Conflicts on Treaties,

942.

Institut,

§

336 cmt. e

& r.n. 4; see also

Regulations Regarding the Effect of

and Disintegration
The

self-defense under

f.

Dalton, n. 58, 557.

Briggs, Unilateral, n. 922, 51.

Integration

& cmt.

§§ 102-03.

939.

id.,

102(3)

v.

Convention negotiations. Kearney

278, 280 (1986);

§

v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 US 243 (1984); see also Charlton v. Kelly, 229 US 447,
Ames, 184 US 270, 288, 290 (1902); United States ex rel. Saroop v. Garcia, 109 F.3d 165,
Restatement (Third) §§ 326, r.n. 2; 336, r.n. 1.

474-75 (1913); Terlinden
170-71 (3d Cir. 1997);

Law

n.

War on

929 and accompanying

text.

Aug. 28, 1985,

Treaties, 1912, art. 2(1), in 7

art. 6,

AJIL 153

61(2) Annuaire
(1913); Walker,

70.

Effects, n.

941,

UN Charter, art.

art. 7,

280-82; Walker, Integration and Disintegration 70. If the inherent right of

51, is considered a jus

cogens norm,

it

supersedes treaty and customary norms.

,
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Even

not a jus cogens norm,

if self-defense is

See

treaties.

943.

The Effects,

Institut,

Council decisions under

as

944.

An

The

Institut,

Charter,

art.

id., art.

103 declares that the Charter, which includes

art. 5 i,

trumps other

10 and accompanying text.

n.

n.

941,

282; Walker, Integration and Disintegration 70. This restates the rule insofar

art. 8, at

UN Charter, arts.

Effects, n.

941,

art. 9, at

25, 48 are concerned. See also n.

282; see also Vienna Convention,

652 and accompanying
art. 75.

This

is

text.

a correlative of the

103 rule imposed on States complying with Security Council decisions; see n. 10 and accompanying

aggressor cannot

compound advantage gained by being an

aggressor by wriggling out of treaty obligations.

UN
text.

The

principle parallels those stating that a party causing a treaty breach, or conditions giving rise to claims of fundamental

change of circumstances or impossibility, cannot assert these claims
arts.
its

60(1 ), 60(2)(b), 60(2)(c), 61(2), 67(2)(b); see also nn. 927-29

own wrong. Chorzow Factory (Pol.

law on the issue,

e.g.,

v.

1927PCIJ,Ser. A, No.

Ger.),

Brownlie, International

945.

See nn. 938-44 and accompanying

946.

Vienna Convention,

947.

ICAO

Convention,

art.

to

Law

suspend or end

and accompanying
9, at 4, 31.

a treaty.

text. I.e., a

Vienna Convention,

party cannot benefit by

Commentators

reflect the uncertain

616-17.

text.

accompanying

44; see also nn. 938-44 and

text.

art. 89.

The Effects, n. 941, arts. 3-4, at 280; Institut, Regulations, n. 941, art. 5, 7 AJIL 154; 5 Hackworth §
Oppenheim § § 99(2), 99(5); Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, n. 922, art. 35(a), at 664;
Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vite, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 1993 Int'L Rev. Red
948.

5

3, at

1

Institut,

383-84; 2

Treaties, 73 RCADI 255, 312 (1948); Cecil J.B. Hurst, The
BYBIL 37, 42 (1921); seealso Vienna Convention, art. 60(5); David Weissbrodt & Peggy L.
of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 1993 Int'l Rev. Red

Cross 94; G.G. Fitzmaurice, The Judicial Clauses of the Peace

EffectofWaron

Treaties, 2

Hicks, Implementation

Cross 120; nn. 939-45 and accompanying
949.
1

Treaty of Rome,

is

298

n. 819, arts. 223-26,

992, arts. 2102(1 )(b)-02(c), 2204, TI

NAFTA

text.

subject to General

AS—

,

in

32

Agreement on

UNTS at 88-89; North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17,

ILM 289, 605, 702

Tariffs

&

(1

993) (NAFTA). Potentially a hemispheric treaty,

Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61(5,6)

Stat.,

55-61

UNTS

(GATT).

NAFTA, art. 103(1), 32 ILM at 297. GATT, art. 21, 61(5) Stat, at A63, 55 UNTS at 266, is like NAFTA, art. 2102, 32
ILM at 699-700. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 1 5, 1994, art. 2, TIAS 33
ILM 1 144 (1994), and General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, arts. 1-2, TIAS— 33 ILM 1 154-55
(1994), modifying GATT, do not amend its provisions dealing with war, ere. See also Amelia Porges, Introductory Note,

—

1125 (1994). See also nn. 819, 928-29 and accompanying text; VI. 76, 665 and accompanying text for

id.

,

NAFTA

analysis in the maritime environmental law context.
950.

E.g.,

1969 Civil Liability Convention,

art. 3(1),

supplemented by Protocol, Nov.

19, 1976, in 16

ILM

617

Damage, May 25,
1984, in 6 Benedict, Doc. 6-4A (1984 Civil Liability Convention Protocol); Protocol to Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 27, 1992, in id., Doc.6-4B, will further modify the Convention; neither is in force for
the United States. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2, TIAS

(1977); see also 2

Hyde

§

550, 1555-56. Protocol to Convention

on

Civil Liability for Oil Pollution

—

ILM 1144 (1994), and general Agreement on Tariffs & Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, arts. 1-2, TIAS— ,33 ILM 1154-55
(1994), modifying GATT, do not amend its provisions dealing with war, etc. See also Amelia Porges, Introductory Note,
33

id.

1125 (1994). See also nn. VI. 14, 74 and accompanying

text.

951.

UN Charter, art.

952.

This analysis has been adapted from Walker, Oceans

953.

Chapter IV analyzes the law of the

raised during the

103; see also n. 10

and accompanying

sea,

Chapter

V

text.

Law

190-92.

analyzes the

Tanker War, and Chapter VI analyzes the

LOS

LOS

in the context of naval warfare issues

and the law of naval warfare

in the context of the

maritime law of the environment.
954.

Compare,

e.g.,

LOS

Convention, preamble,

arts. 2(3) (territorial sea), 19, 21,

passage), 34(2) (straits transit passage), 45 (straits innocent passage), incorporation

31 (territorial sea innocent

by reference of arts.

19, 21, 31,

52(1) (archipelagic sea lanes passage), 58(1), 58(3) (EEZs), 78 (continental shelf; coastal State rights do not affect

superjacent waters; coastal State cannot infringe or interfere with "navigation and other rights and freedoms of other
States as provided in this Convention"), 87(1) (high seas), 138 (the Area), 303(4) (archeological, historical objects

found

at sea,

"other international agreements and rules of international law regarding the protection of objects of an

e.g., High Seas Convention, art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 1. Two
LOS conventions do not have other rules clauses but state they do not affect status of waters above as high seas in

archaeological and historical nature"), with,

1958

Continental Shelf Convention,

arts. 1, 3;

or other high seas rights in Fishery Convention,

arts. 1-8.
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The General Assembly elects the 34 ILC members from government nominees. The ILC drafted the 1958 Los
W. Briggs, The International Law Commission (1969); Brownlie, International Law

955.

Conventions. Herbert

Law, n. 358, 66-69, 71-72;

30-31 ; Schachter, International

by the International

Law

Briggs, Reflections on the Codification ofInternational Law

RCADI 233 (1969); R.Y. Jennings, The Progressive
24BYBIL 301, 310-29(1947); Hersch Lauterpacht, Codification
(1955); Shabtai Rosenne, The International Law Commission, 30

Commission and by Other Agencies, 126

Development of International Law and Its Codification,

and Development of International Law, 49 AJIL 16

BYBIL

104 (1960).

ILC

956.

Report, n. 192, 267-68; 2 Schwarzenberger 376-77; Boleslaw Boczek, Peaceful Purposes Provisions of the

United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea, 20

ODIL 359 (1989); Briggs, Unilateral, n. 922, 5 1

316, 539-40; Davidson, n. 11.332, 178; Fenvick, Legal Aspects, n. 11.501, 245;

;

Christol

Lowe, The Commander's,

& Davis, n.

n. 318, 132;

Bernard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 VJIL 809, 811
(1984); Ronzitti, The Crisis 15; Russo, Neutrality at Sea, n.

Legal Aspects of the Future, 18

ODIL

II. 1

12, 384;

Wolfrum,

255, 257 (1987);

A.G.Y. Thorpe, Mine Warfare

n. 11.332, 391-92.

at

Sea

—Some

Apparent dissenters include 2

O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1112-13, referring to id. 747-69 in the context of nationality of merchant ships; Luan Low
& David Hodgkinson, Compensation for Wartime Environmental Damage: Challenges to International Law After the Gulf
War, 35 VJIL 405, 421 (1995), who discuss environmental protection obligations in the Los context but say nothing
id. elliptically seems to recognize the principle; Okorodudu-Fubara, n. 11.210,195-97;

about the clauses, although

Elmer Rauch, The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Repercussions on the Law ofNaval Warfare: Report to the
Committee on the Protection of Human Life

(manuscript in author's possession).
rights, declares:

1

in

Armed

Brown

Conflict of the Society for Military

Law

of

War

22-49a (July 1983)

280, recognizing similar other rules clauses pertaining to high seas

"[F]reedom of the high seas must be exercised under conditions

... in

the Convention and by other

unspecified rules of international law."

LOS

957.

Convention,

peaceful purposes.

art. 88.

Id., arts.

Area use

reserved for peaceful purposes; marine scientific research must be for

is

141, 143(1), 147(2)(d), 155, 240(a), 242(1), 246(3). This analysis

is

not confined to

art. 88.

These conclusions apply to other peaceful purposes provisions in e.g., Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959,art. 1(1), 12UST
794, 795, 402 UNTS 71, 72; Treaty on Principles governing Activities of States in Exploration & Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon & Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 id. 2410, 2413-14, 610 UNTS 205, 207 (Space Treaty);
ENMOD Convention, art. 3(1); Convention on International Maritime Satellite Organization, Sept. 3, 1976, art. 3(3),
31

UST 1,4 (INMARSAT Organization shall act exclusively for peaceful purposes); Agreement Governing Activities
Moon & Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, art. 3(1), 1363 UNTS 3, 22.

of States on the

958. Restatement (Third) § 521, cmt. b, citing UN Charter, art. 2(4); UNCLOS, arts. 88, 301 and referring to
Restatement (Third) § 905, cmt. g; accord, Legality of Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 (1) ICJ 244; 3 Nordquist HIT
87.9(i), 88.1 -88.7(d);

Regime,

Russo, Targeting,

n. 624, 8; see also

Helsinki Principle

Boczek, Peaceful,

1.2;

n.

956;

Oxman, The

John E. Parkerson, Jr., International Legal Implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1 1 6 Mil. L.
79-85 (1987). Bin Cheng, Studies in International Space Law 368, 413, 513-22, 528, 533, 650-52 (1997),

n. 956, 8 14;

Rev. 67,

arguing that the US and other States' view that the space treaties' peaceful purposes language means only a prohibition

on aggression

in space

is

wrong and

that the treaties' peaceful purposes clauses

objects, concedes the clauses are not clear

mean no

military use of space or space

and need definition, perhaps in a future agreement. Nowhere, however, does

the impact of UN Charter, art. 103 and the right of self-defense under id., art. 51. See also n. 959 and
accompanying text. Nor does he adequately analyze contrary authority construing other peaceful purpose clauses; see

Cheng consider

nn. 956-57 and accompanying

text.

959.

UN Charter, art.

960.

Id., arts. 2(4), 51; see also

961.

3

Nordquist H

Convention,

art. 2,

103; see also n. 10

962.

Many

text.

nn. 47-590, 617-30 and accompanying text.

87.1(i), citing

LOS

Convention,

arts. 19(2)(b), 19(2)(f)>

52(2) (innocent passage).

High Seas

has been interpreted to include freedoms to undertake scientific research, to explore or exploit

high seas subsoil resources and to

accompanying

and accompanying

test

nuclear weapons. See also Restatement (Third)

§

521 cmt. b; n. 958 and

text.

but not

preamble, declaring

it

all

of the other 1958

restates

LOS

customary law;

Conventions' terms

NWP 9A Annotated

11

reflect

custom. See High Seas Convention,

1.1 at 1-2 n. 4;

cf. 1

O'Connell,

Law of the Sea

385, 474-76.
963.

NWP

1-14M Annotated Part

Moore, Introduction
Robertson

to

1

19, 29; see also President

(Mar. 14, 1983); but see

Convention

I

H 1.1;

Restatement (Third), Part V, Introductory

Note, 3-5;

cf.

John Norton

Nordquist xxviii; Bernard H. Oxman, International Law and Naval and Air Operations at Sea,

1

Reagan, United States Ocean Policy, Mar.

O'Connell,

Law

10, 1983, 19

of the Sea 48-49. O'Connell researched through 1978 using

drafts but died before a final version

was

available. Ivan A. Shearer

in

Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 383
made changes and

LOS

additions,
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publishing before the Convention was signed. Shearer, Editor 's Preface to id.
the time before

Restatement (Third) was published

in 1987. In 1983 the

vii.

O'Connell's views

United States claimed

accordance with the Convention. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10605 (Mar.

and

EEZ

analysis, see Parts IV.B.2, IV.B.4, IV.B.6, IV.D.2-IV.D.4.

Restatement (Third)

§§ 102-03.

964.

ICJ Statute,

965.

See nn. 725-28 and accompanying

text.

966.

See nn. 962-63 and accompanying

text.

967.

See nn. 158-590, 617-30 and accompanying

968.

See nn. 593-94 and accompanying

969.

See

n.

970.

See

n. 10

971.

See nn. 79-103 and accompanying

text.

972.

See nn. 104-57 and accompanying

text.

973.

See nn. 650-61 and accompanying

text.

974.

See nn. 69, 657 and accompanying

text.

975.

See nn. 158-590, 617-30 and accompanying

976.

Id.

977.

Id.

978.

See nn. 591-616, 645-49 and accompanying

text.

979.

See nn. 303-307, 800-17 and accompanying

text.

980.

See nn. 168,199 and accompanying

981.

See nn. 10, 202-06 and accompanying

982.

See nn. 289-302, 308-36 and accompanying

983.

See

n.

438 and accompanying

text.

984.

See

n.

440 and accompanying

text.

985.

See nn. 445-47 and accompanying

986.

See nn. 448-68, V.677-78, VI.231-38 and accompanying

987.

See

988.

See nn. 10, 725, 729, 735, 823 and accompanying

989.

See

990.

See nn. V.697-709, VI.268-271 and accompanying

991.

See nn. 828-915 and accompanying

992.

See nn. 919-51 and accompanying

text.

993.

See nn. 951-67 and accompanying

text.

n.

n.

art.

38(1);

631 and accompanying

and accompanying

text.

text.

text.

text.

948 and accompanying

934 and accompanying

text.

text.

text.

text.

text.

text.
text.

text.

text.

text.

text.

a

10, 1983). In

12-mile territorial sea in accordance with the Convention. Proclamation No. 5928, 54
territorial sea

may reflect views of

id.

200-mile
1988

it

EEZ

in

claimed a

Ill (Dec. 27, 1988). For

Chapter

IV

CLAIMS RELATED TO THE LAW OF THE

SEA
Since

World War

ments

II,

have attempted to negotiate multilateral agree-

boundaries and use of the Earth's oceans and

to delimit

—the High
Territorial Sea and Fishery Conventions —were signed

have been successes and
tal Shelf,

States

(LOS)

failures. In

seas.

There

Seas, Continen-

1958 four treaties

at

the

Geneva

UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and are now in force for ratifying States.
Two years later attempts to delimit the territorial sea failed at Geneva. In 1982 another agreement, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), a
comprehensive treaty covering subjects of the 1958 conventions and other principles,

environmental protection, discussed in Chapter VI, was signed

e.g.,

Montego Bay, Jamaica

after nearly a

decade of negotiations; several principal

at

ac-

including the United States, elected not to sign due to problems with the Con-

tors,

The LOS Convention is now in force,
but not for the United States and an increasingly smaller number of countries.
Besides the LOS conventions, many other agreements, e.g., the ICAO Convenvention's deep seabed mining provisions.

tion,

impact

LOS boundaries and ocean usage, not to mention State practice, the

research of scholars,

and occasional

judicial

and

arbitral decisions.

LOS issues relating to the Tanker War under three printhe relationship among the law of the UN Charter, the LOS and the

This Chapter analyzes
cipal topics:

A also discusses issues related to treaty interpretation in these contexts. Part B analyzes LOS issues related
law of armed conflict (LOAC), discussed in Part A. Part

to

oceans use, and Part

etc.)

plying the oceans.

C

discusses the status of vessels (merchantmen, warships,

A conclusion

relates these claims to

Tanker War

issues in

each Part, and a general conclusion, Part D, summarizes Tanker War LOS issues.

Part A.

The

Charter, the LOS,

and the Law

of

Armed

Conflict

(LOAC)

The rule for the relationship between the law of the UN Charter as a treaty and
the LOS as stated in treaties is simple. The Charter prevails. Similarly, to the extent that Charter
vail.

If an

there

is

norms

or other

norms have;ws

cogens status, these rules also pre-

LOS norm is stated in a treaty, in custom or in general principles, and

a conflicting

customary or general principles norm parallelling the Char-

modes of thinking about
sources of international law apply, a balancing process among these norms must be
undertaken; it is conceivable that a non-Charter norm might prevail. In terms of
competition between the Charter and the LOS, however, this is largely a theoretical
ter as a treaty, the analysis is less clear. If traditional

3

,
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issue, except insofar as the right of self-defense, other

tory decisions of the

Charter norms, or manda-

UN Security Council might supersede LOS treaty norms.

L The LOS and the LOAC
The relationship between the LOS and the LOAC and its component, the law of
naval warfare

discussed

(LONW),

them

is

somewhat

clear but less well

in a context of general principles of

of treaty interpretation.

They

known.

Chapter

III

has

UN Charter law and principles

are repeated here for convenience in interpreting

the law of the sea.

The 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions include clauses, sometimes overlooked in
analysis or

commentary, stating

that rights

under these agreements are subject

"other rules of international law" as well as terms in the particular treaty.

ample,

LOS

Convention,

art. 87(1),

which declares high

12

to

For ex-

seas freedoms, also says,

"Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law." Four conclusions can be stated.
First, an overwhelming majority of commentators, including the International
Law Commission, a UN General Assembly agency of international law experts,
1

state that the other rules clauses in the

LOS

Conventions

refer to the

which includes the law of naval warfare. Therefore, provisions such
vention,

art. 88, state a

truism:

The high

as

LOAC,

LOS

Con-

seas are reserved for peaceful purposes,

but high seas usage can be subject to the law of armed conflict, when Article 87( 1 )'s
other rules clause

is

read with Article 88. As in the 1958 conventions,

That provision does not preclude. use of the high seas by naval forces. Their use for
aggressive purposes, which would.
violat[e].
Article 2(4) of the [UN] Charter.
is forbidden as well by Article 88 [of the Convention]. See also LOS Convention,
Article 301, requiring parties, in exercising their rights and p[er]forming their duties
under the Convention, to refrain from any threat or use of force in violation of the
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Charter.^"

This analysis

is

buttressed by the Charter's trumping clause; no other treaty can

supersede the Charter.
other
2(4),

LOS

17

Thus

the peaceful purposes language in Article 88 and

Convention provisions cannot override Charter norms,

e.g.,

Article

but also those in Article 5\,i.e., the inherent right of individual and collective

self-defense.

Second, there

is

no indication

that the 1958 or 1982

LOS

Convention drafters

thought the other rules clauses referred to anything else, e.g., to

As discussed
academics' and

a

customary law of

the environment.

in Chapter VI, international environmental law

was

futurists' eyes

a

gleam in

when

the 1958 Conventions were

signed; there was only a patchwork of international agreements touching the sub-

no indication the International Law Commission, which drafted
the 1958 treaties, considered environmental protection. By contrast, there was an
ject.

There

is

Law

established body of law, discussed in Chapter V, dealing with

of the

Sea
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armed conflict situa-

LOS Convention carried

tions, including naval warfare, at the time. Since the 1982

over the same language, it must be presumed that the same meaning attaches to the
other rules clauses.

Third,

e.g.,

other agreements dealing with protection of the maritime environ-

ment include clauses exempting, or partially exempting their application during
20
armed conflict or similar situations. Some speak of war, others of armed conflict
or a need to protect vital national interests.

21

This includes the

NAFTA. 22

This

tends to confirm the view of applying the law of armed conflict as a separate body of

law in appropriate situations.

To the extent that treaties dealing with the maritime

environment do not have such

clauses,

23

such agreements must be read in the light

of the LOS Conventions, which include such provisions.

1958

And to the extent that the

LOS Conventions recite customary norms, and such is the case with the High

Seas Convention,

uations as a customary

other sources

25

LOAC as a separate body of law in appropriate sitnorm must also be considered with LOAC treaties and

applying the

when analyzing

these issues.

Fourth, principles of the law of

treaties, e.g., impossibility

fundamental change of circumstances;
considerable time;

28

of performance;

desuetude, or lack of use of a treaty for a
2*9

•

may

or war, the last applying only to parties to a conflict;

suspend operation of international agreements during

a conflict or other, similar

emergency situations, or may terminate them. Outbreak of hostilities does not sus-

pend or terminate humanitarian conventions or treaties governing neutrality de30
signed to apply during armed conflict, however.
The other side of the coin is
pacta sunt servanda,

that treaties should be observed; a manifestation of this

i.e.,

that States signing treaties should not behave so as to defeat the treaties' object

purpose.

32

The

amorphous law of treaty succession

often

33

particularly for older agreements, including those stating the

is

and

must be considered,

LOAC, to the extent

that those treaties are not part of customary law today. If these agreements restate

custom, and are subject to treaty succession principles with respect to
country, that country

The conclusion

is

is

doubly bound.

inescapable that the other rules clauses of the 1958 Conven-

tions, provisions carried

LOS

fare is a part. Since the

LOS Convention, mean that the
LOAC, of which the law of naval war-

forward into the 1982

conventions' terms are subject to the

of customary law,

High Seas Convention is generally considered a restatement

35
its

other rules clauses are part of the customary law governing

oceans law during armed conflict. Moreover, since

Convention's navigational

customary law,
the case

is

articles,

strong that the

situations; (2) the

LOS

is

many

States consider the

LOS

which often copy 1958 conventions' terms,

and since the navigational

stated in the conventions,
flict

a particular

articles include other rules clauses,

governed by two bodies of rules:

(1) the

LOS as

custom and subordinate treaties, etc., in non-armed con-

LOAC,

including the

LONW, where LOAC rules apply.
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Iraq's claim that the

ply

when

it

struck the

Kuwait Regional Convention and

Nowruz

37

its

Protocol did not ap-

was without basis in law. Although

oil facilities

the Convention might have been suspended between the belligerents,
to

it

continued

apply to relations between Iran, Iraq and third States, the latter of whom were

not parties to the conflict,

i.e.,

belligerents.

38

To

the extent the

Nowruz attack

re-

sulted in damage, including environmental harm, to States not party to the conflict,

Iraq violated the Regional Convention

norms.

39

Iraq might have claimed the Convention was suspended because of im-

possibility of performance,

but Iraq did not

2.

and perhaps other environmental

make

or

maybe fundamental change of circumstances,

these assertions.

Relationship of the 1982

LOS Convention and Other LOS-Related Treaties

Besides general rules of treaty construction applying to

all

international agree-

LOS Convention has special rules for its relationship as a treaty
with the 1958 conventions and other treaties dealing with LOS issues.
For those States that are or become parties, the 1982 LOS Convention will rements,

the 1982

place the 1958 conventions.
for the

LOS

"which

rights

Article 311(2), the general supersession provision

Convention, declares that the Convention does not
arise

from other agreements compatible with

which do not affect enjoyment of other parties'
gations under the Convention.
or suspending operations of the

modification

is

States

rights or

this

alter existing

Convention" and

performance of their obli-

may also conclude agreements modifying

LOS Convention, provided that the suspension or

not incompatible with effective execution of the object and pur-

LOS Convention or its basic principles and do not affect enjoyment of
other States' rights or performance of their obligations under the LOS Convention. States that intend to conclude such an agreement must notify other LOS

pose of the

Convention parties of their intentions and the modification or suspension

which

it

provides.

Rules for non-suspendable

suspension of innocent passage in some
provisions that no single State
States bordering a strait
as

may

from trying

straits,

are examples of LOS

and non-

Convention

undercut. Article 31 1(3) forbids two or
to

suspend

provided by the Convention, through

LOS

straits transit passage,

straits transit or

a treaty,

for

more

innocent passage,

an example of treaty action the

Convention forbids.

The LOS Convention declares for its environmental norms in Part XII, which
states many principles of maritime environmental law:
1.

The

provisions of this Part are without prejudice to the specific obligations

assumed by States under special conventions and agreements concluded previously
which relate to the protection and preservation of the marine environment and to
agreements which may be concluded in furtherance of the general principles set forth
in this Convention.
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assumed by States under special conventions, with respect
and preservation of the marine environment, should be carried out
manner consistent with the general principles and objectives of this

Specific obligations

to the protection

in

a

Convention. 48

This
cipal

LOS Convention, Part XII, the prin49
source for maritime environmental protection standards, which the LOS

is

a lex specialise

Convention allows

i.e.

a special rule, for the

for this

and other articles varying its basic

rules.

The rule for

no suspension of innocent passage for certain straits, e.g., those between the high
as distinguished from general innocent
seas and a foreign State's territorial sea,
52
passage rules allowing suspension under certain circumstances, is another example of lex specialis.

As in the case of the Charter, there is the possibility that a parallel but contradicor other source of law may develop alongside treaty-based norms.
tory custom
The developing customary norm might be the same as, and thereby strengthen,
the treaty norm. If in opposition, custom can weaken or dislodge a treaty norm.
However, no treaty, and probably no custom, can supersede the Charter, mandatory

3.

norms developed under

57
it,

ox jus cogens norms.

The 1982 LOS Convention and the Tanker
Bahrain and Iraq

ratified the

LOS

58

War

Convention in 1985, and Kuwait in 1986;

many other countries, e.g., France and the UAE, were signatories, but other States
with prominent roles in the Tanker War, e.g., the United Kingdom and the United
States,

were not signatories or parties during the Tanker War.

States there

Thus

for

some

was an obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the LOS Con-

vention during at least part of the Tanker War.

These countries also had the duty

comply with customary norms, perhaps restated in the 1 982 LOS Convention or
the 1958 LOS conventions. Others were bound by the 1958 LOS conventions,^.,
the United Kingdom and the United States. These countries also had the obligato

tion to

the

comply with customary norms, perhaps

restated in the 1958 conventions or

LOS Convention. Still other countries were not party to any LOS treaty; how-

ever, they were bound by customary rules the 1958

f\~)

and 1 982 conventions restate.

Most Persian Gulf coastal States were in the latter category. The ensuing analysis
proceeds by analyzing and comparing the 1958 and 1982 LOS conventions as
treaty law, to the extent that they applied as such,
rules

where these are

in accordance with or differ

Part B. Claims to

and seeks

to

supply customary

from the conventional law.

Oceans Use

Because most armed conflicts in which merchant ships are involved have oc-

we begin by examining merchant ships' and warships'
status on the "great common."
This method takes the perspective of all seafarers
curred on the high seas,
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who sailed from Persian Gulf ports. Mariners, whether aboard merchant vessels or men of war, that approach the Gulf from the Indian Ocean must
except those

traverse the high seas before they encounter special regimes,

e.g.,

the continental shelf, the contiguous zone, or the territorial sea.

straits passage,

It is

an analysis of

derogation from the general to the specific, in terms of applicable law.

1.

Ocean Usages on the High Seas
According to the High Seas Convention, the high seas include all parts of the sea
Trends in Claims

to

(including subsurface water) not included in States' territorial or internal wa-

Beyond these broad exclusions, the

ters.

LOS

Convention, Article 88 says that

the "high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes," which, as analyzed above,

mean that navies cannot operate on the high seas. Stated as a positive rule,
States may conduct naval operations on the high seas, subject to other LOS limitations, discussed below. Under Article 2(4) of the Charter, no State may use the high
does not

seas for aggressive purposes; this

along with the Article

5

1

is

in essence a cardinal principle of the Charter,

LOS Convention, Arti-

inherent right to self-defense.

"No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to
its sovereignty." The LOS conventions declare that every State may sail ships on
the high seas under its flag,
and list certain rights, among others, with respect to
cle

89 declares:

the high seas:

freedom of navigation;
freedom of overflight; 70
freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; 71
freedom of fishing; 72
freedom to build artificial islands and other installations permitted by

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

international law; 73

freedom

6.

to

conduct

Both agreements say

all

scientific research. 74

States

must exercise these

rights with reasonable, or due,

regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of high seas rights.

75

The

LOS Convention adds that high seas users must have due regard for others' rights
in those parts of the sea-bed ocean floor
limits,

i.e.,

beyond the

territorial sea,

whether landlocked or not, may

sail

and subsoil beyond national

EEZ

and continental

jurisdictional

shelf.

ships flying their flag on the high seas.

ships and government ships on noncommercial service enjoy complete

on the high

The

seas

from other than the

clear trend, since the

John Selden's closed
larly the

high

seas.

sea concept,

War-

immunity

77

flag State.

triumph of Hugo Grotius'
79

All States,

78

open

seas theory over

has been for freedom of navigation, particu-

Another pattern of claims since Grotius' era has been, however,

limitation of that right. Succeeding Parts of this Chapter
limitations, looking landward.

examine trends

in these
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Fisheries to the

EEZ
One

class of claims

on merchant

vessels'

and warships'

rights to navigation

on

the high seas deals with coastal States' assertions to competence over belts of the

high seas outward from the

territorial sea for exclusive fishing rights.

ject to conflicting claims, if

been largely resolved by

At first sub-

not outright violence on the high seas, the issue has

treaties in

many areas

of the world. Historically the Gulf
80

More reThe US ex-

has been a primary source for pearls and there are offshore fishing areas.
cently,

agreements have attempted to regulate offshore fishing areas.

may point toward problems and solutions for the Gulf
seaward fishing zones and EEZs in particular. "[T]he fishery question has

perience with fishing issues

and

its

been the focal point of the whole problem of territorial waters from
Riesenfeld wrote this in 1942; today doubtless he would

ning."

ysis to include

a.

From

its

very begin-

amend this anal-

EEZ-related claims.

Fishery Claims to Sovereignty Claims to the

EEZ Concept.

The

oldest

claims for offshore use of the high seas surface and water column involve fishing,

and from these came assertions of rights in offshore fishing zones, the continental
shelf,

and EEZs. However, ocean fishing "has never been an unfettered

and, as will be seen, neither have continental shelf or

right,"

83

EEZ claims. Although more

of historical interest in some respects, fishing rights claims analysis develops this
thesis,

and this sub-Part starts by examining fishing rights claims in US practice.

The Treaty of Paris ending the American Revolution gave US fisherman access
Grand Banks, other fishing areas off Newfoundland, the Gulf of St. Law84
rence, the Newfoundland coasts and other coasts off British North America.
85
France also had fishing rights in the area. These rights were not considered cession of territory;
therefore, no navigation rights were impaired. An 1818 Brit87
ish-US convention confirmed and refined fishing rights and liberties, and this
to the

•

process continued in 1854.

88

The Treaty

of Washington, in effect 1873-85, again

confirmed these rights and approved reciprocal rights in

US

waters.

89

In 1906

British-US notes relating to purse seining off Newfoundland were exchanged;
this

modus vivendi continued into 1912.

A

90

1908 bilateral treaty, providing for an

International Fisheries Commission, resulted in authority for restricted halibut

and lobster fishing

in territorial waters.

In 1909 the two countries agreed to submit issues related to fishing in waters
northeast of the United States to arbitration.

The Permanent Court

of Arbitra-

tion decided in Britain's favor with respect to regulating the fishing industry

US

fishermen could hire crews of non-

Newfoundlanders). Although

US fishermen had to report to local

subject to the 1818 Convention

inhabitants

(i.e.,

but held

authorities if they landed to dry or cure fish, they could fish in certain local
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95

Newfoundland and Magdalen Islands waters. A treaty later recited procedual
rules and methods for future disputes that the Court had recommended.
British-US bilateral agreements of 1923, 1930 and 1937, Britain acting for Canada for the latter two, established a Pacific coast International Fisheries Commis97
sion and regulated Pacific high seas halibut fishing.
Similar 1930 and 1956
agreements

later protected

sockeye salmon.

98

In none of these fishing rights claims and counterclaims was there any assertion

of a right to regulate merchant ship or warship navigation except with respect to
taking
Pacific

fish.

The same

trend

may be observed

in claims to

hunt

seals in the

North

and Arctic Oceans.

Russian ukases of 1799 and 1821 gave the Russian-American

Company Bering

Sea whaling and fishing rights, along the northwest coast of America, and in other
seas northeast of Russia. Russia also asserted a right to forbid approaches to Rus-

Britain-Russia treaties were ratified in

1

US

and

sian lands closer than 100 miles. After British

824 and 1825.

provided: "[I]n any part of the [Pacific] Ocean,.

.

.

99

Russia-US and

protests,

The Russia-US agreement

Citizens or Subjects of the high

contracting Powers shall be neither disturbed nor restrained either in navigation,
or in fishing, or in resorting to the coasts

been occupied,

for.

.

.

upon points which may not already have

trading with the Natives," subject to certain exceptions.

Reciprocal rights to fish and to trade with natives were given, except for sale of fire-

The

arms, munitions
luni
of war and liquor.
pattern.

The 1867 treaty selling Alaska
ter territory in

States.

serted

1

825 Britain-Russia treaty followed the

102

to the

United States ceded Russian land and wa-

North America, including the Aleutian Islands,

to the

Although US legislation implementing the treaty would seem

dominion over the Bering Sea,

marine miles offshore were subject

to

United
have as-

an 1 893 arbitral award held that only three

to

US

sovereignty, and that

US

high seas

sei-

zures of British ships in the Bering Sea violated those ships' right of navigation.

"

The award established regulations for concurrent British-US jurisdiction over fur
seal fishing in

Bering Sea high seas areas.

British

Nothing

the award's regulations in 1894.

in the

and

US legislation confirmed

award or
1

a treaty establishing

no

the tribunal claimed to impair high seas navigation.

Other governments' reactions

to the 1893 regulations

admitted claim of control related to

seal fishing.

were mixed, but the only

In 1894, a Russia-US modus

vendi confirmed reciprocal policing rights for regulating seal fishing.

pursuant to a protocol,

Vi-

In 1902,

an arbitrator found for the United States in the Cape Horn

Pigeon case, where a Russian cruiser seized and detained a US-flag fishing vessel on
the high seas

when

the Russian naval

cions that the bark was engaged in an
fered to pay a proper indemnity

illicit

it?
....

commander "had been

in error in his suspi-

pursuit, and the Russian

Government of-

Similarly, in the James Hamilton Lewis,

C.H

White and Kate and Anna claims, where Russian seizures had been attempted on
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the high seas for possible illegal fishing in Russian territorial waters, the award

went to the United States. The arbitrator noted that absent a treaty there was no jurisdiction for Russian naval

cance of these awards

is

commanders

The signifiwhich occurs when seals

to seize US-flag vessels.

that even as to seal fishing,

'

migrate on the open sea, there was no claim to restrict freedom of navigation be-

yond

A

a territorial sea

without international agreement.

1911 Britain-Japan-Russia-US agreement, limiting North Pacific high seas

A decade later,

fur seal fishing, did not restrict navigation rights in these waters.

under Norwegian sover-

a treaty regularizing the Spitsbergen Archipelago's status

eignty declared fishing and hunting rights

dom of navigation;
access

its

but imposed no limitations on free-

Article 3 assured "nationals of all.

.

.

Parties equal liberty of

and entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of

the territories; subject to the observance of local laws and regulations, they [might]
carry on.

.

.

maritime and commercial operations on

a footing of absolute equality."

Transit rights were subject to Norwegian most-favored-nation treatment.
lateral fishing

Bi-

agreements between the World Wars followed the same pattern of

limiting fishing operations while expressly not restricting the general freedom of

navigation or not mentioning

The

1

it

17

at all.

1931 and later multilateral conventions regulating whaling, although ap-

plying in territorial waters and on the high seas,

118

imposed no

limits

on naviga-

tional use of these waters.

During the 1930's and until the outbreak of World War II, the United States expressed concern to Japan over depletion of Pacific salmon fisheries near Bristol

Bay, Alaska; initial proposed solutions included extension of the
three-mile territorial sea limit.

1

19

During the war the United

US

traditional

States considered

linking territorial sea expansion (and therefore possible restriction of freedom of
navigation) with limitations on fishing based on the continental shelf below the

water column.

120

Eventually the linkage idea was discarded,

121

and a US Fisheries

Proclamation (September 28, 1945) asserted national jurisdiction to establish
eries conservation

zones in high seas areas contiguous to

US

fish-

coasts, either for

US

fishermen's exclusive use or by international agreement with other States, with as-

surance that the United States would recognize other States' proclamations on a
seas of the areas in

which such

conservation zones [were] established and the right to their free and

unimpeded

reciprocal basis.

However, "[t]he character as high

navigation [was] in no

way thus

affected."

122

Despite these trends, three South American countries

Peru (CEP States)

—took

a claim to possible assertion of a 200-mile fisheries

step further, first by decrees in 1947

of Santiago on the Maritime
sole sovereignty

—Chile, Ecuador and

and 1950.

The August

18,

Zone followed, proclaiming, "[E]ach

zone a

1952 Declaration
[State] possesses

and jurisdiction over the area of sea adjacent to the coast of its own

country and extending not

less

than 200 nautical miles from the said coast."

The
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Declaration added:
strictions

not be construed as disregarding the necessary

"[It] shall

on the exercise of sovereignty and

jurisdiction

re-

imposed by international

law to permit the innocent and inoffensive passage of vessels of all nations through
"

the zone

CEP States formalized the Declaration with a Supple-

In 1954 the

mentary Agreement to consult to uphold the 200-mile territorial
termining action

be taken

to

if force
1

were used against them.

1

25

and

relations noted "differences in views"

a

impact was negated

its

tions in 1955 led nowhere,
belt,

on the

127

territorial sea.

was subjected

at the

to

The

international

An Ecuadoran pro-

such "sweeping modifications"

1954 Inter-American Conference.

and the 200-mile Santiago Declaration

128

Negotia-

territorial sea

linked with fishing rights claims, remained in effect although protested by

the United States.
territorial sea

ued

States

1953 Ecuador-US agreement on fishery

response to these expansive claims was immediate and strong.

that

The United

-yc

protested the executive decrees,

posal, similar to the Declaration,

including de-

sea,

to

129

By

1958, however, the

width and fishing control jurisdiction

issues.

Ecuador,

e.g.,

adhere to the 200-mile Declaration jurisdiction but asserted only

200-mile territorial
claims exceeding

The USSR,

contin-

a 12-mile

however, Ecuador's presidential proclamation claimed a

territorial sea. In 1966,

sea; the

United States does not recognize

this claim.

Other

LOS Convention limits persist; these too have been protested. 130

as successor to the tsarist

territorial sea jurisdiction

tween

CEP States had agreed to separate the

regime with

its

propensity to claim wide

through asserting fishing control,

territorial sea claims

and

distinguished be-

fisheries regulation jurisdiction.

A

1927 Soviet or-

dinance asserted
claimed

a 12-mile defensive limit of territorial waters; a 1935 ordinance
132
Repeating a pattern of an eara 1 2-mile fishing regulation jurisdiction.

agreement,

lier

Kingdom

133

the

USSR

concluded the Barents Sea Pact with the United

in 1956, permitting fishing

Barents Sea coast.

Following

by

UK vessels

a decree restricting

up

to three miles

from the

Sea of Okhotsk, western Be-

ring Sea and other contiguous North Pacific waters salmon fishing,

135

the

USSR

signed a bilateral agreement with Japan to regulate salmon fishing in these waters.

As

in the Barents Sea Pact, the treaty omitted territorial sea claims with a

right of excluding shipping.

Thus

it

was entirely consistent with customary international law that the 1958

Fishery Convention implicitly recognized an unimpeded right of navigation in

high seas areas potentially subject to fisheries conservation. Apart from treaty obligations, special interests
sions, all States

and rights of coastal States, and special Convention provi-

have a right

provisions for their nationals

deemed

to

on the high

137

seas.

States

seas fisheries or arbitrate differences. Coastal States

have special interests in areas off their shores.

138

This agreement

does not limit high seas navigation except insofar as fishing regulation

The High

must adopt

who fish on the high seas, and must negotiate agree-

ments with other users of high
are

to fish

is

involved.

Seas Convention, proclaiming separate high seas navigation and fishing
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on

The

confirms this principle.

freedoms,
that passage

is

not innocent in the territorial sea

lished coastal State regulations

on

Convention declares

Territorial Sea

if fishermen

may

Coastal States

territorial sea fishing.

pass laws to prevent and punish infringement of customs,

do not observe pub-

fiscal,

tions in their contiguous zone or territorial sea; these rules

or health regula-

may

also

impact

off-

shore fishing.

Decades
zones, two

1958 witnessed assertions of wider exclusive offshore fishing

after

Cod Wars between Iceland and

the United

Kingdom, and an ICJ

deci-

sion holding that custom had crystallized into allowing coastal States to claim an
exclusive 1 2-mile offshore fishing zone.

The 1 976 US Fishery Conservation and

Management Act, declaring a regulatory regime for a 200-mile area from territorial
sea baselines

and otherwise proclaiming a national right to regulate

all

but highly

migratory fish species, did not assert a right to regulate high seas navigation.

though Title
ments,

no

II

provided for foreign fishing pursuant to existing or future agree-

later

US

treaty has

impinged on general overflight or navigation

rights in fishing zones. In the Persian
sive fishing

Al-

zone in the Gulf of

Gulf area, Iran proclaimed

Oman and

to the limits of its continental shelf

The next year Saudi Arabia established an

boundary in 1973.

zone with median lines

as

exclusive fishing

boundaries with other countries.

The LOS Convention continues

a

high seas fishing areas, but largely in
possibility of a 200-mile

a 50-mile exclu-

EEZ,

the

theme of generally free navigation access to
the context of a claimed EEZ. Allowing the

LOS Convention declares for general high seas

freedoms including navigation and overflight, subject to

a coastal State's right to

explore and exploit natural resources of the water column, the seabed and subsoil;

and structures;

to scientific research;

coastal environment.

The LOS Conven-

to establish artificial islands, installations

and

to protecting

tion

EEZ is subject to the treaty's regime of peaceful uses of the high seas, invalid-

ity

and preserving the

of sovereignty claims for the high seas, navigation rights, status of ships, visit

and search, hot pursuit, rights

to lay

submarine cables and pipelines, and suppres-

sion of slavery, piracy, the drug traffic and unauthorized broadcasting, as well as

"other pertinent rules of international law,"

i.e.

the law of armed conflict.

148

As

in

the Fishery Convention, States with competing interests must give due regard to

other States' interests.

Although

Case.

it

itary exercises in the
tivities,

it

is

149

This principle

has been argued that the

LOS Convention reference to high seas
EEZ for military exercises, subject to due re-

submitted that the

a right to use an
152
for coastal State interests.
Even those

cede that the

LOS Convention does not allow mil-

EEZ, and some States have claimed a right to bar military ac-

freedoms includes
gard

parallels the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction

LOS

who argue against this position con-

Convention permits unimpeded

Islands capable of

human

rocks, low-tide elevations

EEZ

habitation or economic

overflight.

life

and human-made offshore

can have an EEZ, but

installations such as oil
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derricks,

A

etc.,

EEZ

State's

band of the

In those cases the

cannot.

sea

EEZ is measured from shore baselines.

proclamation, while asserting regulatory rights over a 200-mile

and

the territorial sea.

its

bottom, cannot claim a right to regulate navigation outside

The presumption

that high seas freedoms prevail, subject to

is

requirements of due regard for coastal State jurisdiction and sovereignty validly
asserted, and, in appropriate situations, the

LOAC, and in

all

cases the law of the

High

seas freedoms also prevail in high seas fishing areas as well, sub-

ject to principles

of due regard for others' high seas freedoms and, in appropriate

Charter.

situations, the

tion

EEZ

The LOS Conven-

LOAC, and in all cases the law of the Charter.

formula

is

customary law.

157

Conclusions. Claims to use ocean resources, whether in the water column or on

b.

may have begun

the seabed,

.

.

.

high seas navigation rights.
since then.

159

as attempts to

158

.

of

Episodic proclamations have claimed sovereignty

to navigate those potentially resource-rich areas, subject to

coastal States' rights to regulate activity that

vironmental damage, and subject

for purposes of overflight

might impair those resources, e.g., en-

to other limitations

Fishing zones and general

on high sea navigation, e.g.,

EEZs are subject to high

seas

and navigation by warships and merchant

Warships and merchantmen must, however, have due regard
terests in the

common

However, today international law firmly declares merchantmen's

and warships' rights

peaceful use.

encroach upon the great

.

freedoms

vessels alike.

for coastal State in-

EEZ.

High Seas Fisheries, EEZs, Pipelines, Freedoms of Navigation and Overflight,
and the Tanker War. Among Persian Gulf States, Iran claimed a 50-mile fishery
c.

zone off its coasts, subject
a

to

median

200-mile fishery zone, and the

However, Iran

EEZ,

is

among

line boundaries in the Gulf. Qatar

UAE were among 80

1

States claiming an

EEZ.

f\7

four States forbidding foreign military exercises in her

derogation unlawful under the

a

proclaimed

(Iran asserted this claim in 1993;

it is

LOS

that the United States has protested.

not relevant for this analysis.)

Insofar as the high seas parts of Gulf fishery zones or

EEZs are concerned, there

appears to be no record of impairment of usage by neutrals during the Tanker War.
Belligerents
cise of

EEZ

and neutrals

alike

owed

neutrals due regard for those neutrals' exer-

or fishing zone rights.

To be

sure, there

dhows, i.e., possibly fishing vessels operating in

a

is

evidence of attacks on

proclaimed zone, on offshore

oil

may have been servicing installations in a zone.
Since these incidents are concerned as much with attacks on a ship engaged in nav-

facilities

and on

vessels that

igation in the Gulf, analysis of the legitimacy of the attacks appears in Chapters III

and V. Iraq attacked Iranian offshore
and other
lations.

facilities.

installations, including

pumping

stations

Iran attacked Iraqi facilities but also neutral countries' instal-

Insofar as these were a belligerent's attacks on

its

opponent, the

LOAC

Law

of the

Sea
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applied through the LOS other rules clauses, by then a customary as well as a treaty

On the other hand, attacks on neutrals' facilities were violations of the UN

norm.

I

Charter,

fin

V

Chapter

art. 2(4).

discusses legitimacy of these attacks from an

LO AC perspective; Chapter VI examines them in the context of the law of the marAlthough pipelines necessarily led from the shores of Gulf

itime environment.
States,

e.g.,

Kuwait and

Iran, to these countries' offshore

pumping

stations, there

were no reports of attacks on the pipelines or any other submarine pipelines during
the Tanker War.

The United

States

responded

on US-flagged tankers by de-

to Iranian attacks

stroying Iranian offshore platforms that were a source of the attacks and which

may have been sites of legitimate EEZ activity under the LOS.
mate

This was a legiti-

under Article 51 of the Charter; whether seen

act of self-defense

cogens -protected right or as

trumping the LOS.

attacks were also proportional

170

As explained

under the law of naval warfare;

171

as a jus

in Chapter V, the

since there appar-

no appreciable environmental damage resulting from the attacks, no
claim of environmental derogation was at stake.
Thus to the extent that the atently was

tacks

might not have enjoyed primacy

self-defense or as a superior treaty

norm under Charter

of the inherent right to

Article 103, the United

had a customary right to respond in self-defense under the law of naval war-

States
fare,

norm

as a jus cogens

which

as part of the

LOS norms

LOAC applied under the circumstances in derogation of

through the other rules clauses of the

now customary law as well.
to the conflict,

i.e.,

173

LOS

conventions, which are

In terms of behavior toward Gulf States not parties

those that had proclaimed neutrality, the United States and

other maritime powers that sent naval forces to the Gulf
coastal State operations

and installations

in proclaimed

owed due regard

for

EEZs or fishing zones.

There is no evidence the United States or other powers did not show due regard for
proclaimed EEZs or fishing zones; i.e., there do not appear to have been
tions pertaining to fishing zones or

When
wing or

LOS viola-

EEZs.

the United States and other neutral countries launched aircraft, fixed-

helicopters,

whether on training

flights or to support protection of ship-

ping, those aircraft were entitled to high seas freedom of overflight as long as due

regard
alike.

175

was given high

As between neutral

ent, the
aircraft,

seas

freedoms and rights of neutrals and belligerents

air forces

and other high

law of the sea governed, subject to the

seas users, neutral or belliger-

LOAC.

1

nc.

When Iran attacked those

they or surface naval forces operating with them were entitled to respond

in proportional self-defense.

177

Neutral warships also had freedom of navigation on the high seas of the Gulf,
I

JO

subject to their obligation to give due regard

and freedoms, whether the other country was
case of high seas overflights, the

LOS

to other countries'

high seas rights

As

a neutral or a belligerent.

governed, subject to the

LOAC.

1

7Q

in the

When

neutral surface naval forces engaged in freedom of navigation or naval maneuvers
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under the law of the

(also legitimate

erents' aircraft or

180
sea),

were attacked, by

by belligerent surface naval

forces,

was lawful

it

to attack Iranian aircraft, surface naval forces,

Iran Ajr, in self-defense.

e.g.,

high seas as a self-defense measure.

It was also
181

from

bellig-

forces, those surface naval forces

could respond immediately in proportional self-defense. Thus

United States

fire

lawful to

for the

and minelaying

remove mines

laid in the

Just because a neutral did not respond im-

mediately in self-defense, as in the case of the Samuel B. Roberts, did not

mean that

a right of response did not exist.

Belligerents also

had rights of freedom of navigation and overflight.

It

was legit-

imate, e.g., for Iran to conduct naval exercises on the high seas, as well as in
torial waters,

its terri-

with due regard for others' high seas rights and freedoms, but not in

the Strait of Hormuz so as to obstruct or block navigation.

182

both belligerents to exercise freedom of overflight,

long as they gave due

regard

183

for neutrals'

as

It

was legitimate

high seas rights, on the way to attack targets of an opponent.

Belligerents' exercise of high seas freedoms, like the exercise of these freedoms
neutrals, were qualified

by the requirement that belligerence give due regard

neutrals' exercise of these freedoms. Belligerents'

qualified

by the
1

LOAC
or

liner.

US

forces,

at the time,

and other

Thus

where it applied.

for

engaged

Iran's

r

Airbus had

and

a right to overfly the

air

for

LOS was also

States' rights of proportional self-defense

in a surface

were exercising

conduct under the

by

Gulf as a

185

civil air-

naval action with Iranian speedboats

a right of self-defense. If the

U.S.S Vincennes honestly

(but mistakenly) believed the Airbus was an attacking Iranian aircraft, and that a

short-range surface-to-air missile was a proportional self-defense response, then
the tragic shootdown was legitimate under self-defense principles.
tion to victims of the accident

Stark attack,

i.e.,

a clause in

3.

compensation

gratia

payments; defendants in

187
'

for the

(There

civil lawsuits

is

include

settlement agreements every day, to the effect that any payment or

other performance

mit

Iraqi

there was no admission of fault by the United States.

nothing unusual about ex
such

was made ex gratia, as was

US compensa-

is

not an admission of fault. Payment in either case does not ad-

liability.)

The Regime of the Continental Shelf in the Persian Gulf
Claims relating to the offshore adjacent seabed and its subsoil began in the nine-

teenth century with assertions of national jurisdiction over subterranean mines;
these claims occasionally went
188

sea.

beyond what a coastal

State claimed for a territorial

Other early assertions of rights to the adjacent waters' seabed and subsoil re-

lated to claims to fishing rights,
sea^claims.

189

territorial sea

and subject

and these

also

sometimes went beyond

territorial

Early writers disagreed as to whether the seabed surface beyond a

was equivalent

to effective

to the

high seas or appurtenant to the adjacent land

occupation "subject only to no unreasonable interference

in the free use of the high seas above."

Great Britain claimed prescriptive rights

1

Law

for offshore pearl fisheries near

Ceylon

(Sri

Lanka) and

of the

Sea
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in the Persian Gulf,

and

there were Australian and Tunisian claims to offshore sedentery fisheries, partly

based on municipal law.
shelf was the 1942

191

The only known

UK-Venezuela agreement

early treaty dividing a continental
for exploiting oil resources

between

Trinidad and Venezuela in the Gulf of Paria. The parties disclaimed claims to high
seas rights or to passage or navigation rights.

a.

Developments Since World

ies jurisdiction claim,
194

in 1945,

193

192

War II. Contemporaneous with publishing a fisher-

the United States issued another executive proclamation

asserting jurisdiction

and control over natural resources of the subsoil

and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas off the United States. The
claim was subject to international agreements with adjacent nations "in accor-

dance with equitable principles," and, equally importantly, the proclamation
unequivocally asserted, "The character as high seas of the waters above the continental shelf and their right to free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus
fected."

Although national security had been advanced during World War II State

Department considerations of the proclamation,
tion of shelf natural resources
to

af-

it

asserted use

and conserva-

and "self-protection compelling] the coastal nation

keep close watch over activities off its shores.

resources" as rationales for the claim.

nental Shelf Lands Act

195

(OCSLA)

197

.

.

necessary for utilization of these

The US Congress passed the Outer Contiand the Submerged Lands Act

OCSLA specifically provides that the Act should not be construed to
seas fishing

and navigation

in 1953.
affect

198

high

199

rights.

A spate of continental shelf claims followed.

While most

States followed the

US lead in not asserting jurisdictional rights over high seas areas to control navigawould seem to have claimed,
204
205
Argentina;
such:
the CEP States, Chile,
Ecuador
and Peru,
culmi707
yOf.
70S
70Q
nating in the Declaration of Santiago;
El Salvador;
Honduras;
Mexico.
In each of the latter cases the United States and other countries protested claims of
tional or passage rights, a handful did claim, or
202

201

203

jurisdiction or right to regulate high seas freedoms, navigation or passage.
late as

210

As

1985 Chile and Ecuador asserted claims beyond 200 miles, which the United
21

States protested.

During the early postwar era, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, on behalf
of certain Persian Gulf sheikdoms, proclaimed sovereignty over offshore continental shelves but only for exploitation purposes.

212

In 1955 Iran proclaimed a

continental shelf for the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, but

it

did not purport to affect

in

superjacent waters or other States' installation of submarine cables.

claimed a continental shelf without a reservation like
(Bahrain, Dubai and Sharjah of the
shelf claims

and negotiated boundary treaties

Gulf States— Bahrain (1949, when under

Other Gulf States

Iran's.

UAE, Kuwait, Oman,

Qatar) had continental
2

for these rights.

UK protection;

Iraq also

1

S

Nevertheless,

all

1958, 1971), Iran (1955,
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Kuwait (1949, when under UK
Qatar (1949, when under UK protec-

1958, 1968, 1969, 1971, 1974, 1975), Iraq (1957),

protection; 1965, 1968),

Oman (1972,

tion; 1965, 1969), Saudi

Arabia (1949, 1958, 1965, 1968), States of the

UK protection;

when under

1968, 1969, 1971, 1975)

bed rights by unilateral proclamation
posite or adjacent countries.
line in

1974),

(e.g.,

These treaty-defined areas end
coastal

US and

an agreed meeting

boundary seaward.

and subsoil outside the

717

territo-

depth of 200 meters or beyond that where superjacent waters' depth

rial sea, to a

permit natural resources exploitation. Islands can have

Agreements must determine opposite
line

at

other proclamations or treaties.

shelf is defined as adjacent submarine seabed

median

sea-

Shelf Convention resolved definitional, dimensional and ju-

risdictional issues erupting after the

The

— have asserted offshore

those of 1949) or by agreement with op-

mid-Gulf for the most part or extend the

The Continental

UAE (1949,

continental shelf.

States' boundaries; absent a treaty, the

the boundary, "unless another boundary

is

a

is

justified

by

special cir-

cumstances." Similarly, agreements were to determine adjacent States' shelf
boundaries, without which the line was to be "determined by.

.

.

the principle of

equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of each State is

measured."

219

In 1965 the Restatement (Second), For-

Convention principles.

eign Relations accepted

220

The 1969 North Sea

Continental

Shelf Cases, however, concluded that the Convention's "special circumstances"
rules

had not yet crystallized into custom, in a controversy not covered by the Con-

vention

—being not between adjacent or opposite States— and where one State was

not then

a treaty party.

Although
ral resources,

.

.

a coastal State has sovereign rights to explore

which include both

living

and exploit shelf natu-

and non-living resources,

222

"rights of the

do not

affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas,
223
the airspace above these waters."
Article 5(a) underscores this, declaring:

coastal State.
or.

221

.

.

"[EJxploration of the.
result in

.

.

shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources

must not

any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the conserva-

tion of the living resources of the sea[.]" Exploration or exploitation cannot interfere

with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research whose results

will

be published.

Certain special continental shelf uses

— are subject

installations, tunnelling

—submarine cables or pipelines,

to special rules.

tion declares the rights to lay submarine cables
rights,

225

The High

artificial

Seas Conven-

and pipelines are high

seas usage

but that they are subject to the principle that these freedoms, and others rec-

ognized by general principles of international law, must be recognized by States

with "reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the

dom of the high seas."
Convention says that

y?fi

This

is

also a

a coastal State

customary rule of international law.

727

free-

The

many not impede other States' submarine ca-

ble or pipeline laying, subject to the coastal State's rights to take reasonable

Law

of the

Sea

257

measures for exploiting its continental shelf and exploitation of the shelf s natural
110

This

resources.

in effect a restatement of the

is

High Seas Convention "reason-

able regard" principle in the context of the continental shelf and pipelines or ca-

might cross the

bles that

shelf. Similarly, the

exploring the shelf or exploiting

its

Shelf Convention provides that

resources "must not result in any unjustifiable

interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the living resources of

the sea, nor result in any interference with fundamental oceanographic or other

research

scientific

out

carried

with

the

of open

intention

publication."

"[Installations or devices [permitted on the shelf], nor the safety zones around

them,

may be

established where interference

may be

nized sea lanes essential to international navigation."

caused to the use of recog229

Subject to these limita-

may build, maintain or operate installations and other devices
necessary to explore and exploit their shelf s natural resources. Coastal States may
tions, coastal States

and

up

to

500 meters around these installations and devices

take, within these zones,

measures necessary for their protection. All ships

establish safety zones of

must respect these zones, which do not have the

and therefore do

status of islands

not have a territorial sea around them. Coastal States must give due notice of installation construction

and maintain permanent means

to warn of their presence.
230

Abandoned or disused installations must be removed.
The LOS Convention made few changes relevant to high seas rights and freedoms issues. High seas navigation and other rights are not affected by a State's continental shelf declaration of sovereign rights to explore

and exploit

its shelf;

the

superjacent water and air space are not affected, as in the Conventions, and a
coastal State

cannot unduly interfere with these high seas rights and freedoms.

231

The 200 meter depth-exploitability criteria were changed to a flat 200 nautical mile

EEZ

limit, the

maximum

limit,

232

or the continental margin, whichever

350-mile seaward extension.

mained the same.

233

The seabed and

is

greater, with a

subsoil formula re-

Opposite and adjacent State claims must be resolved by

"agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the [ICJ]
Statute.

.

.

to achieve

in force will

an equitable solution." (Disputes relating to treaties already

be determined by the

no agreement,

LOS

same under the

LOS

treaties' terms.) If there is
235

Convention dispute resolution procedures must be used.

Coastal State exploration and exploitation rights are the

Convention, and the same exploitable resources are

listed.

The 1958

treaty,

however, placed the burden on scientific research installations or equipment to
stay out of "established international shipping lanes"

warning signals

to ensure safety at sea.

237

fere with other legitimate uses of the sea.

of such uses."

.

to display appropriate

Research must not "unjustifiably inter-

and shall be duly respected in the course

The LOS Convention sets forth a full range of potential claims re-

lating to conservation,

these will be

.

and

environmental control and research for

examined separately insofar as they pertain

to

all

ocean areas;

Tanker War

issues.

a
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As

in the Shelf

LOS

Convention, the

Convention provides

submarine cables and pipelines,

::tinental shelf:

structures, drilling

for special uses of the

artificial islands

and similar

and tunneling

En 1969 the ICJ had been reluctant to declare Continental Shelf Convention Artides

o

Coon

andc

1

asdeclan

_

G

panel in the

id

Dint

TheL'mtec
i

g

b.

.

LOS

the

by 1984, however,

boundaries;"

-.shell

at

Convention continental shelf

present with general international

tested a few States' legislation or proclamations.

Ml

extend jurisdiction beyond

Chile a:

Conclusions. Thus

LOS Convention limits.""*

obligations to avoid interfering unduly with shelf

ct to

M exploitation, or to exerc se safety it sea. the right of warships and

ex"

D

merchant

vessels

i

to

navigate the high seas water

shelf continues una:-

>y the

LOS

column covering the continental

Convention, whether binding as

a treaty or

errations such as the Santiago Declaration,

reflect

Moreover, :he:e
j State

some

uncements

unilateral pre

from using

is

treaties'

nothing in the law of the sea conventions

continental shelf for placing

its

notwith-

to the contrary-

its

to bar a

military installations

there First, since a proclaimed shelf is subject to the coastal State's sovereignty for
istal State

thee

puj

j

under the Chi:

self-defense

has the inherent right of
^

.end those interests.

Second,

to the extent

LOAC. which includes the law of naval warfare, might apply to a situation,
The relationship between
bodies ;: laa are >eparate from the LOS

that the

those

.

1

warns -rove a neutral's proclaimed continental shelf,
an opposing
or to use a neutral's shelf for emplacement of weapons directed against
-~

belligerents operations in

-

bellicerer.:. is

more complex;

this

is

analyzed in Chapter V-

The Seabed Anns Control Treaty

forbids placing nuclear weapons, or other

weapons of mass destruction, on these^r^i and :ean floor bevond 12 miles from
the baseline bom which the territorial sea is measured.""*" The treaty does not de;

fine
as

weapons of mass destruction, nor does

k nsj

ai :r.zy

nc

not tethered

mines, that are not a

i

:

:

it

covet weapons in the water column,

:he bottom, or other weapons,

I

tight

::

all

expk re and exploit

.:mn: in any event other

are separate

ing that

its

From

the

LOS

the coastal State obtains with a proclaimed continental shelf

no: subject to an unlimited
c

conventional

mass ~e>:ruction. There are opposing positions on

the point, but the foregoing appears to be the better view.""*

>::::.:.

e.g.,

from

i

purposes stated in the law of the

for

it
:

treignty claim.

States'

LOS

is

per-

the

sea: the shelf is

freedoms apply to the water

Charter rights to self-defense and

LOAC options

LOS principles." The Treaty recognizes the ditterence by stat-

terms do not support or prejudice positions under the Territorial Sea

mention and other
must have due regard

as? sets
for

^

::

Those placing such devices
continental shelf rights, however.""

die law of the se;

coastal State's

*

.

Law

c.

of the

Sea
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The Continental Shelf in the Persian Gulf and the Tanker War. The Persian

Gulf is a
there

is

LOS

relatively narrow, shallow

253

For

all

practical purposes,

no deep seabed in the sense of the Continental Shelf Convention or the

Convention. There

Since

body of water.

it is

is

a basin without

Gulf has no continental

no Area within the meaning of the

LOS

Convention.

any continental slope or deep seabed, theoretically the

There are no reports of excessive claims with

shelf.

respect to Gulf States' offshore sea floor claims. Disputes over offshore islands

continue, however.
Insofar as the high seas parts of these offshore areas (which in a sense can be con-

sidered continental shelves) are concerned, there appears to be no record of

by neutral coastal States during the Tanker War.
Belligerents and neutrals alike owed neutrals due regard for those neutrals' exer756
cise of continental shelf rights.
To be sure, there is evidence of attacks on dhows,

belligerents' impairing usage

i.e.,

have been servicing installations on a shelf.
as

may

possibly vessels operating above a proclaimed shelf, or other vessels that
257

Since these incidents are concerned

much with attacks on a ship engaged in navigation in the Gulf, analysis of the le-

gitimacy of the attacks appears in Chapters
shore installations that

III

and V. Iraq attacked Iranian

off-

may have been connected with shelf operations, including
258

pumping stations and other facilities.
Because these were attacks by a belligerent upon its opponent, the law of armed conflict applied through operation of the

LOS

other rules clauses, by then a treaty and customary norm.

cusses legitimacy of these attacks from an

259

Chapter

V dis-

LOAC perspective, and Chapter VI ex-

amines them in the context of the developing law of the maritime environment.

The United

States

responded

to Iranian attacks

760

on US-flagged tankers by de-

stroying Iranian offshore platforms that were a source of the attacks and which

may have been connected with

shelf activities legitimate under the

LOS.

This

was a legitimate act of self-defense under Article 5 1 of the Charter, whether seen
ajus cogens -protected right or as

trumping the LOS.

as

As explained in Chapter V,

the attacks were also proportional under the law of naval warfare;

since there

was no appreciable environmental damage resulting from the attacks, no environmental derogation claim was

Thus

at stake.

to the extent the attacks

might not

have enjoyed primacy as exercise of a jus cogens norm of the inherent right of
self-defense or as a superior treaty

norm under

United States had a customary right

to

val warfare,

which

as part of the

ogation of law of the sea

conventions, which are

Gulf States not parties

Article 103 of the Charter, the

respond in self-defense under the law of na-

LOAC

applied under the circumstances in der-

norms through

the other rules clauses of the

now customary law as well.

to the conflict,

i.e.,

765

LOS

In terms of behavior toward

those which had proclaimed neutrality,

the United States and other maritime powers that sent naval forces to the Gulf

owed due regard
shelves.

There

for their operations
is

and

installations in proclaimed continental

no evidence that the United

States or other

powers did not do
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so;

i.e.,

there appears to have been no violations of the law of the sea as

pertained

it

to continental shelves in the Gulf.

4.

The Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone

Commentators have traced

LOS conference, the 1958 conventions, the unsuccessful at-

Ages through the 1958
tempts to establish

from the Middle

States' claims to territorial seas

a limit in

1

960 and thereafter.

Aside from examining general

claims patterns, with particular examination of the 1958 Conventions and 1982

LOS Convention, those waters will not be navigated again. This Part also reviews
principles of the contiguous zone. Claims going

beyond the

territorial seas, apart

from the contiguous zone, however measured and for whatever purpose, have been
addressed in previous parts, and that material will not be repeated here either.

a.

Analysis:

From a Three-Mile Rule

LOS Convention.

".

.

.

a Twelve-Mile

to

Norm Under

the 1982

[B]y 1926, the three-mile limit was in every sense a rule of
Jf.0

international law," according to the commentators.

However, even

in the early

part of this century there were exceptions.

The

trend had begun with Great Britain's Customs Consolidation Act of 1876,

which asserted a one-league belt of waters in which England claimed a right to visit
and search
mile rule
Act.

.

.

all vessels.

—

269

"Of all the

factors influencing the

treaties, laws, court decisions,

growth of the three-

and writings of the experts

—

probably went the furthest in establishing the three-mile limit as
270

the law of nations.'"

terms of merchant

fleet

tonnage, but also because of the Royal Navy.)

the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act.

three-mile territorial sea in 1793,

a rule in

Two

The United

when US

States

country

to formally

years

Secretary of State

had claimed

Thomas

272

claim three miles.

273

To be

a

Jefferson

A year later Con-

gress passed legislation asserting criminal jurisdiction; the United States
first

.

over only one league of coastal waters in
271

wrote the British and French ministers to the United States.

the

.

(At the time, of course, Brittania ruled the waves, not only in

later Britain asserted criminal jurisdiction

come

the.

had be-

sure, the rest of the

nineteenth century saw conflicting claims that spilled over into the twentieth cen-

but by 1901 the United States had formally reaffirmed three miles as

tury,

275

territorial sea.

Its

short-lived Naval

War Code

three-mile limit for armed conflict situations.

of 1900 had similarly asserted a

Other

States,

bowing

to British
277

diplomatic pressure, began to redefine their territorial belt as three miles.
trations

norm.

and prewar treaties seemed

278

its

Arbi-

way to universal acceptance of the
remained substantial dissent. Hague Con-

to point the

However, before 1926 there

vention VIII (1907) forbade laying mines within three miles of a neutral's coast,

but the Second Hague Peace Conference failed to agree on a uniform general rule
for naval warfare situations.

maritime powers,

e.g.,

279

France,

Just before

and during World War

Italy, Russia,

and other

t
I

•

important

States asserted claims to

Law

more than three

And

miles."

modified its stance by 1 924 to opt for a three-mile limit,
tional

Law

an extent greater or

Harvard Research Draft supported

band of the high
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Association had

the Institute of Interna-

less

.

.

.."

282

may

In 1927 the influential

a similar basic three-mile limit with an adjacent

seas subject to customs, navigation, health or police regulations,

"or for [a State's] immediate protection."

283

The 1930

First

Act of the League of

Law could not agree on a

Nations Conference for the Codification of International
limit.

Sea

declared for the same limit but added that "International usage

justify the recognition of

284

Law

although the International
281

of the

Iran claimed a 6-mile territorial sea in 1934, recognizing a right of inno-

cent passage for warships, including submarines navigating on the surface, except
for vessels in a state of war, in

which case the law of maritime neutrality would apfrom entering certain

ply. Iran also reserved the right to prohibit foreign ships
ritorial waters,

Bilateral

i.e.,

"closed zones," for national security reasons.

agreements between the United States and

1924-30, to assist in

US

its

ter-

285

major trading partners,

national prohibition law enforcement, carefully divided

between those nations agreeing with the United States on the three-mile limit and
IQf.

those which reserved their position on the issue.
After World War

II certain

continental shelf and

were protested.

287

EEZ

The

Latin American States tried to fold claims for a wide

into a territorial sea of the

Soviet bloc and the People's Republic of China asserted

12-mile territorial sea claims during 1950-60.

ceded Norway's historic claim
solved a

same breadth; the claims

288

In 1951 the United

Kingdom con-

to a four-mile limit in the Fisheries Case,
289

method of determining

which

re-

In 1949 Saudi Arabia declared a

baselines.

6-mile territorial sea as part of its sovereignty.

290

In 1955 the Philippines, and in
291

1

957 Indonesia, asserted a 1 2-mile territorial belt around their archipelagoes."

1958 Saudi Arabia expanded its territorial sea claim to 12 miles.
torial

292

Sea Convention failed to settle on a limit for the territorial

coastal State sovereignty over the belt of coastal waters
294

and

In

The 1958 Terrisea,

airspace.

but declares
293

The next

year Iran claimed a 12-mile territorial sea.

The Convention
zone of up

does, however, allow coastal States to declare a contiguous

on

to 12 miles, subject to opposite States' agreeing

a

dividing line (in the

absence of which the median line from baselines forms the division),
ing infringement of its customs,
its

territory or territorial sea,

tions

committed within

its

fiscal,

for:

immigration or health regulations within

and for punishment of infringements of these regula-

territory or territorial sea.

295

The contiguous zone

part of the high seas outside of the territorial sea under the Territorial Sea
tion.

Thus

prevent-

in the case of the

United

States,

which had

1958, the outer 9 miles of its 12-mile contiguous zone

a

is

Conven-

3-mile territorial sea in

were high

Seas Convention provides for a right of hot pursuit from the zone
authorities have reason to believe a foreign ship has violated

its

seas.

The High

if coastal

State

customs, fiscal, im-

migration or health laws in the coastal State's territory or territorial sea."

Iran
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had proclaimed a 12-mile "zone of maritime supervision" when a 6-mile territorial
sea

was claimed in 1934; the claim was amended in 1959

rial sea.

299
'

to assert a 12-mile territo-

Saudi Arabia had claimed a 6-mile contiguous zone for "maritime sur-

veillance" relating to security, navigation
coastal sea in 1949; this

was expanded

and

fiscal

to a 12-mile

matters beyond

6-mile

its

contiguous zone, coincident

with the Territorial Sea Convention limit, in 1958. However,

just before the

1958

UN LOS Conference, Saudi Arabia expanded its contiguous zone to 18 miles and
its territorial

sea to 12 miles.

The Convention establishes methods for measuring baselines for the territorial
301

and declares rules

sea,

States' ships

for

innocent passage through the

enjoy a right of innocent passage through the territorial

the Convention's other principles. Passage
rial sea for

territorial sea. All
sea, subject to

means navigation through the

territo-

traversing that sea without entering internal waters, for proceeding to

internal waters, or for

making

for the

high seas from internal waters. Passage in-

cludes stopping and anchoring, but only incident to ordinary navigation or
essary because of force majeure or distress. Passage

innocent "so long as

good order or security of the

prejudicial to the peace,

must take place

is

in conformity with the

coastal State."

is

not considered innocent

these vessels from fishing in the territorial sea. Submarines
surface

and show

their flag,

done so

State has

above the

have agreed

if

these

to prevent

must navigate on the

unless a State consents to submerged transit; no
Aircraft do not have a right of innocent passage

publicly.

unless allowed to do so by the coastal State; most

territorial sea,

coastal States

not

Such passage

do not observe published coastal State regulations designed
302

it is

Convention and "other rules of interna-

tional law." Foreign flag fishing vessel passage

vessels

if nec-

to allow

commercial

sarily military or other State aircraft.

aircraft overflight, but

Coastal States

may

not neces-

not hamper innocent

passage and must give appropriate publicity to dangers to navigation within their
territorial seas of which

a right of

innocent passage.

Coastal States

may

However, surface warships enjoy

they have knowledge.
307

act to prevent passage that is not innocent.

ceeding to internal waters, a coastal State

may

For ships pro-

take necessary steps to prevent

breaches of conditions to which admission of those ships to those waters

is

subject.

Subject to a provision related to straits passage declaring that there can be no sus-

pension of international
tion

among

straits passage, a coastal State

may, without discrimina-

foreign-flag vessels, suspend temporarily innocent passage of these

vessels in specified areas of its territorial sea if the suspension

tection of the coastal State's security,
308

lished.

How

long a temporary suspension

cannot be factually permanent.

conform

and only

309

after the

is

necessary for pro-

suspension has been pub-

may be imposed

is

not clear, but

it

Foreign-flag vessels in innocent passage must

to coastal State regulations

enacted in conformity with the Convention

and "other rules of international law,"

as well as regulations relating to transport

1

Law

and navigation.

310

The Convention

also provides for charges

Sea

of the

263

on merchant ships

31

All of the foregoing apand criminal and civil jurisdiction over merchantmen.
plies to government ships operated for commercial purposes, and all but the civil
jurisdiction rules apply to government ships operated for non-commercial purposes.

The Convention does not affect government ships' immunities enjoyed un-

der the Convention or "other rules of international law."

comply with

a coastal State's regulations

request for compliance, the coastal State

on

territorial sea

312

warship does not

If a

passage and disregards a

may require that warship to leave the ter-

313
ritorial sea.

A

1960 conference failed to resolve the issue of the width of the

territorial sea;

debate centered around a 6 or 12-mile belt, and a compromise of a 6-mile territorial
sea coupled with a 6-mile fishing zone failed

(Second) cautiously says that

by one

The

vote.

1965 Restatement

"A state does not violate the rights of another state by

setting the breadth of the territorial sea at three nautical miles,"

315

but otherwise

Whether the Iranian and Saudi
317
seas were legitimate is debatable,
but by

generally confirms Convention principles.

claims as of 1980 to 12-mile territorial

the end of the war they were in the clear majority.

The 1982 LOS Convention declares a 12-mile belt as the maximum claim over
which a coastal State may claim sovereignty, including its airspace, seabed and
318
subsoil.
The LOS Convention adopts Territorial Sea Convention baselines
measuring methodology, adding provisions
rivers

and

reefs,

and

states that offshore installations

permanent harbor works
(Third) takes the

for low-tide elevations,

in

and

mouths of

artificial islands are

determining baselines near ports.

319

not

The Restatement

LOS Convention position on breadth of the territorial sea, 320 not-

ing that some countries, including the United States at that time (1987), might

claim less than 12 miles.

321

In 1958, 9 of 75 coastal States had claimed a 12-mile territorial sea; 2 claimed
over 12, and 45 asserted the traditional 3-mile limit.

claimed a 12-mile

sea, 3

claimed over

later the figures were: of

more than

12 miles,

1

12,

and 32 claimed

coastal States

a 3-mile limit.

A decade

16 coastal nations, 54 claimed a 12-mile sea, 20 claimed

and only 28 clung to the 3-mile

ginning of the Tanker

By 1965 26 of 85

War

limit.

Within

a year of the be-

numbers were: of 131 coastal States, 76
32?
claimed a 1 2-mile limit, 25 claimed more, and 23 held to a 3-mile limit.
This was
(1980) the

the trend as delegates began negotiating the 1982
enties. It

continued as

a trend as the

Besides permitting a

1

LOS

Tanker War began

2-mile territorial sea claim,

Convention in the Sevin 1980.

the

1

982

LOS Convention

copies the Territorial Sea Convention contiguous zone provisions;

been expanded to 24 miles.

its

breadth has

The LOS Convention provides that at least the outer

12 miles of a declared contiguous zone are subject to high seas freedoms of navigation

and overflight

if a coastal

State has declared a 12-mile territorial sea. If the

toral State has a territorial sea of less

than 12 miles,

it

may

lit-

declare a contiguous
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zone of up to 24 miles, with the balance of the zone retaining high seas freedoms.

The

coastal State's right of hot pursuit

from

its

contiguous zone under the

torical objects
a

found

at sea, stating a

LOS

The LOS Convention

Convention follows High Sea Convention principles.
adds a new provision, permitting States to control

325

archaeological or his-

traffic in

presumption that these objects' removal from

contiguous zone without coastal State approval results in an infringement within

coastal State territory or territorial sea of its contiguous zone-related laws.

In 1983 the

US

Oceans Policy Statement recognized the rights of other States in

waters off their coasts, as reflected in the
ity,

if a coastal

i.e.,

327

State recognized the

LOS Convention, on the basis of reciprocUS' and other countries' rights and

free-

doms in the waters of the coastal State. The United States would exercise and assert
its

navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis consistent

with the balance of interests reflected in the Convention.

The United States would

not acquiesce in other States' unilateral acts designed to restrict the international

community's rights and freedoms

in navigation, overflight

and other related high

The United States continued to claim a 3-mile territorial sea, howThe result was that the United States would recognize other countries'

seas uses.
ever.

328

under the 1982

valid claims

LOS Convention navigational articles. 329 In that year,
'

of 1 39 coastal States, 79 claimed a 1 2-mile territorial sea, the number claiming over
12 miles

had declined

to 20,

and those claiming

a 3-mile limit stood at 25.

1987 the Restatement (Third) recognized a 12-mile territorial

In

The next year

sea.

the United States claimed a 12-mile territorial sea in accordance with the

Convention.

"

LOS

332

By 1989 the number of States claiming a 3-mile limit had declined to 10, among
them Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE; a decade later it was down to 4. By 1989 Iran,
Iraq,

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had joined the United States and 103 other States in

proclaiming a 12-mile

territorial sea.

333
"

Whether

a State

was party

Convention or not, and many 12-mile claimants were by 1997,
the 12-mile limit had

become

(1988),

and more certainly so

in 1997

— continued to assert

a

a

it is

to the

fairly safe to say

customary norm by the end of the Tanker

decade later.

LOS

A few countries — 19 in

War

1989 and 15

territorial sea claims greater than 12 miles.
336

335

These

were the subject of US and others' diplomatic protests.

New rules for innocent passage was another major change between the Territorial Sea Convention and the LOS Convention. The basic right of innocent passage,
the meaning of passage, and the rule that submarines must navigate on the surface
unless there
as

is

coastal State consent that they

do rights of protection

remain submerged, remain the same,

for the coastal State, principles for charges for traversing

the territorial sea and criminal and civil jurisdiction applicable to

all

ships,

and the

statement that with certain exceptions in the treaty, the Convention does not affect

immunity of warships and government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. The rule
that if a warship does not comply with coastal State regulations

—

Law

on

territorial sea

coastal State

tained, the
ately."

of the

passage and disregards a request for compliance

may

require that warship to leave the territorial sea

Sea

made

—was

265

to

it,

a

also re-

Convention adding that the offending war vessel must leave "immedi-

337

Principal innovations in the
sage; laws

and regulations a

providing for sea lanes,

LOS Convention deal with defining innocent pas-

coastal State

traffic

may impose relating to innocent passage;

separation schemes, foreign nuclear-powered ships

and vessels carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances;
a coastal State's duties; definition of a warship;

damage caused by

a

and

flag State responsibilities for

warship or a government ship operated for non-commercial

purposes.

As
sage

in the Territorial Sea Convention, the

is

innocent so long as

it is

LOS

Convention declares that pas-

not prejudicial to the coastal State's peace, good or-

der or security. Such passage must take place in conformity with the Convention
referring to the law of armed con-

"and with other rules of international law,"
339
flict.

The LOS Convention enumerates

"prejudicial to the peace,
(a)

activities

during passage considered

good order or security" of the

coastal State:

any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of the coastal State, or in any manner in violation of the princi-

embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or secu-

ples of international law
(b)
(c)

rity of the coastal State;

(d)

any

act of propaganda

aimed

at affecting

the defence or security of the coastal

State;
(e)

the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;

(f)

the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;

(g)

the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to

the customs,

fiscal,

immigration or sanitary

[i.e.,

health] laws

and regulations

of the coastal State;

and serious pollution contrary

(h)

any

(i)

any fishing

(j)

the carrying out of research or survey activities;

(k)

any

act of wilful

act

(1)

Convention;

activities;

aimed

facilities

to [the]

at interfering

with any systems of communication or any other

or installations of the coastal State;

any other activity not having

Most commentators say the

list is

a direct

bearing on passage.

exclusive.

vention, submarines transiting the territorial

show their ensign,

340

As under the Territorial Sea Consea must navigate on the surface and

and innocent passage does not include a right of overflight.

A coastal State may adopt regulations, in conformity with the Convention and
"other rules of international law,"

through the

maritime

territorial sea

traffic;

i.e.,

the

LOAC,

relating to innocent passage

with respect to safety of navigation and regulation of

protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities

The Tanker War

266

or installations; protection of cables and pipelines; conservation of the sea's living
resources; prevention of infringement of the coastal State's fisheries laws; preser-

vation of the coastal State's environment and prevention, reduction and control of
pollution of the coastal State; marine scientific research and hydrographic
surveys;

and prevention of infringement of the

coastal State's customs, fiscal, im-

migration or health laws. These laws do not apply to foreign ship design, construc-

manning

tion,

or equipment unless the laws give effect to "generally accepted

international rules or standards."

eign ships in innocent passage

The coastal State must publicize these laws. For-

must comply with these laws and

all

generally ac-

cepted international regulations relating to prevention of collisions at

Convention

list

of regulations

The Convention

is

The

sea.

"exhaustive and inclusive."

allows coastal States to require foreign ships exercising the

right of innocent passage to use sea lanes

and

traffic

separation schemes, where

necessary for navigational safety. Tankers, nuclear-powered vessels and ships car-

rying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances or materials

may be required to confine their passage to these sea lanes. A coastal State must indicate these sea lanes

and separation schemes on publicized charts.

Foreign nu-

clear-powered vessels and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or

noxious substances must carry documents and observe special precautionary measures established for
sage.

them by international agreements while

in innocent pas-

348

The LOS Convention modified

the coastal State's duties and obligations with

respect to innocent passage. Besides declaring that a coastal State

may not hamper

innocent passage in form or fact, the Convention stated that in particular, in applying the Convention or regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention, a
coastal State

may

not "(a) impose requirements on foreign ships which have the

practical effect of denying or impairing.

form or

.

.

innocent passage; or (b) discriminate in

fact against ships of any State or against ships carrying cargoes to,

on behalf of any

State."

As

in the 1958 Convention, a coastal State

any danger to navigation, of which

it

has knowledge, in

from or

must publicize

its territorial sea.

A coastal

may suspend innocent passage temporarily in specified areas of its territorial
sea if suspension is necessary for protecting its security. This suspension may take
State

effect

only after

If a

it

has been published.

349

warship or other non-commercial government vessel does not comply with

legitimate coastal State regulation concerning innocent passage, the flag State

bears responsibility for any loss or

damage

to the coastal State resulting

from

this

non-compliance.
Despite Territorial Sea Convention and
right of warship
States,

LOS Convention articles according a

unnanounced and unimpeded innocent passage,

as of 1989, 43

including Iran, claimed a right to control foreign-flag warship entry into

their territorial seas, requiring prior authorization or permission, prior notice, or

Law

limits

on numbers present

at

one time.

352

of the

Sea

267

Twenty-six States, including Iraq and
353

Oman, specifically recognized the right of warship innocent passage.
By 1996 57 States had claimed contiguous zones of 4 to 24 miles, including BahAlthough the Conrain, Iran, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
gress considered in 1991-92 legislation to extend the

miles,

it

failed to pass.

355

US

contiguous zone to 24

In 1 999, however, the United States proclaimed a 24-mile

contiguous zone, as reflected in the
that high seas freedoms,

e.g.,

LOS Convention. The US proclamation stated

of navigation and overflight, apply in the zone and

that the proclamation did not alter

US or other States' rights and duties in the US

Two countries bordering the Persian Gulf were among 1 8 States asserting

EEZ.

a right to include protecting national security interests; Iran did so in 1993

Saudi Arabia at some earlier date.
tested
rial

and

The United States and other countries have pro-

most of these claims as not being within rights permitted under the Territo-

LOS
the US

Sea Convention or the

might be contrasted with

Convention.

357

These general security claims

defense zones of the early part of this century,

which limited or temporarily excluded navigation.

358

The latter, promulgated de-

cades before standards were stated in the LOS conventions, would still pass muster
in

most

The

cases.

same under the 1958
However, the measurement of them has caused numerand 1982 conventions.
36ft
ous diplomatic protests and US FON operations,
the principal problem being
declarations of straight baselines under the Territorial Sea Convention and the
LOS Convention. If a country claims a territorial sea and a contiguous zone or
other area, e.g., an EEZ, fishing zone or continental shelf based on erroneous calcurules for baselines determinations are virtually the
359

lation of baselines
areas' outer

pushing

lines

toward the high

seas, the result

may be that these

boundaries will encroach on what should be high seas under the 1958

numerous cases where States have protested
36?
erroneous assertions of straight baselines.
Of over 75 States and their dependenor 1982 conventions. There have been

cies in a

1996

list,

4 countries bordering the Persian Gulf, Iran,

Oman, Saudi

Ara-

and the UAE, had baselines the United States considered miscalculated.
However, only those of Iran, Oman and Saudi Arabia were declared before or dur-

bia

ing the Tanker War.

363

Since the Persian Gulf is so narrow,

asserting claims to the continental shelf,

eignty or jurisdiction

among them,

etc.,

its

coastal States

have been forced to divide sover-

and the only issues related

to erroneous

baseline claims involve territorial sea and contiguous zone claims that
cessive. If these claims

coastal State

were excessive, the

might claim policing authority

result could
365

be that

in a contiguous

subject only to high seas law, such law perhaps being limited

continental shelf,

etc.,

claims considerations.

366

a

may be ex-

a Persian

Gulf

zone area that

is

by legitimate EEZ,

Similarly, a territorial sea claim

that extends too far into the high seas could result in claims

improper activity in the disputed waters, with

when

by the

coastal State of

counterclaim by the State of the
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flag of, e.g., a transiting

warship that the area

is

high seas for navigational and other

purposes, although perhaps limited by legitimate continental shelf,

etc.,

claims

considerations.

A US movement toward ratifying the

Conclusions.

b.

1982

LOS Convention may

mean that tangles of claims resulting from Territorial Sea Convention deficiencies
will gradually be eliminated.

However, issues of warship innocent passage, exces-

sive baseline claims, excessive territorial sea

LOS

putes over whether the

Convention

prejudicial to coastal State peace,
to fuel debate

sea

c.

and contiguous zone claims and

lists

dis-

of activities for declaring passage

good order or security is exclusive, will continue

LOS Convention as it applies to the territorial

on the meaning of the

and contiguous zone.

The Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, and the Tanker War. There were few

LOS issues related to territorial sea or contiguous zone passage during the Tanker
War. Although Iran purported
her territorial

War;
tion

sea, there is

of warship innocent passage in

to restrict the right

no record of any incidents arising during the Tanker

Iran's claim to assert national security as a basis for contiguous

came over

a

There

decade after the conflict.

no record of Saudi Arabia's

figuring in the war. Although

claim of national security for her contiguous zone

many Persian Gulf States began

is

the war with territorial seas of less than 12 miles,

by the end of the conflict most had asserted a 1 2-mile belt as the 1982
tion

and customary law

were entitled

to

allow,

and two

(Iraq,

Oman) had

innocent passage like merchantmen.

a safety corridor

zone jurisdic-

GCC

through her and

369

LOS Conven-

explicitly said warships

Saudi Arabia proclaimed

States' territorial sea,

presumably with

those States' authorization, to facilitate tanker traffic; there was nothing in the law

LOS Convention allows establishment of sea
lanes and traffic separation schemes. Similarly, Iran was free under the LOS to di-

of the sea forbidding this. Indeed, the

rect coastal

convoying of its ships in

ritorial sea traffic lanes

and

traffic separation.

subject to Iraqi attack under the

war-sustaining goods,

its territorial

LOAC

if

means of controlling terHowever, these convoys were

sea as a

they were carrying war-fighting or

370
e.g., oil.

Two aspects of Iranian naval maneuvers deserve mention, however. When Iran
conducted naval maneuvers in Saudi
violation of the

LOS Convention

the Territorial Sea Convention,

377

i.e.,

territorial waters,

371

Iran committed a clear

and a violation of the more general standard of

which forbids "Passage.

peace, good order or security of the coastal State."

373

.

.

prejudicial to the

Given the Iranian track

re-

cord by then, these maneuvers were clearly prejudicial to Saudi Arabia under both
the

LOS

Convention and the Territorial Sea Convention. The maneuvers, de-

pending on their nature,

also

may have violated the law of naval warfare,

appli-

cable under the other rules clauses of the Territorial Sea Convention and the

LOS

Law

375

Convention.
val

Sea
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On the other hand, to the extent that Iran proposed to conduct na-

maneuvers in

own

its

LOS

ted under the

of the

territorial sea,

whether part of territorial waters permit-

or high seas included within an excessive claim due to
"inf.

such military activity was allowable;

erroneous baseline claims,
sea

was under Iranian sovereignty.

377

Only

if

its territorial

Iran coupled these maneuvers with

more than temporarily, without equal treatment of all
378
379
justified. The record does not
was Iraq's protest
or without notice

closure of its territorial sea
seafarers,

show that any of this was the

case.

However,

maneuvers may

to the extent Iranian

have affected traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which was nearby, different criteria,

5.

those for straits passage, were involved.

i.e.,

380

Access to Ports, Roadsteads and Internal Waters

"Among writers, the better line of authority supports the view that as a point of
law, foreign

other hand,.

.

.

[other authorities] indicate that there are exemptions from the local

jurisdiction as a matter of right,

mity."

381

On the

merchant vessels in port are subject to the local jurisdiction

and not merely

Similarly, territorial waters

as a

and ports are,

matter of courtesy or co-

"as a rule,

open

to

men-of-war

merchantmen of all nations, provided they are not excluded by special
382
international treaties or special Municipal Laws of the littoral States."
Nevertheless, "[t]he status of the waters in ports, harbors, roadsteads, and the mouths of
as well as to

rivers

is.

.

.

different

from that of the waters of the maritime belt.

are national or internal,

and the latter territorial."

383

.
.

for the

;

While Oppenheim's

former
treatise

made these statements before the LOS conventions were negotiated, they are still
384
true. Modern port facilities are much more complex today,
but principles governing access to them are similar.

The ensuing analysis examines
collective

vessels

the general right of access to internal waters (a

term for ports, roadsteads, rivers and canals) for warships and merchant

under the law of the

sea. Particular

claims for protection of values

power, through attempts to assert jurisdiction over ships) will be noted.

{e.g.,

The geo-

graphic arena for analysis ends, however, at the water's edge; no attempt will be

made

to explore

manipulation of the wealth or other processes through devices

such as customs duties, or access to the land through immigration.

a.

Analysis. Principles of relatively exclusive coastal State control of the territorial

sea apply to internal waters.

They are part of the

ternal waters have been variously defined
legislation

Nautical Road,

may

and titled,

is

In-

and in some cases national

is

from the

sea, e.g., the

require compliance while in coastal State territorial seas.

concern here

385

US Inland Rules of the
governing signals and lights for transiting US navigable waters,

whose primary impact
387

State's sovereign territory.

388

The

principal

the arena of port facilities, "a place where ships are in the habit of

coming for the purpose of loading or unloading, embarking or disembarking;"

389
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roadsteads; and access to these, as through the territorial sea, internal waters and

navigable rivers. "Internal waters," for purposes of this study, are, as stated in the

on the landward side of the baseline of the
the 1982 LOS Convention definition.
Since the

Territorial Sea Convention, "Waters
territorial sea;"

this is also

outermost permanent harbor works forming an integral part of a harbor system are

and the coast

part of the coast,

is

the fundamental baseline,

waters on the

if normally

used for loading,

other side of the line are internal waters. Roadsteads,

unloading and anchoring ships, and

if wholly

or partly outside the territorial sea's

outer limit, are included in the territorial sea.
territorial sea
395

"bulge"

394

Thus roadsteads within

and extending outward into the high seas create

in favor of the littoral State.

On

the other hand,

if a

within territorial and internal waters, the baselines approach
into two parts.

a jurisdictional

roadstead

396

is

partly

operates to split

it

The LOS Convention adds that offshore installations and artificial

islands are not considered permanent harbor works

397

and therefore are not part of

the territorial sea. Since the baseline division for rivers flowing into the sea
straight line across the

mouth,

398
all

Shatt al-Arab

is

is

a

landward river waters are internal in nature,

except rivers forming a boundary or rivers declared open to

The

the

all traffic

by

399

treaty.

an example of such a waterway.

Early nineteenth century State practice permitted receiving, during peacetime,
vessels of all countries into.

.

.

ports, to

whatever party belonging, and under whatever

them only the payment of the

and
obedience to the laws while under their jurisdiction without adverting to.
whether
they had committed any violation of the allegiance or laws obligatory on them in the
countries to which they belonged,.
in assuming such a flag, or in any other
flag sailing, pirates excepted, requiring of

duties,
.

.

.

.

respect. 401

That

is still

the rule today.

Schooner Exchange

v.

McFaddon

restated the customary right of foreign war-

ships to enter ports in time of peace unless local law closed the ports.

Customary

law once stated that during war enemy warships can be kept from ports by force,
e.g.,

blocking access by obstructions that result in also barring neutral merchant

traffic,

but such obstructions should "be retained only as long as needed for bellig-

erent purposes."

If a

channel for nonbelligerent shipping was

left

open, with

designated hours for travel, then customary principles would be satisfied.

day the

LOS Convention allows closure of the territorial sea on a temporary basis,

without discrimination in form or fact

among foreign ships, if suspension is neces-

sary to protect a coastal State's security
closure.

To-

Territorial sea closure

and

if the coastal State

under these circumstances necessarily impli-

cates closure of a port within the territorial sea

side of the line.

merchantman

The

publishes notice of

coastal State

and the

and those on the internal waters

flag State of a transiting

retain their self-defense rights

warship or

under these circumstances, the

Law

coastal State
408

its territorial

interests

and the

of the

Sea
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vessel's flag State its interests in the

ship

The 1982 Convention

also follows prior rules in the 1965 Transit

Trade Con-

vention governing landlocked States, i.e., those countries that have no seacoast, the
Territorial Sea

and the 1921 Freedom of Transit

and High Seas Conventions,

and principles

Convention,

rights of access to

and from the

in the

GATT,

art.

Landlocked States have

V.

sea to exercise their rights

under the law of the

sea,

including transit through countries (transit States) whose territory a landlocked

must use to access the sea. Landlocked and transit States must agree on terms
Landlocked
of transit through bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements.
State

and transit

States

Vessels flying a landlocked State flag must be treated equally in mari-

transport.

time ports.
territory,.

may agree upon overland pipelines in place of rail, road or water

.

Transit States, "in the exercise of their

have the right to take

.

and facilities provided for in

sovereignty over their

measures necessary to ensure that the rights

this Part [of the

fringe their legitimate interests."
it

all

full

LOS Convention] shall in no way in-

The Transit Trade Convention

declares that

does not prescribe belligerents' and neutrals' rights and duties during war, say-

ing that

it

continues in force during wartime "so far as such rights and duties [of

and neutrals] permit." The Convention

belligerents

also subject to the Char-

The LOS Convention and the 1958 LOS conventions

ter.

sult

is

achieve the same re-

through application of the other rules clauses, which declare that the law of

armed

To

conflict applies in certain situations.

Convention, the

LOS

the extent that Trade Transit

Convention and High Seas or Territorial Sea Convention

provisions coincide, they reinforce customary law on the subject of access of land-

locked States.

418

The LOS Convention prevails over
to the

LOS

Convention;

419

the Territorial Sea Convention for parties

however, as noted above,

similar to or identical with the 1958 Convention,

similar or identical application.

many

of

its

provisions are

and therefore should be given

The LOS Convention

also provides that

it

does

not alter States' rights and obligations arising from other treaties compatible with
it if

they do not affect enjoyment of other States' rights and obligations under the

nor does the Convention affect international agreements expressly

Convention,

permitted or preserved by

it.

Moreover, the

ered in connection with other sources.

LOS Convention must be consid-

Similarly, the Territorial Sea

vention does not affect treaties already in force

connection with custom and other sources.
trends in the law, with particular emphasis on

Con-

and must be considered

in

Therefore, examination of past

US

practice,

is

States have exercised the option stated in Schooner Exchange

appropriate.
to limit entry of

foreign warships, particularly during times of crisis. In 1805, seven years before

Exchange, the

armed

US Congress authorized the President to forbid entrance of a foreign

vessel or

its

master upon proof that a trespass, tort or spoilation had been
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committed, or that vessels trading in

US commerce had been interrupted or vexed.

The

In that year President

legislation expired in 1807.

Thomas

cluded British vessels by proclamation because of the Chesapeake

Jefferson ex-

In

affair.

820

1

Congress forbade warship entry into all but designated major commercial ports ex428

The legislation expired two years later.
During the
Abraham Lincoln directed that foreign warships would be

cept in distress situations.
Civil

War

President

on the basis of reciprocity accorded US warships abroad.

treated

United States had declared an open-ports policy, reserving the right

ever, the

ask foreign warships to leave

if

Other States continued

ture).

(By 1 878, how-

the law of nations or

US

to

treaties required depar-

and

to claim exclusionary or regulatory rights,

by 1909 the United States, through the Navy Department General Board, could except certain ports from warship visits. Otherwise, no permission was required.

i

Besides customary claims of merchant ships' right to enter another State's ports
to load or
eral

unload cargo, the United States and other nations have concluded

agreements

(for the

United

bilat-

form of peace, amity or friend-

States, often in the

commerce and navigation (FCN) treaties), usually guaranteeing reciprocal
rights. The first for the United States came in 1778 with France,
and the trend
ship,

continued through the next two centuries. Warships were occasionally given
cess

on the same terms

as

merchantmen. Often warships were not mentioned;

sometimes they were given restricted

access. Coastal trading,

nearly always reserved for port State ships.

vored nation

(MFN)

e.g.,

Many

which grants

clauses,

all

i.e.,

cabotage, was

agreements included most

fa-

favors granted to others in the

Other States have negotiated similar networks.

past or future, to other States.

In some situations,

ac-

China, entry was restricted to designated Chinese ports,

with nothing said about Chinese vessels trading in

US

ports.

There

is

nothing

in the record of the latter treaties to indicate that these agreements restricted entry

undoubtedly national policies of exclusion of for-

for national security reasons;

eigners generally,

and foreignors'

If one accepts the

view that these "many hundreds

customary right,

ideas,

were behind the Asian exclusion

then by the early twentieth century a right of entry founded in

custom existed, at least for merchantmen.
clude

to

and from the

In 1898 an Institute of International
general rule access to ports.

.

.

is

1928 the Institute had changed
.

.

is

1

Law

presumed

its

open to foreign vessels."

asserts the
is

The 1 982 LOS Convention would ex-

MFN clause applicability to agreements with landlocked States for goods

and people transiting countries

ports.

policies.
438
create a
of bilateral treaties"

sea.

resolution

to

had provided

that

be open to foreign vessels."

"As

a

By

resolution to read, "as a general rule access to

Lowe, citing the rapporteur for the Institute,

928 formulation was de legeferenda.

Nonetheless,

if the

proposition

accepted that the hundreds of bilateral agreements, and practice under them by

1928,

amounted to custom, which under traditional

analysis

when coupled with a

Law

Sea

of the

273

agreement between contending States overrides the secondary source of

bilateral

then today there

publicists,

The 1923 Convention and

a basic right of peacetime entry.

is

Regime of Maritime Ports

Statute Concerning

pro-

vided for free and equal access of all vessels, public and private, to parties' ports,

The Convention

subject to equality of usual port charges.

does not apply "to

warships or vessels performing police or administrative functions,

any kind of public authority,

employed for.

.

.

or.

.

vessels

.

which

for the

or.

.

.

exercising

time being are exclusively

The Convention also
The Statute does not

Naval, Military or Air Forces of a State."

does not apply to fishing vessels, their catch, or cabotage.

require admitting passengers or goods where health, security or municipal laws
forbid such.

States

may suspend

equality of treatment, but this

is

subject to

An "emergency affecting the safety of the State or the vital

World Court review.

interests of the country

may, in exceptional

possible, involve a deviation

cases,

and

for as short a period as

Nor does

from" equal treatment.

the Convention

prescribe belligerents' and neutrals' wartime duties, although the Convention

"continue[s] in force in time of war so far as such rights and duties permit."

These

latter clauses are consistent

with the

LOS Convention

Convention suspension and their "other rules" clauses.
•

Convention clause paramount

454

and

Territorial Sea

If they are not, the

LOS

•

i

or the later in time treaty construction rules

455

would give primacy to the other rules clauses. The Ports Convention is also subject
By 1999, 42 States were party, into the Charter and the right of self-defense.
cluding Iraq since 1929; treaty succession principles

may move the total

up.

The 1921 Barcelona Convention and Statute Concerning Freedom of Transit has
similar terms for vessel transit across the territory of its parties,

the territorial sea and inland waters.

458

As of 1999 there were 33

which includes

parties,

none of

which bordered the Persian Gulf; many are also Ports Convention parties.
Barcelona Convention

is

subject to the

same considerations,

e.g.,

459

The

the Charter, as

the Ports Convention.

The 1963 Mar del Plata Convention pledges parties' best efforts "to prevent unnecessary delays to vessels, passengers, crews, cargo and baggage in [administering] laws relating to immigration, public health,
relative to arrivals

and departures of vessels."

and Harbor Conference

is

If a State

General Secretariat immediately.

cannot comply,

it

must notify the

Although the Convention does not

guish between merchant ships and warships,

armed

The OAS Inter-American

Port

charged with adopting standards and recommended

practice for signatory States.

the former.

customs and other provisions

its

OAS

distin-

language appears to relate more to

No rules for suspension of territorial sea innocent passage, warships or

conflict are stated, but

to the Territorial Sea

under principles of treaty interpretation applicable

Convention and the LOS Convention, the latter's suspension

provisions and other rules principles, as a matter of custom and treaty law, apply.

Likewise, the Charter applies in self-defense situations.

Presently 12
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American

To

States are party to this regional treaty, including the

the extent

its

principles are consistent with the general

United

LOS,

States.

the Convention

reinforces them.

The 1965 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic repeats
Af.0
but excludes warships and pleasure yachts from coverMar del Plata pledges
Allowing better treatment under national law or other treaties, the Conven-

age.

tion also permits "temporary measures.

.

.

necessary to preserve public morality,

order and security or to prevent the introduction or spread of diseases or pests
fecting public health, animals or plants." Matters for

not provide are subject to national laws.
territorial sea

innocent passage

470

No

which the Convention does

specific provisions declare

may be suspended,

af-

when

or the effect of armed conflict,

but under principles of treaty interpretation applicable to the Territorial Sea Convention and the

LOS

Convention, these rules as treaty and customary law ap-

Likewise, the Charter applies in self-defense situations.

ply.

Eighty States,

including Iran and Iraq, are party to the Convention, Iraq's accession dating from

To

1976.

the extent the Convention's principles are consistent with the general

LOS, they reinforce them.
The results of arbitral awards

Arabia-ARAMCO

are consistent with

LOS

The Saudi

arbitration (1958) confirmed that "according to a great princi-

ple of public international law, the ports of every State

and can only be closed when the

merchant

vessels

quire."

The Kronpnns Gustaf Adolf arbitration,

eral

principles.

must be open

of the State so re-

vital interests

considering Sweden-US bilat-

noted the right of policing outbound wartime

agreements,

to foreign

traffic stated in

the treaties derogated from a general right of free navigation to and from ports, also
recited in the bilaterals.

In 1945

Hyde

477

said that there

was

a

corresponding obligation upon each mari-

time power not to deprive foreign vessels of commerce of access to
ports.

478

Similarly, the Institute of International

Law

of

all

its

returned to the subject in

1957, declared for free access of commercial vessels, save in exceptional circum-

stances "imposed by imperative reasons.
tice.

.

.

to

.

.

.

[I]t is

consistent with general prac-

permit free access to ports and harbors by such vessels."

479

Colombos

thus aptly summarized competing claims for ports in 1967:
to international traffic.

The

liberty of access to ports granted to foreign vessels implies their right to load

and

(i)

in time of peace,

commercial ports must be

left

open

unload their cargoes; embark and disembark their passengers.

.

.

.

Freedom

for

foreign vessels to enter the ports of a State implies the right to load and unload goods;
(ii)

no port can ever be shut against

compelled

to enter

it

in distress;

(iii)

a foreign ship

seeking shelter from tempest or

purely military ports

may be closed to all foreign

warships or merchant vessels on the ground of justifiable precaution;
ships of war even into commercial ports
as regards the

number

(iv)

entry of

may be subjected to certain restrictions both

of vessels allowed to enter and the length of their stay.480

—
Law

Whiteman took essentially the same position in 1 965

481
.

of the

Sea
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The Restatement (Second),

Foreign Relations said in 1965 that "In the case of vessels not in military service, the
ports of a state are open to their visit without any prior notification, except

the state has expressly provided otherwise."

482

For military

ment said "notification of an intended visit is customary.
coastal state expressly communicate.

expressly prohibit the visit

.

.

its

sufficient consent."

is

porters' notes for these Restatement sections
clear the Restatement drafters

saw

from the

there

littoral State, as in

no general port access

is

open them

to all

[T]hat it does not

Although comments and

re-

do not support these propositions, it is

to

under international law

advance notice for the warship and a

right of exclusion otherwise, presumably by international
tice

not necessary that the

It is

a general right of entry

merchant ships and warships, subject

for

vessels, the Restate-

consent to the visit
483

where

agreement or special no-

the case of quarantine for plague. O'Connell says

right,

arguing that

merchantmen, subject

opens

if a State

its

ports,

it

must

to usual rules pertaining to health, etc.

may close its port or ports but must do so as to all ships.
The Restatement (Third) takes no clear position on warship entry:

A

State

"In general,

maritime ports are open to foreign ships on condition of reciprocity,.
coastal state

may

.

but the

.

temporarily suspend access in exceptional cases for imperative
485

The reporters' note
does not mention warships, being content to say that "States may impose special

reasons, such as the security of the state or public health."

.

restrictions

on certain categories of ships[,]" citing Convention on Liability of Op-

erators of Nuclear-Powered Ships
ships,
to

i.e.,

.

US warships, from

its

and New Zealand's barring US nuclear-powered

The

ports.

likely Restatement position appears

be that merchantmen have an unfettered right

principles of temporary closure for security

presumption that warships

may

also enter

to enter foreign ports, subject to

and other reasons, and that there

is

a

but subject to permission from the

(The Restatement

(Third) is very clear, however, in saying that war487
ships have a right of innocent passage,
as distinguished from right of entry into
coastal State.

port without coastal State permission.)

Recent United States
States

open
for

agreements involving some former Soviet bloc

and the People's Republic of China (PRC) may evidence a trend toward

access.

Agreements with the PRC, Poland and the former

advance notice

— 24 hours

wishing to enter port.
489
sels.

bilateral

488

to four days

—with respect

to

USSR all provide

any merchant vessel

The agreements do not apply to warships

By clear implication, permission

to enter

less

or fishing ves-

any party's port requires advance

notice and permission.

The PRC and USSR Agreements

PRC
lists

agreement stating that the
are

major ports related

designate ports for entry in each country, the

list is

subject to review. Notably absent from the

to defense installations

e.g.,

Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok; in the United States for the
Charleston, South Carolina;

all

Rhode

USSR,
former USSR,

in the former

Island ports; Norfolk, Virginia area; San

—
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Diego, California; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. However, some ports with nearby de-

USSR, Murmansk, Arkhangel'sk,
Odessa, Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), Yalta, among 40 ports open; in the
United States, Seattle and Newport, Rhode Island among ports open to the
fense facilities are included: in the former

PRC 490
These recent

bilaterals reflect the present status of competing claims today for

voluntary access to ports. There

is

a general right of access to ports for

ships to discharge or load cargo in time of peace.

To

merchant

the extent that the former

USSR-US and PRC-US bilateral agreements list ports and thereby deny merchant
vessels

under their

flags access to others

said to violate general international law.
ties
is

without reason, the agreements could be

However, because these are bilateral

establishing special or local rules between States,

no violation of international

tect health,

to

trea-

affecting only them, there

law. Special State interests

customs inspection

national security

491

e.g., quarantine

to pro-

prevent smuggling, barring warships to ensure

— may override the general claim of access

for reasonable periods

of time, and perhaps forever in the case of warships. For example, a quarantine exclusion could be imposed during the epidemic. Strict customs enforcement, dur-

ing an actual or anticipated influx of illicit goods, might be required for years, e.g.,
in narcotics trafficking. Ships considered dangerous because of cargo

natural gas,

LNG) or propulsion system (e.g.,

to access. Ports

nuclear power),

(e.g.,

liquid

may be regulated as

might be barred to some or all foreign merchant or war vessel traffic

because of national security concerns for greater or lesser periods of time, ranging

from an indeterminate period of low-intensity conflict through defined periods of
actual

war

to a

through access
sal right

few hours needed for

for vessels in distress or driven in

with few,

Thus voluntary
tions

critical fleet or

if

other evolutions. Relief

by force majeure remains a univer-

any, restrictions.

access to ports

by merchantmen stands

depending on temporary circumstances such

as a right,

with excep-

as incidence of infectious dis-

ease necessitating quarantine precautions, or, in the situation of relative intensity

of security interests ranging from low-level conflict

War)
a

to all-out protective exclusivity

(e.g.,

(e.g.,

the now-concluded Cold

for vital military installations or

during

hot war) for military ships. However, the right of foreign-flag military vessels to a

right of innocent passage, qualified as,

guished from port

Thus

far

calls,

e.g.,

in the case of submarines, as distin-

remains a cardinal rule of international law.

voluntary port entry has been considered; international law also pro-

vides principles for entry in distress or due to force majeure.
his 1967

493

summary of principles on ports entry,

As Colombos

stated in

a general claim of right of entry

for all vessels has

been recognized for situations of entry in distress or due to force

majeure. "If a ship

is

vital repairs or

state shall

driven in by storm, carried in by mutineers, or seeks refuge for

provisioning, international customary law declares that the local

not take advantage of its necessity," Jessup wrote in 1927.

495

Law

The customary
1

803 in England

lar principle.

498

FCN

and 1 809 in the United

By 1820
with

treaties

Sea

277

claims developed through court decisions, at least as early as
States.

French courts applied a simi-

the principle had been echoed in

United States and other States began
ten

of the

US

legislation.

499
'

The

to include clauses in bilateral agreements, of-

MFN clauses,

as a further assertion of the unqualified

right of entry due to force majeure or distress from the eighteenth century onward.

Early treaties often added enemy or piratical attacks as reasons to grant safe haven;

agreements frequently pledged repair

These

seized goods.

treaties usually

or return of pirate-

facilities availability

were the same

as those

qualified entry into ports, or were in agreements touching

permitting free or

upon such

502

rights.

The treaties did not discriminate against warships, and Schooner Exchange

consid-

ered immunity of a French privateer, the Balaou, driven into Philadelphia by bad
503

weather.

Legal opinions within the British and

US governments, instructions

to their representatives

and diplomatic correspondence of the era, further confirm

that the bilaterals did,

and do,

tions took the
pie.

Nineteenth century arbitra-

articulate custom.

same position.

Current commentators also recognize the princi-

506

Ship and aircraft commanders have an obligation to
lost at sea.

This long recognized duty.

under certain circumstances

sea or

.

.

assist those in

danger of being

permits assistance entry into the territorial

aircraft

without [coastal State permission].

.

.

to

engage in bona fide efforts to render emergency assistance to those in danger or
distress at sea. This right applies only when the location of the danger or distress is
reasonably well known.

It

does not extend to entering the territorial sea or

airspace to conduct a search. Efforts to render assistance
faith

and not

as a

must be undertaken

in

[its]

good

subterfuge.^ 7

Prudence would suggest notifying the coastal State if possible, perhaps through
national communications, and

if

the situation warrants and national notification

is

not possible, notification by the entering vessel or

b.

Conclusions.

tributed

little

The

that

is

Territorial Sea

508

aircraft.

Convention and 1982

LOS

Convention con-

new to principles governing access to and from inland waters

and ports, etc. The principal points of change or difference are that
their rights to temporarily

LOS

suspend access

to ports

States can use

and inland waters through the

conventions' provisions for temporary suspension of innocent passage

through the
States to

territorial sea,

and from the

and there

sea, subject to

is

a stated right of transit for landlocked

agreement with transit States and those

State's rights to protect their "legitimate interests."

visions are subject to the

The LOS conventions' pro-

LOAC, which includes the law of naval warfare, through

the other rules clauses in particular situations, whether the
ticulate treaty or
trines,

e.g.,

custom based norms.

LOS

conventions

ar-

Other general treaty suspension doc-

impossibility of performance, fundamental change of circumstances or

The Tanker War
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armed
fense,

c.

conflict,

512

might apply.

which trump

treaty

UN

e.g.,

the right of self-de-

and perhaps customary norms, might apply.

513

War and Access to andfrom Inland Waters and Ports. Iraq became a

The Tanker

de facto landlocked State early in the

and

Charter principles,

Tanker War, when Iran seized

of its coasts

However, no obligations under the

effectively closed the Shatt al-Arab.

LOS Convention

all

armed conflict; the LOS Convention phrase "no sea-coast"
means no physical sea-coast. Thus although States
like Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey negotiated transport of Iraqi
arose because of closure by

goods, including Iraqi-originated

by road, air and pipeline means,
to

conclude these agreements.

Iraqi

war

effort,

LOS

and the

oil to

517

finance the war, through their territories

there was no obligation under the law of the sea

To the extent that these materials contributed to the
might be deemed

to

erned through the conventions' other rules clauses.
also subject to objection

on grounds of

have applied, the
518

LOAC gov-

Any LOAC obligation was

treaty suspension: impossibility, funda-

mental change of circumstances and war.

519

On the other hand, Iran's attempts to disrupt neutral traffic to and from neutral
520
violated general LOS principles of access to ports. Besides being a viGulf ports
olation of

UN

Charter, Article 2(4) insofar as the attacks violated or threatened

neutrals' territorial integrity or political independence, the Security Council

passed a resolution condemning this action.

521

The resolution was thus supportive

of well-established law.

6.

The Strait of Hormuz
522
major Tanker War issue was passage through international straits,
e.g., the

Passage Through International

A

Strait of Hormuz, a

Straits:

choke point vital

for transporting oil

from the Persian Gulf.

523

This sub-Part examines straits passage under the law of the sea, with particular emphasis on that waterway.

Before the

LOS Convention negotiations, the law of the sea was unsettled as to

rights governing straits passage.

"There
straits.

shall
.

.

The

Convention provides that

be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through

used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and

another part of the high seas or the

most

Territorial Sea

straits

territorial sea

thus tying

of a foreign state,"

passage to concepts of territorial sea innocent passage and declared
525

nonsuspendable by Convention Article 1 6(4) in most cases.
In 1 965 the Restatement (Second), Foreign Relations declared that innocent passage in straits between

one high seas area and another high seas area "or the territorial sea of another state"
could not be suspended.

526

At the same time other

LOS issues were emerging.

For example,

territorial sea
527

claims asserted sovereignty beyond the traditional three-mile limit;
arose as to the

meaning of innocent passage under the Convention,

questions

particularly

Law

with respect to military aircraft and warships;

528

States

Sea

of the
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began claiming EEZs,

for

529

and States began asserting
which the 1958 Conventions stated no general rules;
special status for archipelagic waters. Broadened territorial sea claims by Iran and
the

UAE, plus Iranian claims

baseline assertions, implicated

The law

Abu Musa and the Tunis and Iranian and Omani
530
the Strait of Hormuz during the Tanker War.

to

of the sea as stated in large part in the 1982 Convention responds to

these trends, recognizing six types of international straits and restoring the cus-

tomary law of international
(1) straits

by the
(2) straits

used for international navigation and not completely overlapped
territorial sea;

used for international navigation connecting the high seas or an

EEZ with
(3) straits

or an

531
straits:

the territorial sea of another country;

used for international navigation between one part of the high seas

EEZ and another part of the high

(4) straits

seas or an

EEZ;

used for international navigation and connecting one part of the

high seas or an
the strait

is

EEZ with another part of the high

seas or an

formed by an island of the State bordering the

mainland of that

EEZ, where

strait

and the

State;

(5) straits

used for international navigation and governed by

(6) straits

used for international navigation in archipelagic waters.

treaties; or

The Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Gulf with the Indian Ocean, today is in cate532
gory (3).
To place the law governing the Strait of Hormuz in perspective, it may
be useful to examine briefly the principles governing other kinds of straits,

i.e.,

Cases (l)-(2),(4)-(6).

a. Straits

Case
area or

Connecting High Seas or EEZ Areas,

(1). If a strait

connecting a high seas area or

EEZ with

another high seas

EEZ has a corridor of high seas completely through it, i.e.,

there

is

a

band of

navigable water over which no coastal State has claimed a territorial sea through-

out the

strait, that

band of water is subject

freedoms of overflight, navigation,

etc.,

to the

high seas

LOS regime. High seas

subject to high seas users' obligations to

observe due regard for others' exercise of freedom of the seas, apply.

533

Nearly 50 of

these straits existed in 1989 because littoral countries had not claimed as

they might for their territorial seas under the

24 miles

Only 25

at a strait's

narrowest point

if

LOS Convention,

i.e.,

much

as

12 miles or

both coastal States claimed 12 miles.

535

536

The 1989 list included the Bahrain-Qatar Passage, and
537
perhaps waters around Abu Musa Island in the Gulf.
(Iran occupied Abu Musa
no
existed in 1997.

before the beginning of the Tanker War,
part of the

Lesser

UAE

Tunbs

or Iran, there are

and whether the island

enough waters around

to support claims of high seas passage

it

is

considered

and the Greater and

around them, between either

The Tanker War
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539

UAE.)
There are 60 straits where the narrowest passage is greater
than 24 miles, none of which are in the Gulf, except for the possibility of waters
around Abu Musa.
Case (1) might be resolved differently by a strict reading of
the Territorial Sea Convention and its nonsuspendable innocent passage regime
for all straits except those covered by prior treaty,
with attendant problems of
Iran or the

The 1958 Conventions

defining innocent passage under the Convention.

EEZ

do not address

issues.

The LOS Convention

also

resolves the Case (1) issue;

if a

high seas route with similar convenience with respect to navigational and
hydrographical characteristics exists in the
not apply. General rules
the high seas or

for, e.g.,

strait, straits

passage special rules do

freedom of navigation or overflight, apply.

EEZ corridor is not of similar convenience in navigational or hyBefore expanded

drological characteristics, transit passage principles apply.

claims became admissible, the Strait of

territorial sea

within Case

Case

(1); its

narrowest breadth

is

seas or

fit

EEZ waters with a coastal State's

innocent passage regime applies,

territorial waters, the territorial sea

that the right of innocent passage

Hormuz would have

about 22 miles.

is

Where a strait connects high

(2).

If

The Bahrain-Saudi

not suspendable.
548

except

Ara-

LOS Convention coincides with the Territorial Sea Convention, except for the new LOS Convention
549
innocent passage definition and the 1958 Conventions' omission of EEZ rules.
The innocent passage rules apply to straits connecting the high seas or an EEZ
bia Passage

is

among these "dead-end" straits.

Here the

with an historic bay.

Case

(4).

Where a strait connects a part of the high

part of the high seas where an island of a coastal State

seas or an

and the

EEZ and another

coastal State's

main-

LOS Convention provides that territorial sea passage,
innocent passage, applies, if a route to the high seas or EEZ seaward of the island is
land forms the

strait,

the

i.e.

of equal convenience with regard to navigational and hydrographic characteristics.

As

pended.

in Case 2 dead-end straits, passage through these straits cannot be sus-

552

The 1958 Conventions

give

no

clear response to this

kind of claim;

presumably the Territorial Sea Convention's nonsuspendable innocent passage
regime applies.

Case
ing

(5).

straits

There

are

no such

straits in

the Gulf.

The LOS Convention exempts longstanding

passage from treaty regimes; here the analysis

the Territorial Sea Convention.

It

subjects

its

treaty regimes govern-

is

nearly the same under

rules to all prior treaties; the

Convention permits derogation only if a treaty is longstanding.
treaty that

might govern

straits

LOS Convention.
The LOS Convention

patible with the

Case

(6).

passage would be a

No

LOS

Another kind of

more recent treaty that is com-

straits treaties

apply to the Gulf.

gives special rules for straits through archi-

pelagic waters, which are substantially the same as innocent passage through inter-

national straits, except that archipelagic innocent passage

is

suspendable, while

ceo
straits

innocent passage

is

nonsuspendable.

This situation might occur

if a

Law

strait

rial

There

is

no

clear

Sea

281

LOS Convention-permitted ar-

under prior law becomes encapsulated in an

chipelago.

of the

answer under the 1958 Conventions, but the Territo-

Sea Convention general rule of nonsuspendable innocent passage in the

absence of treaties, of which there are none, may apply.

"'

There are no claimed ar-

chipelagos in the Gulf, and no island groups eligible for claims.

Conclusions as to Cases
sion from the foregoing

is

(l)-(2), (4)-(6).

The first and most important conclu-

that the Territorial Sea Convention, despite

omis-

its

and ambiguities, when combined with the other 1958 Conventions'

sions

LOS Convention, state a general policy of relative freedom of
access through most straits, a high seas and EEZ regime in Case (1), straits through

principles,

and the

which there is high

seas passage; Cases (2)

and

(4),

nonsuspendable innocent pas-

sage for dead-end straits and straits between an island and the mainland where
there

is

an alternate high seas route around the island; Case

through archipelagic
result is virtually the

the treaty applies.
straits

straits.

For Case

(5), straits

passage

(6), transit

governed by treaty regimes, the

same under the 1958 Conventions and the LOS Convention;

The second

LOS

is

that the

LOS

Convention

clarifies the

law of

EEZ.
concerning the Bahrain-Qatar Passage and waters around Abu

while recognizing

developments,

e.g.,

the

Only Case (1),
Musa; Case (2), concerning the Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Passage; and Case (3), the
Strait of Hormuz; apply to the Gulf. There is no record of claims regarding restricting passage, etc., around Abu Musa or through the Passages. The Tanker War involved navigation and other passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and therefore
the question of transit passage under the law of the sea as stated in the

LOS

Convention.

b.

Passage Through the Strait ofHormuz. As

to argue that

a technical point of law,

two regimes governed passage through the

it is

possible

Strait of Hormuz

during

the 1980-88 Tanker War.

(i)

High Seas Passage Through Hormuz? The

Strait is

about 22 miles wide

at its

narrowest points. If a view is taken that the maximum territorial sea claim admissible

under the LOS was three miles, the position of the United States until 1983,

when

the conflict had been raging for about three years, navigation, overflight,

warship

activity, etc.,

in the middle

1

LOS high seas principles

6 miles of the Strait and territorial sea principles

torial seas of Iran,

Case ( 1 ) scenario.
ines passage

within the Strait was subject to

within the terri-

Oman and the UAE. Under this analysis, the Strait presented a
There is no record of claims to this effect. Analysis now exam-

under Case (3), passage from a high seas area or EEZ through a strait to

another high seas area or

EEZ

on the other end of a

strait.

The Tanker War
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(ii)

Case

(3): Strait

of Hormuz Transit Passage and the

international navigation

is

combined with

cent passage in the Convention,

suspend passage in a

it is

on

clear that a coastal State

strait for security

mean stopping and anchoring

Ter-

reasons as

it

might

territorial sea inno-

may not temporarily

for territorial sea inno-

mean entry into internal waters.

incident to ordinary navigation or

if

ren-

569

dered necessary by force majeure or

The

limitations

Passage in either case does not

cent passage.

does

If the

Sea Convention nonsuspendable innocent passage rule for straits used in

ritorial

It

Tanker War.

distress.

general definition of innocent passage in the Territorial Sea Convention,

"Passage

is

innocent so long as

570
leaves
the coastal State,""

equated to

straits

it is

open

not prejudicial to the good order or security of

a question of whether

passage under the Convention,

ing fishermen engaged in fishing that
are in innocent passage.

572
'

permission under the general

innocent passage

is

totally

r

and therefore whether transit-

not contrary to coastal State regulations

is

The Convention

flight (particularly by military aircraft)

571

also leaves

open issues of whether

through the strait, forbidden without prior

territorial sea

innocent passage regime,

573

or whether

must navigate on the surface and show their ensign unless
prior permission has been granted.
There were also questions of whether weaptransiting submarines

how innocuous, such

ons practice (no matter

as topside loading

launching, landing or taking aboard aircraft (including,

e.g.,

machine

aircraft

drills);

involved in

mail delivery or medical evacuation cases); launching, landing or taking aboard

any military device; or electronic interference with
while tuning radars) could be conducted.

merchantmen,

tion over

576

tions.
flict in

a transiting

comply with

its

where the

an anomolous result

is

warship

that naval forces

by a coastal

577

may

stances without regard to Convention rules.

assertions of unnecessary claims

commercial shipping, and

to leave the strait of the coastal

otherwise legitimate territorial sea regula-

LOAC applies,

insistence on the Convention

is

subject to the law of armed con-

and

to the right of self-defense,

transit a strait

under those circum-

A further possible result is that strict

State or third States could result in

579

r

or the law of naval warfare.

hardly the kinds of results the Convention drafters contemplated.
straits,

578

more

under these principles, with attendant counter-

claims of violations of the Charter

For Case 3

(e.g.,

There can be issues related to jurisdic-

Because the Territorial Sea Convention

situations

coastal State facilities

rules applying to State-owned

whether a coastal State can ask
State for failure to

575

580

These are

581

those used for international navigation and connecting a part

EEZ with another part of the high seas or an EEZ and which
582
the LOS Constrategically important straits including Hormuz,

of the high seas or an
include most

vention provides that
passage.

583

all

ships and aircraft enjoy a right of

unimpeded

transit

Transit passage means exercise of the freedoms of navigation and over-

flight solely for

continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of

the high seas or

EEZ and

another part of the high seas or EEZ. Continuous and

Law

of the

Sea
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expeditious transit includes strait passage to enter, leave or return from a country

bordering the

strait,

subject to that country's conditions for entry.

584

Transit pas-

sage exists throughout the strait, including its approaches, and not just a territorial
sea overlapped area.

585

seas or

EEZ areas, for which

and are therefore not subject to

a territorial sea inno-

These approach areas are high

high seas freedoms apply,

586

cent passage or straits transit passage regime. Activity not an exercise of transit

passage

subject to other

is

LOS

Convention provisions,

587

including the law of
588

armed conflict through the Convention's other rules clauses.
The LOS Conven589
During early LOS Contion transit passage rules are also subject to the Charter.
vention negotiations Saudi Arabia advocated the rules eventually adopted; Iran

supported regulated passage and a special regime for the Gulf.

While

and

in transit passage, ships (including warships)

590

aircraft (including

military aircraft) must: proceed without delay through or over the strait; refrain

from

activities other

than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and

expeditious transit unless they experience/ore^ majeure or distress; refrain from a
threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political inde-

pendence of straits-bordering

comply with

must

LOS

States in violation of the Charter;

Convention

transit passage rules.

SOLAS

comply with generally accepted

also

and practices

regulations, procedures

pollution from ships.

592

591

and otherwise

Ships in transit passage

standards and international

for preventing,

reducing and controlling

must observe ICAO-estab-

Aircraft in transit passage

lished Rules of the Air as applicable to civil aircraft; State aircraft, e.g., military aircraft, "will

normally comply" with these and will always operate with due regard

for aviation safety.

They must monitor

air control

and

signed by the competent internationally designated air
593
ity.

There

is,

distress frequencies as-

author-

traffic control

of course, unquestionably a right of warship transit through and

military aircraft overflight of these straits, unlike the rule against territorial sea
overflight

where warships, like all vessels have innocent passage rights.

594

Ocean-

ographic research or surveys cannot be conducted without bordering States' prior
authorization.
tion,

this

595

In terms of normal

of transit under the

means submarines and other undersea

merged; for today's submersibles, that
face vessels

mode

may steam

is

their

vehicles

LOS

may

Conven-

transit sub-

normal operational mode.

in formation, zig-zag, or deploy aircraft incident to

597

Sur-

normal
598

modes of operation; they may use, e.g., radar for navigation but not for attack.
They must not threaten bordering States' sovereignty, territorial integrity or poi

•

•

htical independence.

599

There

exercise straits transit passage

Bordering States

schemes

may

c-

is

by

no requirement of prior notification of intent
aircraft or warships.

designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation

for straits if necessary to

these after approval
in transit passage

by

a

to

promote

safe navigation

and must publicize

competent international organization,

must respect these

lanes

and schemes.

i.e.,

IMO.

Vessels

Hormuz was among
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major

straits subject to a traffic separation

States bordering straits

scheme during the Tanker War.

may prescribe rules relating to

navigation and regulating

traffic;

transit passage for safety of

preventing, reducing and controlling pollution;

prevention of fishing and stowing fishing gear; loading or unloading goods, cur-

rency or persons in violation of a coastal State's customs,
health laws, and must publicize them.
countries, those countries
tional

rules

If a strait

is

not discriminate in form or fact

have the practical

effect of

bordered by two or more

among

foreign ships or in application

denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit

which can be

rules for straits cannot stop transit passage, even

This principle applies

rarily.

naviga-

However, these

devices.

passage. This differs from territorial sea innnocent passage,

pended temporarily;

immigration or

may cooperate through agreements to establish

and pollution prevention, reduction or control

may

fiscal,

to

sus-

tempo-

dangers to navigation that a coastal State must

must comply with these rules, and the
country of a State aircraft registered under its flag, or of a vessel registered under its
flag, bears international responsibility for loss or damage to coastal States from vi-

publicize.

Vessels in transit passage

'

f\C\l

olating these rules.

c.

Conclusions. During and before the Tanker War there were threats from Iran to

close the Strait.

The United

and other countries rightly

States

resisted these

claims, insisting on the right of freedom of transit through the Strait for all ships or
/TAO

aircraft entering or leaving the Gulf.
it

(Case

1),

under no circumstances could

Strait is considered
3),

no

If the Strait

a coastal State lawfully close

under the LOS Convention

coastal State could close

it

had a strip of high seas through

straits transit

it.

If the

passage regime (Case

either.

Iran delivered a diplomatic note concerning transit of the Strait in 1987.

United States asserted that the right of transit passage was
correct interpretation.

There were no other coastal

or military aircraft transit; under the
straits

LOS

a

The

customary norm,

a

State claims to limit warship

Convention regime, States bordering

may not limit passage of these platforms, which were entitled to transit the

Strait in their

normal mode, subject

to

LOS Convention

rules

on

transit passage,

which might include submarines transiting submerged and formation steaming
by surface combatants. Although the record is sparse as to exactly where warships
began escorting or convoying tankers, since this was also a normal mode of operation and a proper defensive measure, convoying, escorting or accompanying
through the

Strait

scheme

for the

close to

its

would have been permissible.

upper Gulf required merchant ship notification

ports.

The LOS

management
before coming

Iran's traffic

did not require prior notification of straits passage

by any merchantman, and certainly not by any warship or State aircraft;
no indication

in the record that this

was required, however.

Strait of

there

is

Hormuz
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separation schemes did not figure in the war, except insofar as they

traffic

have channeled shipping, making

it

may

easier to attack ships.

The belligerents attacked neutral-flag vessels in or near the Strait, including its
traffic separation

schemes.

It

was permissible

for

warships to defend them-

come to the aid of stricken merchantmen, under these circumThus it was lawful for the Vincennes and other US warships to defend
stances.
It would also have been
themselves from Iranian speedboat and air attacks.
and

selves,

to

proper for neutral navies, including those of Oman and the

and conduct other mine countermeasures in the
pede straits

Strait, so

UAE, to remove mines

long as they did not im-

transit passage and, in the case of navies of States

bordering the

Strait,

giving adequate notice of their operations to remove these menaces to neutral navigation.

619

Cargo and Other

Part C. Nationality of Ships,

Interests

Ownership, financing and use of merchant ships has been a complex business

Ownership of cargo aboard

for centuries.
{.JO

break-bulk

grain),

(e.g.,

bagged goods,

vessels in bulk

crates),

earth-moving equipment, railway locomotives),
ject to freight

(e.g.,

cement,

oil,

perhaps stowed on deck
or containerized,

(e.g.

and sub-

charges or other liens, has become a complex business. This Part be-

gins by examining transnational
arising during the

aspects of ship

and cargo ownership and issues

Tanker War before proceeding

to

development of trends in

claims on the public international law plane.

Warships have always been under State

registry,

but even here lines can be

less

to attack

enemy

shipping, was a practice that ended only in the mid-nineteenth century.

In-

than

clear. Privateering,

where

creasingly today, governments

States

commission private vessels

own or charter vessels that are merchant vessels in

appearance and use. Some, although seeming to be merchant ships in function,

and

refrigerator

others serve military purposes, such as troopships, but

may be con-

serve warships as naval auxiliaries,

e.g.,

tankers, cargo carriers,

(TIC

ships.

trolled

Still

by

a country's institutions other than its navy.

with a law enforcement mission
other than

its

navy,

e.g.,

the

US

craft like police or fire boats. In

may be

Other government vessels

operated by government departments

Coast Guard, or local governments

may

operate

some cases these functions may be combined with

naval forces. Dividing lines can be far from bright, especially for States with mini-

mal coasts or maritime forces. This Part ends by examining these principles, with
analysis of the

1.

Tanker War "reflagging" debate.

Defining "Ships"

There

is

no general definition of "ship"

conventions and the

in the law of the sea, even in the 1958

LOS Convention. The 1962 amendments to the 1954 Oil Pol-

lution Convention say that a ship

is

"any sea-going vessel of any type whatsoever,
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including floating

craft,

whether self-propelled or towed by another

ing a sea voyage," and the

MARPOL 73/78 definition is similar:

type whatsoever operating in the marine environment.

.

.

The 1986 Ship

mak-

"a vessel of any

including] hydrofoil

boats, air-cushion vehicles[ACVs], submersibles, floating craft

ing platforms."

vessel,

and fixed or

float-

Registration Convention defines a ship as "any

self-propelled sea-going vessel used in international seaborne trade for the trans"

port of goods, passengers, or both

Here the definition might be

said to ex-

no

elude warships, since they do not carry passengers or goods as a general rule.

General as they
sive

1962 and the

are, the

MARPOL 73/78 definitions are more inclu-

and have been accepted by most seafaring

629

States,

MARPOL's

although

some seafarers' eyebrows. National legislaoccasionally supplies varying definitions, most of which are in accordance

reference to fixed platforms might raise
tion

nn

with the Convention statement.
Definition of a merchant ship under the law of the sea has fared similarly;
there

is

no agreed definition except by way of exclusion: merchant ships

privately or publicly

ernment public

service,

immunity, engaged
to say

owned
e.g.,

any

vessels that are not warships or are otherwise in gov-

police or fire boats

commercial

in

are

631

63?
activity.

and therefore entitled

to sovereign

The law of naval warfare has much

about merchant ships and cargoes, but those principles apply in appropriate

situations through the

lyzed for the Tanker

LOS

War

in

conventions' other rules clauses

and

will

be ana-

Chapter V.

Merchant Ships and Cargoes; Crews; Insurance
Individuals have owned ships since the earliest times; even today ownership of
pleasure boats, some of which may be as large as small commercial vessels, is likely
to be in an individual. Since one person might not be able to advance enough capi-

2.

Ownership

in

buy and

outfit a ship, a practice of joint venture, i.e., ownership of shares in
63S
ships, perhaps for the voyage or longer, developed.
Some of British North
636
BeginAmerica's colonial charters reflect this kind of business relationship.
tal to

ning in the nineteenth century, concurrent with evolving business forms on land,
the corporation

came

to

command economies have used the corporate form, i.e.,
638

panies.

"

637

Even
State-owned trading com-

be the dominant modality for vessel ownership.

By the opposite token, free enterprise-based nations have owned and op-

erated ships, usually through corporations. Countries with government-owed

shipping

fleets

many Gulf States during the Tanker War: Iran, Iraq, KuVessels may travel indeArabia and the UAE among them.

included

wait, Qatar, Saudi

pendently as tramp steamers, picking up cargo
destination,

and picking up another cargo

routes as liners.

steamers

still

Today most US shipping

transit the oceans.

at

one port, discharging

for a third port,

etc.,

may

at

or along regular

operates as liners, but

Shipping corporations

it

many tramp

cluster in

one of

over 350 liner conferences to set carriage rates for certain routes and manage

Law

sailings efficiently.

of the

Sea
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This can result in noncompetitive pricing and competition be-

tween conference and non-conference shipping companies, however. Associations

may influence decisions, particularly those in the political
Corporations may own many ships; they may establish each vessel in a

of shipowners also
arena.

subsidiary corporation for tax and liability minimization.

A vessel

owner may "rent"

An owner can

ter.

a ship to others

through

charter only part of a ship,

a "charter party" or char-

but usually an owner

the

lets

whole vessel by one of three methods: demise or bareboat charter, time charter, or
voyage charter. In a demise or bareboat charter, "the charterer takes over the ship,
lock, stock

and barrel, and mans her with his own people."

In a time charter, the

owner's people continue to work the ship, and the owner retains possession; the
charterer buys the vessel's carrying capacity for a fixed time to go anywhere.

The other non-demise arrangement, the voyage charter, is a contract for hire of the
ship for one or more voyages.

It is

probably the most common form.

Subcharter-

may occur unless prohibBrokers in major maritime centers, e.g., London or New

ing to another party, for part or all of the ship or the time,
ited

by a charter party.

York, carry on "fixture" of a ship under a charter far from the ship, its owner or the

Today an owner may telex or radio

charterer.

after a charter has

Today

been

on

its

use

nondemise charter

in-

a vessel to give directions

fixed.

charters are standardized documents. Usually a

cludes a "safe ports" clause, allowing a master (an employee of the owner) the option of discharging the charterer's cargo at a port that

example,
let,

if a

is

For

safe to enter.

charterer directs a master to proceed to a port with a bar across the in-

the master can refuse and go to another port; the owner can claim damages.

"Safe port" also means political dangers to the vessel's safety;

armed

conflict situation can affect these private contracts.

development of an

A safe port clause does

not apply after a vessel's arrival. However, if a port becomes unsafe after a charterer

nominates

it,

the charterer

the circumstances.

nated port,

must nominate another if that port is reasonable under

Reasonable deviation

is

permitted in proceeding to a nomi-

and doctrines of frustration of performance or commercial im-

practability, perhaps caused by armed conflict or requisition clauses in the charter,

may end

Governments may charter ships instead of requisitioning
them during wartime.
If government cargo is stowed on a vessel that carries pria charter.

vately held goods as well, there

is

the possibility of multiple ownership interests,

the vessel owner, the charterer, the subcharterers, and consignors and consignees

of the goods.

The holder of a mortgage or other financing device

on

a ship is another

im-

portant ownership interest. Although nearly all maritime States have national legislation

governing ship mortgages,

to multilateral

many (but not the United States) are parties

conventions establishing rules for ownership of mortgages by per-

sons that are nationals of States other than that of the registry of the ship.

Other
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provisions of national law
tional of a registry State
priorities for a

may condition transfer of mortgage interests from a na-

on mortgage registry State approval

national, with

ownership

plated, the

A

in a State

State

B whose

ship, regis-

trustee

a State

is

C

D corporation, whose shareholders may be na-

When the possibility of fleet mortgages — a security
several vessels of different flags with a common owner — is contemissue becomes even more complex. When States guarantee or insure

tionals of States E, F, G,
interest in

given parity or near

by nationals of the ship of registry.

A may be subject to a mortgage in

tered in State

may be

foreign-owned ship mortgage, which

parity with mortgages held

or accord lower lien

etc.

may under federal legislation,
yet another
participant
this time a sovereign nation
may have potential interests. Under
these kinds of financing arrangements, a vessel owner may appear to be in some reship financing, as the United States

—

—

spects a lessee (charterer in maritime terminology)

may

appear to be the owner of the vessel.

proper owners, charterers or others

and the financing

Whatever the

who can

limit liability

institution

issues as to

under

who

are

treaties or na-

the variety of financing arrangements add to the complexity of deter-

tional law,

mining ownership

interests

under the Intervention Conventions

and perhaps

issues of nationality of the ship for law of the sea issues.

Transnational arrangements for carriage of goods

While ordinarily

a military

commander

or the

at sea are equally

complex.

commander's lawyer

concerned with the nuances of these transactions, except incident
search, the following illustrates the complexity of trade

will not
to visit

be

and

by sea and the possible

multitude of private parties, and therefore the countries potentially involved.
Seller

and buyer of goods sign

a contract of sale.

If the transaction is

F.O.B.

may be either a shipment contract or a destination contract. If
the former, perhaps stated F.A.S. (Free Along Side a named vessel), a seller places

(Free on Board),

it

the cargo with a carrier at a designated point or ship; the buyer bears the risk dur-

ing transit. (Doubtless a buyer will buy insurance.) If it
contract, the seller bears the risk of transit

The

is

an F.O.B. destination

and tenders delivery

at

port of arrival.

alternative, C.I.F. (Cost, Insurance, Freight), obligates a seller to

buy

insur-

ance and pay freight to the carrier; these are added to costs for the buyer's price at
destination.

The buyer may obtain a letter of credit from a bank, by which the bank promises
to

honor the

i.e.,

seller's draft if the

the shipment's negotiable

letter is

buyer submits shipping documents for the goods,

bill

of lading, invoice and insurance contract.

The

forwarded through the seller's bank for payment on submission of the doccnc\

uments.

A buyer may have credit arrangements to finance the letter of credit or

to finance sale of the goods.

Although these transactions are technically independ-

ent of the sales contract or the contract of carriage, they are linked to the sales contract,

and participants in

interests in safe, timely

letter

of credit transactions

—usually banks—

and orderly carriage of cargo on the

also

seas.

have

Today

Law

multimodal transportation using containers

many

is

of the

Sea
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very common, the result being that

land-based companies under different ownerships (and therefore different

national interests)

may be

involved

perhaps because of military action

if

goods do not arrive or arrive damaged,

at sea.

Whether cargo is sent F.O.B. (perhaps F.A.S. for ocean transit), F.O.B. destination, or C.I.F., risk of loss during shipment must fall on a shipper or a carrier. As
f\T)
carriage of goods by sea innoted earlier in the context of direction of shipping,
volves many ownership interests regulated by the customary, treaty and national
law of admiralty. Most such arrangements are covered by the COGSA Convention
These standards may be incorporated
as supplemented by more recent treaties.
in a private contract,

e.g.,

a charter party.

Clauses in contracts of carriage or affreightment may affect ownership interests
in freight charges for transportation

and hence ownership

interests in transport-

ing the goods. For situations related to armed conflict, these include

fire, perils

the sea, acts of war, acts of public enemies, arrest or restraint of princes
straints

by governments), seizure under

legal process, riots or civil

{i.e.,

of

re-

commotions,

may trigger invocation of the war exception, the peripheral impact of armed conflict may
cause ships to deviate from planned courses, or they may be tied up in port due to
saving

life

or property at sea, and deviation.

Although armed

conflict

departure restrictions or domestic unrest resulting from armed conflict, etc. Thus,

armed

conflict can result in private parties' raising claims against other private

parties, all of which

may hail from

different countries,

may hear from affected parties,

and governments in these

fnf\

who may urge measures affecting the
conflict, ranging from entry into the conflict to less coercive measures. The result
countries

is

that cargo interests or others, faced with a carrier claim of exemption

under

COGSA, may look elsewhere, perhaps to their insurers, perhaps to the country that
(Jin

allegedly caused
if

them harm,

fCTZ.

but possibly to their governments for espousal,

the ultimate cause of their loss

tional law.

is

cognizable and compensable under interna-

This was the basis of claims for the Stark and Vincennes attacks,

al-

though injury and death claims were primarily involved.
Besides these claims related to cargo carriage, a ship owner

with claims related to
least,

illness, injury

is

also

concerned

or death of mariners aboard the ship. At the

an owner must pay maintenance, cure and wages;

principle that injured or sick merchant

seamen

all

States recognize the

are entitled to food

and lodging,

medical services and unearned salary for the remainder of the voyage, plus burial
expense,

if death,

injury or illness occurs while enrolled as a seaman on a ship.

may accord other relief for injured seamen or mariners who die at sea.
In
the United States and many industrialized countries, maritime workers (mariners,
shipyard employees, and stevedores who work the docks) are heavily unionized;
States

the unions themselves can be potent forces for claims involving members, as
countries discovered during the

Tanker War.

some
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Passengers and others involved in maritime-related business,
workers,

may claim

for injuries or death

e.g., oil

platform

under maritime law, perhaps augmented

/TOT

by national

The same can happen when

legislation.

civil aircraft.

there

damage

to

While these claimants might be content with claims against other

private parties

who allegedly harm them, there is a possibility of claims against an
by

allegedly offending State or perhaps requests for espousal

ments.

or

is loss

their govern-

684

Overarching these primary claims
subrogation

to

a potential for insurance coverage

is

and

an insured's claims, i.e., where an insurance company steps in an

insured party's shoes, a

common procedure for property damage claims under US

law. Participants in the

marine insurance field may be of entirely different nation-

alities

than the insured ship owner, charterer or cargo interests.

usually operating from Lloyd's syndicates,

other nationals or their companies

have dominated the

may be involved.

surer agrees to indemnify another insurance

on insurance
terests),

for a

in favor of a third party,

per.

'

(e.g.,

but

Reinsurance, where a rein-

company against

689

field,

risks

assumed by

it

vessel owner, charterer or cargo in-

may introduce more potential claimants (a reinsurer as ultimate subrogee)

maritime law claim. Today three kinds of marine insurance are written. Hull

insurance covers a vessel or a

fleet, ships'

machinery and certain

plus general average and salvage charges.

ties

UK underwriters,

691

under

Protection and indemnity (P
a hull policy,

&

I)

Cargo insurance protects a ship-

insurance covers nearly everything not

including personal injury, illness and death of those aboard

ship; other collision liability; pollution liability;

not within the express provisions in use.
insurers,

P&

I is

omnibus coverage

about 65 percent of the world's shipping.
sure nearly everything, and can

buy an

692

UK P &

I

693

war

written separately because of the "free of capture and seizure" (F

premium

for

war

risks

a separate policy

interests can inrisk insurance

C&

is

S) clause in

and pay an additional

risk.

Obtaining insurance or writing

it

are voluntary acts.

uninsured because of high premium

to operate ships

new

clubs have insured

Although ownership

"all risks" policy,

Thus insureds must buy

for

underwritten through "clubs" of

most of which are in the United Kingdom.

typical policies.

collision liabili-

Owner interests can

costs,

elect

but they are foolish to

do so because of the high risk of personal liability beyond the value of the vessel, as-

suming that the ship or cargo survives the mishap for imposition of maritime liens,
because of the possibility of failure of limitation of liability. Insurers can elect to
charge relatively high premiums

when the risks are high, e.g., projected transit of a

dangerous zone of the ocean,

or choose not to write policies at

all

for certain

Today all oceangoing vessels carry basic war risk insurance. The rehas been that States have war risk insurance legislation for coverage "when-

risks, e.g., war.

sult

ever

it

appears.

.

.

that such insurance adequate for the needs of the water-borne

commerce of the United

States cannot be obtained

on reasonable terms and

5

1

Law

conditions from companies

.

as the
697

.,"

.

growing use of flags of convenience,

US

legislation has

legislation

vessels besides nationally registered ships; cargoes

had

of the

Sea

Recognizing

it.

may permit coverage

maritime risks

may be

ance coverage

may continue.

covered as well.

to spread
701

698

The government may provide

commercial carrier

for these

on both national-flag and

of convenience ships; and personal injury, death or detention of crews.
699

291

flag

Other

reinsur-

risk. Private coverage, if available,

The result is that governments may become subrogated to claims

caused by war situations besides their building and operating, chartering or requisitioning vessels during crisis.

3.

702

Nationality of Merchant Vessels

The foregoing sub-Part has analyzed the plethora of government and private interests that may claim in transactions involving merchant ships. This sub-Part analyzes trends in claims to ships' nationality in international law. Jurisdiction over

such ships

in, e.g., territorial waters,

Bilateral agreements, often in the

century,

has been mentioned separately.

form of FCN

and continuing through the nineteenth into

mutual recognition of each

Although early

of the late eighteenth

this century,

State's ships as national vessels if the

a passport, sea letter or other sufficient
thority.

treaties,

703

provided for

master produced

document issued by competent national au-

treaties stated this

requirement

wartime measure,

as a

perhaps requiring periodic renewal of papers, later agreements were more general

and not so limited.

705

When

bilateral treaties

began

to include

MFN clauses to

grant each party the highest favor any other treaty partner of either held, the practice

and necessity of including sea letter clauses declined.

cited requirements for these documents.

should be included: passport, sea

707

In 1906

letters, charts, bill

706

Occasional treaties

Moore

re-

said these papers

of health, bill of sale or owner-

ship certificate, manifest, charter party, bills of lading, and invoices.

708

A

few

agreements also based vessels' nationality on the crew's composition and the master's nationality,

cient.

709

US

perhaps with a statement that national recognition was

suffi-

Prohibition Era bilateral antismuggling treaties also infer a need for

ship's papers.

710

To

the extent these treaties had

common

or similar terms,

it

can

be argued that they point to establishing a customary norm for determining the nationality of a vessel.

countries in

some

71

Treaty succession principles applied their terms to other

cases.

712

Early admiralty cases upheld the presumptive validity of bills of sale or similar

documentation for vessels

and therefore the nationality of the

ship.

By

the

mid-nineteenth century these papers were required to be aboard neutral ships.

The

flag,

Moore wrote

in 1906,

was only "prima facie evidence, on the high
71

71

seas,

ft

that the nationality of the ship corresponds to that of the flag."

In 1873 a Spanish man-of-war overtook 5.5. Virginius on the high seas; Virginius

was accused of carrying arms and insurgents to Cuba, then

a

Spanish possession.

717
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US vessel, as later investigation
showed; her real owners were Cubans resident in New York.
The United States
had been registered fraudulently

Virginius

as a

710

Spain admitted an international law violation for

protested Virginius' seizure;

having taken the ship on the high seas while flying a

US

US

ensign and carrying

registry papers.

In 1896 the International
tionalities of captain

Law

Institute adopted a

recommendation

and crew should not be criteria of a ship's

that na771

nationality.

The

1905 Montijo arbitration rejected the argument that a ship could not be considered
a

US

vessel because only a third of her

That was

a

crew was American,

a violation of
72?

US

law.

The Per-

domestic matter for the United States, the arbitrator ruled.

manent Court of Arbitration in the 1 905 Muscat Dhows Case held a State was free to
773
decide which ships could fly its flag and to prescribe rules for the privilege.
"What that case reveals is that there is no unique connection between the national
identity of a ship for jurisdiction purposes and the flying of a flag." Even though
the dhows flew a French flag, they were Muscati manned and could be claimed as
Muscat vessels.
Although

bilateral treaties

continued to provide

ships' papers to establish nationality,

nominally registered under certain

owned by

other States' nationals

—

725

advent of

States'

for

mutual recognition of

flags of

convenience

— vessels

municipal legislation but beneficially

in the early twentieth century challenged the

basic principle of exclusively national decisionmaking as to which vessels could fly
Uft

a State's flag.

Adopting another

State's flag

was nothing new,

777

came into vogue with attempts to evade Prohibition and in
728
other flag vessels incident to World War I demobilization.

practice

The 1927 Lotus
ferred

on

it

by

but a general

sale of US

and

Case reiterated the principle that a vessel has a nationality con-

a State

and

is

subject to the authority of the flag

Multilateral agreements following World

729
it flies.

War I began to vindicate establishing
The 1 928 Convention on Pri731
1929 SOLAS,
1930 Load Line

nationality by ship's papers with the flag as a symbol.

vate International

Convention

732

Law (Bustamante

and 1 948

SOLAS

733

Code),

730

echoed these principles. Given widespread ac-

ceptance in multilateral agreements, these principles began to reflect custom.
In 1953 the

US Supreme Court repeated the traditional national determination

principle:

Perhaps the most venerable and universal rule of maritime law relevant to our
problem is that which gives cardinal importance to the law of the flag. Each State
under international law may determine for itself the conditions on which it will grant
its nationality to a merchant ship, thereby accepting responsibility for it and
acquiring authority over it. Nationality is evidenced to the world by the ship's papers
and its flag. The United States has firmly and successfully maintained that the
regularity and validity of a registration can be questioned only by the registering
State. 735

1

Law
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of the

Sea

293

years later the Nottebohm Case articulated the "genuine link" test for deter-

mining nationality

for espousal purposes in a dual-national situation.

The 1958 High Seas Convention repeats traditional principles that every State
may fix conditions for granting nationality to ships, registering them and granting
the right to fly its flag. Nodding to Nottebohm, the Convention requires that a "genuine link" must exist between a ship and the State of registry; a State must exercise

and control

jurisdiction

flagged vessels.

in administrative, technical

and

social matters over its

A State must issue documentation to vessels under its flag. Except

may not shift flags in
port or on the high seas. Ships sailing under two or more States' flags may not as737
sert them to any other State and may be assimilated to a Stateless vessel.
for bona fide transfers of ownership or registry changes, a ship

The ICJ, however, in rendering its advisory opinion on the Constitution of the
Maritime Safety Committee of IMCO, stated that the phrase "largest ship-owning
nations" in the

IMCO Convention meant registered tonnage, and not beneficially

owned tonnage,

738

thereby supporting a view that registry, and not metaphysical

linkage, controls for purposes of nationality of ships.

Other multilateral agreements

SOLAS,

739
1

974

SOLAS,

740

restate the familiar nationality rule,

and marine pollution conventions;

responsibility to ships entitled to fly the flag, or in

some cases

741

Boczek

nationality.

1960

they key State

ships operating un-

der a party's authority, fundamentally the High Seas Convention rule.
tors also recognized the principle of national

e.g.,

Commenta-

decisionmaking to determine a ship's

also claimed, "[T]he practice of registering ships has be-

come universal and it is an established rule of international law that all maritime
States make registration a formal condition of their nationality, the only exception
being small

ment

craft.

.

.

not intended for long-distance navigation." Issuing a docu-

The Convention on

to evidence registration "is also universal."

tion of International

Maritime Traffic confirms

Facilita-

this view.

The 1982 LOS Convention follows the High Seas Convention's theme with additional requirements for flag States. The genuine link concept is preserved, together with requirements for jurisdiction over administrative, technical and social

matters in vessels.

The LOS Convention also requires registry of all vessels, exand mandates

cept small craft, flying a State's flag,
safety at sea

through adequate manning, construction and safety equipment, and

signalling to

grounds

communicate and prevent

to believe a flag State is

over a ship, the other State
tigate the

flag State responsibility for

collisions.

If

another State has clear

not exercising proper jurisdiction and control

may report the facts to the flag State, which must inves-

matter and take appropriate action.

748

The 1986 Ship Registration Convention
elaborates on the LOS Convention.
Few States are party to it, but they include two Gulf States (Iraq, Oman), which ratified after the
ity

Tanker War.

whose flag they are entitled

After declaring that ships have the State's national7S

to fly,

the Convention requires that parties

must
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have a competent, adequate national maritime administration
trol vessels flying their flags.
753

for

down

which must "include appropriate provisions

rules,

State or

its

nationals as owners of ships flying

such ships and for the
to

Registration requirements are stated with particu-

specific rules for nationality. First, a State's national laws

ownership

by the

manage and con-

to

Although the Registration Convention does not mention genuine link, it

larity.

lays

752

level of such participation."

its flag

may provide

for participation

or in the ownership of

These laws must "be

sufficient

permit the flag State to exercise effectively its jurisdiction and control over ships

flying

tory part of the
ful

Alternatively, States

its flag."

permanent

seafarers

complement" of a ship be flag

flag State's] ships,"

applied on a ship,

the principle that a satisfac-

State nationals, domiciliaries or law-

This goal must be considered in the light of available

residents.

meeting the

ships, but its

may "observe

criterion,

"sound and economically viable operation of [the

and other international agreements. This alternative must be
755

company or fleet basis.

Other nationals may serve on

a State's

own nationals, domiciliaries or permanent residents should be given

opportunity for education and training in maritime work.

Under

either alternative, a registry State

pany, or a subsidiary,

within

its

must ensure

established "and/or has

is

territory in accordance with its laws

its

principal place of business

and regulations."

not a flag State-established enterprise or does not have
ness there, a flag State national
tion

—in

a

management

— either

shipowning com-

that a

its

company

If a

is

principal place of busi-

a natural or juridical person, e.g., a corpora-

or representative capacity

must be

available for legal

must ensure that those accountable for or managing
757
responsible as to potential tort liability and crew wages.

process. Moreover, a flag State
a ship are financially

Registration and documentation requirements are detailed; there are provisions for bareboat charterers.

758

The Convention encourages

enlarge developing States' national shipping industries

supplying nations' interests.

760

IMO

759

joint ventures to

and protecting labor-

and other international organizations may

761

assist in

implementation.

Because of low acceptance since 1 986 and its emergence during the Tanker War,
the Registry Convention does not represent customary law.

Convention

rules,

although the
istry details

Its

which build on the High Seas Convention's,

confirming

76?
i.e.,

LOS

means

that

LOS requires a genuine link between a registry State and a ship, reg-

must be

Few claims with

left to

that country.
763

respect to separate chartering interests

'

have been asserted.

US charter interests to fly the national ensign at
the masthead and a Chinese ensign at the stern, despite US Navy concerns about
In 1921 the United States allowed

identification.

Chinese municipal law permitted the practice.

would have tended

to

rules for single flags

run afoul of High Seas Convention and

from

765

ships.

The Ship

This practice

LOS

Convention

Registration Convention permits a

State to register a vessel bareboat chartered-in, for the time of the charter,

and

to

Law

allow the vessel to fly

Sea
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This would not have violated the rule against two

its flag.

the chartered ship will be registered in only the chartering-in State.

flags, for

may

States

of the

The

espouse charterer claims like other claims.
require charter interests to be consulted

conventions

if possible;

intervention

certain limita-

may equate some charterers with owners for private civil lieven as a charterer may be equated with an owner when cargo

tion of liability treaties
ability purposes,

770

damage during

interests claim for

4.

transit.

771

Warships; Other Public Vessels

The definition of a warship under the law of the sea and the law of naval warfare
are nearly identical today. Thus whether a warship operates under the LOS or the

LOAC, to which the LOS is subject under the other rules clauses of the LOS
ventions or customary law,

772

the analysis results are the same.

The

con-

first defini-

tions of warships were published in the law of naval warfare.

Hague
was the
...

first

A

announcing rules

VII,

for conversion of

merchantmen

into warships,

general treaty to state rules that would apply to converted vessels:

merchant ship converted into

accruing to such vessels unless

it is

a

war-ship cannot have the rights and duties

placed under the direct authority, immediate

Power whose flag it flies.
Merchant ships [so]
must bear the external marks which distinguish the war-ships of their
nationality.
[Its] commander must be in the service of the State and duly
commissioned by the competent authorities. His name must [be] on the list of the
officers of the fighting fleet.
The crew must be subject to military discipline.
control and responsibility of the

converted.

.

.

.

Vessels so converted

.

ratified

must take

.

.

must observe the law and customs of war;

announce conversion
sion

.

.

.

have not

.

.

as

restates

it,

place,

soon as possible.

775

773

belligerents

The Convention, although

customary law except perhaps

as to

all

must

States

where conver-

today a moot issue because of merchantmen's size and

demands conversion in a shipyard and not on the high seas as
occurred with the C.S.S. Alabama during the Civil War.
The 1913 Oxford Manual of Naval War defined "War-ships [as] Constituting
part of the armed force of a belligerent State and, therefore, subject as such to the
laws of naval warfare.
which, under the direction of a military commander and
manned by a military crew, carry legally the ensign and the pendant of the national
complexity, which

.

.

navy," plus ships converted as warships,

In 1916 the

A

US

777

the customary rule of that time.

119k

Secretary of State published this definition of a warship:

is any vessel which, under commission or orders of its
government imposing penalties or entitling it to prize money, is armed for the
purpose of seeking and capturing or destroying enemy property or hostile neutral
property on the seas. The size of the vessel, strength of armament, and its defensive or

belligerent warship

offensive force are immaterial.^ 9
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The 1930 London Naval Treaty did little to help definition. Although carefully
categorizing ships usually considered men of war, e.g., capital ships or battleships,
aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, minelayers, etc.,

including "special vessels,"
yon

e.g.,

yachts, tenders, transports, depot ships,

etc.,

by again describing existing combatant

ity

eluded from classification as

men

of war.

was a second effort

vessels;

782

vessels'

The 1 936 London Naval Treaty

did not clarify whether these were warships or not.
categories for vessels usually considered warships

combatant

as "naval

781

at particular-

naval auxiliaries were ex-

The 1936 Montreux Convention,

regulating Turkish Straits passage, followed this formula.

78 3

Forty years and two World Wars involving major maritime conflict

later,

the

1958 High Seas Convention defined "warship" as
a ship

belonging

to the naval forces of a State

and bearing the external marks

distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly
commissioned by the government and whose name appears in the Navy List, and
manned by a crew. under regular naval discipline. "784
.

.

This represents the customary

785

rule.

It is

repeated, nearly verbatim, in the 1962
70/T

Convention on Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships,

Agreement
to vessels

787

and the 1977 Panama Canal neutrality treaty.

armed

services,

may

vices other than navies

e.g.,

the Canadian Forces, or that military ser-

operate warships

(e.g.,

the

ii

US

LOS Convention followed virtually the same language in
eas.

there

Except for referring

"belonging to the armed forces of a State," thereby recognizing present

realities of unified

790
"

Coast Guard).

i-ii
1982, but for

all

Nuclear and conventionally powered warships have identical

is

INCSEA

the 1972
788

no requirement

that a warship be armed.

792

Title to

LOS

continues to apply,

e.g.,

ocean
status;

ar791

793
J

Under
service, enjoy sovereign immu-

nity from authorities of States other than the flag State.

the extent the

The

sunken or wrecked

warships and military aircraft remains in the State whose flag they flew.
the law of the sea, warships, wrecked, sunken or in

789

between

In wartime situations, to
a belligerent

and

a neutral,

LOS immunity rules continue to apply, including title to sunken vessels or air795
as between
craft. On the other hand, operation of the other rules clauses
belligerents during war

means that attacking and capturing an opponent's warship

or military aircraft vests

sunken warships or

immediately in the captor. This includes wrecked or

title

aircraft if successfully recovered or otherwise
796

brought into an

opponent's possession,
Protocol
warfare,

I,

797
is

Article 43(1),

more

one of that

treaty's

general, applying to

all

few provisions applying to naval

armed

forces but echoing the

LOS

definition:

The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of organized armed forces, groups and
units

which

are

under

a

command

responsible to that Party for the conduct of

its

Law

subordinates, even

if

that Party

is

of the
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represented by a government or an authority not

recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of
armed conflict. 798

international law applicable in

Undoubtedly the LOS Convention rule is a customary norm for the law of the sea
However, as Swarzenberger and others have pointed out,
the LOS deftoday.
inition

is

subject to the

LOS treaties' other rules clauses, 801 the result being that in

the future the definition of a warship for law of naval warfare purposes
different course than the

build gloss on Protocol
if they are

LOS

I, art.

definition.

may chart a

For example, States could invoke and

43, or apply Article 43 as a base for a

customary norm

not party to the Protocol, the present case for the United States. For now,

LOS and the LOAC. 802 The definite
trend of the law is that if a ship meets the LOS warship definition, regardless of its
however, the definitions have merged for the

means of propulsion and armament or lack of it, it is a warship.
Although the LOS conventions have mentioned other ships owned or perhaps
803
no definitional
operated under charter by or for States for public purposes,
claims have been asserted, beyond statements that they may be totally immune
from other States' jurisdiction on the high seas.
These issues should be differen805
tiated from the law of naval auxiliaries, which applies during wartime.
On the
size,

other hand, there were issues related to State-owned commercial vessels, e.g., tank-

owned by governments such as Kuwait. In general the law of the sea applies the
same rules for these ships as for privately owned merchantmen.
The LOS Convention also provides that the genuine link and single-flag reers

quirements do not prejudice the issue of vessels "employed on the
of the United Nations,

Agency, flying the
similar provisions.

its

of the organization."

flag
807

that Organization."

specialized agencies or the International

Protocol

808

The High

forbids flying the

I

official service

Atomic Energy

Seas Convention includes

UN flag unless "authorized by

The UN flag has been flown on several occasions; when em-

ployed in peacekeeping operations, in practice

it

has been flown alone after agree-

ments with the Host Country, i.e., the State supplying the platform(s) or unit(s).
Protocol

and sun,

I

also prohibits

810

improper use of the red

the inference being that

it

cross, red crescent,

can be used with

ICRC

and red

809

lion

permission and by

agreement of State(s) concerned.

Ocean Transit in Company; Warship Formation Steaming; Convoys
Although as a general rule, merchantmen of any size travel independently, albeit in the case of liners on predetermined paths through the seas, or on prescribed

5.

routes, perhaps

on the high seas

as a

matter of private

initiative, or

through

straits

Oil

or the territorial sea at coastal State direction,

small ships,

e.g.

fishing vessels,

may proceed in convoy for mutual assistance in case of casualties or heavy weather.
on
They may operate together for commercial purposes, e.g., fishing.
Warships
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may also steam
rines.

independently, which

is

the usual situation in the case of subma-

and mutual protection, warships may proceed in comformation as ordered by the force commander. The law of the sea

However,

pany, often in

for safety

does not restrict these freedoms of the seas, even in the case of warships steaming in

formation in

813

814

LOS

except that all oceans users must have due regard for others'

straits,

rights.

By

extension of this analysis, the law of the sea, as distinguished

from the law of armed
other rules clauses,
age of the oceans,

815

i.e.,

conflict, applicable in certain situations

through the

LOS

does not forbid or qualify the right of "mixed company" us-

when merchant

ships and warships travel together in con-

and perhaps protection by the warship(s).

voys for reasons of safety

Royal

Navy warships accompanied and attempted to protect UK flag trawlers fishing be818
yond the three-mile territorial sea limit off Iceland during the First Cod War,
for example. Convoy principles in armed conflict situations are different, however.

6.

819

The Tanker War: Analysis

Even today the record

is less

tional claimants involved in the

poused claims

820

than clear and

Tanker War.

full as to

Civil litigation

may proceed for years in the future.

there were significant claims during the war.

the identity of transna-

821

and government-es-

It is certain,

Merchant shipping

however, that

losses,

deaths and injuries of merchant mariners, were the highest since World
there were claims arising from attacks by and on naval vessels,
sive in nature,

823

and the environment

suffered.

824

and the

War II,

822

some of them defen-

There were

also questions in-

volving the nationality of ships.

The

clear inference

long as a
the

from the

LOS

conventions and customary law

is

that as

new registry State has a genuine link to a vessel through compliance with

new State's registry requirements for ship safety, etc., and there is ownership of

the vessel, perhaps beneficial ownership through corporate shares, in nationals of

the

new

registry State,

tion details to the

LOS

requirements are

new registry State.

It

satisfied.

The LOS

leaves registra-

may be presumed that reflagging Kuwaiti-

US registry satisfied the LOS basic requirements. Proper US
825
It
registration procedures were followed, and US nationals served as masters.
was also appropriate for US and other navies to convoy, escort or accompany merregistered tankers to

chantmen, exercising

a right of proportional self-defense if the

were attacked or threatened with

merchant ships

attack.

Neutrals also observed the rule of rescuing persons in danger of being lost at sea

when

they picked up survivors of attacks on merchantmen or naval vessels

(e.g.,

same or another flag, people on offshore platforms, or
at least one aviator who went down at sea. (In many cases the record is silent on in-

IranAjr), whether flying the

dividual rescue efforts, but available sources indicate neutrals, including warships

Law

and merchant

Sea
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attempted to perform rescues commensurate with their

vessels,

ships' safety, as the rule allows.)

827

Late in the war Iran used speedboats to attack tankers and other ships exercising freedom of navigation in the Strait of

Hormuz and

the Persian Gulf These

Crew surviving neutrals' self-dethe 1949 Geneva Conventions provide.

boats apparently exercised in naval maneuvers.
fense responses were repatriated to Iran as

Presumably other speedboaters Iraq may have captured were treated
of war and repatriated at the war's end.

828
It is

not

clear,

as prisoners

from the available record,

whether these vessels met the customary definition of warships.

829

Although their

personnel were perhaps imbued with a spirit of suicide not unlike World

War

II

kamikaze and other pilots and midget submarine crew, the boats themselves appear
to

have been warships.

On at least one occasion when the reflagged tankers were ready to leave Kuwait,
commercial tug crews refused to man tugs to accompany them. US Navy volunteers
is

manned the tugs, which were equipped with minesweep gear.

830

The record

not clear whether the tugs met two standards of the definition of a warship,

under the

command

of an officer duly commissioned by the United States, or

whether the tugs bore external marks distinguishing ships of the United
Probably the crews were under US military discipline.

whether the tugs were government ships used
they

may have been

i.e.,

privately

for

831

States.

Nor can it be determined

non-commercial purposes;

owned but manned by

832

military personnel, or they

may have been State-owned by Kuwait but operated for commercial towage. If priowned but crewed by military personnel of a nationality other than the
833
owner(s), this would make the tugs subject to the LOS genuine link principle.
If
owned by Kuwait, the issue is whether they were operated for commercial purposes or whether they were used for noncommercial purposes. The available record does not give an answer. The nature of the minesweep gear aboard the tugs is
vately

not clear either; this

may be presumed

is

that

a law of naval warfare issue.
it

834

Based on the scanty record, it

was admissible under international law

under the circumstances.

If the tugs

were commercial

in nature,

crew made no difference; merchantmen the world over
nationalities. If the tugs

sail

to

man

having

the tugs
a foreign

with crews of mixed

were non-commercial, owned by Kuwait,

it

was the busi-

who would man them. The tugs did not become warships because they were operated by US Navy personnel, however.

ness of Kuwait to determine

Early in the war it was proposed evacuating merchant ships trapped in the Shatt
al-Arab under the

lowed

UN or ICRC flag. Iraq rejected this. 83S The UN flag proposal fol-

UN practice in seeking affected parties' agreement. 836 When

forthcoming, the proposal died.
ties'

agreement,

837

and when

Merchant shipping
war,

839

was not

The ICRC flag proposal also required affected par-

this
838

losses,

this

was not forthcoming,

this proposal also died.

and claims arising from dislocations during the

were many. In many instances owners' losses were covered by insurance.

840
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There
issue

is

always a possibility of government espousal,

842

will arise.

Thus

far there

USSR tanker

charters to Kuwait,

afloat in the
843

Gulf during the Tanker War,

there appear to have been no published

claims in connection with losses to charter interests. In

have been subrogated to insurance carriers,
espousal for these claims as well.

where the genuine link

appear to be no such claims.

Although there were charter interests
e.g.,

841

many instances these may

although there

is

the possibility of

845

Aside from possible subrogation claims in connection with pollution intervention or private claims,

no separate identification of insurance claims with, or apart

from, the vessel have been noted. Insurance rates for war risk and other coverage

which were the

rose spectacularly during the war, predicated on shipping losses,

heaviest since
847

of the
tions.

Insurance and cargo claims usually follow the law

may espouse nationals' claims here as in other situaNational cargo preference legislation may direct that certain cargoes, e.g.,

flag,

848

World War II.

QAf.

although States

military supplies, be carried only in vessels flagged under that State.

cumstance the
States

is

850
ties.

will coincide.

its

is

'

In that

trade of most

often confirmed

e.g.,

crude

from Valdez, Alaska, bound

oil

lift,

for

US

refineries.

which was almost never in cab-

Tanker convoys may have proceeded along the Saudi or Iranian

coasts, but

these were not engaged in coastal trade, at least as far as the record shows.
for

851

world

went by

by trea-

would not necessarily be true, in many cases nationality of the
cargo will coincide. This would be particularly true with respect to pe-

This might be contrasted with Persian Gulf oil

was

cir-

it

troleum products,

otage.

The cabotage

restricted to carriage in national bottoms; this

Although

ship and

and ship

flag of cargo

849

trade.
852
pipeline.

There seems

to

Local

shipments,

e.g.,

from northern

be no record of government-espoused

Nor does

surance interests.

oil

853

to

The oil

southern Iran,

claims for cargo or in-

the record reveal the extent of claims by banks and

other holders of ship mortgages; since vessels are almost invariably mortgaged,
usually to the

hilt,

to the extent not

undoubtedly these claims figured

covered by insurance.

economic dislocation or war shows,

in

economic

losses of the

war

854

855

As the record of claims after any crisis,
there was and is potential for espousal of

these claims.

There was heavy loss of life and injury to merchant seamen during the war from
857

may have been injured or may
858
have died because of Iranian attacks on neutrals' offshore oil pumping facilities.

belligerents' attacks

on neutral shipping.

There were 290 deaths
compensated victims'

Others

in the Vincennes- Airbus tragedy,

families.

859

and the United

There may have been deaths or

States

injuries result-

ing from other mistaken defensive actions, e.g., the United States' firing on fishing
vessels or

dhows.

860

There were deaths and personal

Stark and U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts crews.
tral

countries

may have been

hurt or

injuries

among

the U.S.S.

Other military personnel from neu-

may have

died because of belligerents'

Law
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war-related actions. There probably were deaths or injuries connected with

US de-

on

fensive attacks

with

oil

and there were deaths or

platforms,

of the

injuries connected

US defensive attacks on IranAjr and other Iranian vessels or aircraft, notably
In the Vincennes- Airbus and Stark cases, governments paid

the speedboats.

compensation, the United States in the Vincennes incident and Iraq for Stark
QC.A

may resolve other death and personal injury claims, particularly for the merchant mariners, or parties may be comIn many cases insurance may protect owners,
pensated through espousal.
Governments may comcharterers, etc., from personal liability for these claims.
deaths and injuries.

Transnational litigation

Qf.fi

pensate their military personnel or their survivors under national law for active
service injury or death,

and these sums might be added

to

espoused claims.

The record is sparse as to proceedings involving these claims, and their amount
and number, other than those involving Stark, Vincennes and the Rostum
platforms.

Part D. General Conclusions

and Appraisal

Law

for the

of the

Sea

The Tanker War was a long conflict, eight years from the first shots and four
years of more intensive war at sea. It produced nearly every conceivable issue related to the law of the sea, the law of armed conflict,

Chapter

III

and law under the UN Charter.

analyzed Charter law in the Tanker War, and Chapter

V will

discuss

LOAC issues.
The Tanker War began while LOS Convention

When

negotiations were underway.

the war ended in 1988, the ratification process was underway, but not

enough countries had
agreement.

ratified the treaty for

Some Tanker War

participants

it

to

had

be effective as an international

ratified the

LOS

Convention by

1988, however. For these States, there was an obligation not to defeat the treaty's

object and purpose besides their duties

customary rules restated in the

under customary law (which might include

LOS Convention) and perhaps the

ventions, if they were party to them. Other countries,

and the United

States,

were not signatories or parties

ing the war but were parties to the 1958
also

LOS

e.g.,

to the

1958

LOS con-

the United

Kingdom

LOS Convention dur-

conventions. These countries were

bound by the customary law of the sea, including custom

Convention.

none of the

Some

LOS

States, including

many

restated in the

Persian Gulf nations, were party to

conventions. Nevertheless, these countries were

customary law of the sea restated

LOS

bound by

in the conventions, as well as other

the

customary

norms. The Tanker War era, 1980-88, was a time of transition for the law of the sea,
requiring analysis of every issue under custom and five
tion to other special LOS-related agreements.

LOS conventions, in addi-
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High Seas Freedoms: Navigation and

Overflight

Neutral countries' warships and military

LOS norms limiting those freedoms, e.g.,

of these high seas freedoms, and the
in their relations with neutrals

air-

in the Gulf, sub-

due regard for others' exercise

LOAC when it applied. Similarly, belligerents

had high

seas freedoms of overflight

LOS norms limiting those freedoms, e.g.,

tion, again subject to
trals'

whether launched from

had freedom of navigation or overflight

craft carriers or the land,
ject to the

aircraft,

exercise of high seas freedoms,

and the

and naviga-

due regard

for neu-

LOAC when it applied. In all cases, as

between treaty-based norms and the U.N. Charter, the Charter prevailed. One ex-

ample of this was the Airbus tragedy. Iranian

aircraft

had Gulf overflight

rights,

but the United States had a right to respond (in this case, in error) in self-defense

when

its

warship appeared threatened by what was mistakenly perceived to be an

incoming Iranian military
In terms of customary

aircraft.

LOS norms, the same principles were at stake, unless one

takes the view that a separate customary Charter-based

principles under the Charter

norm had been

was

at issue, or that the

norm

at

variance from

customary Charter-based

elevated to jus cogens status and therefore prevailed over custom or

treaty-based rules. There

is

no evidence of claims involving these

During the Tanker War belligerents interfered with

neutrals'

gation through indiscriminate mining. Moreover, although

because they chose to
military aircraft in

fire

many

indiscriminately on neutral

it

issues.

freedom of navi-

was an

LOAC issue

merchantmen or

neutral

instances, belligerents also violated neutrals' high seas

rights of freedom of navigation

and

overflight. It

was proper under the law of

self-defense for neutral military forces (air, surface warships) to respond proportionally to attacks

on warships, merchantmen

flying the warship's flag, or (if re-

quested, under a theory of informal self-defense) merchant ships flying other
neutrals' flags, if the
e.g.,

merchant vessels had not acquired enemy character through,

carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining goods for the opposing belligerent

pursuant to that belligerent's direction or control as discussed in Chapter V.
Belligerents could

announce and conduct naval maneuvers in Gulf high seas ar-

eas so long as they observed due regard for neutrals' high seas freedoms. Similarly,

neutrals could

announce and conduct these maneuvers,

so long as they observed

due regard for others' high seas freedoms, whether the other States were neutrals or
belligerents.

2.

EEZs, Fishing and the Continental Shelf in the Persian Gulf
There appear to have been no claims of LOS violations regarding Gulf EEZs,

fishing or continental shelf zones. (As a technical matter, the Gulf does not have a

continental shelf as defined in the law of the sea; there is no continental slope to the

deep abyss.) All

States, neutral or belligerent,

continued to have high seas

free-

doms of navigation and overflight through these areas claimed by neutrals, subject

Law

imposed by the

to limitations

rights of coastal States in their

LOS

regime,

e.g.,

of the

Sea
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due regard or the equivalent

EEZ, fishing or continental shelf operations. There

were one or two attacks by neutrals on neutral fishing vessels operating
mately in these areas
forces.

As

facilities, as

legiti-

these craft were mistaken for attacking belligerent

in the Airbus case, the response

ceived threat.

ities

when

for

was in self-defense

to a

mistakenly per-

The LOAC governed belligerents' attacks on an opponent's offshore

analyzed in Chapter V. Belligerents' attacks on neutrals' offshore facil-

were governed by Charter-based law,

i.e.,

Article 2(4). Similarly, the

US

de-

struction of Iranian offshore platforms was a self-defense response to attacks

launched or directed from those and other platforms on innocent neutral

merchantmen.
3.

The

Territorial

Sea and Contiguous Zone

in the Persian Gulf;

Entry into

Neutral Ports

During the Eighties more and more

States shifted

from traditional three-mile

more expansive sovereignty claims, up to and beyond the
12-mile limit the LOS Convention would allow. There were also claims to offshore
contiguous zones. These claims in some cases exceeded LOS limits, in terms of
breadth (particularly under the 1958 Territorial Sea and similar customary reterritorial sea

claims to

gimes) and because of baselines declarations that did not always square with
definitions.

None

LOS

of these claims figured in the sea war, however.

Territorial sea usage did, however. Iran could use its territorial sea as well as the

high seas for naval maneuvers. Iran could suspend

territorial sea

innocent passage

temporarily for security reasons in connection with these maneuvers.
its territorial

sea for coastal convoys of tankers

and attacks on the convoys

if

could use

under the LOS regime. (As Chapter

V will point out, the LOAC allowed attacks on its warships
vers

It

during these maneu-

they carried war-fighting or war-sustaining

goods.) However, Iran could not permanently bar territorial sea innocent passage,

even as it could not permanently bar transit passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
Saudi Arabia could legitimately proclaim territorial sea safety corridors to
itate neutral

for naval

tanker

traffic. It

was unlawful

for Iran to use neutrals' territorial seas

maneuvers; this was a violation of neutrals'

Charter, Article 2(4).

It

was

territorial integrity

under the

also unlawful for belligerents to attack neutral ports or

attempt to frustrate entry into or egress from neutral ports, and the

Council was fully justified in denouncing this behavior.
is

facil-

congruent with Article 2(4) and

LOAC

UN Security

The LOS principle, which

principles regarding neutrals, was

thereby strengthened and reinforced.

4.

Passage Through the Strait of Hormuz

As noted, the Tanker War began while LOS Convention negotiations were
on-going. When the war ended in 1988, the ratification process was underway.
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During the Eighties more and more
ritorial sea

from traditional three-mile

LOS Convention would allow. This had important ramifications

law of straits passage. If three miles was

Strait of Hormuz

had a narrow band of high

exercise freedoms of navigation

high seas regime.

all a

seas

UAE could (and

coastal State could claim, the

through which ocean

traffic

could

LOS conventions'

and overflight under the 1958

On the other hand, if the LOS Convention territorial sea defini-

was the law and 12 miles could be claimed, the

tion

ter-

claims to more expansive sovereignty claims, up to and beyond the

12-mile limit the
for the

States shifted

territorial seas of Iran

LOS

did) totally overlap, so that the

passage regime applied. Claims of Iraq and neutrals,

Convention

e.g.,

and the

straits transit

the United States, that

Iran could not deny straits passage under either regime were well-founded in international law. This was one of the major victories of the Tanker

law of the

War in terms of the

sea.

The war also pointed out one of the major weaknesses of the
confusion over
overlap,

which

straits passage, particularly if territorial seas of
is

now

the situation for the Strait

States) believe, countries
territorial sea

when

sure

1958 conventions,

if,

may legitimately claim a

innocent passage regime, with

a State bordering a strait like

its

as

opposite States

most (including the United

12-mile territorial

sea.

Does the

potential for temporary straits clo-

Hormuz asserts its security is threatened,

apply through the Territorial Sea Convention, or does the customary rule of unfettered straits passage apply? Given worldwide dependence

similar navigational needs for other straits

(e.g.,

on Persian Gulf oil, and

Bab el-Mandeb

in the

Red

Sea,

through which tanker and other traffic may pass to transit the Suez Canal and serve

Mediterranean Europe and Africa and the

rest of the

Earth through the Straits of

Gibraltar), this remains a critical issue. Successful assertion of a straits passage re-

gime, perhaps founded on the

War

of the Tanker

5.

LOS Convention rules, was another critical victory

for the law of the sea.

Merchantmen and Warships: Reflagging and Other Issues
The Tanker War raised no countries' claims concerning the definition of a war-

ship, although there

and

US

was the possibility of it with respect to the Iranian speedboats

crewing of tugs for

The High

at least

one voyage of reflagged tankers from Kuwait.

Seas Convention defines warships in traditional terms; other of the 1958

conventions have no definitions, and 1 958 convention parties must depend on cus-

tomary

LOS

rules,

which

are relatively well-established, for high seas situations.

Convention repairs

Reregistration,

i.e.,

this gap.

reflagging of the Kuwaiti tankers complied with the

genuine link doctrine; for
the tanker was

all

LOS

LOAC purposes, as Chapter V will point out, the flag of

that counted.

The

rejected proposal for reflagging neutral mer-

chant ships trapped in the Shatt al-Arab under the

LOS

The

Convention principles;

UN or Red Cross flag followed

Iraq's refusal to allow this

was within

Iraq's rights.

Law

However,

if the

of the

Sea
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Security Council had decided to allow this under Charter Articles

25 and 48, the procedure would have been allowed.

Because of the complex business of today's international shipping, where own-

tionals

may be

among

na-

and companies of many nations, there was, and remains, the potential

for

ership, cargo, insurance, financing

espousal of claims related to
the war.

None

and other

damage

interests

to or destruction of ships

spread

and cargoes during

of these claims appear to have surfaced, however.

No

espoused

claims for deaths of or injuries to merchant mariners or other maritime workers

have appeared, but that potential for the future also
tled death claims arising

exists.

The United

from the Airbus destruction by ex

gratia

States set-

payments, and

presumably similar settlements were made for deaths or injuries related to
fense responses connected with Gulf shipping,

Iraq settled claims arising from

its

e.g.,

the

dhows and

self-de-

fishing boats.

mistaken attack on the U.S.S. Stark on the high

seas.

6.

Final Thoughts

For most countries, the

LOS Convention has become treaty law to serve, along-

side customary rules often

customary norms,
vention

is

needed

embedded

as a relatively stable legal
is

overflight, vital to navies but also to

vention provides rules for

is

transit passage

now

LOS

The Convention

traffic

and

civil aviation.

at all in

territorial sea

countries,

e.g.,

The Con-

have crystallized. Knotty prob-

and

will

be solved through the

regime for watery isthmuses like the Strait of Hormuz.
all

and

those earlier conventions.

The same

ocean areas.

the United States, have thus far chosen not to ratify the

Convention, even though a protocol, the Boat Agreement, revises what the

United States and other nations have perceived as weaknesses in the
tion's

restates

in the law of the sea since the 1958

closer to solution

warship definition will apply for

Some

merchant

not covered

Rules for today's reality of a 12-mile

areas.

freedoms of high seas navigation and

new developments

EEZ, which

lems of straits passage are

e.g.,

Convention along with developing

regime for the oceans. That this Con-

most apparent in several

thereby strengthens traditional rules,

treaties, e.g., the

in the

LOS Conven-

deep sea mining provisions. These countries must depend on customary

norms, which can change through practice and acceptance

as law,

an example be-

ing the 12-mile territorial sea. Nonratifying countries' positions can be weakened,
despite the vehicle of protests of nonacquiescence, as worldwide practice changes

and more

States accept the

States, are

1958

had not
norms,

changes

United

LOS conventions parties, their position is less strong than if they

ratified these treaties,

e.g.,

as law. If these countries, like the

because opponents can argue that 1958 treaty

the dangerously confusing straits passage principles, apply, and not

the customary norm restated in the

LOS Convention or in general customary law.
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The final lesson from the Tanker War, as it applies to the law of the sea, is an argument

for ratifying the 1982

and may not cover all

LOS

situations;

Convention. That Convention

no contract, no will, no

statute,

document does or ever will. The straits passage and warship

is

not perfect

no treaty, no legal

definition issues aris-

LOS conventions are two examples. It is hoped that nonratifying
countries will study the Tanker War record as it applies to the LOS and give serious consideration to ratifying the 1982 LOS Convention and its protocol. Ratificaing from the 1958

tion of these treaties,

and observance of them, may help prevent future

crises or

wars.
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Id., art.
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maneuvers
less

in Saudi territorial sea), 379 (Iran's projected naval

365 (Iran naval
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principles. See also 3 Nordquist

Id., arts.

11

87.9(f)-

on continental shelf norms
259-60 provide for

in

id.,

arts.

artificial scientific

76-85, and marine

research installations;

id., art.

261 declares these installations "shall not constitute an obstacle to established international shipping routes."

Id., art.

262 provides for identification markings and "internationally agreed warning signals" to ensure safe sea and

air navigation.
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edge of the continental margin, whichever

greater;" the

is

EEZ, defined

in id., as

up

to

of the

Sea

31

200 miles offshore,

have

all

potential for claims of national jurisdiction, or sovereignty in the case of the territorial sea.
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art. 3, 8 Stat.

1

n. 3, 6

or,

Treaties

and Treaty

Quincy Adams, Right of the People of the United States
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—Peculiar Character of

the Treaty of 1783, in

to the
id.,

Fishing Liberties

The Duplicate

—

Effect of

Letters,

The

Fisheries and the Mississippi 182, 189-90, 194-96, 197 (1822).
87.
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101.

Id., arts. 4, 5,

102.
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Virtue of the Convention of Feb. 29, 1892, Feb.

8,

1896, Gr. Brit.-US, 29 Stat. 844, also advanced no claims to regulate

high seas navigation in the disputed fishery area.
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949, the latter urging decoupling the concepts.

Sturgeon,

121.

15, 1944,

governments were
Fisheries

Dunn,

memorandum

of conference between

memorandum

948-50; Sturgeon, internal

id.

US Departments
for

of State and Interior representatives, July

Department of

State, July 19, 1944,
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e.g.,

Herman

Phleger, Recent Developments Affecting the Regime of the High Seas, 32 Bulletin 934, 936-37
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Whiteman

See generally 4

129.

id.

Roach

& Smith

11

28, 1963, 4

1207-08;

id.

MCRM

5.5.

131.

See nn. 99-101 and accompanying

132.

Gene Glenn, The Swedish-Soviet

133.

See

134.

Barents Sea Pact,

text.

Territorial

Sea Controversy

in the Baltic,

50

AJIL

942, 944 (1956).

id.

May 25,

1956,

USSR-UK, 266 UNTS

210.

The USSR terminated this in

1962. 4

Whiteman

982.
135.

USSR decree, Mar.

136.

Treaty Concerning Fisheries on the High Seas in the North Pacific Ocean,

21, 1956,

id.

1021

(transl.).

May

14, 1956,

Japan-USSR, 263

UNTS 99.
137.

Fishery Convention,

138.

Id., arts. 3-13.

139.

High Seas Convention,

140.

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(5); see also nn. 301-07

141.

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24(1), see also nn. 295-300

142.

Fisheries Jurisdiction

art. 1(1).

For background on

id.,

see

4

Whiteman

963-77.

arts. 2(l)-2(2).

(FRG v. Ice., UK v. Ice.), 1974 ICJ

1

and accompanying

;

and accompanying
1

fishing.

id.

194, replaced

text.

O'Connell, International Law 530-42. In 1966

the United States claimed a 12-mile offshore fishing zone. Contiguous Fishery
908. Pub. L. No. 88-308, 78

text.

Zone

Act, Pub. L. No. 89-658, 80 Stat.

by Pub. L. No. 90-427, 82 id, 445, had prohibited foreign flag territorial sea

,

The Tanker War

314

Fishing

143.

& Conservation Management Act of 1976, Pub.

L. No. 94-265, § 101, 90 Stat. 331, 336, subsequently

amended (FCMA).
144.

general

The Act also empowered the US Secretary of the Treasury to amend regulations under the Act to conform

LOS convention, e.g.,

amended.

E.g.,

the 1982

Pub. L. No. 99-659,

§

LOS Convention. FCMA, n.

101, 100

id.

FCMA

3715, repealed

to a

143, §§ 201-05, 401, 90 Stat. 337-46, 359-60, later
§

401.

145.

MacDonald

146.

Id.

147.

LOS Convention, arts. 55-58(1). The Convention also provides for high seas fishing rights, subjecting them to

140-41, 146.

141, 146-47.

existing treaties, cooperation in achieving agreements on high seas fishing, and Convention rules for certain fish

stocks and conserving high seas living resources.

Fishery Convention,

No.

1,

id.

Compare Fishery Convention,

and accompanying

art. l(a)(b)

Fisheries Jurisdiction, 1974 ICJ 22, 29.

151.

2

52.

If high seas military exercises

means

and

EEZ

EEZ

1.5.2 n.49;

153.

Some

Convention,

154.

LOS

etc.,

may

arts. 56(2), 58(3); see also 2

n. III.318,

etc.

Due

regard's content,

i.e.,

more

Charter,

12-14 (same).

care

must be taken

in the

EEZ

NWP

1-14M Annotated

H 1.5.2 n.51;

NWP 9A

H 7.4.

NWP 9A Annotated H

n. III. 318, 114-15.

NWP

Nordquist HH 60.1-60.15(c), 60.15(k), 121. 1-121. 12(c);
1.5.2 n.50.

UN Charter, arts. 51,103; LOS, arts. 58, 87; High Seas Convention, art. 2;
UN

1

be different and more exacting, but the shared use principle remains the

arts. 60(8), 121; see also 2

H 1.5.2 n.52;

III. 10-11,

Nordquist H

LOS Convention, arts. 87-88, citing arts. 87-88 in id.

use for military exercises or maneuvers.

Roach & Smith

Convention,

285; see also n.

58. 10(d); for analysis of other

subject to the due regard principle governing high seas navigation,

countries have a different view. Lowe, The Commander's,

1-14M Annotated

156.

LOS

II

Protests on claims to regulate the

text.

Brazil's objection to
II

V.6-V.33,

NWP1-14M Annotated H1.5.2,at 1-20; NWP9A Annotated H1.5.2,at 1-21. See also n. 75
EEZ beyond LOS parameters have been lodged, e.g.,

same. 2 Nordquist H 58.10(c);

and accompanying

EEZ

navigation, overflight,

because of nearby installations,

Annotated

11H

text.

can be held pursuant to the

exercises can be held in the

etc.,

63(2), 64-67, 118-20; compare

text.

Nordquist H 58.10(b) (Brazil, Cape Verde); Lowe, The Commander's,

overflight,

155.

with

75 and accompanying

150.

1

id., arts.

521, cmt. e; S. Doc. 103-39, n.3, 6 Dispatch Supp.

LOS Convention, art. 58(2), incorporating id., arts. 88- 115; see also 2 Nordquist

56.11(f), 58.10(e)-58.10(f); n.

art. 58,

§

116.1-1 16.9(g); Charney, Marine Environment, n. 49, 896-901.

rules clauses, see nn. III. 952-67, IV. 10-25
149.

incorporating

Id., art. 116,

Restatement (Third)

regulating or prohibiting high seas fishing. See also 2 Nordquist

at 27-28, listing treaties

55. 1-58. 10(d),

148.

arts. 1-8, 13; see also

1

Brown 219; Robertson, New LOS

47-630, 916-18, 932-67, IV.6-36 and accompanying text.

arts. 51, 103;

LOS

Convention,

art.

87;

High Seas Convention,

nn.

art. 2; see also

III.

10-11,

47-630, 916-18, 932-67, IV.6-36 and accompanying text.
157.

Delimitation of Maritime Boundary of Gulf of Maine (Can.

Nordquist H V.33;

NWP

Restatement (Third)

1-14M Annotated

§ 5 14,

cmt.

a

H 1.5.2 n.48;

NWP

v.

US), 1984 ICJ 246, 294;

9A Annotated

H 1.5.2 n.46;

1

1

Brown

Oppenheim

245; 2
§

329;

& r.n.1-3; Roach & Smith H 7.2;butsee NWP 1-14M Annotated H 1.5.2 n.48 (Japan's

EEZ rights, jurisdiction "are yet to be established as principles of general international
draft LOS Convention EEZ terms
the United States proclaimed a 200-mile EEZ, the largest EEZ on Earth. Presidential

1987 Statement, coastal State
law.");

1

O'Connell,

Law

restated custom.) In 1983

of the Sea 570-79 (uncertainty, in 1982, whether

Proclamation No. 5030, Mar. 10 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 10601 (1983); United States Ocean Policy,

n. 3;

NWP

1-14M

Annotated H 1.5.2,1-20-121.
158.

See nn. 80-136 and accompanying text (fishery claims).

159.

See nn. 123-30 and accompanying

160.

LOS Convention, art. 88; see also nn. 111.932-67, IV. 10-25 and accompanying text (art. 88 analysis in context of

text.

"other rules" clauses, Charter law).
161.

LOS

162.

NWP 9A Annotated, Table ST1-5; see also MacDonald 199-200.

163.

Roach & Smith HH

2.6, 14.2.1 at 413-14.

164.

LOS

art. 87(2);

Convention,

Convention,

art. 87(2),

High Seas Convention,

High Seas Convention,

art. 2; see also n.

art. 2; see also n.

75 and accompanying

text.

75 and accompanying

text.

Law

of the

Sea

315

165.

See nn. 11.178-80, 210-14, 272, 306, 309, 367, 401-02, 410-11, 434, 457 and accompanying

166.

See nn. 11.178-80, 210-14, 272, 306, 309, 401-02, 434, 457 and accompanying text.

167.

See nn.

168.

See Parts V.A, V.G.I, V.J.I, V.J.7, Chapter VI.

169.

See nn. 11.281, 393-99 and accompanying

170.

UN Charter, arts. 51,

171.

See Parts V.A, V.J.I.

172.

See nn.

II.

173.

See nn.

III.

174.

LOS

175.

LOS Convention, art.

176.

LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III. 952-67, IV. 10-25 and accompanying

III. 952-67

and accompanying

text.

text.

text.

103; see also nn. III.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25

and accompanying

text.

393-99 and Chapter VI.
952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

Convention,

art. 87(2);

87(2);

High Seas Convention,

art. 2; see also n.

75 and accompanying

text.

High Seas Convention,

art. 2; see also n.

75 and accompanying

text.

text.

177.

UN Charter, arts. 51,

178.

LOS

179.

LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. 111.952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying

Convention,

103; see also nn. III.9-10, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25

art. 87(2);

High Seas Convention,

art. 2; see also n.

and accompanying

75 and accompanying

text.

text.

text.

180.

LOS

181.

UN Charter, arts. 51,

Convention,

art. 88; see also

1

nn.

III. 955-58,

IV.15-18 and accompanying

text.

03; see a/so nn. 11.250,264, 354, 357,359,368, 420, 430,111. 10-11, 46-630,916-18, 932-67,

IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
182.

See nn. 11.148, 216, 278, 303, 357, 379-81, 463 and accompanying text; Part B.6.

183.

LOS

Convention,

art. 87(2);

High Seas Convention,

art. 2; see also n.

75 and accompanying

text.

184.

LOS

Convention,

art. 87(2);

High Seas Convention,

art. 2; see also n.

75 and accompanying

text.

185.

UN Charter, arts. 51,

186.

LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. 111.952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying

103; see also nn. III.10-1

1,

47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

text.

187.

See nn. 11.338-39, 459-69 and accompanying

188.

See generally Colombos

189.

See generally Swarztrauber 95-97.

Humphrey Waldock,

190.

(1951).

314, 766-67;

fisheries
191.

issue of

Swarztrauber 97-99.

The Legal Basis of Claims

For other summarized views,

see

Colombos

to the

§§ 81-84;

1

O'Connell,

Law of the

v.

Sea 467-70;

AJIL 828-30, 832 (1956). McDougal & Burke 412, 662 reject a connection between exploiting

and mineral exploitation on the

Skiriotes

Socy Trans. 1 15, 1 16-18
1 Oppenheim §
Shelf and International Law:

Continental Shelf, 36 Grotius

Swarztrauber 165-69; 4 Whiteman 740-41; Josef L. Kunz, Continental

Confusion and Abuse, 50

Florida, 313

shelf.

US 69 (1941) based jurisdiction on defendant's Florida citizenship, leaving open the

whether Florida could regulate offshore sponge fishing beyond the three-mile sea limit the United States

recognized.
192.

§ 83;

text.

Colombos

§§ 81, 164, 428;

Swarztrauber

96-97.

Treaty Relating to Submarine Areas of Gulf of Paria, Feb. 26, 1942, UK-Venez.,

124 implemented by

UK

Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Paria (annexation) Order

arts. 2, 6,

in Council,

205

LNTS

Aug.

6,

121, 122,

1942, § 4, 4

Whiteman 791, 792; see also Colombos § 82; 1 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 470, 484; Swarztrauber 160; 4 Whiteman
789, 791. The Order supported lack of a claim based on custom. Brownlie, International Law 5; see also Colombos §
82;

1

O'Connell

470, 473-75, 484.

Swarztrauber

193.

Proclamation No. 2668,

194.

Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil

Shelf, Proclamation

Swarztrauber

n. 122; see also

No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945),

160-61.

161-63.

& Sea Bed of the Continental

3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48); see also 2

Nordquist

1111

V.5, VI.6;

The Tanker War

316

195.

See,

Eugene H. Dooman memorandum

e.g.,

Dooman memorandum

US

to

William Phillips, June

to

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, July

3,

the Interior Harold L. Ickes letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 9,
State Cordell Hull,
196.
197.
issues.

June

1943,

9,

Proclamation No. 2667,
Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67
See Schoenbaum

id.

946.

now enacted as 43 USC §§ 1331-43, which has caused knotty private law
Restatement (Second) § 23 r.n.l. Outer Continental Shelf Resources
1801 (1994), amended and supplemented OCSLA.

Stat. 462-71,

1-9; see also

§

Submerged Lands Act, 43

§

USC §§

inside of the three-mile limit; see also
199.

Law

5;

OCSLA, §
1

3(b),

Oppenheim

67

§ 10,

1301-15 (1994), relinquishing

Schoenbaum

Stat. 462, since

US

title to

the continental shelf to the states

§ 1-9 n.3.

amended. This buttressed the customary norm. Brownlie, International

26.

200.

MacDonald

201.

Edwin J. Cosfordjr., The Continental Shelfand the Abu Dhabi Award,
Intl Conciliation 195, 226-27 (No. 520, 1958).

Law

&

754-55;

n. 194.

Management Act of 1978, 43 USC
198.

William W. Bishop

15, 1945;

Whiteman

US Secretary of
1943; Roosevelt letter to US Secretary of

1945, 4

115-16.
1

McGillL.J.

109, 124(1953); Sorenson,

&

Continental Shelf, Decree

of the Sea,

Argentina, Declaration Proclaiming Sovereignty Over the Epicontinental Sea

202.

No. 14,708, Oct.

9,

1946, 41

AJIL Supp.

11 (1947); see also

Chile Presidential Decree, June 23, 1947, 4

203.

Colombos

Whiteman

§

87B, 74; Swarztrauber 162-63.

794-96; see also

Colombos

§

87B, 74; Swarztrauber

164.

204.

Ecuador Congressional Decree, Feb.

205.

Peru Presidential Decree No. 781, Aug.

206.

Declaration of Santiago on Maritime Zone,

21, 1951,

Santiago on Maritime Zone, MacChesney 275;

1

1,

Whiteman

1947,

id.

799-800.

797-98; see also

Colombos

§

87B, 74.

Supplementary Convention to Declaration of
Swarztrauber 165; nn. 123-30 and accompanying

n. 124; see also

Oppenheim

§ 31 5;

text.

207.

El Salvador Const.,

208.

Honduras Decree No. 25

art. 7,

4

Whiteman

801-02; see also Swarztrauber 164-65.

(Jan. 17, 1951), discussed in

1

Oppenheim

§

715

n.4.

Presidential Declaration with Respect to Continental Shelf, Oct. 29, 1945, discussed in

209.

162-63;

Mexican Presidential Decree, Feb.

25, 1949, 4

Whiteman

US Ambassador James Bruce note to
US Ambassador Claude G. Bowers protest note to Chile
Foreign Relations Minister German Vergara Donoso, July 2, 1948, id. 796-97; US Ambassador Paul C. Daniels note to
Ecuador Ministry for Foreign Affairs, June 7, 1951, id. 800-01; US Charge d' Affaires ad interim de Lambert note to
Peru Foreign Affairs Minister Armando Revoredo I, July 2, 1948, id. 798-99; US Ambassador George P. Shaw note to
Swarztrauber 163; Cosford,

210.

Argentina Foreign Office, July

2,

n. 201, 124.

1948, 4

Whiteman

US

Swarztrauber

803.

protests included

794-94;

Salvador Minister for Foreign Affairs Canessa, Dec. 12, 1950,

&

id.

802.

211.

Roach

212.

Saudi Arabia, Territorial Waters of Saudi Arabia, Decree No. 6/4/5/371 1,

(1949);

Smith

1

8.5, 205-08.

May 28, 1949, in 43 AJIL Supp. 54
MacDonald 115-16, 118-22 144-46, 199 (noting similarity of Saudi claim to US
O'Connell, Law of the Sea 473; Richard Young, Saudi Arabian Offshore Legislation, 43 AJIL 530

Colombos

proclamation);

11

§

1

88;

(1949).

213.

Colombos

§

88A;

MacDonald

116, 119, 145.

214.

Colombos

§

88A;

MacDonald

199.

215.

Earlier disputes over land boundaries

and islands clouded delimitation of offshore lines.

MacDonald 116-17,

126-37, 147-51, 199-201; see also nn. 11.50-51, 69.

MacDonald

216.

2-526

-

199-200; see also

MCRM 2-37, 2-235

-

2-240, 2-283, 2-352

-

2-356, 2-387

-

2-388, 2-437

2-528.

Whiteman 814-42

an anthology of continental shelf definitions issues through 1965.

217.

4

218.

Continental Shelf Convention,

is

art. 1; see also 2

O'Connell,

Law of the

Sea 714-23.

-

2-526,

Law

Continental Shelf Convention,

219.

arts. 6(1), 6(2); see also 2

O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 684-727;

322-23. Convention shelf definitions do not necessarily coincide with geological definitions.

H1.6n. 56;
laws

NWP9A Annotated HI. 6 n.54;

may vary from both; see, e.g., id.

1

Oppenheim

492-98.

§

316. See

1

O'Connell ch.

Law

317

Oppenheim

1

§§

NWP 1-14M Annotated

12 for geological analysis. National

To the extent national definitions vary from custom or treaty obligations,
art. 46; Nottebohm (Liech. v.
Restatement (Third) § 311(3).

they are inadmissible under international law. Vienna Convention,
20-21; Brownlie, International

Sea

of the

35-36;

Oppenheim

1

§ 21;

Guat.), 1955 ICJ 4,

220.

Restatement (Second)

221.

North Sea Continental Shelf (FRG v. Den. FRG v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 38, 53; see also 1 O'Connell, Law of
1 Oppenheim § 324; Wolfgang Friedmann, The North Sea Continental Shelf

§ 23.

,

the Sea 480-82; 2 id. 690, 699-703, 705-08;
Cases—A Critique, 64 AJIL 229 (70).
Continental Shelf Convention,

222.

art. 2; see also

1

Brown

255-56;

1

Oppenheim

§

317;

Restatement (Third)

§

515(1).

223.

Continental Shelf Convention,

Annotated H
224.

1.6, at 1-24; 1

Oppenheim

Continental Shelf Convention,

should "not normally [be withheld]

.

art. 3; see also 1

.

Brown

if

.

.

.

.

Brown

1

225.

Continental Shelf Convention,

226.

High Seas Convention,

227.

See

228.

Continental Shelf Convention,

229.

Id., arts. 5(1), 5(6).

230.

The

n.

1.6; 1

231.

Compare

§

321;

.

LOS

§

319;
232.

Compare

.

shelf," if the coastal State

can participate or be

art. 4.

all

appropriate measures in the zones to protect the sea's living resources

See also Colombos §§ 89-91;

Convention,

Restatement (Third)

.

text.

Swarztrauber

Nordquist 111 VI.4, 78. l-78.8(d);

State's right to tunnel to exploit the subsoil at

214.

art. 78,

with Continental Shelf Convention,

NWP 1- 14M Annotated H

1 .6,

at

1

-23;

Brown

art. 3; see also 1

NWP 9A Annotated U

1 .6,

at

1

-24;

1

258-59; 2

Oppenheim

§ 515.

LOS Convention, art.

for distance,

76. 18(a)-76. 18(b) is neutral

shelf claims by

any

NWP 1-14 M Annotated H 1.6; NWP 9A, Annotated H

57, with

id., art.

76(1); see also 2

Nordquist HI 57.8(a)-57.8(b), 76.1-76.18(b).

233. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 76(1), 76(2), 76(4)-76(6) with Continental Shelf Convention, art. I;
Oppenheim §§ 322-23. Although NWP 1-14M Annotated H 1.6 and NWP 9A Annotated H 1.6 declare

customary norm

which

arts. 4, 5(2)-5(7), 7.

must undertake

Id., arts. 5(2)-5(5), 5(7), 7.

Oppenheim

NWP 9A

256-57.

from harmful agents. The Convention does not prejudice that
depth.

1.6, at 1-23;

11

art. 2.

75 and accompanying

coastal State

1-14 Annotated

submitted by a qualified institution" engaged in "purely scientific

research into the physical or biological characteristics of the

represented in the research; see also

NWP

§ 515(2).

requires coastal State consent for shelf research,

art. 5(a). Id., art. 5(8)
.

256;

Restatement (Third)

319;

§

Lowe, Commander's Handbook,

on the

point.

LOS

n. III. 31 8, 114, says

Convention,

Commission on Limits of the Continental

arts. 76(7)-76(9),

it

may not be the case.

2

see also

1

this is a

Nordquist 1111

provide for publishing and approving

Shelf, established in

id.,

Annex

II.

See also 2 Nordquist

1111

76.18(c), 76.18(e)-76.18(/).

234.

Compare

LOS

235.

Compare

LOS

Convention,

Convention,

art. 76(2),

Convention,

arts. 6(1), 6(2); see also

art.

83(l)-83(2), 83(4), referring to

Maritime Delimitation

1993 ICJ 38, 59-60; Continental Shelf (Libya
18, 43;

North Sea Continental

with Continental Shelf Convention,

Shelf, n. 221;

v.

in

id.,

arts.

art. 1(a).

279-99, with Continental Shelf

Area between Greenland

& Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.),

Malta), 1985 ICJ 18,43; Continental Shelf (Tunisia

United Kingdom

Arb. 1977); Delimitation of Maritime Boundary (Guinea

v.

-

France Continental Shelf (UK

Guinea-Bissau), 25

ILM

251, 272

v.

Libya), 1982 ICJ

v. Fr.),

54

ILR 6

(Ct.

(Ad Hoc Arb. 1985);

2

O'Connell, Law of the Sea 480-82; 2 id. 685-714; 1 Oppenheim §§ 325-26.
Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 26, 1958, 450 UNTS 169, refers
Nordquist HH 83.1-83.19(c), 83.19(e);

1

disputes to the International Court of Justice but
Introductory Note, at 4 n.3. United States

is

not in force for the United States. Restatement (Third), Part V,

Ocean Policy,

n. 3,

besides proclaiming a 200-mile

EEZ,

said the claim

would

"provide jurisdiction for mineral resources out to 200 nautical miles that are not on the continental shelf." This claim
is

consistent with customary law.
236.

Compare

77.1-77.7(b).

LOS Convention, arts. 77( 1 )-77(3) with Continental Shelf Convention, art. 2

;

see also 2

Nordquist

1111

The Tanker War

318

237.

Compare

LOS Convention, arts.

261-62 with Continental Shelf Convention,

4 Nordquist

art. 5(1); see also

1IH

261.1-62.5.

238.

Compare

LOS

Convention,

art.

240(c) with Continental Shelf Convention,

art. 5(1); see also

4 Nordquist UH

240.1-40.8, 240.9(c).

239.
to

LOS

Convention,

192-265; Continental Shelf Convention,

arts.

art. 24, calls

upon

States to draft regulations

prevent sea pollution resulting from seabed and subsoil exploration and exploitation. See nn. VI. 64,

accompanying
240.

Compare

LOS Convention, arts. 60, 79-8 1

,

10,

1

16-20 and

85 with Continental Shelf Convention, arts. 4, 5(2)-5(7), 7; see also 2

Nordquist HI 60.1-60. 15(m), 79. 1-81. 7(d), 85.1-85.6;
the deep seabed beyond the continental shelf;

Convention,

1

text.

arts.

Brown

its

1

Oppenheim

§

320-21 ;n. 215 and accompanying text.

resources are declared the

common

The Area is

heritage of mankind.

LOS

Oppenheim §§ 350-52; nn. VI.64, 116-17, 147-50 and
Because of the Persian Gulfs shallow depth, there is no Area beneath its waters. See nn. 11.66-69

136-37; see also

10, 20, 445-47;

1

accompanying text.
and accompanying text.

and accompanying

241.

North Sea Continental

242.

Delimitation of Maritime Boundary of Gulf of Maine (US

Shelf (Libya

v.

Shelf, n. 221

Malta), 1985 ICJ 13, 55;

(Third), Introductory Note to Part V, 5;
e.g.,

LOS

Convention,

text.
v.

Can.), 1984 ICJ 246, 294; see also Continental

Law of the Sea 688-714; Roach & Smith H 8.5; Restatement
b, say some LOS Convention provisions may be de lege ferenda,

O'Connell,

1

id. §

515, cmt.

arts. 68, 77.

243.

Roach & Smith

244.

See nn. 123-30, 200-16 and accompanying

245.

UN Charter, arts.

246.

LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III. 952-67, IV. 10-25 and accompanying

8.5.

II

text.

51, 103; see also nn. III.10-1

1,

47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

text.

247.

See nn. V.653, 659 and accompanying text;

248.

Seabed Arms Control Treaty, arts.

limit for contiguous zone).

As of January

Given the

Brownlie, International Law

accompanying
249.

1

incorporating by reference Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24 ( 1 2-mile

TIF 445-46.

Symposium, State Succession; Walker, Integration and
the treaty may be on the way toward recognition as a customary norm.
Oppenheim § 10,28; Restatement (Third) § 102(3) & cmt. 4; see alson. III. 10 and
the number.

text.

Accord,

NWP

1-14M Annotated

Law of the

O'Connell,

5;

V.G.2-V.G.3, V.J.6-V.J.7.

1998,99 States were party, albeit some with reservations, ere.

may increase
number of parties,

State succession principles
Disintegration.

1 -2,

1,

see also Parts

H 10.2.2.1;

NWP

9A Annotated

H 10.2.2.1; see also

1

Brown

Sea 488 (divergence of views whether coastal State has exclusive use of

its

243-44;

1

proclaimed

continental shelf for these purposes).
250.

UN Charter, arts. 51,

Convention,

art. 2.

See nn.

103;

III.

LOS Convention, arts.

78, 87(1); Continental Shelf Convention, an. 3;

10-11, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-9, 10-25

and accompanying

High Seas

text.

251.

Seabed Arms Control Treaty,

252.

LOS Convention, arts. 78-79(1), 87(1); Continental Shelf Convention, arts. 3-5( 1 ); High Seas Convention, an.

2; see also nn. 75, 149-50, 152,

art. 4.

155-56 and accompanying

text.

253.

See nn. 11.66-69 and accompanying

254.

MacDonald

255.

Id.

256.

See

257.

See nn. 11.367, 410-1

258.

See nn. 11.178-80, 210-14, 272, 306, 309, 401-02, 434, 457 and accompanying

259.

See

260.

See Parts V.A, V.G.I, V.J.I, V.J.7, Chapter VI.

261.

See nn. 11.281, 393-99 and accompanying

262.

Cf.

text.

119.

200; see also n. 11.51 and accompanying text.
n.

239 and accompanying
1

n. III. 952-67, IV.

UN Charter, arts.

text.

and accompanying

text.

text.

10-25 and accompanying text.

text.

51, 103; see also nn. III. 10-11, 916-18, IV.6-9

and accompanying

text.

Law

263.

See nn. V.21-28 and accompanying

264.

See generally Chapter VI.

265.

See nn. 111.10-11, 48-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying

266.

See nn. 75, 149-50, 152, 155-56, 239 and accompanying
See Colombos

267.

(1927);

O'Connell,

1

of the

Sea

319

text.

text.

text.

95- 1 06; Philip C. Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction 3-66

§§

Law of the

Sea chs.

3-4;

Swarztrauber passim

for similar analysis

through their publication

dates.

268.

Swarztrauber

269.

Customs Consolidation Act, 39

1

30; accord, Jessup,

The Law,

n.267, 66.

& 40 Vict., ch. 36, §

134.

The Act also asserted other claims related to policing

smuggling.

Swarztrauber

270.
107.

Convention

70; see also Jessup,

The Law,

n. 267, 10-11, also citing

May 6,

for Regulating Police of North Sea Fisheries,

Act of Aug. 20, 1853, 16

1882, arts. 2,

3,

160

&

17 Vict., ch.

CTS 219, 222, established

a

three-mile zone for exclusive fishing by coastal State nationals. Convention Respecting Free Navigation of the Suez
Canal, Oct. 29, 1888,

art. 4,

CTS

171

241, 244

Ship Canal, Nov. 18, 1901, Gr. Brit.-US,
the ends of the Suez and

and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Treaty

art. 3(5),

32

to Facilitate

Construction of a

1904, forbade hostilities within three miles of ports at

Stat. 1903,

Panama canals. Alleganean Claim (Gr. Brit. v. US), 4 Moore, Arbitrations 4332, stated three
Colombos § 106; Jessup, The Law, n. 267,

miles was the territorial limit recognized by international law. See also
61-62;
271.

Law of the

O'Connell,

1

Sea 157.

& 42

Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, Oct. 16, 1878, 41

Keyn, 2 Ex.D. 63

US

272.

(1876).

Secretary of State

French Minister

to the

Vict., ch. 73, §§ 2, 7,

Colombos §105 notes the connection between the

Thomas Jefferson

letters to British

United States Charles Genet, Nov.

8,

superseding

The Queen

v.

Acts.

Hammond,
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 440-42

Minister to the United States George

1793, in 6

(Paul Leicester Ford ed. 1895).
273.

Act of June

1.4.1 n.30;

5,

1794, § 6,

Swarztrauber

1

NWP 1-14M Annotated

Stat. 381, 384; see also

11

1.4.1 n.32;

NWP 9A Annotated,

11

60.

The Law,

Swarztrauber 64-107.

274.

See generally Jessup,

275.

Declaration of Herbert H. D. Price, U.S. Agent, in C. H. White Case (US v. Russ.), 9 UNRIAA 63, upon the US

n. 267, 9-66;

Secretary of State's specific authority. Until 1988 the United States remained committed to three miles.

US

Department of State Public Notice 358, 37 Fed. Reg. 1 1906 (June 15, 1972). See also The Delaware, 161 US 459 (1 896);
Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 US 240, 257-58 (1891) for contemporary judicial views; Colombos § 107; 1902
FRUS, App. C 440-61; Swarztrauber 77-78, 92-95.
276.

US Naval War Code, art.

277.

See Swarztrauber 112-15.

278.

Id.

2.

117-23, citing Convention for Preservation

Atlantic Fisheries (Gr. Brit.

v.

US),

n. 95,

& Protection

of Fur Seals, n. 114,

art. 5,

37 Stat. 1543; North

implemented by North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Treaty,

n. 91, art. 2,

37 Stat.

1635.
279.

Compare Hague VIII,

art. 2,

with

Hague

XIII, referring to "neutral waters;" see also Report

Commission of the Second Hague Peace Conference, Sept.

17, 1907, art. 2, in

to the

Third

James Brown Scott, The Reports to the

Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, at 664 (1917). Swarztrauber 1 16 says "This draft was essentially the British
." The US Navy may have been more interested in a different rule than id. indicates; Naval
War College,
International Law Topics and Discussions 1913, at 1 1 (1914), a draft for a Hague conference that never was because of
World War I, advocated a six-mile marginal sea. See Jessup, The Law, n. 267, 56; see also Robertson, New LOS 274-77;
version

.

.

nn. V.60, 70-72 and accompanying text.

Colombos

O'Connell,

Law of the

280.

See generally

281.

Report of the Neutrality Committee, in International

§

157;

1

Law

Sea 157; Swarztrauber 123-25.

Association, Report of the Thirty-Third Conference

260 (1924), recommending Amended Draft Convention: Laws of Maritime Jurisdiction

Colombos
282.

§ 114, 103;

Institute of International

(1928); see also

283.

Swarztrauber

Colombos

§ 114,

Law, Projet de reglement

102-03;

Harvard Research Draft,

in

Time of Peace,

id.

286. See also

126.

Swarztrauber

arts. 2, 3.

relatifa la

127.

mer

territoriale

en temps de paix, 34 Annuaire 755

The Tanker War

320

Conference

284.

(1930), 24

AJIL

Law, Final Act, B. Territorial Sea, Resolution, arts. 1-2, 4-5
§§ 114-17; O'Connell, Law of the Sea 158-59; Swarztrauber

for Codification of International

Supp. 169, 183-85 (1930).

Colombos

131-38 describe events leading up to the Conference, illustrating divided opinion on the limit.

id.

285.

MacDonald86.

286.

Sixteen conventions were ratified: Belgium, Dec.

2852, 133

LNTS

383;

LNTS

141;

Denmark, May

Germany, May

1924,43

19,

9,

LNTS 171

1925, 45 Stat. 2456, 72

;

Chile,

Cuba (with exchange ofnotes& memorandum of understanding), Mar. 4,
29, 1924, 43

id.

1809, 27

id.

LNTS

361; France, June 30, 1924, 45

1815; Great Britain, Jan. 23, 1924,

id.

LNTS

1761, 27

id.

May 27, 1930, 46

1926, 44

2403, 61

2395,61

uf.

LNTS

415;

181; Greece, Apr. 25, 1928,45

id.

LNTS 231; Italy, June 23, 1924, 43id. 1844; Japan(with memorandum of understanding), May 31, 1928, 46 id.
2446, 101 LNTS 63; Netherlands, Aug. 21, 1924, 44 id. 2013, 33 LNTS 433; Norway, May 24, 1924, 43 id. 1772, 26
LNTS 43; Panama, June 6, 1924, id. 1875, 138 LNTS 397; Poland, June 30, 1930, 46 id. 2773, 108 LNTS 323; Spain,
Feb. 10, 1926, 2, 44 id. 2465, 67 LNTS 131; Sweden, May 20, 1924, 43 id. 1830, 29 LNTS 421. All are in force except
2736,91

those with

Germany and Italy. TIF22, 52, 66, 72, 97,

11 1,155, 203, 213,222, 236, 263, 270, 304.

Jessup.The Law,

n. 267,

56-57, in zeal for the three-mile limit, does not note the distinction, although several treaties leaving the issue open

were concluded by 1927.
287.

See nn. 123-30, 200-16 and accompanying text;

288.

See Swarztrauber 171-72.

289.

Fisheries Jurisdiction

(UK

see also

Colombos

§§ 87, 88A;

Nor.), 1951 ICJ 116, 119-21, 143; see also

v.

4); Colombos

formula followed in Territorial Sea Convention, art.

Brown

Swarztrauber 162-65.

24-26 (Fisheries Jurisdiction

§§ 124-28 A, 131, 134 (same);

1

Law of

O'Connell,

the Sea 199-206.
290.

MacDonald

291.

Philippines Ministry of Foreign Affairs note to

86-87.

UN

Whiteman 282-83;
The United States noted

Secretary General, Dec. 12, 1955, 4

Republic of Indonesia, Announcement on Territorial Waters, Dec.

14, 1957,

id.

284.

non-acquiescience to the Philippines claim and protested the Indonesia Announcement.

MacDonald

292.

283-85.

87-88.

LOS Convention, art. 2;seealso 2 Nordquist 111 11.1,11.3,
& cmts. a, b, r.n.l, 2.

Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1-2, reaffirmed by

293.

2.8(0;

Id.

1

294.

Oppenheim

The

§

187;

Restatement (Third)

12-mile claim was an

nn. 300, 354 and accompanying
295.

512

§

amendment of its 1934 assertion of a contiguous zone. MacDonald 88,

107; see also

text.

Territorial Sea Convention,

destruction, as stated in the Seabed

art.

24,

which

is

Arms Control

also the limit for

Treaty,

arts. 1-2.

emplacing nuclear weapons or weapons of mass
See nn. 248-52 and accompanying

may

112 says, this exceeds the scope of the Convention's grant. However, States

commit

arrest, try

id.

n.

14 in United States

v.

the

III. 318,

and punish persons who

offenses in the zone pursuant to jurisdictional bases other than the territorial principle,

principle cited by

To

text.

extent that States assert a right to punish offenses committed within the zone, as Lowe, The Commander's, n.

e.g.,

the protective

Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 938-39 (11th Cir. 1985). See Restatement

(Third) §§402-04, 421-23.
296.

Territorial Sea Convention,

297.

The US contiguous zone was

24(1) ("In a zone of the high seas contiguous to the territorial sea

art.

reasserted in

US

State

Department Public Notice 358,

n. 275.

Most

Brown

128-30;

1

Oppenheim

§

205. In 1999 the

No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48701 (1999). See
298.

High Seas Convention,

3.11.2.2.2;

art.

also n.

536 and accompanying

23; see also

NWP 9A Annotated 1 3.9;

2

United States proclaimed

Brown

O'Connell,

135-36;

Law of the

a

.

.").

countries'

pre-Convention contiguous zone claims were part of widespread practice for protecting revenue and health
See

.

interests.

24-mile contiguous zone. Proclamation

text.

Colombos

§§ 171-79;

NWP

1-14M Annotated

Sea 1075-93; Restatement (Third)

§

513 cmt.

1
g;

A Functional Interpretation Adaptable to Emerging Technologies and Practices, 20
ODIL 309 (1989) (analyzing LOS Convention rules); Susan Maidmtni, Historic Aspects of the Doctrine ofHot Pursuit, 46
Craig H. Allen, Doctrine of Hot Pursuit:

BYBIL

365 (1972).

299.

MacDonald

300.

Manley O. Hudson and Richard Young of the Harvard Law School, acting

100, 107.

1949 claim, noting regional practice for
301.

a

6-mile territorial sea.

Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 3-13; see also

Fisheries Jurisdiction, n. 289);

Colombos

§§

in private capacity, drafted the

Id. 87-88, 100-07.

Brown

24-26 (Territorial Sea Convention,

118-10, 134 (same);

1

O'Connell,

Law of the

art.

4 follows

Sea 170-235;

Law

Swarztrauber 204-11; 4 Whiteman

MacDonald

accompanying

text.

What

is

its

other rules clause refers to the

"prejudice" under the Convention,

&

cmts. a-c,

e, f,

Roma

r.n.1-2;

Norm, 10 Yale Int'l

§

see

2.3.2.1 n.25.

LO AC. See nn. III. 953-67, IV. 10-25 and

was

left to

45, cmts. f-g; 48;

LOS

coastal State interpretation

in

sea.

& r.n.3-6;

(Third) §§ 512, cmt. c

id.

and

See also

Swedish Waters: The Erosion of an

19 tries to eliminate

some

subjective

Convention innocent passage

rules.

NWP

Convention

interpretative difficulties that have arisen concerning the 1958

Annotated H

14(4)

Sadurska, Foreign Submarines

34 (1984).

L.J.

art.

which a foreign ship engaged while transiting the territorial

O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 294-97; Restatement (Second)

513(1)-513(2)
International

321

For discussion of Iranian and Saudi baseline claims through 1959,

passim.

failed to limit prejudicial activities to those in
1

Sea

92-98.

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14;

302.

of the

art.

O'Connell does not rule out using force against a submerged

9A

transiting submarine but says

"every measure should be taken short of force to require the submarine to leave, as provided in Article 23 of the
[Territorial Sea Convention]."
self-defense,
text.

under

1

O'Connell 297. A coastal State retains a right of self-defense, including anticipatory
51, 103. See nn. III.10-11, 48-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying

UN Charter, arts.

See also 2 Nordquist H1I19.1-19.11.

303.

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.3.2.4 n.33; NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.2.4 n.32.

304.

1

O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 294 (right

NWP 1-14M Annotated
cmt.

i

2.3.2.1;

11

to exclude rooted in treaty law,

e.g.,

1, 3(c));

& r.n.6.
Special agreements can give military and other State aircraft overflight or landing rights.

305.

(Third)

UNTS

Restatement

513, r.n.6, citing Chicago International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693, 84

§

389,

which does not cover military or

State aircraft.

306.

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 15.

307.

Eight countries appended reservations to protect their claims that surface warship passage was subject to prior

notification or authorization. Nevertheless, the weight of authority

Brown 64-66;

warships without prior notice or authorization.
H 2.3.2.4;

1

is

that the Convention permits innocent passage of

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.3.2.4; NWP 9A Annotated

O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 274-91 (customary trends, which apply to warship innocent passage under the

Convention; no evidence of State practice before very recent times of other than

Restatement (Second)
§

ICAO Convention, arts.

NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.2.1; Restatement (Second) §45, cmt. \;id. (Third) §513,

§

49 (implication of coastal State waiver); id (Third)

§

free,

uncontested warship passage);

513, cmt. h

& r.n.2; but see 1

Oppenheim

201 (right doubtful). Saudi Arabia opposed warship innocent passage; Iran claimed warship passage required prior

authorization.
308.

513(2)

MacDonald

170-71, 178.

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16; see also

&

NWP

309.

McDougal & Burke

310.

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 17; see also

clause refers to the
311.

513(2)
312.

1

O'Connell,

LOAC; see

592-93;

nn.

1-14M Annotated

III. 953-67,

cmt.

H 2.3.2.3 n.31;

Restatement (Third)

§

IV.10-25 and accompanying

Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 18-20; see also

&

Law of the

Sea 297-98; Restatement (Third)

§

cmts. b-c. For analysis of straits passage, see Part.B.6.

NWP 9A, Annotated H 2.3.2.3 n.30.

513(2)

&

cmts. b,

c.

Art. 17's other rules

text.

Restatement (Second)

§§ 46-47;

id.

(Third) §§ 512,

r.n. 5;

e.

Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 21-22.

The

other rules clause refers to the

LOAC.

See nn.

III. 953-67,

IV.10-25 and accompanying text.
313.

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 23.

314. Brown 44-45; Colombos §§ 119-20A; MacDonald
Swarztrauber 214-18; 4 Whiteman 122-35; Powers & Hardy, n.
315.

Restatement (Second)

two years

§

15(2); accord,

later that the three-mile limit

Colombos

was the only

171;
2,

1

O'Connell,

§ 121, citing inter alia

common

Law

McDougal & Burke 562,

See generally Restatement (Second) §§ 11-15, citing Territorial Sea Convention,

317.

MacDonald

318.

LOS

319.

Compare

Convention,

LOS

Convention,

Nordquist HH 4.1-16.8(e);
175-235;

1

arts. 2-3; see also

Oppenheim §§

accompanying

2 Nordquist HH

arts. 4-16,

asserting

denominator.

316.

90-91; see also nn. 299-300 and

of the Sea 161-64;

70-71.

arts. 3-4, 6-12.

text.

2. 1-3. 8(e).

with Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 3-13; see also

Brown

22-36; 2

NWP

1-14M Annotated H 1.3; NWP 9A Annotated H 1.3; 1 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea
188-95; Roach & Smith Ml 4.1-4.5. 2 O'Connell 842-47 notes the LOS Convention's

ambiguity on whether deepwater ports are
1502(10), provide for them; see also

artificial islands.

The US Deepwater Port Act of
1.4.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated H

NWP 1-14M Annotated H

1974, 33
1.4.2.2.

USC

§§ 1501,

The Tanker War

322

& cmt.

320.

Restatement (Third )§§ 511(a)

321.

Id.

322.

In 1958 19 States claimed 4 to 11 miles; in 1965 24 claimed 4 to 11 miles; in 1974 14 claimed 4 to 11 miles; in

§511,

r.n.4.

1979 7 claimed 4 to

Table

b; 512.

1 -6: The Expansion of Territorial Sea Claims, in NWP 1
1 4M Annotated, at 1 -84;
Roach & Smith 149; see also Brown 45-50. Newly independent States claimed
had claimed 4 to 1 1 miles moved to 12 miles as the number of countries adhering to a

miles. Table

1 1

A

-

Territorial Sea Claims, in

3:

12-mile limits, while

many that

3-mile limit declined.
323.

LOS

324.

Compare

Convention,

LOS

Oppenheim

art. 3; see also 1

Convention,

196.

§

with Territorial Sea Convention,

art. 33,

art. 24.

Restatement (Second)

§

21

33(1) ("In a zone contiguous to

its

approves Territorial Sea Convention principles.

This analysis

325.

territorial sea
.

.

.

.
.

")

.

the territorial sea

24(2)

id., art.

is

Compare

326.

id.W

LOS

327.

§

513 cmt.

Convention,

accompanying

&

.

.

text. Article

Convention. Compare

id., art.

may not extend beyond 24
Brown 129-35; 2 Nordquist

zone

.

.

cmt. k; 513 cmt.

LOS Convention, art.

111. l-11.9(i);

(Third)

§ 22; id.

("The

measured."). See also

Restatement (Third) §§ 511(b)

33. 8(g); 3

LOS

derived from the

is

with

Ill, with

.

§§ 33.1-33.8(i);

High Seas Convention, art.

23; see also

Maidment,

g; Allen, n. 298;

Brown

303(2); see also

art.

303 also says

n.

Mark

r.n.4;

329.

Brown

Feldman

B.

art.

27, 1988, 54 Fed. Reg.

Restatement (Third)

135;

§

and

historical nature," an

IV. 10-25

III. 953-67,

and accompanying

11

example of

Weekly Comp.

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 1.2; NWP9A Annotated

David Colson, The Maritime Boundaries of the United

a 12-mile territorial sea.

777 (1989);

see also n.

5; see also n.

II

1.2;

States,

75

AJIL

328 and accompanying

Roach & Smith

332.

Presidential Proclamation No. 5928, Dec. 27, 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Jan. 9, 1989).

§

729, 730 (1981).

text.

Five years later the

text.

Restatement (Third

)

Pres. Doc. 383 (Mar.

Proclamation No. 5928, Territorial Sea of the United States, Dec.

332 and accompanying
3:

in

Restatement (Third) § 511

331.

claimed 4 to 11 miles. Table

LOAC

text.

Only

333.

135-36; 2 Nordquist

521 r.n.6; nn. VI. 141-50 and

330.

5

205;

terms are also "without prejudice to other international agreements and

its

Restatement (Third), Part V, Introductory Note

United States proclaimed

Brown

311(2) and the Convention's other rules clauses, which allow applying the

50-51;

&

§

298; n. 298 and accompanying text.

President Ronald Reagan, United States Oceans Policy, Mar. 10, 1983, 19

328.

Oppenheim

NWP 1-14M Annotated 113. 11.2.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated H 3.9; Restatement (Second)

appropriate situations. See nn.

14, 1983); see also

1

f.

rules of international law regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological

derogation permitted by

miles from the baselines from which

.

Territorial Sea Claims, in

149.

& r.n.4.

511(a)

By 1997 Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE had joined 1 1 9 other States in proclaiming 1 2-mile territorial seas. NWP
NWP 9A Annotated, Table ST1-5; see also Brown 45-50.

1-14M Annotated, Table Al-5;

Brownlie, International

Oppenheim

Restatement (Third)

& cmt.

Cf.

335.

NWP 1-14M Annotated, Table Al-5 at 1-84; NWP 9A Annotated, Table ST1-5; see also Table 6.1

Sea Claims as at

1

June 1993,

in

Brown

336.

Roach & Smith HH

337.

Territorial Sea Convention,

innocent passage rule in

Sea Convention,

id., art.

art. 23,

art.

show

their flag.

338.

339.

Compare

LOS

Convention,
§

615;

III. 952-67,

§

102(3)

:

f.

Territorial

Part B.5. Although

17-18, 20, 25-28, 30, 32 with Territorial

51-53, 62-64; 2 Nordquist
2.3.2.1, 2.3.2.4;

11

1111

art.

H11

2.3.2.1, 2.3.2.4;

LOS Convention, art. 30, like Territorial Sea Convention,

submerged submarine

to leave,

and

this

might be the only step

a coastal

and any LOAC rights, the latter applying to the territorial sea through other
1(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2).

accompanying

UN

text.

19(1) with Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4); see also 2 Nordquist U

Restatement (Third)

IV. 10-25

17.1-18.6(f), 20.1-20.7(c),

NWP 9A Annotated

103; see also nn. 111.10-11, 47-630, 914-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and

Oppenheim

See nn.

LOS Convention, arts.

Brown

LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 31; Territorial Sea Convention, arts.

arts. 51,

1

Compare

NWP 1-14M Annotated

limits a coastal State to requiring a

19.10(a);

28;

14(5) omitted reference to foreign flag fishing ships, as did the straits

arts. 14-15, 18-20, 22(2), 23; see also

Law of the Sea 294-97;

rules clauses in

§ 10,

46-49.

State takes, that State also has self-defense

Charter,

1

16(4). The 1982 LOS Convention, art. 20 also requires "other under\vater vehicles" to

25.1-28.4(e), 30.1-30.6, 32.1-32.7(b);

O'Connell,

5;

5.4-5.5.

navigate on the surface and to

1

Law

334.

§

513(1)

and accompanying

text.

& cmt.

b, r.n.l.

Law

LOS Convention, art.

of the

Sea

323

19(2) with Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(5).

340.

Compare

341.

Compare Joint Statement with Uniform Attached Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing

Innocent Passage, Sept. 23, 1989, USSR-US,

11

ILM 1444, 1446 (1989) (Joint Interpretation) (list exhaustive); 2

28

3, in

may indicate
14M Annotated

Nordquist HH 19.2-19.9, 19.10(b)-19.11 (although negotiations
likely to

be influential for view that

NWP 9A Annotated

list is

exhaustive);

2.3.2.1 n.26 (same); F.

11

NWP

1 -

open-ended, Joint Interpretation

list
11

2.3.2.

1

n.27

19[2] list exclusive);

(art.

David Froman, Uncharted Waters: Non-innocent Passage of Warships in

the

San Diego L. Rev. 625, 659 (1984) (same); Robert J. Grammig, Comment, The Yoronjima Submarine
of August 1980: A Soviet Violation of the Law of the Sea, 22 Harv. Intl L. J. 331, 340 (1981) (same); John R.

Territorial Sea, 21

Incident

Stevenson

AJIL

& Bernard H. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law ofthe Sea:

763, 771-72 (1975) (same) with

criticism of

list as

"only" ones;
list");

Brown 56-58 (taking no position);

being open-ended);

art. 19(2)(/)

so general as to

Lowe, The Commander's,

O'Connell,

1

comprehend anything);

n. III. 318,

116

(list illustrative;

agreeing with this point). Restatement (Third)

Compare

342.

§

1

Nordquist H

Sea 270

1

See nn.

345.

LOS

III. 952-67,

Convention,

IV.10-25 and accompanying
art.

199, 616 ("possibly

comprehensive

NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.2.1 as

14(6); see also

1

Oppenheim

201, 620;

§

text.

ICAO Convention, arts.

NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.2.1, at 2-11; Restatement (Third) §

344.

§

erroneous citation of

LOS Convention, art. 20 with Territorial Sea Convention, art.

O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 294 (citing inter alia

2.3.2.1, at 2-9;

conference

does not say these activities are the

(list

Oppenheim

The 1975 Geneva Session, 69

19.10(/) (diplomatic

513 cmt. b takes no position.

Sadurska, n. 302, 57; nn. 302, 337 and accompanying
343.

Law of the

2

NWP 1-14M Annotated H

1, 3(c));

513 cmt.

i.

text.

21; see also Joint Interpretation, n. 341, arts. 5-7, 28

ILM

1446-47; 2 Nordquist

H11

NWP 1-14M Annotated U 2.3.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated 2.3.2.2.
NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.3.2.2 n.30; NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.2.2 n.29; see also Brown 58-59 (no view);

21.1-21.12;
346.

11

Oppenheim

§

198 (same); Restatement (Third)

1

513 cmt. c (same).

§

In designating sea lanes and traffic separation schemes, a coastal State must consider competent international

347.

organization recommendations, channels customarily used for international navigation, particular ships' and

LOS Convention, art. 22. See also Brown 59-61 2 Nordquist IW
Law ofthe Sea 833-36, noting their use in straits and on the high seas; 1 Oppenheim § 200;

channels' special characteristics, and traffic density.

O'Connell,

22.1-22.9; 2

Restatement (Third)

LOS

348.

(Third)
349.

§

513 cmt.

§

Convention,

513 cmt.

Compare

art.

;

d.

23; see also

Brown

60; 2

Nordquist

111

23.1-23.9;

1

Oppenheim

200;

§

Restatement

d.

LOS

Convention,

arts.

24-25 with Territorial Sea Convention,

Nordquist HH 24.1-25.9;

NWP 1-14M Annotated

Restatement (Third)

513 cmt.

§

c;

4

Whiteman

11

2.3.2.3;

379-86; n. 337 and accompanying text.

States has authority to suspend innocent passage in

350.

LOS Convention, art.

351.

Territorial Sea Convention,

31; see also 2

US

Nordquist

art. 14(1);

arts.

territorial waters.

1111

14-16; see also

NWP 9A Annotated U 2.3.2.3;

31

.

1

50

USC

1

Brown

Oppenheim §§

61; 2

198, 200;

The President ofthe United

§ 191.

-3 1 .7(b).

LOS Convention, art. 17, confirmed by Joint Interpretation, n. 341,112,

Brown 64-66; 2 Nordquist H 17.9(b); NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.3.2.4; NWP 9A Annotated H
2.3.2.4; 1 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 274-91 Restatement (Third) § 51 3, cmt. h & r.n.2; Froman, n. 341, 625; Bruce
Harlow, Legal Aspects of Claims to Jurisdiction in Coastal Waters, JAG J. 86 (Dec. 1969-Jan. 1970); Bernard H. Oxman,

ILM

28

1446; see also

;

The Regime,

n. III.956,

accompanying
352.

at 2-1 7; see also

Sea 292-93 says the

shift

from global seapower
353.

1

Oppenheim

Table ST2-2: Nations Claiming a Right

Annotated,

US

854; but see

§

201 (expressing doubt as to the rule). See also nn. 337-50 and

text.

Froman,

n.

to

Control Entry of Warships into

341,651-55; Lowe, The Commander's,

has been from a Cold

War orientation

to States

1

NWP

9A

O'Connell, Law of the

wishing to demonstrate positions detached

:

is

Territorial Sea, in

politics.

Table ST2- 1 Nations Specifically Recognizing the Right of Innocent Passage,

view

Own

n. 111.318,119.

that surface warships possess the

right cannot be conditioned

same innocent passage

in

NWP 9A Annotated, at 2-

right as any vessel in the territorial sea,

on prior notice or authorization of passage.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

11

1 2.

The

and

that

2.3.2.4 n.32;

NWP

9A Annotated 2.3.2.4 n. 31; accord, Brown 66-72; 1 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 292-93; Froman, n. 341, 625; Harlow,
n. 351, 86; Oxman, The Regime, n. III. 956, 854; see also nn. 337-50 and accompanying text.
11

354.

All listed countries except Saudi Arabia,

proclaimed
n.7.

a

which claimed an 18-mile zone and

24-mile zone. Table 7: States Claiming a Contiguous Zone Beyond the

a 12-

Territorial Sea, in

mile territorial sea,

Roach & Smith 164

.

The Tanker War

324

164

355.

Id.

356.

Presidential Proclamation No. 7219, n. 297, referring to Presidential Proclamation No. 5030,

n.7.
n.

157; see also

nn. 157, 297, 329 and accompanying text.
357. The most egregious is North Korea's 50-mile military maritime boundary. Roach & Smith
6.2; see also
Restatement (Third) § 511 cmt. k (international law does not recognize coastal State assertions of special zones to
11

protect security or environment).
358. Colombos § 170A, referring
Documents 1948-49, at 157-68 (1950);

to Defensive

359.

See nn. 301, 319 and accompanying

360.

See generally

text.

U.S. Freedom ofNavigation Program: Policy, Procedure

ch.6.

LOS Convention, art. 5, 7; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 3-4; see also Brown 23; 2 Nordquist 11 5. 1-5. 4(d),
NWP 1-14M Annotated 1.3.2; NWP 9A Annotated 1.3.2; 1 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 170-218;

7.1-7.9(h);

Oppenheim
362.

in

Roach & Smith 1 4.6; Dennis Mansager, The

and Future, Liber Amicorum
361.

in 46 Naval War College, International Law
MacChesney 603-04.

Sea Areas,

Defensive Sea Areas,

See,

11

188;

§

e.g.,

Table

2:

Claims

1

11

Restatement (Third)

§

511 cmt.h; nn. 289, 301, 319, 359 and accompanying

Made to Straight Baselines, Roach & Smith

protest or assertion should not be inferred as acceptance or rejection

claims." See also

id.

H 4.6, at 77-81,

n.63, listing scholars' criticism of 17 States' claims.

Roach & Smith

Table

364.

See nn. 11.66-69, IV.2 12-16 and accompanying

365.

See nn. 296-300, 324-27 and accompanying

text.

366.

See nn. 80-157, 188-243 and accompanying

text.

367.

See

368.

See nn. 300, 357 and accompanying

text.

369.

See nn. 333, 353 and accompanying

text.

370.

LOS Convention, art. 22; see also nn. II. 103, 262, IV. 347 and accompanying text.

n.

362, in

357 and accompanying

See

372.

See,

n. 11.365
e.g.,

and accompanying

LOS

Convention,

O'Connell,

text.

convoying in the

arts. 19(2)(a) (threat,

Charter), 19(2)(b) (exercise, practice with
1

4.6, 79-81.

Law of the

373.

Territorial Sea Convention,

374.

See generally

See Parts V.B, V.C.3, V.C.5,

LOAC context.

text.

integrity or political independence, or in

on passage);

11

text.

V.J.I, V.J. 3, for analysis of Iranian coastal

371.

with notation, "Absence of

by the United States of the straight baseline

363.

2, n.

text.

use of force against coastal State sovereignty, territorial

any other manner violating principles of international law in the

weapons of any kind),

Sea 293-94;

see also nn.

art. 16(4); see also

Hague XIII; San Remo Manual,

19(2)(/)

UN

(any other activity not having direct bearing

338-43 and accompanying

text.

nn. 338-43 and accompanying text.
111

15-16

&

Commentaries; nn. V.485-92 and accompanying

text; Parts V.F.2, V.F.5, V.J.6.

375.
III.

LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 31; Territorial Sea Convention, arts.
363 and accompanying

376.

See

377.

LOS Convention, art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, art.

378.

LOS

O'Connell,

n.

Convention,

Law of the

art. 25(3),

Sea 297-98;

text.

349 and accompanying

See nn.II. 379-81 and accompanying

380.

See Parts IV.B.6, IV.D.4, V.F.I, V.F.2, V.F.5, V.J.6.

381.

381. Jessup 144-45; see also

382.
1

1

1

;

1

318-21 and accompanying

text.

art. 16(3); see also

1

text.

text.

Colombos

§§ 180-81;

1

Oppenheim §§

US Department of State Office of the Legal Adviser (Sept.

193, 203;

Memorandum

of Frank Boas,

1957), reprinted in 4 Whiteman 259-61.

Lassa Oppenheim, International Law §449, 853 (HerschLauterpachted., 8th ed. 1955); accord, Colombos
Lowe, The Right ofEntry into Maritime Ports in International Law, 1 4 San Diego L. Rev. 597-98 ( 1 977)

8 1 ; but see A. V.

383.

see also nn. 293,

adding weapons exercises; Territorial Sea Convention,
n.

379.

Attorney Adviser,

§

1(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2); see also nn.

953-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying text.

Oppenheim,

n. 382,§ 190c; see also

Colombos

§ 181, 177.

Law

Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine,

Cf.

385.

LOS

386.

See Swarztrauber 4-6.

387.

Inland Navigational Rules Act of 1980, 33

Convention,

arts. 2(1), 8; Territorial

(US

n. 11.59, ch. 16

384.

Sea Convention,

USC

Sea

of the

325

ports).

arts. 2(1), 5(1).

COLREGS,

most countries

§§ 2001-38. In

i.e.,

treaties

governing high seas ship maneuvering and collision minimization principles, also apply to those countries' inland
waters.

Schoenbaum

§ 12-2, 716.

388.

Schoenbaum

389.

The Mowe, 1915

390.

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 5(1); for baselines definitions, see

Swarztrauber

§ 12-2;

P. 1, 15

(Adm.);

95, 239.

see also

Colombos

§ 180.
id., arts.

3-4, 8,

1 1.

Restatement (Second)

§§ 11-14 accepted the Convention definitions.
391.

LOS Convention, arts. 2(1), 5-8(1), 13-14, 16; seealso Brown ch. 5; 2 Nordquist 1H2.1-2.8(f), 5. 1-8.6, 13.1-14.6,

16.1-16.8(e);NWPl-14M Annotated TI
511, cmt.
392.

1.4.1;

NWP9A Annotated H 1.4.1; 10ppenheim§ 171; Restatement (Third) §

e.

LOS Convention, art. 1 1; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 8; see also 2 Nor dquistUH 11. 1-11. 5(d);

1

LOS Convention, art. 5; Territorial Sea Convention, art.

Oppenheim

Oppenheim

§193.
393.

188;

3; see also 2

Nordquist UH

5. 1-5. 4(d); 1

Restatement (Second) § 14, accepting Territorial Sea Convention definitions; id. (Third)

394.

LOS Convention, arts. 12, 16; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 9; McDougal & Burke 423-27; 2 Nordquist HH

12.1-12.4(c), 16.1-16.8(e);

218-21;

§

& cmt e, r.n.2.

§ 51 1

1

Oppenheim

§

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 1.4.1; NWP9A Annotated H 1.4.1;

193;

Restatement (Second)

§ 15,

cmt. c

Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(l)(B) for

396.

See nn. 390-91 and accompanying

397.

LOS

398.

LOS Convention, art. 9; Territorial Sea Convention, art.

Lawofthe

Sea 221-25;

1

art. 11; see also

Oppenheim

r.n.3;

id.

(Third)

an example of a jurisdictional "bulge" in

395.

Convention,

&

§

1

O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea

511, cmt. e

a private

2 Nordquist HH 11.1-1 1.5(d);

1

Oppenheim

Nordquist HH

13; see also 2

9. l-9.5(e); 1

O'Connell,

§ 189.

400.

See nn. 11.66-69 and accompanying

401.

US Secretary of State James Monroe note to Spanish Minister Chevalier deOnis, Jan.

402.

McDougal & Burke 99-100.

403.

Schooner Exchange

404.

2

Moore 270, citing id.

law context.

§ 193.

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 1.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated H 1.4.1;

blockships; China's sinking

r.n.2.

text.

399.

v.

&

McFaddon,

1

Oppenheim §§176-77; 3 Whiteman 872-1075.

text.

11

US

(7

19, 1815, 2

Moore 269.

Cranch) 116, 141 (1812).

855-58, referring to the US' sealing Charleston harbor during the Civil

them during the 1884 China-France war, and Japan's near

closure of

War by sinking

Foochow harbor

during the China-Japan war.

Moore

405.

7

406.

LOS Convention, art. 25(3); compare Territorial Sea Convention, art.

855, 858.
16(3); see also n. 349

and accompanying

text.

407.

See Parts V.F.I, V.F.2, V.F.5, V.J.6 for

through the
Convention,

LOAC

analysis.

LOS conventions' other rules clauses, e.g., LOS
arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2); see also

408.

UN Charter, arts. 51,

409.

Compare

includes the

LONW,

applies

arts. 2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 31; Territorial

Sea

nn. 111.953-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying text.

103; see also nn. HI.10-1

LOS Convention, art.

The LOAC, which

Convention,

1,

47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying

I24(l)(a),with Transit

Trade Convention, art.

1(a),

which has 37

text.

States parties.

TIF 458. S*? a/so McDougal & Burke 113; 3 Nordquist HI X.5, 124.1-24.8(f); 1 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 580-81; 1
Oppenheim § 240. The number may be higher because of treaty succession for the USSR and Yugoslavia. Symposium,
State Succession; Walker, Integration

and Disintegration.

& Statute Concerning Freedom of Transit & Statute on Freedom of Transit, Apr. 20, 1921, 7
(Freedom of Transit Convention), which has 50 parties and perhaps more if treaty succession principles
apply. For some States, however, the Transit Trade Convention or the LOS conventions may have superseded it in
410.

LNTS

part.

Convention

11

See generally 1999

UN Treaties 955;

Symposium,

Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration

and Disintegration.

The Tanker War

326

411.

3 Nordquist 1
Zomtpare

onventioc
erritoriai

X

:

LOS Convention, arts.

124,1 \b\ 125 took Transit Trade Convention, arts. l(c

tedom of Transit Convention.

-

Sea Convention,

xritorial sea

Statute, n. 410. arts 1-4. "

affirm a right of

art. 14(1)

ships, flagged

all

—

.

Compare

Convention,

A

innocent pusige, thereby giving them ports access.

npetus far the High Seas Convention provision- Colombos

414.

1

:

.

LOS Convention, art.

LOS

131

z^iih

Convention,

UN

art. 17;

States, to

Gcncol Assembly resolution was an

art. 1(c).

Con vent::

1

1

hird)

.

5

an. 2(1 \and

-III.

512

High

Seas

r.n.3.

125(3) tnrA Transit Trade Convention, arts. 11-12;

art.

.

Convention,

under coastal or landlocked

Trade Convention,

Transit Trade

LOS

I"

200.

5

3 Nordquist 11 131.1-31.7(e); Restat

art. 3(1); see also

rmpare

!4<2) talk Trans::

-

...

1957

LNTS

Freedom of Transit

"

Convention, Statute,
416.

n. 410,

an.

29.

Transit Trade Convention,

.sCovenar

aid accompanying
41"

Et

Freedom of Transit Convention, Sutute,

arts. 13-14; see also

same; subject to League

n. 410, arts. 8-9, 7

.-.aner,ans.2(4),51,103;nn. 111.10-11,47-630,916-18,

text.

L-OS Convention, arts.

Temtorial Sea Convention,

2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 31;

arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2);

See

md accompanying text.
418.

?v\l L\v/

Bftov

Seas Convention, preamble, says
articles are also

it

widely thought to

5;

1

restates

Oitekheim

:om. See nn.

:

119

LOS

120.

LOS Convention, an.

-11.

LOS Convention, art. 31 1(5); see obo

Convention, an. 311

i-.ute, art.

rial

S 10, 28;

1 ';

see

Restatement (Third)

customary law. and most accept

oho

Ill

962-63 and accompanying

44 and accompanying

n.

$ 102(3)

LOS

this; the

& cmt

f

The High

Convention navigational

text.

text.

31 1(2); see oho nn. 45-46 and accompanying text.

38(1);

50 and accompanying

n.

Restatement Third) SS 102-03;

text.

see also n. 111.10

and accompanying

text-

Sea Convention, ar.

Me, an. 38(1); Restatement (Third) $S

102-03; see also nn. IIL10 and accompanying texL

.-.-..-.
-.-

-..

.

e

718, 720,

refemng

to

Thomas

F.

Bayard

Proclamation of Nov.

19.

May

Manning,

letter to

1807,3

Am.

", designated Boston.
v Act of May 15, 1820
New York City, Norfolk, Va.; Philadelphia; Portlan i
.

St.

28, 1886, 2

Moore

1

Mass: Charleston. S C
I

;

Mobile

London,

Ct.;

C. See nn. 480, 492, 494-506 for analysis of

entry in distress.

Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation of Apr.

1865M

FRUS

-.

President

430.

Re

431.

See generally 2

432.

Permission to enter Guam; Kiska Islands. Alaska: Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Subic Bay, Philippines; Tonugas,

.

310.

::58(1878).

Moore

564-70 (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, South Australia, Venezuela, others).

Fla.; and ^actual limits of any navy yards"

d iplomatic channels US Secretary of d
:kworth 416.
433.

11, 1865,

Treat..

was necessary and could be obtained from the Secretary of the Navy through
Frank Knox Nov. 19, 1909 letter to Mr. Ekengren, Swedish Charge

4 Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, Fr.-US, arts. 3-4, 8 Sul 12, 14, abrogated by Act of July 7, 1798,

«£578.
434.

See^e

9,12,uLZ.
Stat.

:

__

:eswith Algiers, Sept,

5,

1795, arts. 2, 10,8 Stat.133-34, superseded, June 30-July

:newedandrnodified,Dec.22-23,1816,arts.9,12,ui2-u 245

1001,1002; July 27,1853,an. 2, uL 1005,1006; Austria, Aug. 27, 1829,ans.

art. 7, 47 uL

1876, 1881; Belgium, Nov. 10, 1 845, arts.

1045-46; superseded Mar. 8, 1 875, arts.

1, 4,

1 9 id.

1, 6, 8

id.

1,

5,

1815,

arts.

.:gentina,July20,1853,arts.2^,10
7-8, 8

ui.

398, 399-400; June 19, 1928,

606, 608, superseded,July 17, 1858, arts. 1,5, 12

628, 630; partially terminated Feb. 21, 1961,

uf.

1043,

MUST 1284,480 UNTS

149; Bolivia, May 13, 1858, an. 3, 12 Stat. 1003, 1004;BraziL Dec. 12, 1828, arts. 3-4,8ui 390-91; Brunei, June 23, 1850,
arts. 2, 7,

10 uL 909-10; Bulgaria, Apr. 15, 1974, art, 48, 26

arts. 3-», 6,

8 Stat. 322-24; Chile,

May

UST 687, 717; Central American Federation, Dec

16, 1832, arts. 3-*, uL 434-35;

Colombia, Oct.

3,

5,

1825,

1824, arts. 3-4, id 306-08,

Law

superseded Dec.

12,

10, 1851, an. 2, 10

UST

12

art. 2,

10

916, 917; Danzig, Mar. 9, 1934, 48

UNTS

908, 910, 421

Ecuador, June
arts. 3, 7,

846, arts. 3-7, 9 id. 88 1, 882-84; Congo, Jan. 24, 1891, arts.

1

id.

13, 1839, arts. 3, 7, 8

1680;

534, 536; Egypt, Nov. 16, 1884,

id.

arts. 3, 7,

18

id.

art.

327

27 id. 926, 927, 930; Costa Rica, July

1, 6,

Denmark, Apr.

Dominican Republic, Feb.

105, 108;

891-92; superseded Dec. 6, 1870,

id.

id.

Sea

of the

25, 1826, art. 2, 8

uf.

340; Oct.

1,

1951,

1867, arts. 3, 7, 15 StaL 473, 475, 477;

8,

l,24id. 1004, 1005; El Salvador, Jan. 2, 1850,

725, 726, 728; Estonia, Dec. 23, 1925, arts.

1, 7,

44 id.

UST 2134, 2145, 206 UNTS 41, 76; Fiji, June 10, 1840, an. 2, 7 Bevans 684; Finland,
2659, 2663, 152 LNTS 45, 50, modified by protocols of Dec. 4, 1952, 4 UST 2047, 205

2379, 2381; Ethiopia, an. 14, 4

Feb. 13, 1934,

art. 6,

49

Stat.

UNTS 149 & July 1, 1991, TIAS

;

France, Feb.

1778, arts. 3-4, 8 Stat. 14; renewed, Sept. 30, 1800, an. 6,uL 178,

6,

id. 1723; modified, Nov. 25, 1959, 11 UST 2398,401
UNTS 75; Germany, Dec. 8, 1923, an. 7, 44 StaL 2132, 2137; terminated June 3, 1935, art. 1,49 ii. 3258; reinstated June
3, 1953, an. 1, 5 UST 1939, 1941, 253 UNTS 89, 90; partially terminated Oct. 29, 1954, an. 20 & Protocol 1 20, 7 id. 1839,
1860, 1908, 273 UNTS 3, 26, 44; Great Britain, Nov. 19, 1794, ans. 3, 12-14, 8 Stat. 116, 117, 122-24, modified May 4,

180; superseded June 24, 1822,

1796,
id.

130, July 3, 1815, arts.

id.

498-500; replaced Aug.

9

art. 1,

1, 3,id.

228-29, continued Aug.

1951, art. 21, 5

Nov.

Stat. 873, 874, 876; Haiti,

10, 1846,

3,

278; modified, July 17, 1919,41

id.

3,

6,

1864, arts. 6, 12, 13

Bevans 861 (entry of US ships into Hawaii); Dec.
699, 700; superseded Dec. 7, 1927, arts.

1, 7, 1 1,

arts. 1, 6, 8 id.

20, 1849, arts. 2, 5-7, 9

45

May 20, 1840, arts.

711, 713, 716; Hanover,

id.

857; Hanseatic Republics, Dec. 20, 1827,

id.

1827, an. l,u£ 361; Greece, Dec. 22, 1837,

arts. 1-5, 8

UST 1829, 1889, 224 UNTS 279, 324; Guatemala, Mar. 3, 1849, arts. 3, 6, 10

id.

977-78; Honduras, July 4, 1864, an.

2618-19, 2622, 2625; Iraq, Dec.

id.

July

1-2, 8 id. 552;

366, 368; Hawaii, Dec. 23, 1826, an. 2, 8

3,

1938, an.

3,

54

2,

13

id.

1790, 1792;

id.

1 UST 785, 798, 206 UNTS 269, 290; Israel, Aug. 23, 1951, an. 19, 5 id. 550, 570, 219
UNTS 237, 276; Italy, Feb. 26, 1871, ans. 1, 7, 17 StaL 845, 848; replaced Feb. 2, 1948, ans. 19, 22, 63 id. 2255, 2284,
2286, 79 UNTS 171, 200, 204; Japan, Mar. 31, 1854, an. 2, 11 Stat. 597 (designated pons in Japan, no reciprocity);

Ireland, Jan. 21, 1950, art. 18,

modified June

17, 1857, art. 1,

Nov. 22, 1894,

art. 2,

29

id.

723 (Nagasaki opened); July 29, 1858, an.

848-49

id.

commerce, navigation

reciprocal

(full,

12

3,

id.

1051, 1052 (more

pons opened);

rights); Feb. 21, 1911, an. 4, 37

1504-05

id.

UST 2063, 2077, 206 UNTS 143, 214; Korea, May 22, 1882, an. 5, 23 StaL 720,
2, 1953,
722, replaced Nov. 28, 1956, 8 UST 2217, 302 UNTS 281; Lagos, July 31, 1854, 9 Bevans 513-14; Lama, Apr. 20, 1928,
(same); replaced Apr.

ans.

7, 12,

4

art. 19,

45 Stat. 2641, 2643, 2645; Liberia,

Ocl

21, 1862, an. 2, 12

id.

1245; replaced Aug.

8,

1938, ans. 7, 21, 54

id.

LNTS 163, 168, 176; Loochoo [Ryukyu], July 11, 1854, 10 id. 1101; Luxembourg, Feb. 23, 1962,
an. 13, 14 UST 251, 260, 474 UNTS 3, 22; Madagascar, Feb. 14, 1867, arts. 2-3, 15 StaL 491-92, replaced May 13, 1881,
1739, 1742, 1747,201

an. 4(1), 22
art. 3, 8 id.

id.

952, 955; Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Dec. 9, 1847, arts. 1-2, 9 StaL 910, 912; Mexico, Apr. 5-Dec. 17, 1831,

410, replaced Feb.

& Ocl

replaced Sept. 10

2,

1848, an. 17, 9

1836, ans.

1,

7, 14, id.

922, 935; Morocco, June 23-July 15, 1786, arts. 7, 14, 8

id.

484-85; Muscat, Sept. 21, 1833, ans. 2,

1782, arts. 2-3, id. 32; superseded Jan. 19, 1839, an.

l,id.

6, id.

100-02,

id.

458; Netherlands,

Ocl

8,

524; Aug. 26, 1852, ans. 1-2,4, 10 ui 982-84; Mar. 27, 1956, an.

& Protocol 1 17, 8 UST 2043, 2073, 2089, 285 UNTS 231, 259, 273; Nicaragua, June 21, 1867, an. 2, 15 StaL 549-50;
UST 449, 463, 367 UNTS 3, 26; Norway, June 5, 1928, arts. 7, 15, 47 Stat. 2135, 2140, 2146, 134
LNTS 81, 86, 92; Oman, Dec. 20, 1958, an. 10, 1 1 UST 1835, 1840, 380 UNTS 181, 206; Ottoman Empire, May 7, 1830,
19

Jan. 31, 1956, an. 19, 9

arts. 1, 5, 8 Stat.

408-09; Paraguay, Feb. 4, 1859, an.

superseded Aug. 15, 1955, an. 10, 8
replaced July 4, 1854, 11

725; Sept.

id.

6,

id.

162;

May 1,

1

840, arts.

1828, arts.

1

,

7, 8 id.

1, 7, id.

48

id.

superseded Sept.

4,

3,

arts. 2-3, 8 id.

id.

2105, 2106, 2110; Sweden, Apr.

2, id.

id.

833; replaced Oct.
id. 1

id.

435.

While

For

treaties).

§

a

18, 1832, an. 1,

27, 1795, arts. 15-16, 8

& July 4,

3,

id.

42

1, 6,

17,

id.

id.

60, 64;

346, 348, 354:

1928, 1929-30 (reciprocity), Nov. 13, 1937, an.

id.

id.

138, 146 (by

1783, arts. 7-8, 8

1827, arts.

1,

143,

1

1855,

art. 8, 11 id.

147-48;

1,

1929,

art.

3,46

art. 12,

Stat.

1,

53

4, 1 1 id.
id.

1731

639,645; Venezuela, Jan. 20, 1836,

Yemen, May 4,

1946, art.

3,

60

id.

US ships only);
Two Sicilies, Dec. 1, 1845. art.

ui 157, 159 (rights for

2743, 2744;
arts.

2-3,8

id.

466; replaced Aug. 27,

1782, 1783. See also nn. 488-90 for recent treaties

USSR

clauses usually appear in bilateral treaties, they can be in multilateral agreements,

These contrast with national treatment, reciprocity or preferences
669; Restatement (Third) § 801 & cmts. a-d, r.n.1,2.

n. III. 949.

Oppenheim
436.

MFN

232, 240

214-15 (same); Tunis, Aug. 28, 1797,

with Bulgaria, Poland, PRC, and the former

GATT,

966; Spain,

6

454 (entry into Thai pons only); replaced May 29, 1856, an.

arts. 3, 9,

replaced Feb. 24, 1824, art. 12,id. 298-99; Turkey, Oct.

1860, ans. 6-7, 12

Ocl

Stat. 963,

arts. 1, 12, id.

1507, 1512;

512, 514; Saudi Arabia, Nov. 7, 1933,

22

Norway),

1444-45, 1447;
id.

10, 19

replaced June 4, 1805, an. 11,

1,9

id.

id.

&

id.

48

UST 5843, 5855, 652 UNTS 253, 282; Togo, Feb. 8, 1966, an. 1 1, 18 id. 1, 8, 680 UNTS
1886, arts. 4, 6-8, 25 StaL 1440-41; Tripoli, Nov. 4, 1796 & Jan. 3, 1797, an. 9, 8 id. 154-55;

May 29, 1966, an.
2,

8

arts. 1, 13,

1816 (Sweden

Tonga, Oct.

1, 7,

1902, ans. 2, 9, 33

683, 684 (same); replaced Dec. 16, 1920,

159, 174;

6,

785, ans. 2-3, id. 84; superseded July 11,1 799, arts. 2-3,

704; Sardinia, Nov. 26, 1838, arts.

Thailand (formerly Siam), Mar. 20, 1 833, art.
(same);

698-99, 701; Aug. 31, 1887, ans. 2, 7,25

1

StaL 709;

3, 11

1851, ans. 2, 12, 10 StaL 926, 931;

487, 488; Poland, June 15, 1931, an.

560, 564; Prussia, July 9,

1826; Serbia, Oct. 14, 1881,

implication), replaced July

1091-92; Persialran, Dec. 13, 1856, an.

id.

378, 380; Russia, Apr. 5/17, 1824, arts. 1-2, id. 302; replaced Dec.

444; Samoa, Jan. 17, 1878, an. 2, 20
art. 3,

12

8, l%id.

1870, arts. 2,

Peru-Bolivia Confederation, Nov. 30, 1836,
Portugal, Aug. 26,

2,

UST 899, 907, 284 UNTS 93, 122; Peru, July 26,

sampling, see

6E Benedict, Docs. 18B-1

-

18B-4 (selected bilateral

clauses.

treaties,

McNair

including

FCN\

e.g.,

the

ch. 15;

1

consular

The Tanker War
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437.

Treaty, July

Commerce, June
Relations, Oct.

to

1844, China-US, arts. 3-5, 8 Stat. 592-93, supplemented by Treaty of Peace,

China-US,

1903, China-US,

8,

Navigation, Nov.

opened doors

3,

18, 1858,

4,

1946, arts.

2, 21,

art.

24, 63

other Chinese ports,

1023, 1026; supplemented, Treaty for Extension of Commercial

id.

2208, 2209; superseded, Treaty of Friendship,

3,

33

id.

1299, 1301, 1316, 1318, 25

Commerce &
UNTS 69, 92, 128, 132. The later agreements

MFN basis and later to all Chinese ports and all US ports. The first

on an

first

agreement with Hawaii, Article of Arrangement, Dec. 23, 1826, Hawaii-US,
vessels; the second, Friendship,

&

Amity

id.

12

art. 14,

Commerce & Navigation

art. 3, 8

Bevans 861, applied only

Treaty, Dec. 20, 1849, Hawaii-US,

arts. 2, 6-7,

to

US

9 Stat. 977,

978, extended reciprocal rights but confirmed the Hawaii practice of limiting access to designated ports as in the case

of China. Agreements with Japan followed
1 1 id.

Commerce

Treaty, July 29, 1858, Japan-US,

12

art. 3,

Treaty, Nov. 29, 1894, Japan-US,

art. 2,

Navigation Treaty, Feb. 21, 191

1,

Japan-US,

arrangement until 1920. Amity

& Commerce Treaty,

ports);

Dec.

Siam-US,

1937, Siam-US,

UST

id.

& Commerce Treaty, May 29,

Amity

16, 1920,

10, 19

29

art. 10,

art. 3,

53

42

id.

848, 849 (full reciprocal

37

art. 4,

id.

art. I, id.

1854, Japan-US,

art. 2,

723 (Nagasaki opened); Amity

&

Commerce & Navigation
commerce, navigation rights); Commerce &

1051, 1052 (additional ports);

1504, 1505 (same). Thailand, formerly Siam, had the

Mar. 20, 1833, Siam-US,

1856, Siam-US,

art. 4, 1

1 id.

art. 2,

8

same

454, (entry into Siamese

id.

Amity & Commerce Treaty,
Commerce & Navigation Treaty, Nov. 12,

683, 684 (same);

1928, 1929 (reciprocity); Friendship,

1731, 1736 (same); Treaty of Amity

id.

& Economic Relations, May 29,

1966, Thailand,

art.

UNTS 253, 282 (same).

5843, 5855, 652

438.

Lowe, Right of Entry,

439.

Brownlie, International Law 13-14;

The Law, n.

id.

& Amity, Mar. 31,

Treaty of Peace

a similar pattern.

597 (designated ports in Japan); Convention, June 17,1 857, Japan-US,

n. 382, 619.

Oppenheim

1

Restatement (Third) § 102(3) & cmt. f. Jessup,
mere attempts to obtain mutual

§ 10, 28;

267, xxxii, 60, 192-93 asserts these treaties were not norm-creating, being

benefits by a bargaining process.

Lowe, Right ofEntry,

norm-creating character' necessary

n. 382,

for the transition[;] the

619, argues that these bilaterals "lack the 'fundamentally

mere repetition of rights of entry

.

.

could not constitute

.

a

rule of customary international law."

440.

Compare custom's impact through the

441.

LOS

Convention,

bilaterals, n. 434, with

126; see also Transit

art.

Lowe, Right of Entry,

Trade Convention,

arts. 10, 15,

n.

382, 607.

(same; Convention applied on

reciprocity basis); see also 3 Nordquist Ml X.5, 126.1-126.8(d); nn. 409-18.
442.

Institute

International

de Droit Internationale,

Law

144 (James

Id.,

444.

Lowe, Right of Entry,

445.

ICJ Statute,

art. 38(1);

446.

Convention

&

LNTS

Statute

448.

Id.,

449.

Id., Statute, art. 17,

450.

Id.

451.

Id, Statute, art. 12, 58

452.

453.

Statute, arts. 9, 14, 58

58

Resolutions of the Institute of

is

not permitted.

Id.,

and accompanying

Ports, Dec. 9, 1923, Statute, arts. 2-3, 5-7, 10-13,
Statute, art. 15, 58

LNTS

305.

LNTS

303-05.

305.

LNTS 303; see also id., arts. 21-22, 58 LNTS 307-09. The ICJ has succeeded the PCIJ.
LNTS

305, cited in Saudi-Arabia

n. 382,

v.

Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 27

ILR

117, 212 (1955),

598-600, 606.

Ports Convention, n. 446, Statute,

art. 18,

58

LNTS

307; for further analysis, see

Colombos

§§ 182, 418;

1

§ 204.

E.g.,

LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2(2), 14(4), 16(3), 22(2);

LOS

Convention,

art.

and accompanying

311(2); see also n. 45

text.

and accompanying

text.

455. Vienna Convention, arts. 30, 59; brownlie, international law 624-25; McNair 215-33;
Restatement (Third) § 323; Restatement (Second) § 156; Sinclair 184-85.
456.

text.

LNTS 305.

LNTS

see also nn. III. 952-67, VI. 10-25

454.

MFN status

58

by Lowe, Right of Entry,

Oppenheim

in

§§ 102-03; see also n. 10

on International Regime of Maritime

Id., Statute, arts. 13-14,

criticized

(1898),

Brown Scott, The Institute ofInternational Law, 22 AJIL 844, 847 (1928).

Restatement (Third)

447.

Statute, art. 8; 58

Annuaire 274

n. 382, 602.

285 (Ports Convention).

,

17

Scott ed. 1916).

35 Annuaire 736(1928), in James

443.

58

Brown

Ports Convention, n. 446, art.

2,

58

1

Oppenheim

§

591;

LNTS 295, declares it is subject to the Treaty of Versailles, which included
UN Charter in 1945; the Convention, Statute, art. 24, 58 LNTS 309,

the League of Nations Covenant, succeeded by the
declares the Convention

may not

be construed to affect parties' rights and duties under the Covenant. Since

self-defense was recognized as an inherent right

under the Covenant, there would have been no inconsistency between

7

.

Law

the Convention and the Covenant on that score.

UN

Charter,

arts. 51, 103;

nn.

III.

of the

Sea

329

10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67,

IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

Compare Convention

458.

LNTS

&

11, 19, 27-33, with Ports

Walker, Integration and Disintegration.

&

Statute Concerning

Freedom of Transit, Apr.

Convention,

discussed nn. 446-57 and accompanying text.

n. 446,

20, 1921, art.

UN Treaties 957-58, 961-62; see also n. 446 and accompanying text. An

1999

459.

192 1 , 7

UN Treaties 961-62; see also Symposium, Treaty Succession;

1999

457.

1

Statute, arts 1-15,

Additional Protocol, Apr. 20,

LNTS 65, extends certain obligations to navigable waterways normally not of international concern. There are

UN Treaties 959. Treaty succession principles may bind more States. See

23 parties, none of them Gulf States. 1999

Symposium,

Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration

and Disintegration.

460.

UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51, 103; see a/so nn.III.10-1 1,47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

461.

Inter- American

Mar

del Plata),

June

7,

Convention on Facilitation of International Waterborne Transportation (Convention of

1963,

TIAS

12064, in

462.

Id., arts. 4-5,

6E Benedict

19-105.

463.

Id., art. 6(a),

6E Benedict

19-106.

464.

E.g.,

6E Benedict, Doc.

19-12, arts. 1-3,

id.

19-104

-

19-105.

LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1),21(1),25(3), 311(2); Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2(2), 14(4), 16(3),

22(2); see also

Vienna Convention,

arts. 30, 59;

nn.

III. 952-67,

IV. 10-25, 455

and accompanying

text.

465.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

466.

TIF 404.

467.

Brownlie, International

468.

Compare Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime

Law

5;

Oppenheim

1

§ 10,

Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime

§

102(3)

& cmt.

f.

Traffic, Apr. 9, 1965, arts. 1-3, 18

UNTS 265, 266-68, with Convention of Mar del Plata, n. 461, arts.

412, 591
469.

Restatement (Third)

28;

1-3,

6E Benedict

Traffic, n. 468, art. 2(3), 18

UST 410,

19-104.

UST

412, 591

UNTS

266-68.
470.

Id., art. 5,

18

UST 414, 591 UNTS 268. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) plays a similar role
through proposals or conferences as the OAS Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference

for achieving standards

does for the Convention of Mar del Plata, n. 461. Compare Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime
Traffic, n. 468, arts 4, 6-8, 18

19-105

-

19-106. For

see generally

47 1

6E Benedict, Doc.

E.g.,

473.

former

19-1 1; see also

Vienna Convention,

to the

Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime

Oppenheim

Traffic,

§ 204.

arts. 30, 59;

nn. HI. 952-67, IV. 10-25, 455 and accompanying text.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
TIF 404; 6E Benedict 1 9-93, which does not list Iran. Treaty succession principles may add to the total for the

USSR and Yugoslavia. Symposium,

474.

Brownlie, International

475.

Saudi-Arabia

446,

1

LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 1 9( 1 ), 2 1( 1 ), 25(3), 3 1 1(2); Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2(2), 14(4), 1 6(3),

22(2); see also

472.

UST 414-16, 591 UNTS 26S-72,with Convention of Mar del Plata, arts. 4-6, 6E Benedict

amendments and annexes

art. 12,

58

v.

LNTS

Law

5;

Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration

1

Oppenheim

Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 27

305;

criticized,

ILR

1

§ 10,

17,

Lowe, Right of Entry,

476.

Seen. 434.

477.

The Kronprins Gustaf Adolf (Swed.

478.

1

479.

Institute of International

v.

US), 2

28;

and Disintegration.

Restatement (Third)

§

102(3)

& cmt.

f.

212 (1955), citing inter alia Ports Convention, Statute,

n.

n. 382, 598-600, 606.

UNRIAA

1239, 1256 (1932).

Hyde §187.

the Territorial Sea

haw, Resolutions Adopted at Its Session ofAmsterdam: Distinction Between the Regime of

and the Regime ofInternal

Waters, preamble, Sept. 18-27, 1957, 1957[2]

Annuaire, reprinted in 52 AJIL

103(1958).
480.

Colombos

§

181; see also

majeure, see nn. 492, 494-506 and

Whiteman

id.

§§ 273-75; for analysis of port access for ships in distress or forced in by force

accompanying

258-60, quoting Boas

481.

4

482.

Restatement (Second)

§ 50,

cmt.

text.

Memorandum,
a.

n. 381; see also

1

Hyde

§

187.

The Tanker War

330

483.

Id. § 49,

cmt.

Perhaps significantly, Restatement (Third)

a.

§

512 does not

analyzing

cite these references in

the law of ports.

O'Connell,

Law of the

484.

2

485.

Restatement (Third)

486.

Id. r.n. 3, citing inter alia

(1963); see also 2

O'Connell,

512, cmt.

§

see also

citing

c,

Lowe, Right of Entry,

n. 382,

598-600, 606.

r.n.3.

id.

Convention on Liability of Nuclear-Powered Ships,

Law of the

Restatement (Third)

487.

§

Sea 848;

May

AJIL 268

25. 1962, in 57

Sea 848.

&

513, cmt. h

r.n.2; see also nn.

337-50 and accompanying

text.

Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters, June 1, 1990, USSR-US, TIAS 11541, reprinted in 6E
art. 3, 6E Benedict 18-300 - 18-301 (2 days' notice) (USSR Agreement); Agreement on
Maritime Transport, Dec. 15, 1988, China-US (China Agreement), Supplemental Agreement on Entry of Vessels of
488.

Benedict, Doc. 18B-10,

Either Party into Ports of the Other Party, 11

3,

TIAS 1 2026 (Supplemental Agreement), reprinted in 6E Benedict, Doc.

18B-11, at 18-314; Agreement on Maritime Matters: Port Access Procedures, Sept. 27, 1973, Pol.-US, 24

(Poland Agreement), no longer in
Matters, Oct. 14, 1972,

USSR Agreement

force.

USSR-US,

23

art. 4,

3573, 3578, imposing a four-day notice period. China Agreement

id.

superseded Agreement on Maritime Transport,

Memorandum of Conditions

Party into Ports of the Other Party, Sept. 17, 1980, China-US, HH 1-2, 33
id.

id.

2314, which imposed four to seven days' notice requirements. Other

nations do not have these requirements and are

Transport, Bulg.-US, Feb. 19, 1981, 33

id. 1 1

The USSR agreements may

Applicable to Entry of Vessels of Each

3595, 3597, extended, Sept.

US

treaties

1

&

10, 1983, 35

with other former Soviet bloc

more like typical bilateral arrangements, e.g., Agreement on Maritime

16, 1281

4400; Agreement on Maritime Transport, June
force.

UST 2271

superseded Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime

UNTS 9 (Bulgaria Agreement), extended Feb. 7 &
1976,

4,

Rom. -US, 27

id.

13, 1984, 35

id.

1416 (Romania Agreement), no longer in

be in force through treaty succession principles. Symposium, Treaty Succession;

Walker, Integration and Disintegration.

USSR Agreement, n. 488, art. 1, 6E Benedict 18-300; China Agreement, n. 488, art. 1, id. 18-309; cf. Bulgaria
n. 488, art. 1, 33 UST 1 17; Romania Agreement, n. 488, art. 1, 27 id. 1417; Poland Agreement, n. 488, 24

489.

Agreement,
id.

1

2271 (by implication).

USSR

490.

Agreement,

Supplemental Agreement,

n. 488, art. 2
n.

488,

1111

& Annexes MI, 6E Benedict
& Annexes A-B, id. 18-314

3

1,

18-300, 18-303

-

-

18-305; China Agreement,

18-316 (listing China ports open,

US

ports

forbidden).
491.

See nn. 488-90 and accompanying

492.

See nn. 494-506 and accompanying

493.

LOS Convention, arts.

text.

Some

text.

text.

17-32; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 14-23; see also nn. 437-50

and accompanying

countries would dispute this. See n. 352 and accompanying text.

494.

Colombos

495.

Jessup,

496.

The Fortuna, 164 Eng. Rep. 685-86 (Adm. 1 803); see also The Eleanor, id. 1058, 1067 (Adm.
The Law, n. 267, 200-01; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 853-54.

181 ; see also

§

The Law,

Lowe, Right of Entry,

n. 267, 194;

1

Oppenheim

§

n. 382, 607-19.

204;

Restatement (Third)

§

512, r.n.5.
1809);

Colombos §

181 n.2; Jessup,
497.

Hallet

& Bowne v. Jenks, 7 US (3 Cranch) 210, 219 (1805); see also Jessup, The Law, n. 267,

399-42; 2 O'Connell,

Law of the

Sea 853-54.

O'Connell,

Law of the

Sea 854.

498.

2

499.

Act of May

500.

See nn. 433-37 and accompanying

501.

Many

to

these have been included to

text.

two provisions, one promising assistance

wrecked goods and

a pledge of restoration to owners.

5,

1795,

art. 6, 8 Stat.

133, 134, superseded

225, renewed and modified, Dec. 22-23, 1816, arts. 9-10,

14, 14

17, 1858, art. 14, 12 id. 1043, 1047;

20,

8, id.

Mar.

8,

id.

1

28 1

enters in distress and another

June 30

392; Brunei, June 23, 1850, arts.

8, 10,

& July 5,

1815, arts. 9-10,

244, 245; Belgium, Nov. 10, 1845,

1875,

art. 13,

art. 16, id.

id.

224,

606, 610,

19 id. 628, 632, superseded, Feb. 21, 1961,

UST 1284, 1303, 480 UNTS 149, 169; Bolivia, May 13, 1858, arts. 9-10, 12 Stat.

arts. 8, 10, 8 id. 390,
1 1

if a vessel

Others included only one provision, but

show the universal obligation to assist and protect ships forced to enter because of distress

or force majeure, e.g., Algiers, Sept.

superseded July

Moore

15, 1820, 3 Stat. 597.

early treaties have

renouncing claims

194-97; 2

art.

1003, 1009; Brazil, Dec. 12, 1828,

10 id. 909,910; Bulgaria, Feb. 19, 1982,

art. 7,

33

UST 1116,

UNTS 9; Central American Federation, Dec. 5, 1 825, arts. 8, 10, 8 Stat. 322, 326; Chile, May 1 5, 1832, arts. 6,

434, 435; China, July

3,

1844,

art. 27, id.

592, 598 (refuge anywhere on China coast despite prohibition on trading

Law

except in five designated ports), supplemented June 18, 1858,
22(5),

63

UNTS

1299, 1317, 25

id.

(Colombia), Oct.

3,

Republic, Feb.

1867,

8,

1824,

69, 130;

Sea

331

1023, 1026, superseded Nov. 4, 1946,

id.

6E Benedict

n. 488, art. 6,

308, 309, superseded Dec. 12, 1846, arts. 9, 11, 9

art. 8, 8 Stat.

art. 11,

12

art. 13,

China Agreement,

of the

id.

art.

New Granada

18-311;

881, 885-86;

Dominican

San Salvador, Jan.

15 Stat. 473, 479; Ecuador, June 13, 1839, arts. 9, ll,8irf. 534,538;

2,

U, 10 id. 891, 893, superseded Dec. 6, 1870, arts. 9, 1 1, IS id. 675, 677; Germany, art. 28, 44 id. 2132, 2156,
superseded for FRG, Oct. 29, 1954, art. 21,7 UST 1839, 1861, 273 UNTS 3, 28; Fiji, June 10, 1840, art. 3, 7 Bevans 684;
1850, arts. 9,

France, July 18, 1966,

UST 2939, 2950, 700 UNTS 257, 282; Great Britain, Nov.

UNTS 279, 326;

1829, 1893, 224
15-16, 13

18

art. 32,

US vessels only); Greece, Dec. 22,

127 ('protection for

Guatemala, Mar.

711, 716 (applied in John

id.

superseded June 20, 1 846, art.

4, 9 id. 857,

superseded Dec. 20, 1849, arts.12-13, 9
1179; Italy, Feb. 26, 1871,

art. 9,

Snow

I.

UST 768, 804, 518 UNTS

art. 14, id.

16, 1794, art. 23, 8 Stat.

498, 506, superseded Aug.

Moore

859; Hawaii, Dec. 23,

1

May

349); Hanover,

23

art. 3,

15, 1786, arts. 8-9, 8
id.

art.

19

id.

for

1972,

7,

art. 52,

24

UST 1141,

Reimbursement of Shipwreck Expenses, May

720, 721, superseded Jan.

8,

1963,

14, 1867, art. 7, 15

410, 414, superseded Feb. 2, 1848,

& Oct.

id.

1245, 1246;

9,

art. 17,

9

1847,
id.

art. 4,

9

id.

US

art. 23,

17, 1880,

14 UST 1637, 1643, 493

art. 7,

491, 493 (applies to

id.

952, 960; Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Dec.

100, 101, superseded Sept. 16
8,

16,

1864, arts.

3,

29 id. 848, 851(full reciprocity), superseded Mar. 23, 1963,

Convention

Madagascar, Feb.

id.

arts. 10, 12, 8 id.

id.

458; Netherlands, Oct.

1956,

22

13, 1881, art. 8,

Apr. 5-Dec. 17, 1831,

1

UST

Bevans 862 (US ships' entry into Hawaii),

826, art. 4, 8

981 (reciprocal rights); Hungary, July

art. 1 1,

179, 288 (see also

11, 1854, 10 id. 1101;

May

art. 22, 5

20, 1840, art. 8, 8 Stat. 552, 558,

105, 130; Latvia, Apr. 20, 1928, art. 28, 45 Stat. 2641, 2651; Liberia, Oct. 21, 1862, art. 5, 12

superseded

1951,

17 Stat. 845, 849; Japan, Mar. 31, 1854, arts. 3-5, 10, lliJ. 597-98 (applicable only to US

22 Stat. 815); Korea, May 22, 1882,

(Ryukyu), July

3,

1849, arts. 8, 10, 10 Stat. 873, 876-77; Haiti, Nov.

claim, 2

Stat. 977,

ships in distress), superseded Nov. 22, 1894,
15

3,

1837,

UNTS

Loochoo

vessels only),

910, 912; Mexico,

922, 935; Morocco, June 23-July

1836, arts. 8-9, id. 484, 485; Muscat, Sept. 21, 1833, art. 5,

1,

1782, arts. 16-17, id. 32, 42, superseded Jan 19, 1839, art.

5, id.

524, 526, superseded Mar. 27,

& Protocol HH 16-17, 8 UST 2043, 2073, 2089, 285 UNTS 231, 259, 273; Nicaragua, June 21, 1867, art.

13,

Norway, June 5, 1928, art. 27,47 id. 2135, 2156; Ottoman Empire, May 17, 1830, art. 9, Sid. 408,409;
1851, arts. 16-17, lOid. 926, 933, superseded Sept. 6, 1870, 13-14, 10 Bevans 1038, 1042, superseded Aug.

15 Stat. 549,557;

Peru, July 26,

Nov.

31, 1887, arts. 12-13, 25 Stat. 1444, 1449-50; Peru-Bolivia Confederation,

Poland, May 31, 1972, art. 34, 24 UST 1231, 1268; Portugal, Aug. 26, 1840, art.
arts. 9, 18, id. 84, 88, 92,

superseded July 11, 1799,

30, 1836, arts. 5, 7, 8

9, 8 Stat.

arts. 9, 18, id. 162, 166, 172,

id.

487, 488-90;

560, 564; Prussia, July 9, 1785,

& May

1,

1828,

art. 12, id.

378, 384;

Romania, July 5, 1972, art. 13, 24 UST 1317, 1327; Sardinia, Nov. 26, 1838, arts. 11-12, 8 Stat. 512, 516; Siam (now
Thailand), Mar. 20, 1833, art. 5, id. 454, 455 (protection for US ships in Siamese waters), superseded Dec. 16, 1920, art.
10,

42

id.

1928, 1931 (full reciprocity), superseded Nov. 12, 1937,
138, 142, superseded July 3, 1902, art. 10, 33

arts. 8, 10, 8 id.

superseded Sept.

4, 1816, arts.10, 12, id. 232, 238-40,

354; Tripoli, Nov. 4, 1796

1805, arts. 8-9,

& Jan. 3, 1797, arts. 6-7, id.

id.

superseded July

839, superseded Oct.

1,

1855, arts. 16-17,

639, 648-49;

1 1 id.

53

id.

1731, 1737 (same); Spain, Apr. 3, 1795,

4,

1827 (Sweden

3,

1783, arts. 20-21, 8

& Norway), arts.

id.

Docs. 18B-1

-

18B-4,

6E Benedict,

referring to

502.

See nn. 433-40 and accompanying

503.

Schooner Exchange,

504.

E.g.,

Jr.,

11 U.S. (7

USSR, June

1964,

1,

art. 14,

19

UST 5018, 5029, 165 UNTS

to Brazil, 2

US, UK,

USSR and

id.

1143, 1149. See

other bilaterals.

text.

Cranch) 141-42.

Op. Att'y Gen. 509 (1821);

1

Charge d'Affaires

60, 72,

to US ships), superseded June 4,
Two Sicilies, Dec. 1, 1845, arts. 9-10, 9 id. 833,

157, 158;

121, 144; Venezuela, Jan. 20, 1836, arts. 9-10, 8 Stat. 466,470, superseded Aug. 21, 1860, art. 11, 12
also

id.

15, 17, id. 346,

154 (apparently only applicable

214, 215; Tunis, Aug. 28, 1797, arts. 8-9,

id.

art. 12,

2105, 21 10; Sweden, Apr.

Moore

US

Secretary of State John Forsyth June 23, 1835 letter to William Hunter,

342;

US

Secretary of State Daniel Webster Jan. 29, June 28, 1842 letters to

Edward Everett, US Minister to England, id. 353-54; Webster Aug. 1, 1842 letter to British Minister Plenipotentiary
Lord Ashburton, id. 353; US Secretary of State William Henry Seward June 4 & 1 3, 1 864 letters to Russian Minister to
the US M. Stoeckl, id. 343 (identical Russian practice); US Secretary of State Bayard Nov. 6, 1 886 letter to Mr. Phelps,
id.

343-45, 1886

in 2

FRUS 362, 364-65; US Secretary of State Report, Feb. 26, 1887, S. Exec. Doc.

Moore 345-46; Acting US

R.G. Pitkin and Pitkin
505.

See 2

Law of the
506.

Moore

Secretary of State James G. Blaine Feb.

May 27 & July 7,

350-52, 355-62; 2

1891 letters to Blaine,

Moore, Arbitrations

id.

1

3,

1

892

349, 1891

1016-18, 4

id.

letter to

FRUS

109,49th Cong., 2d

Sess.,

US Minister of Argentina John

4, 10-12.

4349-72; 5

id.

4609, 4623; 2 O'Connell,

Sea 854-56.

See generally

7.3.2, at 7-12;

Brown

39;

NWP 1-14M Annotated UH 2.3.1, at 2-7, 3.2, 7.3.2; NWP 9A Annotated

Restatement (Third)

507.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

508.

The US Department

circumstances

is

11

§

512

2.3.2.5;

r.n.5; 2

O'Connell,

Law of the

1111

2.3.1, 3.2,

Sea 853-58.

NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.2.5.

of State believes a customary right of aircraft entry into territorial seas under these

not as well developed as that for ships.

NWP

1-14M Annotated

H 2.3.2.5 n.35, citing inter alia

US

The Tanker War
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Department of State
citing inter alia

et

al, Statement of Policy (June 27-Aug.

US Department

of State

et

8,

1986),

id.

2-48;

NWP 9A Annotated H

509.

LOS

Convention,

art. 25(3);

510.

LOS

Convention,

art.

511.

LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 31; Territorial Sea Convention, arts.

III. 953-67,

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); nn. 349, 378

125(a)(3); see also nn. 409-18

IV.10-25 and accompanying

2.3.2.5 n.34,

al, at AS2-1-1.

and accompanying

and accompanying

text.

text.

1(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2); see also nn.

text.

61-62; nn. 111.928-29, 938-49, IV.26-27, 29 and accompanying text.

512.

Vienna Convention,

513.

UN Charter,arts. 2(4), 51,

514.

The see-saw nature of the conflict meant that from time to time Iraq had access to its coast and the Shatt before

arts.

1

03; see a/so nn.

III.

10-11, 47-630,916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25

and accompanying text.

the end of the war in 1988.

LOS

Convention,

515.

See generally

516.

LOS

517.

See nn. 11.111-14 and accompanying

518.

LOS Convention, arts. 2(3),

III. 953-67,

Convention,

arts.

124-32, nn. 409-18 and

nn. 409-18 and accompanying

art. 124(l)(a); see also

1

9(

accompanying

text.

text.

text.

2 1 ( 1 ), 3 1 ; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4),

1 ),

IV.10-25 and accompanying

For analysis of

text.

this issue

LOAC,

under the

1

7, 22(2); see also

see Parts

nn.

V.A.-V.E,

V.J.1-V.J.5.

61-62; nn. 111.928-29, 938-49, IV.26-27, 29 and accompanying text.

519.

Vienna Convention,

520.

See nn. 11.250-59 and accompanying

521.

UN

Charter,

accompanying

text.

arts.

Wellens

Res. 552 (1984), in

2(4); S.C.

art.

To the extent

text.

473; see also nn. 11.250-59, 111.47-157 and

the Iranian action involved hostilities in neutral territorial waters, there was also a

violation of traditional neutrality law principles. See Parts V.F.I, V.F.2, V.F.5, V.J. 6.
522.

Not every

strait

523.

See Lewis

M. Alexander, International

524.

Territorial Sea Convention,

525.

Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 14-23. Because

geographers recognize

is

a strait in international law.

Straits, in

art. 16(4);

2

1

O'Connell,

Law of the

Sea 299.

Robertson 91, 104-05; nn. 11.69-73 and accompanying

Nordquist

text.

III.1-III.8.

1111

id., art.

25 declares the Convention does not affect treaties

already in force, those straits governed by international agreements are not regulated by the Convention. See also nn.

555-57 and accompanying
526.

text.

Restatement (Second)

§

45(3)(b)

&

r.n.l, 2, citing Territorial

Sea Convention,

arts. 14-15,

Corfu Channel,

1949 ICJ 28.

Nordquist

nn. 268-94, 314-22, 328-34 and

accompanying

527.

3

528.

Brown

529.

See nn. 83-157 and accompanying

530.

See nn. 11.51, 67, 81, 119, 163, 379-81, IV.333, 363 and accompanying

11

III. 7; see also

80; 3 Nordquist H III. 7; see also nn. 285, 301-13, 337-53, 367, 369

text.

and accompanying

text.

text.

text.

531. 1 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 299; but see Brownlie, International Law 284; for a trend study, see
O'Connell 301-31. For analysis of LOS Convention negotiations, see Brown 81-86; 2 Nordquist HH III.9-III.15; 1
O'Connell 328-31. Commentators say the LOS Convention navigational articles, which include straits passage
principles, reflect customary norms. See nn. III. 963 and accompanying text. Brown 96 agrees that the LOS

Convention
532.

reflects

customary

straits

passage principles, except for warship transit passage.

See Fig. A2-4: Strait of Hormuz, in

NWP

1

-14M Annotated, at 2-74;

Fig.

SF2-5

:

Strait of Hormuz, in

NWP 9A

Annotated.
533.

LOS

Annotated 11

Convention,

2.3.3.2;

the high seas regime.

1

arts.

86-87;

Oppenheim
It is,

§ 2

1

High Seas Convention,

0;

Alexander,

of course, possible that the

strait State(s)

contiguous zone rights for the ocean area beyond the
rules

would

arts. 1-2;

n. 523, 99- 1 00; see

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.3.3.2; NWP 9A

nn. 68-79 and accompanying text for analysis of

may claim EEZ, fishing zone, continental shelf or

territorial sea(s) in the strait. In that case those regimes'

also apply to the belt of waters within the strait

beyond the

534.

See nn. 268-94, 314-22, 328-34 and accompanying

text.

535.

NWP

AS2-4: International

9A Annotated

H

2.3.3.2

n.43

& Annex

LOS

territorial sea.

Straits:

erroneously listing Strait of Hormuz as having a least width of more than 24 miles;

Least Width, seemingly

Annex AS2-6:

Straits,

Less

Than

Law

24 Miles in Least Width, in

Which There Exists a Route Through

the

High Seas

of the

or an Exclusive

Similar Convenience with Respect to Navigational or Hydrographical Characteristics,

compare

id.,

Fig. SF2-4: Strait of Hormuz, in

NWP

536.

1-14M Annotated

H 2.3.3.2 n.46

Which There

&

a least

Table A2-5: International

Straits:

Exists a Route

Through

the

11

2.3.3.2 n.43

11

Abu Musa

539.

See Fig. A2-4: Strait of Hormuz,

2-86 - 2-88; compare id., Fig.

text.

NWP 1-14M Annotated, at 2-74.
Table A2-5: International Straits: Least Width, NWP 1-14M Annotated, at 2-87; Table AS2-4: International
Least Width, NWP 9A Annotated, at AS2-4-2; see also nn. 11.51, 67, 81, 119, 163, 379-81, 410 and

accompanying

in

text.

541.

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(4), 25; see also nn. 524-25, 555-57, 566-81

542.

See nn. 566-81 and accompanying

543.

id.

Island might be considered as falling within this category.

See nn. 11.51, 67, 81, 119, 163, 379-81, 410 and accompanying

540.

Than 24

2.3.3.2 n.46.

538.

Straits:

Less

& Annex AS2-6. By 1997 Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE had claimed greater

only the area around

NWP 1-14M Annotated

Straits,

High Seas or an Exclusive Economic Zone of

at 2-74.

NWP 9A Annotated,

537.

territorial seas, n. 533;

AS2-6-1;

-

Least Width, seemingly

width of more than 24 miles; Table A2-6:

Similar Convenience with Respect to Navigational or Hydrographic Characteristics, in

A2-4: Strait of Hormuz,

Economic Zone of

AS2-4-1

in id.

333

id.

erroneously listing Strait of Hormuz as having

Miles in Least Width, in

Sea

and accompanying

text.

text.

LOS Convention, art. 36; see also brown 88; NWP 1-14M Annotated 2.3.3.2; NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.3.2;
Law of the Sea 330; Restatement (Third) § 513 r.n.3; Roach & Smith H 11.4.
11

1

O'Connell,

&

544.

Roach

545.

See Fig. A2-4: Strait of Hormuz, in

546.

See nn. 337-50 and accompanying

547.

LOS Convention, art. 45; see also 2 Nordquist HH 45.1-45.8(c); NWP 1-14M Annotated

Smith H

1 1.2,

283; see nn. 582-607 and accompanying text for transit passage analysis.

NWP 1-14M Annotated, at 2-74.

text.

11

2.3.3.1, at 2-16;

NWP

9A Annotated H 2.3.3.1, at 2-23; Restatement (Second) § 45(3)(b); Restatement (Third) § 5 13 r.n.3; Roach & Smith,
11

11.3;

Alexander, n. 523, 103; John Norton Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on

Law of the Sea,
548.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

549.

Compare

11

2.3.3.1 n.45;

LOS Convention, arts.

NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.3.1

see also

Restatement (Second)

550.

Alexander, n. 523, 99.

551.

LOS

552.

Id., arts. 44-45(l)(a); see also

Annotated H

Convention,

2.3.3.1 n.36;

n.42.

17-20, 45, with Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 14, 16(4); see also nn. 301-13,

337-50 and accompanying text. Article 16(4) was drafted with Case 2

the Sea 331;

the

74 AJIL 77, 112 (1980).

§ 43(3)(b);

Alexander,

straits in
n.

mind. Brown 80;

1

O'Connell,

Law of

523, 99.

art. 38(1).

Brown

92; 2 Nordquist

NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.3.1

Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 28-29); Roach

& Smith

11

1111

n.36;

38.1, 38.8(b), 44.1-44.8(c), 45.145.8(b);

Restatement (Third)

§

513

r.n. 3 (Art.

11.3; Alexander, n. 523, 100-01 ;seenn. 337-50

NWP 1-14M

45 responds to

and accompanying

text for territorial sea innocent passage analysis.

553.

Compare

addresses

EEZ

LOS

Convention,

arts. 38(1), 45,

with Territorial Sea Convention,

art. 16(4).

No

1958 Convention

claims.

554. The Strait of Messina between the Italian mainland and Sicily is a familiar example. See Table A2-2: Straits
Formed by an Island of a Nation and the Mainland Where There Exists Seaward of the Island a Route Through the
High Seas or an Exclusive Economic Zone of Similar Convenience, NWP 1-14M Annotated, at 2-84; id., 2.3.3.1 n.36.
Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs are more than 24 miles from the mainland. See nn. II. 5 1, 67, 81, 119, 163,
11

379-81, 410 and accompanying text.
555. Compare LOS Convention, art. 35(c) with Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 16(4), 25; see also Brown 86; NWP
1-14M Annotated 2.3.3.1 n.36; NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.3.1 n.36; 1 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 322-24; Roach &
Smith §§ 11.8.4, 11.8.8; Alexander, n. 523, 101-02; Moore, Regime of Straits, n. 547, 111; Daniel Vignes, Commentary, in
Law of Naval Warfare, 468, 479-81.
11

The Tanker War
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LOS Convention, art. 31 1(2); see also Brown 86-88, citing Treaty of Peace, Mar. 26,
ILM 362, 365, 392 (1979); NWP 1-14M Annotated 2.3.3.1 n.42; NWP 9A Annotated

556.
5(2), 18

Smith

II

and accompanying

11.8.15; n. 45

11

1979, Egypt-Israel,
11

2.3.3.1 n.42;

art.

Roach &

text.

LOS Convention art. 35(c) exceptions; see
LNTS 213 (Montreux Convention); as is the Beagle
Channel, Boundary Treaty, July 23, 1881, Arg.-Chile, art. 5, 159 CTS 45; Treaty of Peace & Friendship, Nov. 29, 1984,
Arg.-Chile, 24 ILM 11, 13 (1985). Other treaties or statememts affecting straits include Treaty Concerning
Sovereignty & Maritime Boundaries in the Area Between the Two Countries, Dec. 18, 1978, Austl. -Papua N.G., 18
ILM 291 (1979) (Torres Strait); Treaty ofPeace, Mar. 28, 1979,Egypt-Isr., 1136 UNTS 100, 1138 id. 59; Agreement
Relating to Delimitation of Territorial Sea in the Straits of Dover (With Joint Declaration & Map), Nov. 2, 1988,
The Bosphorus and Dardanelles

557.

Convention Regarding Regime of the

are generally considered

July 20, 1936, 173

Straits,

Fr.-UK, 1547 id. 47, 54 ("unimpeded transit passage

normal mode of navigation, and

in their

.

.

.

of merchant ships, government ships and especially warships

"continuous and expeditious."); Statements by Malaysia

Law

of the Sea in

1-8 (1982), in 4

UNTS

Its

233.8

11

(US

aircraft" recognized; passage

between Trinidad

& Singapore, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.145, Annex & Adds.

a party to statement);

& Tobago- Venez.,

&

Delimitation Treaty, Mar. 31, 1978, Neth.-Venez.,

may

treaties

1 Oppenheim §§234, 275; see also 2 Nordquist HIII.20; 1 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 322-24;
Restatement (Third) § 336 r.n.2; Vignes, Commentary, n. 555.

558.

See

LOS Convention, arts.

111

2.3.3.1 n.36, 2.3.4.1;

Freedom ofNavigation in a Post-LOS Convention III Environment,

140

49

111.20 n.

Alexander,

1

Oppenheim§

NWP 1-14M Annotated,

17-26, 52, 53(4), 54; see also 2 Nordquist 1M 51.1-54.7(b);

NWP 9A Annotated,

2.3.3.1 n.36, 2.3.4.1;

1111

11

1

Submarine

apply to third States through the erga omnes

principle.

213;

&

19 L. of the Sea Bull. 22 (Oct. 1991), cited in 2 Nordquist

Tobago, Venezuela). These

must be

Relating to Article 233 of the Draft Convention on the

311 (strait between Netherlands Antilles, Venezuela); Agreement on Delimitation of Marine

Areas, April 18, 1990, Trin.
(strait

et al.

Application to the Strait of Malacca

Nordquist

by

also the right of overflight

n. 523, 95-96;

Thomas

A. Clingan,

Symposium, The Law ofthe Sea: Where Now, 46 L.

in

&

Contemp. Probs. 107, 117 (1983); Bruce Harlow, Comment, in Symposium 125, 126; Oxman, The Regime, n. III. 956,
851-61; William J. Schachte, International Straits and Navigational Freedoms, 24 ODIL 179, 181-84 (1993); see nn.
337-50 (territorial sea innocent passage), 546-54 (nonsuspendable
559.

Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 16(4), 25.

560.

See Table Al-7: Archipelagos; Table Al-8,

Claiming Archipelagic Status,

in

&

straits

innocent passage).

Table Al-9: States with Acceptable Water/Land Ratios

NWP 1-14M Annotated, at 1-85

Table ST1 -9: States with Acceptable Water/Land Ratios

for

-

1-87;

for

Table ST1-7: Archipelagos; Table ST1-8,

&

NWP 9A Annotated, at

Claiming Archipelagic Status, in

1-17-1-18.
561.

See nn. 524-30 and accompanying

text.

562.

See nn. 268-94 and accompanying

text.

563.

See nn. 68-79 and accompanying

564.

See nn. 268-94 and accompanying

text.

565.

See nn. 533-45 and accompanying

text.

566.

567.

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(4); accord,

art.

25(3); see also nn. 301-13

and accompanying

§ 45(1)

&

cmts. a,b.

Restatement (Second)

§

45(3)(b); compare

LOS

text.

Restatement (Second)

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(1); accord,

and accompanying
569.

Restatement (Second)

Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 16(3)-16(4); accord,

Convention,
568.

text.

§ 45(2)(a)

& cmt.b; see also nn. 381-521

text.

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(3); accord,

Restatement (Second) §45(2)(b)& cmt.b; see also nn. 302,492,

494-95, 500-01, 507 and accompanying text.
570.

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4); accord,

accompanying
571.

1

O'Connell,

Law

§ 45(1); see also

of the Sea 331. Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 29-33, which spoke

passage," influenced the Convention drafters.
523, 96-99.

Restatement (Second)

nn. 301-13 and

text.

Brown

78-79; 2 Nordquist

11

III. 5;

in terms of "innocent

O'Connell 314-16; Alexander,

n.

Promoting territorial sea innocent passage in the straits context as a rule of international law continues. See

Brownlie, International

Law

281, 284 (Territorial Sea Convention,

Convention "a substantial departure from

.

.

.

customary law");

1

art.

16[4] the straits passage rule; the

Oppenheim

§

210; but see

id. §

LOS

211, recognizing the

LOS Convention transit passage regime. In later LOS discussions, maritime States made it clear that maintaining an
LOS treaty. 2 Nordquist III.6.

unrestricted ships straits passage regime was essential for a future

11

Law

See Territorial Sea Convention,

572.

declares that "any" fishing

art. 19(2)(i)

art. 14(5);
is

Restatement (Second)

considered under

id., art.

Cf. Territorial

573.

LOS

for a future

clear that

treaty. 2

arts.

1

-2; see also

Nordquist

II

submarine

straits

text.

by contrast,

LOS Convention,

text.

LOS discussions

passage regime was essential

straits aircraft overflight

III.6.

Restatement (Second)

discussions maritime States

passage regime was essential to a future

LOS Convention, art.

575.

LOS

In later

f;

nn. 304-05 and accompanying text. In later

maintaining an unrestricted

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(6); see also

574.

and accompanying

art.

Sea Convention,

it

cmt.

335

19 as prejudicial to a coastal State's peace, good

order or security; see also nn. 301-02, 337, 340-41 and accompanying

maritime States made

§ 45,

Sea

of the

LOS

19(2) declares these activities

made

treaty. 2

§

45 cmt.

g; but see id. § 48;

nn. 302-03

clear that maintaining an unrestricted

it

Nordquist H

III.6.

and others in an all-inclusive list are considered under id.,

19 to be prejudicial to a coastal State's peace, good order or security; see also nn. 338-41 and accompanying text.

Sea Convention,

18-23; see also n. 313

and accompanying

576.

Cf. Territorial

577.

Territorial Sea Convention, arts.l(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2) (application of "other rules of international law"); see

and accompanying

also nn. III. 952-67, IV. 10-25

578.

UN Charter, arts.

579.

E.g.,

arts.

text.

text.

51, 103; see also nn. 111.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25

and accompanying

text.

UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103. LOS Convention, art. 19(2)(a) declares "any threat or use of force against the

sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other

the principles of international law
coastal State's peace,

embodied

in the Charter"

good order or security. See also nn.

is

considered under id.,

art.

manner

in violation of

19 as conduct prejudicial to a

47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying

III. 10-1 1,

text.

Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4).

580.

Convention, declares a "coastal state

may

For example, Restatement (Second)

take the necessary steps in

its territorial

§

45 cmt.

i,

following the

sea to prevent passage that

is

not

immunity is not affected. While the latter
covers warship immunity, reading the "necessary steps" language broadly without considering warship immunity
could lead to an erroneous conclusion that warships can be treated like merchantmen for straits passage.
innocent, regardless of the type of vessel involved," adding that the vessel's

581.

See

MacDonald

170 for Saudi Arabia's position on innocent passage through

straits

under the 1958

Convention.
582. Others include the Straits of Gibraltar, between the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean; Bab el
Mandeb, between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean; Malacca, between the Indian Ocean's Andaman Sea and the
Pacific Ocean's South China Sea. See Fig. A2-2: Strait of Gibraltar; Fig. A2-3: Strait of Bab el Mandeb; Fig. A2-5, in

NWP1-14M Annotated, at 2-72, 2-73, 2-75; sec also 10'Connell,Lawofthe Sea 318-22; Alexander,n. 523, 104-05.
LOS

583.

44.144.8(c);

36-38(1), 44; see also 2 Nordquist Ml 36.1-36.7(e), 37.1-37.7(c), 38.1-38.8(c),

arts.

one purpose only

1-14M Annotated

11

—

.

.

.

2.3.3. 1, at 2-23;

Alexander, n. 523,91,94.

38.1-38.8(b), 38.8(d)-38.8(e); NWP
NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.3.1, at 2-23; Restatement (Third) § 513(3) & cmt.

continuous and expeditious transit"); 2 Nordquist

2.3.3.1, at 2-15;

entry, see

NWP 1-14M Annotated
NWP 9A Annotated

4, at 2-59;

2.3.3.1 n.37, citing

11

2.3.3.1 n.37;

11

ITU

j,

unimpeded transit passage a customary norm); Alexander,
nn. 381-513 and accompanying text.

r.n.3 (right of

585.

11

LOS Convention, art. 38(2); see also Brown 89 (transit passage is "a right akin to freedom of the high seas but

584.
for

Convention,

NWP1-14M AnnotatedH2.3.3.1,at2-15;NWP9A Annotated

n. 523,

91-93; for analysis of conditions of

US Navy Judge Advocate General message 061630Z June 1988
& Smith H 11.2, 286, quoting Dec. 21, 1984 telegram to US
11

Roach

Embassy, Santiago, Chile.
586.

LOS

Convention,

accompanying

arts.

58, 87-115;

High Seas Convention,

arts.

1-2; see also nn. 68-79,

587.

LOS

588.

Since waters in and around these straits are necessarily part of coastal State territorial seas, an

seas, the

Convention,

art. 38(1).

other rules clauses of id.,

arts. 2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 31, 58(3),

Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2).

sovereignty or jurisdiction
clauses refer to the

Regime on
589.

the

E.g.,

147-57 and

text.

is

exercised subject to

LOAC. See 2 Nordquist

Law of Neutrality at Sea,

20

1111

LOS

id., arts.

Convention,

34-45,

1

accompanying

text.

EEZ or the high

High Seas Convention,

rules of international law."

(1995); nn. 111.953-56, IV.10-25
1 )(b),

art. 2;

34(2) declares straits-bordering States'

Mayama, The Influence of the Straits

UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51,103; LOS Convention, arts. 39(

952-67, IV.6-25 and

art.

and "other

34.1-34.8(g); Akira

ODIL

87(1) apply; see also

and accompanying

30 1 ; see also nn.

III. 1 0- 1 1 ,

Other rules

Transit Passage
text.

47-630, 916-18,

The Tanker War
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590.

MacDonald

591.

LOS Convention, art.

NWP9A Annotated

183-84; see also 2 Nordquist Ml IH.9-IH.14.
39(1); see also 2

2.3. 3.1, at

11

2-22;

1

592.

LOS

Convention,

art. 39(2); see also

593.

LOS

Convention,

art. 39(3); see also 2

594.

2

Nordquist

Alexander,

LOS

595.

11

n. 523, 93;

Convention,

40; see also

art.

art.

id.,

at 2-15;

strait-bordering State's territorial waters within the strait

mode

continuous, expeditious transit in
596.

LOS

597.

2

Convention,

Nordquist

Alexander,

n. 523, 91

Treaty Text, 52
Perspective, 39

of operations while going through a

nn. 591, 595 and accompanying

1-14M Annotated

11

Wash. L. Rev.

193, 212-14 (1977);

2.3.3.1, at 1-15;

The Regime of Straits and National Security:
territorial sea

19(1) innocent

if

a

sonic depth sounding

legitimately incidental to

text.

NWP 9A

Annotated

11

2.3.3.1, at 2-22;

Interpretations of the Proposed

n. III.318, 120,

122;

in

Law ofthe Sea
A Legal

International Straits:

Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Passage

Right Preserved in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 20

843-44 (1980); Schachie, International Straits,

under

strait, e.g.,

Ronald Clove, Submarine Navigation

Nav. L. Rev. 103(1990); Lowe, 77^ Commander's,

A

id., art.

that State consents. 2 Nordquist H 40.9(d). Research does

These activities are not prohibited
the normal mode. Id. 1111 39.10(0, 40.9(c).

NWP

2.3.3.1, at 2-22;

However, research may be conducted in

William T. Burke, Submerged Passage Through Straits:

Through International Straits:

contrast,

if

II

survey activities considered

conducted by ships otherwise in

if

etc.

art. 39(l)(c); see also

39.10(e);

11

;

NWP 9A Annotated

19(2)(j) (territorial sea research,

passage); 2 Nordquist HH 40. 1-40. 9(e); Alexander, n. 523, 92-93.

by fathometer or position plotting by radar,

text.

Nordquist Ml 39.10(k)-39.10(/).

good order or security

not include transiting platforms' normal

accompanying

2 Nordquist H 39.10(j); nn. VI. 136-40 and

39.10(k); NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.3.3.1,
Lowe, The Commander's, n. III. 318, 119.

prejudicial to coastal State's peace,

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.3.3.1, at 2-15;

Nordquist MI 39.1-39.10(h);

0'Connell,Lawofthe Sea 331-336; Moore, Regime ofStraits, n. 547, 95-102.

VJIL

801,

Lowe, The Commander's, 122; W.Michael Reisman,
Appraisal of International Lawmaking, 74 AJIL 48, 71-75 (1980). By

n. 558, 184-86; but see

An

innocent passage rules submarines must transit surfaced, flying the ensign.

LOS

Convention, art. 20; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(6); see also nn. 302, 338, 342, 493, 574 and accompanying text.

For special maritime vehicles,

598.

normal

to

e.g.,

hovercraft or hydrofoils, normal

them under the circumstances. For

aircraft

circumstances. 2 Nordquist HH 39.10(e), 40.9(c);

1-14M Annotated,
Commander's,
i.e.,

LOS

599.

-

1

H 5

transit passage

means the mode

and speed appropriate under the

makes

clear, this is for navigation safety

and

ships' protection,

art.

39(l)(b); see also

1

Nordquist 207, 450; 2

id.

H 39.10(c); 5

id.,

11

301.5; discussing

LOS

301.

78. If prior notification or

permission

argued nn. 337-52 and accompanying text concerning
arts. 14-23,

mode

altitude

US Navy Judge Advocate General message, n. 586, HH 5, 9, in NWP
Law of the Sea 333; Alexander, n. 523, 92; but see Lowe, The

O'Connell,
As the Navy Message
2-61;

is

UN Charter, arts. 5 1,103; see also nn. 10- 11, 47-630, 916- 18, 952-67, IV. 6-25 and accompanying text.

Convention,
art.

Brown

600.

2-60

n. III.317, 122.

self-defense.

Convention,

at

normal mode

surely there

is

no prior

is

unnecessary for warship

LOS

Convention,

arts.

territorial sea

innocent passage, as

17-32 and Territorial Sea Convention,

notification or permission requirement for straits transit passage

where

a strait

includes territorial seas.

or

separation schemes must conform to generally accepted international regulations. If two

601.

Sea lanes and

more

States border a strait, they

id., art.

traffic

22(1) (coastal State

;

NWP 1-14M Annotated 2.3.3.1, at 2-26; NWP 9A Annotated U 2.3.3.1, at2-23; Alexander,n. 523, 94-95.
NWP 1-14M Annotated I 2.3.3.1 n.43, referring to Fig. A2-4, at 2-74; NWP 9A Annotated 2.3.3.1 n.41,

41. l-41.9(h);

602.

must cooperate in formulating proposals to IMO. LOS Convention, art. 41 see also
sea lanes, traffic separation schemes for its territorial sea); 2 Nordquist 111

may prescribe
11

id.

11

referring to Fig. SF2-4.
603.

LOS Convention, arts. 42(1), 42(3); see also 2 Nordquist IM 42.1-42.10(e), 42.10(h); Alexander, n.

523, 94-95;

nn. VI. 122, 136-40, 175 and accompanying text.
604.

LOS Convention, art.

605.

Compare

43; see also 2 Nordquist IM 43.1 -43.8(e).

LOS Convention, art. 42(2) with id., art. 25(3) (no discrimination in form or fact when territorial sea

innocent passage temporarily suspended);

see also

nn. 301-13, 337-50 and accompanying

text.

606.

LOS

607.

LOS Convention, arts. 42(4)-42(5); compare id., arts. 21,31 (similar rules for territorial sea innocent passage);

see also 2

608.

Convention,

art.

44; see also 2 Nordquist

Nordquist Ml 42.10(i)-42.10(/); Alexander,

11

44.8(b); Alexander, n. 523, 94-95.

n. 523,

94-95; n. 350 and accompanying text.

See nn. 11.104-06, 220, 277, 290, 325, 357, 375, 379-81, 463 and accompanying

text.

Law

609.

LOS Convention, arts.

36,87(1);

High Seas Convention, art.

of the

Sea

337

nn. 533-45, 561-65 and accompanying

2; see also

text.

610.

LOS

611.

See nn. 11.325 and accompanying

612.

Lowe, The Commander's,

613.

UN Charter, arts.

614.

See n. 11.102 and accompanying

615.

See

616.

See,

Convention,

n.

44; see also nn. 566-607 and accompanying text.
text.

n. III.318, 120.

51, 103; see also nn. III.10-1

600 and accompanying

e.g.,

accompanying

arts. 38(1),

48-626, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

1,

text.

text.

nn. 11.357 (mines), 457 (Iran's Larak oil terminal by air attack), 463-64 (speedboat attacks) and

text.

617.

UN Charter, arts.

618.

See nn. 11.459-69 and accompanying

619.

Cf.

620.

See Whitehurst, U.S.

621.

See Gilmore

& Black

188;

622.

See Gilmore

& Black

14, 144;

LOS

51, 103; see also nn. 111.10-11, 48-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25

Convention,

arts.

and accompanying

text.

text.

41-44; see also n. 11.357 and accompanying text.

Merchant Marine,
Schoenbaum

§

n. 11.59, ch. 7.

8-33;

Schoenbaum

§

Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine,

8-33;

n. 11.59, 201-02.

Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine,

n. 11.59, 202.

623. Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law 2 (1956) coined the phrase, now in general use, to define private parties'
and governments' relationships in the international context. Transnational law is a mix of public international law,
e.g., the LOS or the LOAC with which this study is primarily concerned, and conflict of laws, also known as private

international law.
624.

US

Const.,

gives Congress

art. I, § 8

power

Congress to approve privateering. The general view
century or more ago. Colombos

Convention on Naval

§§

is

to "grant Letters of

that privateering

536-3 8 ; 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea

Marque and

Reprisal,"

is

outlawed, despite

1 1

02-03,

1 1

06;

i.e.,

authorizing

US equivocations half a

Tucker 40-4 1 Harvard Draft
;

& Aerial War, art. 50 & cmt.; Hisakazu Fujita, Commentary, in Law of Naval Warfare 66, 68.

Whatever its weight as a customary norm, the Declaration's 53 original and acceding
States, which has not ratified the Declaration, represent nearly all nations if treaty
succession principles are taken into account. Schindler & Toman 789-90; Symposium, State Succession; Walker,
Integration and Disintegration.
See Paris Declaration, H

625.

See

1.

United

parties, except the

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.1.3; NWP 9A Annotated U 2.1.2.3; Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine, n.

11.59, ch. 11

(US National Defense Reserve

Reserve Fleet); except as a "fleet in being,"

219 and accompanying

text. Insofar as

Properly speaking, under the

LOS,

Fleet, Military Sealift

Command,

naval fleet auxiliaries,

RDJTF, Ready

RDJTF played no active role in the Tanker War. See nn. 11.40, 77, 80, 175,

the record indicates, no State employed naval auxiliaries during the war.

naval auxiliaries are State-owned vessels operated for noncommercial purposes

by LOS Convention, arts. 31-32; Territorial Sea
On the high seas they enjoy immunity as well. LOS Convention, art. 96; High Seas Convention,

that are not warships and, in territorial waters, are governed

Convention,
art. 9.

art. 22.

See generally 2 Nordquist HH 31.1-32.7(b), 3

id.

96.1-96.96.10(d);

NWP

1-14M Annotated H

2.1.3;

NWP 9A

Oppenheim § 565. Where the law of armed conflict applies through the other rules clauses ofthe
LOS conventions, they would be considered under Law of Naval Warfare principles applicable to naval auxiliaries.
Applicable international agreements include 1936 London Naval Treaty, art. 1(B)(6); Montreux Convention, n. 557,
Annex II, art. B(6), 173 LNTS 237; Convention on Maritime Neutrality, arts. 12-13. However, because there were
apparently no naval auxiliary issues, as distinguished from issues of government-owned or operated vessels for
Annotated H

2.1.3;

1

commercial purposes, during the Tanker War, Chapter
626.

1962 Oil Pollution Convention Amendments,

COLREGS, Rule
627.

V will not analyze this

l(c)(i).

Some ILO conventions

Ship Registration Convention,

registered tons

(GRT). See

also

2(2)(b); compare

art.

offer partial definitions. 2

n. 11.61, art. 2(4),

Restatement (Third)

§

26

ILM

See Part C.4 for analysis of the definition of a warship.

629.

By 1995

MARPOL

MARPOL

O'Connell,

73/78,

art.

Law ofthe

2(4);

1960

Sea 749.

1237, (1987) excluding vessels under 500 gross

501 r.n.l.

628.

percent of world merchant

difficult issue.

73/78 had been accepted by countries, including the United States, representing 92

fleets,

measured in GRT. Bowman

& Harris 292-93 (1995

Supp.);

TIF 400-01.
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USC § 916(e); 33 USC §§1471(5), 1502(19); 46 USC §23 (includes seaplanes on the v/nti); see also 2
Law of the Sea 747-50.

See,e.g., 16

630.

O'Connell,
631.

San Remo Manual, cmt.

632.

NWP1-14M Annotated H 2.1.3 n.l3;NWP9A Annotated U 2.1.2.3 n.13; San RemoManual H 13(i)& Commentary.

633.

E.g.,

634.

See Parts V.C.-V.E, V.J.3-V.J.5.

635.

Gilmore

636.

See,

637.

Gilmore

638.

Alford,

LOS

Convention,

& Black

13.23.

art.

87(1); see also nn. III. 953-67, IV. 10-25

and accompanying

text.

12.

First Charter of Virginia, Apr. 10/20, 1606, arts. 1-2.

e.g.,

& Black

12.

n. III. 833, 84-88.

The USSR, a command economy State, has since collapsed and is moving to a free
command economies and those transitioning to a capitalist system may still use

enterprise economy. However, other
these.

Many free enterprise-based economies also have the form, e.g., Israel and its State-owned ZIM shipping line.
Table

639.

2.2

Non-Communist

:

Countries with Government

Owned Shipping Fleets, in Lawrence Juda, The UNCTAD

Liner Code: United States Maritime Policy at the Crossroads 46 (1983).
640.

Gilmore

& Black

Gilmore

& Black

13-14, 197;

Schoenbaum

§

8-5,491; Whitehurst, U.S.

Merchant Marine,

nn. 11.59, chs.

8-9.

641.

12, 990-95;

Juda,

n. 639, ch. 1;

Daniel Marx, Jr., International Shipping Cartels:
(1953);

Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine,

642.

See,

e.g.,

n. 11.60, 14-16, 30,

198-202, 289-91, 293-95;

n. 11.59, 35.

arrangements in In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F.Supp. 228 (S.D.N. Y. 1968), rev'd, 409 F.2d 1013

(2d Cir. 1969), (1967 Torrey Canyon
111.

Lawrence,

A Study of Industrial Self-Regulation by Shipping Conferences

oil spill disaster);

In re

Amoco Transp. Co. (Amoco Cadiz),

1979), affd, 954 F.2d 1279, 1302-04 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Frankel, n. 11.60, 66;

1979

Gilmore

AMC 1017 (N.D.
& Black

841-43;

Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine, n. 11.59, 225; Andreas Lowenfeld, Public Law in the
International Arena: Conflict ofLaws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for their Interaction, 163 RCADI 31 1, 322-26

Schoenbaum

§

13-2 n.4;

(1979); nn. 664, V. 12-15

a part;

644.
also

document drafted in duplicate, so that only the whole could give rise to rights and remedies. Each party
comparing the halves proved the document's authenticity. Schoenbaum § 9-1 n.l.

See,

e.g.,

Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp.

Schoenbaum
Gilmore

645.

charter

text.

"Charter party" derives from the Latin charta partita (divided document), the ancient custom of splitting a

643.

ship rental

kept

and accompanying

is

a

§ 8-6,

v.

M/S Norse Commander

Corp., 264 F.Supp. 625 (S.D. Tex. 1966); see

492.

& Black

194. If an

owner provides master and crew, tendering them

demise, although not technically a bareboat charter. Schoenbaum

646.

Gilmore

& Black

194;

Schoenbaum

§ 9-1,

631.

647.

Gilmore

& Black

193;

Schoenbaum

§ 9-1,

631-32.

648.

Gilmore

& Black

195.

649.

Id.

197-98;

Schoenbaum

§ 9-2. Satellite-based

communications through

§

INMARSAT (International Maritime

Communications), established by Convention on International Maritime

Satellite

1976, 31

UST

1;

Operating Agreement on International Maritime

as the charterer's agents, the

9-3 n.l -2.

Satellite Organization, Sept. 3,

Satellite Organization, Sept. 3, 1976,

id.

135,

accomplishes this for many ships. Whitehurst, U.S.
v.

Alpine Shipping Co., 1982

AMC

& Black 202-07;

1241

Merchant Marine, n. 11.59, 152. See, e.g., Dominant Navig. Ltd.
(R Glenn Bauer, Manfred W. Arnold, Jack Berg, arbs.).

Schoenbaum

650.

Gilmore

651.

The

652.

Schoenbaum

653.

Id. § 9-10, 654.

654.

Gilmore

655.

Gilmore & Black 223-28; Schoenbaum §§ 9-14, 9-16; George K. Walker, The Interface of Criminal Jurisdiction
Charter, 20 Tulane Maritime L.J. 217, 241 (1996).

Gazelle, 186
§

US

474 (1902);

see also

§ 9-10.

Schoenbaum

§

9-10, 654.

9-10, 653-54.

& Black 209-10;

Schoenbaum

and Actions Under the United Nations

§ 9-14.

1

Law

656.

E.g.,

Calmar

S.S.

Corp.

Cir. 1960) (voyage charter);

1958);

The Claveresk, 264

Scott, 345

v.

Navious Corp.

F. 276,

US 427, 439-40 (1953);

v.

The

Although they created

complete a voyage,
658.

see also

Bottomry bonds, loans on the security of

obsolete.

i.e.,

if it

liens

sank.

on

v.

Hellenic Lines, 272 F.2d 253 (2d

ship and

a

& Black 632, 690;

USC

and respondentia bonds on cargo

cargo,

its

Western Pioneer, 492

v.

& Black 240.

Gilmore

vessel or cargo, the liens

Gilmore

Ship Mortgage Act, 46

E.g.,

Glidden Co.
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161 F.Supp. 932 (D. Md.), affd, 260 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.

II,

281-82 (2d Cir. 1920) (time charter); Denali Seafoods, Inc.

F.Supp. 580 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (voyage charter);
657.

Ulysses

Sea

of the

{i.e.,

the security) were discharged

Schoenbaum

if a

now

are

ship did not

§ 7-5 n.2.

§§ 31322, 31325.

659. Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens & Mortgages, Apr. 10, 1926, 120
LNTS 1 87; Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens & Mortgages, May 27, 1967, in 6E
Benedict, Doc. 15-5; Convention on Maritime Liens & Mortgages, May 6, 1993, 33 ILM 353 (1994). Each supersedes

the previous one; the 1993

IMO-sponsored convention

is

not in force for many States, the situation for earlier treaties.

Tulane L. Rev. 68
The United States is not party to any maritime lien treaty. See John M. Kriz,Ship Mortgages, Maritime Liens and
Their Enforcement: The Brussels Conventions of 1926 and 1967, 1963 Duke L.J. 670, 674-75.

See Jan M. Sandstrom, The Changing International Concept of the Maritime Lien as a Security Right, 47
(1973).

660.

Ship Mortgage Act, 46

E.g.,

US

holding a

Schoenbaum
661.

USC

§

US

USC

31328, requires

US Department

of Transportation approval of trustees

who cannot

ship mortgage in trust for the benefit of a foreignor

hold

a

US

ship mortgage; see also

§ 7-5.

law,

e.g.,

subordinates foreign preferred ship mortgages in

31326(b); see also

Gilmore

& Black

709-12;

Schoenbaum

US

courts to repair facilities' lien claims. 46

§ 7-6.

662.

See generally Gilmore

& Black

702-06;

663.

See generally Gilmore

& Black

702-06.

664.

See,

665.

See generally Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Limitation of Liability of Owners of

e.g.,

444.

§ 7-5,

In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., n. 642; see also n. 642 and accompanying

Sea-Going Vessels, Aug.
of Liability of

Schoenbaum

24, 1924, 120

text.

LNTS 123 (1924 Limitation Convention); Convention Relating to Limitation

Owners of Seagoing Ships, Oct.

10, 1957, 6

Protocol, Dec. 21, 1979, id., Doc. No. 5-3; Convention

Benedict, Doc. No. 5-2 (1957 Limitation Convention);

on Limitation of Liability of Maritime Claims, Nov.

19, 1976, 16

ILM 606 (1977) (1976 Limitation Convention); Schoenbaum ch. 13; In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., n. 642; n. 642 and
accompanying text. The United States is not party to these treaties; Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act, 46 USC
US

§§ 181-89, governs in
666.

courts.

See nn. VI. 14-15, 160-65, 195-97 and accompanying

Maritime

text.

liens,

inchoate

(i.e.,

hidden)

in

rem

merchantmen, personal injury and death aboard ship, contracts for
vessel repair, charter claims, towage, pilotage, wharfage, cargo damage claims, etc., add still another dimension (and
therefore more possible claimants) relating to the vessel. See generally Gilmore & Black 586-688; Schoenbaum ch. 7.
interests in a ship because of collisions with other

667.

See

LOS

nationality for

Convention,

LOAC

art.

situations.

91; High Seas Convention, art. 5;
San Remo Manual 1IH 60 & cmt.

see also

Part B.3.

60.4; 112-14

&

The

vessel's flag

governs

its

cmts.; see also Parts V.B-V.E,

V.J.2-V.J.5.

668.

Much of what follows has been

maritime
669.

sale,

distilled

from Schoenbaum

§ 8-1,

who publishes a

helpful diagram of typical

financing and transportation contracts.

Convention on Contracts

for International Sale of

Goods, Apr.

11,

1980,— UST— 19
,

ILM

668 (1980),

increasingly governs maritime transactions' sales aspects. At least 52 countries, including the United States and
if

treaty succession principles apply, are parties.

TIF

more

459; Symposium, State Succession; Walker, Integration and

John Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations
Symposium on the International Sale of Goods Convention, 18 Int'L Law. 3 (1984).

Disintegration. See also

Convention

(1982);

670.

This was the transaction in Banco Nacional de Cuba

671.

See generally Schoenbaum

672.

See nn. 635-67 and accompanying

673.

LNTS

Convention
155

§ 8-4;

v.

Sabbatino, 376

Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine,

for Unification of Certain

Rules Relating

to Bills

n. 11.59, ch. 17.

of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 51

Stat. 233,

120

1924 Convention for Unification of Certain Rules

of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Feb. 23, 1 968, in 6 Benedict, Doc.

ILM 608 (1978);

398 (1964).

text.

(COGSA Convention), modified by Protocol to Amend

Sea, Mar. 31, 1978, 17

US

1

-2,

and UN Convention on Carriage of Goods by

neither of the latter are in force for the United States.

US

trading partners are

parties to the modifications, albeit with reservations or domestic law gloss. Comparative Table of Ratifications of the
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Hague Rules and

Hamburg

the

Convention reservation, 51

paramount to the Convention

§§ 8-15

-

Schoenbaum

674.

law,

modify the contract of carriage

8-41.

choice of law, stated in

§ 9-6. Parties'

marine insurance and carriage of goods contracts. See
675.

also

contract clause, can also be applied in salvage, towage,

a

§§ 8-20, 10-11; Walker, Interface, n. 655, 245-46.

id.

COGSA Convention, arts. 4(2)(b)-4(2)(c), 4(2)(e)-4(2)(g), 4(2)(k)-4(2)(/), 4(4), 51

Cf.

167; see also,

USC

42

e.g.,

1304(4) for application in
n. 655, 239-41.

USC

app. § 182, 42

Stat.

251-52, 120

LNTS

§§ 1304(2)(b)-1304(2)(c), 1304(2)(e)-1304(2)(g), 1304(2)(k)-1304(2)(/),

US law, and Gilmore & Black §§

3-31

-

3-34;

Schoenbaum

§§ 8-27

8-29; Walker, Interface,

-

The COGSA Convention and US COGSA parallel public law obligations to save life at sea by granting a

civil case liability

exception.

LOS Convention, art. 98; High Seas Convention, art.

12;

Second Convention, arts. 12-13;

Parts V.H.2, V.J. 8, nn. VI. 12-15 and accompanying text.

see also

Besides these treaty-based exceptions, the maritime law of average, in which a party sustaining loss from a

676.
peril

the Carriage of

i.e.,

US courts, thereby perhaps creating different results in US courts from cases
to a certain extent, perhaps incorporating US
more parties, such as shoreside freight handling companies, also may be involved.

such that even

rules,

Schoenbaum

US

for cases in

in other countries' courts. Parties can

COGSA

Schoenbaum § 8-14. The US COGS A
Goods by Sea Act, 46 USC §§ 1300-15, is

Rules (1996), Doc. 1-3A, 6 Benedict; see also

Stat. 252, declares

during

a

voyage

party's property

(e.g.,

may

of the sea)

(e.g.,

by pushing

it

collect pro rata

contribute to the party losing property. See generally
677.

Argentine Republic

Cf.

company's claim

v.

from other parties in the maritime venture

overboard) saves the ship, can involve more claimants,

Gilmore

& Black 252-54;

Schoenbaum

i.e.,

if loss

of that

those forced to

ch. 15.

Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 US 428 (1989), where jurisdiction over a shipping
when a dud bomb lodged in the ship during the Falklands/Malvinas War and

for loss of its vessel

could not be dislodged safely resulting in the scuttling of the ship was denied because of the Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act, 28

USC

§§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11.

the Suits in Admiralty Act,

id.

The Public

USC

Vessels Act, 46

§§ 746-90,

and

§§ 741-52 govern liability of the United States for acts of its public ships, e.g., warships,

and ships the government operates commercially. See also Schoenbaum §§ 17-1, 17-3. This parallels LOS immunities.
LOS Convention, arts. 32, 58, 95-96, 1 1 0(1 ), 236; High Seas Convention, arts. 8-9; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 22;
see also

on the ocean does not necessarily mean

etc.,

Convention,

art.

Military Justice,
678.

As

a

that a ship's

damages

31 (State's liability to a coastal State for

commanding officer can be
art.

1

10, 10

liable for

USC

§

hazarding

a vessel

Traction, Light

may modify

these principles.

government

id.

(Third)

902.

§

LOS

Convention,

See nn. 11.338-40, 459-69 and accompanying

680.

Cf.

Inc.,

§

476

682.

states a

UNTS

683.

minimum. Warren

Mahnich

Lawrence,
text

v.

Southern

n. 11.60,

(UK

United

S.S. Co., 321

at 2-9,

States,
act,

v.

Guat.), 1955 ICJ 4;

2, at

1

1-12; Barcelona

is

§§ 378-80;

an example of a

treaty's

Restatement

confirming the

Case of Sickness, Injury or Death of Seamen, Oct. 24,

-

340

US

maritime standards may be more favorable; the

523 (1951).
liability

103-04 (1944); East River S.S. Co.

under

v.

US maritime law,

Transamerica Delaval,

3-7, chs. 4, 6.

Merchant Marine,

n. 11.59, 35-36, 225; n. 11.359

and

opposed arming merchantmen).

to Carriage of Passengers

&

Their Luggage by Sea, Dec.

13, 1974, arts. 3, 6-9, in 6

2-11-2-13; Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Carriage of Passengers

29, 1961, arts. 4, 6, 10, in

id.,

Doc.

ship, subject to a comparative fault defense

Sea 780-81. The United States

684.

31-32

unseaworthiness or product

US 96,

2-1, at 2-1, 2-3

because of shipwreck, collision, stranding, explosion or

theory. See

in

287-88, 292-93; Whitehurst, U.S.

seafarer unions

Convention Relating

Benedict, Doc. 2-2,

by Sea, Apr.

v.

858 (1986). See also Schoenbaum §§ 3-6

accompanying

(Liech.

Law 407-23; 1 Oppenheim

arts.

169, 172-76. National

recovery under an employers liability

688;

US

ship's

text.

Convention Respecting Shipowners' Liability

1936, arts. 2-7, 54 Stat. 1693, 1695-99, 40

E.g.,

A

Uniform Code of

liability.

679.

USC

Nottebohm

Gr. Brit.), 1924 PCIJ, Ser. A, No.

v.

236 (Ital.-US Concil. Comm'n, 1955); Brownlie, International

681.

territorial sea.)

law. Cf.

& Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ 3; United States ex rel. Merge v. Italian Republic, 14 UNRIAA

(Second) §§ 26-27, 201-13;

Convention

warship causes in

general rule only the State of an individual's nationality, or the State of a company's incorporation, can

Mavromattis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction) (Greece

principle of

its

and other charges under military

910.

claim against another government; treaties

46

immunity in civil litigation and from
government escapes liability. E.g., LOS

nn. 77, 312, 337, 809 and accompanying text. Just because warships have

boarding,

is

fire

-

2-5, state

presumptions of fault if injury or death occurs

(which might be caused by external forces), or defect in the

and recovery caps. Few States are parties. See also 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe

not a but achieves similar results through legislation and

Death on the High Seas Act, 46

See nn. 677-79 and accompanying

USC

text.

§§ 761-68;

Schoenbaum

§§ 3-5, 6-1

-

a

comparative negligence

6-3, 6-5

-

6-6.

8

.

Law

of the

Sea

685. See generally Gilmore & Black 91-92; E.R. Hardy Ivamy, Marine Insurance 481-86 (3d
Lambeth, Templeman on Marine Insurance 392-408 (5th ed. 1981).

Edinburgh Assoc. Co.

686.

v.

R.L. Burns Corp., 479 F.Supp 138, 144-45

Cir. 1982) describes the Lloyd's system; see also n. 11.65

& Black

Gilmore

687.

55, 60.

(CD.

and accompanying

The American Hull Insurance

Buglass,

689.

Hartford Fire Ins. Co.

ed. 1979); R.J.

Cal. 1979), affd,

669 F.2d 1259 (9th

many

foreign insurance

text.

Institute includes

companies. Leslie J. Buglass, Marine Insurance and General Average in the United States
688.

341

(2d ed. 1981).

1

n. 687, 291.
v.

California, 509

US

764 (1993) considered

UK reinsurance agreements in the US

antitrust law context. See also Part VI.B.4.

New London Hull Clauses,

690.

See generally Alex L. Parks, The

691.

See generally Samir Mankabady, The

692.

See generally

Association, 17

id.

Mark

15

J.

Mar.

New Lloyd's Policy and Cargo

L.

& Com.1 (1984).

Clauses, 13

id.

527 (1982).

and Development of the Mutual Shipowners'

Tilley, The Origin

Protection

and Indemnity

261 (1986).

Gilmore & Black 75; William D. Winter, Marine Insurance 193 (3d ed. 1952); Milford L. Landis, /I //.Ris&s
Morrison Grain Co. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1980).

693.

Insurance, 1951 Ins. L.J. 709; see also

Law of Marine Insurance and General Average 111 880-906 (Michael J. Nlusiilletal. eds., 16th
Gilmore & Black 71-72; Winter, n. 693, 325; Haehl, The Hull Policy: Coverages and Exclusions Frequently
Employed, 41 Tulane L. Rev. 277 (1967).
2 Arnould's

694.

ed. 1981);

This was the Tanker War practice. See generally Michael D.Miller, Marine War Risks 18-22,270-72(1992);

695.

Chaser Shipping Corp.

USC

United

v.

States,

649 F.Supp. 736, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);

n.

215 and accompanying

696.

46

697.

See generally Boczek, Flags, n. 11.60; Carlisle, n. 11.60; Frankel, n. 11.60, 74-77; Lawrence,

app. § 1282(a).

Merchant Marine,

182-89; Whitehurst, U.S.

46

text.

USC app.

698.

E.g.,

699.

See,

700.

E.g.,

42

USC app.

701.

E.g.,

42

USC app.

e.g., id. §

n. 11.59, ch.18;

Wiswall, Flags, n.

n. 11.60, 101-04,

11.60.

1283.

§

1284.
1287.

§

§

1293.

The legislation has been renewed periodically. Cf. id.

§

1294;

& Black 981

Gilmore

n.130.

id.

& Black 980-8 1

702.

Gilmore

703.

See nn. 302-13, 337-50 and accompanying

704.

The terms passport, sea brief, sea letter or pass have been used interchangeably. See 2 Moore, Digest 1 046 and

1066-68, reprinting Morton P.

text.

Henry Apr. 1887 opinion letter to US Department of State Solicitor and Examiner of

Claims Francis Wharton. For a representative form,

see

id.

1058.

US and other countries' legislation might distinguish

between ships built in the State and those owned by nationals, also eligible
nationals and eligible for a certificate but not registration. See,

1958 Geneva Conference on
705.

See,

4, 8 Stat.
7,

1

e.g.,

33;

the

Law of the Sea,

1

8 1 5, art. 7, id. 224,

19 id. 628,631; Bolivia,May 13, 1858,

Central American Federation, Dec.
1946,

art. 21(2),

63

id.

1, 3-4.

5,

225 ; Dec. 22-23,1816,

art. 12, Sid.

art.

22, 12

1825, art. 21,

id.

id.

13, 1839, art. 22, 8

id.

1

1,49 id. 3875, 3887;

534, 544; El Salvadorean. 2, 1850,

art. 22,

1778, art. 27, 8 Stat. 12, 28, abrogated by Act of July 7, 1798,

Dec.

8,

1923,

art. 10,

44 id. 2132, 2140; replaced Oct. 29, 1954,

Mar.

3,

1849,

art. 21,

10 Stat. 873, 883; Haiti, Nov. 3, 1864,

2618, 2626; Italy, Feb. 26, 1871,
art. 10,

37

id.

art. 17,

17

id.

id.

10

art. 15,
1 id.

art. 23,

art. 15,

id.

8,

1867,

13

7

UST 1839,
71

1,

15

id.

63

art. 17,

1841, 253

id.

art.

85 3, art.

id.

390, 391, 395;

881, 892;

id.

473,482; Ecuador,
id.

698, 710;

LNTS 45, 56; France, Feb.
8

id.

178, 186;

Germany,

UNTS 89, 90; Guatemala,

720; Honduras, Dec.

art. 19(2),

1795,
1

434, 438; China, Nov. 4,

891, 896; Dec. 6, 1870, art. 25, 18

49 id. 2659, 2669, 152

id.

id.

art. 16,

to the

1043, 1046; Mar. 8, 1875,

306, 314; Dec. 12, 1846, art. 22, 9

578; Sept. 30, 1800,

art. 1,

845, 853; Feb. 2, 1948,

1504, 1507; Liberia, Aug. 8, 1938,

16, 1821,art. 19,

Dominican Republic, Feb.

Feb. 22, 1926, art. 10, 46 id. 2817, 2825; Finland, Feb. 12, 1934,
6,

art. 10, 12id.

1003, 1015; Brazil, Dec. 12, 1828, arts. 4,21,

322,332;Chile,May

5,

244, 245 ; Argentina, July 27,

art. 7, id.

606,610; July 17, 1858,

1299, 1316; Colombia, Oct. 3, 1824, art. 19, 8

continued, Sept. 13, 1935,art.

June

Whiteman

and ships built abroad by

these representative treaties between the United States and other countries: Algiers, Sept.

June 30-July 3,

10 id. 1005, 1008; Belgium, Nov. 10, 1845,

art. 9,

9

for registration,

Paper Prepared for Use of the U.S. Delegation
See also 46 USC §§ 12102-05, 12112-14.

e.g.,

7,

1927,

art. 10,

45

id.

2255, 2284; Japan, Feb. 21, 1911,

54 id. 1739, 1745; Morocco, Sept. 16

& Oct.

1, 1,

1836,

art. 4, 8

id
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8, 1782, art. 10, id. 32, 38; Jan. 19, 1839, art. 4, id. 524, 526; Mar. 27, 1956, art. 19, 8 UST 2043,
UNTS 231, 259; Norway, June 5, 1928, art. 10, 47 Stat. 2135, 2143; Ottoman Empire, Feb. 25, 1862, art. 10,18

484; Netherlands, Oct.

2073,285
id.

585, 588; Paraguay, Feb. 4, 1859,

25, 18

id.

art. 7, \2id.

698,710; Aug. 31, 1887, art. 23, 25

492; Prussia, July 9

& Sept.

10, 1785, art. 4,

138, 148, confirmed Feb. 22, 1819, art. 12,

1091, 1094; Peru, July 26, 1851, art. 28, lOid. 926,940; Sept.

id.

1444, 1456; Peru-Bolivia Confederation, Nov. 30, 1836,

id.

84, 86; July 17, 1799, art. 14,

id.

252, 262; Sweden, Apr.

3,

id.

6,

art. 18,

1870,
8

id.

art.

487,

162, 168; Spain, Oct. 27, 1795, art. 17,

1783, arts. 11-12,

id.

60, 66;

Sweden

id.

& Norway,

Sept. 4, 1816, art. 12, id. 232,240; July 4, 1827,art. 17, id. 346,354; Tripoli, Nov. 1796 -Jan. 3, 1797, art. 4, id. 154;June4,

1804,

art. 6, id.

214, 215; Tunis, Aug. 28, 1797,

Jan. 20, 1836, art. 22, 8

id.

art. 4, id.

466, 476; Aug. 27, 1860,

Examiner of Claims Francis Wharton, Opinion (Nov.
Boczek,

who

n. 11.60, 94-98,

nationality based

on

157;

Two Sicilies, Oct.

arts. 15-16,

12

30, 1885), 2

id. 1

143,

Moore

1

1,

1855,art. 9,

151-52.

1 1 id.

639, 646; Venezuela,

US Department of State Solicitor &

1063-66 omits some prior agreements, as does

divides the era into two periods: bilateral recognition of a stronger power's ships'

internal laws with a weaker power's rights stated in the treaty; beginning in 1830, equal

its

reciprocity.

706.

See nn. 434-36 and accompanying

707.

E.g.,

Peru-Bolivia Confederation, Nov. 30, 1836,

name, residence of master or commander;
id.

162, 168 (sea-letter; passport with

party or

text.

bills

of lading;

list

name, property and

Denmark-US,

13

art. 2,

id.

ship's burthen, plus master's

name and

dwelling; charter

of ship's company). These documents might serve other purposes,

comparing the crew manifest, e.g., Protocol

deserters by

487, 492 (name, property, ship's burthen;

art. 18, 8 Stat.

certificates describing cargo, port of origin); Prussia, July 11, 1799, art. 14,

to Friendship,

e.g.,

identifying

Commerce & Navigation Treaty, July

11,1 862,

605, 606.

Moore 1048. 1 OppENHEiMn. 382, § 262 had practically the same list. A US circular (181 5) listed certificate of
US built or owned vessels, a sea-letter or passport and a Mediterranean passport. 2 Moore 1059.

708.

registry for

709.
19, 12

E.g.,
id.

Treaty, China-US, n. 437,

art. 10, 8 Stat.

594; Treaty of Peace,

Amity & Commerce, China-US, n.

437,

art.

1023,1027.

9, 1925, art. 2(1), 45 Stat. 2456, 2457, 72 LNTS 171, 173;
LNTS 141, 143; Cuba (with exchange of notes & memorandum of
understanding), Mar. 4, 1926, art. 2,44 id. 2395, 2396, 61 LNTS 383, 385; Denmark, May 29, 1924, art. 2(1), 43 id. 1809,
1810,27 LNTS 361, 363; France, June 30, 1924, art. 2(1), 45 id. 2403, 2404,61 LNTS 415,417; Germany,May 19, 1924,
art. 2(1), 43 id. 1815, 1816; Great Britain, Jan. 23, 1924, art. 2(1), id. 1761, 27 LNTS 181, 183; Greece, Apr. 25, 1928, art.
2, 45 id. 2736, 2737, 91 LNTS 231, 233; Italy, June 23, 1924, art. 2(1), 43 id. 1844, 1845; Japan (with memorandum of
understanding), May 31, 1928, art. 2(1), 46 id. 2446, 101 LNTS 63, 64; Netherlands, Aug. 21, 1924, art. 2(1), 44 id. 2013,
2014, 33 LNTS 433, 435; Norway, May 24, 1924, art. 2(1), 43 id 1772, 1773, 26 LNTS 43, 45; Panama, June 6, 1924, art.
2(1), id. 1875, 1876, 138 LNTS 397, 399; Poland, June 30, 1930, art. 2(1), 46 id. 2773, 2774, 108 LNTS 323, 325; Spain,
Feb. 10, 1926, art. 2, 44 id. 2465, 2466, 67 LNTS 131, 133; Sweden, May 20, 1924, art. 2(1), 43 id. 1830, 1831, 29 LNTS

Sixteen conventions were ratified: Belgium, Dec.

710.

Chile,

May 27,

1930,

art. 2(1),

46

id.

2852, 2853, 133

421, 423. All are in force except those with

Germany and

Italy.

TIF 22, 52, 66, 72, 97,

1

11, 155, 203, 213, 222, 236, 263,

270, 304.

Law

Oppenheim

Restatement (Third)

& cmt.

711.

Brownlie, International

712.

Symposium,

713.

Ohl v.Eagle Ins. Co., 18 F. Cas. 630,631(C.C.D. Mass. 1827) (Story, J., on Circuit, citing English precedent);
v. Penniman, 29 id. 815, 819 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (same).

Weston
714.

2

id.

1

1046. See also

§ 10, 28;

102(3)

f.

and Disintegration.

US Treasury Secretary Bantwell May 23,

Id.

1046.

716.

Id.

1002.

717.

Id.

895-96.

718.

14 Op. Att'y Gen. 340, 343 (1874).

719.

US

Secretary of State Hamilton Fish Nov. 14, 1873 telegram to

reprinted in 2

§

1871 letter to

US Minister to France

1062.

715.

720.

13-14;

Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration

Moore, Digest

Elihu B. Washburne,

5,

Moore, Digest

Protocol of Conference, Spain-US, Nov. 29, 1873,

d'Affaires to Spain Alvey A. Adee,

721.

Boczek,

722.

The Montijo (US

id.

Minister to Spain Daniel E. Sickles,

id.

896-97; Fish Dec. 31, 1873 telegram to

US

Charge

899; see also Claims Agreement, Feb. 27, 1875, Spain-US, 11 Bevans 544.

n. 11.60, 108, citing Institut
v.

US

896.

de Droit Internationale, 15 Annuaire 202 (1896).

Colom.), 2 Moore, Arbitrations 1421, 1433-34 (1905).

Law

723.

Muscat Dhows (Fr.

Boczek,

Gr. Brit, j,

v.

1

Sea

of the

Hague Ct. Rep. 93, 96, 99, 2 AJIL 923, 924, 928 (Perm. Ct. Arb.

343

1905); see also

n. 11.60, 100-01.

O 'Conn ell, Law of the

Sea 753.

724.

2

725.

See nn. 704-12 and accompanying texL

726.

See generally Boczek,

727.

Boczek,

728.

See generally Boczek, n. 11.60, 9-12; Carlisle,

Carlisle, n. 11.60.

n. 11.60;

Carlisle,

n. 11.60, 8;

n. 11.60, xiii.

included an agreement with Panama, were

Lotus (Fr.

n. 11.60, 2-18.

The anti-smuggling

treaties, n. 710,

which

a response.

Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A), No. 10, at 25.

729.

S.S.

730.

Convention on Private International Law, Feb.

v.

LNTS

20, 1928, General Rules, art. 274, 86

326

111,

(Bustamante Code).

SOLAS,

731.

1929

732.

International

50

n. 19, art. 2(3)(a),

Stat. 1130,

136

LNTS

90.

Load Line Convention, July 5, 1930, an. 3(a), 47 id. 2228, 2240, 135 LNTS 301, 312 (1930 Load
on Load Lines, Apr. 5, 1966, an. 4(l)(a), 18 UST 1857, 1860, 640 UNTS 133, 136

Line). Its successor, Convention

(1966 Load Line), also applies the registration formula. Over 140 States are party to iL

SOLAS,

733.

1948

734.

Brownlie, International

735.

Lauritzen

accompanying
688,

seaman

736.

v.

text.

test

n. 19, art. 2, 3

Larsen, 345

Hellenic Lines

UST 3450,

Law 5;
US
v.

1

164

UNTS

Oppenhelm

5

TIF 404-05.

124.

10, 28;

Restatement (Third)

§

102(3)

& cmt

f.

and

571, 584 (1953), citing inter alia the Virginias incident, nn. 717-20

Rhoditis, 398

US

306, 308-10 (1970) amplified Launtzen's Jones Act, 46

but did not qualify Justice Jackson's statement, 345

US

584. See also

Schoenbaum

Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 ICJ 4; see also Brownlie, International Law 407-20;
1 Oppenhelm § 378; Restatement (Second) §26; id. (Third) § 211.

2

j

USC

$

18-11.

O'Connell,

Law

of the Sea 757;

High Seas Convention,

Agreement Regarding Financial Support of North Atlantic Ice
UNTS 171, 174. See generally 9 Whiteman 7-15, (summarizing
genuine link debate before Convention negotiations); Boczek, n. 11.60, 119-24; Brownlie, International Law
424-26, 493-94; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 755-57; 1 Oppenhelm §§ 287-88, 290; Restatement (Second) § 28;
Restatement (Third) § 501 Wilfred A. Hearn, The Lav: of the Sea: The 1958 Geneva Conference, JAG J. 3, 6 (Mar.-Apr.
1960); Myres S. McDougal, Foreword, Boczek xii-xiv.
737.

Patrol, Jan. 4, 1956, art. 2, 7

arts. 5-6; see also

UST

1969, 1970, 256

;

738.

Constitution of Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization,

1960 ICJ 150, 170-71, construing Convention for Establishment of Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization, Mar.

6,

1948,

Brownlie, International

art. 28(a),

9

Law 407, 426;

UST
9

739.

1960

SOLAS,

art. 16.

740.

1974

SOLAS,

art. 2.

741.

E.g.,

1969 Civil Liability Convention,

art.

15(lXa); 1973 Pollution Convention,

621, 629, 289

Whiteman

art. 1(4);

art. 3(1).

UNTS

48, 60-62. See also

Boczek,

n. 11.60,

125-55;

20-25.

1971

Fund Convention, an

ILO-sponsored conventions

1(2);

state the

1972

Dumping Convention,

same requirements. Boczek,

n. 11.60, 114-15.

Colombos

742.

Boczek,

n. 11.60,

743.

Boczek,

n. 11.60, 111.

744.

Convention on Facilitation of Maritime Traffic, n. 468, Annex,

288;

§

309;

Restatement (Second)

§ 28.

§ 2,

1

8

UST 436-48, 591 UNTS 300-10; see also

nn. 468-74 and accompanying text.

LOS

745.

Compare

746.

LOS

747.

Id,

748.

Flag States also must conduct inquiries into high seas marine casualties or incidents of navigation involving

their ships
also

Convention,

Convention,

arts.

91-92, 94(1), with

High Seas Convention,

arts. 5-6.

art. 94(2)(a).

arts. 94(3)-94(5).

and cooperate with other States involved. Id.,

arts. 94(6)-94(7);

compare High Seas Convention,

Brownlie, International Law 424-26; 493-94; 2 NordquistHI 91.1-92.6(f), 94.1-94.8(/); O'Connell.

Sea 755-57;

1

Oppenheim §§ 287-88, 290; Restatement (Third)

§§ 501-02.

art. 10.

See

Lawofthe

NWP 1-14M Annotated 1 2.1.3, n.13 and
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NWP 9A Annotated H 2.1.2.3 n.13 do not discuss characterization of merchantmen under the genuine link or other
theories, saying that in international law a

sovereign immunity,

commercial

activities.

merchant ship

a privately or publicly

i.e.,

See also San

Remo Manual

749.

Ship Registration Convention,

750.

See

6E Benedict

owned
11

any vessel including

is

or controlled ship that

&

13(i)

n. 11.61; see also

1

is

not

a fishing vessel
a

not entitled to

warship and that

engaged in

is

cmt. 13.23.

Oppenheim

§ 288.

15-20.

Compare Ship Registration Convention, n. 11.61, art. 4(2), 26 ILM 1238 (1987), with LOS Convention, art.
High
Seas Convention, art. 5(1). Provisions for landlocked States' rights, ships flying two flags and changes of
91(1);
flag or registry are identical. Compare Ship Registration Convention, arts. 4(1), 4(3)-4(5), 26 ILM 1238 (1987), with
LOS Convention, arts. 90, 92; High Seas Convention, arts. 4, 6.
751.

752.

Ship Registration Convention,

753.

Compare id.,

754.

Compare Ship Registration Convention, n.

94;

art. 5,

26

High Seas Convention,

1238-39 (1987), with

ILM

1238 (1987).

LOS Convention, art. 91(2); High Seas Convention, art. 5(2).

11.61, art. 8,

ILM

26

1239

(1987),zui//i

LOS Convention, arts. 91(1),

art. 5(1).

Ship Registration Convention,

755.

ILM

ILM

26

n. 11.61, art. 5,

n. 11.61, arts. 7, 9(l)-9(3),

26

ILM

1239-40 (1987); see also

id., art.

9(6)(b), 26

1240.

26

ILM

1240 (1987).

756.

Id., arts. 9(5)-9(6),

757.

Id., art. 10,

758.

Id., arts.

759.

Id., art. 13,

26

760.

Id., art. 14,

incorporating Resolution

1,

26

ILM

1243, 1245-46 (1987).

761.

Id., art. 15,

incorporating Resolution

2,

26

ILM

1243, 1246 (1987).

762.

See nn. 745-48 and accompanying

26

ILM

11-12, 26

ILM

ILM

Convention on Registration
15-22

1240-41(1987).

1241-42 (1987).

1242-43 (1987).

text.

International Institute for Unification of Private Law, Draft

& Nationality of Air-Cushion Vehicles,

1976, arts.

1,

5-6, 8, in

15-23, repeat familiar rules of requiring registration, leaving details to flag States;

-

or State

owned

or operated

15-2, at

does not apply to military

ACVs.

See nn. 625, 643-56, 664-65, 674, 686, 702, 707-08 and accompanying

763.

6E Benedict, Doc.

it

text.

Hughes May 31, 1921 telegram to US Consul, Canton, China; Hughes
US Secretary of the Navy Denby; US Assistant Secretary of State Leland Harrison June 15, 1923
letter to US Minister in China Jacob G. Schurman; Harrison Oct. 7, 1924 letter to US Charge d' Affaires ad interim Bell,
2 Hackworth 732-34.

US

764.

Oct.

Secretary of State Charles Evans

1921 letter to

7,

High

765.

(Third)

Seas Convention,

art. 6;

LOS Convention, art.

92; see also

Restatement (Second)

§ 28;

Restatement

§ 501.

766.

Ship Registration Convention,

767.

Id., art. 12(5),

26

ILM

26

ILM

1242 (1987).

1242 (1987), requiring deleting the chartering-out State's registry.

FRG's economic

in 1951 with the

n. 11.61, art. 12(1),

The practice began

rebirth. Wiswall, Flags, n. 11.60, 109-111.

678 and accompanying

768.

See

769.

Intervention Convention,

770.

Civil Liability Protocol, art. 4(2) (no claim against charterer allowed); 1924 Limitation Convention, n. 665,

art. 10,

n.

120

LNTS

Benedict, Doc.
see also

text.

art. 3;

Intervention Protocol,

133 (charterer steps into owner's shoes); 1957 Limitation Convention,

5-2, at 5-15 (same);

1976

771.

See,

772.

E.g.,

n. 665, art. 6(2), in

6

UN Limitation Convention, n. 665, art. 1(2), in id., Doc. 5-4, at 5-32.1 (same);

Limitation of Liability Act, 46

accompanying

art. 1(3).

USC

App.

§

186 (bareboat charterer equated to owner);

n.

665 and

text.

e.g.,

COGSA Convention, n. 673, art.

LOS

contiguous to the

Convention, preamble,

territorial sea

1(a),

51 Stat. 251, 120

arts. 2(3), 19(1), 21(1),

and subject to the high

LNTS

163; see also 46

USC

§ 1301(a).

31 (territorial sea), 33 (contiguous zone, an area

seas regime except as modified

by the

LOS Convention for the

continental shelf, fishing zones or EEZ), 34(2) (straits), 58(1), 58(3) (EEZ), 78(2) (continental shelf), the 87(1) (high
seas),

138 (Area), 303(4) (archeological property); High Seas Convention, preamble,

Convention,

arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2); see also

Continental Shelf Convention,

arts. 1, 3,

art.

2;

Territorial Sea

15 (waters above shelf high

Law

seas);

Fishing Convention,

arts. 1-8,

considered part of high seas); nn.
773.

Hague

774.

The United

more through
Integration

13 (waters are high seas); Territorial Sea Convention,

III. 953-67,

of the

art.

Sea

345

24(1) (contiguous zone

IV.10-25 and accompanying text.

VII, arts. 1-6.
States never

was a party; France and Great Britain denounced

Schindler

treaty succession principles.

& Toman

it.

Thirty States are party, perhaps

794-96; Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker,

and Disintegration.

Hackworth 445-46; 2 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 1 106-07; 2 Oppenheim § 84; 2 Schwarzenberger 375-76;
Law of Naval Warfare 120, 122-23; War Claims Arbiter Functioning Under
Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928, Administrative Decision III (Mar. 29, 1929), 23 AJIL 673, 676 (1929); cf. NWP
1-14M Annotated H 2.1.1 n.l; NWP 9A Annotated H 2.1.1 n.l. In 1913 the Naval War College would have limited
775.

1

Gabriella Venturini, Commentary, in

conversions to a belligerent's or an

provided that such

a

ally's territorial waters, or

waters "occupied by one of these," and would have

Naval War College, International Law Topics and

conversion lasted until war's end.

Discussions 1913, 148, 154 (1914). Absence of a requirement for conversion in a belligerent's territorial waters, as

Hague VII, preamble notes, was a reason the United
Convention on Maritime Neutrality,
conversion
States

is

art.

States did not sign

whether conversion could take place on the high
777.

Oxford Naval Manual,

778.

Verri,n. 71, 331.

779.

US

Secretary of State

1930

780.

Annex

III.

also 2

seas. 2

O'Connell,

Law of the

is

if,

122.

inter alia,

in force for the

United

Sea 1107.

definitions. Conferees divided

Sea

1

on

107.

art 2.

Memorandum,

London Naval Treaty, art.

Apr. 27, 1916, 1916

14, incorporating

FRUS

244, 247, 7

by reference id.,

Hackworth

445.

which incorporates by reference id.,
The United States and 48
France, Italy, Netherlands, Panama, the

art. 8,

All of the Treaty except arts. 22-23 (submarine warfare) expired Dec. 31, 1936.

other countries, including Iran, Iraq and other Tanker War participants, e.g.,

United Kingdom and the USSR, are
Yugoslavia

merchant ships

Law of the

O'Connell,

London Declaration, arts. 49-50, 62 mentions warships but offers no

1909

Hackworth 446; Venturini

7

The Convention

in the flag State's or an ally's port or jurisdictional authority.

and seven Western Hemisphere countries. TIF 443. See

776.

Hague VII.

13 allows naval auxiliaries' reconversion to

may increase

the number.

London Naval

781.

1936

782.

Id.,zns. 1(B)-1(G), 19.

Treaty,

parties.

TIF

443. Treaty succession principles applying to the

USSR

and

Symposium, State Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.

arts.

1(A)-1(C),

no longer in

force.

Montreux Convention, n. 557, art. 8, Annex II, 173 LNTS 221, 235-37, citing 1936 London Naval Treaty, arts.
Nyon Supplemental Agreement H 2 refers to "surface
vesselfs]" but means surface warships in addition to submarines.
783.

1(A)- 1(C), to that extent preserving the 1936 definition.

High Seas Convention,

784.

art. 8(2); see also

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.1.1; NWIP 10-2, art. 500(d); NWP 9A

Annotated H 2.1.1; 2 Nordquist 11 29.2; 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 1 106;

1

Oppenheim § 201, 620. Third Convention

(1949), arts. 14-15, 28, 32 refer to warships without defining them.

High Seas Convention, preamble.

785.

2

Schwarzenberger 376;

id.

377-78 notes the Convention,

the definition for the purpose of that treaty only and that article 2(1) says freedom ofthe seas
rules of international law, e.g., the

Case, 12
786.

United

7,

UNRIAA

is

art. 8(2)

adopts

also subject to other

UN Charter and the LOAC. See also, e.g., High Seas Convention, art. 2

;

Lighthouses

161, 205; nn. 111.963-67, IV.10-25.

Convention on Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships,

n. 486, art. 1(11),

57

AJIL

269, not in force for the

States.

787.

INCSEA

788.

Treaty Concerning Permanent Neutrality

1977,

Panama-US, Annex A,

Agreement,

art. l(l)(a).

U 2, 33

UST

1,

& Operation ofthe Panama Canal, with Annexes & Protocol, Sept.
UNTS 177, 187. Although the Treaty binds only Panama and

22, 1161

the United States to a neutralized Canal, the Protocol can bind third States. At least 36 countries and perhaps

through treaty succession rules for the former

USSR are

Walker, Integration and Disintegration. Erga omnes

Law 623-24;

1

Oppenheim §§ 583,

Protocol parties.

may apply Treaty terms

TIF

219;

Symposium,

to third States.

more

Treaty Succession;

Brownlie, International

at 1205; 626, at 1261.

789. The US Coast Guard is an armed force ofthe United States. 10 USC §101. Coast Guard vessels designated
"USCGC" under the command of a commissioned officer are warships. NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.1.1. The Coast
Guard becomes a part ofthe Navy when Congress declares war or the President so directs. 14 USC § 3.

;
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High Seas Convention,

790.

art. 8(2) refers to

strictly speaking, for the territorial sea.

definition

is

"these articles,"

LOS Convention, art.

"For the purposes of this convention,"

the Convention, and there

i.e.,

for the entire treaty.

i.e.,

is

no

definition,

29, although in the territorial sea provisions, says the

Compare

LOS

Convention,

29 with

art.

High Seas Convention, art. 8(2); see also 2 Nordquist 1111 29.1-29.8(b); NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.1.1; NWP 9A
Annotated 2.1.1; 1 Oppenheim §§ 201 at 620, 561; Oxman, The Regime, n. III. 956, 813. Another result of the 1958
Conventions is that States that have not ratified the High Seas Convention with its warship definition but which
11

1958 Conventions

ratified other

— there are

few in that category,

a

definitions, without the persuasive authority of having ratified the

Convention solves the problem with
Joint Interpretation,^ 341,11

791.
2.1.2.1;

LOS

cf.

Convention,

a single, unified
2,

28

TIF

see

— are

374, 402-03-

LOS

with customary

left

High Seas Convention and

its

definition.

The LOS

agreement.

ILM 1446(1989); NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.1.2.1; NWP9A Annotated
which by

arts. 21(1), 22(2)-23,

special provisions

under these circumstances support

11

a

view that nuclear-powered vessels have equal status with conventionally powered ships on the high seas and in other
circumstances unless otherwise limited, e.g., by other agreements not incompatible with the
2 Nordquist

1111

793.

NWP
NWP

794.

LOS

792.

Lowe, The Commander's,

21.1-21.1 1(e), 21.12; 22.1-23.9; but see

1-14M Annotated

11

1-14M Annotated

11

Convention,

LOS Convention; see also

n. III.318, 115.

NWP 9A Annotated H 2.1.1 n.2.
2.1.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated
2.1.2.2;
Oppenheim § 560.
2.1.1 n.2;

1

11

arts. 32, 58(2), 95,

236;

High Seas Convention,

Colombos

art. 8;

§

277; 2 Nordquist HH

32.1-32.7(b); 58.1-58.9, 58.10(d), 95.1-95.6(c) (reaffirms "longstanding principle"), 236.1-126.6(0 (ships, aircraft);

NWP

1-14M Annotated

LOS

Convention,

795.

E.g.,

796.

NWP

797.

See generally

798.

Protocol

NWP 9A Annotated

U 2.1.2;

I

Bothe el

11

al.

Oppenheim

1

87(1); see also nn. III. 953-67, IV. 10-25

art.

1-14M Annotated

2.1.2;

11

8.2.1 n.36;

NWP 9A Annotated H 8.2.1

233-39; Pilloud

Commentary

506-14;

§ 560.

and accompanying
n.34;

cf.

NWIP

10-2, art. 503(a)(2).

Introductory Note,

also requires a party to a conflict to notify parties to a conflict if

it

text.

San Remo Manual

incorporates a paramilitary or

armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces. Compare Protocol I, art. 43 with LOS Convention,
Seas Convention, art. 8(2); see also Bothe etal. 233-36,240-41; Pilloud, Commentary 517-18.
799.

See nn. 784, 790 and accompanying

800.

2

801.

E.g.,

802.

NWP

Schwarzenberger 376-77;

LOS

Convention,

see also

5.

art.

29;

High

text.

nn.

III. 953-67,

and accompanying

IV. 10-25

text.

art. 87(1).

1-14M Annotated

11

2.1.1;

NWP 9A Annotated

11

2.1.1;

San Remo Manual,

H 13(g)

& Commentary

13.21.

n.

803.

LOS

804.

LOS Convention, arts. 3

Convention,

77 and accompanying

arts.

31-32, 96;
1

-32, 96;

High Seas Convention,

art. 9;

High Seas Convention, art.

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 22(1).

9; Territorial

Sea Convention,

art.

22( 1 ); see also

text.

805.

Seen. 625 and accompanying text; see also Parts V.B., V.C.I, V.D.I, V.F.I, V.F.2,V.F.5.,V.J.2,-V.J.4,VJ.6.

806.

Cf.

807.

LOS Convention, art. 93, referring to e.g., id.

arts. 1-6.

LOS

The

Convention,

result

arts 27-28; Territorial

was the same

as the

808.

text.

Protocol

I, art.

concurs with Protocol
12.4;

LOS

For general analysis of art.
38(2); see also
I, art.

id., art.

High Seas Convention, art. 7, referring to id.

8(2); the

id.

207-1

Nordquist
3

1;

11H

Nordquist

38[2], extends its application to

93.1 -93.7(g);
11

93.7(g);

,

definition applies only to the high

draft into four treaties. 3 Nordquist

93, see 3

Bothe el al.

arts. 19-21.

91-92; compare

arts.

warship definition in

seas because of a decision to split the 1958

accompanying

,

Sea Convention,

1

11

93.7(a); see also n. 805

Oppenheim

§

and

289, 734.

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 12.4 (US
as policy); NWP 9A Annotated

maritime operations

11

Pilloud Commentary 446-60.
Nordquist

809.

3

810.

Protocol

II

I, art.

93.7(e).

38(1); see also,

e.g.,

First Convention, arts. 36-39, 43-44;

(distinctive emblem for medical transports, hospital ships, etc.);

NWP 9A Annotated
811.

11.10.1;

1

Pictet 280-308, 322-39; 2

See nn. 347 (territorial sea), 601

directed by ship
812.

11

Cf.

n. 111.62, 350-51, 365;

Bothe

Second Convention,

NWP

arts.

38-41, 43-45

14M Annotated 1 1 .9. 1
1
Pilloud Commentary 446-60.

207- 1

212-32, 240-49;

(straits transit), 640,

owner or charterer) and accompanying

Broms, The Definition,

id.

et al.

;

1-

11

649 (independent steaming on high seas except as

text.

Walker, Maritime

Neutrality, n. III.828, 134, 136-37.

Law

813.

See nn. 111.957-60, IV.15-18, 582-600 and accompanying

814.

E.g.,

LOS

Convention,

art. 87(2);

aspects of the law of the sea. See n. 75

LOS

Convention,

815.

E.g.,

816.

Sea services, e.g., the

may accompany,

art. 87(1); see also

The due

art. 2.

regard principle applies to other

text

nn. 111.952-67, IV. 10-25 and accompanying text.

US Navy and Coast Guard, as well as other ships or aircraft, go to the assistance of, and

mariners in danger of being

war; there are certain conditions to saving
ship.

347

text.

High Seas Convention,

and accompanying

Sea

of the

lost at sea. International

and national law mandates

the rescuer must do so

life at sea, e.g.,

LOS Convention, art. 98; Convention on Salvage, Apr.

28, 1989, arts. 4, 10,

if it

this in peace and
would not endanger the rescue

TIAS

,

in

6 Benedict, Doc. No.

4-2 A, at 4- 1 3, 4- 14, 4- 1 7 (not applicable to warships unless State party applies treaty to them), to supersede Convention
for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Assistance

(not applicable to warships); 1974

Relating to Assistance

SOLAS,

& Salvage at Sea, Sept. 23, 1910, arts.

Regulations

& Salvage of Aircraft or by Aircraft, at Sea, Sept.

4-21 (not in force but United States a signatory);

1 1,

14,

37

Stat. 1658,

1672

V; Convention for Unification of Certain Rules

2, 10, ch.

28, 1938, art. 2, 6 Benedict,

High Seas Convention,

art. 12;

Doc. No.

Second Convention,

4-5, at

arts. 12, 18, 21;

Colombos § 369 (ancient duty of masters); 3 Nordquist HH 98.1-98.1 1(g) (general tradition
1-14M Annotated HI 3.2.1-3.2.1.2 (same), 11.4; NWP 9A Annotated HH 3.2.1-3.2.1.2, 11.6; 1
Oppenheim § 298; 2 id. §§ 204-05; 2 Pictet 84-92, 129-36, 150-53; Schoenbaum § 14-8. The author recalls his destroyer
escort's (i.e., frigate's) going to the assistance of a merchant ship and accompanying it to safe haven during the 1962
Ash Wednesday Storm off the Virginia Capes and picking up Cuban refugees fleeing the Castro regime on another
occasion in 1962. They were in open boats on the high seas, out of fuel, and would have drifted in the Gulf Stream until

Hague X,
and

art. 16; see also

NWP

practice);

they died or were picked up.
817.

Cf.

818.

1

They were taken

to

Port Everglades, Fla.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10-11,48-630, 916-18, 932-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

O'Connell,

Law of the Sea

533; see also nn. 80-157 and accompanying text for

EEZ

and fishing zone

analyses.

819.

See Parts V.B, V.C.3, V.J.2, V.J.3.

820.

See

821.

See,

n.

678 and accompanying

e.g.,

Lekas

& Drivas, Inc.

text.
v.

Goulandris, 306 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1962), decided 22 years after a cargo loss

caused by Greece's requisition of the ship during World

War

II.

The

trial

court ruled on the claims in 1959, 173

F.Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
822.

See

n. 11.519

823.

See,

e.g.,

and accompanying

text.

nn. 11.338-40 (U.S.S. Stark), 368-72 (IranAjr), 459-69 (Vincennes incident), 430-33 (U.S.S. Samuel B.

Roberts), 281, 393-99 (oil platforms).

824.

See,

e.g.,

nn. 11.210-11 (Iraqi attack on Iranian

Nowruz

facility)

and accompanying

text; see also ch.

VI

for

further analysis of the law of the environment.
825.

Registry changes to other,

11.52, 1448, 1450-52,

11.332, 138; Peace,

e.g.,

Norwegian or UK, ensigns

1458 1461-63; Caron,

Major Maritime Events,

n. 11.328, 161-66;
n. 11.90,

likely

Davidson,

met

553-54; Phillipps, n. 11.332, 275; Wolfrum, Reflagging, n. 11.332,

387; Mertus, n. 11.332, 207; Wachenfeld, n. 11.332, 202;

Murphy

statement, n. 11.332, 58-60; (1987). Armacost

statement, n. 11.332, 1431 said Kuwait had reflagged two tankers under the

Second Report,

111

6.14-6.15, reporting that at

LOS standards. Weinberger, Report, n.
Nordquist & Wachenfeld, n.

n. 11.332, 387;

one time 50

to

UK ensign. In fact there were many more.
may have switched to the UK flag.

60 Norwegian ships

Some in the United States opposed the transfer. See generally Gamlen & Rogers, n. 11.326,
394 (US national as master blinded in Iranian attack) and accompanying
826.

See nn.

827.

See,

II.

e.g.,

343-45, 348, 350-52, 358-59, 361-62, 382, 437, 446-47, 453, 472, 1 V.8 1

1-

19 and accompanying text.

nn. 11.178-80, 210-14, 250-60, 272, 281, 306, 309, 334, 338-40 (U.S.S. Stark), 354, 357, 362, 367, 368-72

(Iran Ajr), 373, 393-99, 401-02, 410-12, 421, 430-33 (U.S.S.

speedboat survivors), 470, IV.816 and accompanying
828.

See nn. 11.364, 379, 41 1, 459-69.

829.

LOS Convention, art.

830.

See

831.

LOS Convention, art.

832.

Cf LOS Convention, arts.

Part B.4.

133-35; see also nn. 11.326-33,

text.

n. 11.355

29;

High Seas Convention,

and accompanying
29;

Roberts), 434, 446, 457, 459-69 (Airbus, Iranian

nn. 772-802 and

art. 8(2);

accompanying

text.

text.

High Seas Convention,
31-32;

Samuel B.

text.

art. 8(2); see also

High Seas Convention, art.

nn. 772-813 and accompanying text.

9; Territorial

Sea Convention,

art.

22(1); see also
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833.

LOS

834.

See Parts V.B, V.C.3, V.C.5, V.D, V.J.2-V.J.4.

835.

See nn. 11.153-55.

836.

See nn. 825-26 and accompanying

837.

See

n.

838.

See

n. 11.250, 260, 334, 354, 361, 373, 393-94, 412, 421,

839.

See,

Convention,

art.

91;

High Seas Convention,

827 and accompanying

nn. 737, 745-48 and accompanying text.

text.

text.

National Petrochem. Co. of Iran

e.g.,

art. 5(1); see also

v.

446, 469, 519 and accompanying text.

M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860

F.2d 551 (2d

Cir. 1988) (diversion of vessel

from Iran destination).
215, 519, IV.685-702 and accompanying text.

840.

See nn.

841.

See

842.

LOS

843.

See nn. 11.326 and accompanying

844.

See nn.

845.

See

846.

See nn. 11.215, 334, 250, 260, 334, 354, 361, 373, 393-94, 412, 421, 446, 469, 519 and accompanying text; see also

n.

II

678 and accompanying

Convention,

n.

II

art.

91;

text.

High Seas Convention,

art. 5(1); see also

nn. 737, 745-48 and accompanying text.

text.

215, 519, IV.685-702 and accompanying text.

678 and accompanying

text.

nn. 685-702 and accompanying text.
847.

Cf.

The August,

848.

See

n.

849.

See generally Schoenbaum

850.

E.g.,

851.

Cf. nn. 11.103 (Iranian convoys),

852.

There was

1891 A.C. 328.

678 and accompanying

USC

46

§

Kuwait

effort.

472; 9

§ 8-2,

883; see also

also a

financed the Iraqi war

text.

to

Gilmore

Whiteman

US

264-83.

& Black 963 (US

is

policy since 1817);

262 (Saudi corridor) and accompanying

Yanbu, Saudi Arabia pipeline

to

See nn. 11.182-83 and accompanying

678 and accompanying

legislation

10

USC

§

2631.

Schoenbaum

§ 8-2, 472.

text.

pump outbound

oil,

the sale of which

853.

See

854.

See nn.

855.

See,

856.

See

857.

See nn. 11.250, 260, 334, 354, 361, 373, 393-94, 412, 421, 446, 469, 519 and accompanying

858.

See nn. 11.309 (UAE), 401-02 (Kuwait), 434

859.

See nn. 11.459-69, IV.683-84 and accompanying

860.

See nn. 11.367, 410-11 and accompanying

861.

See nn. 11.338-40, 430-33 and accompanying

862.

Iran has claimed against the United States in the International Court of Justice for the

n.

II

e.g.,

n.

text.

215, 519, IV.685-702,

Moore, Arbitrations;

678 and accompanying

attack. See nn. 11.281, 393-99

and accompanying
the

text.

UNRIAA series.

text.

and accompanying

(UAE) and accompanying

text.

text.

864.

See nn. 11.338-40, 459-69, IV.678-80 and accompanying

865.

See

866.

See nn. 685-702 and accompanying

text.
text.

text.

text.

See nn. 11.368-72, 391, 429 and accompanying

678 and accompanying

text.

text.

863.

n.

may have

text.

text.
text.

Rostum platform

Chapter V

THE TANKER WAR AND THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT (LOAC)

Thearmed

War nearly ran

gamut of issues related to the law of
conflict (LOAC), or the law of war (LOW) and its component, the law

1980-88 Tanker

of naval warfare

the

(LONW). The general law of maritime neutrality, general

of necessity and proportionality, and issues of specific concern

—

visit

issues

and search

including operations against convoyed, escorted or accompanied neutral mer-

chant ships; commerce of belligerents including belligerents' convoys and contra-

band; acquisition of enemy character; blockade, maritime exclusion and other
zones and other uses of the ocean for warfare; capture of neutral vessels; humanitarian law

and belligerents' personnel interned by neutral governments; targeting

of ships and aircraft including convoys; conventional weapons; mine warfare;

treatment of noncombatants, £.£., merchant seamen; deception (ruses of war) during armed conflict
this

Chapter

Chapter

—

all

figured during the

Tanker War. These

as they applied to belligerents

III

analyzed

self-defense and

its

UN

are the subjects of

and neutrals during the war.

Charter law with particular reference to the law of

relationship to the law of neutrality, the law of treaties, custom-

ary law, andjus cogens-based norms, and the general principles of neutrality as they

apply to war at sea, and to conduct between neutrals and belligerents. This Chapter
will not repeat that analysis, except as

volving neutrals,

e.g.,

mine

it

interfaces with the

LOAC in situations in-

warfare, discussed in sub-Part G.2.

Chapter IV analyzed the law of the sea, and those principles will not be repeated

LOS concepts, e.g., due regard for others' uses of the sea, apply
by analogy in the LOAC. The LOS conventions are subject to the LOAC during
in here, except as

war because of operation of these
clauses.

Because these clauses,

treaties'

at least for

"other rules of international law"

high seas areas and perhaps other parts

LOS customary rules are also subject to the
LOAC for countries not party to the LOS conventions. This Chapter tries to give

of the ocean, restate customary law,

content to those other rules of international law, the LOAC, to which the law of the
sea

is

subject.

Law

of treaties principles declaring suspension or termination of

may also apply. This Chapter also attempts to place
LOS principles in the LOAC context, e.g., by analyzing how the LOS rules for the

treaties'

operation during war

territorial sea interact

with

LOAC principles governing war at sea.

While many international agreements governing

land, sea

and

air

warfare

remain primarily subject to customary norms, general principles of law, commentators' research including military manuals,

occasional judicial decisions,
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resolutions of international organizations,

the

UN General Assembly and Se8

and perhaps;w5 cogens-bastd norms. Council "decision" complimandatory for UN Members, but other international organizations'

curity Council,

ance

e.g.,

7

is

and this was

resolutions can restate or help crystallize rules of international law,

the Tanker

War experience.

As in the case of LOS analysis, law of treaties principles may apply to agreements governing the LOAC, e.g., impossibility, fundamental change of circumdesuetude,

stances,

clauses," e.g., "do their
distress clauses

Some

or material breach.

utmost" and the

LONW treaties have "escape

and these

like,

treaties'/ore^ majeure

may or may not amount to a restated form

damental change,

of impossibility or fun-

conflict does not vitiate treaties governing humanitarian law,

Geneva Conventions,
law of neutrality.

Armed

but the possibility remains for these kinds of claims.
19

and

18
e.g.,

the 1949

or agreements governing the law of warfare, including the

Law of treaties principles cannot operate to suspend or terminate

custom, including custom derived from or restated in international agreements,
e.g.,

Thus claims of impossibility, fundamental

those governing armed conflict.

change of circumstances or desuetude cannot be applied

from

treaties. If a treaty

that exception

is

also a

has an exception clause,

e.g.,

to

customary law derived

for entry in distress,

customary rule, that exception must be applied

20

and

if

to the basic

become custom. If treaty-based custom has lapsed into
treaty norm may have taken its place. There is always the

rule in the treaty that has

new custom

disuse, a

or

possibility of application of other sources,

humanity and

chivalry,

and

rules laid

e.g.,

general principles of law including

down by courts and commentators.

and Proportionality;
Dimension

Part A. Basic Principles: Necessity

ROE; the
The principles

Spatial

of necessity and proportionality apply

of individual or collective self-defense

is

invoked.

conflict also requires application of necessity
22

standards for these principles,
course, not the

same

Nuremberg trials.

21

when

the inherent right

However, the law of armed

and proportionality;

now firmly embedded in

it

has

its

custom. Necessity

as military necessity or kriegsraison, a defense rejected

own
is,

of

by the

NWP 9A Annotated, published at the end of the Tanker War,

ably recites the customary rules of necessity, proportionality and the rule against
perfidious conduct during

The law of armed
tion

armed

conflict:

conflict seeks to prevent unnecessary suffering

by controlling and mitigating the harmful

effects

minimum

standards of protection

tants."

[T]he law of armed conflict provides that:

1

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

and destruc-

of hostilities through

accorded to "combatants" and "noncomba-

Only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of
armed conflict, required for the partial or complete submission of the

Law

2.

3.

Conflict

.

.

However, the
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.

.

.

.

.

.

.

conflict are forbidden. 24

LOAC is not intended to impede waging war:

purpose

is

to ensure that the violence of hostilities

enemy's forces and

is

principles of warfare

is

directed toward the

not used to cause purposeless, unnecessary

human

misery and

[T]he law of armed conflict complements and supports the

physical destruction

and

Armed

enemy, with a minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources
may be applied.
partial
The employment of any kind or degree of force not required for
or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of
time, life, and physical resources, is prohibited.
expedients, and
Dishonorable (treacherous) means,
conduct during armed

Its

of

...

in the concepts of objective, mass,

economy of force, surprise,

security.

The LOAC and principles of warfare underscore the importance of concentrating
forces against critical military targets while avoiding

expending personnel and re-

sources against militarily unimportant persons, places and things.

25

NWP 9A Annotated also explains policies behind the customary rules of necessity

and proportionality:

As long as war is not abolished, the law of armed conflict remains essential.
During such conflicts the law of armed conflict provides common ground of
rationality between enemies. This body of law corresponds to their mutual interests
during conflict and constitutes a bridge for a new understanding after the end of the
conflict. The law of armed conflict is intended to preclude purposeless, unnecessary
destruction of life and property and to ensure that violence is used only to defeat the
enemy's military forces. If followed by all participants, the law of armed conflict will
from needlessly affecting persons or things of little military value. By
preventing needless cruelty, the bitterness and hatred arising from armed conflict is
lessened, and thus it is easier to restore an enduring peace. The legal and military
experts who attempted to codify the laws of war more than a hundred years ago
inhibit warfare

reflected this

when

they declared that the final object of armed conflict

is

the

"reestablishment of good relations and a more solid and lasting peace between the
belligerent States." 26

War prisoners of war illustrates

The return

of Tanker

"bitterness

and hatred" long

after the

that prisoners of war be repatriated

shooting stops. Humanitarian law requires

promptly after hostilities end,

been returned previously because of wounds or illness.
ter the

the point of a potential for

war ended, most prisoners of war had not been

US

have not

Nevertheless, a decade afrepatriated,

central issue in protracted final settlement negotiations.
trasted with rapid

if they

28

and

this

was

a

This might be con-

turnover of surviving Iran Ajr crew after that incident.

29
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Beyond the broad sweep of the customary rules of necessity, proportionality
and prohibition against perfidy, problems in law and practice remain.
1.

and Proportionality in Self-Defense and in the Conflict Context
The same terms, necessity and proportionality, are employed in the jus ad hello

Necessity

context of the inherent right of self-defense, and particularly anticipatory self-de30

What passes muster as a necessary and proportionate response in self-defense may not necessarily pass muster as a necessary and
fense,

as in^'ws in hello situations.

proportionate response against the same object once armed conflict has begun, and

Comparing the

vice versa.

definition of anticipatory self-defense

principles demonstrates this.

and the

LOAC

NWP 1-14M Annotated, differing slightly from

its

predecessor, says: "Anticipatory self-defense involves the use of force where attack

imminent and no reasonable choice of peaceful means is available." Under either
31
this view or Caroline Case principles,
it is clear that necessity in combat need not
is

await the enemy's attack or threat of attack.

LOAC

necessity principles apply in

when a belligerent attacks or if it is necessary to defend against a belligerent's attack. The same can be said about proportionality durthat context, to be sure, but also

ing combat; the principle applies for attack or defense during war as well as in
self-defense situations, but

what

is

proportional for

LOAC situations may or may

not be proportional in a self-defense scenario. Moreover, the law of self-defense
says
fidy,

little, if

anything, about the third

although

well as the

it

LOAC principle, prohibition

against per-

should. Lawful ruses should be part of the law of self-defense as

LOAC,

although their content and what

will necessarily differ

from

LOAC situations.

is

permitted as a lawful ruse

32

In a situation involving multiple States, e.g., three countries, two of whom are at

LOAC

war,

principles of necessity

and proportionality apply

as to the

two

belligerents. If a third State individually (and not pursuant to a defense treaty) at-

tacks either belligerent, the attacked belligerent

must observe necessity and proportionality
33

right,

which may be

different

may respond

in self-defense but

principles attached to that inherent

from those attaching

to defenses

under the law of

armed conflict. Once in a war situation, the attacked belligerent (the target in the
latter scenario) and the new belligerent (the attacker) must observe LOAC principles. It

may be
It is

ality

is,

of course, entirely possible that necessity and proportionality standards

the same in a given self-defense or

impossible to lay down black-letter rules for

and humanity principles

relying on Protocol
as

LOAC scenario.

any in

its

With

I

to

LONW necessity, proportion-

be observed during war. The San Remo Manual,

land warfare provisions by analogy, does about as good a job

Precautions in Attack principles:

respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:

.

Law

those

(a)

who

of

Armed
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Conflict

upon or execute an attack must take all feasible meawhich will assist in determining whether or not

plan, decide

sures to gather information
objects
(b)

which

are not military objectives are present in an area of attack;

in the light of the information available to them, those

who plan,

decide upon

or execute an attack shall do everything feasible to ensure that attacks are limited to military objectives;

they shall furthermore take

(c)

and means
age; and

all

an attack shall not be launched

(d)

ties

or

feasible precautions in the choice of

[of warfare] ... to avoid or

damage

.

.

if it

minimize

methods
dam-

collateral casualties or

may be expected to cause collateral casual-

excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military ad-

.

vantage anticipated from the attack as a whole; an attack shall be cancelled or

suspended

as

soon as

it

age would be excessive

becomes apparent that the collateral casualties or dam34
.

.

.

"Attack" includes defensive as well as offensive measures and includes measures
taken against shipping or aircraft that have acquired enemy character as well as the

enemy.

The question then arises as to whether, and how, these general principles relate
to other

LOAC principles, e.g.,

prohibitions against attacking coastal traders or

when engaged in their usual occupations and not contributing
36
The traditional, correct view is that necessity and proto the enemy war effort.
portionality must be considered when attacking or defending any target. If a target
coastal fishermen

is

a forbidden object,

e.g.

a coastal trader or fisherman,

customary necessity and

proportionality principles cannot be weighed against customary or treaty-based
rules forbidding attacks

on that

object.

The same might be

said about using ne-

means of warfare otherwise forbidden. Thus attack on a coastal fishing vessel engaged in its trade and not
contributing to the enemy war effort cannot be legitimized by factoring in necessity; to do so would be to invoke the military necessity (kriegsraison) doctrine con37
demned at Nuremberg. Similarly, necessity does not enter into the equation of
using gas warfare the Geneva Gas Protocol forbids; again, to do so would be to invoke the condemned kriegsraison doctrine. A target, e.g., a coastal fishing boat,
can lose protected status if it aids the enemy, and under those conditions it may
properly be an object of attack, subject to LOAC necessity and proportionality
cessity

and proportionality

principles.

39

reservation

as qualifying use of a

Similarly, if an

is

triggered,

opponent uses gas warfare, the Protocol no-first-use

and the

target State can respond.

proportional reprisals involving use of force or other unlawful

Other options are

means not

involv-

ing force to compel compliance with the law, or retorsions, i.e., unfriendly but lawful acts to

differs

compel compliance with the

from the

law.

Here again the law of jus ad helium

LOAC, the law ofjus in bello; by the majority view only reprisals

not involving use of force can be used before war begins, but afterward, during war,
reprisals involving use of force or non-force reprisals

can be used. Retorsions can
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be used in either context. The
national

The

command

authority,

US and perhaps other States' policy is that only the
at the presidential level,

i.e.

can order reprisals.

relationship between objects of attack, whether during the offensive or in

defense, should be understood to

mean

that if an object

is

a lawful target, necessity

and proportionality dictate that methods and means of attack should be chosen
minimize or avoid,
protected status.

if at all feasible,

damage

to

to or destruction of objects that enjoy

Where there is no specific prohibition against attacking an object

defensively or offensively, here too the principles require using methods or
that best achieve the objective without

damage

to other objects that are not neces-

sary for achieving the objective. Therefore, the two concepts

and proportionality, and in some

ciples of necessity

some objects or using some means of warfare

—

means

— the customary prin-

cases, rules against attacking

travel alongside each other as sepa-

rate rules of law.

2.

The Temporal Factor: When Does Liability Accrue?
I

have urged application of a rule from the law of armed

decisionmaker should be held
time the decision

when

is

made

to

what he or she knew or should have known

Protocol

I

and

in

LOAC and is in

and the Convention

four States' declarations of understanding to

as treaty law,

Nuremberg

among

all

and these provisions
this principle

States for the

principles for initiating

armed

is

well

LOAC. This

conflict

as

customary

on its way to ac-

rule also follows

and recognizes

a

com-

the time

may

Rules of Engagement (ROE)
The place of rules of engagement (ROE) in the context of the law of

self-

mon-sense observation that hindsight can be 20/20, but decisions
be clouded with the fog of war

3.

interna-

LOAC. Because of widespread acceptance of Pro-

norms by those States that have not ratified,
ceptance as a rule of law

the

That princi-

two Conventional Weapons Convention protocols,

tional agreements governing the
I

at

as to the necessity for or proportionality of a response

these issues arise incident to a claim of a right of self-defense.

ple arises from the

tocol

conflict, that a

defense

48

has

its

at

and should be judged accordingly.

analogue in the relationship of ROE to the law of armed conflict.

As with the supremacy of Charter-based norms, including the right of individual
49
and collective self-defense, over treaties and perhaps the customary LOAC, a
military commander has the option, indeed the duty under

or her unit, ship or force.

US ROE, to defend his

ROE may impose limitations on options for actions the

law of armed conflict would permit, or they may allow a commander a full range of
options the law permits.

In the context of neutral merchant ship visit and search

operations, for example, current law allows a belligerent to visit

a

di-

merchantman for later visit and search. A belligerent's ROE
commander to divert and not search immediately. However, that

vert a neutral-flag

might direct

and search or

Law

of

Armed
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Conflict

commander always retains the right to defend his or her ship, unit or force. If during a merchant ship interception that vessel displays hostile intent, a commander
of a belligerent warship, unit or force
portional self-defense measures.

The same is

true for the law of self-defense

neutral country exercises
a

may initiate appropriate necessary and pro-

52

its

if, e.g.,

a warship of a belligerent or

analogous law of the sea right of approach and visit of

merchant vessel on the high seas upon suspicion of piracy, slave trading or pirate

radio broadcasting, if the ship has
53

tionality.

no nationality, or the ship is of the warship's na-

In this case the law of armed conflict does not apply through the

and the

other rules clauses,

LOS

sole basis for force, unit or ship protection is neces-

sary and proportional self-defense, which preempts the law of the sea under the cir-

The

cumstances.

right of visit

and search, part of the

LONW and therefore the

LOAC, does not and cannot apply to merchant ship visits on suspicion of piracy,
slave trading,

4.

etc.

The Spatial Dimension
Robertson has aptly analyzed the differences between oceans areas, and areas

above the oceans, under the law of the sea and under the law of naval warfare. The

LOS has developed a relatively detailed structure of law for the high seas, the EEZ,
fishery zones, the continental shelf, the Area

The

and the contiguous zone.

LONW, still mostly stated in custom and older treaties, recognizes only two sea areas, territorial

waters and their correlative, internal waters, and the high seas and

airspace above these sea areas; belligerents
in their side's territorial

may conduct warfare on the high seas,

and inland waters,

in opposing States' territorial

and

in-

land waters and airspace above these areas, but not in neutrals' territory, territorial
or inland waters

and airspace above these

areas,

with certain exceptions.

57

The

high seas are a legitimate arena for combat, subject to neutrals' rights to navigate or
overfly the high seas, with neutrals'

and

belligerents'

having due regard

for the

CO

other's exercise of high seas freedoms,
tional self-defense.

59

and

neutrals' right to exercise propor-

Writing in the context of the impact of changes in

tional zones upon the law of neutrality, Robertson notes

acceptance of the expanded territorial sea for
straits principles for

the

jurisdic-

modern military manuals'

LOAC purposes, adoption of LOS

LONW, and advocates applying LONW principles to the

EEZ, fishing zones in the high

seas

whether qualified by an

EEZ claim or not, the

continental shelf and the contiguous zone inasmuch as these areas are subject to

high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight for

LOS purposes.

NWP 1-1 4M

and the San Remo Manual continue the view that these areas are subject
seas freedoms,

with

and that belligerents may exercise

straits

to

high

passage in accordance

LOS principles.

Robertson and the Manual also make the important point that belligerents

must have due regard for neutrals' rights under the law of the sea in the newer areas
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LOS

(e.g.,

EEZ,

LOS

conventions, in addition to the high seas, where there

continental shelf) recognized by the

Convention and the 1958
is

no

explicit

LOAC

rule to cover the point.

5.

ROE and the Spatial Dimension in the Tanker War

Necessity, Proportionality,

The historical record is slim with respect to belligerents' general observance of
the principles of necessity, proportionality and prohibitions against perfidy dur-

ing the Tanker War. Parts B-J of this Chapter
specific circumstances of warfare, e.g.,

comment on observance of them in

mine warfare, attacks on shipping, etc. Simi-

larly,

the historical record does not disclose what Iranian or Iraqi decisionmakers

knew

or should have

is

known when planning offensive or defensive measures. Nor

there any record of perfidy or ruses of war in the self-defense context.

formation,

The US

if it exists, is in

self-defense response

attacks, including those

This

tional.

government intelligence and military

is

and other

That

archives.

States' potential responses to Iranian

during the Airbus tragedy, were necessary and propor-

an example of the three-State scenario discussed above.

At the

time of this and similar attacks on neutrals and opposing belligerent platforms,

suming they were thought
required to use

in-

to

as-

have acquired enemy character, Iran and Iraq were

LOAC principles of necessity and proportionality in attacks and

defensive measures. There

is

no published record of what any country knew, or

should have known, during these situations, apart from information the US had on
origins of the attacks,

i.e.,

from platforms, helicopters and ships involved.

There is no published record of Iranian or Iraqi ROE, if any. US and other countries'

ROE,

to the extent that they

have been published,

deal largely with

CO

self-defense issues,

although their other aspects, undoubtedly classified, might

LOAC subjects such as neutral convoy protection of neutral merchantmen.
These have not been published; therefore analysis of LOAC topics like convoy and
cover

accompanying merchant ships must look
self-imposed restrictions imposed by

to the facts

ROE.

ROE

and the law, and not

to

dealing with self-defense

any

show

awareness of necessity and proportionality principles for self-defense reasonable

under the circumstances.
Iran appeared not to observe the distinction between restricting
waters,

i.e.,

its territorial sea,

for military operations

and

its territorial

Strait of Hormuz, the implication from Iran's
70
could restrict Strait transit passage. Under the

were within the
ing that

it

waters that

announcements be-

LOS and the LONW,

Iraq or Iran could not deny straits passage to neutral vessels.
territorial

its territorial

71

waters for naval maneuvers, besides being a clear

violated the

LOAC.

Iran's using neutrals'

LOS violation, 72 also

The same is true concerning Iran's attacks on merchantmen
Whether Iran or Iraq
air attacks on neutral mer-

or facilities in or landward of neutral territorial waters.

showed due regard for neutrals' high seas freedoms
75
chantmen and warships is also questionable.

in

Law

Part B. Visit

of

Armed
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Conflict

and Search; Capture, Destruction or Diversion

LOS right to approach and visit vessels on the high seas

Warships have had an

as an exception to the rule that ships sailing the

high seas are

risdiction of any country other than the flag State.

immune from the ju-

This includes merchant ships,

fishermen, boats, etc., if the vessel to be approached and visited is a suspected pirate
ship or slaver, refuses to

show its flag, or flies a flag of another State but is in reality

registered under the warship's flag.

The LOS Convention adds two

categories:

ships without nationality, or a ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the

warship's flag State has jurisdiction as the Convention provides.
visit right

service,

does not extend to warships or government vessels on noncommercial

e.g.,

naval auxiliaries; they are

States have also concluded treaties,
to allow

The approach and

immune from
sometimes

this procedure.

bilateral,

with other countries,

high seas approach and visit of the other country's merchant ships, etc., to

inspect ships suspected of carrying

Prohibition Era treaties,

77

latter cases

permission to

agreement provides.

78

illicit

cargoes destined for that State,

e.g.,

the

more recently, drug interdiction agreements. In the
board may be obtained by telecommunications as the
or

Agreements

maritime navigation and offshore

also exist for suppressing terrorist acts against

oil

platforms.

79

LOS approach and visit or interdiction operations, a
r
80
of self-defense.
The LOAC applies through the LOS

In either case, traditional

warship retains

its

right

conventions' other rules clauses, or applying treaty suspension or wartime termi-

nation principles, in war situations.

1.

Visit

and Search Pursuant to

81

the Law of Naval Warfare

The right of warship visit and search on the high seas and in a belligerent's territorial sea

and
the

during armed conflict differs from the
82

visit.

First, visit

LOS right of high seas approach

and search rights obtain through the other

rules clauses of

LOS conventions or applying treaty suspension or termination principles dur-

ing wartime situations.
search,

and does not

proach and

visit is

chantman with

83

spill

Second, the right applies only incident to the
over into a right of approach and

governed by

visit

LOS

84

principles.

and search and approach and

If a

visit;

visit

and

the right of ap-

warship closes on a mer-

visit in

mind during an armed

must apply. Third, neutral warships and neutral noncommercial vessels retain immunity they have under the law
of the sea from visit and search. Fourth, warships conducting visit and search re-

conflict situation, the rules for each procedure

Of.

tain a right of self-defense.

and search may be conducted in belligerents'
waters and on the high seas, including areas subject
Visit

EEZ,

may

fishing zone or continental shelf claims,

and

territorial seas

and internal

to States' contiguous zone,

in the Area. Visit

and search

not be conducted in neutral States' territorial seas, in international

straits
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overlapped by territorial seas in that part of a
States' territorial seas,

forbids visit

and

and search

strait

whose waters comprise neutral

in a neutral's archipelagic sea lanes.

Hague XIII, art.

in neutral State "territorial waters," a

customary

2,

rule,

but the previous formula takes into account Hague XIII's more general language
oo

modern LOS principles. Although coastal States have rights in
the contiguous zone, EEZ, fishing zone and the continental shelf, these zones' wain a context of

ters

remain subject to high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight as do waters

above the Area,
kind's

89
i.e.,

the deep seabed the

common heritage.

seas not subject to

90

Visit

LOS

Convention reserves

and search operations in these

any of these claims, are subject

to a

areas,

as

human-

and on high

requirement that a belliger-

ent observe due regard for neutral States' rights, whether that be high seas rights,
neutrals' rights in these zones, or

LOAC

humankind's rights

rules applying to the situation.

search in

its territorial

sea

91

A

in the Area, besides specific

belligerent

may conduct

visit

and

and internal waters without applying the due regard
92

Even here, however, belligerents
must apply LOAC rules, including humanitarian and neutrality law principles.
Similarly, a belligerent may conduct visit and search in an opposing belligerent's
territorial sea and internal waters, but here visit and search must observe due regard for neutral State rights, i.e., innocent passage by neutral shipping in an oppos93
ing belligerent's territorial sea, in addition to positive rules of the law of armed
conflict. However, this innocent passage in a belligerent's own territorial sea

principle; that

is

part of its sovereign territory.

might be subject to the

LOS rule that a coastal State may suspend innocent passage

temporarily for security reasons,

94

and the LOAC rule that belligerents may order

away from the immediate area of naval operations or may impose
95
restrictions on this shipping.
In an opposing belligerent's territorial sea,

neutral shipping
special

only the

LOAC naval operations rule would apply, territorial sovereignty continu-

ing to reside in the coastal State. In either case belligerents
sea access to a neutral nation unless there

is

a route of equal access.

Hague XIII and customary law say nothing
straits;

however, the customary rule against

should apply by extension for

one side of a
seas, visit

straits

may not deny territorial

specific about visit

visit

and search

bordered by neutral State

strait is belligerent territorial seas

and the other

is

and search

in

in neutral waters
territorial seas. If

neutral territorial

and search may be conducted in the belligerent's territorial sea but not in

the neutral's territorial sea. Besides this restriction, a belligerent must observe due

regard for high seas rights through straits with a high seas passage in the middle,
neutral State transit passage, or innocent passage through a strait, or treaties gov-

erning a particular strait, depending on the kind of strait involved.
matter, this could well

ing on the

strait's

97

As a practical

mean barring visit and search in a particular strait, depend-

geographic, navigational and hydrographic configurations; the

nature of the vessel to be searched; methodology of visit and search
vessel, small

boat or helicopter); and other factors.

98

(e.g.,

surface

If a littoral State cannot close

,.

Law

a strait under the law of the sea
ritorial sea

innocent passage,

99

of
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Conflict

for temporary security protection as

it

may for ter-

a belligerent cannot cite this reason for closing

side of a strait, even if incident to an otherwise valid visit

its

and search. The same

principle applies to invoking the rule that a belligerent may order neutral shipping

out of the immediate area of naval operations or impose special restrictions on

them;

this

LOAC rule cannot have the effect of impeding neutral shipping straits

passage, unless another route of similar convenience is open to neutral traffic.

Recent operational law manuals restate traditional
and search should be exercised with

1.

Visit

2.

Before summoning a vessel to

visit

and search

and consideration.

all tact

the warship should hoist

lie to,

rules:

its

national flag.

The summons is made by firing a blank charge, by international flag signal
or by other recognized means. The summoned vessel, if a neutral merchant
.

.

.

ship, [must]

.

.

.

stop, lie to, display her colors,

moned vessel is an enemy ship,
by

force,

but thereby assumes

summoned

it is

all

and not

not so bound and

risk of resulting

vessel takes flight, she

resist. (If

the sum-

may legally resist, even

damage or

destruction).

may be pursued and brought

by

3.

If the

4.

When a summoned vessel has been brought to, the warship should send a boat

to

forcible measures if necessary.

with an officer to conduct the

visit

and

search. If practicable, a second officer

The officer(s)
and the boat crew may be armed at the discretion of the commanding officer.
If visit and search at sea is deemed hazardous or impracticable, the neutral
vessel may be escorted by the summoning, or another,
warship or by a
should accompany the officer charged with the examination.

5.

.

.

.

.

.

military aircraft to the nearest place (outside neutral territory) where the visit

and search may be conveniently and

safely conducted.

The

neutral vessel

is

not obliged to lower her flag (she has not been captured) but must proceed ac-

cording to the orders of the escorting warship or
6.

The boarding

aircraft.

first examine the ship's papers to ascertain her
and destination, nature of cargo, manner of employment, and other facts deemed pertinent. Papers to be examined will ordinarily include a certificate of national registry, crew list, passenger list,

officer

should

character, ports of departure

logbook,

bill

of health clearances, charter party

(if

chartered), invoices or

manifests of cargo, bills of lading, and on occasion, a consular declaration or
other certificate of noncontraband carriage certifying the innocence of the

cargo [navicert].
7.

Regularity of papers and evidence of innocence of cargo, employment, or des-

by them are not necessarily conclusive, and, should doubt
company may be questioned and the ship and cargo searched.

tination furnished
exist, the ship's
8.

Unless military security prohibits, the boarding officer will record the

concerning the

visit

and search in the logbook of the

facts

visited ship, including

the date and position of the interception. The entry should be authenticated
by the signature and rank of the boarding officer, but neither the name of the
visiting warship nor the identity of her commanding officer should be disclosed.

102
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Although once

a debatable issue, today the diversion option

and search on the spot
and search by military

how

is

accepted practice.

aircraft, there is

based

aircraft, is to

approach and

(11

5) instead

"Although there

is

The common

of visit

a right of visit

no established international

that right should be accomplished."

availability of seaborne helicopters

for

103

practice as to

practice today, given

on smaller surface warships or perhaps land-

launch a helicopter. Under those circumstances, the same rules

visit

using boats, which are frequently impracticable, given the

modern merchantmen and frequently sea conditions, should prevail.
Aircraft may also be used for scouting for merchantmen and escorting the mersize of

chant ship to a diversion point for search or to a belligerent port, instead of using
warships for those purposes.

As the visit and search principles suggest, a resisting merchant ship, or one that
attempts to flee, risks capture, damage or destruction, like merchantmen who assist the enemy's intelligence system by signaling or are otherwise integrated into
AT
the enemy's war effort, unless exempted under the law of naval warfare.
If the
1

vessel

is

found

be declared

to carry

contraband or warfighting/war-sustaining cargo, she

a prize of war.

108

The right to visit and search

continues during an

mistice, unless the armistice's or other ceasefire's terms provide otherwise.

A

right of belligerent visit

and search extends

to other vessels

merchant ships, e.g., ships carrying cultural property,
mail ships,

112

and other vessels exempt from capture,

fishing vessels,

113

beyond

typical

perhaps

hospital ships,
etc., e.g.,

ar-

109

coastal trading

and

although there are no specific treaty provisions permitting visit-

ing and searching these other exempt vessels.
eral rubric of being

Two

may

merchant ships

They

are

subsumed under the gen-

for this purpose.

exceptions to belligerents' right of visit and search, besides neutral war-

ships or neutral-flag government ships operated for noncommercial purposes,
are neutral-flag vessels not engaged in an opposing belligerent's

war

effort or

not

carrying contraband and under convoy by a neutral warship, or neutral-flag vessels

not engaged in a belligerent's war effort or not carrying contraband and escorted or

accompanied by
tral-flag

crises

a neutral warship.

Under the London Declaration, only neu-

convoys are subject to exemption; however, practice during other wars or

{e.g.

Formosa

World War

Straits crisis)

II,

before the United States entered the war, during the

confirms that neutral warships flying a country's flag other

than that of the vessel(s) convoyed
in support of the belligerents'

chantman's

war

may escort or convoy neutral merchantmen not
effort

and not carrying contraband

flag State so requests. Traditional practice has

been

if

the mer-

for a belligerent

warship to request information as to the character of cargo and vessels convoyed or
escorted,

and for the escort or convoy commander to certify the innocent nature of

the convoy or escorted ship(s) by signal to the belligerent warship. Given
practice of instant, reliable
ples on

modern

worldwide communications, the 1998 Helsinki Princi-

Maritime Neutrality rightly advocate authorizing communications between

Law

neutral

and belligerent

as a progressive

lege of neutral

escort or

States'

of

Armed

governments and their ships

development. Even

if

Conflict

at sea for this
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purpose

the belligerent warship believes the privi-

convoy or escort has been abused,

it is

up

convoy commander to withdraw protection.

to the neutral

If a neutral

warship

warship com-

mander does not do so, a belligerent government may protest this. For a belligerent
to attack a neutral warship, or its

men,

convoyed, escorted or accompanied merchant-

invites self-defense responses.

The traditional law of naval warfare states no principles for neutral military aircraft convoy, escort or accompaniment of merchantmen that do not carry contraband or material contributing to a belligerent's war effort. However, the same
principles should apply. The main problem is communications with a belligerent
warship or aircraft proposing to conduct visit and search. Aircraft must have capability to communicate with belligerent warships or aircraft wishing to conduct
visit and search; this is usually the case with today's aircraft. Even if there has been
communication between governments, prudence suggests a clear understanding between the platform proposing visit and search (perhaps another air-

prior

craft,

perhaps a warship) and the convoying, escorting or accompanying

aircraft.
1

17

The same principles for risk of self-defense response also apply to this situation.
In the case of "mixed" convoy, escort or accompaniment situations, i.e., when
same principles should
symmetry of flag between the aircraft

neutral military aircraft and warships operate together, the
apply. This should be true

whether there

is

and warships or situations where aircraft of one flag convoy, escort or accompany,
along with warships of other nationalities. Here communications are

only between neutrals and belligerents, but also

among

neutrals.

critical,

The

not

traditional

law, including the law of self-defense, has nothing to say about this situation, yet

another reason for clear communications, particularly with belligerents.

118

Different principles apply if belligerent warships and/or aircraft convoy, escort

accompany merchantmen, however; these merchantmen are subject to attack
119
and destruction by opposing belligerents.
Under the customary law of naval warfare, the flag the merchantman flies, and
or

LOS genuine link analysis, counts for prima facie attribution of vessel na120
tionality,
yet another example of the operation of the LOS conventions' other
not the

rules clauses.

121

(Different rules apply if a belligerent transfers flags from
122

its

War issue, insofar as the historical
record shows.) If there is a transfer from one neutral flag to another, this may raise
merchantmen

LOS

issues,

to neutral flags,

but the

not a Tanker

LONW rule of prima facie attribution of neutrality covers

the transfer to attribute prima facie neutral flag status to the reflagged vessel.

(The principle is different if a vessel flies the UN or ICRC flag; under the LOS and
2S
presumably the LONW jurisdiction remains vested in the registry State.)
Thus
1

neutral-flag warships

may convoy, escort or accompany neutral-flag merchantmen
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that have been reflagged

under the same circumstances

as they

could

no

if

reflagging has taken place.

Transfers of goods follow the same kind of rules. If there has been a bona fide
transfer of cargo

from a belligerent to a neutral before a voyage from a neutral coun-

try to another neutral begins, that is considered neutral cargo. Rules concerning

delivery of neutral cargo

to a

belligerent from a neutral, or transfer of title

belligerent to a neutral, once the cargo has been lifted

from

a

and is on its way, i.e., the con-

The continuous voyage rule might apply, for excontraband consigned to an enemy destination with intermediate

tinuous voyage rule, do not apply.

ample, to

1

overland transportation from a neutral port to a belligerent.

7 ft

and Search: Tanker War Issues

2. Visit

There are no reported cases of attempts by belligerent or neutral warships

to

conduct approach and visit on suspect merchant ships under the law of the sea, nor

were there any accounts of terrorist attacks on vessels or Persian Gulf oil platforms,
during the Tanker War. If there had been, principles applying to these situations,

and not

LONW principles, would have governed. 127

Iran conducted visit and search operations with ships and aircraft against neutral

merchant ships inbound

to Iraq

through Kuwaiti or other ports, and vessels

outbound with Kuwaiti or other cargo destined for neutral ports, throughout most
of the war.

within

128

Despite neutral governments' protests on some occasions, Iran was

LOAC rights to conduct these visits and searches, including visit and

its

search after the cease-fire,

met. For example,
visit

it

if

international law criteria for these operations were

was not proper

and search, unless that ship

search rules

Iran violated

tried to evade visit. Iran

complied with

visit

and

not clear,

e.g.,

first

whether vessels that were attacked

and asked questions

later.

tried to

In the latter cases

LOAC rules. Although Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz

from time to time,
to visit

is

or whether Iran shot

visit,

up a merchantman before conducting

some of the time, but in other cases the evidence may point toward vio-

lations of the law. It

evade

to shoot

129

the purpose of threatened closure appeared not to be incident

and search operations.

If visit

and search occurred near or

in the Strait,

there are no reports of these actions impeding neutrals' straits passage.
Belligerents kept merchant ships plying the Gulf pursuant to their high seas

and

straits

passage rights under surveillance, Iraq primarily through aircraft and

Iran through aircraft and surface vessels.
first step in a

overflight,

1

30

This surveillance, if interpreted as the

projected visit and search, was legitimate under the

LOS as high seas

freedom of navigation or straits transit rights, as long as it did not interI

fere with the

merchant

ships' high seas or transit passage rights.

21

These

States'

warships and military aircraft also could conduct surveillance as a self-defense
1

measure.

2T

However, once the

visit

and search process began with notice

merchantman, Iran and Iraq were bound by

its

to the

LONW procedures. This did not

Law

of

Armed

363

Conflict

include initial indiscriminate attacks by aircraft or surface vessels, or mines, particularly if a vessel's identity, cargo

and destination were not known.

Whatever

these were also violations of the law of na-

the result under Charter law analysis,
val warfare proportionality

133

and necessity principles

as they related to visit

and

search.

The United

States

and other neutral nations were within

their rights to

form

convoys of neutral-flag merchant ships, or to escort or accompany neutral-flag

merchant ships, carrying cargoes

to

and from neutral

States,

cargoes did not directly contribute to a belligerent's war effort,
erty of a belligerent or destined to a belligerent when lifted.

may have been

legitimately sold to a neutral or

changed before

lift

from

a belligerent did not

Kuwait, where

e.g.,

were not prop-

i.e.,

The fact that the cargo

may have been

legitimately ex-

change the cargo's characterization

when on the high seas. There is no evidence that the convoyed or escorted neutral
flag

merchant ships, reflagged or otherwise, carried belligerents' cargoes that con-

tributed to

war

135

efforts.

Early in the war, Iraq rejected overtures to allow neutral merchant ships

UN or ICRC flag. Toward war's
end, there was no consensus on substituting a UN naval flotilla, supported by Italy
trapped in the Shatt al-Arab to leave under a

and the USSR,
137

ders.

for warships operating in the

Gulf pursuant

to each country's or-

(The UN ensign has been used on several prior occasions.)

138

If vessels re-

leased from the Shatt

had traveled in convoy or had been escorted or accompanied

by warships, an

might have arisen on whether these ships were legitimately

issue

LOAC

reflagged under the

for purposes of the evacuation.

139

If they

were

re-

would be whether the United Nations or
the ICRC could legitimately request convoy protection for these ships. The United
flagged legitimately, a further question

could request protection, preferably

Nations, possessing legal personality,

but the ICRC as a nongovernmental orga-

through a Security Council decision,
nization

would not have had

voy, unless the
a

status necessary in international law to request con-

ICRC were placed in UN service.

UN or ICRC flag

would have applied

merchantmen had flown
under these circumstances, presumably the same principles

for convoying,

If the

a warship with a different ensign

i.e.,

could

have convoyed, escorted or accompanied the merchant ships, provided there had

been a request for protection from the

from the United Nations.

The same

flagging questions unless

connection with the
flotilla

were different from the usual

LOAC rules

issues could have arisen, except perhaps re-

merchantmen

as well as warships flew the

UN flag, in

UN flotilla proposal late in the war. They did not because the

was never approved.

Indiscriminate shooting
ships

if they

measure,

Council decision had established terms,

If a Security

those would be mandatory, even
for these operations.

flag State and, as a precautionary

at,

damage

to,

and destruction

of,

neutral merchant

by surface ship or aircraft weapons subjected both belligerents

to possibilities
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of self-defense responses. If a merchantman was flagged under the same ensign as

convoying, escorting or accompanying warships, the right of self-defense

its

stemmed from a right to protect the merchant ship as an act of individual self-defense. If the merchantman was flagged under an ensign different from the warship's,

and convoy,

to protect those

escort or

accompanying had been requested, there was

merchant ships under an informal

Merchant ships painted grey

ory.

a right

collective self-defense the-

to simulate warships, feigning convoys, or

which snuggled close to convoyed, escorted or accompanied ships without request
for protection,

were not entitled

to self-defense protection

whatever might be said of these measures

on those accounts,

as ruses.

To the extent that belligerents used mines to deter, threaten or attack convoyed,
escorted or accompanied merchantmen,
ciples.

148

this too

was a violation of LONW prin-

Besides neutral warships' rights to remove the mines, neutrals could also

defend against these by removing the source of the mines, e.g., Iran Ajr,

149

as inci-

dent to legitimate self-defense of their warships; as legitimate self-defense of vessels

convoyed, escorted or accompanied; or as incident to legitimate self-defense of

their

and others' neutral flag shipping if assistance had been requested. Nothing in

the law of naval warfare forbade removal of the mines.

3.

Projections for the Future

The Tanker war thus strengthened traditional visit and search rules, albeit with
some

cases

where neutral countries wrongly protested the

actions. Valid protests

against belligerents' indiscriminate attacks on innocent neutral merchant ships

vindicated the strength of those principles. Traditional principles of convoy, es-

accompaniment of neutral merchantmen were reinforced, with added dimensions of developing rules for potential use of aircraft with surface ships as part

cort or

of operations, and using warships of one neutral flag for convoy,
neutral flag's

merchantmen when requested by

etc.,

of another

that neutral.

Given downsizing of naval forces worldwide, and ready availability of aircraft,
particularly helicopters aboard ship but perhaps shore-based, a trend of conduct-

ing visit and search by aircraft, perhaps operating with warships and perhaps alone
(i.e.,

helicopters),

is

likely to continue.

voys of merchantmen;

it is

part of a convoy, escort or

The same is true with respect to neutral con-

likely that this

kind of operation,

accompaniment operation,

Similarly, convoying operations

will

i.e.,

use of aircraft as

be seen in future wars.

employing aircraft and warships of different flags

are likely. Traditional principles should apply in these situations as well. Because

of relative ease of communications between governments, and a risk of lack of com-

munications on the high

seas, the Helsinki Principles

option of government-to-

government communications during convoy operations should be adopted
rule of law.

as a

Law

Part C. Belligerents'

Seaborne Commerce;

of

Armed

365

Conflict

Belligerents'

Convoys

Part B discussed the law of naval warfare relating to neutral flag commerce during

the Tanker War. This Part analyzes issues of the belligerents' seaborne commerce,
principles of convoying applicable to belligerent-flag shipping,

and principles of

contraband.

/.

The Law of Naval Warfare and Belligerents' Seaborne Commerce
Enemy warships and military aircraft, including naval and military auxiliaries,

are subject to capture, attack, or destruction
i.e.,

anywhere beyond neutral territory,

outside neutrals' inland waters or territorial seas, including the high seas and

areas governed

by contiguous zone, EEZ, fishing zone, continental

shelf, or

Area

regimes. Captures, attacks and destruction of vessels in these areas are subject to

the principle of due regard for neutrals' uses of these areas and a belligerent's right
to exclude neutrals

from the immediate area of naval operations.

warship, naval auxiliary or military aircraft immediately vests

Crews of captured, attacked or destroyed
oners of war

when

captured.

If the

aboard a neutral warship or military

152

title in a captor.

aircraft or military vessels

wounded,

Capture of a

become

153

pris-

sick or shipwrecked are taken

aircraft, "it shall

be ensured, where so

re-

quired by international law, that they can take no further part in operations of
war."

155

Although enemy merchantmen sailing outside neutral territorial seas or inland
waters

may be

and search
means.

157

subject to visit

search,

determination of

if positive

(Hague VI

and

may be captured without visit
enemy status may be made by other

principles, regulating conduct toward belligerents' mer-

chant ships in enemy ports at war's outbreak,

tomary law.

159

they

158

are considered not to reflect cus-

Before 1907 some countries observed a usage that

ships in a belligerent port could not be captured; there was

enemy merchant

no rule of law to that ef-

Today they too may be captured.) Enemy merchant ship officers and crews
must be made prisoners of war.
If military circumstances preclude sending it in
fect.

as prize, a captured ship

may be destroyed after all possible measures are taken

to

provide for passenger and crew safety. Ship and cargo documents and papers and,
if possible,

passenger and crew personal effects should be preserved.

Enemy merchant ships may be attacked and

destroyed without prior warning

and: (1)
them if they are a legitimate military objective
persistently refuse to stop upon being summoned to do so, e.g., incident to visit and
or an attempt to capture

search; (2) actively resist visit

and search or capture;

(3) are

armed,

i.e.,

equipped

with weapons or other equipment capable of inflicting serious battle damage on a

warship or aircraft;
gence systems;

(5)

(4) are

incorporated in or assist in any way the enemy's

engage in belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy;

val or military auxiliary; (7) sail

intelli-

(6) act as a na-

under convoy of enemy warships or military
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aircraft; or (8) are integrated into the

enemy

war-fighting or war-sustaining

ef-

merchantmen are addressed in Part D.) This list follows NWP 9A, published at the end of the Tanker
War, with an addition from the San Remo Manual and modifications suggested, for
(Principles relating to belligerent convoy of neutral

fort.

reasons stated below.

The

NWP 9A

and Manual enumerations

differ slightly

and they divide on minor points and one major
and

(7) are essentially the

same

in

from customary law,

issue. Categories (1), (2), (4), (6)

NWP 9A and the Manual and correspond with

customary and treaty norms.

The traditional rule for armed merchant ships, Category (3), has been that they
may have defensive armament, e.g., pistols or rifles for defense against pirates, but
fin
that armament of a kind to enable the ship to conduct warfare is forbidden.
NWP 9A and the Manual sensibly drop the distinction between defensive and ofi

fensive weapons.

NWP 9A

comments:

In light of modern weapons, it is impossible to determine, if it ever was possible,
whether the armament on merchant ships is to be used offensively or merely
defensively. It

is

unrealistic to expect

enemy

forces to be able to

make

that

determination.
I

The Manual is

CO

same effect.
While shoulder-fired missiles and rockets
would likely be considered arming a vessel, equipping an enemy merchantman with
to the

bow can be an

ramming weapon, having a sharp bow, perhaps reinforced against collisions, does not mean that a merchant
ship is thereby armed.
NWP 9A recites that an enemy merchant ship is subject
170
to attack and destruction "If armed."
The Manual says an enemy merchantman
chaff would not. Although a ship's

is

effective

armed to an extent that [it] could inflict damindividual weapons for the defence of person-

a proper military objective if it "[is]

age to a warship; this excludes light
nel,

e.g.,

against pirates, and purely deflective systems such as "chaff{.]"

171
.

.

.

Both

must be read with their explanatory comments to determine, for NWP
9A, the limitation on offensive armament; for the Manual, what is meant by "damdefinitions

age to a warship,"

i.e., it

the Manual definition,
vessel,

however.

its face,

the

does not include using a

may not mean

bow to

ram. Being armed, under

damage another merchant
If NWP 9A might seem too broad on

the capability to

The Manual does not say.

172

Manual statement might seem

to lack precision in definition.

Given

advances in weapons technology, it is almost impossible to describe banned or lawful

weapons within

9A does,
I

a definition or to anticipate the future.

to avoid lists or definitions,

suggest this as a

17?
It is better, as

whether by inclusion or exclusion.

more workable restatement of the law on

Enemy merchant

ships

may be

NWP

attacked and destroyed

equipped with weapons or other equipment

if

this issue:

they are armed,

i.e.,

capable of inflicting serious battle

Law

of

Armed

367

Conflict

damage on a warship or aircraft. This does not include equipment aboard an enemy
merchant ship for its protection from collision, pirates, or riots; for maintaining
internal order aboard the vessel, e.g., to quell a mutiny; or for deflecting incoming
weapons, e.g. special paint to deceive homing missiles, chaff and like devices to
deceive missiles, or extra shell plating to protect against projectiles or missiles as well
as against collisions, ice or other

maritime

perils.

"Weapons or other equipment" covers armament, e.g., missiles or naval guns but
also equipment that could damage or destroy sensing systems, e.g., offensive elec175
tronic warfare equipment, etc.
As a matter of theory, pistol bullets could inflict
some battle damage against close aboard warships, e.g., the Iranian speedboats durnc
ing the Tanker War,
but side arms are not considered arms within the meaning
of the definition. "Battle damage" is common parlance well understood in naval
warfare. Use of the generic word "equipment" would cover not only weapons, but
also devices, e.g., tear gas or high pressure water hoses that might be used to deflect
I

an attempt to rush a ship.
reinforced

177

Similarly, having heavier than usual shell plating or a

bow to protect against ice or collision should not qualify a vessel

armed merchantman. With good reason, NWP 9A,

its

successor and the

as

an

Manual

depart from the traditional law; perhaps their definitions could be refined,

however.

The San Remo Manual adds Category (5), permitting attack on and destruction
of enemy merchant ships if they "engag[e] in belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy, e.g., laying mines, minesweeping, cutting undersea cables and pipelines, engaging in

visit
178

NWP 9A, but

it

There are problems with the statement, however,

if

This has no direct counterpart in other sources, e.g.,

vessels[.]"
is

and search of neutral merchant vessels or attacking other merchant

a restatement of the law.

Hague VII, reciting conditions for converting
179
merchant ships into warships, lays down customary standards
but does not
cover situations where merchantmen engage in belligerent acts. The 1856 Paris
180
Declaration condemns privateering
but does not cover a situation when privateers commit belligerent acts from a merchant ship. Category (5), taken from the
there are no other considerations.

Manual, would cover these

The LOS,

e.g.,

condemns and

crime of piracy.

and

situations.

181

There are problems with the law of the

sets standards for jurisdiction
1

here the conventions' other rules clauses

trals

pirates can be pursued, captured, tried

LOS

violators

law.

have no impact,

is

assumed that pirates and

cannot be assumed to commit belligerent acts when they

engage in LOS-condemned

ment of the

over the universal
8?

and convicted by belligerents or neu-

during armed conflict as in other situations. If it

other

sea.

activity,

The problem

is

then the Manual definition

with the clause,

"e.g.,

is

a correct state-

laying mines,

.

.

.

attacking

other merchant vessels." Suppose, for example, a patriotic pirate attacks a mer-

chant ship of the enemy.

Is

the pirate subject to the

LOS

rules or those of the

A
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LONW? Perhaps it would have been better to omit the examples, as stated above in
184

Category

(5).

Category

.

.

.

(7), a

residual clause,

185

copies

its

principles from

NWP 9

:

[EJnemy merchant vessels may be attacked and destroyed by surface warships,

either with or without prior warning, in any of the following circumstances:

...

If integrated

into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort and

compliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would, under the
circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the surface warship to imminent

danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment. 1 *^

The San Remo Manual is more defense-oriented "The following activities may
render enemy merchant vessels military objectives:
otherwise making an effec:

.

.

tive contribution to military action,

cause the

9A

Manual conferees

e.g.,

.

carrying war materials."

187

This was be-

agreed, after considerable discussion, that the

NWP

descriptive phrase "integration into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining

effort"

was too broad

to use for a residual category.

1

the Helsinki Principles defined contraband as "goods
fighting

and other goods useful

for the

88

.

.

Three years
.

were willing to accept such

war effort of the enemy."

NWP

logically they

if

the Principles

might well have ac-

view of a residual category of integration into the enemy

war-fighting or war-sustaining effort. Although the issue

use of

Although con-

190

broad definition for goods shipped to a bellig-

merchantmen, then

erent's port in a neutral-flag

cepted the

a

however,

designed for the use of war

traband only involves goods shipped to a belligerent port,
drafters

later,

NWP 9A and

191
its

sure, "war-sustaining"

successor,
is

Category

is

close, given

(7) follows the

worldwide

NWP model. To be

not subject to precise definition, "effort" that indirectly

but effectively supports and sustains a belligerent's warfighting capability

The varying language of the NWPs, the Manual and

within the scope of the term.

the Principles represents distinctions without differences for practice.

nothing unusual about this kind of phraseology. Naval targeting
concepts like necessity and proportionality,
principle

nor

194

193

the

LOS

the

London

governed by

due regard

neither

more

and

will

determine proportionality.

on being duly summoned, or active resistance to visit

a surface warship or

submarine may not sink or render incapable

of navigation a merchant vessel without having
ship's papers in a safe place.

is

Protocol would require, except for Categories (1) and

(2) (persistent refusal to stop

and search) that

is

There

determine what constitutes "war-sustaining,"

precisely as State practice has determined
its face,

is

recites a

to describe oceans usage sharing. "War-sustaining"

less precise. State practice will

On

is

first

placed passengers, crew and

The Protocol says the vessel's boats are not regarded as

a safe place unless passenger

and crew

safety are assured

under existing sea and

weather conditions by proximity of land or presence of another ship that can take

1

Law

The

them aboard.

of

Armed

Protocol does not mention air attacks,
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although by 1936,

when the Protocol was negotiated, attacks from the air were part of the experience
of armed conflict. The 1923 Hague Air Rules, however, had restated the general
and although the Rules recited

rule of the military objective,

this in a context of
197

land targets, this general principle could be said to apply to maritime targets.

The issue is the vitality and scope of these London Protocol requirements, negotiated in 1936 with World War I experience in mind, in today's law of naval war198
and since 1949 the Second Geneva Convention and
fare. The law of the sea,
Protocol
sea,

and

others,

I,

restate a

requiring rescue of those in peril on the

customary rule

by

status of these persons, helpless against the elements unless assisted

undoubtedly has played an emotional role even though these principles do

not apply to the Protocol issue. Sinking merchantmen, particularly ships with passengers aboard,

War,

201

liners,

e.g.,

had been

a highly

and it was an emotional and legal issue

ing the early years.

202

Even

after the currents

charged issue during the Great

in

World War II, particularly dur-

of war swept liners from the seas, ex-

cept for use as troopships, for which they were (and are) liable to attack and

was considerable.

The

and the Axis did not follow Protocol standards during World War

II, ini-

destruction,
Allies

on

tially

losses of merchant mariners after attacks

a theory of reprisal

and

later

because merchant ships were armed, con-

voyed, used as intelligence collectors, or otherwise incorporated into the war
Besides attacks from surface ships and submarines, merchantmen were also

effort.

205

enemy aircraft.
The Nuremberg trials of German Admirals Karl Doenitz and Erich Raeder did
not resolve the issue. The admirals, inter alia found guilty of failing to rescue the
attacked by

shipwrecked, received no sentence on these counts because of evidence of wartime

UK and US practice. 206
Post- World

War II commentator opinion

don Protocol is of no effect today
it

207

or not relevant in

has been cast in ambiguous light or
210

feet,

has also divided.

is unrealistic,

Some

say the Lon-

modern warfare,

209

others say

it

208

some say

remains in

ef-

and still others say it applies only to Categories ( 1 ) and (2), i.e., where a mer-

chant ship persistently refuses to stop upon due

and search, the Protocol's exact language,

21

summons

or actively resists visit

or does not apply to attacks from the

212

•

air.

Military manuals

Code

show similar ambiguity. For example, the 1 900 US Naval War

said that prizes could be destroyed

seaworthiness,

213

reflecting the law

under certain conditions,

and times when

visit

and search,

e.g.,

un-

as distin-

guished from diversion, was the typical way to deal with merchantmen. The

US

Navy's 1917 Instructions said a prize could be destroyed "in case of military neces-

and search and "persons on board have been placed

sity,"

but only after

safety

and also, if practicable,

were

to

visit

be preserved.

A

their personal effects."

in

Documents aboard the prize

neutral ship engaged in unneutral service "must not be
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destroyed

.

.

save in

.

.

.

.

the gravest military emergency which would not justify

[the capturing warship] in releasing the vessel or sending it in for adjudication."

World War

II

US Navy manuals

published the Protocol word for word but in a

They declared that since title to an enemy vessel vested
in a captor through capture, "enemy ships made prizes may in case of military necessity be destroyed
when they cannot be sent or escorted in for adjudication."
context of visit and search.

.

In the ordinary case,

.

.

if a

neutral flag prize could not be sent or escorted in for adju-

dication, they should be released. Neutral prizes could also be destroyed, but be-

cause "responsibility ... for destroying a neutral prize

is

so serious that [a

capturing warship] should never order such destruction without being entirely
satisfied that the military reasons therefor justify
tral prizes

observed.

it

" In cases of enemy or

neu-

Protocol provisions for protecting passengers, crew and papers had to be

215

NWIP 10-2, published and revised by the US Navy as a naval warfare publication between

September 1955 and October 1 974,

and declared not to be "a legis-

lative

enactment binding upon courts and tribunals applying the rules of war,"

was

major watershed in

a

US

naval thinking.

The

217

1955 version, published as an

Appendix to Tucker's Law of War and Neutrality at Sea, written in 1955 but printed
218
in 1957,
represented the thinking of the US Navy when it was the largest naval
power on Earth.

219

The NWIP

10-2 text continues recitation of Protocol princi-

pies of safety of passengers, crew

and papers

In a note to this requirement, however,

merchantmen

that could be attacked

as applicable to prize destruction.

220

NWIP 10-2 refers these terms to its list of

and destroyed before capture. The note de-

clares in part:

According

to the

customary and conventional law of naval warfare valid prior

to

World War II, a belligerent warship or military aircraft was forbidden to destroy an
enemy merchant vessel or render her incapable of navigation without having first
provided for the safety of passengers and crew; exception being made in the
circumstances of persistent refusal to stop on being duly
resistance to visit

and search

summoned

or of active

(or capture).

After reciting the Protocol rules, the note says: "These rules,

deemed

declaratory

of customary international law, have been interpreted as applicable to belligerent

enemy merchant vessels," but that they
have not been considered applicable to nonmilitary enemy aircraft. The note then
recites World War II experience and mentions the Doenitz acquittal without saying how these square with the prior analysis.
The final version of NWIP 10-2
military aircraft in their action toward

(1974) follows the 1955 edition.

222

One reading of NWIP 10-2 is that it means what it said, i.e.,
customary law and attacking
the result

is

that the

aircraft are

NWIP 10-2

Under this analysis,
223
came to a
the Naval War College

bound by them

drafters at

the Protocol recites

too.

:

Law

of

Armed
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from Professor Tucker, a Stockton Professor of International

different conclusion

author of The Law of War and

Law at the College (and later a consultant there),

which precedes the 1955 version of NWIP 10-2

same
A second is that the drafters omitted a final part of the note, which would
book.
have concluded the law had changed because of World War II experience, the

Neutrality at Sea,

in the

Doenitz judgment and perhaps treaty interpretation principles of desuetude, impossibility of performance (perhaps the situation of an aircraft

enemy merchantman),

which attacks an

or fundamental change of circumstances because of the

armed and in convoys, lifting goods for the
771
This is negated by earlier language in the note
war effort in a global conflict.
228
A
and lack of amendments in six later manual supplements over nearly 20 years.
third is that the War College drafters intended the World War II experience as a
229
"soft law" coda to the "hard law" of the Protocol and a parallel customary norm.
universal use of merchantmen, often
77ft

The

difficulty

with this

analysis in 1955

is

that these concepts were not part of international law

and were only beginning

10-2 supplement was published.

230

to

appear in 1974,

sels, still

to

the last

NWIP

The reason for the difference is thus not clear.

The 1976 US Air Force manual quoted NWIP
and concluded: "The extent

when

which

10-2, noted trends in practice,

this traditional

immunity of merchant ves-

formally recognized, will be observed in practice in future conflicts will

depend upon the nature of the conflict, its intensity, the parties to the conflict and
various geographical, political and military factors."

Ambiguities of the

first

231

round of post- World War

II military

manuals thus

NWP

NWP

match the differences (and difficulties) among commentators.
9A and
1-14M represent improvement. Besides adopting WIP 10-2's category approach
for vessels subject to attack and destruction without warning, they publish the

N

Protocol text, review World War

and

ity as a current rule of law,

.

.

.

[Ejnemy merchant

warships,

...

.

.

.

II practice,

note debate over the Protocol's valid-

close thus:

vessels

may be

attacked and destroyed by surface

with or without prior warning, in any of the following circumstances

If integrated into the

compliance with

.

.

.

the

.

.

.

enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining

effort

and

Protocol would, under the circumstances of the specific

encounter, subject the surface warship to imminent danger or would otherwise

preclude mission accomplishment.

The NWPs then say that rules for surrender and search for the missing and collection of the shipwrecked, wounded, sick and the dead also apply to enemy mer232
chantmen and civil aircraft that may become subject to attack and destruction.
The NWPs then recite the same rules for submarines, including a statement that
the Protocols apply to submarine attacks, but noting the "impracticality of

imposing on submarines the same targeting constraints

as

burden surface warships

The Tanker War
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World War II
attacked and destroyed without warning enemy mer-

[being] reflected in the practice of belligerents of both sides during

when submarines

regularly

chant shipping[,]" justified as reprisal or as "a necessary consequence of the arming of merchant vessels, of convoying, and of the general integration of merchant

shipping into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort." Like surface ships,

submarines must search for the missing and collect the shipwrecked, sick and

A third

wounded, to the extent military exigencies permit, after an engagement.

analysis for aircraft attacks follows the pattern of those for surface warships

submarines, except that

NWP 1-14M adds armed merchantmen to the

places Category (2), active resistance to visit

and search,

list,

in a footnote that

not be part of the commander's version of the manual. Moreover,
reference to the Protocol for aircraft attacks, a change from the

and
and

would

iheNWPs omit

NWIP 10-2 view,

although they require military aircraft to search for the missing and collect the
shipwrecked, wounded and sick, to the extent military exigencies permit.

The San Remo Manual, published in 1995 in between iheNJVPs, discusses the
235
"failure" of the London Protocol
but adopts its principles as a standard for captured

merchantmen:
.

.

.

[A] captured

destroyed

when

vessel

may,

as

an exceptional measure, be

military circumstances preclude taking or sending such a vessel for

adjudication as an
(a)

enemy merchant

enemy

prize, only if the following criteria are

the safety of passengers and crew

is

provided

for; for this

met beforehand:
purpose, the ship's

boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers

and crew

is

assured in the prevailing sea and weather conditions by the prox-

imity of land or the presence of another vessel which

(b)

them on board;
documents and papers

(c)

if feasible,

is

in a position to take

relating to the prize are safeguarded;

and

personal effects of the passengers and crew are saved.

Destruction of enemy passenger vessels carrying only civilians at sea is prohibited.

For passenger safety, these liners must be diverted to an "appropriate area" or port
to

complete capture. Thus except for a prohibition on destruction of passenger

ships carrying only passengers, which must be diverted for completion of capture,

the Manual adopts the Protocol's
tion of

enemy merchantmen

if

literal

language, which says

it

applies to destruc-

they persistently refuse to stop upon being duly

summoned or if they actively resist visit and search. The Manual does not state an
alternative for disabling a vessel, mentioned in the Protocol. The Manual applies
its

terms to aircraft attacks under these circumstances.

The Manual treats the Protocol rules, like the rules for visit, search and destruc737

tion as alternatives to attack.

In effect they are indicia of proportionality; the

Manual says that "Indeed, it could be argued that according to the wording of the
[London Protocol]
destruction of merchant ships can be considered legal as
.

.

.

long as passengers, crew and ship's papers have been placed in safety."

One

Law

should add that any right to destroy a merchantmen
ting destruction

is

Armed

of

Conflict
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subject to categories permit-

In effect, the Manual

and exemptions, e.g., for hospital ships.

sees the Protocol principles as indicia of proportionality for particular situations

in naval war.

Given the divergence among individual commentators, the collective

effort of

among operational law manuals, what is the status of the Protocol
today? While it would appear that its literal language is not binding law, many of
the Manual, and

its

policies are reflected in rules of law.

A perhaps oversimplified analysis might

be:

1.

If

an enemy-flag merchantman

falls

within any of the categories listed

above, clearly recognized in international law,
stroyed without
2.

3.

This principle

is

it

may be attacked and de-

warning. 242
subject to an important qualification: Certain classes of

merchantmen may never be attacked if they are operating within exceptions granted by law, e.g., hospital ships operating as such. 243
As an option to attack, a belligerent's warship may choose to visit and
search, followed by destruction as an alternative to sending in as prize,
with diversion as an option to completing visit and search on the high
seas. As a further alternative to the foregoing, a warship may first order a
merchant ship to divert to an appropriate place where visit and search

may be conducted. 244
245

4.

Principles of necessity and proportionality apply to

5.

Preserving crew's and passengers' lives and property, and ship's papers,

all attacks.

are very important proportionality factors if necessity indicates an en-

emy merchantman's

destruction

is

appropriate.

The London

Protocol

and proportionality. Even here,
however, there are gradations, with passenger and crew effects having a
lower priority than the lives of crew and passengers and ship's papers. 246
By the same token, a decisionmaker must take into account possible costs
in his or her force members' lives, and property, if, e.g., visit and search as
opposed to attack without warning is considered. 247 While the LONW
sets a high premium on humanity aboard the target ship through law
flowing from the London Protocol and humanitarian law after destruction of a ship, where assistance is subject to circumstances after attack, 248
states specific principles of necessity

humankind aboard

a belligerent platform before projected destruction of

the target also has high value. Admiral Service has emphasized the value

of

human

beings aboard a belligerent platform, 249 risk of loss of

life

aboard each platform, the attacking platform(s) and the merchant ship,

and the military value of the merchantman, must be thrown into the necessity and proportionality balance. It might be argued that this point is
new to the LOAC and humanitarian law in particular, i.e., that lives
aboard an attacking ship should not be taken into account in striking the
proportionality balance. This argument does not square with emerging
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basic principles of human rights law,
right to life,"

which

inter alia declare

an "inherent

which cannot be derogated during public emergency. 250

Nor does it square with

the possibility that loss of "smart" attacking plat-

forms engaged in rescue may result in more casualties when that belligerent must resort to less sophisticated weaponry that

of life for both sides. Last, the argument

flies in

may entail greater loss

the face of a basic policy

be conducted by means calculated to engender the least bitterness and hatred, so that a more lasting and just peace
can be more easily achieved at war's end. 251 And while the latter is usually considered a problem of the defeated State, one might ask whether
of the law of warfare, that

it

the Versailles victors' decisions for the vanquished Central Powers were

6.

by the enormous

on the Western Front, and
that these decisions contributed to what many have seen as onerous peace
treaties that led to Adolf Hitler and World War II? Suppose the British
invention of the tank had worked, the German lines had broken with relatively light loss of life, and there had been an armistice at that point?
The foregoing apply to all modalities of attack, i.e., by surface warships,
submarines, or aircraft. 252 Different principles of proportionality and
partly motivated

necessity

may

dictate different options for different platforms, indeed

different options for the
size of the

loss of life

merchant

same platform under

ship, military value of

its

different conditions,

cargo, heavy or moderate

temperate weather, relative nearness of enemy forces,

seas, cold or

does not seem logical,

e.g.,

to say that aircraft attacks should not

sidered in the light of London Protocol requirements.
tack

jet

cannot do

pursuant to

strict

much about

e.g.,

etc. It

be con-

To be sure, an

at-

placing crew and passengers in safety

Protocol standards, but a

method of attack

{e.g.,

ship-

disabling fire instead of ship-destroying weapons) might be appropriate,

given the nature and military value of the cargo and ship, so that the crew

could use lifeboats.

By

the opposite token, a large helicopter might be

winch a surviving crewman of a small craft to safety aboard the helicopter under some circumstances, and that might be taken into account. Moreover, if attack will be coordinated among, e.g., three or more
platforms, e.g., aircraft, surface warship and submarine, having different
basic rules for each invites confusion. Operational plans or orders and
ROE can spell out proportionate actions dictated by the situation.
Although this Part has discussed attacks on enemy merchant ships in the
LOAC context, the same kinds of necessity and proportionality are at
play in the conditioning factors of necessity and proportionality in the
self-defense 253 context. The content of necessity and proportionality will
able to

7.

be different;

e.g.,

while a deliberate confrontation with an enemy mer-

chantman might dictate visit and search of e.g., a suspected intelligencetransmitting merchantman (perhaps to have a look at its equipment before ordering destruction or other action) with Protocol provision for

crew and passengers, while in

a self-defense situation, particularly with

Law

of

Armed

Conflict
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an immediate problem of anticipatory self-defense, destruction might be
appropriate under self-defense necessity and proportionality principles.

In any case, after the merchant vessel has been sunk, the attacking plat-

8.

form^) must search

for the missing

and

collect the shipwrecked, sick,

wounded and dead in accordance with humanitarian

law, taking into ac-

count "all possible measures," i.e., risk of hazard to the platform that has
conducted an attack or destruction with the possibility of loss of additional life if the platform engages in this effort, the capabilities of the
platform, etc. Thus a submarine, having legitimately attacked and sunk a

might not be able to conduct search and rescue because of danger to
from enemy attack while on the surface, with resultant loss of more life,
because of hull configuration, or because of capacity on board to accommodate more people, the case of a small submarine. An attack jet might
be able to do no more than report that there are survivors in the water,
while some helicopters, depending on the operational situation and their
size and capabilities, might be able to pick up some or all. A surface warship might be able to pick up all, unless there is the possibility of successful fatal attack on the warship with more resultant casualties or heavy
ship,

it

seas; this

occurred after sinking of the Bismarck during World War II.

the other hand,

if destruction

On

occurs after visit and search, and there is no

on the visiting platform(s) with resultant loss of crew
in perhaps a combined surface ship and helicopter operation, humanitarian law dictates picking up survivors if, e.g., the merchantman's lifeboats
do not operate properly or it appears London Protocol requirements can-

possibility of attack

not otherwise be met. 254
9.

Principles 1-8 are subject to

taken pursuant

UN Security Council decisions and actions

to them. 255

This seems an appropriate way to cut the Gordian Knot of responding
ern warfare's technological

realities,

ond Convention and Protocol
legitimate under the

I

London

to

mod-

Protocol requirements and Sec-

principles for an attack or destruction otherwise

LOAC or self-defense principles.

The foregoing assumes a potentially legitimate target. The LOAC, and humanitarian law in particular, has declared that certain objects, enemy-flag vessels or en-

emy-flag

civil aircraft, are

employed in
acts

their capacity

not legitimate objects of capture or attack,

if

they are

exempting them from capture or attack, do not commit

harmful to an opposing enemy, immediately submit to identification and

spection

when

hamper combatants' movements, and obey bel7S7
move out of the way when required.
If, e.g., they are

required, do not

ligerents' orders to stop or

not so employed or do not obey orders to stop
subject to other action, e.g., attack

empt

in-

vessels include:

for, e.g., visit

and search, they may be

and destruction under some circumstances. Ex-
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1.

Hospital ships; 258

2.

Small
ports;

3.

4.

craft
259

used for coastal rescue operations and other medical trans-

conduct for transporting
prisoners of war, diplomats or other noncombatants, e.g., civilians from a
war zone or repatriated civilians; 260
Ships engaged in humanitarian missions, including those carrying supCartel ships,

vessels belligerents grant safe

i.e.,

plies indispensable to civilian population survival,
relief or rescue operations,

and ships engaged

pursuant to the belligerents' agreement;

in

261

5.

Ships transporting cultural property under special protection; 262

6.

Passenger vessels

7.

Ships on religious, scientific or philanthropic missions; 264

8.

Small coastal fishing vessels or small boats in local coastal trade; 265

9.

Vessels designed or adapted exclusively for responding to pollution inci-

when engaged only in carrying civilian passengers; 263

dents involving the marine environment, perhaps not a customary

but introduced by the San Remo Manual; 2 ^
10.

Ships or vessels of any size

{e.g.,

norm

boats) or aircraft that have surren-

dered; 267
11.

Life rafts and lifeboats; 268 or

12.

Vessels a belligerent gives a unilateral safe-conduct or license, perhaps by

proclamation. 269

There is no customary exemption

for ships driven ashore

by force majeure.

270

Mail

ships are not exempt; there seems to be no custom to exempt them, although the

sue is not free of doubt.
tanic (lost in 1912) is

271

However, if a mail ship,e.£., R.M.S. (Royal Mail Ship)

exempt

for another reason,

carrying only passengers and no military cargo,

capture or attack.

272

it

Enemy merchant vessels in

are otherwise exempt,

e.g.

Titanic, as a

is-

Ti-

passenger liner

normally would not be subject to
an belligerent's port, unless they

a hospital ship or a passenger vessel
273
passengers aboard, are not exempt from capture or attack.
e.g.,

with only civilian

By the opposite token, if a ship otherwise exempt from attack is used for war efor

fort,

that ship

if it is

otherwise used in activity that removes

may be

it

from exempt

subject to capture or attack, depending

on circumstances.

Rules of engagement or operational plans or orders can direct options,
sion instead of visit

wise exempt,

and

status,

e.g.,

77 ft

diver-

search, limit capture or destruction of vessels not other-

277
etc.

Certain kinds of enemy civil aircraft are also exempt from attack:
aircraft; 278

1.

Medical

2.

Aircraft granted safe conduct

3.

Civil airliners. 280

by

belligerents; 279 or

Law

of
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As with exempt enemy merchant vessels and exempt ships, enemy aircraft other281
they are subject to
wise exempt can lose this status under certain conditions,
282
283
and UN Security Council decisions.
Rules of enself-defense considerations
gagement or operation plans or orders can further limit capture or destruction of
aircraft

2.

not otherwise exempt.

Acquiring Enemy Character
Neutral merchantmen

ities

3.

284

may acquire enemy character by acting in various capac-

on behalf of belligerents. Part

D discusses this.

Convoying by Belligerents
Principles applicable to neutral warships' convoying, escorting or accompany-

ing neutral merchantmen that are not carrying goods for a belligerent's war effort

have been discussed.

285

When a belligerent's warships or military aircraft convoy,

accompany merchantmen flying its flag, the result is quite different.
These convoys are presumed to be military convoys and, being lawful military objectives,
are subject to attack, with or without warning, and may be defended by
the convoying State, just as independently steaming merchantmen may be pro287
The exception is if the convoy, escorted ship or accompanied ship is entected.
titled to protected status, i.e., coastal fishing vessels engaged in their trade and not
288
contributing to the enemy war effort.
An enemy warship or military aircraft,
escort or

unless exempted,

e.g.,

as part of a cartel ship operation, is subject to attack

even

if

the convoyed, escorted or accompanied vessels are not.

4.

Principles of Contraband

The law of contraband in naval warfare only applies to goods inbound to a belligerent.

289

Goods with a neutral destination coming from a belligerent's port can-

not be contraband.

290

classified as aiding the

This

is

not to say, however, that these goods

may

not be

enemy war effort, i.e., warfighting or war-sustaining goods,

and therefore subject to an opponent's options, discussed in Parts C.l

-

C.2,

which

when under

include visit and search, diversion, and in some circumstances,

e.g.,

enemy

Contraband was

direction or control, attack

and destruction of the

vessel.

associated with neutral-flag merchantmen during the Tanker War, if at all, and the

principal discussion

5.

is

in Part D.

The Tanker War

Did Iran and Iraq comply with the principles of attack and destruction of en291
emy-flag merchantmen
during the Tanker War? Iran conducted visit and search
292
operations on numerous merchant ships during the war,
but there is no firm evidence of attempts to destroy these ships incident to these operations. Iraq^ lacking

much of a navy or aircraft capable of visit and search, did not use these procedures.
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The

question then comes to the legitimacy of Iraqi air attacks on Irani-flag mer-

chantmen, and of Iranian

air

fortunately, the record

not clear as to whether these attacks, as distinguished

is

and surface attacks on

from attacks on neutral-flag merchant ships,

293

Iraqi-flag

merchantmen. Un-

occurred. Analysis proceeds on an

assumption that these attacks occurred.

The
empted

record

is fairly

clear that these attacks did not involve destruction of ex-

vessels or aircraft,

e.g.,

There were no

hospital ships or civil airliners.

claims of self-defense attacks on them. There were no Security Council decisions

were conducted under the

affecting these aspects of the war. All belligerent attacks

law of naval warfare.

Given Iraqi propensity to use long-distance weapons
whatever

flag,

merchantmen of

to attack

without discrimination between those carrying war-fighting or

war-sustaining goods or otherwise subject to attack without warning

295

and those

with other cargoes, the attacks clearly lacked proportionality, unless in the case of
cargoes subject to attack Iraq knew, or had reason to
ture of the cargoes. Attacks
it is

assumed

that these

know at the time,

296

r

of the na-

on vessels not carrying these goods might be excused if

were cases of legitimate collateral damage,

297
e.g.,

attack conducted against a proper target results in a missile's seeking

another vessel, despite the attacking platform's best
of similar Iranian attacks. Since attack

jets

298
)

if it is

there was

and hitting

The same can be

conducted these attacks,

matter of this warfare mode (and as a matter of law,
Protocol does not apply to aircraft attacks

efforts.

where an
said

as a practical

accepted that the London

little to

no opportunity for

humanitarian law survivor assistance. Perhaps the belligerents notified other vessels

to

of the survivors;

299
y

the record

is

silent

on the point.

If Iran

and Iraq had reason

know there were survivors (which cannot be assumed, given

the distances from which
feasible

some

attacks were conducted),

the fog of war and

and did not do what was

under the circumstances, there were humanitarian law

violations.

Iranian attacks by surface warships, whether destroyer types or speedboats, and
its

helicopter attacks stand on different footing.

Here Iran had

a

much

better op-

portunity for other options. In some situations, to be sure, there was a risk of Iraqi
attack

on belligerent forces

at sea,

and under these circumstances, attack

in lieu of

other operations was a permissible mode. However, in cases where there was no
possibility of attack, the option of visit

and search or diversion should have been

given strong, perhaps imperative, consideration,

if this

option was feasible. If visit

and search had been conducted, and destruction were ordered by a surface combatant,

compliance with London Protocol and humanitarian law requirements was

mandatory. Given that attack was a valid option, the issue is whether the attack was
necessary and proportional under circumstances

been known

known

or which should have

The record on this issue is less than clear, and will
likely be forever enshrouded. The same can be said of Iran's duty to attend to surviat

the time.

vors in the water. If

it

was possible, Iran should have searched

for the missing,

1
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Conflict

2 A]

shipwrecked, sick, wounded or dead after an engagement.

In many cases, partic-

ularly those involving surface ship attacks, Iran probably

had a capability to do so

and did

not. If so, Iran

was guilty of humanitarian law

Iranian warships and perhaps other platforms

{e.g.,

violations.

military helicopters, fixed-

wing aircraft) convoyed tankers carrying petroleum down its coast, using Iranian
302
Iranian-flag merchantmen were subject to
coastal waters as much as possible.
Iraqi attack while being convoyed; Iran could defend these ships under the

LO AC,

303

As will be seen, neutral flag merchantmen participatThese convoys should be distining in these convoys were also subject to attack.
guished from situations where neutral-flag warships convoyed, escorted or
accompanied neutral-flag merchantmen carrying cargoes that were not part of the
belligerents' war efforts; these convoys were not subject to belligerent attacks as lelike

any other Iraqi target.

gitimate targets.
survivors,

etc.,

305

In either case, however, the humanitarian law or

LOS rules for

applied.

Neutral-flag warships could respond in self-defense to belligerents' air and surface ship attacks

vessels flying the warship's flag, or the flag of an-

merchantmen were not lifting
307
the merchantmen steamed
war-fighting or war-sustaining goods,

other neutral
belligerent

on merchant

if that

neutral requested

it,

if

the

independently, or were convoyed, escorted or accompanied.

308

Neutral warships

and merchantmen they convoyed, escorted or accompanied had obligations
to the missing, shipwrecked, sick,

wounded

to see
309

or dead after each engagement.

Other merchantmen in the area of the engagement but not involved in the attack
also

had an

in the

LOS duty to assist with search and rescue. 310 Duties of ships involved

LOAC

engagement devolved from the

defense

31

under the law of

self-

through the LOS conventions' "other rules" clauses, the customary law

of the sea, and Article 103 of the Charter,
in the

as applied

engagement only had

LOS

on

other ships in the area but not involved

obligations.

Similarly, neutrals could respond to
face ship attacks

312

313

what were perceived to be air, mine or sur-

their military aircraft or warships

in self-defense,

but in

these cases neutrals also had obligations to see to the missing, shipwrecked, sick,

wounded

or dead after each engagement.

316

In these situations as well, the

did not apply during the engagement; duties to rescue,

LOAC as applied under the law of self-defense

317

etc.,

through the

LOS

devolved from the

LOS conventions'

other rules clauses, the customary law of the sea, and Article 103 of the Charter.

318

Merchantmen in the area but not involved in the engagement were obligated to at319
tempt rescue pursuant to the LOS.
Although the record is not clear, perhaps owing to the fog of war or incomplete
reporting, there is no indication that neutral military aircraft, warships and merchantmen involved in air or surface attacks on them did not attempt to succor victims after these attacks by Iran or Iraq, or the occasional erroneous and tragic
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attacks

by neutral forces on neutral

neutral-flag shipping

(e.g.,

firings

aircraft

(e.g.

the U.S.S. Vincennes incident) or

on dhows or fishing

370

vessels).

There appear to have been no incidents of battles between Iranian and Iraqi naother military forces over the high seas; their territorial seas, continental

val, air or

shelves,

EEZs, or contiguous zones; or neutrals' EEZs or continental shelves. Con-

sequently, the general rule (subject to important qualifications) allowing belliger-

ent combat in these areas, as well as belligerents' inland waters and territories,

321

was not at stake during the Tanker War. Similarly, there was no application of the
requirement to recover those

on land and

yond

this

lost at sea or the dead.

322

The story was

far different

in belligerents' inland waters, but these aspects of the conflict are be-

volume's scope.

Merchantmen: Enemy Character;
Reflagging; Contraband

Part D. Neutral Flag

During the Tanker War, neutral flag merchantmen carried much of the trade
323
r
apart from petroleum Iraq
between the belligerents and the outside world,
Iran
pumped through pipelines to Turkey, Syria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,
through pipelines to
the

USSR.

326

its

southern Gulf ports,

325

and perhaps through pipelines

Iran conducted visit and search operations aboard neutral flag mer-

chantmen, looking

for cargoes destined to benefit the Iraqi

belligerents attacked

in the war.

neutral flag

328

both

Iran published a contraband

to these issues, specifically

merchantmen acquired enemy character

amenable to attack because they, e.g.,
belligerent's

327
effort;

329

This Part examines claims related

when

war

and damaged or destroyed some of these ships, sometimes by

surface ship or aircraft attacks, but also by mining.
list late

to

lifted

whether and

so as to render

them

warfigh ting/war-sustaining goods for a

war effort; the effect of reflagging; and the doctrine of contraband, in-

cluding the continuous voyage rule. If a neutral merchant ship or aircraft has not
acquired
the sea,

enemy character, it may be subject to approach and visit under the law of

330

or visit

and search pursuant to the law of armed conflict,

331

but

erwise exempt from capture or attack and destruction, and doubly so

exempt

vessel or aircraft.

332

Neutral exempt vessels

may

it is

oth-

if it is

also acquire

an

enemy

character.

1.

Vessels

and Aircraft

that Have or Acquire

Enemy Character

A ship operating under an enemy flag or an aircraft with enemy markings possesses

enemy character. Just because

a

merchant ship

flies a

neutral flag or an air-

craft has neutral

markings does not necessarily establish neutral character. Any

merchantman or

aircraft a belligerent

gardless of whether

it is

owns or controls has enemy

character, re-

operating under a neutral flag or has neutral markings.

333

Law

of

Armed

Conflict

381

An opposing belligerent may treat ships or aircraft acquiring enemy character as if
they are

enemy vessels

or aircraft.

Neutral ships and civil aircraft are prima facie neutral in character if flying a neutral flag

or bearing neutral markings.

ligerent

may treat them

as

335

They acquire enemy character, and a bel-

enemy warships

or military aircraft

if

they take direct

part in hostilities on the enemy's side or act in any capacity as a naval or military
auxiliary in

enemy armed

capture, attack

forces.

and destruction

as

This unneutral service makes them subject to

though they were enemy-flag warships.

Neutral merchant ships and civil aircraft acquire enemy character, and a belligerent

may treat them as enemy merchantmen or civil aircraft, if they are operating

directly under enemy control, orders, charter,

employment or direction, including
337
operating in convoys escorted by belligerent aircraft and/or warships.
Under
these circumstances they may be subject to visit and search, diversion, capture, attack or destruction, depending on the situation and perhaps whether they are in an
338
Neutral merchant ships or civil aircraft that retain
exempt category of ship.
neutral character also may be captured and perhaps destroyed, and may be at339
if they:
tacked if they resist visit and search or diversion,

2.

Avoid attempts to identify them;
Resist visit and search;

3.

Carry contraband;

4.

Break or attempt to break blockade;

5.

Present irregular or fraudulent ship's papers, lack necessary ship's pa-

1.

pers, or destroy, conceal or deface ship's papers;
6.

Violate rules a belligerent establishes for the immediate area of naval
operations;

7.
8.

Carry personnel in the enemy's military or public service; or
Communicate information in the enemy's interest, e.g., by communicating belligerent warship movements on the high seas. 340

A neutral platform may be liable to capture if it engages in more than one of these,
by resisting visit and search while carrying an opposing belligerent's military
personnel. Neutral merchantmen are not liable to capture because they carry military or public service personnel or for communicating information in the enemy's
interest, at the beginning of a war, if the ship is unaware of the opening of hostili-

e.g.,

ties or, in

them
know about a war

the case of military, etc., passengers has not been able to disembark

after learning of the

opening of hostilities.

A vessel is deemed to

if it leaves

an enemy port after war begins, or if it leaves a neutral port after notice of

hostilities

has been made in sufficient time to a neutral whose port the merchantman

departs. Because of the ease of

worldwide communications today, there

sumption that the merchantman knows of the outbreak of hostilities.

is

a pre-

Captured

The Tanker War

382

vessels are sent in for adjudication as prize; they

circumstances.

destroyed under certain

in the case of enemy flag

merchantmen, these specific principles are subject
the general principles of necessity and proportionality, either in the context of

As

to

may be

342

self-defense or the

LONW, depending on the circumstances.

Under the LOAC

the belligerent whom these vessels serve may defend them, like any legitimate military target.
344

They are also subject to any UN

Security Council decisions on the

sit-

uation.

If a neutral
e.g.

merchant vessel or

by operating

civil aircraft

as a military auxiliary for

has taken direct part in hostilities,

enemy

its officers

forces,

and crew

may be made prisoners of war. On the other hand, officers and crew of neutral ships
or aircraft that have acquired

enemy character by other means, e.g., operating in an

must be repatriated as soon as circumstances permit.
enemy convoy,
Enemy
nationals who are armed forces members, employed in the enemy's public service
or are suspected of service in the enemy's interests, may be prisoners of war. They

may be removed from

the neutral vessel or aircraft regardless of whether the plat-

form is subject to capture as prize. Other enemy nationals are not subject to capture
or detention.

348
'

These humanitarian law principles may be subject

Council decisions.

2.

to Security

349

The Effect ofReflagging

The law of the sea has developed detailed, if less than clear, provisions for vessel
350
nationality and therefore when a vessel may fly a State's flag.
These do not apply
351
during armed conflict.
During war a merchantman flying an enemy flag is con352
clusively presumed to have enemy character.
A merchantman flying a neutral
353
The question of when
flag is prima facie presumed to have neutral character.
there

is

a proper transfer of flag

prize court decisions go either

This issue cannot

cile.

from

a belligerent to a neutral is less

way on whether

the test

is

than clear;

nationality or domi-

arise if a neutral-flag vessel validly transfers its flag pur-

suant to the law of the sea to another neutral as long as the nature of the carriage

does not change. These principles are subject to any Security Council decisions on
the subject in a particular conflict.

3.

355

Contraband Issues

The law of contraband deals with cargoes inbound to a belligerent.

356

Outbound

cargoes from a belligerent cannot be classified as contraband under traditional
law.

357

However, they may be subject

to other principles,

e.g.,

material that con-

tributes to a belligerent's warfighting/war-sustaining capability.

Traditionally goods shipped to the
traband, goods whose character

358

enemy have been divided into absolute con-

makes

it

obvious they are destined for use in war;

conditional contraband, goods that can either be used for war or for other

Law

purposes,

e.g.,

food; "free goods," cargo that

is

of

Armed

not considered contraband under

any circumstances. Belligerents sometimes published contraband
distorted differences between absolute

359
lists,

Practice during the

often varied according to circumstances of the war.

Wars

383

Conflict

which

World

and conditional contraband;

nev-

some recent conflicts belligerents have published contraband lists.
Treaties tried to define rules for absolute and conditional contraband and free
goods. For example, the unratified 1909 London Declaration said these might be
ertheless, in

treated as absolute contraband without notice to other States:

(1)

Arms

of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive

component

parts.

(2) Projectiles, charges,

and cartridges of all kinds, and their

distinctive

compo-

nent parts.
(3)

Powder and explosives

(4)

Gun-mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons,

specially prepared for use in war.

component parts.
Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military

field forges,

and

their distinctive
(5)

character.

(6) All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character.
(7) Saddle,

draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war.

(8) Articles of camp equipment,
(9)

and

their distinctive

component

parts.

component

parts of such a

Armour plates.

(10) Warships, including boats,

and

their distinctive

nature that they can only be used on a vessel of war.
(11)

Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, for the manufacture or repair of arms, or war material for use on
land or

sea.

Articles used exclusively for

which had

to

be published.

tional contraband,
for

war might be added

The

to a list of absolute contraband,

Declaration had a similar long

which could be captured without notice

list

for condi-

to other States if used

war purposes:
(1) Foodstuffs.
(2)

Forage and grain, suitable for feeding animals.

(3) Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes, suitable for use in war.
(4)

Gold and

silver in coin or bullion;

paper money.

(5) Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their component parts.

(6) Vessels, craft,

component
(7)

and boats of all kinds; floating docks, parts of docks and

their

parts.

Railway material, both fixed and rolling-stock, and material for telegraphs,
wireless telegraphs,

and telephones.

(8) Balloons and flying machines and their distinctive component parts, together
with accessories and articles recognizable as intended for use in connection

with balloons and flying machines.
(9) Fuel; lubricants.

(10)

Powder and explosives not

specially prepared for use in war.
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Barbed wire and implements

(11)

for fixing

and cutting the same.

(12) Horseshoes and shoeing materials.
(13) Harness and saddlery.

(14) Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers,

and all kinds of nautical instruments.

More items could be added to a conditional contraband list by notice to

States.

Countries could also publish items for which they had waived status as contra-

World War

band.

I

belligerents soon rejected this

list

as all-inclusive.

The Declaration also stated that "Articles which are not susceptible of use in
war may not be declared contraband of war," i.e., they would be considered free
goods.

It

(1)

then attempted a comprehensive

Raw cotton, wool,

silk, jute, flax,

list

of these:

hemp, and other raw materials of the

and yarns of the same.
and nuts; copra.
Rubber, resins, gums, and lacs; hops.
Raw hides and horns, bones, and ivory.
Natural and artificial manures, including

textile

industries,

(2) Oil seeds
(3)
(4)
(5)

nitrates

and phosphates

for agricul-

tural purposes.
(6) Metallic ores.

(7) Earths, clays, lime, chalk, stone,

including marble, bricks,

slates,

and

tiles.

Chinaware and glass.
(9) Paper and paper-making materials.
(10) Soap, paint and colors, including articles exclusively used in their manufacture, and varnish.
(11) Bleaching powder, soda ash, caustic soda, salt cake, ammonia, sulphate of ammonia, and sulphate of copper.
(12) Agricultural, mining, textile, and printing machinery.
(13) Precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, mother-of-pearl, and coral.
(14) Clocks and watches, other than chronometers.
(15) Fashion and fancy goods.
(16) Feathers of all kinds, hairs, and bristles.
(17) Articles of household furniture and decoration; office furniture and
(8)

requisites.

and wounded, which in case of "urgent military necessity" and subject to payment of compensation could be requisitioned if not destined for the enemy.
Articles intended for the use of the vessel in which they are found, as well as
367
those intended for use of her crew and passengers during the voyage.

(18) Articles serving exclusively to aid the sick

(19)

These lists' very length and complexity articulates problems States discovered five

World War I began. As with weapons development and arms conAbsotrol agreements today, technology had already begun to outrun the lists.
lute contraband lists began to swell, and there were constant disputes over
369
conditional contraband. The free goods lists shrank.
A modern list of free
years later when

goods, reflecting recent humanitarian law conventions, includes:

Law

of

Armed

385

Conflict

(a)

Religious objects;

(b)

Articles intended exclusively for treatment of the

(c)

Clothing, bedding, essential foodstuffs, and means of shelter for the civilian

wounded and

sick

and

for

disease prevention;

population in general, and
is

women and

children in particular, provided there

not serious reason to believe such goods will be diverted to other purpose, or

would not accrue to the enemy by their subwould thereby become available for military

that a definite military advantage
stitution for

enemy goods

that

purposes;
(d)

Items destined for prisoners of war, including individual parcels and collective relief shipments

containing food, clothing, educational, cultural and rec-

reational articles;

Goods otherwise specifically exempted from capture by international
by special arrangement between belligerents; and
Other goods not susceptible of use in armed conflict. 370

(e)

(f)

Modern

treaty or

LONW manuals and other publications have abandoned distinctions

between absolute and conditional contraband.
structions published abbreviated

371

US Navy World War I and II in-

of what was contraband, saying that articles

lists

and materials exempted by treaty provisions, e.g., with

still-extant bilateral agree-

ments, would not be contraband, and that upon outbreak of or during hostilities
the United States might publish
States.

There was no

Current

and goods
goods

free

goods

of other items. This was followed by other

lists

372
list.

US naval manuals take the position that if a State wishes to seize ships
for carrying contraband, all that is necessary is a publication of a free

373
list.

The San Remo Manual

publish a contraband

list

must
The Lon-

takes the opposite view; a belligerent

before goods

may be seized on this account.

don Declaration had required publication of all items not on its absolute or condi375
tional contraband lists.
(The Helsinki Principles take no position on the
*

issue.

)

Now

that the Declaration lists are obsolete,

is

the notice requirement

also obsolete?

Given the uncertainty of what may or may not be contraband, and uncertainty
of a publication requirement, a more prudent course is for States to publish contra-

band

lists; this

publish
zones,
lish
lists

lists

379

likely

remains a requirement of international law.

of free goods despite treaty

378
lists,

blockade declarations.

would not

380

and must pub-

Proper publication of contraband and free goods

limit applying a belligerent's other options,

search, diversion, capture, attack, destruction,
that have acquired

They must

must publish notice of war

must let neutrals know about areas of naval operations,
381

377

etc.,

of neutral

e.g.,

visit

and

merchantmen

enemy character, e.g., by serving as intelligence collectors for

the enemy or sailing in

enemy convoy.

38?

Published contraband and free goods

should begin with a general warning that a belligerent reserves rights to
search, divert, capture, attack, destroy, etc., neutral

visit

lists

and

merchant ships under the law

386
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of naval warfare,

if that is

the case. Publishing a contraband

items as absolute contraband, would inform
that carry them,

may be

ing a free goods

all

and labeling

that these cargoes,

and vessels

subject to condemnation as prize. Similarly, publish-

with warnings that these goods,

list,

list,

if

used for enemy

war-fighting or war-sustaining effort or for other reasons that would subject the

and search, diversion, capture, attack or destruction, would clarify what is considered free goods. An option to the latter would be a general notice, to the effect that the proclaiming belligerent will observe its 1949 Geneva
Conventions obligations and other humanitarian law the belligerent recogvessel to visit

nizes,

e.g.,

Protocol

would be bound by
would clarify the
belligerents could

383
I.

it

Since

much

of the latter

is

customary law,

a belligerent

regardless of being a treaty party, but even here publication

As

issue.

in the case of cartel ships

and similar

make special arrangements for the conflict;

384

vessels,

while this might

be likely for free goods, particularly those of a humanitarian nature, a special agree-

ment on contraband

much

is

less likely.

Publishing contraband

lists

with warn-

ings of alternatives the belligerent might pursue, could have a practical effect, from
a

proclaiming belligerent's point of view, of deterring shipping from accepting

these cargoes. Such a proclamation could, of course, be a lightning rod for debates
like those that erupted

Yet another option

during World Wars I and II over contraband definitions.
is

385

for belligerents to arrange for certificates of noncontra-

band carriage, i.e., navicerts, aircerts and/or clearcerts, a customary practice of two
World Wars and as late as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Under this procedure a
belligerent agrees with a neutral State that the belligerent's consular officers
issue certificates stating that a ship's or aircraft's cargo has been

traband. Issuance of these certificates

found

may

free of con-

may minimize visit and search by the issuing

belligerent, although unneutral service of another kind,

e.g.,

serving as an intelli-

gence collector for the enemy, etc., may result in action by that belligerent. Certificates issued

by one belligerent have no effect on visit and search, etc.

belligerents.

,

rights of other

A neutral vessel's or aircraft's accepting a certificate does not consti-

tute unneutral service.

386

The continuous voyage rule may apply to contraband issues. In 1856 the Paris
Declaration laid down now-customary rules that neutral flags cover enemy goods,
except contraband and that neutral goods except contraband are not liable to capture under an enemy's flag (free ships, free goods).

387

The London Declaration declared absolute contraband liable to capture if destined to enemy or enemy-occupied territory or to enemy armed forces. "It is immaterial

whether the carriage of goods

is

direct or entails transshipment or a

subsequent transport by land." Conditional contraband
tined for

enemy armed

forces or an

is

liable to capture if des-

enemy government department,

unless cir-

cumstances in the latter case show the goods cannot be used for the war in progress,
currency and bullion excepted. Conditional contraband

is

not liable to capture

Law

unless found aboard a vessel

enemy, "and when
ception

is

it is

bound

Armed

Conflict

387

for territory belonging to or occupied

by the

of

not to be discharged in an intervening port."

The sole ex-

where the enemy has no seaboard. The continuous voyage

rule, as re-

London Declaration, says that if goods declared absolute contraband,
however defined, are bound for an enemy port or for a neutral port with provision
fined by the

how-

for transshipment to the enemy, or if goods declared conditional contraband,

ever defined, are

bound

for

an enemy that has no seaboard, those cargoes

may be

captured.

Conditional contraband destined for a neutral's port, with provision for trans-

shipment

to the

enemy, cannot be captured under the continuous voyage

rule.

This rule cannot apply to cargoes outbound from enemy or neutral ports, since
contraband principles apply only to inbound traffic. The rule cannot apply if there
has been no declaration of contraband. Finally, the rule as stated in the
Declaration

may have become a relic of the past, given longstanding trends toward

blurring distinctions between absolute and conditional contraband,
claring contraband at

all

and relying on capture,

carrying goods supporting or sustaining the
capture,

London

etc.,

for neutral

enemy war

effort,

389

or not de-

merchant ships

or other bases of

390
etc.

These principles are subject to UN Security Council decisions on the issue.
4.

391
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Neutral vessels carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining cargoes destined directly

to Iraq or Iran, or invoiced to

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE or other neutral States

for later transhipment, perhaps overland, to either of those belligerent States, were

subject to visit and search.

392

Some of these neutral merchantmen acquired enemy

became subject

393

Those sailing
in coastal convoys organized, directed and physically protected by Iran were a
394
clear example.
To the extent that they were convoyed, directed or protected by
Iran, neutral tankers carrying oil from Kharg and other Iranian ports, and therecharacter and

to possible attack

and destruction.

fore lifting war-sustaining cargoes, also acquired

wise subject to attack.

On

enemy

character and were like-

395

the other hand, Iraq, having lost

could not ship oil direct by sea.

It

its

coast

and ports

for

most of the war,

396

could only ship through pipelines to neutrals for

eventual lifting through Gulf and Mediterranean Sea ports, and then only after

oil

to these neutrals and had become neutral property. The last points
397
the factual record.
Under these circumstances, as a technical matter

had been sold

seem

to

of law,

be

if these

were bona fide

sales to neutrals,

and the oil thereby became the prop-

erty of neutral States or their nationals, vessels carrying this oil did not acquire en-

emy character. Any

attacks

on them were not valid under international law, and

there was nothing invalid for neutrals to convoy, escort or

(On the other hand,

if

the sales were shams, or

if

accompany these ships.

Iraq retained

title

until final

The Tanker War

388

destination, the rule would be the opposite.
tions were anything but arms-length

There is no indication that the transac-

and that title passed on neutral

territory, e.g.,

398

in Kuwait.)

Neutrals protested Iran's legitimate right to

chant ships.

399

If these protests

visit

and search neutral

flag

mer-

had led to active resistance to visit and search, Iran

could have used forceful means, up to and including destruction, to overcome that

No

resistance.

Iranian attacks appear to have occurred on this basis.

Reflagging Kuwait-owned tankers to the
trals' flags,

comported with the law of the

US

sea.

ensign,

and others

Since the tankers were registered

with a neutral State, and re-registered with another neutral country,

on transferring

flag

valid under the

LONW; it was valid under the LOS.

from belligerent

to other neu-

to neutral did not apply.

The

LONW rules

reflagging was

The law of contraband had little impact on the Tanker War. First, since its principles can only apply to cargo

inbound

to a belligerent,

the law of contraband

was not involved with shipments of oil outbound by the belligerents themselves.

The contiguous voyage rule

cannot have applied to shipments through pipeline

connections to neutrals (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey for Iraq, perhaps the

USSR

for Iran); these too

were outbound shipments,

for

which contraband law

does not apply.

Only in January 1 988 did Iran appear to publish a contraband list, the Iran Prize
Law, which inter alia declared as prize merchandise and means of transport belonging to neutral States or their nationals, if the merchandise or means of transport
could contribute effectively to the enemy's combat power, or if the means of transport, either directly or through a neutral intermediary, was an enemy of Iran.
This generalized statement was consonant with recent statements, either of situations where an opposing belligerent could attack a merchantman that had ac-

enemy character because it carried war-fighting or war-sustaining cargo
while under enemy direction or control,
or of the definition of contraband itself.
The Prize Law also appeared to recognize the foregoing principles, i.e.,
quired

contraband rules applied only to inbound
rule.

To be

sure, perhaps

traffic,

and the continuous voyage

from caution, the United States and other countries

declared their convoy, escort and accompanying operations did not involve con-

traband-carrying neutral merchantmen or goods contributing to belligerents' war
efforts,

but there

is

no indication

that these statements applied to

more than in-

bound traffic, e.g., tankers in ballast headed for Kuwait. There is nothing in these
statements by neutrals to indicate there had been prior contraband proclamations
by Iran or Iraq. They were merely statements of conformity with international law,
which permits neutral warship convoy of neutral merchantmen not carrying contraband.

409

Moreover, if it is accepted that publication of contraband
international law,

lists is

a requirement of

any Iranian captures on claims of contraband before January

Law

of

Armed

389

Conflict

1988 were not valid. The same can be said for any Iraqi captures during the conflict,
since apparently Iraq never published a contraband

points

The

list.

record on these

not clear as to whether there were any captures on this basis by either

is

belligerent.

no record of issues relating to free goods, and particularly items
which should pass to a belligerent by sea under humanitarian law. Nor is there any
There

is

also

indication of employing navicerts or similar procedures.

no

Similarly, there

UN Security Council decisions affecting these LONW issues.

analyzed
ity were

earlier, it

seems

fairly clear that

were

However,

as

standards of necessity and proportional-

not observed, particularly by Iraq in

its

long range,

fire

and forget attacks.

Moreover, the method of Iran's attacks on these merchantmen, even

if warranted

under the LONW, indicates that necessity and proportionality principles were not
observed in

all cases.

Part E.

The Law

of

Blockade and the Tanker War

There were statements early in the war about "blockade" of Iraq's small
line

and

Iraq's

of this Part

is

coast-

The theme

Kharg Island "blockade," mostly by commentators.

that neither belligerent could have effectively invoked the law of

blockade during the war.

1.

UN Charter and the Law of Blockade
The UN Charter, Article 42 declares that the Security Council may take action,

The

including blockade, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article

The Council authorized interdiction of
1 965, but not a blockade,
although a commen-

42 has never been formally invoked.

petroleum bound for Rhodesia in
tator says the operation

was

a

form of "pacific blockade,"

i.e.,

blockading a coast

UN
It may be argued, however, that Article 42 indirectly supported the UN

during time of peace, probably not allowed as a measure for States under the
Charter.
forces'

North Korea blockade, pursuant

rea.

Since Council decisions may supersede at least treaty law,

law

Council decisions

to aid

South Ko-

the traditional

may not apply in blockade operations when Council decisions authorize or di-

rect action.

2.

to

421

Blockade Under the Law of Naval Warfare

The
views,

traditional law of blockade, recited mostly in

custom or commentators'

may be stated fairly simply. Unlike issues related to contraband, which is

concerned with

traffic

inbound to a belligerent,

to prevent vessels or aircraft of all countries,

blockade

is

a belligerent's right

enemy and neutral, from

entering or

leaving specified ports, airfields or coastal areas under the sovereignty, occupation
or control of the enemy. Belligerent visit and search interdicts the flow of contra-

band goods;

belligerent blockade tries to prevent ships

and

aircraft, regardless

of
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cargo, from crossing an established, publicized line separating an

ternational waters

and

enemy from

in-

airspace.

A belligerent or a belligerent's blockading force commander acting pursuant to
At a minimum a

the commander's government's order must declare a blockade.
declaration
its,

must include the date and time

a

blockade begins,

its

geographic lim-

and a grace period within which neutral ships and aircraft may leave the area to

be blockaded. Vessels whose registry has been changed from enemy to a neutral

under the law of naval warfare may be

flag

restricted

from leaving.

changes, or a blockade ends, these too should be declared.
laration, notice

Under the London Dec-

warfare.

If a

War I and

blockade

is

II

and Korean War practice and

interrupted,

e.g.,

realities

of

by withdrawing blockading

forces for gunfire support elsewhere, a belligerent retains a right of visit
for

an area

should also be given local authorities, although this provision has

been superseded by World

modern

If

and search

contraband and other modalities of economic warfare, e.g., attack and destruc-

merchantmen serving as intelligence collectors for the enemy. However,
the blockade at this point becomes a "paper blockade," unlawful under the LOAC
tion of

since the 1856 Paris Declaration.
If a

blockade

again. If an

is

enemy drives

instituted. If a

must declare a blockade
the blockade ends and must be re-

interrupted, a blockading belligerent
off blockading ships,

blockading power captures the blockaded port, the blockade ends;

however, if a blockading power controls territory near a blockaded port or area, but
not the blockaded port or area
ruption,

end

a

A

e.g.,

by

blockade

itself, a

blockade remains in force. Temporary inter-

a violent storm, does not
428
by appropriate notice.

end

a blockade.

A blockading force may

may continue during an armistice unless there is an agreement to
the contrary.
Although individuals who violate armistice terms, e.g., by continuing blockade activity after an armistice suspends or ends it, may be punished if
captured, there is no unanimous view on what a State may do in such a case. Some
say it may reopen hostilities; others say it may denounce the armistice, the posiblockade

429

Hague Regulations.
A blockade must also be effective, i.e., forces (air, surface, submarine, or a combination) must maintain it sufficient to render ingress or egress to a blockaded area
tion of the

dangerous. Effectiveness does not require covering every possible avenue of ingress or egress.

Although

distance blockade,

World Wars

tary feasibility before then

traditional law required a close-in
I

and

II

and Korean War

and developments

in

and not

a long-

practice; perhaps mili-

weapons systems and platforms,

including submarines, high-speed aircraft, cruise missiles and missiles from the

blockaded shore since; have rendered the

close, in-shore

blockade

difficult if not

impossible and therefore obsolete except perhaps in localized conflicts.

backhand way, extension of the

territorial sea to 12 miles for

helped eliminate the truly close blockade;

a

most

In a

States has also

blockaded belligerent

may

Law

temporarily suspend innocent passage in
volved,

Thus

of

may not have

to

Conflict

sea if a strait

its territorial

and this may force more neutral merchantmen

a naval force

Armed
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not in-

to use high seas passage.

approach enemy coasts

as closely as before to

enforce a blockade.

Hague VIII

says belligerents cannot lay

mines off belligerents' coasts with the

sole object of intercepting

commercial shipping and must notify danger zones

around anchored mines

soon as military exigencies permit; the 1913 Oxford

as

Manual denounced mining to maintain a blockade. These rules were soon found
impracticable and do not seem to have survived World War I and II practice, although laying anchored mines with a sole object of interrupting commerce by
blockade with no naval forces to enforce a blockade may still violate international
law.
In only that narrow context may the prohibition survive. The San Remo
Manual says mining operations in a belligerent's internal waters, territorial sea or
archipelagic waters "should" provide for free egress of neutral shipping when mining

is first

signaling the rule's total demise.

executed,

A blockade must be impartial; it must apply to all States' aircraft and ships. Discriminating against or in favor of some States, including a blockading State's
ships, invalidates a blockade.

However, particular

aircraft or vessels or classes of

them may be permitted to pass through a blockade, provided no distinction is
made as to flag, either by agreement or unilateral act of a blockading belligerent.
Examples might include cartel ships repatriating prisoners of war or permitting
repatriation of merchant mariners of neutral nationality.
Although neutral
warships and neutral military aircraft have no positive right of entry to a blockaded

area, they

may be

allowed to enter or leave this area as a matter of courtesy,

with length of stay and other conditions in the hands of a blockading force com-

mander or higher

authority.

438

Humanitarian law imposes limitations on declaring, establishing or maintaining blockades. They cannot be established with a sole goal of starving the civil population, as distinguished

from enemy armed

forces. If the civil population is

inadequately provided with food or materials essential for survival, or
supplies are needed for this population or

members,

a

sick

medical

enemy armed forces

blockading State must provide for passage of food, these materials or

medical supplies. This
cal

wounded and

if

arrangements,

e.g.,

may also provide for

is

subject to a blockading State's right to prescribe techni-

visit

and search,

for

blockade passage.

A blockading State

distributing these supplies under local supervision of a Pro-

Power or a humanitarian organization, e.g., the ICRC, that can offer guarantees of impartiality and that food and other materials, as distinguished from
tecting

medical supplies, do not support enemy armed forces. This might be accomplished by belligerents' agreement or a blockading belligerent's unilateral declaration.

439
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Blockades cannot bar ingress to or egress from neutral ports or coasts. Neutrals

keep rights to engage in neutral commerce

if it

does not involve origin or destina-

tion in blockaded areas. Blockades cannot block international straits passage.

may blockade

belligerent

its

own

coasts if it

Breach of blockade, for which a vessel or
destruction, occurs

when

is

A

enemy-occupied.

aircraft

a ship or aircraft passes

may be

subject to attack

and

through a blockade without the

blockading belligerent's entry or exit authorization. Attempted breach, for which
a vessel or aircraft

may also be

time the platform leaves

a port or airfield until the

edge of a blockade's existence

tempt

to

subject to attack and destruction, occurs from the

is

is

Knowl-

complete.

an essential element of breach of blockade or

at-

breach blockade. Knowledge can be presumed once a belligerent declares

Under the continbound for neutral terri-

blockade and notice has been provided other governments.

a

uous voyage

rule,

even though the vessel or

tory at the time of interception,

platform
a

voyage

is

if its

aircraft is

ultimate destination

a

is

blockaded area, that

subject to principles governing attempted breach of blockade.

There is

presumption of attempt if a vessel or aircraft is bound for a neutral port or airfield

that

is

a transit point to a

blockaded

area.

Necessity,

i.e.,

distress,

may excuse a

merchantman's actions that would otherwise be breach of blockade.
Besides being subject to
general

3.

UN Charter decisions,

blockades are also subject to

LOAC necessity and proportionality rules.

The Tanker War and the Law of Blockade
Insofar as the record shows, neither belligerent formally declared a blockade. If

one was declared, there is no record of beginning times or area parameters, or grace
periods for departure of neutral vessels and aircraft. Use of the term "blockade" ap-

An

pears only in commentators' and historians' statements.

time expression, "loose

lips sink ships,"

might apply

here.

terminology by commentators, historians, the media or

governments can muddy
that belligerents
selves,

may

fairly well-established

and perhaps neutrals

War

many

less

than knowledgeable

later in the conflict, or these sources

One

great

them-

problem in

re-

has been relative availability of sources. In blockade

issues, as in other aspects of the conflict, truth

in

Loose use of blockade

LONW principles, with a result

be relied on as practice in future wars.

searching the Tanker

analogy to a war-

may have been the first casualty, and

instances the facts are not available or are sealed in government

ar-

chives.
If perchance these

secondary sources refer to

official belligerent declarations,

records of times, areas and grace periods have not surfaced. Without these, any

blockade by the belligerents would have violated international law.

Any block-

ade Iraq declared would not have been effective; Iraq had no naval

assets, e.g.,

Paper blockades have been invalid

on-station surface warships, to enforce

it.

since the 1856 Paris Declaration.

If speedboats, fixed-wing aircraft

and

Law

helicopters are thrown into the equation along with

bly had enough platforms to enforce a blockade

its

if it

of

Armed
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Conflict

larger warships, Iran proba-

had been properly

declared.

Iranian acceptance of a proposal (which Iraq declined, citing sovereignty over the
Shatt al-Arab) to allow neutral-flag

merchantmen

UN or Red Cross flag

ning of the war under a

to leave the Shatt at the begin-

could be said to be compliance

with a requirement of allowing these ships egress, except those that had switched

from an Iraqi to a neutral

Iraq may have also justifiably refused on grounds

flag.

of temporarily suspending territorial sea innocent passage,

on grounds of controlling

its

ports

and

at least its

LOS applied,

if the

share of Shatt territorial waters

during war, or restrictions on merchant ship movement in the immediate area of
naval operations (albeit in the riverine warfare context),
Iraq's

LOS

if such

was the case.

authority to temporarily suspend territorial sea innocent passage, in

terms of time, disappeared not long afterward, and was replaced by the
that time the war's course

around Basra port and damage

LOAC. By

to the ships themselves

undoubtedly made them immobile. Whether there was naval warfare in their
cinity throughout the conflict

is

vi-

not clear from the record. However, the law

is

have used this derogation from freedom of navigation, if it

clear that Iraq could not

applied in the riverine context, to permanently bar access to navigation. That

is

certainly the rule for high seas naval operations.
If either belligerent tried to blockade neutral coasts, e.g., Kuwait's or Saudi Ara-

by sowing mines, or use of air or naval forces, that violated international law.
Thus if somehow the law of blockade, as distinguished from LOS rules for entry

bia's

into

and exit from ports, applied, Iran was equally culpable under the LOAC. The

UN Security Council was fully justified in passing Resolution 552(1 984), although
its

text did not

mention blockade but LOS rights to enter and leave port.

459

To the

extent that Iranian naval maneuvers occurred in Saudi territorial waters as a naval

demonstration,

that operation violated the Charter's prohibition of threat of

force against a neutral State as well as

LOS territorial sea rules and LOAC princi-

ples governing belligerents' conduct toward neutrals.

There

is

no record of a

mounting a quarantine operation.
There are no known instances of attempts to use cartel ships to return prisoners
of war, etc., during the Tanker War, nor are there any reports of neutral warships'

belligerent's

attempting to pass through blockades (assuming that lawful blockades existed).

Although Iran accepted

a proposal to allow

1980 to depart under a

UN

clined.
likely,

Assuming

or

Red Cross

merchant ships trapped in the Shatt in

flag,

Iraq as the "blockaded" State de-

a proper blockade of Iraq's coast then existed,

which

is

un-

departure of neutral nationality mariners aboard these vessels could have

been accomplished as a humanitarian law exception to the law of blockade, since
the purported blockading State (Iraq) approved as a matter of discretion.
If it is

doubtful,

assumed that either State established

many

attacks

a lawful blockade,

on neutral merchantmen

which

is

highly

for alleged breaches of the
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blockade were disproportionate, under the same general standards of necessity

and proportionality applicable

to attacks

on neutrals

generally.

In no instances

are locations of these attacks relative to whatever blockade areas proclaimed, if

there were any, available; no precise

commentary on legitimacy of attacks on

this

basis can be made.

The UN Security Council
UN-mandated interdictions.

LONW requires.

did not address blockade directly; there were no

Neither belligerent declared a blockade, as the

However,

to the extent that

mines belligerents

laid

and might somehow be considered

pered access to neutrals' ports

blockade, Council Resolution 552 (1984) condemning lack of access

condemnation of the

ham-

related to

stands as a

practice.

Part F. Zones: Excluding Shipping, Aircraft from Area of Belligerents'

Naval Operations; High Seas Self-Defense Zones; War Zones;
Air Defense Identification Zones; Ocean Zones Created
for Humanitarian Law Purposes

During the Tanker War, Iran and Iraq declared war zones, advising by
NOTMARs and NOTAMs that any merchantmen in the zones might be attacked.
Iran justified its zone on the basis of defending its Gulf coast and to assure safety of
shipping. After first pledging that the Straits of Hormuz would remain open, Iran
later

announced that its

State protests. Iraq said

Straits areas
its

reprisal response to Iran's

shipping in
the Gulf,
also

a

war zone, for which there were neutral

GMEZ) was a

zone (Gulf Maritime Exclusion Zone, or

war zone declaration and

that Iraq

would attack any

would help discriminate among shipping in
the zone was presumed a legitimate target.
Iran

zone, saying the zone

its

i.e.,

were

any shipping in

conducted

visit

and search operations throughout much of the Gulf.

Iran

announced or conducted naval maneuvers in its territorial waters, on the high
seas, perhaps in the Strait of Hormuz, and in Saudi territorial waters.
Neutrals' armed forces were also heavily involved in the waters of the Gulf and
the Strait of Hormuz and the skies above them. There

is

some evidence Saudi Ara-

may have allowed Iraqi military aircraft access to refueling on its territory.
Midway through the war Saudi Arabia declared an air defense identification zone

bia

(ADIZ) over waters adjacent to its Gulf coast. Two weeks before the ADIZ proclamation Saudi Arabia had shot down an Iranian fighter over international wa-

The United

ters.

aircraft

forces

States issued

NOTMAR and NOTAM warnings to ships and

about coming within certain distances and altitudes from

on the high

seas; these

ing a right to declare what
self-defense zones (SDZs).

maritime

were later amended to omit specific distances, claimI

have characterized (and acronymed)

The US and
4.78

as

high seas

other navies conducted naval opera-

mine clearance;
formation steaming and other air and surface
escorting, accompanying or convoying neutral flag merchantmen

tions, including

evolutions;

its

Law

that did not carry contraband;
4.81

forces.

of
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and defense of these ships and

their naval

Saudi Arabia announced a safety corridor throughout its and other Gulf
482

States' territorial seas.

This Part analyzes these issues in the
fare in particular;

LOAC context and the law of naval warand Chapter IV cov-

Chapter III discussed self-defense issues,

ered LOS aspects. Parts C,

D and E of this Chapter considered issues related to visit

and search, contraband and blockade with respect to attacks on and destruction of

enemy and

neutral flag

merchantmen and

aircraft.

Excluding Shipping and Aircraft from Immediate Areas ofBelligerents' Naval
Operations; High Seas Self-Defense Zones (SDZs)
1.

Although the law allowing exclusion of neutral merchant shipping and civil aircraft is fairly straightforward, principles regarding excluding neutral warships

military aircraft are less than clear. Application of

and

UN Charter norms adds a fur-

ther difficult dimension to these issues. Claims with respect to high seas defense

zones (SDZs) are relatively new, but they have been implicit in the
to

conduct peacetime naval operations.

LOS authority

How SDZs interface with the LOAC right

of a belligerent to exclude shipping and aircraft from the immediate area of naval
operations presents further difficult questions.

One more

aspect of the problem

has been, as for blockades, development of longer range weaponry that can expand
threat zones

a.

many miles from

a naval force.

Excluding Shipping and Aircraft from Immediate Areas ofBelligerents' Naval

Operations.

Custom allows belligerents to establish special restrictions, including

total exclusion

from waters near operations or requiring departure from the

area,

on neutral merchantmen and aircraft near an immediate area of high seas naval operations if hostilities are taking place or will occur in the near future, or where belligerent forces are operating,

e.g.,

conducting

include flight and submarine operations.
territorial sea

visit

and

search.

These areas can

A belligerent may not purport to deny

innocent passage access to neutral States' coasts or to close an inter-

national strait to transit or innocent passage unless another route of similar con-

venience

is

restrictions

open

to neutral traffic.

485

A

on neutral merchantmen and

territorial sea where the belligerent
territorial sea

belligerent

may

also

aircraft in its territorial sea,

occupies

temporary suspending innocent passage through the

air traffic

LOS

principles for

territorial sea

right of innocent passage in a belligerent's territorial sea.

maritime and

an enemy's

enemy coasts, or occupies an enemy's

but does not occupy the coast, consistent with

restrict neutral

impose similar

486

and lack of a

A belligerent's right to

on and over the high

seas applies to high

seas fishing zones; neutrals' contiguous zones, continental shelves, EEZs and fish487
ing zones; and in the Area.
However, belligerents exercising this high seas right
•

must pay due regard

to neutrals' rights in these areas, including the

high seas
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where no contiguous zone, continental
,.

applies.

EEZ

shelf,

or fishing zone, or Area law

488

This customary right of restricting neutral activities does not apply to warships,
naval auxiliaries, ships on governmental or noncommercial service or State or military aircraft,
489
sea.

which continue

Consistent with

'

due regard principle,
area.

Consistent with

to the request

have complete immunity as under the law of the

to

LOS principles applying to the territorial sea and the LOS
a belligerent

may ask

these neutral platforms to leave the

LOS principles, neutral platforms should give due regard

and a belligerent's right

to restrict other neutral traffic in the

diate area of naval operations. Neutral military

commanders may choose to leave a

belligerent's area of naval operations, or be otherwise guided

by

rules of engage-

ment, but these are matters of neutral force discretion and not
right.

492

e.g.,

conducting one's own naval operations.

Policies allowing this "limited

and

civil aircraft,

which

its

and transient" control over neutral merchant

is a

and other freedoms, are based on
emy,

a belligerent's

A belligerent's request should not be lightly denied, absent other consid-

erations,

vessels

imme-

derogation from their navigation, overflight

a belligerent's right to attack

and destroy

right to defend itself without suffering from neutral interference,

right to ensure

493
its forces'

security.

On

the other hand,

when

its

en-

and

its

neutral warships,

must be balanced against those
platforms' navigation, overflight and other freedoms, their immunities, and the
right of these neutral platforms to defend themselves and vessels or aircraft under
their charge (e.g., convoyed neutral flag merchantmen not carrying contraband),
and a right to ensure neutral forces' security, and the security of platforms under
military aircraft, etc., are concerned, these policies

neutral forces' charge.

Consistent with customary blockade principles, a State exercising this high seas

must give notice appropriate under the circumstances, e.g. a naval commander's flaghoist or radio message but perhaps a commander's government
right

NOTMAR or NOT AM if a major operation such as a Normandy-size amphibious
landing is underway.

The area to be cleared, or the distance to which a neutral plat-

form must depart, should be defined with reasonable precision and should be proportional, i.e., limited to that part of the high seas necessary for the evolution. If an

operation has not begun, a start time should be given unless this compromises the

compromising the

belligerent's security. Similarly,

and

belligerent's security, notice of

ending an operation should be given. Unlike

also consistent with not

blockade areas or war zones, which have definite geographic coordinates, these exclusion areas can be tied to mobile operations, unless the operation involves a relatively long-term location,

e.g.,

an amphibious landing.

should apply to military operations in a belligerent's

emy's

territorial sea.

495

The same

principles

territorial sea or in

an en-

Law

of

Armed
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In connection with this right of belligerent control, a belligerent naval com-

mander may exercise control over communications of neutral civil aircraft or neutral merchantmen whose presence in the immediate area of naval operations might
endanger or jeopardize these operations. A neutral civil aircraft or merchantman
within that area that fails to conform to belligerent directions may thereby assume
enemy character and risk capture or attack. Legitimate distress communications
should be allowed to the extent that the operation's success

is

not prejudiced.

Any

transmission to an opposing belligerent concerning the belligerent's military operations, including the order to depart the area, is inconsistent with neutral duties

of abstention and impartiality and renders the neutral merchantman or
craft liable to capture or destruction.

497

Since a neutral warship, naval auxiliary,

government ship on noncommercial service or
tied to

immunity,

498

communications and

a military or State aircraft

distress messages.

an area of a belligerent's naval operations and

common

neutral platforms should exercise discretion in
etc.

enti-

what

is

Due regard for

sense dictate that these

communicated, on what

Transmission to an opposing belligerent risks a self-defense

sponse by the belligerent conducting the naval operation.
ken,

is

a belligerent cannot exercise control over those platforms'
499
for these neutral platforms' rights to
must give due regard

communicate, including their right to transmit

frequencies,

civil air-

if a belligerent force

neutral platforms after

it

commits

By

the opposite to-

a hostile act against or attacks

rightly refuses to allow control of

its

re-

one of these

communications,

that belligerent risks a self-defense response.

A belligerent naval force may also exercise its right of self-defense against neutral forces that

display hostile intent against or attack the belligerent force while

exercises a legitimate right to control
if a neutral

it

an immediate area of naval operations. Thus

merchant ship legitimately ordered out of an immediate area of naval

operations by a belligerent signals to a warship of its nationality requesting assistance,

and that neutral warship

ling the

fires

on the belligerent force legitimately control-

immediate area of naval operations that has ordered the merchantman

depart the area, the belligerent can respond in self-defense. Similarly,

warship or military

aircraft observes

if a neutral

one of its neutral-flag merchantmen

legiti-

mately ordered out of an immediate area of belligerent naval operations and

on the belligerent naval

to

fires

force, the neutral platform risks self-defense responses

by

the belligerent. If a neutral military aircraft or warship, being asked to leave an im-

mediate area of belligerent naval operations legitimately declared,

displays

hostile intent or attacks the belligerent force, that neutral platform risks the belligerent's self-defense response.

Where

a belligerent has not legitimately declared

such an area, a risk of self-defense response is also present, and lack of a legitimate
claim of an area of belligerent operations

may be

a rejoinder to a belligerent's

some cases a belligerent's claim of a legitimate area can be
evaluated and decided by higher, perhaps executive level, authority. In other cases
self-defense claim. In
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the on-scene neutral

commander may be required to evaluate and decide on the sit-

uation with advice of counsel

if available

and

act,

consistent with

ROE guidance

and the right of self-defense.
b.

High Seas Self-Defense Zones (SDZs). The law of the

sea provides that after

due publication of a notice, a State may temporarily suspend, without discrimination in

form or

fact

among foreign

ships, the right of innocent passage for foreign

ships in specified areas of its territorial sea if suspension
its

security, including

rial sea

airspace

weapons

and may

is

essential for protecting

A State has sovereignty over its territo-

exercises.

totally exclude foreign aircraft. Transit or innocent pas-

sage through straits cannot be suspended, unless a treaty governing straits passage
says so.

502

States cannot establish

permanent security or military zones, purport-

ing to regulate activities of other countries' warships and military aircraft, seaward

from their
tions.

coasts.

503

However,

States

For States concerned (e.g.,

exercising high seas freedoms,
States with

due regard

EEZ

e.g.,

a State

right of self-defense,

which gives

seas military opera-

conducting a military operation, States

freedom of navigation, fishing or overflight,

or continental shelf operations), the

for others' oceans uses.

zone (SDZ), also

may conduct high

These

LOS

requires each to have

LOS rules are subject to the inherent

States authority to declare a high seas defense

known as a "cordon sanitaire,"

507

on

a

temporary basis during na-

val forces' transit.

SDZs may be defined as a geographically limited area beyond the territorial sea
including the water column, ocean bottom and airspace associated with
State unilaterally declares as a

warning

area,

around

its

that a

it

naval or air assets and

within which other countries are warned of a heightened risk of self-defense

re-

sponse, including response in anticipatory self-defense, to attacks or hostile acts

from

aircraft,

ships or submarines.

The SDZ

travels

with a naval force and

is

not

tied to geographical coordinates, as with territorial sea innocent passage suspen-

war zones,

blockade areas,

sion areas,

some but not all

areas

from which

a

would exclude shipping and aircraft while conducting naval operations during armed conflict,
or permanent security zones tied to a country's
coastline and extending beyond the territorial sea, the latter of which violate inter-

belligerent

si 2

national law.
territorial sea

The SDZ may or may not have time parameters,

unlike rules for

innocent passage suspension areas (requiring publication of

and stop times)

en

or blockade areas (start times must be published, and

blockade ends must also be published).

However, on

a

start

when

a

time line an SDZ-cov-

ered area usually will not be encumbered for long, due to a naval force's mobility.

An immediate precedent for mobility aspects of the SDZ was the UK "defensive
bubble" employed as the

UK task force deployed to the Falklands/Malvinas Is-

lands during the 1982 war.

A close analogue is the well-established right of all

States, belligerent or neutral, to

conduct naval operations on the high

seas,

which

Law

carries with

it

The

the right of self-defense.

of

Armed

Conflict
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difference between these areas

is

SDZ and a warning to all States, not just a belligerent, of the right of self-defense in the SDZ notice, which a naval force has under the
law of the sea in any event. By contrast, some naval operations the LOS permits are
announced through NOTAMs and NOTMARs, e.g., gunfire exercises in desigone of notice in

all

cases for the

nated areas, while others are not, e.g., flight or antisubmarine warfare exercises. In
still

other cases a naval force, perhaps steaming in formation, dispersed, or inde-

pendently as separate units,

man

or civil aircraft;

517

may exercise high

seas freedoms like

these evolutions are almost never published, a major

exception being flight plans for some aviation. Security concerns

no notice be published

any merchant-

for areas

where

a force will

be operating.

may dictate that
518

The primary sources of an SDZ claim are the right of self-defense and the LOS,
which

is

subordinate to the right of self-defense.

519

A right to establish an SDZ is

limited to areas beyond the territorial sea and straits passage for the declaring
520
State.

The further problem then arises as to conflicting uses of the high seas and

straits navigation.

Here LOS principles of shared high seas use, restated in the LOS

due regard principle,
into play.
rights,

521

and the rule that straits passage cannot be impeded,

522

come

A State claiming an SDZ cannot operate so as to deny others' high seas

e.g.,

to navigation or overflight freedoms, a coastal State

cannot claim an

SDZ so as to deny others their straits passage rights, and a naval force in straits passage cannot use an SDZ claim to deny coastal States their rights or other States'
platforms their rights to pass the
straits,

or straits coastal States,

strait.

Similarly, others using the high seas or

must have due regard for forces operating under an

SDZ notice.
If an

SDZ-publishing State exercises

its

right of self-defense, that exercise

is

governed by necessity and proportionality principles. Under no circumstances
can an

SDZ notice be a basis for free-fire attacks or reprisals involving use of force

on neutral shipping or aircraft.

523

SDZ notice says otherwise, publishing an SDZ notice does not limit
that State's self-defense responses. For example, although an SDZ notice warns of
Unless an

a possibility of a self-defense response if an aircraft approaches within a stated dis-

tance, that does not bar self-defense responses at greater distances if the aircraft has

launched an attack or has displayed hostile intent so
right.

as to trigger a self-defense

A platform covered by an SDZ notice may respond to attacks or threats not

covered by the notice, e.g., responding to a submarine displaying hostile intent or a

submarine attack when the SDZ notice covers only air or surface ship threats or attacks.

A

State

whose platform

is

self-defense to threats to or attacks

ship covered by an

covered by an

SDZ

notice

on other ships or aircraft, e.g.,

may respond
a

in

convoying war-

SDZ notice may respond to threats to or attacks on a convoyed

merchantman, a nearby unescorted merchantman of the same flag as the warship,
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or a sister warship not involved in the convoy, even though these vessels are not

covered by the

An SDZ

SDZ

notice.

notice, unless

defense, either

by an

it

limits

does not affect rights of collective

it,

self-

SDZ notice-covered platform coming to the aid of a platform

covered by a formal or informal self-defense arrangement, or a platform of a State
aligned in a formal or informal self-defense arrangement with an

SDZ

no-

tice-covered platform.

Thus although use of SDZ notices seems to have begun with
on

a gloss

UK practice

Nyon Arrangement
limiting principles,

during the Falklands/Malvinas War, and earlier during

operations (1937),
is

525

consistent with the

State conducting an attack based

an

the Tanker War as

their use, subject to the above-stated

UN Charter and the law of the sea. A

on unlawful use of an SDZ, e.g.,

a country using

SDZ to establish a free-fire zone, risks self-defense responses, nonforce reprisals

or retorsions by a State whose platforms are threatened or attacked under a claim

based on an SDZ, and nonforce reprisals or retorsions for declaring but not using
illegal

526

SDZs.

As the Falklands/Malvinas War suggests, belligerents may declare SDZs
vise their self-defense rights relative to non-belligerents,

ation the

LOAC

neutrals. In this situ-

applies to interactions between belligerents, but the law of

self-defense applies to belligerent-neutral interactions.

declaring an

i.e.,

to ad-

A belligerent considering

SDZ to advise of self-defense intentions must weigh the SDZ notice,

which may advise belligerents of its

forces'

whereabouts, against a factor of warn-

ing neutrals (and perhaps belligerents, as a courtesy to allied belligerents and as a
threat to opposing belligerents

incident to coming near

who may wish

its forces.

As with

to conserve military assets) of risks

neutrals'

tional law does not require belligerents to operate

SDZ

under an SDZ. The inherent

right of self-defense, subject to limitations, if any, in an
situation with respect to neutrals.
self-defense rights

A

its

SDZ notice applies in this

belligerent does not gain

by publishing an SDZ;

belligerent a free-fire area within

declarations, interna-

e.g.,

an

SDZ

any

LOAC

or

declaration cannot give a

geographic parameters.

Rules of engagement have no bearing on an

ance principles for a military force within

its

SDZ

declaration;

ROE are guid-

own units and personnel. Forces may

ROE whether or not an SDZ has been declared. ROE
should take SDZ standards into account, however. ROE and SDZs are independ-

or

may

not operate under

ent concepts.

c.

Other Self-Defense and

UN Charter Issues for SDZs. A final set of issues deals

with conflicting self-defense claims. Suppose, hypothetically, a naval force of
country A issues NOTAMs and NOTMARs publishing a legitimate
forces in a high seas area

NOTMARs

and

whose waters

SDZ 527 for its

are a scene of increasing tension.

NOTAMs include defending neutral convoys

The

carrying cargoes

Law

of

Armed

401

Conflict

not part of any State's war-fighting or war-sustaining capability, e.g., medical supplies that could

be used for civilians or armed forces personnel.

tacks country C.

Country

A

declares neutrality.

Country C,

528

Country B

at-

as a self-defense

measure, begins conducting naval operations and wishes to control a high seas area
for these operations.

529

Country A's neutral forces are operating in the area, and to

comply with the country C exclusion order will implicate A's announced self-defense measures. What principles guide this hypothetical situation, where there are
conflicting self-defense claims that

may have jus

cogens status?

530

Under these circumstances the proper response may lie in a due regard analysis
of claims. The relative importance of each self-defense claim should be assessed. If,

and search of merchantmen suspected of carrying materials for mass destruction weapons destined for its enemy,
that claim should have priority over the country A claim, assuming the convoy is

e.g.,

on

country C's claim of control involves

visit

a routine voyage to supply a neutral with replenishment material for its hospi-

and there is no urgent need for them. If country A's medical supply cargo convoy is destined for emergency humanitarian relief in country D, at war with
tals,

country E which has authorized the shipment to country D,

531

and country C's na-

val operation is a routine neutral shipping visit and search, the balance tips in favor

of the country A convoy.

Where policies appear equal, the principle of first in time,

A convoy primacy. Country A's SDZ
claim was asserted before country C's self-defense claim based on LOAC princifirst in

right should apply to give the country

ples for belligerent control of an

These are the "easy"

cases,

immediate area of naval operations.

and real-world situations

plex. States confronted with this situation

will

be

much more com-

should try to avoid escalation and in-

commanders accordingly, perhaps through ROE. ROE might give
532
advance guidance, although commanders retain the right to defend their forces.
The more difficult dilemma will be respective military commanders confronted
with these circumstances, particularly where ROE give no guidance. Local comstruct military

munications should help. In the convoy hypothetical, assuming no self-defense
claim from country C's government, the on-scene country

C commander

must,

under principles governing control of the immediate area of naval operations,
533

communicate with the convoy commander.
Similarly, the country A convoy
commander must communicate the nature of the convoy.
At this point the respective commanders must use judgment, as they do daily on much more routine
naval matters. Other situations

may not be

resolved so easily,

e.g.,

where

aircraft

are involved, because of relatively short decision time.

Another hypothetical situation might involve interaction between two
erents in separate wars with different belligerents,

and each

bellig-

belligerent wishes to

control the immediate area of naval operations in separate evolutions that overlap
in terms of ocean areas.

535

Yet another

is

the situation where two self-defense
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zones overlap, a rarer circumstance given (thus
claimed.

The same kinds

an SDZ, the same rules apply between

war with opposing

its

belligerents, opposing belligerents

LOAC will apply.

the relatively small ocean areas

of analysis should be employed here as well.

If a belligerent proclaims

countries not party to

far)

belligerents.

it

and other

As between

allied

and neutrals involved in that war, however, the

In the latter situation the

SDZ operates as

an

LOAC zone.

Under the hypotheticals posed in this sub-Part, as in other situations discussed

ROE and the SDZ are independent considerations. States may operate under ROE without proclaiming an SDZ, and vice versa. An SDZ proclaiming
State should be sure that its ROE and SDZ are congruent, however.
in sub-Part b,

-

The foregoing assumes no paramount Security Council

decision, perhaps

com-

ing after the self-defense claim(s); in the latter case the decision prevails. Practice

under the decision should follow these principles insofar
sion does not give directives. If the issue

is

as the letter of the deci-

a belligerent's control of the

immediate

area of naval operations under the law of naval warfare, a Council decision also has
priority. Similarly, practice

ciples insofar as there is

no

under the decision should be informed by LOAC princonflict

between them and the decision.

International law does not require notice of an

sume
to

defensive, operational

anyone on the high

seas,

and armed

SDZ.

States' naval forces

conflict postures without

may as-

announcement

except where other principles, e.g., directions to ships

aircraft to stay outside the immediate area of naval operations during armed
537
conflict,
require notice and/or other action. If a State publishes an
notice, a

and

disclaimer analogous to the

US Tanker War NOTAMs and

warned mariners of the Iranian and
their legal validity,

may be

included.

SDZ
NOTMARs,

which

Iraqi zones without expressing opinion
o

538

Unless the contrary

is

intended, an

on

SDZ

notice announcing risks or warnings should advise that stated force actions are

among the options the naval force may exercise.
The foregoing legal analysis expresses no opinion on the strategic or tactical desirability of announcing an SDZ. To proclaim an SDZ declares a force's approximate location, more so than radio communications intercepts; this may be less
only

than desirable from an operational perspective.

nouncement may have advantages, e.g.,

On

the other hand, an

in psychological operations to

SDZ

an-

warn an ad-

versary of strong naval presence, or comity in advising a co-belligerent of the

proclaiming State's intentions, but these must be balanced against the disclosure
problem. Under international law there

is

no reason why

a State cannot declare a

SDZ, e.g., announcing movement of some forces but not discussing cooperations, e.g., those with submarines. Nor must an SDZ announcement

"selective"

vert

publish a

list,

inclusive or otherwise, of options a force

may employ.

539
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War Zones

During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) Japan declared the first of what have
come to be known as war zones.
Japan declared them before the war; at the war's
outbreak 12 or more of these areas were designated, the boundaries of which ex-

The United

tended from Japan's coast into the high seas by up to seven miles.
States designated similar areas after entering World Wars I

the coastal State claimed a right to exclude

and II.

In both cases

merchantmen on the

basis of self-de-

Commentators have said establishing these limited zones was legitimate under international law.
These defense areas were historical antecedents of later
war zone claims.
During the Spanish Civil War, the 1937 Nyon Arrangement divided much of
fense.

unknown submarines, or surmerchant ships. The UK Admiralty or-

the Mediterranean Sea into areas where danger from
face ships or aircraft, existed for neutral

dered that a submarine detected within five miles of a torpedoed merchantman to

be hunted and sunk;
Later
i.e.,

a

a five-mile

ROE allowed attack on

a

war zone existed around an attack datum.

submarine submerged within a

specific sea area,

war zone coupled with exercise of an anticipatory right of self-defense was

Nyon Arrangement orders were,

created.

"defensive bubble"

In

i.e.,

World War

I,

SDZ.

in effect, a forerunner of the

moving

545

and again in World War

II,

both sides proclaimed war zones

over wide areas, sometimes coupling them with policies of unrestricted submarine
warfare or starvation blockades, and justifying
acts of the

them

as reprisals for prior illegal

enemy. This species of war zone was also a

result of new

and

different

methods and means of warfare, e.g., the submarine and the aircraft. During and after the

wars these zones were condemned as excessive;

although this gave zones

word reprisal, the concept of a valid zone remained.
States have employed a war zone concept in some conflicts after World War II.
During the Korean War the UN Command proclaimed a Sea Defense Zone (SDZ)
a

bad name,

like using the

in 1952, rescinding

mand

it

a year later

during armistice negotiations.

SDZ to "prevent
added attacks on the Korean Coast;
the Command sea lanes of communication and prevent
introduc-

established the

secur[e]

.

.

.

UN Com-

The

.

.

.

.

.

.

tion of contraband or entry of enemy agents into [the] Republic of [i.e., South]
rea."

A

blockade had been proclaimed in 1950

around North Korea's coast;

During the Algerian

civil

548

the

SDZ

at

Kothe beginning of the war

affected South Korea's coast.

war France declared a 20 to 50 kilometer (1 1-28 mile)

customs zone off Algeria for small craft, seeking to visit and search ships suspected
of running war materials to rebels in Algeria. High seas interceptions occurred off
Algeria but also 45 miles off Casablanca in the Atlantic

Ocean and

in the English

Channel. France justified her actions on self-defense grounds. Flag States of vessels

involved protested vigorously; compensation was paid for some ships wrong-

fully detained.

During the 1971 India-Pakistan war the Bengal Chamber of
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Commerce advised neutral shipping it would not risk attack in the Bay of Bengal if
it

did not approach within 40 miles of the coast between dusk and dawn.

During

the 1973 Arab-Israel conflict, shipping was warned about entering the region of
conflict, at first

with respect to Egyptian and

parts of the Mediterranean Sea

Israeli territorial waters,

later

and Egyptian, Libyan and Syrian ports were

During the Vietnam War, Operation Market Time

listed.

but

patrol areas, origi-

nally part of a 12-mile defensive sea area, eventually extended to over 30 miles off

the South Vietnamese coast.
rea's security zone,

operate.

553

552

These areas were not tied to a coast, like North Ko-

but were moving zones within which patrol vessels might

The concept of a

"cordon sanitaire,"

i.e.,

an area around a peacetime naval

force analyzed in Parts F.l.b-F.l.c, also developed at this time.

Kingdom

In 1982's Falklands/Malvinas war Argentina and the United

claimed war zones

after

Argentina invaded South Atlantic islands, the Falklands/

Malvinas group and others over which Britain exercised sovereignty,
gentina disputed.

and naval

pro-

a claim Ar-

The first UK proclamation declared that Argentine warships

auxiliaries

found in

Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ),

a

dius of the islands, would be subject to

200-mile defense zone (DZ) off

its

UK

coasts

attack.

a

200-mile ra-

Argentina followed with a

and around the

islands.

The United

Kingdom also proclaimed a Defensive Sea Area, a defensive bubble around its task
force,

then underway for the South Atlantic, warning that approaches by Argen-

tine warships or naval auxiliaries, or surveillance by Argentine civil or military aircraft,

would

result in "appropriate"

UK

action.

When

fighting started in the

islands, the

UK changed the MEZ to a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ), purporting to

exclude

vessels

all

and

aircraft

supplying the Argentine war

effort.

The TEZ

area

was the same as the MEZ; the declaration said any ship or aircraft, military or civil,
found within the zone without

UK authority would be regarded as operating to

support the Argentine occupation and would be regarded as hostile. Like earlier

UK announcements, the UK TEZ declaration said was without prejudice to the
UK's general self-defense rights under the UN Charter.
Two days after the TEZ proclamation, the UK submarine Conqueror sank the
it

Argentine cruiser General Belgrano with heavy

TEZ;

Belgrano, inter alia

armed with Exocet

loss of life

30 miles outside the

surface to surface missiles,

had ap-

UK forces well over the horizon. The UK government justified the sinking on its MEZ warning that any Argentine ship or aircraft
557
threatening the UK force would be dealt with.
The UK also boarded and sank

peared to turn in the direction of

Narwal, an oceangoing Argentine trawler with communications equipment and

an Argentine communications officer aboard that had been shadowing the
formation.
tion,

558

Justified

on the

basis of the threat language in the

the Narwal capture was also lawful under the

Argentina then declared
ing to attack any

UK

all

UK

TEZ proclama-

LOAC.

South Atlantic Ocean waters

a

war zone, threaten-

ship therein. Perhaps the only neutral ship Argentina

Law

attacked in the zone was S.S. Hercules, a Liberian-flag,
in ballast

and steaming 600 miles

off Argentina

The United Kingdom responded

to the

of

Armed

405

Conflict

US interests-owned tanker

and 500 miles from the islands.

Argentine proclamation by announcing

that because hostile forces could cover distances involved in resupplying Argentine forces

on the islands, particularly at night and in bad weather, UK forces find-

ing any Argentine warship or military aircraft more than 12 miles off the Argentine
coast

would consider it hostile.

Because Argentina faces

much of the South At-

lantic below Uruguay and Brazil, this

tine-declared area,

meant a substantial overlap of the last Argenwhich presumably extended from the Equator to Africa and

Antarctica.

The war ended two months later, but the United Kingdom continued its TEZ.
Ten days after hostilities ended, however, the United Kingdom lifted its TEZ but
warned Argentina to keep military ships and aircraft away from the islands, declar-

Zone (PZ) around the islands. Argentina was required to
seek UK agreement before Argentine civil aircraft or merchantmen went into the
PZ.
The PZ continued for some time thereafter.
The Argentina-UK war is important for the Tanker War; it occurred in 1982,
ing a 1 50-mile Protection

just before belligerent attacks

on Persian Gulf shipping intensified.

most recent intensive use of war zones since World War

It

was

also the

Commentators have
analyzed the conflict from the perspective of the zones as proclaimed and employed; it is therefore appropriate to synthesize principles emerging from this war.
In some cases the belligerents were correct in their actions, sometimes they were
correct for the wrong reasons, and in a few cases there were actual or potential inII.

ternational law violations.

To the extent the UK MEZ and TEZ and the Argentine DZ declared opposing
naval forces were subject to attack within the zones,
tions international law permits. Attack

once there

is

a state of war, can occur

then under special circumstances.

the claims were within ac-

on or capture of opposing naval

forces,

anywhere except within neutral waters, and

The

initial declarations

were thus no more

than declarations of intent to do what the law allowed. Under either theory,
limitation because of the

terception
is less

i.e.,

MEZ or TEZ or the general law of naval warfare, UK in-

ofNarwal was proper.

Whether 200 miles was

a reasonable distance

than clear from facts at hand; later Britain declared the 1 50-mile PZ, but this

was

after hostilities

was

sufficient,

ended, and

any more than

end. Argentina also included

it

it

cannot be said whether 200 miles during the war

can be said the 150-mile

its territorial

sea within

PZ was reasonable at the

its

DZ, and

the

MEZ/TEZ

DZ necessarily included these waters of the islands. Argentina could validly declare a DZ for its mainland territorial waters under the law of the sea, but
only for a limited time.
It could make a similar claim under the LOAC for terriand the

torial seas

on the mainland and around the Falklands/Malivinas that were imme-

diate areas of military operations.

Britain, claiming sovereignty over the islands

The Tanker War
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(a

LOS exclusion rights for the is-

claim Argentina disputed), could likewise assert

lands' territorial seas; the

United Kingdom could also exclude neutrals from parts

of the territorial seas around the Falklands/Malvinas and Argentina's mainland
territorial sea

while conducting military operations.

exclusion claim under the

LOS

for the Falklands

Any Argentine territorial sea

would have been

invalid, if it is

The UK reservation of
assumed Britain had sovereignty over the islands.
self-defense rights was proper but not necessary, except perhaps as a saving clause,
or as a warning to third States. Argentina could have validly asserted the
claim.

The right to self-defense is paramount.

as against others,

570

Britain could reserve these rights

might acquire an

in hypothetical situations that Argentina

e.g.,

same

mounted an attack against Britain, or if a future decision on the war as
then fought would say that UK attacks on Argentine assets elsewhere were valid
under this theory. The reality is that these assets would have been subject to attack,
not on a self-defense basis, but pursuant to the LOAC.
571
The UK defensive bubble
was also proper; it had precedent under the Nyon
572
Agreement and other declarations,
in that it was limited to a certain ocean area.
Like the Nyon Agreement and similar procedures, the bubble was mobile, but that
was no cause for concern; all high seas mariners have radar today, and they could
ally that

have observed the task

force,

undoubtedly steaming in formation, on their screens.

Moreover, the UK task force would have seen neutral ships and

aircraft

on

its

sen-

and would have warned them if they got too close. A neutral ship blundering
into the formation and aware of the bubble through a NOTMAR would be at risk,
sors

but mutual visual identification and signals were available.

The

UK TEZ

declaration that any ship or aircraft within the zone

considered hostile could have come close to the line of illegality.
declare a presumption of hostility, but even here belligerents
sity

and proportionality principles

targets.

war

Argentine

effort,

air

and naval

proper under the
tine platforms.

assets,

was

TEZ, and whether

is

targets,

TEZ,

Britain

but the

had

to

its

determine that the target was

that Britain

The self-defense

under the law of naval warfare,

UK

TEZ

or no

task force or not.

had declared it would not attack Argentine mil-

and certainly no indication

it

they appeared to be moving toward the

Exocet missiles aboard.

so.

The Belgrano sinking 40 miles

Belgrano appeared to turn toward the

itary forces elsewhere,
if

proper

UK blanket declaration meant

no indication that Britain did not do

a legitimate act

There is no indication
Belgrano

must observe neces-

LOAC or under self-defense principles in the case of non-Argen-

There

TEZ

Britain could

including ships and aircraft supplying

statement analysis is the same as under the MEZ.
outside the

would be

as against vessels or aircraft that are not

continued to be proper

that before attacking in the

573

would not

UK

attack ships like

force with ship-killing

575

The Argentine war zone

declaration covering the entire South Atlantic

576

was

disproportionate; in theory this stretched from the shores of South America below

Law

and Uruguay

Brazil

to the continent's

southern

of

Armed

and across

tip
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Conflict

The Ar-

to Africa.

gentine attack on the neutral tanker Hercules was unlawful because

it

was an attack

war zone; even if the zone had been proportional and
questionable whether Argentina observed proportionality and ne-

inside a disproportionate
necessary,

it is

cessity in the attack, given the size of the
for

enforcement in

Argentine navy, threats to

these waters, and the relative size of the conflict.

all

capacity

it, its

577

Neutral

ships and aircraft did not lose protections just because they passed through a war
zone.

578

The

UK declaration came close to saying the same in terms of area, al-

though limited
579

Under

ships.

LOAC
seas,

to a

presumption of

these circumstances,

all

UK

the

Argentine flag

aircraft

and

declaration did was to repeat

standards for dealing with these platforms, wherever found on the high

and the declaration

was

to that extent

Britain could legitimately continue

posture of the conflict being cooled
conflict was heating up, and the
islands.

hostility for

its

down

lawful.

TEZ after the end of hostilities; 580 the
at that

point was the same as

when

the

UK task force organized and proceeded toward the

There is no indication the defensive bubble was abandoned; Britain could

continue this proclamation, and indeed can declare a bubble, reasonable in area

and the time

it

will take a

UK force of any size to transit an area, to this day, any581

As noted above, whether the 150-mile PZ
was reasonable in area under the circumstances can only be determined by operational considerations, for which the record does not supply information. However,
the UK PZ could continue after hostilities and until final resolution of the confrontation; if visit and search, blockade or a war zone may be maintained during an
where

to assert rights of self-defense.

armistice or other cease-fire absent belligerents' contrary agreement,
tion zone after the

end of possible

hostilities

zone of the high

to exercise

The

seas,

which would exclude all ships and aircraft seeking

problem of all these zones

permitted zones.

It

is

relationship between

was unfortunate that the

585
It

was not necessary, either as an

areas overlap geographically,
in breadth.

tion for the

and

this

is

583

them and LOS-

TEZ and the DZ coincided with the

200 miles the law of the sea allows for an EEZ.
exclusive.

PZ can purport to operate like

high seas rights. Security zones so structured are unlawful.

final

a protec-

and before restoration of peace can

likewise be continued. Neither a postwar TEZ nor a
a security

582

584

The two

concepts are mutually

LOS or LOAC matter, that the two

illustrated

by the

later

UK PZ, 150 miles

A belligerent's assertion of a war zone cannot bolster an EEZ declarasame

area,

and an

EEZ

claim cannot bolster a war zone claim for the

same area. Opposing belligerents must take into account EEZ installations, etc., in
necessity and proportionality calculations, however. Although no recent war has
involved contiguous zone, continental shelf, fishing zone,
the same considerations apply.
the

LOS

etc.,

demarcation

lines,

As to parts of a war zone in the territorial sea, under

any State including a belligerent can limit neutrals' innocent passage

temporarily.

586

The same

rule applies during

armed

conflict,

although the time
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during armed conflict near shore

may be

different,

and belligerents may

also to-

exclude neutral ships and aircraft from immediate areas of naval opera-

tally

587

tions.

An

opposing belligerent's military

supporting the war

effort,

may be attacked

Argentina could not have closed

forces, including vessels or aircraft

there.

its Straits

of Magellan waters to neutral ship-

ping; the treaties covering the Straits have no provision for it.

and the LOAC, these

had

straits

Straits (they did not use them),
territorial

to stay open.

588

If

Under both the LOS

UK forces had transited the

Argentina could not have attacked them in Chilean

waters in the Straits, nor could either belligerent have purported to close

the strait to neutral navigation, either by sinking the other's assets to block passage, or to

have closed the

of naval operations.

A

might have occurred

Straits

by declaration of a war zone or an immediate area

naval engagement, or an exercise of self-defense (which

if a

third State attacked either belligerent's forces in the

would have invoked necessity and proportionality principles, which
might have been the same or different for the law of armed conflict or self589
defense,
depending on the circumstances. In either case necessity and proportionality considerations would have required consideration of neutrals' straits
transit rights during war or peace. All of this is theoretical, of course, because no
Straits)

military actions are reported to have taken place in the Straits during the brief war.

In summary, then,
ful,

it

appears that the Falklands/Malvinas war zones were law-

except as to the Argentine declaration for the entire South Atlantic and

tack on Hercules.

its at-

590

A central purpose of these zones has been to avoid committing large forces to a
task of cutting off enemies' seaborne

and

air

commerce,

or for a measure of sea

control where a belligerent has only limited forces to bring to bear on controlling

enemy commerce. Undoubtedly they will be used more frequently as navies downsize in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Midway through the Tanker War,
Fenrick attempted to sum up the developing norm for war zones:
If belligerents use [war]

.

.

.

zones, they should publicly declare the existence,

and duration of the zones, what is excluded from the zone, and the sanctions
likely to be imposed on ships or aircraft entering the zone without permission, and
also provide enough lead time before the zone comes into effect to allow ships [and
one would add, aircraft] to clear the area. As with blockades, "paper" zones are
location,

insufficient. Belligerents declaring zones
to

make

it

"effective," that

is,

should deploy sufficient forces to the zone

to expose ships or aircraft entering the

significant probability of encountering submarines, ships or aircraft

enforcing the zone. All militarily practicable efforts should be

minimum

sanctions, such as seizure instead of attack

militarily practicable

and

to ensure that

measures should be taken

to

on

made

sight.

zone to

a

engaged in
to

employ

Similarly,

all

ensure proper target identification

only legitimate military objectives, such as military

aircraft,

warships, and ships incorporated into the [opposing] belligerent's] war effort, are
attacked.

The emphasis on what is militarily practicable is important. Sometimes the

Law

minimum

on

practicable sanction will be attack

sight;

of

Armed

Conflict

sometimes ships or

409

aircraft

that are not legitimate military objectives will be attacked because of errors in target
identification.

There must be

a proportional

and demonstrable nexus between the
state establishing the zone.^ 92

zone and the self-defence requirements of the

Moreover, the same body of law, i.e., the

LOAC with its limitations (e.g., necessity

and proportionality, exemption of some

ships,

e.g.,

coastal fishing craft,

from

at-

tack as long as they do not contribute to the enemy war effort), and the overarching
right of self-defense under the

UN Charter, applies inside and outside the zone.

A zone's extent, location and duration and measures imposed may not exceed what
594

and should take into account one
rationale for the zone, promoting safety of neutral merchant shipping and aircraft
is

required by necessity and proportionality,

by keeping them a safe distance from areas of actual or potential hostilities.
If it
is no longer necessary that a surface ship be on station to enforce a blockade, the
same rule is true for a war zone. The only requirement is for forces sufficient to enforce the zone.

The zone's
under the

location

LOS

or the

and extent need not coincide with other zones established

LOAC. For

example, although some Falklands/Malvinas

war zones extended about 200 miles from the South American mainland and the is597

•

•

LOS

598

EEZ,
war zone
principles may dictate a zonal width broader, narrower or the same as LOS limits.
The same is true for the law of naval warfare; for example, a blockade area might be
599
the same as, greater than, or less than, a war zone laid on top of the area.
National
lands,

the

same permissible distance the

allows for an

war zone declaration should proclaim a zone different from other zone lines in the area, e.g., those for the EEZ, commensurate with
security planning suggests that a

necessity

and proportionality requirements.

If a

zone line must coincide with an

LOS zone line, a declarant should state in the war zone proclamation that war zone
lines are

independent of any other zones, and that the war zone declaration should

not be taken as an assertion of any other,
declarant's

EEZ

rights are not affected in

This should help avoid other
effect,

rity

e.g.,

rights for an

EEZ, and

that

any way by the war zone declaration.

States' protests that the

war zone proclamation

is,

in

claiming rights which when combined with other claims amounts to a secu-

zone like North Korea's unlawful claim.

Due regard

must be given

neutrals' rights to uses of the oceans.

Necessary

must be provided
where the geographic size of the zone significantly impedes free and safe access to a
neutral's ports and coasts, and in other cases where normal navigation routes are
affected, except where military requirements do not permit it.
A war zone cansafe passage

not bar

through the zone for neutral vessels and

straits passage, access to

innocent passage through a neutral's

waters, or access to neutrals' territorial seas.

duties under the

zone.

aircraft

territorial

A belligerent is not absolved of its

LOAC and international humanitarian law by establishing a war

"In short, an otherwise protected platform does not lose that protection by

410
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crossing an imaginary line drawn in the ocean by a belligerent."
belligerents

must publish

restrictive

measures so that neutrals will know what

expected of them, publication of enforcement measures
a belligerent

may choose to do so.

Although
is

not necessary, although

is

A neutral's complying with a belligerent's or-

ders in the zone cannot be construed as an act harmful to an opposing belliger-

These belligerent measures can include only those

ent.

essential for passing

through the zone, and do not include complying with a belligerent's order that
fectively converts a neutral into part of a belligerent's

UN

effort.

Security Council decisions can override these principles, to the extent a

Council resolution

is

in point.

These considerations

commentators' and countries' objections,

War II

war

ef-

confirms war zones' lawfulness

and despite some

apart,

State practice before

if properly

and after World

noticed, properly configured in

duration and area, and properly employed so as to not violate universally-accepted
principles of necessity

3.

and proportionality during armed

conflict.

Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs)
States

may

bar foreign aircraft or regulate their entry into national airspace,

which includes the
law of the

sea, the

territorial sea as part of national sovereignty.

Analogous

to the

ICAO Convention allows countries to establish prohibited areas

in their territories, over

which foreign

flag aircraft

may

not

fly.

Unlike the LOS,

these prohibitions can be permanent. Aircraft flight through straits cannot be sus-

pended temporarily or permanently.
also subject to the

apply the

Since this aspect of the territorial sea

LOAC through LOS other rules provisions,

a belligerent

is

may

LOAC to its territorial sea airspace. Any State, belligerent or neutral, has

a right of self-defense of this airspace as well as its land territory, territorial waters

and inland waters below the
Belligerents
fication zones

airspace.

and neutrals have a customary right to establish

(ADIZs)

in international airspace,

anchored

air

defense identi-

to their territorial sea

airspace, to establish reasonable rules of entry into their territory.

The legal basis

ADIZ is a nation's right to establish reasonable conditions for entry into its
territory.
An ADIZ is not analogous to a sort of contiguous zone for the air, givfor

an

ing a coastal State a right to police airspace above that part of the high seas outside a

contiguous zone. (Coastal States may, of course, police airspace above a contiguous

zone for

activities, e.g.,

drug smuggling or customs violations,

if the

such action and that State has laws claiming jurisdiction over such

LOS permits
activities.)

An ADIZ cannot be a sovereignty claim over high seas airspace; freedom of navic o
gation and overflight are high seas freedoms.
An ADIZ does not stand in the
way of high seas freedoms.
An ADIZ is a reference area for initiating identification procedures for aircraft on a course that will penetrate an ADIZ State's national
airspace.
States cannot combine an ADIZ proclamation with other LOS rights,
-I

e.g.,

contiguous zone, EEZ, fishing zone, continental shelf,

etc.,

claims, to assert

1

Law

greater rights over an ocean area,

e.g.,

combining an

of

Armed

EEZ

claim with an

claim to assert sovereignty over a high seas area. Each claim
that can be asserted

may

and cannot be thus lumped together.

is

41

Conflict

ADIZ

separate in rights

A proclamation for these

some or all of them in the same document, but claims for an
ADIZ and LOS rights must be separately stated.
The ADIZ also differs from aircraft warning zones, which are legitimate and
may be declared incident to military exercises on, under and over the high seas,
which purport to warn but not to exclude,
or warnings concerning belligerents'
immediate area of naval operations,
blockade areas,
SDZs or war zones.
rights

assert

An ADIZ

can be an incident of self-defense, including anticipatory

defense, in that entry presupposes

communication with an

aircraft that

self-

proposes

by its identifying itself as it proceeds toward the ADIZ State or by a challenge and response system between an ADIZ State and an approaching aircraft. If
to enter,

an incoming

aircraft displays a threat,

hostile intent, or begins hostile action

i.e.,

amounting to an attack, an ADIZ State may initiate self-defense responses, including interception and anticipatory self-defense, subject to principles of necessity
and proportionality and

rules against attacking certain aircraft.

A belligerent

may use its ADIZ during wartime to identify and intercept incoming enemy military aircraft
ity,

and attack them, observing principles of necessity and proportional-

such that neutral

objects of attack; or

States' aircraft, ships,

enemy aircraft,

persons or property that are not proper

ships, persons or property that are not proper

An ADIZ

objects of attack; are not endangered.

cannot be a justification for

self-defense or belligerent attacks, however,

any more than proclaiming, e.g.,

zone can

The ICAO Convention

justify indiscriminate attacks.

been amended

to prohibit States

from using weapons against

a

war

has recently

civil aircraft,

and

in

the case of civil aircraft interception, action so that lives of those on board and the
safety of the aircraft cannot be endangered.

This does not detract from a

State's

inherent right of self-defense, but it does establish conditions of necessity and proportionality if a civil aircraft

is

involved.

Similarly, the

conditions of necessity and proportionality in

LOAC situations.

Thus far the only requirements for a valid ADIZ
international airspace for this purpose,
aircraft identification.

but

if a State

gard,

ADIZs

thus far

modifies or ends an

ADIZ minimum

amendment establishes

are notice, claim of an area of

and that the zone has been established for
have been relatively permanent in nature,

ADIZ, that should be notified as well.

In that re-

requirements are similar to those for other zones.

Analogous to the law of the sea, air law recognizes an exception for aircraft entry
£22

in distress.

During peacetime, States must allow entry of any aircraft in distress.

During war neutrals must allow belligerent aircraft in distress entry, but their
crews and the aircraft must be interned for the duration of the war; civilians must
be allowed

to return

tory in distress

home.

Belligerents' aircraft entering an opponent's terri-

maybe captured or destroyed, and the crews made prisoners of war,

The Tanker War

412

except neutral passengers

who do not contribute to the war effort, who must be re-

patriated.

4.

Ocean Zones Created for Humanitarian Law Purposes
Humanitarian law allows establishing special hospital zones and neutralized

zones by the parties' agreement. These zones may be on belligerents' territory and,
arises," in

occupied areas.

A

neutralized zone to the

enemy through

a neutral

"if the

need

belligerent

may propose

establishing a

country or a humanitarian orga-

ICRC, in combat areas for sheltering wounded and sick and civilians playing no part in hostilities. A zone must be stated in a written agreement,
which must reflect geographic area, zone administration, food supply and zone sunization, e.g., the

pervision.
rial sea as

Since belligerent territory and occupied areas can include the territo-

part of a belligerent's territory or a belligerent's occupied territory, these

zones can include sea approaches to them,
hospital.
fort,

landing

facilities for a

shoreside

(Hospital ships and similar craft, unless they contribute to the war

carry their exemptions with

where,

e.g.,

e.g., at

a

dock in

them whether they

are

on the high

Humanitarian law

territorial waters.)

ef-

seas or else-

treaties

do not

provide for similar zones on the high seas. However, during the Falklands/Malvinas

War, at Britain's suggestion the belligerents agreed on a high seas zone in addition
to a neutralized

zone in the center of the city of Stanley in the islands. The high

"Red Cross Box," was 20 nautical miles in diameter and north of
the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. Argentine and UK hospital ships were stationed
in the Box. Its primary purpose was exchange of sick and wounded. The Box agree639
ment was not in writing.
Since 1982 no other high seas areas have been so
seas zone, called a

designated.

The San Remo Manual
for

suggests the possibility of establishing a high seas area

humanitarian purposes: "[P]arties to the conflict

may agree, for humanitarian

purposes, to create a zone in a defined area of the sea in which only activities consistent with those

humanitarian purposes are permitted." Perhaps recognizing the

informality of communications at sea, the

Manual would not

insist

on

a written

agreement. Once established, the zone does not have to exist indefinitely but for

No

the time agreed upon.

activity forbidden

by the agreement, or inconsistent

with the zone's purpose, should be conducted,

e.g.,

using the zone as a refuge for

combatant vessels like submarines. Military craft, e.g., helicopters, can traverse the
zone to ferry sick and wounded.

The Manual proposal is progressive development, not a customary norm. However, the idea has merit

and should be followed in future wars. Like agreements on

hospital and neutralized zones ashore, the agreement should be in writing if at

possible and should spell out terms analogous to those for shoreside zones.
day, despite the fog of

communications

(e.g.,

war inevitably accompanying armed

conflict,

all

To-

worldwide

facsimile for signed agreements) are such that belligerents

3
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Conflict

should be able to agree in writing, preferably government to government, rather
than relying on naval commanders

at sea

who will have more pressing

matters at

Naval commanders should be consulted, of course. Location of the Box or

hand.

any similar zone,

its

duration including whether

stice or other cease-fire,

other zones

(e.g.,

will continue

during an armi-

and the agreement's terms including its relationship with

war zones or ADIZs, discussed in Parts F.2-F.3), should be pub-

lished, particularly

Manual formula.

it

by

NOTAM

Belligerents

and

NOTMAR,

also another omission of the

might consider language similar

to that

used in ex-

cluding neutrals from the immediate area of military operations, permitted as discussed in Part F.l.a, to encourage other countries' shipping to stay out of the Box

and its vicinity,

to avoid complicating situations.

The agreement should consider

the due regard principle, discussed in Part A, to assure other high seas users' rights
are not

unduly compromised.

Further, there seems no reason

why

belligerents' agreement, to succor sick,

neutrals cannot establish a Box, with

wounded and

civilians

who do

not take

part in the conflict. Given the likelihood of relatively small sea wars like the

among the Earth's navies in the future, it is quite possible that many belligerents may not have resources (e.g., hospiFalklands/Malvinas conflict and downsizing

tal

ships) for a

Box although they would wish

and that other

to establish one,

may have these assets and a willingness to deploy them to alleviate sufand dislocations during the war. Military commands might prepare Box

countries
fering

agreements in advance of any conflict, to be sure they are complete and ready for
rapid use if armed conflict and the need for a

5.
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Box or

similar zone arise.

War

There are no recorded belligerent claims

to exclusion of neutral shipping

from

the immediate area of belligerent naval operations.

The United

States proclaimed

what amounted

to

SDZs

in

its

NOTAM

and

NOTMAR warnings and its reversion to "zone defense" after the 1988 ceasefire.
US NOTAM and NOTMAR warnings referred to a specific area in the Gulf
but did not mention any specific naval units; they warned of dangers incident to

approaching US naval

forces.

These warnings were lawful, in that they notified

others of special dangers incident to approaching too close to

forces,

e.g.,

much as NOTAMs and NOTMARs notifying high seas

self-defense responses,

users of naval maneuvers, like those Iran

which were lawful high
straits if straits

US

announced during the Tanker War,

seas uses but not lawful in neutrals' territorial seas or in

passage would be impeded.

The US SDZ claims for particular areas in the Gulf, at first limited to relatively
small areas around

its forces,

and later redefined with no specific areas, appear rea-

To be sure, there were mistaken firings on, e.g.,
coming close to US forces and the Airbus, but there is no

sonable in the context of the war.

dhows and fishermen

The Tanker War
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evidence the United States violated necessity and proportionality principles,
given information available
that were not lawful targets
lateral

at

the time, or knowingly attacked ships or aircraft

under the

and other damage incident

States paid

to self-defense responses, for

compensation (without admitting fault,

tlements and releases in the

common

Although there appear

claims.

LOAC. These were situations of tragic col-

to

law) for

a

which the United

common practice in tort set-

some and probably

SDZs

be no published

as

all

damage

such for the war's

neutral convoy, escort or accompanying operations, permitted under interna(LAQ

SDZ, whether communicated by diplomatic channels or perhaps as the need arose for the convoy commander, that was reasonable in
terms and moving area covered, would have been compatible with international
use of a published

tional law,

law. International law does not require establishment or notice of
649
ever.

SDZs, how-

Other neutrals and the belligerents did not proclaim SDZs. Iran could have
published them for

its

convoy operations and projected naval operations and ma-

neuvers, but apparently chose not to do

An SDZ

tack.

so.

The convoys were subject to Iraqi at-

declaration could not have changed that. Iran

had

a right to

conduct naval maneuvers in its territorial sea, as well as high seas naval maneuvers,
the latter subject to due regard for others' oceans uses, but had no right to conduct

maneuvers

in Saudi territorial waters.

gality, or lack thereof,

on

seas, subject to

territorial seas,

and an

Nor could publishing an SDZ

rules.

SDZs could

not alter the

le-

of these operations. Both belligerents' military aircraft

could overfly the Gulfs high

but not neutrals'

Publishing

due regard for others' high seas rights,

SDZ publication

could not change these

justify belligerents'

mine or other

attacks

neutrals.

They roughly corresponded with the genof some but not all military operations. The zones were not

Iran and Iraq published war zones.
eral

geographic area

"paper" zones and were legitimate in terms of geographic scope, since Iran and
Iraq had capability for operations over them,

sought to control or
Strait

war zone

mation

to

of Hormuz transit passage. Iran could publish a

warn of risks of hostilities, but

it

to close the Strait or restrict straits passage

North Korea could
doms.

restrict Strait

except to the extent that Iran

establish

its

could not use the zone procla-

by

neutrals,

any more than

security zone, purporting to limit high seas free-

657

The

principal problem with the belligerent zones was with their misuse. Iran

and Iraq made neutral ships their principal targets with
ports that financed their opponent's

a

view to inhibiting oil ex-

war effort. Iran also attacked neutral shipping

proceeding between neutral ports. These attacks occurred outside the zones as
well.

side

Both belligerents

fired

on neutrals' military

aircraft

and warships, both

in-

and outside the zones. There was an obvious disregard of target discrimina-

tion, failure to observe general principles of necessity

and proportionality, and

a

5
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on shipping that was exempt from capture or destruction.

failure to avoid attacks

To

of

that extent both States violated international law in use of otherwise valid

To the extent mining was part of war zone operations, the zones were un-

zones.

lawful in use because they did not provide safe sea lanes for neutral shipping.

UN Security Council resolutions condemning indiscriminate Tanker War attacks
on neutral shipping support

this view.

Saudi Arabia established an ADIZ during the war.
consistent with international law;

it

was noticed.

Establishing the zone was

The record

does not disclose

the high seas area it covered, but presumably it was that part of the high seas off the

Saudi Gulf coast, nor does the record say what the ADIZ notice recited in terms of
identification.

However, there were no recorded protests, and it must be presumed

that Saudi Arabia acted in accordance with international law

on these

points.

Two weeks before establishing the zone, Saudi Arabia shot down an Iranian airThe ADIZ would not have given a right to
craft over the high seas of the Gulf.
shoot

it

down, even though

through

initial

information for Iranian flights

may have come

AWACS information procedures. The shootdowns were governed by the

right of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, as well as principles of necessity, proportionality

and admitting of no other alternative in the case of anticipa-

There is nothing in the record to say the law was not observed.

tory self-defense.

There are reports Saudi Arabia allowed
facilities

on

which

it

no evidence that these aircraft entered under
and it must be presumed that Saudi Arabia permitted entry,

its territory.

distress conditions,

was allowed

Iraqi military aircraft to use refueling

to

There

is

do under the

LOS and the law of the air.

667

Whether this

could be claimed as a violation of Saudi obligations as a neutral was a separate

is-

Depending on resolving the issue of whether a neutral may aid a country that
is victim of an aggressor, and who was the aggressor in the war, the response could
go either way. Commentators may differ on whether a neutral may aid a country
sue.

believed to be a target of aggression, but the view seems to be that it
sist

the target with aid, including military aid.

If neutral Saudi

is

proper to

as-

Arabia could aid

Iraq as a victim of Iranian aggression, then the assistance was proper. If Iraq was

The difficulty, of course, is which country committed aggression. The reported facts may point toward Iran or Iraq; the isthe aggressor, then the aid was improper.

sue

is far

from

clear.

Perhaps owing to the nature of the conflict,

i.e.,

isolated attacks

on shipping or

defense of shipping, or lack of seaborne assets dedicated to humanitarian use,
670

hospital ships,
671
flict.

e.g.,

no equivalent of a Red Cross Box was established during the con-
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Part G.

Weapons and Weapons

Use; Mine Warfare

Unlike the land war, where Iraq used poison gas against Iranian forces in

viola-

armed conflict,
no nuclear, biological or chemical weapons
were employed in the Tanker War at sea.
Conventional weaponry in the sea war included all sizes of projectiles, from bullets sprayed on merchantmen's bridges to medium-size naval guns, surface to surface rockets, belligerent helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft fire and bombing,
intermediate range land-based Silkworm missiles Iran fired against merchantmen
in Kuwaiti port berths, and surface to air missiles and projectiles. Iran fired conventional weapons at Iraqi port facilities, neutrals' port facilities and neutral shipping; these attacks came from Iranian naval units and land-based aircraft. Iraq
conducted aerial attacks on Iranian oil facilities and neutral shipping; the flights
originated on land, because Iraq had no shipboard naval aviation capability. Neither belligerent bombarded its opponents' shores incident to a seaborne invasion.
After giving occupants of Iranian offshore oil platforms, used for surveillance and
harboring small, offensively armed boats, notice and an opportunity to leave them,
tion of the law of

US naval forces shelled these platforms in response to speedboat attacks on neutral
merchantmen. US naval forces also used weapons fired from helicopters and surface ship

weapons in self-defense responses against belligerent surface vessels. The

down the Airbus with surface to air missiles.
Other US warships mistakenly fired on dhows and fishing boats. At least one belligerent's attack jet was downed by a Saudi interceptor.
U.S.S. Vincennes mistakenly shot

Both belligerents laid sea mines during the Tanker War. All apparently were of
the contact variety,

i.e.,

actuated by contact of a vessel with the mine. Iran laid

them, probably tethered to the bottom, in approaches to Kuwaiti and other neutral

them in Iranian Gulf port approaches. Both States laid them in inshipping lanes, i.e., in high seas areas where traffic generally sailed.

ports. Iraq laid

ternational

Sometimes these were

laid just before a ship

was due

to pass.

Some were

drifting

mines, the result of anchored mines' having broken their moorings; others

mained

tethered. Neutral navies

began

to report,

sweep and destroy or remove

mines, sometimes individually, and in other cases cooperatively
States' naval forces.

layer Iran Ajr,

The US Navy captured and

re-

among

several

later scuttled the Iranian

mine-

and returned surviving crew to Iran. After hostilities ended neutral

navies organized to sweep thousands of mines in the upper Gulf.

Apart from mine warfare discussed in sub-Part

2, this

Part concentrates on

methods and means of belligerents' attacks on opposing enemy forces, shipping or
facilities in the Tanker War. Analysis of belligerents' attacks on neutral military
forces, neutral shipping or neutral facilities has

in Parts A.-F.,

and that analysis

will not

been discussed in Chapter III and

be repeated here.

7

Law

of

Armed

Conflict

41

No Tanker War participant, belligerent or neutral, employed weapons considered inherently unlawful under the
the war

is

LOAC or in self-defense. The central issue for
used conven-

whether belligerents, or neutrals acting in self-defense,

weapons consistently with principles of necessity and proportionality and,
for anticipatory self-defense, necessity, proportionality and admitting of no other
tional

alternative.

belligerents

What might be proportional and necessary under the LOAC between
might or might not be necessary and proportional in

a self-defense

f\7f\

context,

and vice

versa.

Besides these general principles, there were few guide-

posts in treaty or customary law.

1.

Conventional Weapons Use, Apart from Mine Warfare

bombarded Iraqi shore facilities during the Tanker War, using land-based
air and perhaps naval assets. Iraq bombarded Iranian shuttle convoys carrying oil
that Iran sold to finance its war effort, Iranian vessels on the high seas, and Iranian
port facilities and offshore oil installations. No international agreement specifically covers the circumstance of attacks on offshore oil platforms, which I would
also characterize as "shore bombardment." Hague IX declares that military installations and warships in a harbor may be destroyed by bombardment, with consideration for historical, scientific and artistic monuments and hospitals, after
summons to surrender and a reasonable time of waiting. No summons need be
f\T7
given if necessity {i.e., surprise) dictates otherwise.
The Hague Air Rules have
Iran

similar provisions for attacks

mons.

from the

air

but omit requirements for a sum-

678

Whether or which of these principles are customary law or are in desuetude is a
debate

among commentators. However,

at the least these provisions

today reflect

customary rules of necessity and proportionality applying to attacks on military
objectives under the
sity

LOAC or in self-defense responses. These principles of neces-

and proportionality apply

areas, e.g., oil platforms

to military objectives within otherwise civilian

within an EEZ (a "civilian area") used for military surveil-

lance or as launching pads for attacks on shipping (a proper military objective).

Bombardment may not be used to terrorize the civil population or to wantonly destroy areas of concentration of civil populations. Today the rule seems to be notice
should be given of an attack
cal

and

artistic

military situation permits

if the

monuments, medical

679
it.

Besides histori-

facilities are off limits for attack

unless used

for military purposes.

The record of belligerents' bombarding opponents' shore facilities as incidents
of the Tanker War is sparse.
Whether notice if appropriate was given; whether
Hague IX and Hague Air Rules standards were followed; whether civilian objects
or historical,

artistic, scientific

ligerents attacked areas

tacks were designed to

or hospital sites were involved; whether bel-

where the

and did

civil

population was concentrated; whether

terrorize the civil population; or

at-

whether attacks
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followed
the

LOAC principles of necessity and proportionality, is less than clear.

War of the Cities and other aspects of the

indicator, there

is

a

CO")

If

1980-88 conflict on the land are any

high likelihood that there were

LOAC violations, perhaps of

the general principles of necessity and proportionality and perhaps of specific
rules in

Hague IX and

Hague Air

the

Rules.

historical record of this aspect of attacks

2.

Mine Warfare
Mine warfare law

is

a

vices,

fied

e.g.,

targets.

and elsewhere since introduction of sea mines,

it

Although modern mine de-

two centuries ago.

as torpedoes, over

CAPTOR, which rises from the seabed to attack submarines by a modi-

homing

century,

on land

the available

mixture of one treaty dating from 1907, Hague VIII,

and custom developed from
once known

We do not know from

torpedo, have been developed and were used in

belligerents laid only

many wars

in this

bottom-moored contact mines during the Tanker
/TOT

War, although some of these may have broken loose from
on

ysis therefore concentrates

legal aspects of this

their moorings.

weapon

as

Anal-

used in the war.

A State laying mines must notify other States of the location of mines as soon as
f.QQ

military exigencies permit.

Belligerents

may

not lay mines in neutral waters,

689

Anchored mines, i.e., moored or tethered mines,
must become harmless when they break their moorings or control over them is
lost.
Unanchored mines, i.e., those not fixed to or imbedded in the bottom, must
become harmless after a mine layer loses control of them, e.g., after a vessel drops
them over the side or an aircraft deploys them.
As the foregoing indicates, these
principles apply to mines and not to a delivery system; aircraft and submarines are
692
bound by them like surface ships.
Minefield locations must be carefully recorded to ensure accurate notification
(and therefore appropriate action by other States, e.g., to avoid them), and to facilitate removal and/or deactivation, perhaps after hostilities end. At the end of hostilities States must remove mines they have laid, except that States must remove
i.e.,

neutrals' territorial seas.

mines in their waters, regardless of who

laid

may make

them. Parties to a conflict

other arrangements for removal, including arrangements with other countries for

mine removal.
mines

693

Neutral States do not commit an unneutral act

laid in violation of international law'

they clear

if

unless to do so would violate other

international law principles.

Mines may be used

to

channel neutral shipping but not to deny

archipelagic sea lanes passage.

Mines cannot be

coasts with a sole objective of intercepting

may be
697

laid off

straits or

an enemy's ports and

commercial shipping; however, they

otherwise used in strategic blockade of

enemy

coasts, ports

and water-

mine areas of indefinite extent in international waters, i.e.,
the high seas. Reasonably limited war zones may be established if neutral shipping

ways.

States cannot

has an alternate route around or through the zone. Indiscriminate high seas

9

S

Law

mining is unlawful. Minelaying

of

Armed

must have due regard

States

41

Conflict

for others'

high seas

and freedoms.

rights

Belligerents or neutrals

may not lay mines in other neutrals' internal waters or

would

UN

violate that State's territorial integrity under the
699
Mines cannot be laid in international straits so as
Charter as well as the LOAC.
territorial seas; this

to impair or impede neutral passage unless alternate routes of equal safety

and con-

venience are provided.
Neutrals

may

lay

mines in their

territorial sea as a self-defense

they are bound by rules for belligerents,
ping, not impeding shipping,

701
etc.

e.g.,

When

notice, leaving lanes

a threat ends, the

LOS

VIII require that such mines be removed or rendered harmless.

measure, but

open
702

703

for ship-

and Hague

Unless

it is

a

case of self-defense by a neutral or a belligerent expecting or experiencing attack by
a country with

which that belligerent

is

not presently at war, and usually in

cumstances of anticipatory self-defense, armed mines

cir-

may not be laid on the high

absent an armed conflict situation. If mines are placed on the high seas un-

seas,

der these circumstances, a minelaying State must give prior warning by analogy to
705

other Hague rules must be applied analogously, e.g., mines must be
Hague VIII;
70ft
removed expeditiously or rendered harmless once an imminent danger passes.
Controlled mines, i.e., those that cannot be actuated except by signal from a

minelaying
terfere

State's forces,

707

may be laid on the high seas as long as they do not in-

with other high seas uses, or uses involved with parts of the seas covered by

EEZ, etc.,

regimes.

708

Due regard principles apply here too.

mines are laid that would interfere with high seas freedoms,

709

Even

this

if controlled

may be permissi-

ble if there are published alternate safe and convenient routes for other high seas
users.

mine

710

Since most countries laying controlled mines would want controlled

locations secret until there

is

a

need

to actuate

them,

it is

not likely a

minelaying State would notify other countries of their location by notice of an
ternate route or risk entanglement with another high seas user, followed

matic protest based on the due regard principle.

3.

al-

by diplo-

711

Mine Warfare Principles and the Tanker War
Chapter

III

analyzed the necessity and proportionality of self-defense re-

sponses, and that discussion will not be repeated here,

proportionality questions incident to

712

nor will the necessity and

LOAC issues, discussed in Parts A-F, be re-

hearsed anew here. In some cases, assuming that an objective was a proper military

merchantmen under belligerent convoy with cargoes support713
ing an enemy war effort,
it is questionable whether the method of attack was
target,

e.g.,

neutral

necessary or proportional under the circumstances. Iranian forces in particular

seemed to target merchant ship crews by aiming at personnel areas of ships.

The

same can be said for belligerents' indiscriminate mining, resulting in casualties to
71
merchantmen and warships alike.
Failure to publish location of minefields was
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a factor in lack of discrimination, as

came inoperative

was belligerents'

failure to lay

mines that be-

716

after losing their tethers.

Besides failing to satisfy general principles of necessity and proportionality, in-

cluding target discrimination and minimization of civilian and neutral military
casualties, the belligerents,

lated

many specific rules of mine warfare. Although belligerent ships probably laid

most mines, the

rules applied to

tions were not published.

olation
to

and Libya if involved in the 1984 Red Sea mining, vio-

and

718

after

laid

LOAC.

719

was required

effort

717

aircraft as well.

Minefield loca-

Mines, particularly those Iran

breaking moorings.

corded minefields carefully is unknown.

war

by

Belligerents laid mines in neutral waters, a Charter vi-

a violation of the

become harmless

mines

720

Whether the

laid, failed

belligerents re-

What is clear is that an international post-

to clear northern

Gulf mines, which could infer that

neither belligerent, having laid mines, had the necessary

means

to retrieve

them

721

Hague VIII requirement.
Iran's mines in the Strait of Hormuz
principle of mine warfare, that international straits passage must

after hostilities, a

also violated a

not be impeded.

722

Iraq

may have violated

the rule against laying mines off a bel-

ligerent's coast, i.e., the Iranian coast, for the sole purpose of intercepting commer723
cial shipping.
Iran deliberately laid mines in international waters, with no

minefield announced and no provision for alternate routing around or through the

mined area, another LOAC violation. The belligerents showed little, if any, due regard for high seas users' rights.
There was no record of damage to EEZ facilities
as a result of mines,

however, other than the almost certain pollution from holed

ships.

Throughout the Tanker War neutral navies were engaged in mine countermea725
International law
sures, including sweeping, retrieving and destroying mines.
permitted this on the high seas and in neutral territorial waters where the neutral
coastal State allowed entry for this purpose. Even if a neutral had not granted
permission, and there was a mine threat (e.g., a CAPTOR mine) to a third State's
shipping, the third State could enter neutral waters to remove the threat if the
neutral could not or

would not do

so.

For example, Saudi Arabia requested

US

mine sweeping and clearance of its
727
waters during the 1 984 Red Sea mining episode.
If it is assumed that minelaying
assistance (and thereby gave permission) for

'

in neutral territorial waters violates the

warfare,

it

UN Charter in addition to the law of naval

could be argued that the Saudi-US mine clearance agreement was an in-

formal self-defense arrangement to respond to the mine invasion.
self-defense claim related to the

Another
r

an element of which

remove mines, and devices involved with them
the minelayer), from ocean areas, i.e., the high seas, where mines have been

was neutrals' customary right
(i.e.,

US destruction of Iran Ajr,

729

728

unlawfully

to

730
laid.

Although the belligerents committed numerous
failure to observe necessity

LOAC violations,

and proportionality principles

including

in surface

and

air

Law

Armed

on neutral shipping (warships and merchantmen alike),

attacks
fare

of

421

Conflict

731

their

mine war-

for wholesale violations of international law. And al732
the rules of that treaty are grounded
neither State is party to Hague

programs take the prize

VHP

though

in custom,

whose norms both

belligerents violated.

Part H. Other Humanitarian

Law Issues

Chapter III and Parts A-G have discussed Tanker War humanitarian law issues
in other contexts,

self-defense or
cessity

general principles of necessity and proportionality in

LOAC situations, including limitations on reprisals and when ne-

and proportionality should be measured and the prohibition against per-

733

fidy;

and

e.g.,

visit

and search or diversion, attack on and destruction of enemy

vessels with

enemy war

enemy character,

effort,

is

exempt from attack unless they aid the

and goods exempt from designation

their humanitarian nature;

vessel

vessels

as

contraband because of

blockade and exemptions from blockade because a

carrying cargo for a humanitarian purpose;

ing war, including a

vessels

Red Cross Box

735

as a sea area

creating various zones dur-

where

belligerents' sick

and

bomwounded may be transported for hospital ship treatment on the high seas;
737
bardment and mine warfare.
Those analyses will not be repeated here. However, other humanitarian law issues arose during the war and are discussed in more
detail in this Part.

Merchant Ship Crews Trapped in the Shatt al-Arab at the Beginning ofthe War
The fate of crews trapped aboard neutral flag merchantmen in the Shatt al-Arab
738
at the beginning of the war is not clear.
Those of the Iraqi merchant marine who

1.

fell

into the hands of Iran,

and Iranian merchant marine personnel who

fell

into

the hands of Iraq, were entitled to at least prisoner of war status under the Third

The same would be true of ships' crew if a neutral vessel
739
acquired enemy character.
Crew of neutral flag ships that had not acquired enemy character, which probably accounted for personnel on most stranded vessels,
1949 Geneva Convention.

were protected persons under the Fourth Convention: "Persons

.

.

.

who, at a given

moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying
are not nationals."

lowed

to return

Power of which they

They should not have been detained and should have been

al-

home promptly.

Crew entitled to prisoner of war status were entitled to treatment as prisoners of
war,

including repatriation before the end of hostilities for those seriously ill or

wounded.

In any event these crews should have been repatriated "without delay

after the cessation of hostilities."

ers of war were repatriated.
after the war,

There

is

no record of when or

if these

prison-

However, if part of those were still in captivity 10 years

the Detaining

Power

(Iran or Iraq)

may have been

guilty of a
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grave breach of humanitarian law.

wounded who were not returned

The same can be

said for the seriously

in accordance with the

ternees.

Power

interests.

749

Internees should have been

released from internment as soon as conditions for internment
isted,

if in-

Unless interned, these crews were entitled to leave unless their depar-

ture was contrary to Detaining
750

or

Third Convention.

Fourth Convention-covered crew also had considerable protections even
748

ill

and then

as protected persons they

In no event could internment

last

were entitled

no longer

to rapid repatriation.

ex751

longer than the end of hostilities, at which time

any crew internees should have been repatriated

as soon as possible unless there
752
r

There

were outstanding penal proceedings against them.

•

no record of when

is

Fourth Convention-protected crew were returned. However,

if

crew considered

protected persons were not interned, they should have been repatriated. Interned

crew should not have been held longer than the end of hostilities before repatria-

were criminal charges against them.

tion, unless there

bers were held longer, the Detaining

Power was

particularly if they were among those held over

2.

Rescue of Those

On

in Peril

at least three

belligerents'

armed

1

If

any of these crew

mem-

guilty of a grave breach,

753

years after the end of hostilities.

on the Sea

members of
US Navy ship

occasions neutral armed forces took custody of
forces after attacks

on or over the high

seas.

A

rescued an Iraqi pilot shot down by an Iranian air-to-air missile; the pilot was repatriated to Iraq
pices.

US

during the war through Saudi Arabian Red Crescent Society aus-

forces rescued 22 Iranian Iran Ajr

US

crewmen

after their

minelayer was

The 22, and remains of 3 crewmen
that died in the attack, were handed over to Omani Red Crescent officials, who sent

captured during a

self-defense response.

them to Iran. US naval forces also rescued six Iranian Revolutionary Guards boat
crewmen from the water during a US self-defense response; two died aboard a US
Navy ship. The survivors and remains of the dead were turned over to Omani Red
Crescent officials, who sent them to Iran. It is not known whether Iraq consented
to repatriation of the Iranian service members, but it does not appear that Iraq objected to the procedure. Similarly,

it is

not

known whether

Iran consented to the
*7

Iraqi pilot's return or

tack on the

whether Iran objected

Rostum platforms

to this procedure.

in response to attacks

CA

After the

US at-

on neutral shipping, and

a

subsequent naval battle with Iranian surface combatants, there were heavy casualties.

US forces permitted Iranian tugboats to engage in rescue operations without

impediment.

755

Undoubtedly there were survivors in the high
attacks
tral

seas after belligerents'
756

on shipping by mines, aircraft or surface combatants.

naval forces or other merchant ships rescued

numerous

Undoubtedly neu-

many of them. There is no record

of Iranian naval forces' succoring survivors; Iranian tugs picked up platform crew

when US forces attacked them.

757

Since Iraqi fighter aircraft prosecuted high seas

Law

attacks, these platforms could

of

Armed
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Conflict

have not actively participated in rescue operations,

although commensurate with security Iraq could have signaled to other platforms

concerning survivors in the water. If Iraq had helicopters or surface ships in the
area,

they could and should have participated. There were apparently no belliger-

ent minelaying units nearby that could have participated in rescue efforts

when

mines detonated against shipping.

There is
flict,

tral

a general obligation,

to rescue persons in peril

warships or

aircraft,

under the law of the sea and the law of armed con-

enemy

flag

758

Thus whether belligerent forces, neumerchantmen or neutral merchantmen, all

on the sea.

to rescue shipwrecked mariners. Apart from Iranian tugs' as759
there is no record of belligerent ships or aircraft's
sisting Iranian nationals,

had the obligation

helping to rescue persons in peril on the

sea.

Consistent with their security needs,

and aircraft should have done their utmost to assure safety of these persons, perhaps communicating their observations after reaching a place of safety.
There is no indication as to whether this was done, or if it could have been done unthese ships

der the circumstances.

Some rescues, £.£.,

came after self-defense responses. It
did not occur during armed conflict as between

that of the Iran Ajr crew,

could be argued that since these

rescuer forces and rescued persons, the
fense measures ended.

LOS

760

Alternatively,

incidental to the right of self-defense;

it

supplied the standard after self-de-

could be argued that these rescues were

761
i.e.,

the

LOS did not apply, and these res-

cues became part of the developing law of self-defense.
self-defense carries with

LOS

and

LOAC

it

Under this theory, a right of

the responsibility of attempting to save

life at

sea

under

standards. Since the United States was a neutral, unless the

LOAC in this particular instance applied to it, 76? the LOAC could not have governed these rescues.
be.

763

These are distinctions without a

Given the obligation's universality,

it

difference, as they should

could be argued that a duty to rescue

those in peril on the sea has achieved;*/* cogens status,
subject to a rescuer's responsibility of protecting

its

required in peace and war,

own

crew, passengers and

platform.

3.

Neutrals' Repatriation of Belligerent Armed Forces

Members

Sub-Part 2 discussed neutrals' rescue and repatriation of Iranian and Iraqi

armed forces members during the war. Humanitarian law requires that neutrals
into whose territory, including territorial waters, belligerent military personnel
fall must intern them for the war's duration, so that they do not take further part in
the conflict, according to the Second Convention, which
765

this issue.

With

respect to the Iraqi pilot shot

is

particularly in point for

down, rescued by

turned over to the Saudi Red Crescent and returned to Iraq, this
cally violated

ment.

US

forces,

may have techni-

humanitarian law standards unless Iran consented to the arrange-

The same could be said of the IranAjr crew rescued by US forces, turned over
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to the

Omani Red Crescent and returned to Iran, if humanitarian law applicable to

LOAC

the

applied unless Iraq consented to premature repatriation. If

as-

it is

sumed that the United States turned these persons over to Red Crescent representatives in

good

faith, the

blame for premature repatriation arguably lies elsewhere

than on the United States.
Since these attacks occurred in the context of US self-defense responses, it could

be argued that the humanitarian law applicable during armed conflict did not apply of its
fense.

own force, but only in the context of necessary and proportionate self-deUnder this theory, new standards of humanitarian law, not necessarily

the same rules applicable during
self-defense responses. If this
fore the

is

armed

conflict,

could apply during and after

the case, returning Iranian crew and remains be-

end of hostilities was not unlawful; there were no

patriation, since the Charter

However,

it

treaty rules to govern re-

and its right of self-defense trumped the treaty law.

could be argued that the same rules of humanitarian law applicable
•7

/TO

during armed conflict should be applied by analogy in the self-defense context.

A third argument would be that the law of self-defense ceased with the armed response, and that other norms, e.g., the LOS and LOAC rescue at sea requirements
769
and LOAC nonrepatriation principles then arose to supply the rules.
Under the
first

or third theories, and arguably what should be the law in the self-defense con-

text, it

was not proper

hostilies
test

to repatriate the rescued

crew prior to termination of

without opposing belligerent consent. However, since there was no pro-

from opposing belligerents, these

States' acquiescence in these actions

may be

presumed.
Part

I.

Deception During Armed Conflict

at

Sea: Ruses and Perfidy

Stratagems and ruses are allowed in sea warfare within the same general limits
as land warfare;

customary and treaty law denounce perfidy ("breaking of faith")

or treachery in land, sea, air or space warfare. Ruses of war involve misrepresentation, deceit or other acts to

no obligation

mislead an enemy under circumstances where there

to speak the truth. Perfidy or treachery involves acts inviting an ad-

versary's confidence that the actor

tion

1.

is

under international law.

is

entitled to protection or

must accord protec-

770

Legitimate Ruses of War and Actions Constituting Perfidy

Although the

LONW follows general

rules for ruses of

war

in other arenas,

there are principles peculiarly applicable to sea warfare and others that have

more

frequent application to sea warfare situations.

For example, most commentators say it is lawful for a warship to use a neutral or

enemy flag when chasing an enemy vessel, when trying to escape, or to draw an enemy vessel into action. The warship must fly its national ensign immediately before

it

attacks, however. It is perfectly proper for warships to

assume

disguise,

i.e..

Law

of

Armed
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adding funnels or masts to simulate a merchantman. Aircraft, including naval
ation,

may not use

false

markings, however. Use by a belligerent of neutral

insignia or uniforms during actual

armed engagement

avi-

flags,

771
is

forbidden.

Besides the false flag rule for warships, legitimate ruses of war for warships and
naval auxiliaries, and vessels convoyed by a belligerent and other ships with en-

emy character, include camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation,
which might include

false or

misleading communications signals, acoustic or

other emissions, paint except for the markings or pendent
quires,

and the like. These (but not the false markings

number

the

LOAC re-

rule) also apply to aviation

operating over the oceans. Other lawful ruses include surprises; ambushes; feigning attack, retreat or flight from battle; simulation of quiet or inactivity; deception

by bogus orders or plans; use of enemy signals or passwords; communications or
orders to nonexistent units; deceptive supply or military unit movements; decoying through use of obsolescent or poorly armed military aircraft or warships to lure
hostile forces into combat;

dummy ships or aircraft; altering vessel or other equip-

ment appearance by

adding fake funnels or masts; mock combat among

e.g.,

friendly forces to lure an opponent into

combat

to aid its forces; flares or fires to

mimic battle damage; smoke to conceal opposing forces' size and power; taking advantage of weather (e.g., fog); removing or changing navigational aids; psychological

methods

inciting an

to incite

enemy

enemy personnel

to rebel,
772
population to revolt.

mutiny, desert or surrender; and

Ruses can be unlawful or unlawful, depending on the situation. Although deceiving the adversary

is

generally lawful, deception that involves misleading or

luring an adversary into what would otherwise be a treacherous or perfidious act is

an unlawful ruse. For example, luring or misleading an adversary into attacking civilian objects or the civil population in that adversary's ruse-induced
lief the target is a legitimate military objective is

condemns.

773

mistaken be-

an unlawful ruse that the

LOAC

While some unlawful ruses are common to all warfare modes, others

have particular emphasis in naval warfare.

Warships and naval
craft or

auxiliaries

may

not simulate hospital ships, small coastal

medical transports; vessels on humanitarian missions; passenger ships

carrying civilian passengers; vessels guaranteed safe conduct by parties' prior

agreement, including cartel ships; vessels entitled to be identified by the red cross
or red crescent emblem; or vessels carrying cultural property under special protection.

775

Although the San Remo Manual says

reflect the state of the law;

e.g.,

a warship

this list is exhaustive,

ognizes.

act, as

does not

the Manual later rec-

In terms of aviation operating over the high seas, a similar

be: medical aircraft; aircraft

it

may not simulate a vessel that has surren-

dered and is therefore exempt from attack, a perfidious
777

776

on humanitarian missions;

list

civil airliners

might

carrying

only civilian passengers; aircraft granted safe conduct by parties' prior agreement;

and

aircraft entitled to

be identified by the red cross or red crescent emblem;
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aircraft carrying cultural property

under special protection.

of prohibitions on warships and naval auxiliaries, the
aircraft

cannot display any

false

markings.

list is

778

And as in

the case

not exhaustive;

779
e.g.,

780

The Manual would also bar belligerents from actively simulating status of a vesthe

sel flying

UN flag as part of its "exhaustive' list, noting that "It has not yet been

determined precisely in which circumstances flying [UN] colours would indicate
protected status
entitled to a

[I]f

UN forces are not taking part in the conflict

form of protected

.

.

.

,

they are

781

status."

The Manual standard, while perhaps appropriate as a general principle, may be
deficient in several respects. First, in practice, when the UN ensign has been flown

-ii

•

i

i

•

during peacekeeping operations, it has been subject to prior agreement.

any such agreement
sede

783
it.

is

subject to Security Council decisions,

782

Second,

which could super-

Third, the rule does not take into account situations where a belligerent

or neutral State

is

faced with a UN-flagged force of warships arrayed against

it.

While that country may be entirely in the wrong in opposing the force, perhaps op-

UN supported blockade, 784 that State may oppose, attack and destroy these UN flagged forces as
can under the present LOAC or law of
self-defense. On the other hand, if the UN flagged force is used for humanitarian

erating under a

-

it

purposes,
poses,

785

e.g.,

to transport cargo

through a blockade for humanitarian purthird point, where a

UN force is

false flag rule, a legitimate ruse

of war at sea

the Manual principle would apply.

used for combat purposes, invokes the
for warships as long as the false flag is

colors are flown,

which the Manual

The

hauled down before hostilities begin and true
786

also recognizes.

Under

the false flag rule, a

UN combatant force could fly the UN flag as a ruse under cirdescribed, and under LONW customary standards the UN flagged

country opposing a

cumstances

warships would not be entitled to protected status as the Manual suggests
State's naval forces

UN operation

is

proceeding under a Council decision, as a technical matter the

a matter of international

foregoing analysis suggests, as the

vessels

would

fly

the

Manual

likelihood the result, as

also does, that the law of

UN

The best procedure in every case would be for States

UN

flag to seek

girded with a Council decision, particularly
flagged naval force with

all

law under the Charter, would and should be the same.

flagging is less than complete.

whose

the

hauled down a false flag, hoisted true colors and attacked. If the

LONW rules might not apply of their own force, but in
The

if

armed

agreements with belligerents or be
if a State

would oppose the

UN

-

787
force.

Perfidy includes feigning distress, particularly through misusing an internationally recognized protective sign,
cease-fire,

e.g.,

humanitarian negotiation

and wounded) or other

the

{e.g.,

Red Cross

or

Red

Crescent; feigning

a parley to negotiate removal of

truce; feigning incapacitation

combatants' feigning civilian noncombatant status.

by wounds or

dead

sickness; or

.

Law

of

Armed
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Like lawful ruses, perfidy involves simulation, but it aims at falsely creating a
which the adversary, under international law, feels obliged to take action
or abstain from taking action, or because of protection under international law
situation in

neglects to take precautions

which

are otherwise necessary. Perfidy or treachery to

armed conflict under international law
should
have in the international law of
which
combatants
to strengthen the trust
peace and
armed conflict .... [PJerfidy tends to destroy the basis for restoring]
kill,

injure or capture has been prohibited in

.

.

.

.

.

causes the conflict to degenerate into savagery.788

In naval warfare these include launching attack while feigning exempt platform
status; feigning surrender or distress.

789

Air warfare rules allow an aircraft to feign

disablement or other distress to induce an enemy to end its attack. There is no obligation to stop attacking a belligerent military aircraft that appears disabled.
ever, if it

is

known an

conflict, attack

aircraft is disabled so that

it is

How-

permanently removed from

should end to allow possible crew or passenger evacuation.

790

Sub-

marines have feigned success of depth charge or torpedo attacks by releasing oil or
debris; this practice has never

2.

been questioned

Ruses and Perfidy During the Tanker

as perfidious conduct.

791

War

There are no reported ruses of war, lawful or unlawful, adopted by belligerents
during the Tanker War. There are no reports of perfidious conduct.

US naval vessels began painting their combatants' pendent numbers in shades
of black and grey, instead of the traditional white-on-black familiar to the world, to

minimize

reflective surfaces that

report of it, undoubtedly

might

792

attract a missile.

commonly seen during
793

is

no

US and other aircraft may have used nonreflective paint

and nonreflective markings, instead of the usually
surfaces

Although there

brilliant

aluminum

or other

recent conflicts in which the United States has

US and other countries' warships also began to use
nonreflective paint. Undoubtedly US platforms, and those of other countries, em-

been involved.

Perhaps

ployed emission controls and other devices to minimize detection and therefore to

minimize attacks by

belligerents.

Toward

war's end warships like Vincennes ap-

peared in Gulf waters; these vessels had been designed from the keel up to mini-

mize detection by their configuration and equipment. Neutral navies did not
actively simulate hospital ships

LOAC

rules allowing ruses

and other platforms the

LOAC forbids. 794

and forbidding perfidy did not apply

to

US and

other neutrals' warships and military aircraft operating in the Gulf during the

Tanker War. These countries were not belligerents.
cidents of self-defense,

795

If these actions are seen as in-

and if the LOAC rules are analogized to self-defense sit-

uations, these neutral naval forces' actions were legitimate. Apart
a

pendent number on ships or proper markings on

796
aircraft,

from displaying

international law

does not require a ship or aircraft to be painted a particular color or with a particular

kind of paint, and the law says nothing about the color of these markings.
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and other actions

Similarly, if emission control

mate ruses

for belligerents, neutrals

like Vincennes or aircraft like Stealth

mize detection under the

to

minimize detection are

may employ them

in self-defense.

bombers can be designed and

legiti-

Warships

built to mini-

LOAC and the law of self-defense.

There were two potential uses of the

UN flag during the war. Early in the war

the Organization sought the belligerents' approval for allowing vessels trapped in
the Shatt al-Arab to leave under the

UN or ICRC flag. Although Iran approved,

Iraq refused permission, and the vessels remained there for the duration of the
797
conflict.

No

belligerents

subsequent Security Council decision addressed the

issue. If the

had agreed on terms of departure, that agreement would have gov-

erned. If the Council had issued a decision, that decision

would have governed the
situation.
Use of the ICRC flag, without UN action on its use, e.g., by Council decision or suggestion of an agreement in absence of Council action, would have been
subject to the parties' agreement. In the latter case the LOAC would have governed
799
as to the ICRC, i.e., Red Cross or Red Crescent, ensign.
None of these events occurred, and the scenarios posed are hypothetical, offering considerations for future
798

n

r

wars.

Late in the war the USSR proposed

The

UN flotilla, perhaps flying the UN colors.

proposal came to naught, although the United States correctly insisted on a

careful statement of terms.

the

a

UN

flag. If

However,

this raises the issues of relative sanctity of

the flotilla had been created by Council decision, that decision

would have determined the flag status. On the other hand, if the decision did not,
and the flotilla engaged in operations against the belligerents, it should have been
subject to the same rules, e.g., false flags principles, that the LONW has devel801
802
oped.
As in the case of the UN or ICRC flag proposals for merchantmen,
these scenarios are hypothetical but offer thoughts for future wars.

During the Tanker War merchant ships began
simulating convoys during night steaming.

803

tailing neutral naval

Some merchant

convoys or

ships appeared in

the Gulf painted grey, like warships.
If these ships
efforts,

were neutral flagged and did not carry goods

no perfidy

issues arose.

case of the convoys, there

is

Commensurate with

safety

for belligerents'

on the high

war

seas in the

no objection under the LOAC for merchantmen to sail

close to neutral convoys, even if accompaniment suggests association with the con-

voy. If such a vessel was not formally part of the convoy,

protection and was subject to visit and search as
seas.

It

if it

it

could not claim convoy

steamed alone on the high

could be defended like any other merchantmen by neutral warships.

The same principles apply to painting vessels grey, perhaps to simulate a warship.
If ships tried to look like neutral warships in color, as long as they did not carry a
807

pendent number required of all warships under the

were not subject

LOS

and the LOAC,

to attack as a belligerent target if the simulation

they

approximated

such. If the vessel contributed to the opposing belligerent's war effort, and thereby

S

Law

acquired

enemy character,

that account,

808
it

of
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was subject to capture and possible destruction on

and not because of its paint.

On the other hand, if the simulation ap-

peared to resemble a neutral warship, the belligerents had no justifiable reason to

on account of the color simulation. Grey-painted merchantmen invited

attack

risks of mistaken attacks

opposing

by

a belligerent if a belligerent thought the ship was an
809
belligerent's warship,
or perhaps neutrals' self-defense responses if

the neutral warship thought the grey-painted vessel was a warship approaching

with hostile intent, however.

810

Part J. General Conclusions

and Appraisal; Projections

Cessation of hostilities in 1988 did not end the war.

when

fighting stops

is

claims.
pects.

The belligerents'

usually determined at the time of cessation and

the cessation of hostilities, in this case a cease-fire.
812

for the Future

It

status

by terms of

does not dispose of parties'

This was true for the Tanker War, the 1980-88 conflict's Persian Gulf as-

The belligerents

apparently did not settle matters for two

more

years; Iraq

became involved with the crisis over Kuwait and Coalition war against it in
1990-91.
Tardy prisoner of war exchanges a decade after the cease-fire 814 may
indicate that matters are not settled yet.

Court of Justice over the

There

US platforms attack,

be in lawsuits or the espousal process

change conclusions in

this

is litigation

81

for

in the International

example; private claims

for years.

New

facts

and records

may
may

volume.

This Part advances general conclusions from the available record for develop-

ments in and projections of the law of armed conflict as it applied to the Tanker
War. I do not propose to repeat full, separate analyses for each topic appearing in
this chapter,

1.

however.

817

Basic Principles: Necessity and Proportionality; ROE; the Spatial Dimension

The war

illustrates the distinction that

proportionality in self-defense situations

must be made between necessity and
and necessity and proportionality in

LOAC situations. What is or is not proportional in a self-defense response may or
81 Q
may not be proportional in the same circumstances when the LOAC applies.
The same analysis must apply to the due regard principle, adapted from the law of
the sea and promoted for

LOAC

situations

where no

LOAC

rule applies,

i.e.,

8?0

LOS rights.
Necessity and
proportionality or due regard, like many terms in US and other legal systems, are
belligerents should have due regard for neutrals'

"terms of art" for lawyers that may have different meaning and content depending

on circumstances in which they are used. To cite an example from US law practice,
"jurisdiction" can

mean subject-matter jurisdiction, or competency; venue, or the

particular court(s) within a judicial system that can hear a case; authority of a court

over persons or things, i.e., in personam, in rem, quasi

more generally

"judicial

jurisdiction;"

in

rem or status jurisdiction, or

standing, or the authorization

the

The Tanker War
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Constitution or statutes give a particular claimant to bring a suit;
"trespass"

another example;

is

it

etc.

The word

has one set of meanings for lawyers, another to
821

who are not lawyers, and yet another in the Lord's Prayer.
The LO AC recognizes two ocean areas and the air above them, the high seas and

those

the territorial sea as defined in the 1958 and 1982

LOS

Conventions; special

LOAC rules apply to neutrals' territorial waters. In general, belligerents may wage
war in

their territorial seas

of blockade,

822

principles of treaty interpretation

der the Charter,

LOS

and on the high seas, subject to limitations, e.g., the law

873

and

and application and UN law un-

a general principle of due regard for others' oceans rights.

rules for other ocean areas,

e.g.,

EEZs, do not apply of their own

force,

but

824

In general
must pay due regard to neutrals' rights in these areas.
belligerents may not wage war in neutrals' territorial seas, but here too there are exbelligerents

ceptions,
sity

e.g.,

the rule of necessity permitting a belligerent to attack, using neces-

and proportionality qualifying

neutral territorial waters

the ship from
belligerents

when

its territorial

may

fense situations,

an enemy warship threatening

factors,

the neutral cannot or will not obtain

sea as the law of neutrality requires.

not impair or impede neutrals'

ROE may

qualify

LOAC

As

straits passage.
826

A

responses.

movement of
As

in self-de-

due regard principle,

LOAC situa-

no positive law governing oceans use between belligerents and neuIn any case, the LOS other rules clauses, a customary norm, declare that

tions if there
trals.

from

a general rule,

825

analogous to the same principle in the LOS, has been advocated for
827

it

is

828

body of law must be read in the LOAC context in appropriate situations.
The Tanker War record is slim on belligerents' recognizing or observing these
principles. As Parts B-G suggest, Iran and Iraq failed to observe necessity and prothis

portionality principles throughout the war, particularly in attacks resulting in

damage to neutral shipping from mines, fire from aircraft and surface vessels, and
missiles. Iran violated, or came close to violating, rules for neutrals' territorial seas
and the straits transit regime.
2. Visit

and Search; Capture, Destruction

The Tanker War
guished from

convoyed

LOS

vessels

or Diversion

revisited traditional principles of visit

approach and

visit,

and

search, as distin-

rules applicable to neutral warship-

and belligerents' convoys. As

helicopters, played a role in visit

and

in prior wars, aircraft, particularly

and search, and

this

confirms use of other than

surface combatants for this purpose. Belligerents have a right of visit

merchant shipping
effort. If such

to

determine

if they are

carrying goods for an opponent's war

goods are found, the merchant ship

may

and search of

maybe captured. Alternatively,

more convenient and safe
place. The traditional rule of prima facie validity of a neutral flag flown by a merchantman, and the conclusive presumption rule for merchantmen flying the enemy flag, still apply. Warships are never subject to visit and search. While
belligerents

divert

merchant ships

for search in a

Law

may convoy shipping with

belligerents

voys are subject to attack.

of

Armed

Conflict

military aircraft and warships, those con-

On the other hand, it is legitimate for neutral warships to

convoy neutral-flag merchant shipping; those convoys are not subject to
search,
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visit

and

and neutral convoying warship(s) or aircraft may respond in self-defense if

a belligerent attacks the convoy.

829

and search of neutral shipping to determine if it carried cargoes helping Iraq's war effort. Iran did not have the right to
Iran was within

attack

its

rights to conduct visit

and destroy these vessels without warning or proof they carried such goods.

While Iraq might have exercised visit and search by helicopters, it did not do so,
and its indiscriminate attacks on neutral shipping also violated the LOAC. Iraq
was within its rights

to attack Iranian

for sale to finance Iran's

law when
Iran's

it

convoys shuttling oil down the Iranian coast

war efforts. On the other hand, Iraq violated international

attacked neutral flag convoys carrying goods that did not contribute to

war effort that were escorted by neutral

flag warships. Neutral flag

warships

could legitimately respond in self-defense.
3. Belligerents'

Seaborne Commerce; Belligerents' Convoys

Sub-Part J.2 discussed rules for belligerent convoying; these rules apply to mer-

chantmen flying belligerent flags. Flying
sumption of enemy character.

a belligerent's flag is a conclusive pre-

enemy merchant vessel is a lawful military
objective, and therefore targetable, the US Navy manuals' "war-fighting or warsustaining" approach appears to make sense. Protocol I's land warfare approach,
copied for sea warfare in the San Remo Manual "effective contribution to military
action" phrase, is similar but more restrictive. The US Navy and Manual approaches maybe distinctions without differences; although the Manual analysis is
said to be more restrictive, its application in practice may have the same result as
the US Navy standard.
The London Protocol declares that belligerents should not destroy a merchant
In determining whether or not an

ship unless passengers, crew, ship's papers and,

if feasible,

passenger and crew

ef-

fects are first

placed in safety. State practice since 1909 appears to confirm that an

absolute rule

is

and submarine

impracticable, particularly in air

today should be that general

LOAC principles

attacks.

The rule

of proportionality and necessity

should be observed, and that the safety of passengers, crew, ship's papers and
fects

should be observed when

at all possible,

ef-

which should include advising by

communications of the location of the sinking and of lifeboats. Separate rules, e.g.,
those published in current military manuals, for

air,

surface and submarine plat-

forms, should be consolidated in view of the reality that merchant ship inter-

may be coordinated among all three kinds of platforms. It makes no sense
have one set of rules for each kind of platform. The same principles, perhaps

dictions
to

with different necessity and proportionality factors, should be observed in
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self-defense situations.

831

have proposed

I

a nine-point analysis to

ify the rules. It is clear that belligerents failed to

that neutrals,
like the

e.g.,

attempt to

clar-

observe even these principles, but

the United States, attempted to do so in self-defense responses

Airbus incident.

Certain

enemy vessels and

exempt from attack unless they contrib-

aircraft are

ute to an opponent's war effort. There were no published instances of belligerent
attacks
i.e.,

on these platforms during the Tanker War. Neutrals

fired at these vessels,

fishing craft, during mistaken self-defense responses.
031

4.

Neutral Flag Merchantmen;

Enemy

Character; Re/lagging; Contraband

enemy character if they aid the enemy, e.g.,
by carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining cargo pursuant to enemy diretion or
control or when under enemy convoy, or by supporting the enemy, e.g., by signalNeutral merchant ships can acquire

ing the location of an opponent's sea forces. Absent these considerations, a neutral
flagged ship carries a prima facie presumption of neutral status. Reflagging during

the Tanker

War complied

with

LOAC standards as well as LOS standards.

Late in the war Iran published a contraband
Iraq. Its effect

zures,

etc.,

during the war

is less

than

of neutral shipping before

published before they are
after its publication.

effective.

clear,

its

list

but

it

covering goods inbound to
did not apply to Iranian

publication. Contraband

must be

Although the list was general, it was a valid list

The record of post-1945 wars, and indeed since the 1909 Dec-

laration of London, demonstrates the impossibility of compiling
lists

of absolute and conditional contraband.

ities

supporting a war

effort, often

to publish up-to-date

contraband

Naval manuals continue

to

pay

locked in intelligence and defense agencies' na-

change today as before.

doomed

lists is

Any attempt

to failure before the

lip service to these concepts; a better

listing items that are not contraband,

goods for the war

and publishing

Weapons development and commod-

tional security classifications, are in constant

rest as

lists

sei-

e.g.,

ink

is

dry.

approach

is

humanitarian supplies, and treating the

effort.

833

5.

The Law of Blockade and the Tanker War
Although there was loose talk, in the media and among some commentators,

about Iran's blockading the Iraqi coast or Iraq's blockading Iran's Kharg Island,

no blockade

Neither belligerent

LOAC

would recognize occurred during the Tanker War.
published any notification of a blockade and their sea mine

that the

campaigns could not have counted

as a

blockade with or without notification. In

any event, it is doubtful if Iraq could have mounted an
tire

effective

blockade of the en-

Iranian coast with her air force alone. Iran's naval and air forces could have

blockaded the small Iraqi coast

effectively,

but there

is

no evidence they

did. Al-

though the UN Security Council might have imposed a blockade under its Charter
834.

authority in Article 41,

it

did not do

so.

The

significance of blockade for the

Law

Tanker War

are two: (a) using the term,

however

Armed

Conflict
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loosely, is evidence the

LOAC

of

concept is still alive; (b) States wishing to impose a blockade must comply with the

means

traditional law, even if it

6.

Zones*

that aircraft will mainly be used.

35

Although the Manual and current military manuals confirm the customary rule
that belligerents

are an

may exclude neutrals from properly notified high

seas areas that

immediate area of naval operations which must be proportional in

size, this

procedure was not used in the Tanker War.

The United

States proclaimed a high seas defense zone (SDZ), also

defensive bubble or cordon sanitaire, around

its forces,

known

as a

thereby adding to customary

law for this LOAC-related sea zone receiving modern emphasis in the 1982
Falklands/Malvinas War.

The SDZ must be proportional

in area.

The SDZ need

not be noticed like warnings of belligerents' immediate areas of naval operations.

The SDZ is only an announcement of a State's intention to apply its inherent right
of self-defense. Although they did not do so, Tanker War belligerents or other neutrals

could have published these zones;

if they

had done

so,

they would have been

SDZ cannot justify conduct unlawful under the
LOAC or the law of self-defense. Whether an SDZ is a tactically useful device is
questionable; it advertises a naval force's approximate location. On the other hand,
subject to the

it

may serve

same principles. An

a useful political

purpose in warning about naval presence. Interna-

tional law does not require notice of
self-defense,

SDZs; they

are

grounded

in the law of

which requires no publication.

Iran and Iraq proclaimed war zones.

Modern military manuals and the Manual

recognize high seas war zones as a customary norm,

if

are proportional in area, give time of implementation

they are properly notified,

and duration and allow

a

grace period for shipping to leave the zone. Like blockades, they must be effective;

"paper" zones are inadmissible. Declarants must observe
necessity

and proportionality, exemption of certain

from attack, and enemy character rules
cannot create a high seas free

for

LOAC principles, e.g.,

vessels

(e.g.,

hospital ships)

merchantmen. War zone declarations

fire area entitling belligerents to

shoot on sight. Al-

though the Tanker War belligerents' war zones were notified, proportional and effective,

use of the zones as free-fire areas, including Iraq's notice to that

effect,

meant the zones were unlawful as applied. Belligerents' war zone misuse was
among the most egregious LOAC violations during the Tanker War.
Saudi Arabia proclaimed an
sian

air

defense identification zone (ADIZ) over Per-

Gulf high seas midway through the war.

proportional to

an ADIZ

and the

is

its

purpose,

e.g.,

as

If an

an identification device for incoming

permissible under international law.

LOAC. There

is

ADIZ is properly notified and is
aircraft,

ADIZs are lawful under the LOS

no indication the Saudi

ADIZ

failed this test.
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During the Falklands/Malvinas War the United Kingdom proposed, and Argentina accepted, creation of a high seas Red Cross Box north of the Falklands/
Malvinas, where hospital ships could operate and receive sick and wounded. The
Box precedent was the First and Fourth 1949 Geneva Conventions, which allow
belligerents to agree
vilians.

There

is

on hospital or neutralized zones

no equivalent

in the

for sick

and wounded and ci-

Second Convention on humanitarian law

principles at sea. Despite subsequent lack of practice (none was established during

the Tanker War), the concept

is

useful, if the

seas users' rights are not prejudiced

Box

is

under the due regard principle, and

erents notice the Box's duration and location.

bellig-

A Box agreement should follow the

1949 Conventions Annex form and be in writing

7.

reasonable in size, other high

if practicable.

Weapons and Weapons Use; Mine Warfare
Whether Iran and Iraq followed necessity and proportionality principles

tacks

on convoys,

Cities record

is

oil

platforms and the like

an indicator,

it is

is less

than

clear. If the

War

in at-

of the

highly likely that they did not adhere to these

standards in Tanker War bombardments. As noted in Part J. 5, they did not follow
these rules in high seas attacks on merchantmen;

it

follows that they also probably

did not do so for shore installations.

The

belligerents' automatic

submarine contact mine campaigns were among

War LOAC violations. Neither observed necessity and
proportionality principles in mining. Iraq mined high seas areas; many Iraqi
mines became unmoored and did not deactivate. The same appears true for Iranian
mining. Iraq may have laid mines off the enemy coast for the sole purpose of interthe most egregious Tanker

cepting commercial shipping. Iran laid mines in the high seas without publishing
location of minefields. Iran

may have laid mines

in neutral waters,

and mines ap-

peared in the Strait of Hormuz, thereby threatening to impede or stop neutral
shipping. Iran and Iraq also failed to

show due regard for neutrals' rights to use the

high seas or other ocean areas.

8.

Other Humanitarian

Law Issues

Besides humanitarian law issues related to attacks on shipping and shore facilities,

the Tanker

War

raised issues of evacuation of merchant ships

trapped in the Shatt al-Arab dividing Iran and Iraq, under a
trals'

repatriation of belligerent crew they rescued

ing prisoners of war

at war's

end.

and crews

UN or ICRC flag; neu-

on the high

seas;

and

repatriat-

es

When Iraq refused, as humanitarian law allowed it to do, egress of trapped merchantmen under

a

UN or ICRC ensign, the issue was mooted. These issues may

arise in future wars.

When the United States turned over an Iraqi pilot to a national Red Crescent Society,

and when the United States turned over surviving Iranian IranAjr crewmen to
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another Red Crescent Society, the United States acted in accordance with humanitarian law, which says that belligerents'
to their countries

the

armed forces members must not be returned

during the war if a neutral rescues them on the high

Red Crescent

Societies acted properly

is

Whether

seas.

another matter. Since opposing

presumed they acquiesced in the transactions. On
the other hand, Iran's failure to repatriate prisoners of war until 10 years after the
war's end violated humanitarian law, which says they must be repatriated
belligerents did not protest,

promptly
9.

it is

after hostilities end.

Deception During Armed Conflict at Sea: Fuses and Perfidy

Although there were no reported belligerent actions amounting to ruses of war,
lawful or unlawful, or perfidy, there were actions related to these issues during the

Tanker War.

839

Late in the war the

USSR proposed a UN flotilla of Gulf naval forces; when all

Gulf naval interests did not agree with the proposal, the idea mooted. The issue re-

mains

for future wars, particularly in the

the tip of the iceberg; underneath

lie

peacekeeping context.

command and

multinational naval operations. During the Tanker

The

flag issue is

control structure issues for

War

navies cooperated to

greater or lesser degrees, particularly in clearing mines, analogous to a more formal
coalition opposing Iraq, ultimately with Security Council authorization, in the

1990-91 war.

The USSR proposal may prove

to

have been a seed of future opera-

tions concepts.

Neutral warships and military aircraft probably began to adopt protective measures like non-reflective paint schemes. Warships like U.S.S Vincennes

and some

neutral military aircraft were built from the frames up to be less conspicuous on acquisition radars. Neutral shipping tagged along with neutral convoys;

some ships

were painted grey like warships, probably to simulate them and thereby deter belligerent attacks.

actions

by

None

of these actions were perfidy or unlawful ruses; they were

neutrals.

Summing Up: Projections for Future Conflicts

10.

Although on a worldscale basis the Iran-Iraq war was a small

affair, it

was

a big

war, a total war, for two medium-sized belligerents. It was fought far away from

major neutral naval powers' home ports.
its

kind.

The

1990-91 Gulf War pitted a

belligerent, Iraq,

It

US

has not been and will not be the
-

led coalition against

and there was the potential and

last

of

one Tanker War

reality for a reprise of

many

Tanker War LOAC issues. Yugoslavia's disintegration, continuing to this day, began

Tanker War cease-fire. The same kind of issues, e.g., interdicting
merchant traffic, arose in these conflicts.

just after the

high seas

A critical difference between the Tanker War and these later conflicts was the
Cold War's end and perhaps

a

beginning of a new

UN era, in which Charter law
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issues besides the inherent right of self-defense, a

Tanker War,

To

will figure.

der the

LOAC

result thus far has

been

LOAC standards under Charter law, but the law need not

The

always be identical.

during the

LOAC did not apply; in all cases the

informed the content of Charter-based law. The

close approximation of

legal issue

the extent the later conflicts were governed by

Charter-based law, as a technical matter the

LOAC

major

difference between necessity

and necessity and proportionality

and proportionality un-

in self-defense situations, the

Charter recognizing the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense,

can be great.

842

This was

issue related to the

a

major but disputed Tanker

War, law governing

War issue. To take another

a Security Council decision directing a

blockade might include a "paper blockade," unlawful under the
1856 Paris Declaration.

whether the

LOAC

843

LOAC since the

For national decisionmakers, the question

should be part of the law governing

UN

will

operations;

if

be

not,

many cases the old law has worked well; it is a matter
of understanding and applying it. Tanker War examples of objections to legitimate
visit and search or use of the term "reprisal" when self-defense should have been

what should be

different? In

recited are not helpful in developing the law, traditional or otherwise.

The second problem will be interfacing the LOS with the LOAC. Universal acceptance of the 1982
straits

LOS

Convention

will cure ambiguities in earlier law,

e.g.,

passage rules, and will strengthen customary norms already restated in the

1982 and 1958 Conventions.

A

narrow issue

will

be whether the customary and

treaty-based rule, that the customary other rules clauses of the 1982 and 1958 Con-

ventions, which
will

mean

the

LOS

is

subject to the

LOAC in appropriate situations,

be followed in the future. Properly read and applied, Article 88 of the 1982

LOS

Convention, declaring the high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes, will

not impede Charter-governed operations, LOAC-governed operations, or peace-

time naval operations, for that matter.
regard principle, found in the

A reverse-twist issue is whether the due

LOS conventions as a rule for mutual use of, e.g., the

LOAC concept in belligerent-neutral relations for
84S
oceans use if there is no LOAC rule.
This is not a firm LOAC principle but only
high

seas, will

apply as an

commentators' proposals; should

it

become

a rule of law?

The third issue is applying traditional rules, or perhaps variants of them under a
Charter law regime, to new technologies. The Tanker War was the first where helicopters, as distinguished

from fixed-wing

aircraft,

worked with warships

in visit

and search or diversion operations. The technique was employed again in the
1990-91 Gulf War and the Yugoslavia crisis. Missiles have been a feature of every
war since the early Arab-Israel conflicts. New sea mines may be deployed; the technology of Tanker War mines dated back to the early Twentieth Century.
tronic or other devices

New elec-

may conjure up new ruses of war, with a possibility of claims

of unlawful ruse or perfidy.

How will Internet communications affect traditional

LOAC rules? Will space technology and platforms be a factor? In many ways the
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Iran-Iraq conflict was an old-fashioned war, replete with unrestricted (and unlawful) attacks

on neutral merchantmen and

grisly trench warfare

on land, complete

War I. The next wars may not be simple in

with gas attacks reminiscent of World

terms of weapons technologies and techniques.

How will traditional LOAC rules,

and necessity, proportionality and due regard principles, respond to these issues?
The interdependent world economy is another issue, largely outside the law,
but

may promote problems, whether the law is Charter-based,

it

the

LOAC or the

some of whom have substantial naval assets and
others that do not, other countries' and their citizens' and businesses' interests will
figure in decisionmaking, particularly in UN action, but maybe in individual sov-

LOS. Besides

seafaring nations,

The

ereign State attitudes.

goods and passengers

is

sketch of possible interests in maritime carriage of

a case in point.

Consider

how political decisions might

be different, depending on whose and which national interests are involved. These
decisions have translated, and will translate, into the content of
States' actions.

history of support for the

Tanker War belligerents in the ab-

UN action illustrates the latter point. 847

sence of

One

The

UN and individual

final,

new

issue

is

the maritime environment during

armed

conflict.

Tankers and other oceangoing vessels are larger today than ever before; they are

matched by larger warships, all of which carry more bunkers, or can lift more oil, in
the case of the tankers. There was one major reported spill during the Tanker War,
in 1983, at Iran's

Nowruz

offshore facility, resulting from Iraqi attacks.

848

Un-

doubtedly high seas self-defense responses or belligerent attacks caused others.

The maritime environment

issue

is

the subject of Chapter VI, to which

we now

turn.
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47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

High Seas Convention,
flies

art. 22,

the

same

permitting

visit if a

merchantman is
76 and

flag as the warship; see also n.

text.

LOS

accompanying

Convention,

art.

87(1);

High Seas Convention,

art.

2; see also nn. III. 952-67,

IV.10-25 and

text.

55.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

56.

Chapter IV analyzed

57.

Colombos

§

558;

LOS

NWIP

issues in the

10-2

272-77. For specific analyses, see Parts
this

Liber

B.

suspected of engaging in piracy or the slave trade, or in reality

E.g.,

11.341

11.

51.

54.

TheJCS, n.

11

Tanker War

430; San

context.

Remo Manual

H 10; compare Robertson,

B-G and accompanying text,

New LOS

265-72 with

id.

which develop exceptions and interpretations of

broad statement.

58.

LOS Convention, art. 87; High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. IV.68-79 and accompanying text. As Parts

A-G make

clear, there are

exceptions to this broad statement.

59.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

60.

Robertson,

New LOS 265-77 also analyzes archipelagic waters and the Area, but there are no archipelagoes or

Area waters in the Persian Gulf. Id. 278-97, citing inter alia

NWP 9A Annotated

H11

7.3, 7.3.4.2, 7.3.5, 7.3.6,

and refuting

arguments in Elmer Rauch, The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims

Law

of

Armed

441

Conflict

of International Armed Conflicts and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Repercussions on
the Law of Naval Warfare 34 (1984) and at UNCLOS III for the proposition that coastal States may extend
neutrality to the EEZ and archipelagic waters as declared in the law of the sea.
61.

62.

NWP

Compare

Manual

1-14M Annotated HH

7.3, 7.3.3-7.3.7.1 with

NWP

9A Annotated

HH 7.3-7.3.7.1; San

Remo

HH 14-37.

Helsinki Principles

3.1, 4;

San Remo Manual 1111

303; Dietrich Schindler, Commentary, in

10(b), 10(c), 34, 36-37; Robertson,

Law of Naval Warfare 211,

New LOS 286, 291, 297,

220; see also n. 58 and accompanying text.

63.

See nn. 32, 41-47 and accompanying

64.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 11.459-68, III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

65.

See

66.

See nn. 11.459-68 and accompanying

67.

See nn. 11.341-44, 452-53, III.258, 465 and accompanying

68.

See

69.

See nn. 11.341-44,

70.

See nn. 11.104-06, 220, 277, 290, 325, 357, 375, 379-81, 463 and accompanying

71.

NWP 9A Annotated HI 2.3.3, 7.3.5; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 2.3.3, 7.3.5; San Remo Manual HH 23-33; see

33 and accompanying

n.

n. III. 258

Part

I.

text.

and accompanying
III. 258

text; see also

text.
text.

text.

and accompanying

text.
text.

also Part IV. B.5.

72.

LOS Convention, arts.

IV.372-75 and accompanying
73.

Hague XIII,

See

75.

See,e.g.,

accompanying
76.

LOS

principles,

art. 14(4); see also

nn.

also, e.g.,

NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 7.3,

nn. 11.250-59, 309, 401-02, 434 and accompanying

text.

nn. 11.250, 260, 334-35, 337-39, 362, 373, 393-94, 412, 421, 430-33, 446, 469, 519, V.58 and

text.

Convention,

e.g.,

arts.

Convention

Protocol, Dec. 7,

&

NWP 9A Annotated HH 7.3, 7.3.2, 7.3.4, 7.3.4.2, 7.3.7;
Oppenheim HH 318, 325 n.l; San Remo Manual HH 14-18.

73 and accompanying text; see

74.

Convention,

arts. 1, 5;

7.3.2, 7.3.4-7.3.5, 7.3.7; 2
n.

19(2)(a)-19(2)(c), 19(2)(f), 19(2)(/); Territorial Sea

text.

1

953, 7

95-96, 109-10, 236;

to Suppress the Slave

UST 479, 1 82 UNTS 5 1

;

High Seas Convention,
Trade

&

Other agreements

art. 22.

flesh out

LOS

LNTS

253;

Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60

Supplementary Convention on Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade

& Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 5, 1956, 18 id. 3201, 266 UNTS 3; Telecommunications
Telecommunications Convention & Optional Protocol,
& Optional Protocol, Nov. 6, 1982, TIAS
Regulations, Oct. 25, 1973, 28 UST 2495, 1209 UNTS 32 & Radio Regulations, Dec. 6, 1979, TIAS
European
Institutions

Convention

;

;

Agreement

for Prevention of Broadcasts

Transmitted from Stations Outside National Territories, Jan. 22, 1965, 634

UNTS 239; (illicit radiobroadcasting; see also TIF 450-56); see also The Marianna Flora, 24 US (1 1 Wheat.) 1 (1826);
Brown 294-95, 299-304, 309-10, 314; Brownlie, International Law 237-44; Colombos §§ 156A-56B, 333-37, 457-64,
470-83A; 1 Hyde § 227; McDougal & Burke 887-93; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 3.4-3.8; NWP 9A Annotated HH
Law of the Sea 802-03, 814-19; 1 Oppenheim §§ 292-93, 299-305, 429-30; Restatement
Restatement (Third) § 522; Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade (1997); Eric Ellen, Contemporary Piracy,
21 Cal. W. Int'L L.J. 123 (1990); Samuel Pyatt Menefee, "Yo Heave Ho!": Updating America's Piracy Laws, id.151
(1990); John N. Petrie, Pirates and Naval Officers, NWC Rev. 15 (May-June 1982); Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The
Suppression of Pirate Broadcasting: A Test Case for Control of Activities Outside National Territory, 45(1) L. & Contemp.
Probs. 73 (1982); Louis Sohn, Peacetime Use of Force on the High Seas, in Robertson 38, 39-59; Anna van Zwanenberg,
Interference with Ships on the High Seas, 10 ICLQ 785 (1961).
3.4-3.8; 2

(Second)

77.

O'Connell,

§ 34;

See nn. IV.710-12 and accompanying text; Colombos §§ 151-56. Because the United States abolished National

Prohibition over 60 years ago,

US

their specific function, if that

is

lingering vitality for
78.
17,

LOS

Const.,

amend. XXI, these

treaties

may be headed toward desuetude in terms of
text. They may have

not already true. See nn. III.930, IV. 28 and accompanying

territorial sea issues as discussed nn.

IV.710-12 and accompanying

text.

Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs & Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, art.
ILM 493-518 (1989). The United States and other countries have concluded bilateral agreements

See Convention Against

—UST—

,

in

28

on narcotics interdiction

too. See,

e.g.,

Agreement

to Facilitate Interdiction

United Kingdom Suspected of Trafficking in Drugs, Nov.

13, 1981,

States Bilateral Treaties Providing for the Prevention of Smuggling,

antismuggling bilateral agreements. See also

33

by the United

UST 4224,

1285

Doc. 17-7, 6E Benedict

Brown 310-11; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH

Maritime CounterdruglAlien Migrant Interdiction Agreements (Sept.

1,

1997), in

id.

3-33;

States of Vessels of the

UNTS
lists

197. Table of United

these and other

3.1 1.4.1-3.1 1.6

US

& Table A3-1:

Restatement (Third) §

522, cmt.

The Tanker War
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d

& r.n.4; Phillip A. ]ohnson,Shooting Down Drug Traffickers, Liber Amicorum ch. 4; Sohn, Peacetime Use, n. 76, 59-79.

Smuggling people has been an
Liber Amicorum ch.
79.

Convention

1988,— UST—

,

in

issue too. See,

ILM 668 (1988);

AJIL

3.5.2.3 n.30;

11

Gary W. Palmer, Guarding the Coast: Alien Migrant Operations at Sea,

Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar.

for

27

10,

1988,— UST—

,

80.

NWC Rev.

see also

Brown

304-09;

NWP

1-14M

16 (July- Aug. 1983).

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also Brown 313 (force used to interdict arms shipments); Colombos § 337; NWP

1-14M Annotated,

H 3.11.5.1 (distinguishing force

self-defense right); nn.

III. 10,

war zones, often claimed
81.

LOS

III. 952-67,

82.

The

and search.

in connection with visit

Convention,

IV. 10-33

used in drug interdiction and measures taken in inherent

47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. See Parts F.2-F.5 for analysis of

High Seas Convention,

art. 87(1);

and accompanying

flowing from

claim by Brownlie, International

83.

LOS

arts.

60-62; see also nn.

Law

243 that the approach and
visit

may

visit

regime has been destabilized

indicate lack of appreciation of the law

UN Charter, art. 51,103, and that the LOS Convention confirms what had been developing trends in the

law; compare 2 O'Connell,

III. 928-67,

Vienna Convention,

art. 2;

text.

because of self-defense and other claims related to approach and

Law of the

Sea 801.

art. 87(1); High Seas Convention,
accompanying text.

Convention,

IV. 10-33 and

84.

See nn. 76-79 and accompanying

85.

LOS

Convention,

arts.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

Stone 591-92;

11

Whiteman

UN Charter, arts.

87.

Bring, Commentary, n.

88.

Hague XIII, arts.

San Remo Manual

11

Vienna Convention,

art. 2;

1111

-2,

60-62; see also nn.

text.

High Seas Convention, arts. 8(1), 9; see also Helsinki Principle
7.6; 2 Oppenheim § 416; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 32;
IV.794 and accompanying text; but see Tucker 335-36.

7.6;

NWP 9A Annotated

11

51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

1

arts.

95-96, 110(1), 236;

3; n.

86.

7.6;

685 (1988);

in id.

Malvina Halberstam, The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82

269, 270-71 (1988); Christopher C. Joyner, Offshore Maritime Terrorism: International Implications and the Legal

Response,

5.2.7;

10,

Protocol for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Fixed Platforms

Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar.

Annotated

e.g.,

8.

III. 848,

25;

and accompanying

text.

843; Schindler, Commentary, n. 62, 221.

Stockholm Declaration, arts. 9;

NWP

14-15, 16(d), 118; Bring, Commentary, n.

1

-14M Annotated

III. 848,

11

7.6;

NWP 9A Annotated

11

843; Schindler, Commentary, n. 62, 215,

218.
89.

LOS

Convention,
90.

LOS

Convention,

arts.

arts. 1, 6;Territorial

Convention,

Nordquist HH 1.1-1.19;

1

Continental Shelf Convention,

1(1), 33, 58, 76(1), 78, 135, 137;

Sea Convention,

arts. 1(1),

art.

136-37; see also

O'Connell,

Law of the

24; see also Parts IV.B.l

Brown

18, 20, ch. 17;

Sea 463-66;

1

See nn. IV.75, V.58, 62 and accompanying

92.

LOS Convention, arts. 2, 8; Territorial Sea Convention, arts.

art.

§

350;

3;

Fishery

B.2.

Brownlie, International

Oppenheim

91.

and

Law 252-57;

Restatement (Third)

§

2

523.

text.
1, 5; see

also nn.

IV.267-508 and accompanying

text.

93.

See nn. IV.75, V.58, 62 and accompanying

94.

LOS Convention, art. 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, art.

text.

16(3); see also nn. IV.337,

349 and accompanying

text.

95.
7.8;

Helsinki Principle

San Remo Manual

11

3.3, cmt.;

108;

NWIP 10-2 HH 430b & n.23; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.8; NWP 9A Annotated

Tucker

300-01; cf Helsinki Principle

3.2.

This right of belligerents

to close

II

an area of

the sea incident to visit and search should be distinguished from an exclusion zone claim, discussed in Part F, which

may

involve larger high seas areas.

96.

NWP 1-14M Annotated!! 7.8; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.8;

San Remo Manual

1111

cf.

London Declaration, art.

1

;

Paris Declaration

11

4;

85, 106.

97. See generally Part IV.B.5 and nn. V.58, 62 and accompanying text. Some treaties have specific provisions, e.g.,
Montreux Convention, n. IV.557, art. 19, 173 LNTS 225 (no visit and search or hostile act in Turkish Straits if Turkey
not a belligerent); see also NWP 1-14M Annotated 7.3.5, 7-14; NWP 9A Annotated 7.3.5, 7-20; 1 Oppenheim § 213;
11

Vignes, n. IV.555, 474.

11

Law

Hague XIII,

of

Armed

443

Conflict

requires belligerents to respect neutrals' sovereign rights. Belligerents must abstain from
which if knowingly permitted by any State would be an act of belligerency; Maritime Neutrality
Convention, art. 3 obliges belligerents "to refrain from performing acts of war in neutral waters or other acts which
may constitute on the part of that State that tolerates them, a violation of neutrality." NWP 1-14M Annotated 1 7.6;
NWP 9A Annotated H 7.6 say the prohibition extends to "international straits overlapped by neutral territorial seas .";
San Remo Manual H 15 uses similar language. See also Stockholm Declaration, art. 9(1); Helsinki Principles 1.4, 3.1;
Bruce Harlow, UNCLOS III and Conflict Management in Straits, 15 ODIL 197, 205-06 (1985); Schindler, Commentary,
n. 62, 220-2 1 This would be the situation of e.g., the Strait of Hormuz if Iran, Oman and the U AE were neutral during a
war involving other States; all are littoral States for the Strait. However, this was not the Tanker War case; Iran was a
belligerent, and Oman and the UAE were officially neutral. Under these circumstances Iran should have been
98.

art. 1

acts in neutral waters

.

.

.

permitted to conduct

visit

and search in

its territorial

waters in the

shipping transit passage rights. As a matter of theory, this

almost any kind of visit and search in this

On the other hand, in other straits, e.g.,
been seen early in the war,

cf.

strait's

strait,

so long as

it

did not interfere with neutral

may be the legally correct response, but a practical result of

confines will result in neutral shipping transit passage interference.

those with a considerable high seas belt in the middle, as

Hormuz might have

nn. IV.533-45, 562-65 and accompanying text, Iran could have conducted visit and

search in the high seas area subject to the

LOAC and the due regard principle, nn. 58, 62 and accompanying text, or in

its territorial sea.

99.
1 00.

LOS
I.e.,

Convention,

arts. 38(1),

44-45; see also nn. IV.567, 582-600 and accompanying text.

temporary security measure pursuant to LOS Convention, art. 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, art.
349 and accompanying text.

as a

16(3); see also nn. IV.308-09, 337,

101.

NWP

Declaration,

1-14M Annotated

art. 1;

1111

7.6, 7.8;

Paris Declaration

11

4;

NWP 9A Annotated Ml

San Remo Manual

111

7.6, 7.8;

cf.

Helsinki Principle

15, 85, 106. See Part

F for analysis

5.2.9;

London

of exclusion and

similar zones, which implicate wider high seas areas than the immediate area of naval operations for visit and search.
102.

this is the US procedure,
common practice among navies today. NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.6
NWP 9A Annotated H 7.6.1 (notes omitted), citing Tucker 338-44. See also Helsinki Principles 5.2.1,

Although

(notes omitted);

it is

McDougal&Feliciano509-13;1 W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade 70-85 (1952); NWIP 10-2 631d
NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.4.2; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.4.2; 2 Oppenheim §§ 418-21; Oxford Naval Manual,
art. 32; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1147-48; San Remo Manual Ml 122-24; Tucker 280-82, 312-15, 322-23; W.
Thomas Mallison, Limited, n. III. 316, 389-90; US State Department Press Release, U.S. Acts to Avoid Delays for Ships
Transiting Waters in Vicinity of Cuba, 47 Bulletin 747 (1962), on certificates of noncontraband carriage, i.e., World War I
and II navicerts and aircerts; clearcerts, used during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. No aircerts, clearcerts or navicerts
were reported during the Tanker War.
5.2.6;

11

n. 22;

103.

San Remo Manual

119.1-119.2, citing inter alia

11

121

&

cmt. 121.1.

Colombos

The merchantman may consent to
Tucker 340; see also 2 Oppenheim

§§ 888-92;

diversion. Id.

§§ 421a-21b;

11

1

119

&

cmts.

von Heinegg

301-04.
104.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

105.

See nn. 76-79 and accompanying

106.

107.

11

11

7.6.2; accord, 2

Oppenheim

§

415.

text.

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.6.2; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.6.2.
See generally NWP 1-14M Annotated Ml 7.6.1, 8.2.2.2-8.2.3, 8.3.1,
San Remo Manual Ml

108.

See Parts C.4 and D.3.

109.

Lieber Code,

arts.

135-37, 141-42;

Scope of the Armistice Agreement, 50
110.

NWP 9A Annotated

Cf.

8.2.2.2-8.2.3, 8.3.1, 8.4;

662-63;

7.6.2;

AJIL

Cultural Property Convention,

Toman

Doswald-Beck,

151-72; San

253;

and accompanying

1

NWP

9A Annotated

Ml

7.6.1,

Oxford Naval Manual, art.

92; see also

Howard

S.

Levie, The Nature and

880, 903-06 (1956); Verri, n. IV.71, 337.
art. 14(2), to

Remo Manual

Vessels, n. 11.468,

582, 585; n. V.262

8.4;

47, 136-37, 139-40, 146, 151.

which the United

Ml 47(d), 136(d), 137,

von Heinegg 312; Lyndel V.

States

&

is

not a party;

see also

Colombos

§§

cmts. 47.30, 136.1, 137.1; Stone 586;

Prott, Commentary, in

Law of Naval Warfare

text.

111. Second Convention, arts. 22, 24-25, 29-33, 47; Protocol I, art. 22; Bothe et al. 142-45; Colombos §§ 638-55;
Mallison 124-25; NWP 1-14M Annotated Ml 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated Ml 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; 2
O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1119-22; 2 Oppenheim §§ 190, 206; Oxford Naval Manual, arts. 4142, 49; 2 Pictet

154-62, 164-69, 177-89, 252-56; Pilloud,

Commentary 254-60; San Remo Manual Ml 13(e), 47(a), 48(b), 136(a)
Tucker 97, 117-34; Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. 11.468, 214-29;

cmts. 13.16, 47.1-47.8, 48.10, 136.1; Stone 587;

Eberlin, Identification ofHospital Ships and Ships Protected by the Geneva Conventions of 12 August

1 949, 1 982

&
P.

Int'l Rev.

The Tanker War
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Red Cross 315; Steven
Penna, Commentary,

L. Oreck, Hospital Ships: The Right of Limited Self-Defense, Proceedings 62 (Nov. 1988); L.R.

in

Law

of Naval Warfare 534, 537; Arthur M. Smith, Safeguarding

Proceedings 56 (Nov. 1988); Verri, Commentary,

exemption

if

they contribute to the war

effort.

n.

IV.71, 334-35;

1

von Heinegg

enemy

a neutral or

forwarded by the captor with the

These

the Hospital Ships,

vessels

See nn. 175, 243, 257-58, 273-76 and accompanying

"... [P]ostal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, whatever

112.

found on the high seas on board

313.

ship,

least possible delay.

is

its official

inviolable. If the ship

is

may

lose their

text.

or private character

may

be,

detained, the correspondence

is

The[se] provisions ... do not apply, in case of violation of

blockade, to correspondence destined for or proceeding from a blockaded port

....

[IJnviolability of postal

correspondence does not exempt a neutral mail ship from the laws and customs of maritime war as to neutral merchant

The ship, however, may not be searched except when absolutely necessary, and then only with as
much consideration and expedition as possible." Hague XI, arts. 1-2. Commentators divide on whether mail ships are
among exempt vessels Compare Colombos §§ 665-72 (mail ships not exempt); San Remo Manual 136, cmt. 136.2
ships in general.

11

(same), citing 2 Oppenheim

Stone 589-90

191 (same);

§

(restrictive interpretation, at best, in practice) with 2

Law of the Sea 1123-24 (mail ships exempted); Oxford Naval Manual, art. 53 (same); LA. Shearer,
Commentary, in Law of Naval Warfare 183, 189 (same); 1 von Heinegg 313 (same); Verri, n. IV.71, 335 (same). Even
O'Connell,

the Hague XI correspondence exemption

subject to question and limitation through the practice of two world wars,

is

although neutral diplomatic and consular correspondence and other mails
international law. See,

e.g.,

Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr.

may be exempt under

18, 1961, art. 27,

23

other principles of

UST 3227, 3239, 500 UNTS

Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 23, 1963, art. 35, 21 id. 77, 99, 596 UNTS 261, 290; Colombos § 673; 2
Oppenheim § 191; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 53; Stone 589-90; CD. Allin, Belligerent Interference with the Mails, 1
Minn. l. rev. 293 (1917); A.P. Higgins, Treatment of Mails in Time of War, 9 BYBIL 31 (1928); Shearer, 183-85; Verri,
Commentary, n. IV.71, 335. The Hague Air Rules adopt the naval warfare rules, whatever they are, for air mail. Hague
Air Rules, art. 56. The Hague Air Rules are considered customary norms and are generally regarded as declaring
customary law, at least for naval warfare. NWIP 1-14 H 7.3.7 n.82. The US Navy applied them during World War II.
95, 108;

AFP

1

10-31

11

4-3c, citing 1941 Tentative Instructions.

(AFP

1

10-31 H 5-2c says the Air Rules, arts. 22, 24-26 relating to

The foregoing does not answer the
when it comes to
neutral mail. If a neutral mail ship exemption exists today, such a ship is subject to enemy character rules and
consequences those entail. Hague XI and the general law of naval warfare make that very clear. See Part D.l. The
"consideration and expedition" language of Hague XI, art. 2, if law today, might be considered an early statement of
air

bombardment are not customary law

as a total code,

question of what the naval warfare rule

is;

however;

the Air Rules

see also Part

may

G. 1 .)

incorporate nothing by reference

necessity and proportionality principles. See Part A. See also nn. 257, 271 and accompanying text.

This exemption

113.

is

grounded

in treaty

and customary law. Hague XI, art.

3;

The Pacquete Habana,

175

US 677

Mallison 15-16, 126-28; NWP 1-14M Annotated UH 8.2.3, 8.3.2,
8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 1111 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 1122-23; 2 Oppenheim § 187; Oxford
Naval Manual, arts. 47, 49; San Remo Manual HH 47(g), 136(f), 137 & cmts. 47.45-47.51; 136.1, 137.1; Stone 586;
Tucker 95-96; Doswald-Beck, n. 11.468, 253-56; L.C. Green, Comments, in Grunawalt 223, 225-26; Shearer,
Commentary, n. 112,185; 1 von Heinegg 312; Walker, State Practice 129-30, 140,146,155, 187. As Hague XI, art. 3 and
commentators emphasize, these vessels lose their exemption if they participate in hostilities. For further analysis of
exempt vessels, see Part C.
(1900);

Colombos

§§ 656-59;

1

Levie,

Code

186;

1 14.
Colombos § 870; NWP 1-14M Annotated 7.6; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.6; 2 Oppenheim § 416; Oxford Naval
Manual, art. 32; Stone 591-92; 11 Whiteman 3. Under the law of the sea these ships are also exempt from approach
and visit. See n. 76 and accompanying text. 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea unfortunately uses the same terms, visit and
11

search, for

LOS

approach and

visit

and

LOAC visit and search.

London Declaration, arts. 61-62; NWP 1-14M Annotated
Oxford Naval Manual, art. 32; San Remo Manual H 120;
Tucker 334-35; Frits Kalshoven, Commentary, in Law of Naval Warfare 257, 268; Walker, Anticipatory, n. III. 289,
379, 31 Cornell Int'l L.J. 347 (US World War II convoy of UK-bound cargoes while US neutral); Walker, State
115.

Colombos

NWP 9A

U 7.6;

§

871-77; Helsinki Principles 5.2.8,6.1;

Annotated H

7.6; 2

Oppenheim

Practice 128-29; 170; nn. IV. 81 1-19, 826

§

417;

and accompanying text.

UK practice was once to the contrary. 2 Oppenheim §

way to Germany in
Paul G. Halpern, A Naval History of World War 1 204 ( 1 994). Germany was dependent on iron ore, but the

425. Sweden's warships convoyed iron ore shipments in Sweden-flagged bulk carriers at least part

1915.

questionable nature of what was then absolute contraband clouded the issue of whether Swedish practice violated

London Declaration convoying

rules. See also Part D.3.

116.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

117.

See nn. 115-16 and accompanying

text.

118.

See nn. 115-17 and accompanying

text.

119.

See Part C.l.

Law

Compare Helsinki Principle

120.

1-14M Annotated 111 7.4, 7.5;
rule); High Seas Convention,
121.

LOS

E.g.,

accompanying

NWIP

10-2 H 501;

San Remo Manual

11

Armed

113;

1

NWP
(LOS

(same); see also nn. IV.736-62 and accompanying text.

art. 5(1)

High Seas Convention,

87(1);

art.

cf.

91(1)

von Heinegg 292;

NWP 9A Annotated H 7.4, 7.5 (LONW rule), with LOS Convention, art.

Convention,

Colombos

NWP 9A Annotated

11

2; see also nn. 111.952-67, IV. 10-25

art.

Hyde § 786; London Declaration, arts. 55-56; NWP 1-14M Annotated H
Oxford Naval Manual, art. 52; San Remo Manual H 112; Tucker 80-81; 1 von
n. 115, 267; Verri,

Commentary,

n. IV.71, 335.

See nn. IV.736-62, 824-25 and accompanying text, concluding that reflagging from a Kuwaiti to a

was valid under
124.

See

125.

3

n.

See

126.

120 and accompanying

art. 7;

text.

93.7(e), referring to

II

Protocol

Colombos

I, art.

LOS

Convention,

38; nn. IV.807-10

London,

§§ 605b-08; Declaration of

NWP

art.

art.

LOS

97; see also

and accompanying

Convention,

art.

93;

High Seas

text.

30; Helsinki Principle 5.2.3

& cmt.; NWIP

10-2

Commentary,

1-

11

.

;

n. 115, 263.

See nn. 76-81 and accompanying text; see also nn. 11.305, 347 (terrorist attack potential considered in

127.

111

14M Annotated 111 7.4-7.4. 1.1; NWP 9 A Annotated 7.4. 1 1 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea
Oppenheim § 92; San Remo Manual H 148 & cmt. 148.4; Stone 486; Tucker 267-68; Kalshoven,

63 l(c)( 1 ), 633(a);
1146-47; 2

US ensign

LOS principles.

Nordquist

Convention,

and

§§ 609-10; 3

7.5;

Heinegg 293; Kalshoven, Commentary,
123.

445

Conflict

text.

See generally

122.
7.5;

1.1;

of

US

NOTAMs, NOTMARs).
This included asserting visit and search rights after the ceasefire. See nn.

128.

420, 447, 491-92

and accompanying

II.

177, 274-78, 288, 296-99, 306, 366,

text.

129.

See nn. 11.104-06, 220, 277, 290, 325, 357, 375, 379-80, 463 and accompanying text.

130.

See generally nn. 11.177, 274-78, 288, 296-99, 306, 366, 420, 447, 491-92 and accompanying

131.

LOS Convention, arts.

37-38, 87;

High Seas Convention, art.

2; see also

text.

nn. IV.68-79 and accompanying text

and Part VI.B.6.
132.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

133.

See,

e.g.,

nn. 11.179, 233, 250, 260, 334, 338-40 (attack on U.S.S. Stark, perhaps thought by Iraq to be a

merchantman), 354, 357 (mine attacks on merchantmen), 359, 362, 368, 373, 393-94, 412, 420-21, 430-33 (mining
U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts in shipping lanes), 446, 469, 519 and accompanying text.
III. 568-69

and accompanying

134.

See nn.

135.

See nn. 11.295, 304, 343-45, 349, 351-53, 359, 361-62, 438, 447-48, 454, 472 and accompanying

136.

See nn. 11.153-56 and accompanying

text.

137.

See nn. 11.425-28 and accompanying

text.

138.

3

139.

If a ship flies a

Nordquist H

text.

93.7(e).

UN ensign, perhaps in addition to its registry flag, the view is that only the registry State has

jurisdiction over the ship. 3

Nordquist H

IV.835-37 and accompanying

text.

93.7(e);

cf.

LOS Convention, art. 93; High Seas Convention, art. 7; see also nn.

LOAC analysis is less clear; it is not certain which ensign prevails, the UN's or the

and accompanying

flag State's. See nn. 120-25

text.

Reparations for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ 174; Brownlie, International

140.

Law 680-95; Goodrich et al.

619-20;

1

Oppenheim

141.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48; see also n.

142.

LOS

Convention,

art.

93;

Central America

-

§ 7,

IV. 57 and

18-19;

Restatement (Third)

accompanying

High Seas Convention,

Code to Be Followed on Naval

Etiquette
in

text.

Simma 1126.

§

223;

11

93.7(e), at 133,

text.

art. 7; see also 3

Vessels Provided by Troop-Contributing

Nordquist

quoting Flag

Country to the United Nations Observer Group

--Practice Concerning the Use of the United Nations Flag on Vessels, 1990

UN Jurid. YB 252 (citation

of use of ICRC ensign).
143.

UN

Flag Etiquette Code,

flag,

144.

n. 142, 3

Nordquist H

93.7(e), at 133,

contemplates a possibility that warships could

alone or with the national ensign.

UN Charter, arts.

25, 48; see also nn. IV.57

and accompanying

text.

fly

the

2
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III. 308-48

and accompanyng

145.

See nn.

146.

See nn. 11.363, 412 and accompanying

147.

See Part

I.

148.

See,

n. 11.420

149.

See nn. 11.368-72 and accompanying

150.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Helsinki Principle 6.2; San Remo Manual 1192; ;see also nn. 111.10,47-630,916-18,

e.g.,

text.

and accompanying

text.

text.
text.

LOAC mine warfare analysis.

968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. See Parts G.2-G.3 for further

This rule is subject to qualification,^., warships that have surrendered cannot be attacked. Colombos §§ 5 12,
10-2 HH 430a, 441, 503a; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 8.2.1;
9A Annotated H 8.2.1; 2 Oppenheim § 181;
Oxford Naval Manual, arts. 1,31; San Remo Manual 68 & 11 10, 34-35; Verri, Commentary, n. IV.71, 330-31; n. 267
151.

516;

NWP

NWIP

and accompanying text. Attacks on enemy targets invokes the military objective principle, restated
Protocol

I,

and

52(2)

arts. 48,

NWP 1-14M Annotated

for naval warfare in

8.1.1;

11

for land warfare in

NWP 9A Annotated H 8.1.1; San

AFP 1 10-32 H1I 6-3c; Bother al. 274-80, 282-86, 320-26; Green 161; 2 Oppenheim §§213,
Commentary 585-96, 598-600, 630-37; Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Principle of the Military
the Law of Armed Conflict, Liber Amicorum ch. 10.

Remo Manual

39; See also

II

.

214e, at 522-23; Pilloud,
Objective in
152.

See nn. 58; 62 and accompanying

153.

Prize law does not apply to these captures;

NWP 1-14M Annotated

930, 801;

11

text.
title

US

immediately in the captor, under

vests

law.

Colombos

§

NWP 9A Annotated H 8.2.1, reflecting Oakes v. United States, 74 US (32

8.2.1;

How.) 778 (1863); but see Colombos § 930 and A. Pearce Higgins, Ships of War as Prize, 6 BYBIL 103 (1925), reporting
UK prize court cases on warships. Each country may establish its prize courts' jurisdiction, subject to international
law rules; that explains the difference. Colombos
the United States to claim immediate

There
154.

is

no international law

rule

on the

926; 2 Oppenheim §§ 192, at 484-85; 434; 656.

§

for the

the dead. Second Convention,

NWP 1-14M Annotated

It is

legally proper for

send warships to prize court adjudication.

measures should be taken without delay to search

craft, to take

11

8.2.1;

on board and care

18-21; Protocol

arts. 16,

for, collect

and

Vessels, n. 11.468,

I, art.

33;

for the

wounded, sick or shipwrecked, and

Bother al..

171-75;

Colombos

§

510;

to collect

NWIP

10-211

NWP 9A Annotated H 8.2.1; 2 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 1121; 2 Oppenheim

§§ 204-205a; 2 Pictet 112-16, 129-53; Pilloud,

Commentary

350-54; San

Remo Manual

HH 159, 161, 163-68;

225-26; Matheson, Remarks 424.

155.

Second Convention,

156.

See Part B.

157.

Mallison 101; NWIP 10-2
135; Tucker 103-04.

Manual

to

wounded or sick and the dead. Warships may appeal to the charity of commanders of neutral

merchant vessels, yachts or other

Doswald-Beck,

United Kingdom

subject.

If military exigencies permit, all possible

identify the shipwrecked,

511b;

and

title

art. 15; see also 2

11

502a;

Pictet 107-12;

154 and accompanying

n.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

11

8.2.2.1;

text.

NWP 9A Annotated H 8.2.2.1; San Remo

11

158.

Hague

159.

See

160.

2

161.

Third Convention,

VI,

n. 16

arts. 1-2,4.

and accompanying

text.

Oppenheim § 102b, at 334; DeGuttry, Commentary, nn.
art.

16, 108; Introductory Note, in

Schindler& Toman 791.

more favorable treatment under any other
Hague XI, art. 6); 3 Pictet 45-51, 65-66; San Remo Manual H 165(d) &
1-14M Annotated U 8.2.2.1 & NWP 9A Annotated H 8.2.2.1 ("may be made

4(A)(5) (if they "do not benefit by

provisions of international law," referring to
cmts. 165.5-165.9;

Tucker 1 12-15; cf.

NWP

prisoners of war").
162.

Colombos §§909-10; NWIP

O'Connell,

Lawofthe

10-2

11

502b(2);

Sea 1115-16; 2 Oppenheim

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 8.2.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated H 8.2.2.1;
§

194;

163.

San Remo Manual 1111

164.

These categories have been derived from Protocol

that submarines

Annotated

11

165.

I, art.

Oppenheim §§

181a, 356(1), 389;

52(2);
11

11

139;

Tucker

106-08.

text.

London Protocol, Rule 2; id., Rule 1, declaring
NWP 1-14M Annotated H 8.2.2.2; NWP 9A

503b(3);

San Remo Manual

11

60

& cmts; see also

nn. 45, 166-256 and

text.

Compare

Annotated, U

and accompanying

must obey rules for other warships; NWIP 10-2

8.2.2.2; 2

accompanying

59, 6\;see also nn. 35-40

San Remo Manual

NWP

9A Annotated

U 8.2.2.2

8.2.2.2 except citations) with

and

NWP

San Remo Manual

1-14M Annotated
H 60; see also

H 8.2.2.2 (identical with

NWIP 10-2

11

503b(3).

NWP

9A

San Remo Manual,

Law

cmt. 60.1 recites the
list

of

Armed

447

Conflict

NWP categories in the conjunctive ("and"). The NWP lists are neither disjunctive ("or") as my
8.2.2.2 that
is clear from NWP 9A Annotated
8.2.2.2; NWP 1-14M Annotated

has them nor conjunctive, but it

11

11

means that all criteria, from persistently refusing to stop through
integration into an enemy's warfighting/war-sustaining effort, must be meant. This is not the law; meeting any
503b(3)
Category criterion is enough to subject an enemy merchantman to attack and destruction. NWIP 10-2
the disjunctive

is

meant. If read in the conjunctive,

it

11

presents
166.
8.2.2.2;
in

its criteria

London

in a format similar to the

NWIP

Protocol, Rule 2;

$an Remo Manual 1111

NWPs.

10-2

NWP 1-14M Annotated 8.2.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated
Mallison 122-23; Jon L. Jacobson, The Law of Submarine Warfare,

503b(3);

11

60(b)-60(e); see also

11

11

Robertson 205, 231.
167.

NWP

1-14M Annotated

International

Law Situations

11

cmt. 60.14; Levie, Submarine Warfare, n.
Paper, in
168.

NWP

8.2.2.2 n.54;

9A Annotated

III. 439,

H 8.2.2.2 n.49, citing

NWIP

10-2 H 503b(3)(4);

56; W.J. Fenrick,

Comments on Sally

1930, at 9-19, 21-25 (1931);

110,117-18.

id.

Compare

NWP 9A Annotated H 8.2.2.2 n.49; NWP 1-14M Annotated

NWIP

cmt. 60.14;

10-2 H 503b(3)4 used the formula, "offensive

.

.

use

.

.

.

.

11

8.2.2.2 n.54 with

San Remo Manual,

against an enemy."

170.

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 8.2.2.2 n.54; San Remo Manual, cmt. 60.14.
NWP 9A Annotated 8.2.2.2; see also NWP 1-14M Annotated H 8.2.2.2.

171.

San Remo Manual

172.

Compare

169.

Naval War College,

San Remo Manual H 60(f) &
V. and W. Thomas Mallison's

11

11

60(f).

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 8.2.2.2, n.54; NWP 9A Annotated

11

8.2.2.2, n.49, with

San Remo Manual

cmt. 60.14.
173.

Cf

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2; NWP 9A Annotated

n. 111.252,52;

11

9.2

(mine technology); O'Connell, International Law,

Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Modern Technology and the Law ofArmed Conflict at Sea,

Robertson, New Technologies and Armed Conflicts at Sea, 14 Syracuse J. Intl L.

in

Grunawalt 362, 370;

& Com. 699 (1988); Service, n. III.439,

238-40.
174.
10-2,

11

In this regard

NWP 9A Annotated H 8.2.2.2; NWP
"Enemy merchant

503b(3), which says,

warning, in any of the following circumstances:

been used, or
175.

is

1-14M Annotated 11 8.2.2.2 follow the pattern of NWIP
attacked and destroyed, either with or without prior
If armed, and there is reason to believe that such armament has

vessels
.

.

.

may be

intended for use, offensively against an enemy."

On the other hand, "passive" electronic and similar defense equipment, e.g. electronic countermeasures gear,

infrared decoy dispensers, and chaff,

would be allowed.

Cf.

NWP

1-14M Annotated

11

8.2.3 n.66;

approving similar devices for hospital ships, exempt from attack unless they lose protected
243, 257-58, 273-76 and

accompanying

Oreck,

n. Ill,

status. See nn. Ill, 240,

text.

nn. 11.463-64 and accompanying text.

176.

See,

177.

The author had

178.

San Remo Manual H

179.

Hague

180.

Paris Declaration,

181.

LOS Convention, arts. 100-07, 110; High Seas Convention, arts. 14-22;s£ea/son.76andaccompanyingtext.

182.

E.g.,

e.g.,

60(a).

VII, arts. 1-6, restating custom; see also nn. IV.789-90

LOS

accompanying

experience with this while on naval service.

IV.624 and accompanying

1; see also n.

11

Convention,

art.

text.

text.

High Seas Convention,

87(1);

and accompanying

art. 2; see also

nn. 111.952-66, IV.10-25 and

text.

LOS Convention, arts.

109-10

radiobroadcasting); see also n. 76 and accompanying text.

183.

E.g.,

184.

See

n.

185.

Cf.

San Remo Manual H

186.

NWP 9A Annotated H 8.2.2.2; see also NWP 1-14M Annotated H 8.2.2.2 (same); for analysis of the London

164 and accompanying

(illicit

text.

60, cmt. 60.11.

Protocol requirements of providing for safety of passengers, crew and pzpers,see nn. 195-256 and accompanying text.
187.

San Remo Manual

188.

Id.,

189.

Helsinki Principle 5.2.3; compare

11

60(g).

cmt. 60.10; see also

id.,

cmts. 60.1-60.9, 60.11, referring to Protocol

between "commerce between a neutral

.

NWP 1-14M Annotated
.

.

and

11

7.4;

I, art.

52(2); n. 45.

NWP 9A Annotated

a belligerent that does

11

7.4,

which distinguish

not involve the carriage of contraband or

)
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otherwise contribute to the belligerent's war-fighting/war-sustaining capability." Helsinki Principle
certain goods,

e.g.,

religious objects,

NWP

Helsinki Principles 5.2.4-5.2.5;

190.

Manual
191.

5.2.3, crat., says

considered contraband; see also Part D.3.

1-14M Annotated

H 7.4.1.1;

NWP 9A Annotated

7.4.1.1;

San Remo

n. 6, xv, xvii; see also

Brownlie,

11

H 148; see also Part D.3.

See,

Doyle, International Law,

e.g.,

International

Law

5;

&

Reisman

n. 6,

Leitzau,

21-23; Schmitt, n. 6, ix;

n. 6, 1; n.

Thomas,

6 and accompanying text.

NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 7.4, n.88; 8.2.2.2, n.57; NWP 9A Annotated HI
San Remo Manual H 60, cmt. 60.10; n. 45 and accompanying text.

Helsinki Principle 5.2.3;

192.

8.2.2.2, n.52; see also

193.

See Parts. A.1-A.2.

194.

See,

e.g.,

is

7.4, n.90;

LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also n. IV. 75 and accompanying text. A

similar, but not the same,

there

may never be

interface

LOAC issues where there is no positive rule of law and
LOAC and neutrals' oceans use rights. See nn. 58, 62 and accompanying text.

due regard principle should govern

between the

The London

195.

Protocol declared that 1930 London Naval Treaty, art. 22, which would expire because not
had ratified it, would remain in force "indefinitely and without limit of time."/*/., art. 22, had provided:

signatories

.

.

The

.

all

following are accepted as established rules of international law:

(1) In their action

with regard

to

merchant ships, submarines must conform

to the rules of international

law to which surface ships are subject.

(2)

.

.

.

[Ejxcept in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly

visit or search, a

a

summoned, or of active resistance to

warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation

merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in

ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of passengers

existing sea

a place

of safety

and crew

and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another
them on board.

is

[T]he

assured, in the

vessel

which

is

in a

position to take

The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty had

provided:

[A]mong the rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and
noncombatants at sea in time of war, the following are deemed to be an established part of international law:
.

.

(1

.

A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to determine its character before it can

be seized.

A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuses to submit to visit and search after warning, or to
proceed as directed after seizure.

A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have been first placed in safety.
submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the universal rules above stated;
and if a submarine cannot capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules the existing law of nations
(2) Belligerent

requires

it

to desist

from attack and from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested.

who violated the Treaty and Protocol rules would be liable to trial for piracy under
where that person might be found. Prohibiting submarines as commerce destroyers, as
practiced during World War I, was recognized, as was the practical impossibility of using them as commerce
Anyone in
any

a belligerent's service

State's jurisdiction

The goal was universal acceptance of prohibiting submarines as commerce
The treaty failed of ratification. Introductory Note, Schindler &
96-97, had provided: "In no case after a vessel has been brought to may it be

destroyers without violating these rules.
destroyers.

Toman

Washington Naval Treaty,

877. 1917 Instructions, arts.

destroyed until after visit and search

.

.

arts. 1-4.

.

and

all

.

.

.

on board have been placed in

personal effects." Ship's papers were to be preserved.
effect.

196.
also

See also Kalshoven, Commentary,

NWP 1-14M Annotated

W. Hays

197.

11

8.2.2.2, n.47;

Hague Air Rules,

customary law. See
See,

272;

art.

24(1); see also 2

e.g.,

in

and

also, if practicable, their

Robertson, U.S. Policy, n. III.439, 351; Service, n. III.439, 241 n.9;

Parks, Conventional Area Bombing and the

Remigiusz Bierzanek, Commentary,

198.

n. 115,

safety,

The 1909 London Declaration, arts. 49-50 had been to the same
Nwogugu, n. III.439, 353-54.

Law of War, Proceedings

Oppenheim

§

Law of Naval Warfare

186, 106

(May

214c; Introductory Note, Schindler
396, 401, 406.

The Hague

see

1982).

& Toman

207;

Air Rules are considered

n. 112.

LOS Convention, art. 98; High Seas Convention, art. 12; see also nn. IV.816 and accompanying text.

Law

33; see also n. IV.816 and

199.

Second Convention,

200.

See

201.

Colombos

§

202.

Colombos

§§ 857, 923; Levie, Submarine Warfare, n. III.439, 48-54.

203.

See nn. 263, 274-75 and accompanying

204.

"... [T]he number of neutral seamen and vessels lost

206.

259;

far

accompanying

449

Conflict

text.

text.

923; Levie, Submarine Warfare, n. III.439, 32-40.

§§ 857-58;

text.

Colombos

NWP 1-14M Annotated,

& Mallison,

312-15; Mallison
1

I, art.

those ... in the First Great War."

Colombos

205.

Tucker

Protocol

IV.816 and accompanying

n.

exceeded by

art. 12;

Armed

of

The Naval,

at sea

by enemy action during the Second Great War

923, 794.

§

8.2.2.2 n.47; 2

11

O'Connell,

Law of the Sea

1135-37, 1153;

n. III.439, 90-91.

TWC 311-12 (Doenitz), 317 (Raeder); for widely differing interpretations of the judgments, see Colombos §

NWIP

10-2

503b(3) n.21;

11

1

O'Connell,

Law

of the Sea 1137; Fenrick, Comments,

successful tu quoque defense); L.F.E. Goldie, Targeting, n. 11.262, 10-11;

Thomas Mallison's Paper,

in id. 104,

113-16 (only

n. 167,

Mark W. Janis, Comments on Sally

V.

and W.

106-08; Levie, Submarine Warfare, n. III.439, 91-97; Robertson, U.S. Policy, n.

III.439, 342-43.

207.

E.g.,

Tucker

63-70; Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 115, 272-7'4; Alex Kerr, International

Law and the

Future of

Submarine Warfare, 81 Proceedings 1110 (Oct. 1955); Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the
War, 29

BYBIL

"[References of naval historians
Comments,

Law,

360, 374 (1952); O'Connell, International
to the

law of naval warfare and to the

.

.

.

Protocol

Law

of

Parks, Conventional, n. 196, 106.

n. III.252;
.

.

.

are less than flattering." Fenrick,

Theodore Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II 19(1949);
Weapons Development, War Planning and Policy: The US Navy and the Submarine, NWC Rev. 53, 68

n. 167,

J.E. Talbott,

11, citing

1

(May-June 1984).
208.

Service, n. III.439, 238-40; cf O'Connell, International

209.

Fenrick, Comments, n. 167, 117; Goldie, n. 11.262,

Colombos §

Code 162-63;

Law,

n. III.252, 52.

6, 9.

Oppenheim §§ 194a-94b; L.C. Green, Comments on George K. Walker
(London Protocol is "hard" law, the Nuremberg trials
are opposing "soft" law); Levie, Submarine Warfare, n. III.439, 59; A.V. Lowe, Comments on Howards. Levie's Paper, in
Grunawalt 72, 77; Nwogugu, n. III.439, 353; Robertson, U.S. Policy, n. III.439, 352-53; Robertson, Submarine Warfare,
JAG J. 3, 8 (Nov. 1956). "Soft law" refers to norms of persuasive impact, perhaps in international organizations'
nonbinding resolutions, but below primary authority, e.g., treaties, custom and general principles and secondary or
210.

535;

Levie,

1

2

Paper, in Grunawalt 223, 226; Janis, Comments, n. 206, 106-08

subsidiary sources,

e.g.,

court decisions or commentators. See generally ICJ Statute,

arts.

38(1), 59;

Brownlie,

Restatement (Third) §§ 102, 103 & cmt. c (international
organizations' resolutions "some evidence" of custom), r.n. 2; Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and
International

Law

698-99;

1

Oppenheim

§

16;

Practice ch. 6(1991); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AJIL 413,414-15 (I983);see
also nn. III. 10, IV.57

and accompanying

211.

Fleck, Comments, n. III.439, 83.

212.

Robertson, U.S. Policy,

213.

1900 Naval

text.

n. III.439,

War Code, art.

351; contra,

Colombos

§§ 535, 843, 914.

50 (adding "The imminent danger of recapture would justify destruction

if

there

should be no doubt that the vessel was a proper prize"); 1917 Instructions H 94.
214.

1917 Instructions

215.

1943 Tentative Instructions UH 50, 98-102; 1941

Germany

London

violated

216.

NWIP

217.

Id.

11

1

10-2,

10,

H1I

94-97.

guidance.

It is

whose n.l indicates
manuals were not
at 1,

and

this

trials,

Oppenheim §§ 194a-94b

NWIP

id.,

war crimes

enactments, they could not bind

NWP 9A Annotated, Preface, at

1,

not a comprehensive treatment of the law nor is

follow

50, 98-102. 2

statement tried to repeat, for

legislative

by judge advocates and others responsible
crimes

1JH

(1952), says

iii.

that since military

Annotated, Preface,

id.

Protocol standards, which were customary law.

for advising

trials'

opinions that declared

publishing State.

NWP

1-14M

similarly declare: "This publication sets forth general

it

a substitute for the definitive legal

commanders on

the law." Footnotes in

10-2 to say neither the Handbooks (versions for

Annotated or NWP 9A Annotated (annotated versions cited in

a

this

guidance provided
id.,

citing the

commanders' use) nor

NWP

war

1-14M

book) can be considered as legislative enactments

binding upon courts and tribunals applying the rules of war, adding that their contents may possess evidentiary value

on

US custom

and

practice. See also

Brownlie, International

Law 5.
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218.

Tucker

219.

To

357-422.

i,

be sure, the

USSR

navy was beginning

to challenge

it

in size, particularly in

submarine strength; other

Kingdom and other US allies. Ten years before, at World
War II's end, the US Navy had over 600 combatant ships, but by 1981 the number had shrunk to about 360 while the
USSR navy had risen to 800 combatants, many of them submarines. Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine, n. 11.59,
1 35; id. U.S. Shipbuilding, n. 11.60, 27. Today the Russian navy may number more combatants on paper, but since the
USSR's demise the US Navy undoubtedly is the most powerful on Earth. See generally William E. Odom, The
countries had considerable navies,

France, the United

e.g.,

,

Collapse of the Soviet Military 28-35, 80-81, 300-01(1998).
220.

NWIP

98-103; see also

10-2 H 503b(2), in
n.

Tucker

215 and accompanying

221.

NWIP

222.

Compare NWIP 10-2

10-2

503b(2)

11

&

397; compare 1943 Tentative Instructions

n.20, referring to

U 503b(2)

50, 98-103; 1941

111

id.

1111

50,

text.

Tucker

H 503b(3) n. 22, in

id.,

397, 404-05.

& n.16, 21 (1974 version), wit h NWIP 10-2 H 503b(2) & n.20, 22, in Tucker 397,

404-05.
223.

Robert W. Tucker, Foreword,

224.

He was on The Johns Hopkins

225.

Compare Tucker 63-70 with

tribute to the intellectual

the

Navy or

Tucker iii,

Law Studies

series.

227.

NWIP

arts. 38,

503b(2)

&

volume appeared.

n.20, 22, in

Tucker

Id.

i.

397, 404-05. If so, the difference

for

.

.

III. 10,

928-30, IV. 26-28 and accompanying

Tucker 404-05 ("These

rules,

deemed

and accompanying
Comments,

229.

Cf

230.

See n. 210.

231.

AFP

232.

Compare

Janis,

text.

declaratory of customary

.").

.

NWIP 10-2 H 503b(3) & n.20, 22, reprinted in Tucker 397, 404-05, with NWIP 10-2

Compare

a

is

themselves and not necessarily for

underscores the point for Tucker's volume in

in id. vii

61-62; see also nn.

10-2, H 503b(3) n.22, reprinted in

21; see also n. 216

11

503b(3)

& n.

16,

text.

writing nearly 40 years after

n. 206, 106-08,

NWIP

10-2's first publication.

110-31 H4-4c.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

Second Convention,

There

Annotated HH

is

no

There

is

Protocol

art. 16;

8.2.2.2;

11

I, art.

NWP 9A Annotated H 8.2.2.2, with NWIP 10-2

33; n. IV. 816

and accompanying

;

NWP 9A Annotated HH 8.3, 8.3.1, with NWP 1-14M Annotated

Second Convention,

art. 16;

no stated requirement

Annotated H

8.4 with

n.21; see also

Second Convention,

id.

UH 8.2.2.2,

Protocol

I, art.

33; n. IV.816

11

503b(3); see also

text.

stated requirement for collecting the dead as required of surface warships.

8.3, 8.3.1

8.2.2.2; see also

234.

11

the

have been accorded the same academic freedom.

I

international law, have been interpreted

11

10-2

Thomas H. Robbins, Jr., Preface,

Vienna Convention, preamble,

233.

when

University faculty

NWIP

226.

228.

v.

independence accorded the College faculty, who speak

the government.

the International

in

11

and accompanying

NWP 1-14M
NWP 9A Annotated

Compare

8.2.2.2;

text.

dead as required of surface warships. Compare NWP 1-14M
NWP 9A Annotated Ml 8.2.2.2, 8.3, 8.3.1, 8.4; NWIP 10-2 H 503b(3) &

for collecting the

8.3, 8.3.1;

art. 12;

Protocol

I,

art.

33; n. IV.816

235.

San Remo Manual

236.

Compare London Protocol with San Remo Manual

H 60, cmt. 60.9 (one

and accompanying

text.

group of commentators' views).
1IH

139-40; see also

id.

MI 13(b) (definition of attack),

13(i)

(merchant vessel definition).
237.

Cf San Remo Manual, Part V,

238.

1<LH 139, cmt. 139.1.

239.

See nn. 163-65 and accompanying

240.

Second Convention,

241.

Id.,

arts. 22,

H 139, cmt. 139.2.

AFP

at 31,

187 ("Measures Short of Attack").

text.

29-30, 32-33, 47; Protocol

110-31

11

I, art.

and accompanying

22; see also n. Ill

4-4, at 4-5, in effect says as

much, unfortunately

text.

injecting "political

.

.

factors" into the matrix. See also Parts A.1-A.2.

242.

See nn. 163-65 and accompanying text.

attack platforms,

e.g.,

differentiation

8.2.2.2, at 8-1 1

-

does not seem appropriate to have some categories for some kinds of
aircraft,

where there

is a

possibility that different

NWP 9A Annotated 8.2.2.2, at 8-11 8.12; NWP
8-12 with NWP 9A Annotated H 8.4; NWP 1-14M Annotated 8.4, at 8-22. And

platforms could participate in attacks for

1-14M Annotated, H

It

between surface warships and
all

reasons. Compare,

e.g.,

-

11

11

Law

while

of

Armed
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might be said that fixed-wing aircraft have different characteristics, the helicopter, often carried on a warship
were through World War II, is a projection of the ship's armament, like ship-based guns or

it

like fixed-wing craft
missiles.

243.

See nn. Ill, 240, 257-58, 273-76 and accompanying

244.

In

some

may be mandated, e.g.,

cases diversion

text.

236 and accompanying

for passenger liners. See nn. 103-05,

text.

245.

See Parts A.1-A.2.

246.

See

247.

Service, n. III.439, 238-40.

248.

London Protocol, Rule 2; Second Convention,

n.

195 and accompanying

accompanying

text.

arts.

12-21; Protocol

I, art.

and

33; see also nn. IV.816, V.195

text.

249.

Service, n. III.439, 238-40.

250.

E.g.,

Covenant on Civil

& Political Rights, arts. 4, 6(1). For analysis of human rights law in the context of the

maritime environment, see Part VI.C.2.
251.

See n. 26 and accompanying

252.

See n. 242 and accompanying

"warship," Principle 6 declares that

UN Charter, arts.

253.

text.

text.

all

Although

e.g.,

Principle

5, n.

244 and accompanying

text,

only recites

attacking platforms are included within the analysis.

51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

and accompanying

text; Parts

A.1-A.2.
254.

Second Convention,

arts.

12-21; Protocol

I, art.

33;

London

Protocol, Rule 2

see also Service, n. III.439,

;

238-40; nn. IV.816, V.195-256 and accompanying text.
255.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also nn. III. 10, IV.57 and accompanying text.

256.

Cf. n. 173

257.

NWP 1-14M Annotated Ml 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated Ml 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; San Remo Manual

and accompanying

text.

11

137.

258.

Second Convention,

259.

See generally Second Convention,

1-14M Annotated Ml

arts. 22,

29-30, 32-33, 47; Protocol

8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1;

212-15, 252-56; Pilloud,

arts.

I, art.

22; see also nn. 240

21,24,26-27, 38,43,47; Protocol

NWP 9A Annotated MI

Commentary 262-78; San Remo Manual MI

260.
§

in Periods

ofArmed Conflict, 1985 Int'L Rev.

Bothe^q/.. 147-49;

NWP

& 13.17, 47.1 1-47.17, 136.1

Vessels, n. 11.468,

Red Cross

140;

229-3 1 ; Philippe Eberlin,

von Heinegg 313.

1

See generally Third Convention, art. 118 (requiring returning prisoners of war at end of hostilities); Colombos

660-61;

Mallison

O'Connell,

126;

Law of the

NWP 1-14M Annotated MI 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated MI 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; 2
Sea 1123; 2 Oppenheim

Remo Manual

Ml 47(c)(i), 136(c)(i)

11.468, 239-41;

1

261.

23;

text.

2 Pictet 150-53, 164-67, 169-74,

13(e), 47(b), 136(b)

(noting exceptions, conditions for exemption); Tucker 97; Doswald-Beck,

The Protection of Rescue Craft

I, art.

8.2.3. 8.3.2, 8.4.1;

and accompanying

§

Oxford Naval Manual, arts. 45, 49; 3 Pictet 541-53; San
Stone 586; Tucker 97-98; Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n.

225;

& cmts. 47.18-47.23, 136.1;

von Heinegg 312; Verri, Commentary,

See generally Third Convention,

arts.

n. IV.71, 334-35; Part H.l.

70-77; Fourth Convention, arts. 107-13; Protocol

I, arts.

54, 70;

Colombos § 660; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1123; Oxford Naval Manual, arts. 45, 49; 3 Pictet 340-80; 4 id.
448-73; San Remo Manual MI 47(c)(ii), 136(c)(ii) & cmts. 47.24-47.29, 136.1; Stone 586; Tucker 98; Doswald-Beck,
Vessels, n. 11.468, 242-48; 1 von Heinegg 312-13; Verri, Commentary, n. V.71, 334-35.
262.
110, VI.

263.

See generally Cultural Property Convention,

—

and accompanying

Seegenerally

n.61, 8.3.2, 8.4.1

arts. 12-14, to

264.
vessels.

is

not a party;

NWP 1-14M Annotated Ml 8.2.3,at8-18&n.75,8.3.2,8.4.1;NWP9A Annotated

Vessels, n. 11.468,

see also

nn.

11

8.2.3,at8-20&

Remo Manual

MI 47(e), 140

&

cmts. 47.33-47.36, 140;

248-50.

First stated in treaties, the exemptions are generally considered customary law applying to public or private

Ships gathering scientific data of potential military application are not exempt. See generally Hague XI,

Mallison

NWP

1-14M Annotated MI
O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1123; 2 Oppenheim §
3-4;

States

(although passenger ships normally an object of attack, loss of civilians would be clearly

disproportionate to military advantage gained); San

Doswald-Beck,

which the United

text.

128;

8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1;

186;

NWP

9A Annotated

Oxford Naval Manual, arts.

MI

46, 49;

arts.

8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; 2

San Remo Manual Ml
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47(f), 136(e)

& cmts. 47.37-47.44, 136.1

Heinegg 312; Shearer, Commentary,
This exemption

265.

;

Stone 586, 589; Tucker 96-97; Doswald-Beck,

n. 112, 185-86; Verri,

See also nn. 174-76 and accompanying

war

251-53;

1

von

treaty law. See generally Hague XI, art. 3; n. 113 and
make clear, these vessels lose exemption if they participate in hostilities.

text.
1

could not be deemed to contribute

36. 1 (these ships

effort);

Hague

267.

IV,

art.

23(c); Protocol

NWP 9A Annotated

8.2.1;

1 1 3,

San Remo Manual HH 47(h), 1 36(g) & cmts. 47.52-47.55,
Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. 11.468, 257-59.

266.

Vessels, n. 11.468,

n. IV. 71, 334-35.

grounded in customary and

is

accompanying text. As commentators, n.

to

Commentary,

AFP

41;

I, art.

Oppenheim

8.2.1; 2

11

§

Bother al.

110-31 H 4-2d;

183; Pilloud,

219-24;

NWP

1-14M Annotated

Commentary 480-91; San Remo Manual

U 47(i)

11

&

cmts. 47.56-47.57; Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. 11.468, 259-60. Generally vessels offer to surrender as a unit as

Land

distinguished from land warfare, where people often surrender individually.

commands also may offer to

units'

surrender for an entire organization. Air warfare offers to surrender necessarily come from platforms or units and not
individuals aboard aircraft; aircraft offers to surrender are generally not given, although

AFP

110-31 U 4-2d;

NWP

1-14M Annotated

Obligation to Accept Surrender, 46

Second Convention,

268.

Commentary

Doswald-Beck,

NWIP

269.

Colombos

270.

Oppenheim
241-42;

Oppenheim

664; 2

§

and accompanying

8.2.1;

11

it

has occurred. See generally

Horace B. Robertson,

I, art.
11

Bothe el

8(b);

47(j)

&

Hague XI,

al. 95-97; 2 Pictet 84-92, 129-36; Pilloud,

Oxford Naval Manual,

189;

§

Oxford Naval Manual,

218;

§

arts.

von Heinegg 312; Verri, Commentary,

1

ships,

i.e.,

mail packets and the

Convention on Diplomatic Relations,

arts. 1-2;

Convention on Consular Relations,
See

273.

Seegenerally 2

n.

protection for

accompanying
274.

n. 112, art. 35, 21

263 and accompanying

272.

Oppenheim

enemy merchant

The

cmt. 47.58 (citing war crimes tribunal judgments);

34;

art.

Tucker 98

48-49;

1

n.10; see also

334-35.

n. IV. 71,

von Heinegg 313;

like,

seems not

to

see also nn.

have developed, although

there are contrary arguments. Neutral mail, especially diplomatic and consular correspondence,
search.

Jr.,

text.

A customary exemption for mail

271.

9A Annotated

260.

Vessels, n. 11.468,

IV. 494-506, V.20

Protocol

San Remo Manual

Vessels, n. 11.468,

10-2 H 503c; 2

Doswald-Beck,

NWP

NWC Rev. 103 (Spring 1993).

arts. 12, 18;

115-16, 118-24;

8.2.1;

11

id.

99, 596

n. 112, art. 27,

23

UNTS 290; see also n.

UST
1

12

may be exempt from

3239, 500

UNTS

and accompanying

108;
text.

text.

§ 188;

San Remo Manual,

11

136, cmt. 136.2.

Although Hague VI would afford some

ships in port and on the high seas, the convention

is

in desuetude. See n. 16

and

text.

E.g., coastal fishing or

trading vessels, exempted from capture by customary law and

they contribute to the war effort; see nn. 113, 265 and accompanying

Hague XI, art.

3,

unless

This was the situation of Narwal, an

text.

Argentine fishing vessel the Royal Navy intercepted and destroyed on the high seas during the Falklands/Malvinas
war. Narwal had military communications equipment and an Argentine communications officer aboard and was

NWP 1 -14M Annotated H 8.2.3 & NWP 9A Annotated U
Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands 158 (1983); Martin Middlebrook,
Operation Corporate: the Falklands War 1 86 (1985); see also Colombos § 659; 2 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 1 122;
intercepted far at sea; attack and destruction was appropriate.
8.2.3, citing

Max

Hastings

&

Oxford Naval Manual, art. 49; Howard

S.

Levie, The Falklands Crisis and the

Laws of War,

in

Coll & Arend 64, 67;

Verri, Commentary, n. IV. 71, 334-35; Walker, State Practice 153.
275.

E.g, coastal fishing or trading vessels,

status as coastal craft if found

on the high

exempted from capture by customary law and Hague XI, art. 3, lose their
from the coast; see nn. 1 1 3, 265 and accompanying text. This was the

seas, far

situation of Narwal, an Argentine fishing vessel the Royal

Falklands/Malvinas war.

It

was

Navy intercepted and destroyed on the high seas during the
Colombos §§ 658-59; 2

also probably too large to be considered a coastal trawler.

O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 1122-23; Tucker 95-96; Walker, State Practice 153,

155. Destruction

was also appropriate

because Narwal carried Argentine military communications equipment and an Argentine communications

was contributing

to the

Argentine war

effort.

276.

See nn. 151-254 and accompanying

277.

NWIP

278.

See generally First Convention,

I, arts. 8(j),

8.4.1;

10-2

24-31;

11

503c;

Tucker 98

Bother al.

NWP 9A Annotated HH

115-16, 131-32, 279-337;

von Heinegg 313;

n.10; see also n. III.258
arts.

officer;

it

text.

text.

and accompanying

36-37; Second Convention,

95-96, 101, 150-67;
8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1;

San Remo ManualU

see also n.

See n. 274 and accompanying

1

53(a)

Hague Air

Rules,

Pictet 285-96; 2

art.

39;

art. 17;

id.

text.

Fourth Convention, art. 22; Protocol

NWP 1-14M Annotated

215-22; 4

id.

173-77; Pilloud,

111

8.2.3, 8.3.2,

Commentary

& cmt. 53.1; Tucker97; Doswald-Beck, Vessels,n. 11.468, 262-68;

258 and accompanying

text.

1

Law

279.

of

Armed
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Conflict

NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated Ml 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; San Remo Manual

11

& cmt. 53.2; Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. 11.468, 268-69; 1 von Heinegg 313; see also n. 260 and accompanying text.

53(b)

280.

&cmt.

NWP 1-14M Annotated Ml 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4. NWP 9A Annotated 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.
1

53.3;

cf.

ICAO Convention,

1984 Protocol,

269-75; n. 263 and accompanying text; but see

Oppenheim

281.

2

282.

UN

Charter,

Protocol, art 3

§

arts. 51,

Hague Air

Remo Manual

214h; San

103; see also

;

art. 3 bis; see also

Tucker

1

;

Rules, arts. 33-34; 2 Oppenheim

& cmts.

Ml 54-57

San Remo Manual

11

San Remo Manual 11 53(c)

110-11; Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. 11.468,
§

214f.

54.1-57.5.

53(c)

&

cmt

53.3, citing

ICAO

Convention, 1984

declaring that although every State must refrain from using weapons against civil aircraft in flight

bis,

and that persons'

lives

on board and

obligations under the Charter; nn.

UN Charter, arts.

284.

Cf.

285.

See Part B.2.

286.

See Fart CI.

287.

Mallison 122;

NWP 1-14M Annotated

288.

Hague XI, art.

3.

25, 48, 103; see also n. IV.57

10-2 H 503c;

this does not

modify rights and

47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV. 6-25 and accompanying text.

283.

NWIP

must not be endangered,

aircraft safety

III. 10,

Tucker 98

and accompanying

n. 10; see also

11

text.

nn. III.258 and accompanying

text.

NWP 9A Annotated H 8.2.2.2; Jacobson, n.

8.2.2.2;

166, 231.

Thus in a scenario of a belligerent warship escorting coastal fishing vessels employed as such

and not contributing to the war

effort,

the warship

is

subject to capture or attack but the fishermen are not.

If,

on the

other hand, the fishing vessels are contributing to the war effort, they are subject to attack too. See nn. 265-66, 274-75

and accompanying
289.

Colombos

text.

§

NWP

760; Helsinki Principle 5.2.3;

Law of the Sea

O'Connell,

1144; San

Remo Manual

11

1-14M Annotated 7.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated
& cmt. 148.1; Tucker 263.
11

290.

Helsinki Principle

291.

Part

292.

See nn. 11.177, 274-78, 288, 296-99, 306, 366, 420, 491-92 and accompanying text; Part B.

293.

Part

294.

See nn. 257-84 and accompanying

295.

See

296.

See nn. 21-47 and accompanying

text.

297.

See nn. 24-40 and accompanying

text.

298.

See nn. 196-97, 252 and accompanying text.

299.

Second Convention,

300.

See nn. 30-47 and accompanying

301.

Second Convention,

5.2.5.

D considers these issues.

n. 11.240

and accompanying

art.

text.

text.

21; see also nn. IV.816, V. 154-55, 206, 234, 254

arts.

and accompanying

text.

text.

12-21; Protocol

I,

art.

33; see also nn. IV.816, V.154-55, 206, 234, 254

and

LOS Convention, art. 98; High Seas Convention, art.

12;

text.

302.

See nn. 11.103, 280, 306 and accompanying

303.

See nn. 286-87 and accompanying

304.

See nn. 286-87 and accompanying text; Part D.l.

305.

See Part B.2, n. 286 and accompanying

306.

7.4.1; 2

D considers issues related to neutral-flag merchantmen that may have assumed enemy character.

accompanying

see also

11

148

Second Convention,

arts. 12-21;

text.

text.

text.

Protocol

I, art.

33;

nn. III.948, IV.30, 816, V.154-55 and accompanying text;

London Protocol, nn. V.195-257 and accompanying

text.

307.

UN Charter, arts.

308.

See nn. 11.295, 304, 342-44, 348, 350-52, 359, 361-62, 382, 437, 446-47, 453, 471 and accompanying

309.
see also

51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

Second Convention,

arts.

12-21; Protocol

I, art.

nn. IV.816, V.154-55 and accompanying text.

33;

and accompanying

text.
text.

LOS Convention, art. 98; High Seas Convention, art.

12;

The Tanker War
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310.

LOS

311.

UN Charter, arts.

312.

E.g.,

Convention,

LOS

accompanying
313.

LOS

314.

In

e.g.,

art.

98;

High Seas Convention,

art. 12; see also n.

IV. 816,

and accompanying

51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

Convention,

art. 87(1);

High Seas Convention,

art. 2; see also

text.

and accompanying

nn.

III. 10,

text.

952-67, IV.10-25 and

text.

Convention,

art.

some cases, e.g.,

98;

High Seas Convention,

the response was in error, for

art. 12; see also n.

IV.816 and accompanying

text.

which the responding ship's country gave compensation. See,

nn. 11.368-72, 391, 398, 410-11, 430-33, 459-68 and accompanying text.

315.

UN Charter, arts.

316.

Second Convention,

317.

UN Charter, arts.

318.

E.g.,

LOS

accompanying

51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25
arts.

12-21; Protocol

I,

art. 33; see also

art. 87(1);

High Seas Convention,

art. 2; see also

and accompanying

nn.

III. 10,

text.

952-67, IV.10-25 and

text.

319.

LOS

320.

See nn. 11.367, 410-11, 459-68 and accompanying text;

Convention,

text.

nn. IV.816, V. 154-55 and accompanying text.

51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

Convention,

and accompanying

Convention,

art. 12; n.

art.

98;

High Seas Convention,

IV.816 and accompanying

art. 12; see also n.

IV.816 and accompanying

LOS

see also

Convention,

See nn. 151-55 and accompanying

322.

Second Convention,

323.

See nn. 11.55-61, 71 and accompanying

324.

See nn.

325.

See

326.

See nn. 11.473-74 and accompanying

327.

See nn. 11.177, 274-78, 288, 296-99, 306, 366, 420, 447, 491-92 and accompanying

328.

See,

II. 1

n. 11.183

e.g.,

I, art.

33; see also nn. IV.816, V. 154-55

and accompanying

text.

text.

and accompanying

and accompanying

High Seas

text.

12-21; Protocol

12-14, 182, 473-74

98;

text.

321.

arts.

art.

text.

text.

text.
text.
text.

nn. 11.179 (mines), 233 (mines), 250 (mines), 260, 334 (mines), 354 (mines), 357 (mines), 359 (mines),

361, 368 (mines), 373, 393-94, 412, 420 (mines), 421, 446, 469, 519

and accompanying

text.

329.

See nn. 11.144, 422-23 and accompanying

330.

See

331.

See Part B.l.

332.

See Parts C.1-C.4.

333.

NWIP 10-2 H 501; NWP 1-14M Annotated 1 7.5; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.5; 2 Oppenheim § 89 (flying enemy

Rag prima

LOS

Convention,

art.

&

cmt.;

art.

r.n. 2,3,

22; nn. 76-81

M

enemy character); San Remo Manual
Tucker 76-86. The LOAC corporate-owned

claims espousal rules. Compare,

&

High Seas Convention,

110;

facie evidence of

character), 117

cmt. d

text.

e.g.,

711-13, with San

Barcelona Traction (Belg.

Remo Manual

11

v.

112

&

and accompanying

cmts. (conclusive evidence of

vessels control test

Spain), 1970 ICJ 3;

117, cmt. 117.1.

text.

may

differ

enemy

from corporate

Restatement (Third)

§§ 213,

Compare the nationality approach in

LOS

Convention, arts. 90-94; High Seas Convention, arts. 4-7, considered customary law. See Part IV. B. 3. During war LOS
principles do not apply because of the

High Seas Convention,

art. 2; see also

334.

NWP

335.

San Remo Manual

1-14M Annotated

U 7.5;

H 113

&

LOS

nn.

conventions' other rules clauses. See,

e.g.,

IV.10-25 and accompanying

text.

III. 952-67,

NWP 9A Annotated

cmts.; compare the

11

LOS

LOS

Convention,

art. 87(1);

7.5.

approach in

LOS Convention, arts. 91-94; High Seas
LOS principles do not apply because of

Convention, arts. 4-7, considered customary law. See Part IV.B.2. During war
the conventions' other rules clauses. See,
III. 952-67,

336.

Tucker

IV.10-25 and accompanying

NWIP 10-2

11

501a;

e.g.,

LOS

Convention,

art. 87(1);

High Seas Convention,

art. 2; see also

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.5.1; NWP9A Annotated

11

7.5.1;

San Remo Manual 1111 67-68;

319-21; see also nn. 156-256 and accompanying text.

337.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

338.

See Parts C.1-C.4

339.

NWP

1-14M Annotated

11

7.5.2;

H 7.10;

nn.

text.

NWP 9A Annotated H 7.5.2.
NWP 9A Annotated H 7.10; Tucker 336-37; see also Parts C.1-C.4.

;

Law

Hague Radio Rules, art.

340.

Oppenheim

6;

NWIP 10-2 H 503d; NWP 1-14M Annotated

Remo Manual
98,
sources. The Hague Radio

409; San

§

principles in these

of

1111

146, 153;

Tucker

11

Armed

7.10;

NWP 9A Annotated

321, 325-331, 336, 338.

Rules are customary norms. See

455

Conflict

The

11

7.10; 2

foregoing synthesizes

also Parts C.1-C.4.

NWIP 10-2 U 503d n.25; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.10 n.157; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.10 n.152; Tucker 13,

341.

and accompanying

263, 325; see also n. IV.649

text.

342.

NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 7.10, 7.10.1; NWP 9A Annotated

343.

UN

1111

7.10, 7.10.1; see also Parts C.1-C.4.

Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part

A. 1-2.
344.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text.

345.

See nn. 163-64, 205, 226, 233, 285-88 and accompanying text.

346.

See

347.

Hague XI,

Annotated

n.

II

337 and accompanying

Third Convention, art. 4A(5); Colombos § 611; NWIP 10-2 H 513a; NWP 1-14M
NWP 9A Annotated H 7.10.2; 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 1117; 2 Oppenheim §§ 85, 125a; 3

arts. 5, 8;

7.10.2;

Pictet 45-51, 65-66; San

Hague

348.

text.

Remo Manual

11

166; Shearer, Commentary, n. 112, 187.

XL art. 6; Third Convention, art. 4A; NWIP

Annotated H 7.10.2; 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea

1 1

17; 2

10-2

11

513;

Oppenheim

NWP 1-14M Annotated

§ 126a; 3

11

7.10.2;

NWP 9A

Pictet 45-68; Shearer, Commentary,

n.

112,187.
349.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48,

350.

LOS Convention, arts. 90-94; High Seas Convention, arts. 4-7, considered customary law; see also Part IV.C.3.

351.

See,

e.g.,

accompanying

Convention,

art.

87(1);

and accompanying

High Seas Convention,

text.

nn.

art. 2; see also

III. 952-67,

IV. 10-25

and

text.

Compare Colombos

352.

War

LOS

103; see also n. IV.57

§

559 (conclusive presumption); James Wilford Garner, Prize Law During the World

Remo Manual

§ 89 (prima facie presumption). London
enemy character of a vessel is determined by the flag which she is
entitled to fly," a conclusive presumption. However, during World War I France and Great Britain abrogated the rule.
Garner § § 1 06, 276; 2 Oppenheim § 89, at 280. The Declaration was never ratified as a treaty. Except for Britain, the art.

287 (1927); San

§

Declaration,

art.

11

112 (same) with 2 Oppenheim

57 (1909) says "[T]he neutral or

57 principle had been incorporated in belligerents' prize regulations or naval codes by the beginning of the war.

Garner

§§ 106, 275. 1917 Instructions H 56, however, said

"The

neutral or

enemy

character of a private vessel

determined by the neutral or enemy character ofthe State whose flag the vessel has a right
papers," citing
353.
also n.

354.

apply.

US

Colombos

604; Garner, n. 352 §§ 280-86,289 (prize cases); 2

§

Although there
11

is

less

§ 89;

San Remo Manual

H 113; see

law with respect to transfer of aircraft registry, presumably the same rules will

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.5 n.l

1 1;

NWP 9A Annotated H 7.5 n.l 10; 2 Oppenheim § 91

117, cmt. 117.1; Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 115, 267.

355.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48,

356.

Colombos

§

Oppenheim

text.

even

501 n.5;

San Remo Manual H

O'Connell,

is

evidenced by her

bilateral treaties.

352 and accompanying

NWIP 10-2

to fly as

103; see also n. IV.57

760; Helsinki Principle 5.2.5;

Law of the

and accompanying

NWP

1-14M Annotated

Sea 1144; 2 Oppenheim §§ 395,399; San Remo

357.

Helsinki Principle

358.

See Part C.l.

359.

NWIP

text.

K 7.4.1;

Manual H

NWP 9A Annotated U 7.4.1; 2

148

& cmt.

148.1;

Tucker 263.

5.2.5.

10-2 H 631a;

NWP

1-14M Annotated

II

7.4.1;

NWP 9A Annotated H 7.4.1;

2

Oppenheim §§ 401-03;

Tucker 263.
360.

McDougal & Feliciano 482-83; NWIP

10-2

11

631b;

NWP 1-14M Annotated

11

7.4.1;

NWP 9A Annotated H

7.4.1.

361.

NWIP

10-2 U 631b;

NWP 1-14M Annotated

Sea 1144; Tucker 266-67; Goldie, Targeting,
362.

E.g., the

London

7.4.1;

NWP 9A Annotated

11

7.4.1; 2

O'Connell,

Law ofthe

1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars. See 66 AJIL 386 (1967); 2 von Heintschel Heinegg 94-99;

Walker, State Practice 143-44.
363.

11

n. 11.262, 18.

Declaration,

arts.

22-23.

The Tanker War
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24-25.

364.

Id., arts.

365.

Id,

366.

2

367.

London

368.

See

n.

173 and accompanying

text.

369.

See

n.

361 and accompanying

text.

370.

San Remo Manual 11 1 50

art.

art. 26.

Oppenheim

59; Protocol

§

393; see a/50 Halpern, n. 115, 202, 291.

Declaration,

I, arts.

arts.

27-29; see also 2

Convention,

arts.

arts. 23, 59,

law); 2 Pictet 212-15; 3

NWP 1-14M Annotated

United States
371.

61; Protocol

Helsinki Principle

The US

H 7.4.1;

lists

I,

I, art.

arts.

70; see also

art.

38;

373.

11H

NWP

id.

178-84, 319-23; Pilloud,

London Declaration

included items the

Commentary

816-29;

NWP

H 7.4.1;

9A Annotated

lists,

11

148; see also 2

classified as conditional

23-25; 1941 Tentative Instructions HH 26-28; 1943

exempt

& Annex

5.3, citing

III;

Fourth

Tucker

263.

cmt. (although distinction formally retained, has in fact been abolished);

5.2.3,

continue to require publication of contraband
listing of

72-75

The

70 principles as custom. Matheson, Remarks 426.

art.

NWP 9A Annotated H 7.4.1; San Remo Manual

1-14M Annotated

arts.

BorHEet ai. 432-37; Helsinki Principle

London

distinguish between conditional and absolute contraband. Compare
Instructions

NWP 9A Annotated H 7.4.1.2 (same, adding

Third Convention,

69-70 (relief to pass through blockade in accordance with humanitarian

party but recognizes

I

7.4.1.2;

11

Second Convention,

351-74, 664-68; 4

not a Protocol

is

1-14M Annotated
372.

23,59; Protocol

id.

396.

& cmts., citing Second Convention, art. 38, Third Convention; Fourth Convention,

69-70; compare

cultural items for prisoners of war, citing

Fourth Convention,

Oppenheim §§ 394,

id. 1111

H 7.4.1

contraband and did not

Declaration,

26-28; see also

NWP

Oppenheim §§ 392-93.

arts.

Tucker

22-29, with 1917

266-27.

("To the extent that international law may

recent practice indicates that the requirement

may be satisfied by a

goods.").

374.

San Remo Manual

375.

See nn. 363-64 and accompanying

376.

See Helsinki Principles

377.

San Remo Manual, 11 149; Green, Comments, n. 210, 228. 1917 Instructions H 23; 1941 Tentative Instructions H
id.
26, declared the United States would publish contraband items beyond those in the Instructions. The

26; 1943

11

149.

5.2.3, 5.3

text.

& cmts.

11

would be that States, by referring to the unclassified Instructions and reading US notices, would know what was
and what was not contraband throughout a war. If other States practiced this, as Tucker 266-67 implies, the notice
result

requirement came close to being,
378.

NWP

1-

lists

was not already,

a

customary norm.

14M Annotated 7.4. 1 .2; NWP 9 A Annotated

4 Pictet 178-84, 319-23;

contraband

if it

n.

373 and accompanying

text.

11

7.4. 1.2; see, e.g.,

Fourth Convention, arts. 23, 59; see also

San Remo Manual HH 148-49 takes the opposite position;

must be published; otherwise goods not on

lists

may

not be captured, and this would include free

goods.

& cmt.; NWP

379.

Helsinki Principle 3.3

380.

Helsinki Principle 3.3, cmt.;

Manual
381.

11

383.

United

NWP 1-14M Annotated

1111

7.9;

San Remo Manual

7.8-7.8.1;

11

106(e); see also Part F.2.

NWP 9 A Annotated HH 7.8-7.8.1; SanRemo

108; see also Part F.l.a.

Helsinki Principle 5.2.10;

San Remo Manual
382.

1-14M AnnotatedH

1111

NWP 1-14M Annotated

H11

7.7.2.1-7.7.2.2;

NWP 9A Annotated HH 7.7.2.1-7.7.2.2;

93-94; see also Part E.2.

See Part C.l.

While nearly

all

countries have ratified the First, Second, Third and Fourth Conventions, a few,

States, are not Protocol

I

parties;

many

e.g.,

the

States recognize parts of the Protocol as customary norms. See Table

A5-1, n. III.628.
384.
385.
7.4.1; 2

386.

See nn. 260, 269 and accompanying
See,

e.g.,

Colombos

O'Connell,

§§ 778-80;

Law of the Sea

text.

NWIP 10-2 H 631b n.18; NWP 1-14M Annotated

1143-44;

Tucker 266-67;

see also

See generally 7 Hackworth, Digest 212; Helsinki Principle 5.2.6

Law

7.4.1;

NWP 9A Annotated H

& cmt.; McDougal & Feliciano 509-13;

1

1-14M Annotated H 7.4.2; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.4.2; 2
of the Sea 1147-48; San Remo Manual 1W 122-24; Tucker 280-82, 312-15, 322-23; G.G.

Medlicott, n. 192, 94-101;

O'Connell,

11

nn. 361, 372 and accompanying text.

NWIP

10-2 H 631d n.22;

NWP

Law

Fitzmaurice, Some Aspects of Modern Contraband Control and the

Law

of

of Prize, 22

Armed

BYBIL

Conflict

457

73, 83-84 (1945); Mallison,

Limited, n.JII.316, 389-90.
387.

Paris Declaration

1111

2-3; see also 3

Hyde § 816;2 0ppenheim§

177;

San Remo Manual H 147 &cmt.;Fujita,n.

IV.624, 71.
388.

London Declaration, arts. 30, 33-36; see also Colombos § § 766-70; Helsinki Principle 5.2.4, cmt.; NWIP 10-2
NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.4.1.1 n.99; NWP 9A Annotated
n.99; 2 0'Connell,LawoftheSea 1146; 2 Oppenheim §§ 400-03a; Stone 486-87; Tucker, 268 n.9; Fujita, n.
11

631c (partially accepting London Declaration rules);
7.4.1.1

11

IV.624, 71-72; Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 115, 263-64.
389.

kinds.

In recent wars the doctrine was applied to extensive absolute contraband

Colombos

Commentary,

Law

§§ 771-74; 2 O'Connell,

lists

or to

of contraband of all

lists

of the Sea 1146-47; Stone 487; Tucker 267-75; Kalshoven,

n. 115, 272.

390.

See Part C.l.

391.

UN Charter, arts. 25,48, 103; see also San RemoManualII 150,cmt. 150.3;n.

392.

See nn. 82-126 and accompanying

text.

393.

See nn. 333-49 and accompanying

text.

394.

See nn. 11.103, 280, 306 and accompanying

395.

Cf. nn. 11.103, 183

396.

See nn. 11.111-12 and accompanying

397.

Near the war's end Iran negotiated with the USSR for an oil export pipeline in USSR territory to the north. See

and accompanying

IV.57 and accompanying text.

text.

text.

text.

nn. 11.112-14, 182, 473-74 and accompanying text.
398.

See nn. IV.668-79, 685-94 for descriptions of typical documentation and sale of goods in ocean commerce.

399.

See nn. 11.177, 274-78, 288, 296-99, 306, 366, 420, 447, 491-92 and accompanying

400.

See nn. 337-44 and accompanying

401.

See nn. 11.332, IV.825, V.350-55 and accompanying

402.

See

403.

See nn. 387-90 and accompanying

404.

Iran Prize Law, n. 11.144; but see

n.

356 and accompanying

accompanying
405.

text.

text.
text.

text.
text.

NWP

1-14M Annotated

H 7.4.1 n.96. See also nn. 11.422-23

and

text.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

H1I

7.5.1, 8.2.2.2;

NWP 9A Annotated

1111

7.5.1, 8.2.2.2;

compare San

Remo Manual

11

60(g); see also Parts C.l, D.l.

406.

Cf Helsinki

407.

See nn. 356, 387-90 and accompanying

408.

See nn. 11.350-53 and accompanying

409.

See generally nn. 114-18 and accompanying

410.

See nn. 373-85 and accompanying

411.

See nn. 368-70, 386 and accompanying

412.

See nn. 344, 355, 391 and accompanying

413.

See Parts A.l, A.2, A.5.

414.

See nn. 11.91, 110, 200 and accompanying text; see also

Principle 5.2.3; see also Part D.3.
text.

text.

text.

text.
text.

once considered blockading Kharg but did not do
recognize Iraqi regulations,

etc.,

as

text.

n. 11.236

so; see n. 11.230

text. The United States
The United States did not

and accompanying

and accompanying

text.

law but warned of the danger of the Kharg area through

NOTAMs

and

NOTMARs; see n. 11.288, 420 and accompanying text. Kharg facilities were a frequent Iraqi target; see, e.g., nn. 11.232,
240, 272, 283.

San Remo Manual, Preliminary Remarks, 176-77, notes Manual

law continues today or whether

it is

in desuetude. It says

its

drafters differed

on whether blockade

rules apply "to blockading actions

.

.

.

regardless of the

name given to such actions," trying to modernize the Paris and London Declaration rules. Other sources cited in this
Part adhere to interpretations of the traditional blockade law as though

it

was still viable; that is the thrust of this Part,
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although

cites the

it

Manual where

it

coincides. Helsinki Principle 5.2.10, crat. says the law of blockade

desuetude. For desuetude principles, see nn.

See Goodrich

415.

used for pacific blockade,

i.e.,

UN

S.C. Res. 221,

416.

is

not in

text.

UN Charter, art. 42, has been proposed only once); see also
NWP 9A Annotated 7.7.2 n.129. 2 Openheim § 49 believes art. 42 could be

7.7.2 n.131;

11

IV.28 and accompanying

314-17; Simma 628-36 (using

et al.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

III. 930,

11

blockade during time of peace. See also

a

Doc. S/RES/221 (1965),

in 5

ILM

id.

534 (1966);

§§ 44-48, 52b-52e, 52/; nn. 416-21.

Cable 193-94; O'Connell, The

see also

Influence 137-38, 174-75; Walker, State Practice 142-43.
417.

law

2

O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1157-58, referring

a pacific

blockade

may

to

UN Charter, art. 2(4), noting that even under traditional
Colombos

not have enough practice to be customary law; see also

legality of pacific blockade); 2

Oppenheim §§ 44-49, 52b-52e,

52/ (same);

NWIP

§§ 484-88B (hinting at

10-2 H 632a, n.26.

A related method,

naval demonstration, i.e., sending warships into neutral coastal waters to threaten a coastal State, violates

LOS

art. 2(4),

principles governing innocent passage in the territorial sea, and the

conduct toward neutrals.

Colombos
firing

on

LOS

art. 19;

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4);
text.

UN Charter,

regarding belligerent

Hague

XIII,

arts. 1, 5;

Reprisals involving use of force,

displeased belligerent

UN

Charter,

art. 2(4); see also

may undertake

violation of a trade treaty or

644-48 and accompanying

III. 396-417,

Parts F. 1 -F.2.

There is

also

Colombos

§

491; nn. 111.47-157 and accompanying

text.

relations,

e.g., embargo in
Colombos §§ 481-83;
exclude merchantmen and civil aircraft from

an unfriendly but lawful

may also
may declare exclusion zones

text. Belligerents

nothing wrong with

a

in

act.

See

high seas areas off any nation's coast. See

country's using high seas off another country's coasts for freedom of

navigation and overflight of its warships and military aircraft, or using these high seas areas for naval exercises.

Convention,
Cf.

art.

87(1);

High Seas Convention,

UN Charter, arts.

is

A

nonforce reprisals or retorsions to influence neutral behavior,

withdrawing diplomatic

the immediate area of naval operations and

418.

e.g.,

a neutral coast or other neutral territory to signal a belligerent's displeasure with a neutral's conduct,

equally invalid under

nn.

Convention,

489; see also nn. III.47-1 57, IV.337-50, V.73 and accompanying

§

LOAC

art. 2; see also

25, 48, 103; see also n. IV.57

nn. IV. 68-79 and accompanying

and accompanying

LOS

text.

text.

The UN Command considered but rejected a blockade of the PRC as well. See generally Walker, State Practice
The Republic of China on Taiwan had declared a blockade against the PRC. Janis, Neutrality, n. 111.831,149.

419.
125-28.

See also nn.

III. 220-23

and accompanying

text.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.7.2.1 n.131; NWP9A Annotated

420.

also n. IV.57

and accompanying

Helsinki Principle

421.

1.2;

11

7.7.2.1 n.129;**?

text.

NWIP

10-2 H 632 n.30;

NWP 1-14M Annotated

11

7.7.2 n.131;

NWP 9A Annotated

11

7.7.2 n.129.

422.

NWP

1-14M Annotated

423.

See

356 and accompanying

424.

Colombos

n.

Annotated!! 7.7.1;
III. 322,

425.

text,

Oppenheim §§ 368, 370, 372; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 30; NWP 1-14M
7.7.1; 10 Whiteman, Digest 861-64; Clark, n. III.322, 160; Swayze, n.
Colombos §§ 814-17; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1150; Tucker 283-87; Clingan,
11

War Zones,

n. 11.519,

161 -71; for histories of blockade.^ also n. 417

discussing legality of pacific blockades, naval demonstrations, reprisals and retorsions as
warfare.

decision to impose a blockade

Declaration, arts. 8-9;

NWIP 10-2

O'Connell,

Law of the

Commentary,

n. 115, 260, 274;

426.

text.

NWP 9A Annotated

means of economic

A US

NWP 9A Annotated H 7.7.5.

n. III. 840, 353; Goldie, Afarittme

and accompanying
related

7.7.5;

§§ 813, 842, 844; 2

154. See generally

Submarine Mines,

11

632b

11

lies

with the executive and not with naval force commanders. London

& n.30; NWP

1-14M Annotated

Sea 1151; 2 Oppenheim §§ 375-76; San Remo
Swayze,

7.7.2.1;

Manual

NWP 9A Annotated
U 93;

Tucker

11

7.7.2.1; 2

287; Kalshoven,

n. III. 322, 154-55.

The grace period has ranged from

Vietnam War. London Declaration,

11

Haiphong in 1972 during the
Colombos §§ 824-26; Helsinki

2 to 10 days; ships were given 3 days to leave

arts. 8-9, 11-13, 16;

Alford,

n. IV.638, 345-51;

Charles Cheney Hyde, Blockade 24, 36-37 (1918); NWIP 10-2 632c & n.31, 32 (usual to notify
NWP 1-14M Annotated 111 7.7.2.1, 7.7.5 (same); NWP 9A Annotated 7.7.2.1, 7.7.5 (same); 2
O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1151, 1156 (erroneously reporting Haiphong ships had only three hours to leave); San
Remo Manual H11 93-94, 101 (inter alia stating no requirement to notify local authorities); Tucker 287-92; Harry
Almond, Comments on Hugh Lynch's Paper, in Grunawalt 264, 289; Clark, n. III.322, 172; Goldie, Maritime War Zones,
Principle 5.2.10;

11

local authorities);

n. 11.519,

11

166-71; Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 115, 260, 274; Levie, Submarine Warfare, n. III.439, 33; Swayze, n.

III.322, 154-55.

The Korean War aside, there have been no formal blockades of consequence since 1945. The Republic

of China declared one against the

Bab-el-Mandeb

Straits in 1973,

and

PRC
Israel

in 1949, India proclaimed

one in 1971, Egypt

imposed one on the Lebanese coast in 1982.

1

tried to

blockade the

Anthony H. Cordesman &

;

Law

Abraham

Armed

of

459

Conflict

R Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War 104-08, 216 (1990); Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement

266-69 (1975); 2 O'Connell 1 154-55; 0'Connell,The Influence 101-02; Janis, n. III.831, 149; Walker, State Practice
137-38, 144. There were naval quarantines during the

Howard

S.

Levie,

Mine Warfare at Sea 151-57

Maritime War Zones,

Naval Targeting,

n. 11.519, 157; Janis 151;

n. III.262,

Cuban Missile

Crisis

and the Vietnam War. See

generally

(1992); Clingan, Submarine Mines, n. III.840, 353, 358; Goldie,

Lowe, Commander's Handbook,

n. III. 318, 128;

Mallison

& Mallison,

The tendency has been to proclaim exclusion zones. See Part F.

262-68; Walker 141, 145.

Colombos § 818; Helsinki Principle 5.2.10, cmt.; NWIP 10-2 11 632b n.32; 2 Oppenheim
The UN Security Council may proclaim a paper blockade, at least in theory. UN
see nn. 415-21 and accompanying text.

Paris Declaration H 4;

427.

§§ 177, 378; Fujita, n. IV.624, 69.

Charter,
428.

arts. 25, 42, 48, 103;

London Declaration, arts. 4, 12; Hyde, n. 426, 41-42; NWIP 10-2 632d & n.33; NWP 1-14M Annotated
NWP 9A Annotated U 7.7.2.3; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1151; 2 Oppenheim §§ 378, 382; Tucker 288-89;
11

11

7.7.2.3;

Kalshoven, Commentary,
Lieber Code,

429.

n. 115, 260, 274; see also n.

135-37, 141-42;

arts.

426 and accompanying

text.

Oxford Naval Manual, art. 92; see also

Levie, The Nature, n. 109, 903-06;

Verri, Commentary, n. IV.71, 337.

430.

2

Oppenheim

§

Hague

239, citing 1899

II,

Regulations,

art.

40;

Hague IV,

Regulations,

art.

40; Lieber Code,

145; see also Levie, The Nature, n. 109, 901-03.

art.

London

431.

Declaration,

arts. 2-3;

NWP 1-14M Annotated

n.33;

95-97; Stone 496;
at least

11

7.7.2.3;

Colombos

NWIP 10-2 1 632d &
Oppenheim §§ 379-82; San Remo Manual H11

§§ 818-21, 843-43; HYDE,n. 426, 5-6, 12-14;

NWP 9A Annotated

Tucker 288-89; Kalshoven, Commentary,

11

n.

7.7.2.3; 2
1

15, 260, 274;

Swayze, n. III.322, 154. The old rule, that

one surface warship must be present, has been discarded. Helsinki Principle

NWP

9A Annotated

5.2.10, cmt.;

NWP

1-14M

Oppenheim 380a. Paris Declaration H 4 invalidated
Napoleonic era "paper" or constructive blockades that a State imposes by decree but does not have forces to enforce it.
Annotated H
See

n.

7.7.5;

427 and accompanying

U 7.7.5; compare 2

text.

4; Colombos §§ 837-41, 845-63; Helsinki Principle 5.2.10; Hyde, n. 426, 13-14; NWIP
1-14M Annotated H 7.7.5; NWP 9A Annotated U 7.7.5; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea
1151-56; 2 Oppenheim § 177; San Remo Manual H 96 (force maintaining blockade may be stationed at distance
determined by military requirements); Tucker 290, 305-15, 317; Almond, n. 426, 289; Fujita, n. IV.624, 69, 73;

432.

10-2

11

Paris Declaration

632a n.27-28;

Goldie, Maritime

11

NWP

War Zones,

n. 11.519, 164-71, 178;

Jacobson, n. 166, 233; Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 115, 260, 274;

Levie, Submarine Warfare, n. III.439, 33; n. 173 and accompanying text.
433.

LOS

Convention,

accompanying
434.

2

O'Connell,

45; Territorial Sea Convention,

arts. 25(3),

text; Part IV.B.6,

art.

16(3); see also nn. IV.337,

349 and

analyzing nonsuspendable straits passage.

Law of the Sea

1 1

56.

Hague VIII, arts. 2-3; Colombos §§ 821, at 720; 837-41, 845-63; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 22; Goldie,
War Zones, n. 11.519, 166-71; Howard S. Levie, Commentary, in Law of Naval Warfare 140, 143-44; Lowe,
The Commander's, n. III.318, 137-38; Swayze, n. III.322, 163-65; cf. Nwogugu, n. III.439, 333, 340; but see Nicaragua
435.

Maritime

Case, 1986 ICJ 112, 147-48, involving mining and not wartime blockade issues.
436. Manual commentary suggests the requirement is mandatory, not hortatory, as "should" might indicate. San
Remo Manual 85 & cmts.
11

437.

If a

blockading force officer acknowledges a distress situation, a neutral-flag ship

blockaded place and leave

it,

may be

allowed to enter a

provided the vessel neither discharges nor ships cargo. London Declaration,

Helsinki Principle 5.2.10; Colombos §§ 813, 822-23; Hyde, n. 426, 14, 35-36;

arts. 5-7;

NWIP 10-2 111 632f & n.35, 632h; NWP

1-14M Annotated Ml 7.4.1.2, 7.7.2.4, 7.7.3; NWP 9A Annotated Ml 7.4.1.2, 7.7.2.4, 7.7.3; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea
1 151 2 Oppenheim §§ 370; San Remo Manual 11 100; Tucker 291-92; Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 1 15, 260, 274; see also
nn. IV.494-506 and accompanying text.
;

438. The United States appears to have a view that neutral diplomatic agents are entitled to leave a blockaded place.
Colombos § 813; Hyde, n. 426, 37-39; 7 Moore 854; NWIP 10-2 H 632h(l); Tucker 291; During the Korean War
blockade, foreign warships except North Korea's could enter and leave North Korean ports. Walker, State Practice 1 26,
citing inter alia US Deputy Director of State Department Office of Northeast Asian Affairs U. Alexis Johnson

Memorandum
decision,

it is

of Conversation, July

8,

1950, 7

likely the executive will also

FRUS

1950, 332-33. Since imposing a blockade

like national rules, perhaps stated in rules of engagement,

directed. See nn. III.258

439.

and accompanying text

for

I, arts.

a

US

executive

should consult those rules and refer to higher authority as

ROE analysis.

Second Convention, art. 38; Third Convention, arts. 72-75

Protocol

is

make these decisions. US naval commanders, and force commanders with

69-70; Helsinki Principle 5.3;

& Annex III; Fourth Convention, arts. 23, 59, 61

NWP 1-14M Annotated

11

7.4.1.2;

NWP 9A Annotated

11

7.4.1.2;

San
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Remo Manual 1W

102(a), 103-04, 150; Tucker 263; Frits Kalshoven, Noncombatant Persons, in Grunawalt 300, 312-13;
Bothe et al. 430-37; Hyde, n. 426, 39-41; 2 Pictet 212-15; 3 id. 351-74, 664-68; 4 id. 178-84, 319-23, 325-28;
Pilloud, Commentary 812-29. Protecting Powers, a third, neutral State or an international organization parties to a

see also

conflict appoint to safeguard their interests, including interests of prisoners of war,

Second Convention,

First Convention, arts. 8-11, 23;

arts. 8, 11;

etc.,

Third Convention,

are discussed

arts. 8, 11;

and defined

in

Fourth Convention,

Property Convention, art. 21. See also Bothe et al..
Green ch. 13; 1 Pictet 86-131, 206-26; 2 id. 60-65, 79-82; 3 id.
93-103, 123-27; Aid. 81-92, 113-17, 120-28; Pilloud, Commentary 58-59,61-62,76-102, 150-63, 350-63, 544-59, 708-16,
816-29; Toman 222-26; Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War and the Protecting Power, 55 AJIL 374 (1961). The United
States evacuated civilians from North to South Vietnam in that conflict during offshore interdiction operations.
Wounded and sick French armed forces members were repatriated to France and Morocco. 1 Edwin M. Hoopers al.
The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict ch. 12 (1976); Daniel M. Redmond, Getting Them Out, 116
arts. 9, 12, 14;

Protocol

I, arts.

2(c), 5-6, 11, 33, 45, 60, 70; Cultural

54-55, 64-84, 110-16, 172-75, 260-62, 387-89, 432-37;

.,

Proceedings 44 (No.

London

440.

Annotated U

8, 1990).

Declaration,

Colombos

art. 18;

NWP 9A Annotated

7.7.2.5;

Kalshoven, Commentary,

II

§ 833;

7.7.2.5; 2

NWIP

Helsinki Principle 5.2.10;

Oppenheim

373a; San

§

NWP 1-14M
Tucker 289-90;

10-2 H 632e;

Remo Manual

11

99;

n. 115, 260, 274; see also Parts E.2-E.3.

W.E. Hall, Law of Naval Warfare 205-06 (1921); Helsinki Principle 5.2.10; Hyde, n. 426,
NWP 1-14M AnnotatedH 7.7.4; NWP 9A Annotated 7.7.4; 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe
Sea 1 1 57 (noting this is UK-US policy, and that continental States follow an analogue of hot pursuit after a ship breaks
a blockade cordon); 2 Oppenheim §§ 385, 389 (noting differences in State practice); San Remo Manual 111 98, 146(f),
153(f); Tucker 292-95. See also LOS Convention, art. Ill; High Seas Convention, art. 23; nn. IV.298, 326 and
accompanying text (hot pursuit under LOS).

Colombos

441.

29-33;

NWIP

442.
U 7.7.4;

10-2

§

844;

11

632g(2);

11

Declaration of London,

arts.

14-15;

Colombos §§ 827-28; NWIP 10-2 632g &
383-84; Tucker 292-93.
11

n.36;

NWP 1-14M Annotated

NWP 9A Annotated H 7.7.4; 2 Oppenheim §§

443.

See nn. 387-88 and accompanying

444.

Declaration of London,

NWIP

835-36, 844;

Law ofthe Sea
Annotated

11

Commentary,

10-2 H 632g

11 57;

14-15;

Hague Air Rules,

NWP 1-14M Annotated

n.36;

art. 52, as
11

7.7.4;

interpreted by

NWP

9A Annotated

its drafters;

NWP 9A Annotated

Tucker 292-93, 3 16- 17. See also Declaration of London, arts.

7.7.4 n. 140;
n. 115,

arts.

&

text.

17, 19,

11

7.7.4; 2

considered by

Colombos

§

O'Connell,

NWP 1-14M

H 7.7.4 n.138, as obsolete in light of State practice; Kalshoven,

261-62, 274.

Oppenheim

386; see also nn. IV.494-506, V.437 and accompanying text.

445.

2

446.

UN Charter, arts. 25,42, 48, 103; Helsinki Principle

447.

San Remo Manual

§

H 102(b)

&

see also Parts

V.414 and accompanying

448.

See nn. 11.91,

449.

A similar situation arose in the 1990-91

10, 200,

.

2; see also n. III. 58

cmts. 102.3-102.4; Goldie, Maritime

behind changes in traditional blockade law);
1

1

and accompanying

War

text; Part E.

1.

Zones, n. 11.519, 178 (necessity

A.1-A.2 and accompanying

text.

text.

Gulf War; see Walker, Crisis Over Kuwait 36 n.53, commenting on S.C.

UN Doc. S/RES 665 (1990), in 29 ILM 1329, 1330 (1990), authorizing interception of Iraq-bound cargoes, and
the response of Comprehensive Mandatory Sanctions Imposed Against Iraq, 27 UN Chron. 5, 6-7 (No. 4, 1990); Naval
Blockade Endorsed,
5. The UN Security
7, characterizing the operation as a blockade. See also Vessels Intercepted,
Res. 66,

id. 1

id. 1

Council never formally authorized a blockade; Coalition members never instituted one or treated Council
authorizations under, e.g., S.C. Res. 678,

UN Doc. No. S/RES/678, in

1

Dispatch 298(1 990), as authority to impose one.

450.

See nn. 1.27-33 and accompanying

text.

451.

See nn. 425-26 and accompanying

text.

452.

Several Iranian warships, on order in Italy, never left the Mediterranean Sea; the rest of the Iraqi navy was
up in the Shatt al-Arab early in the war. There is no evidence Iraq used helicopters, which could have enforced

bottled

a blockade, against

Gulf shipping. See nn.

11.130, 236, 322

and accompanying

453.

Paris Declaration, U 4; see also n. 427 and accompanying text.

454.

See nn. 11.153-56 and accompanying

455.

See n. 426 and accompanying

456.

Cf.

LOS

accompanying

Convention,

text.

art.

text.

text.

text.

25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); see also nn. IV.337, 349

and

Law

457.

Helsinki Principle

Remo Manual

3.3, cmt.;

NWP

1-14M Annotated

7.8-7.8.1;

Hit

of

Armed

Conflict

NWP 9A Annotated

461

HH 7.8-7.8.1; San

1 146; see also Part F.l.a.

458.

The

459.

See nn. 11.179, 233, 250-60, 334, 354, 357, 359, 362, 368, 373, 393-94, 412, 420-21, 446, 469, 519 and

record

accompanying

is

nonexistent on these points.

text; see also S.C. Res.

552 (1984),

in

Wellens 473;

Part IV.B.4; n. 440 and accompanying text. While

many attacks Chapter II documents occurred outside neutral territorial waters, the citations are given to illustrate the
frequency of mine and other attacks on neutral shipping, some of which occurred in neutral territorial waters.
460.

See nn. 11.365 and accompanying

461.

UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103; LOS Convention, art. 19; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4); Hague XIII, arts.

1,5; see also

text.

nn. IV.371-73, V.73, 417 and accompanying text.

462.

See n. 426 and accompanying

463.

See nn. 437-38 and accompanying

464.

See nn.

II. 1 53-56

text.

text.

and accompanying text. Neutral-flag ships could have left under another blockade principle,
upon notice of blockade. See n. 426 and accompanying text.

the right of egress during a grace period
465.

See nn. 451-53 and accompanying

466.

See Hague XI,

467.

See Parts A. 1-2 and accompanying

468.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 42, 48; see also Part E.l.

469.

See nn. 425-26 and accompanying

470.

See nn. 11.179, 233, 250, 334, 354, 357, 359, 368, 420 and accompanying text; see also Part G.2 for mine warfare

arts. 5, 8;

text.

Third Convention,

art. 4;

nn. 11.153-56, V.346-47 and accompanying text.

text.

text.

analysis.

471.

See Part IV.D.4.

472.

S.C. Res. 552 (1984), in

Wellens 473;

see also

Part IV.B.5; nn. 440, 459 and accompanying

text.

473. See nn. 11.89-90, 101 (US NOT AM warning), 102, 109, 176 (US NOTMAR warning), 199-202, 208, 232, 288
(US NOT AM, NOTMAR warning of zones), 301, 420 (US NOT AM, NOTMAR warning of zones) and accompanying
text.

474.

See nn. 11.177, 274-78, 288, 296-99, 306, 366, 420, 447, 491-92 and accompanying

475.

See nn. 11.364 (Persian Gulf), 365 (Saudi territorial sea), 379-81 (Gulf of Oman, Iran territorial

have included

Strait of

accompanying

text.

Hormuz), 410 (Iran

territorial sea,

Persian Gulf), 458 (Gulf of

text.

Oman,

476.

See nn. 11.116, 261, 292 and accompanying

477.

See nn. 11.224, 305, 345, 347 and accompanying text; Parts F.l.b-F.lc. At the end of the war

assumed

a

"zone defense" posture. See

n. II.4

sea,

which may

Persian Gulf) and

text.

and accompanying

text.

The

characterization and

US naval forces

SDZ acronym

are

mine.
478.

See,

e.g.,

nn. 11.335-36, 354, 357, 367-72, 384-87, 437-40 and accompanying

479.

See,

e.g.,

nn. II.4, 146-48, 224, 305, 311, 338-41, 345, 347, 372, 383-86, 391-402, 425-28

rejected), 430-33

and accompanying

(UN flotilla proposed,

text.

480.

See,

e.g.,

nn. 11.295, 350-52, 361-62, 382, 384-86, 413, 437-40, 471 and accompanying text.

481.

See,

e.g.,

nn. H.367-72, 391-402, 459-68 and accompanying

482.

See

n. 11.262

483.

See

UN Charter, arts. 51,

484.

Department

and accompanying

for

103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

Disarmament

Affairs,

and accompanying

text.

485.

Hague Air Rules, art.

30;

& cmt.; NWIP 10-2 Wl 430b & n.
325b;

Technology has been an issue

London Declaration, art.
17, 520a; 632a;

Oxford Naval Manual, art.

30;

and accompanying

Report of UN Secretary General, The Naval Arms Race,
text.

conflict as well. See nn. 11.173

text.

text.

A/40/534, at 24 (1986); n. 432 and accompanying

§

text.

1

;

Paris Declaration 1 4;

for the law

Green

1

text.

UN Doc. No.

governing armed

54; Helsinki Principle 3.3

NWP 1-14M Annotated % 7.8; NWP9A Annotated H 7.8; 2 Oppenheim

San Remo Manual
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146;

Tucker 300-01 ;cf. LOS Convention, arts. 38,45;

The Tanker War
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see also Part IV.B.5.

LOS

Convention,

The
arts.

LONW applies to these situations through the LOS conventions' other rules clauses,
2(3), 34(2); Territorial

Sea Convention,

art. 1(2); see also

e.g.,

nn. 111.952-67, IV.10-25 and

accompanying text. Ronzitti, The Crisis 23 says a rule forbidding hostilities in straits is not yet a customary norm; he is
only partially correct. Certain aspects of naval operations,

486.

the

e.g.,

the right of self-defense, continue to apply during

passage as they do anywhere, but others are limited as noted above.

straits

LOS

Cf.

LOAC

Convention,

arts. 2(2), 25(3); Territorial

applies through the

Convention,

LOS

III. 952-67,

similar restrictions

matter for

487.

LOS

Cf.
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Convention,

text, the
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arts. 2, 16(4).

LOS
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decision as to

its territorial

sea

and
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opponent's territorial

As

Territorial Sea

sea.
art. 3;

Fishery

and

LOAC applies through LOS other rules principles in, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 2(3), 34(2),

LOS

III. 952-67,

standards. See also nn.

Convention,

High Seas Convention,

art. 2;

Restrictions should conform as closely as necessity and proportionality allow to

art. 1(2).

LOS

LOS

to exercise

in the case of the territorial sea, n. 486

58, 78, 87(1), 138; Continental Shelf Convention, art. 3 (high seas rights unaffected);

Cf., e.g.,

these circumstances

art. 2(3),

Continental Shelf Convention,

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24.

Territorial Sea Convention,

488.

Under

Convention,

Whether an enemy would choose

text.

arts. 1(1), 33, 55-58, 76-78, 135, 137;

arts. 1(1), 3-4(1), 6, 8;

accompanying

e.g.,

but a restriction should conform as closely as necessity and proportionality allow to

art. 1(2),
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Convention,

Sea Convention,

other rules principles in,

IV.10-25 and accompanying

arts.

text.

27(4), 39(3)(a), 54, 56(2), 58(3), 60(3), 66(3)(a), 78(2) ("unjustifiable

interference"), 79(5), 80, 87(2), 142(1), 234; Continental Shelf Convention, art. 5(1) ("unjustifiable interference");

High Seas Convention, art.

2 ("reasonable regard"); Territorial Sea

to restrict neutral traffic, nn.
e.g.,

486-87 and accompanying text, the

Convention, art.

19(4).

As with belligerents' rights

LOAC applies through LOS other rules principles in,

LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 34(2), 58, 78, 87(1), 138; Continental Shelf Convention, art. 3; High Seas Convention,

art. 2;

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 1(2); see also nn. III. 952-67, IV.10-25

489.

LOS

Cf.

accompanying
490.

Cf,

Convention,

arts. 42(5),

95-96, 110(1), 236;

and accompanying

High Seas Convention,

arts. 8-9; see also

IV.794 and

text.

e.g.,

LOS

Convention,

arts. 27(4),

30 (request to leave

territorial sea), 39(3)(a), 54, 56(2), 58(3), 60(3),

66(3)(a), 78(2) ("unjustifiable interference"), 79(5), 80, 87(2), 142(1), 234; Continental Shelf

High Seas Convention,

("unjustifiable interference");

art.

486-87 and accompanying

Convention,

art. 5(1)

2 ("reasonable regard"); Territorial Sea Convention, arts.

and accompanying

19(4), 23 (request to leave the territorial sea); see also n. IV.75
restrict neutral traffic, nn.
e.g.,

text.

text, the

text.

As with

belligerents' right to

LOAC applies through LOS other rules principles in,

LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 34(2) 58, 78, 87(1), 138; Continental Shelf Convention, art. 3; High Seas Convention,

art. 2;

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 1(2); see also nn.

491.

Cf,

e.g.,

LOS

Convention,

III. 952-67,

IV.10-25, 75, V.58, 62 and accompanying text.

arts.27(4), 39(3)(a), 54, 56(2), 58(3), 60(3), 66(3)(a), 78(2) ("unjustifiable

interference"), 79(5), 80, 87(2), 142(1), 234; Continental Shelf Convention, art. 5(1) ("unjustifiable interference");

High Seas Convention, art. 2 ("reasonable regard"); Territorial Sea Convention, art. 19(4); see also n. IV.75 and
accompanying text. As with a belligerent's right to restrict neutral traffic, nn. 486-87 and accompanying text, the

LOAC

applies through

LOS

other rules principles in

111.952-67, IV.10-25, 75, V.58,

492.

e.g.,

LOS

High Seas Convention, art.
62 and accompanying text.

Continental Shelf Convention,

art. 3;

Convention,

2; Territorial

arts. 2(3), 34(2), 58, 78, 87(1), 138;

Sea Convention,

art. 1(2); see also

In exercising their right of discretion, these neutral platforms retain their right of self-defense; see

nn.

UN

Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
493.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

494.

There

is

11

7.8 n.144;

NWP 9A Annotated

11

7.8 n.141.

apparently no custom or other law on the situation of neutral warships and military aircraft,

etc.,

in

the vicinity of belligerent naval operations, but the foregoing statement of policies and principles appears to be a
correct, if hypothetical, analysis.
Cf. London Declaration, art. 9, as modified by general LOAC principles of necessity and proportionality. See
Hague IX, art. 6 (naval commander conducting shore bombardment must do his utmost to warn local authorities

495.
also
if

the military situation permits), an example of the general principle of necessity for the time the agreement was

negotiated, but supportive of the notice principle in this context; Robertson, Commentary, n. 13, 170 (same, referring
to Protocol

I, art.

49); but see

Stone 389 n.120 (clearly obsolescent principle); O'Connell, International Law, n. III. 252,
(art. 6 may serve no useful purpose today); nn. III.930, IV.28 and accompanying

19 (irrelevant today); Robertson 167
text (desuetude).

496.

See nn. 486-87 and accompanying

497.

Hague Radio

Tucker

Rules,

art. 6;

300; see also nn. 338-44

text.

NWIP 10-2 H 520a; NWP

and accompanying
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1-14M Annotated
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7.8.1;

NWP 9A Annotated
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7.8.1;

Law

489 and accompanying
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Armed

Conflict
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See

499.

See nn. IV.75, V.58, 62, 490-91 and accompanying

500.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
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LOS Convention, arts.
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492 and accompanying
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text.

text.

text.

2(2), 25(3), 38, 45; Territorial

Sea Convention,

arts. 2, 14-15, 16(3), 25; see also
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IV.D.3, IV.D.5.
503.

See nn. IV.309, 357-58 and accompanying

504.

See nn. IV. 16, 67 and accompanying

505.

E.g.,

text.

text.

LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also n. IV.75 and accompanying text. For

LOAC due regard analysis, see nn.

58,

62 and accompanying

506.

UN Charter, arts. 51,

507.

See Gilchrist, n. 11.225.

508.

See n. 502 and accompanying

text.

509.

See n. 426 and accompanying

text.

510.

SeePanF.2.

511.

5e« Part F.l.a.

512.

See nn. IV.309, 357-58 and accompanying

513.

See nn. IV.349, V.508 and accompanying

514.

See nn. 426, 428 and accompanying

515.

See Goldie, Maritime

516.

UN Charter, arts. 5 1,

517.

LOS Convention, art.

518.

An SDZ

text.

103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

War Zones,
1 03;

see also

87(1);

and accompanying

text.

text.

text.

text.

n. 11.519, 172; Ronzitti,

The

Crisis 39;

Walker, State Practice 153.

nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, 67, V.504 and accompanying text.

High Seas Convention,

art. 2; see also

nn. IV.67-79 and accompanying text.

or cordon sanitaire notice necessarily tells everyone where a naval force

is

or will be. See generally

Even if a notice just advises that forces are or will be operating in an area, that may trigger
Submarine patrols are almost never announced for security reasons. However, a submarine on

Gilchrist, nn. 11.225, 60.

unwanted

attention.

patrol retains a right of self-defense.
519.
art.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also LOS Convention, preamble, arts. 138, 279, 298, 301; High Seas Convention,
UN Charter is a treaty); Territorial Sea Convention, art. 25 (same); nn. III. 10,

30 (treaty subject to prior treaties;

47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

A warship in innocent passage in the territorial sea retains its right to self-defense under UN Charter, arts. 51,
LOS Convention, art. 301 Territorial Sea Convention, art. 23 (convention subject to prior treaties, UN Charter is
a treaty). However, the definitions of what is not innocent passage in LOS Convention, art. 19(2) and Territorial Sea
Convention, art. 14(4), seem to come close to barring publication of SDZ notices for neutral territorial sea innocent
520.

103;

;

An argument can be made that since a warship keeps its self-defense right wherever it steams, merely
SDZ for this purpose does not run afoul of LOS definitions on what is not innocent passage. SDZ

passage.

announcing an

publication might trigger

LOS

Convention,

19(2) or Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4)-based protests or

art.

LOS Convention, art. 25(3) and Territorial Sea
LOS Convention, art. 30; Territorial Sea
Convention, art. 23. See also nn. 111.10,47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part IV.B.4. The SDZ
bolster coastal State attempts to suspend innocent passage pursuant to

Convention,

art.

16(3) or to require the warship(s) to leave pursuant to

notices issue for neutral territorial sea innocent passage does not appear to have arisen.
521.
text.

E.g.,

For

LOS Convention, art.

522.

LOS Convention, arts.

523.

UN

Charter,

accompanying
524.

87(2);

High Seas Convention,

LOAC due regard analysis, see nn.

58, 62

art. 2; see also

and accompanying

nn. IV.75, V.505 and accompanying

text.

38, 45; see also Part IV.B.6.

arts. 51, 103; Ronzitti,

The

Crisis 39; see also

nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and

text.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
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525.

The Tanker War

See

Nyon Arrangement; Nyon Supplementary Agreement; O'Connell, The Influence 80,
in Law of Naval Warfare 489, 493-95; Goldie, Maritime War Zones, n. 11.519,

Commentary,
International

Law,

192; O'Connell,

n. 111.252, 54-56.

526.

UN Charter, arts.

527.

See Part F.l.b.

528.

See Second Convention,

59, 61; Protocol

168, 172; Goldie,

I, arts.

51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

art.

38;

Third Convention,

arts.

72-75 and

Annex

and accompanying

III;

text.

Fourth Convention,

arts. 23,

69-70; see also n. 439 and accompanying text.

529.

SeePartF.l.a.

530.

UN Charter, arts.

531.

See nn. 439, 528 and accompanying

532.

UN Charter, arts.

533.

SeePartF.l.a.

534.

See nn. 115 and accompanying

51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

and accompanying

text.

and accompanying

text.

text.

51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

text.

Even in total wars, e.g., World Wars I and II, there was no total symmetry among belligerents. For example,
during World War II the United States never was at war with Finland, whose conflict with the USSR was resolved
before US entry. The United States never declared war against Turkey in World War I. While the United Kingdom
and Argentina fought the Falklands/Malvinas War, Iran and Iraq were at war. Geography separated belligerents in
these conflicts, but given a potential for small wars in the next century, a possibility of two or more small conflicts is as
535.

real,

or perhaps

more

real, as

it

has been for

much

536.

UN

537.

See Part F.l.a.

538.

See,

539.

See nn. 515, 518 and accompanying

of the Twentieth Century.

Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text.

e.g.,

nn. 11.305, 311, 345, 347 and accompanying text.

overtones for the Falklands/Malvinas War;

it

text.

Announcing the defensive bubble may have had psychological
Britain meant business and that the time for the UK

may have signaled

was an opportunity for Argentina to leave the islands before being driven
Undoubtedly the UK announcement that the Ghurkas, well known for their professional fighting competence,
would be part of its armed forces, was another feature of that conflict's psychological warfare.
task force to get to the Falklands/Malvinas

out.

540. This analysis uses "war zone" to differentiate from other sea areas, e.g. security zones, which international law
condemns, nn. I V.309, 357-58 and accompanying text; blockaded sea areas, Part E.2; sea areas from which belligerents
may exclude neutral ships and aircraft, Part F.l.a; high seas defense zones (SDZs), Parts F.l.b-F.l.c; air defense
identification zones (ADIZs), Part F.3; and areas the LOS permits, e.g., exclusive economic zones (EEZs), offshore
fisheries areas and contiguous zones, nn. IV.83-157, 296-300, 324-27 and accompanying text, all of which are styled as

zones, and

all

of which have very different characteristics and uses.

War zones (a German term for World Wars I and II

areas) have been labeled as maritime exclusion zones (Falklands/Malvinas, Tanker Wars), total exclusion zones

(Falklands/Malvinas War), protection zones (Falklands/Malvinas War), defensive sea areas (Russo-Japanese War,

US

World Wars I, II), defense zones (Falklands/Malvinas War), military areas (a World War I UK term),
barred areas (a World War I German term), operational zones, maritime control areas (US practice, World Wars I, II),
restricted areas (a World War I UK term), areas dangerous to shipping, theater of war (a World War I German term),
and geographically (e.g., Argentina's South Atlantic War Zone, Falklands/Malvinas War). See NWP 1-14M
coastal zones in

Annotated 11

7.9;

San Remo Manual, Introduction, 181; Stone 572-73; Tucker 296-97, 300 n. 41 The "zone defense" to
States reverted was an SDZ, since the United States was not a Tanker War belligerent. See n. II.4 and
.

which the United

accompanying

text; Parts F.l.b-F.l.c.

541. Colombos § 558; 2 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 1109; O'Connell, the Influence 166; 2 Oppenheim § 319a;
Tucker 299-300; see also Stockholm Declaration, art. 2(1) (belligerent warships not allowed access to Nordic nation
ports, roadsteads proclaimed naval ports or part of protection zones of coast defense works;

Commentary,

wording

varies); Bring,

n. III. 848, 842.

William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law 642 (Pearce Higgins ed., 8th ed. 1924); 3 Hyde §
Tucker 299-300; Goldie, M antime WarZones,n. 11.519, 156, 158-60;c/ Oxford Naval Manual, art. 1 (theaterof
naval war includes high seas and belligerents' territorial waters); Nwogugu, n. III.439, 331. MacChesney 603-04
542.

720;
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Stone
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US
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Conflict
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Nyon Arrangement; Nyon Supplementary Agreement; O'Connell, the Influence 80, 168, 172;
War Zones, n. 11.519, 192; O'Connell, International Law, n.
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Goldie, Commentary; n. 525, 493-95; Goldie, Maritime
III.252, 54-56.
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Goldie, Maritime

546.
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War Zones,
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.Wilier, Belligerency

Parts F.l.b-F.l.c.

NWP 1-14M Annotated 7.9; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1109-10;
Oppenheim § 319a; Stone 572-74; Tucker 301, 305-16; Fujita, n. IV.624, 72-73;
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O'Connell, The Influence 166-67;
Goldie, Maritime

n. 11.519, 192; see also

2

n. 11.519,
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160-61, 168-70, 184-87; Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 115, 272, 274; William O.

NWCREV. 19(Jan.

and Limited War,

Nwogugu,n.

1969);

III.439, 341 n.6;seealso

HALPERN,n. 115,

49.

US Representative note to UN Secretary-General, Mar. 11, 1954, transmitting Seventy- sixth Report of
Command in Accordance with the Security Council Resolution of 7 July 1950 (S/1588), UN Doc. No. S/3185 (1954),
M 4 Whiteman 1186; O'Connell, The Influence 167; Walker, State Practice 127. The armistice ordered cessation of
Acting

547.

the

U.N.

all hostilities.

1953,

11

12,

4

Levie, 77* Nature,
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UN SCOR Supp. (June-Aug.

548.

Staff July

(1976);
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Agreement Concerning Military Armistice in Korea, July 27,

UST 234, 239.

1,

UN Doc. S/1580 (1950), in

1950) at 50,

Whiteman

10

866-67;

US Joint Chiefs of
FRUS 271

1950 message to Commander-in-Chief, Far East (General Douglas MacArthur), 1950(7)

Malcolm W. Cagle & Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea 281-83, 299-300, 304, 353-57, 370-73 (1957);

James A. Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea 42 (1962); Walker, State Practice 125-27.
549. US Ambassador to France Amory Houghton Jan. 26, 1958 telegram to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,
US Embassy, Paris Nov. 6, 1959 telegram to Dulles, m 4 Whiteman 513-14; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 805-06;
O'Connell, The Influence 123; 2 von Heinegg 100-01; O'Connell, International Law, n. III.252, 36, 38-39; Walker,
State Practice 141; Anna van Zwanenberg, Interference with Ships on the High Seas, 10 ICLQ 785, 791 (1961); Note,
Interference with

Non-National Ships on

Vand.

Jurisdiction, 22
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Transnatl

High Seas: Peacetime Exceptions
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protested Republican Spain's Spanish Civil
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von Heinegg 98; Walker,

2

551.

O'Connell, The Influence 126-27;

BYBIL

17,

27 (1937).

War Zones,

State Practice 144; see also Goldie, Maritime

2

Rule of Flag-State
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proclamations. O'Connell, The Influence 115-16; Stone 572 n.8;

H.A. Smith, Some Problems of the Spanish Civil War, 18
550.

to the Exclusivity

Monitor, Dec.

L. 1161, 1218 (1989); Christian Science

von Heinegg 93; Walker, State Practice

n. 11.519, 190.

137.

552. Republic of Vietnam, Decree on Sea Surveillance, Apr. 27, 1965, 4 ILM 461 (1965); 2 Edward J. Marolda &
Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict 518 (1986); Walker, State Practice 145.
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North Korea's security zone

554.

Gilchrist, n. 11.225,60.

555.
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556. The USSR protested the UK TEZ but not the Argentine DZ, although it observed the TEZ. See 3 Cordesman
& Wagner 242-44, 249; Hastings & Jenkins, n. 274, 105, 119, 124-25, 133, 143, 147, 157; Middlebrook, n. 274,97-98,

126; 2
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Law of the

Sea 1110-11; Craig,
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Gravelle, 77* Falklands(Malvinas) Islands:

An
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War
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Mastny, 77* Soviet Union and the Falklands War, 36

legal issues, see 3

International

Law Analysis

Cordesman
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(1982); Michael Socarras, 77* Argentine Invasion of the Falklands: International Means of Signaling, in W. Michael
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& Wagner 260;
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O'Connell,

Law of the Sea

1 1
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[A]n otherwise protected platform does not lose that protection by

crossing an imaginary line drawn in the ocean by a belligerent."); see also n. 556 and accompanying text.

570 and accompanying

574.

See

575.

Ronzitti, The Crisis 40,

rights. It

n.

was

a

who

warning and not

is

text.

not correct in saying that the

a limitation.

Enemy

TEZ

declaration limited Britain's belligerent

warships like Belgrano are legitimate targets wherever found,

except in neutral territory, and even there under certain circumstances. See nn. 57, 151 and accompanying
561 and accompanying

576.

See

577.

In 1982 probably only the

n.

on the basis of total

forces that

text.

US and USSR navies could have validly asserted such a broad claim, and then only

might have been brought

1982 war for the islands, either belligerent's claim for

have been excessive.
Atlantic, a

If,

text.

to bear in a conflict.

all

Because of the size and localization of the

of the South Atlantic in a local war over the islands would

on the other hand, there had been

a general conflict

between the two powers in the South

war zone of the entire ocean might have been lawful under these hypothetical circumstances. Similarly,

the United States and the Soviet

Union had been engaged generally worldwide, given

weapons and warships of the hypothetical protagonists,
declared war zones.

Even here

578.

Helsinki Principle

579.

See

580.

If visit

n.

it is

conceivable that

rules applicable to targeting, ere,

3.3;

all

would have

of the world's oceans could have been

applied. See Parts B-D.

NWP 1-14M Annotated U 7.9; San Remo Manual MI

562 and accompanying

if

the probable range of aircraft,

105-06.

text.

and search or blockade can continue

after

an armistice or ceasefire, absent belligerents' agreement

otherwise, war zone declarations can also continue. See nn. 109, 429 and accompanying

text.

See generally Levie, The

Nature, n. 109, 888-906.
581.

Whether announcing

a bubble,

requirement. See Parts F.l.b-F. I.e.

announcement is but an

analyzed herein as a high seas

SDZ,

is a

policy matter and not a legal

When there is no state of belligerency, or if a country is neutral, a defensive bubble

assertion of self-defense rights.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18,

968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
582.

See nn. 109, 429, 580 and accompanying

583.

See nn. IV.309, 357-58 and accompanying

584.

LOS

585.

The LOS is subject to other rules of international law, i.e.,

LOS

Convention,

Convention,

art. 57; see also

art. 87(1);

text.
text.

nn. IV. 147-57 and accompanying text.

High Seas Convention,

the

art. 2; see also

LOAC, through the other rules clauses of, e.g.,

nn. 111.952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying text.

Law

586.

LOS

Convention,

accompanying

See Part F. La.

588.

Helsinki Principle 2.3

589.

See

467

16(3); see also nn. IV.337,

439 and

text.

587.

Manual 1IH

25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, art.

art.

Armed

Conflict

of

&

cmt.;

NWP

1-14M Annotated H

7.3.5;

NWP

9A Annotated

11

7.3.5;

San Remo

27-30; Part IV.B.6.

For example, to exercise a right of anticipatory self-defense, there must be no other alternative to self-defense.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.22 and accompanying text.

590.

Accord, San Remo Manual H 106, cmt. 106.2; Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone, n. 11.109, 116, 125; Goldie, Maritime

War Zones,

n. 11.519, 174;

Leckow,

n. 11.147,

635-36 (only

UK zones considered); Walker, State Practice 154-55.

591.

Tucker 301.

592.

Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone, n. 11.109, 124-25; accord,

Warfare, 14 Syracuse J. Int*l L.

Vaughan Lowe, The Impact ofthe Law ofthe Sea on Naval

& Com. 657, 673 (1988); compare Colombos § 561; Tucker 298, 301. SanRemoManual

H 106(e) requires belligerents to publicly declare

and appropriately notify beginning, duration, location and extent of

the zone, as well as restrictions imposed. See also

id.,

cmts. 106.3, 106.6, the latter stating that notification should

ICAO and IMO.

include diplomatic channels and appropriate international organizations, in particular

Prudent

UN Permanent Representatives and notify the Security Council, since some
State will undoubtedly notify the Council and perhaps the General Assembly. See UN Charter, arts. 11-12, 14, 25,

belligerents should also instruct their

31-42, 48, 51, 103; Chapter III; nn. IV.6-25
593.

and accompanying

text.

& cmt.; San Remo Manual H 106(a) & cmt. 106.1

Helsinki Principle 3.3

;

see also

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see

and accompanying text. San Remo Manual 1 108 illustrates the point of
correct statement that a war zone declaration does not derogate from a

also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916- 1 8, 968-84, IV.6-25

LONW

continuing

belligerent's

this point, see also

594.

applicability in

Tucker

rightly

aircraft in

an immediate vicinity of naval operations.

On

300; Parts A-E.

Helsinki Principle 3.3

Tucker 301

its

customary right to control neutral vessels and

& cmt.;

San Remo Manual,

1 106(b)

& cmt.

106.2; Fleck, Comments, n. III.439, 82.

complained in 1955 of the problem of zones with no duration or statement of area covered.

Jacobson, n. 166, 234 suggests a treaty to establish negotiated rules balancing needs of protecting belligerent forces in

an age of long-distance targeting, neutral shipping interests and humanitarian principles.

It is a

worthy thought but

not practically attainable.
595.

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.9.

596.

See Part E.2.

597.

See nn. 555-56 and accompanying

598.

LOS

599.

Cf Helsinki

Convention,

art.

57; see also nn. IV. 147-57

Principle 3.3

&

belligerent's right to exclude neutrals

might be larger than

a

text.

and accompanying

cmt.; San Remo Manual H 108 & cmt. 108.1 (war zone rules do not affect
from immediate area of naval operations; in a particular case an immediate area

war zone, or the two might overlap in

part); see also

600.

See nn. IV.309, 357-58 and accompanying

601.

See n. IV.75 and accompanying text. For LOAC due regard analysis,

602.

Helsinki Principles

Annotated H
603.

604.

LOS

cmts.;

text.

nn. 58, 62 and accompanying text.

& cmts.; San Remo Manual H 106(c) & cmts.

106.2, 106.4; see also

NWP 1-14M

3.3, 5.2.9

& cmts.; San Remo Manual

106.3, 106.5; see also

NWP 1-14M

Convention,

&

arts. 25(3), 38,

cmts.;

NWP

11

106(d)

& cmts.

44-45; Territorial Sea Convention,

11

9.2.3;

this extent a

war zone

art. 16(3);

Colombos

§ 561;

H 7.9;

status of zones are for the high seas, "the right of a belligerent to establish

differs

from blockade.

may

Helsinki

San Remo Manual HH 23, 27-32, 106(d); cf. Helsinki
NWP 9A Annotated 1 9.2.3; San Remo Manual, UU 85, 87-89 &

1-14M Annotated

& cmt.; NWP 1-14M Annotated

Stone 574 (whatever

neutral warships or military aircraft
5.2.10

see

3.3, 5.2.9

neutral territorial waters cannot be seriously contended for");

To

300; Part E.2.

7.9.

Principles 3.3, 5.2.9

Principle 6.2

Tucker

7.9.

Helsinki Principles

Annotated H

text.

such zones in

Tucker 303-04; nn. 586, 588-89 and accompanying text.

A blockading force may bar

entry or exit of all ships and aircraft;

pass a blockade with blockading force discretion. See Helsinki Principle

& cmt.; NWP 1-14M Annotated IM 7.7.1, 7.7.3; NWP 9A Annotated 111 7.7.1, 7.7.3; San Remo Manual

cmt. 100.1;

Tucker 298;

n.

11

100

&

438 and accompanying text. Thus a war zone might be considered "effective," see Fenrick,

The Tanker War

468

The Exclusion Zone,

n. II. 109,

a

&

24-25, while a blockade of the

Colombos § 561; Helsinki Principles 3.3,
Tucker 298 n. 38, 299 n.39.

605.

105

1

same area might not be considered "effective" under law

Tucker 298.

of blockade standards.

5.2.9

&cmts.;

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.9; San Remo Manual

11

cmt. 105.1;

606.

NWP

607.

Rules of engagement

1-14M Annotated

11

7.9.

may give an enforcing belligerent's forces ranges of options and limitations on enforcing

war zone. Most States do not publish ROE. San Remo Manual 11 106, cmt.

and accompanying text.

106. 1 ; n. III.258

H 107 & cmts. 107.1-107.2; this is the same rule applied to navicerts and aircerts. Helsinki
& cmt.; NWP 1-14M Annotated 7.4.2; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.4.2; San Remo Manual H 123 & CMT.

San Remo Manual

608.

Principle 5.2.6
123.1; n. 386

609.

E.g.

11

and accompanying

text.

San Remo Manual

H 107, cmt. 107.2 says a belligerent

convoy escorted by that belligerent's warships;

accompanying

On

text.

UN Charter, arts.

611.

Rainier Lagoni, Remarks,

(USSR

to attack

on

sight. See n.

a

337 and

Remo Manual

1111

107, cmt. 107.1; 123

& cmt.

123.1; see also n. 386

and

text.

610.

(Part I), 1988

not force neutral merchantmen to join

the other hand, forcing transiting neutrals to use navicert procedures should not be

considered an act harmful to the enemy. San

accompanying

may

would subject the merchantmen

this

ASIL PROC.

UK

protest of

States' protests;

and accompanying

25, 48, 103; see also n. IV. 57
in

text.

Panel, Neutrality, The Rights ofShipping and the Use of Force in the Persian Gulf War

161, 163 (war zones lawful only

if tied to

coast of a State establishing

zones during Falklands/Malvinas War); Ronzitti, The

Crisis 10,

war zones enforced against neutrals unlawful even under pre-Charter

War I context but publishing in

writing in the World

they can only be imposed as reprisal;

Mastny,

n. 555,

49

law). 2

Oppenheim

§

319a,

condemn them, saying
Levie, Mine Warfare and International Law, NWC REV. 27, 31

1952, seems to be the last major treatise to

Howard S.

see also

it);

40 (USSR, Latin American

(Apr. 1972).

& cmt.; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.9; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1111-12; San
& cmts.; Fenrick,n. 11.109,94, 113, 121; Goldie, M antime War Zones, n. 11.519, 194; Walker,

Helsinki Principle 3.3

612.

Remo Manual HH

105-08

may have changed

State Practice 155. O'Connell

Falklands/Malvinas War. Ronzitti, The

war zones during limited war,

if

permitted

not to molest neutrals, inferring the
rights

Crisis

view that O'Connell saw
excessive

World War

LOS

Compare

613.

Convention,

II

e.g.,

4.4;

among belligerents and

nn. 555-83 and accompanying

him

text.

O'Connell,

in the Falklands/Malvinas context to

zones are unlawful. 2 O'Connell,

postwar zones, properly limited, as lawful;

Convention,

n. III. 252, 54-56,

The Influence

Law of the

Sea 1111-12 was

published in 1970, supports

a

167 undoubtedly refers to the

arts. 2(2), 25(3),

44-45; Territorial Sea Convention,

with ICAO
Law 119 (who errs in

arts. 2, 16(3)

not applicable to military aircraft; see also Brownlie, International

2-5a, 2-6a; NWP 1- 14M Annotated
Oppenheim § 220; AFP 10-31
NWP 9A Annotated HU 2.5.1. 4.4; Parts IV.B.3, V.B.5. Treaties regulate admitting military aircraft. See,

Armed

1

1

Article VI of the Treaty of

may enter another

NWP 9A Annotated

111

See First Convention,

rules.

I, arts. 8(j),

2.5.1, 4.4. Special

26-27, 29, 31;

art. 5,

1 1

& Security Regarding Facilities & Areas &
UST 1652, 1654, 373 UNTS 248, 252. During

State's territorial airspace

under a treaty; the same rules apply to neutral airspace.

and agreement

1111

Mutual Cooperation

Forces in Japan, June 23, 1960, Japan-US,

peacetime no military aircraft

Protocol

167 (1975) and the

claims.

arts. 1-3, 8-9,

Agreement Under

Status of US

TEZ. See generally

context; Ronzitti quotes

O'Connell, International Law,

saying aircraft straits passage requires a treaty);
111 2.5.1,

a

Crisis 10, that these

Crisis in 1988.

all

allowed only for belligerent operations

at all, are

more than they would have been without
167 wrote in the World War II

published in 1984, and The

The Influence

UK TEZ was inadmissible for that purpose. The UK TEZ did not affect neutral

The Influence

support his view, Ronzitti, The

his view after publishing

40-41 cites O'Connell, The Influence for Ronzitti's view that high seas

without specific permission or authority

AFP 110-31 HU 2-5a, 2-6c; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 2.5.1,4.4;

LOAC principles apply to medical aircraft;
arts.

Bother al.

these also include notification

36-37; Second Convention, arts. 39-40; Fourth Convention,

95-96, 101, 153-56, 159-61, 165-67;

1

art.

22;

Pictet 285-96; 2 Pictet 215-25; 4

LOS
LOS other rules clauses. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see

Pictet 173-77; Pilloud, Commentary 115-16, 131-32, 288-92, 294-98, 308-13, 326-37. These principles apply to
situations through the

also nn. III. 952-67, IV. 10-25

614.

E.g.,

LOS

accompanying

Convention,

art. 2(3);

text.

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 1(2); see also nn.

III. 952-67,

IV. 10-25

and

text.

615.

UN Charter, arts.

616.

Whether

not settled.

and accompanying

AFP

1

51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

and accompanying

coastal States can apply these regulations to aircraft passing through an

10-31 HH 2-lg;

NWIP 10-2

11

422b;

ADIZ and

text.

not inbound

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.5.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated

11

is

2.5.2.3;

Law

Restatement (Third)

§

3, 8, 11,

Whiteman, Digest 496-97; Note, Air Defense

521, r.n. 2; 4

VJIL 485

Jurisdiction in the Airspace, 18

Armed

of

US ADIZ are published in

(1978).

14

469

Conflict

Identification Zones: Creeping

CFR part 99. Cf. ICAO Convention, arts.

not applicable to State and military aircraft, requiring piloted and unpiloted aircraft to submit to rules for

entering another State's territory.

AFP

617.

110-31

NWIP 10-2 H 422b; compare LOS Convention, art. 33; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24,

2-lf;

11

declaring contiguous zones are high seas areas subject to certain coastal State rights to use them for police purposes; see
also 2

Nordquist

accompanying

LOS

618.

Convention,

accompanying

O'Connell,

2

620.

AFP

621.

NOTAMs

10-31

accompanying

511, cmt. k; 521, r.n. 2; nn. IV.296-300, 324-27

and

art. 87(1);

High Seas Convention,

art. 2;

AFP

110-31, H 2-lg; see also nn. IV.68-79 and

text.

619.

1

Restatement (Third) §§

II.8, 33.1;

1111

text.

11

or

Law of the Sea 797.
2-lg;

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.5.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated

NOTMARs may

announce

AFP

these.

110-31

&

2-lg

11

11

2.5.2.3.

n.

13; see also n. IV.67

and

text.

622.

NOTAMs or NOTMARs may announce these. See Part F.l.a.

623.

NOTAMs or NOTMARs may announce these. See Part E.2.

624.

NOTAMs or NOTMARs may announce these. See NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.5.2.3, 2-32, referring to id.

2.4.4 n.68;

NWP 9A Annotated

2.5.2.3, 2-41, referring to

11

id.

11

11

2.4.4 n.56; Parts F.l.b-F.l.c.

625.

NOTAMs or NOTMARs may announce these. See Part F.2.

626.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also ICAO Convention, art. 3(d), requiring States to have due regard for safety of

civil aircraft navigation;

3 bis, requiring States to refrain

id. art.

from using weapons against civil aircraft, and

in cases

of intercepting intruding aircraft, acting so that lives of those on board and safety of the aircraft are not endangered;
First Convention, arts. 36-37 (medical aircraft);

(same); Protocol
578-90;

I, arts. 8(j),

24-31,

NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 4.4;

8.2.3; 8.2.3, 8-13, 8-20; 8.4.1; 1

1137-51, 1159, 1174-1263; San

Second Convention,
1(2), 3-9

(same);

arts.

39-40 (same); Fourth Convention,

AFP 110-31

Remo Manual HH

id.

215-25; 4

Bother al. 95-96,
NWP 9A Annotated

H 2-lg;

8.2.1; 8.2.3, 8-13, 8-15, 8-16, 8-18; 8.4.1;

Pictet 285-96; 2

1111

173-77; Pilloud,

id.

Commentary

art.

22

101, 150-67,
4.4; 8.2.1;

115-16, 279-342,

62-66,70-71, 174-83; Gerald F. FitzGerald, The Use ofForce Against

1984 CYBIL 291; UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn.
(LOAC due regard analysis) and accompanying text; Parts A.l A.2. As

KAL Flight 007 Incident,

The Aftermath of the

Civil Aircraft:
III. 1 0,

Annex I, arts.

47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.58, 62

-

and proportionality principles in self-defense situations are different from these
See n. 22 and accompanying text.

in other circumstances necessity

principles in

LOAC situations.

ICAO

Convention,

627.

See

628.

&*PartF.2.

629.

ICAO Convention, art.

630.

UN Charter, arts. 51,

art. 3(d), 3 bis;

nn. 613, 626 and accompanying

3 bis; see also nn. 613,

626 and accompanying

text.

text.

103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.613, 626

and accompanying

text.

631.

See Parts A.1-A.2; nn. 613, 626 and accompanying

632.

See generally n. IV.68 (high seas military operations), Part E.2 (blockade areas), Part F.l .a (vacating immediate

text.

area of naval operations), Part F.l.b (SDZs), Part F.2 (war zones).
633.
634.

ICAO

Convention,

Hague V,

AFP

arts.

art.

11-15;

25; see also nn. IV.494-506

Second Convention,

and accompanying

arts. 5, 15;

Protocol

I, art.

text.

31;

NWP 1-14M Annotated U 7.11; NWP 9A Annotated

Hague Air

Rules, arts. 40, 42-43, 46;

Oppenheim §§ 337-38, 341a,
348a; 2 Pictet 41-45, 107-12; San Remo Manual H 168; Stone 386, 614; Tucker 251-52; nn. 613, 626 and
accompanying text.

see also

635.

10-31 H 2-6c;

Third Convention, art.

Bother al.
id.

1

456-66;

art.

Fourth Convention, art. 42; Protocol I, art. 75; Hague Air Rules, arts. 32-38; see also

4;

Commentary

First Convention, art. 23;

2675 U 6 (1970), in Schindler

9A Annotated

7.10; 2

NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 7.10.2, 8.2.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated

257-59; Pilloud,
636.

11

U 8.5.1.5; 2

23 an innovation

863-90; San

Remo Manual

Fourth Convention, arts.

14- 1 5

& Toman 267, 268; AFP 110-31

Oppenheim

§

124b;

at the time), 689-90.

1

1111

111

Pictet 206-16; 4

Howard S.

165-67;

111

Stone 614,

7.9.2, 8.2.2.1; 3

Pictet 45-73; 4

619.

& Annex I (form draft agreement); see also G. A. Res.

12-2B, 14-3;
id.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

120-33, 627-39;

Levie, Civilian Sanctuaries:

11

8.5.1.5;

NWP

Stone 669-70 (First Convention,

An Impractical Proposal,

1

Israel Y.B.

The Tanker War

470

Hum. Rights 335

(1

97 1 ) criticized civilian sanctuaries or refuges as G. A. Res. 2444 (1968), in Schindler &

Toman 263,
may recite

proposed, saying existing humanitarian law supplied enough protection. These resolutions are not law but

law or evidence trends in the law. Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03;

see also n. III. 10

and accompanying

text.

637.

See

Pan AA.

638.

See

n.

639.

Sylvie-Stoyanka Junod, Protection of the Victims of Armed Conflict Falkland-Malvinas Islands (1982)

1 1 1

and accompanying

Comm. Red
Remo Manual

26, 33-34 (Int'l

n.101; San
640.

11

San Remo Manual

Annotated H
641.

text.

NWP

Cross ed. 1984);

&

H 160

cmts. 160.3-160.4; see also

Compare First Convention, art.

23;

Insofar as possible a high seas

created under First Convention,
create a

11

NWP 9A Annotated H

8.5.1.5 n.121;

8.5.1.5

NWP

1-14M Annotated

H 8.5.1.5 n.121;

NWP 9A

8.5.1.5 n. 101.

Fourth Convention, arts. 14-15

cmts; see also nn. 636, 640 and accompanying
642.

1-14M Annotated

160, cmts. 160.1-160.3.

23;

art.

Box whose area overlaps a

& Annex I with San Remo Manual 160&
11

text.

Box should have the same terms, and be developed the same way, as those
Fourth Convention, arts. 14- 1 5 & Annex I. Suppose, e.g., belligerents wish to

belligerent's territorial sea or an area of territorial sea seaward of an occupied area.

See nn. 636-37 and accompanying text. There should not be one standard for the territorial sea part and another for the

high seas

part.

Given pervasive claims

for a 12-mile territorial sea

and the nature of vessels available for hospital ships {e.g.,
there

is

more likelihood today than

in earlier times

{e.g.,

and

its

recognition for

LOAC purposes {see Part A.4)

US hospital ships are converted oilers) or seaborne transport,
1949,

that belligerents or perhaps neutrals as suggested above

when

the First and Fourth Conventions were signed)

might wish

to establish a

zone including high seas and

Hospital ships on the high seas, and limited to operating there because of their draft, might

territorial sea areas.

conduct triage and send patients

to shore for further treatment, for

example, in a zone that extends from the high seas

to shore.

and accompanying

643.

See

644.

See nn. 11.224, 305, 345, 347 and accompanying

645.

UN Charter, arts.

646.

LOS Convention, arts.

Gulf high

n. II.4

seas),

text.
text.

51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

19,38, 45; Territorial Sea Convention,

365 (Saudi territorial sea), 379-81 (Gulf of

Hormuz), 411 (Iran

territorial sea,

Gulf high

seas),

Oman,

art.

and accompanying

text.

16(4);seenn. 11.364 (Iran naval maneuvers,

Iran territorial sea,

may have

included Strait of

457 (Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman), IV. 17, 68 and accompanying

text; Parts IV.B.4, IV.B.6.

647.

The United

States paid for the Airbus claims, and

fishing vessels and dhows,

also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

648.

See nn. 114-16 and accompanying

649.

See Parts F.l.b-F.Lc.

650.

Whether it would have been wise for

and accompanying

651.

See Parts C.3,D.l.

652.

UN

653.

Charter,
art.

for other

art. 2(4);

LOS

mistaken attacks,

UN Charter, arts. 5

1

,

e.g.,
1

on

03; see

text.

text.

Iran to do so, and thereby

11.103, 280, 306, 364-65, 379-81, 411, 458, V.515, 518,

Convention,

presumably did so

where there was loss of life, injury or property damage. See also

Convention,

announce presence,

539 and accompanying

arts. 19, 87(1), 88;

16(4); see also nn. IV.68, 75, 301-13, 337-50

is

another matter. See nn.

text.

High Seas Convention,

and accompanying

art. 2;

Territorial Sea

text.

LOS Convention, arts. 2, 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, art.

I; see also

Parts

IV.B.l, IV.B.4.
654. See nn. 11.89-90, 101 (US NOT AM warning), 102, 109, 176 (US NOTMAR warning), 199-202, 208, 232, 288
(US NOTAM, NOTMAR warning on zones), 301, 420 (US NOTAM, NOTMAR warning of zones) and
accompanying text. This satisfied one requirement. See nn. 592-96 and accompanying text. San Remo Manual 106,
11

cmt. 106.6 says notification should notify international organizations, but this does not appear to be a customary

requirement. There
certainly
655.

is

no record that the belligerents did not notify these organizations. The

UN Security Council

knew about them.

Walker, State Practice 169; see also nn. 592-96, 61 2 and accompanying text. Yoram Dinsiein, Remorks,

n. 11.144, 608, said

in

Panel,

the zones were disproportionate in terms of naval assets and therefore disproportionate. However,

he did not take into account belligerent

air assets,

which can be used

to enforce a

zone without use of surface or other

Law

forces.

of

Armed

The zones were therefore proportionate in area. Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone,

also nn. 592-96,

612 and accompanying

See nn. 592-96, 604, 612, 657 and accompanying

657.

See

658.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

600 and accompanying
11

7.9;

n. 11.354, 636;

Practice 168-69; nn. 605-09, 612

Walker 169; see

text.

text.

Almond, n.

426, 313-14; Boczek,Lazu of Warfare, n. 11.154, 258; Fenrick, The

Exclusion Zone, n. 11.109, 121-22; Goldie, Maritime

McNeill, Neutral Rights,

n. 11.109, 124-25;

text.

656.

n.

471

Conflict

War

Zones, n. 11.519, 176; Goldie, Targeting, n. 11.262, 16-17;

Robertson, U.S. Policy, n. III.439, 344-45; Ronzitti, The

and accompanying text. Leckow, n.

11.147, 639, says Iran's

Crisis 41;

Walker, Stare

zone was lawful because it

was more "defensive" in nature.
659.

NWP 1-14M Annotated U 9.7; NWP 9A Annotated

11

9.7;

San Remo Manual ITU

80, 87-89; Clingan, Submarine

Mines, n. III.840, 359-60; Dinstein, Remarks, n. 648, 608; see also Part G.2 and nn. VI.222-30 and accompanying text.
660.

S.C. Res. 552, 582, 598,

UN Docs.

S/RES/552 (1984), S/RES/582 (1986), S/RES/598 (1987),

in

Wellens 452,

473, 454; see also Ronzitti, The Crisis 41.
661.

See nn. 11.261, 292, V.476 and accompanying

662.

See Part F.3.

663.

See nn. 11.261, V.476 and accompanying

664.

UN Charter, arts. 5 1,

665.

See nn. 11.116, V.476 and accompanying

666.

See nn. 633-35 and accompanying

667.

See

668.

See Part III.C.

669.

See nn.

670.

See nn. Ill and accompanying

671.

See nn. 645-50 and accompanying

672.

Iraq also used gas against

n.

1

486 and accompanying

text.

03; see also nn. III. 1 0, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, 1 V.6-25

613 and accompanying

its

and accompanying text; Part F.3.

text.

text.

text.

and accompanying

II. 81-85

text.

text.

text.
text.

own citizens. See generally Geneva Gas Protocol; see also nn.

11.14-15, 84, 300, 375,

text.

673. The record is not clear on methods or means of some attacks, e.g., Iranian attacks on Iraqi shore
which probably included aircraft-launched weapons after flights over the Gulf. See generally Chapter II.

674.

See nn.

II. 1 79,

233, 250, 334, 354, 357, 359, 368-72, 420, 436, 442, 454-56, 493

mine countermeasures operations from a US Navy
Korean-manufactured influence mines were laid; none were discovered.

II. 6,

116-27, describes

and accompanying text. Melia, n.
rumor that North

perspective, reporting

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

675.

Cf.

676.

See generally Parts A.1-A.2 and accompanying

677.

Hague IX,

authorities

facilities,

art. 2.

and prohibit

text.

Other provisions regulate bombarding unfortified towns and notice

pillage.

Hague IX,

arts. 1-7.

to

community

See also Cultural Property Convention, establishing cultural

property protections during war, to which the United States is not a party; Roerich Pact, a Western Hemisphere treaty
to

which the United

and accompanying

States

is

party, also protectioning cultural property;

Toman; nn. V.I 10,

262, VI. 272-77, 300-52

text.

678.

Compare Hague Air Rules,

679.

Colombos

arts.

22-26 with Hague IX,

arts. 1-7.

§§ 580-87 (inferring customary acceptance despite breaches of

Hague IX

rules);

621b, 623 (recitation of treaty law as custom, statement of military objective principle, warning

if

NWIP

10-2

111

military situation

NWP 1-14M Annotated UU 8.5.1-8.5.1.3, 8.5.2 (recitation of treaty law as custom, citing Protocol I, art. 52(2)
by reference, warning if military situation permits, terror bombing forbidden); NWP 9A Annotated UU 8.5.1-8.5.1.3,
permits);

8.5.2 (same); 2

O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 1 103, 1 139 (same conclusion

military objective principle); 2
arts.

Oppenheim

§

213 (Hague IX

as

Colombos, Hague IX obsolete but restates

states military objective test);

Oxford Naval Manual,

25-29 (repeating Hague IX rules); San Remo Manual U 40 & cmts. (Hague IX not cited; citing inter alia Protocol I,

art. 52);

Stone 588 (Hague IX's

O'Connell, International Law,

art. 2

military objective principle);

n. III. 252, 19;

military objective principle in

Hague IX,

Robertson, Commentary,

art. 2;

Hague Air Rules,

Tucker 143-45
n. III. 930,

art.

(military objective principle);

166 (Hague IX in desuetude, citing

23; Protocol

I, art.

52); Russo, Targeting, n.
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III. 624,

20 (rejecting Hague IX as custom); Verri, Commentary,

in forbidding

Convention,
discussion,

bombardment of

art.

Fourth Convention,

51;

Hague Air

art.

333 (Oxford Naval Manual broke

n. IV. 71,

unfortified undefended ports,
147; Protocol

etc.); see also

51(2), 57(2)(c), 85(2);

I, arts.

Bothe

Rules, arts. 22, 24-26 do not represent custom as total code);

360-61, 367-68, 511-14;

Hague Air

custom); 2 Oppenheim §§ 214a-214e;
630-37, 678-79, 686-87, 991-93; San

NWP

Rules, arts. 22-26;
1

Pictet 370-72; 2

id.

Remo Manual 11H 83, 90,

1-14M Annotated
267-70; 4

id.

new ground

First Convention, art. 50;

7.3.7 n.82

11

597-602; Pilloud,

AFP
el al.

Second

110-31 (general

299-301, 320-26,

(Hague Air Rules

Commentary

state

610, 612,

106(e) (notice required for minefields, exclusion zones);

text. Neither Iran nor Iraq are parties to Hague
The Ottoman Empire, predecessor sovereign to what is now Iraq,
and Persia, now Iran, signed but did not ratify Hague IX. Signatures, Ratifications and Accessions, Schindler & Toman
815, 816; TIF 442. To the extent Hague IX states customary law, all participants were bound by its terms.

Maiheson, Remarks 426-27; Parts V.1-A.2;

112 and accompanying

n.

IX, although most other Gulf War participants were.

680.

Hague V, Regulations,

Fourth Convention,

art.

27;

Hague IX,

18-19; Protocol

arts.

I, arts.

art. 5; First

12(4), 13;

NWP 9A Annotated H 8.5.1.4; 2 Oppenheim §§ 120, 158;
Commentary 166-69, 174-80; Stone 657-77, 669, 687.
681.

Pictet 194-99, 200-02; 2

legitimate target,

is hit.

e.g.,

an

oil

Bothe et

300-01;

al.

pumping

facility

is
1

189-93; 4

id.

art.

34;

H 8.5.1.4;

141-56; Pilloud,

n.

673 and

not prohibited; civilians will
Levie,

with resulting fright to civilian population, that attack was lawful.

Hague VIII has been described as one of the least successful

508, 563-67; Levie 52-53; 2

results of the 1907 peace conference.

O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 1 138 (Hague VIII obsolete, but

584 ("modest" provisions); Tucker 303 ("worthless"); Levie, Commentary,

24 forbids laying nuclear-armed mines beyond the

in the

id.

1-14M Annotated

feel some fear and terror when a
Code 217-18; NWP 1-14M Annotated U 8.5.1.2 n.l 12;
679 and accompanying text. Thus if Iran or Iraq bombed an otherwise

See nn. 675-79. Incidental terror to civilians

NWP 9A Annotated H 8.5.1.2 n.92; see also n.

art.

NWP

text.

nearby military objective

683.

Second Convention,

arts. 19, 21;

118, 121;

This analysis does not consider the land campaigns and air attacks incident to them. See Chapter II;

accompanying
682.

1

Convention,

Bother al.

Tanker War, the Treaty

n. 435, 140.

territorial sea limit; since

will not enter into the analysis, except in

its

Colombos §§
Stone

principles are not);

Seabed Arms Control Treaty,

none of these weapons were involved

terms of environmental concerns.

The

treaty

does not affect the law affecting conventional mines. Nor does the treaty prohibit placing nuclear weapons in the water

column above these waters, e.g., nuclear-armed depth charges or torpedoes. Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 426, 135-37;
NWP 1-14M Annotated H 10.2.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated 10.2.2.1. See also Part IV.B.3; nn. VI. 222-30 and
accompanying text. The Tanker War did not involve Seabed Treaty principles; no nuclear mines were laid. Mine
Protocol, art. 1 says it applies to mines laid on the land, including those laid to interdict beaches or waterway or river
crossings but does not apply to anti-ship mines at sea. See also Levie 137-38; NWP 1-14M Annotated 9.3. There is no
evidence Tanker War belligerents mined beach approaches as Iraq did in the 1990-91 Gulf War. See Melia, n. II. 6,
127-31. Whether belligerents mined river or water crossings, e.g., in the Shatt al-Arab, is an issue beyond this book's
II

11

scope.
684. Hague VIII generally remains valid as a restatement of custom applied to all kinds of sea mines. Some States
might dispute applying it to other than automatic contact mines. 2 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 1 138; O'Connell, The

Influence 93

(UK

magnetic mines

admiralty questioned in 1939 whether

literally

Hague VIII must be

not within

Whether Hague VIII

applied to magnetic mines); Stone 584 (acoustic,

NWIP 10-2 U 61

1

n.3 says

new devices to achieve a goal of protecting
no World War I or II belligerent raised this point.

Mine

Warfare, n. 611, 29 reports that

applies as treaty law to other types of mines,

with other general principles of the

685.

it

coverage); Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 146. However,

extrapolated to include acoustic, magnetic and other

peaceful shipping. Levie,

38(1);

its

Restatement (Third)
See generally Melia,

its

terms can be used as a general principle along

LOAC, necessity and proportionality, to achieve the same result. ICJ Statute, art.

§§ 102-03; n. 111.10
n. II. 6 for a history

and accompanying
of

US Navy mine

text; cf

NWIP

10-2 H 611 n.3.

countermeasures operations from the American

Revolution through 1991 and the 1990-91 war in the Gulf. Mines have been proposed for naval warfare since 1585;
belligerents' uncontrolled use of

Warfare,
686.
noise;

n. 424, 9-23;

mines during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) led

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2; NWP 9A Annotated

11

to

Hague

Other modern mines include acoustic influence mines, which detonate upon "hearing"

mines that can count, i.e., can be preset

target; pressure influence

VIII. Levie,

Mine

9.2.

to detonate after screening ships

a ship's

underwater

have passed in order to attack

a

major

mines, which detonate with change in water pressure a passing ship causes; magnetic

influence mines, actuated by a ship's magnetic signature; devices that choose between false and real targets;

remote-control mines, a throwback to shore-based mines employed for centuries; and stealth mines, designed to

blend into the underwater environment. Mines can be moored to the bottom; can
attack like a torpedo; or be free-floating.
free-floating.

Mines can

Moored mines sometimes come

either be self-actuating,

i.e.,

once

laid,

rise

on

a cable or, like

CAPTOR,

loose from their tether and

become

they detonate in accordance with their sensors and

1

Law

of

Armed

Conflict

473

a shore station or ship, must send the actuation signal
Mines can have several characteristics, e.g., an acoustic mine can be programmed to count ships and
detonate below a more desirable target. See generally Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 424, 97-133; MELiA,n. II.6, 5,41-66, 1 14,
136; NWP 1-14M Annotated 1111 9.2-9.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated UH 9.2-9.2.1; Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 142. The 1907
conference that produced Hague VIII gave little thought to the possibility of improved technology and development
of new types of mines. Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 611, 29. As in other weapons development areas, it was a case of
technology outrunning treaty law. See n. 173 and accompanying text. 2 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 1101 wrote in 1984

programming, or controlled, i.e., an outside agency, e.g.,

internal

to the mine.

that there

had been and would be little future use of mine warfare; he was not correct. Mines are an inexpensive, easily

developed substitute for other forces

(e.g.,

surface or air assets) that can be laid covertly with a possibility for great

psychological effect. Levie, Mine Warfare,^ 426, 173

NWC Rev. 3, 8-9 (Autumn

in the Arctic Theater,

687.

1987).

&n.

146, quoting Charles C. Petersen, Soviet Military Objectives

Mines can be very indiscriminate

See nn. 11.179, 233, 250, 334, 354, 357, 359, 368-72, 420 and accompanying

in their effect, however.

O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea

text. 2

1138 says contact mines are obsolete; this has not proven to be true.
688.

Hague VIII, art. 3; Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 22; Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 46-48, 1 12, 147-48; NWIP 10-2 H 61
id. n. 3); Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 426, 44-47; NWP 1-14M

(limited to automatic submarine contact mines, but see

Annotated H 9.2.3 (Hague VIII, art. 3 military exigencies latitude remains the law, criticizing, at n. 25, San Remo
Manual approach); NWP 9A Annotated H 9.2.3 (same); 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 1 1 38; 2 Oppenheim § 1 82a; San
Remo Manual 83 & cmt. 83.3 (omitting military exigencies latitude in Hague VIII, art. 3, felt "not justified in the
11

light of the general requirement

Manual provides

imposed upon belligerents

to limit as far as possible the effect of hostilities"; the

San Remo Manual

for this separately); Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 144.

H 83 adds that there is

no

need to notify if deployed mines can only detonate against military objectives. This is consonant with the Hague VIII,
art. 3

exigencies requirement, and would cover a circumstance,

opposing belligerent forces and deploys mines instead
however, the notification requirement would arise

and not detonated. San Remo Manual H

e.g.,

when

of, e.g., firing

after the

a belligerent

missiles or guns.

warship

Under

is

being chased by

these circumstances,

engagement, when exigencies permit, for mines deployed

83, cmt. 83.2 says notification can be

accomplished by

NOT AM publication

and communication with international organizations, naming IMO. Although Hague VIII deals only with automatic
submarine contact mines, see Levie, Commentary 141-42, Hague VIII's principles have been applied through custom to
other kinds of mines and are thus employed here for

LOAC sea mine principles generally. They have been applied by

analogy for defensive mining. See nn. 705-06 and accompanying
689.

Mine Warfare, n. 426, 27-42; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2.3; NWP 9A
Oppenheim § 182a; San Remo Manual 11 86; Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 142-43. Oxford Naval
20, would generally forbid laying automatic contact mines, anchored or not, in the "open sea." Post- 1913

Hague

Annotated

11

Manual, art.

text.

VIII, arts. 1-2; Levie,

9.2.3; 2

State practice exploded any authority art. 20

may have

Although Hague VIII does not speak

had.

conceivably a mine can lose

its mooring and still be under
Warfare, n. 424, 101-02 (control by acoustic,
electrical signal); NWIP 10-2 H 611 (limited to automatic contact mines, but see id. n. 3); NWP 1-14M Annotated U
9.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated 11 9.2.3; 2 Oppenheim § 182a; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 21(2); San Remo Manual 11 81;
Stone 584; Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 142-43.

690.

belligerent control.

Hague VIII, art.

1(2);

to

it,

Colombos

§

563; Levie, Mine

Hague VIII, art. 1(1), declaring they must become harmless after an hour, the hour rule being superseded by
Colombos § 563; Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 424, 27-31 ;NWIP 10-2 U 611 (limited to automatic submarine
contact mines, but see id. n. 3); NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2.3, 9-8 (US mines have self-neutralizing devices); NWP 9A
Annotated 9.2.3, 9-7 (same); 2 Oppenheim § 182a; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 21(1); San Remo Manual
82
691.

practice;

11

11

(adding that mines must be directed toward a military objective, a truism for any weapons deployment); Stone 584;
Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 142-43; see also Parts A.1-A.2.
692.

Stone 585 ("Nor can any restriction on aerial as distinct from naval mine sowing be spelled out of
Many commentators would disagree; e.g., Helsinki Principles; Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 424;
1 - 14M Annotated; NWP 9A Annotated; San Remo Manual make no distinction among minelaying platforms.
Contra,

treaties or practice.")

NWP
693.

172-75; Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 426, 49-51; NWP 1-14M Annotated H
$; see also Bother
NWP 9A Annotated H 9.2.3, 9-23; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 24; 3 Pictet 541-53; Pilloud, Commentary

Hague VIII, art.

9.2.3, 9-8;

al.

350-63; San Remo Manual HIT 84,90-91

& cm ts. (citing inter alia Third Convention, art. 118; Protocol I, art. 33); Stone

584; Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 144-45; see also n. 715 and accompanying text.
694.

NWP

-14M Annotated H 9.2.3 n.29 (citing the right of self-defense);

1

San Remo Manual

11

92 (declaratory of customary law);

also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

695.

E.g., a

permission. Cf.

naval force

may not

see also

NWP 9A Annotated H 9.2.3 n.23 (same);

Helsinki Principle 6.2;

and accompanying

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see

text.

enter a neutral coastal State's territorial sea to clear mines without that State's

LOS Convention, art. 19; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4); see generally Part IV.B.3. An exception
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to this in the

mines context might be

CAPTOR-like mine

a

laid in a coastal State's territorial sea, n. 686, that could

actuate and attack the force, thereby triggering a right of self-defense for a neutral force or a right of necessity under the

LOAC

for a belligerent's force, if a coastal State is powerless to

CAPTOR or

remove the

like device.

Under

these

circumstances the force could enter a coastal State's territorial sea specifically and solely to deactivate or remove the

CAPTOR as a self-defense measure. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Helsinki Principle 2.1 & cmt.; NWP 1-14M Annotated
11

7.3.4.1;

NWP 9A Annotated

11

San Remo Manual

7.3.4.2;

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10,47-630,

22;

11

916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.694 and accompanying text.

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2.3, 9-9; NWP 9A Annotated

696.

contrary

German World War

9.2.3, 9-9; 2 Oppenheim § 182a (commenting on
San Remo Manual 87; see also Part IV.B.5. The 1907
provision to ban straits mining. See Levie, Mine Warfare, n.

practice, Allied reprisals);

I

diplomatic conference considered but did not adopt a

11

1!

cf.

424, 42-44.
Paris Declaration

697.
art.

11

2 useless on this point);

4;

Hague VIII, art.

NWIP

10-2

11

2;

London Declaration, arts.

1,4-5;

Colombos

§§

563, 821

611 (limited to automatic submarine contact mines, but see

(Hague VIII,
n. 3); Levie,

1-14M Annotated 9.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated 9.2.3; 2 Oppenheim §§ 182a
(commenting on contrary German World War I practice, Allied reprisals), 380a; San Remo Manual H 88; Tucker 303;
Fujita, n. IV.624, 70; cf. Oxford Naval Manual, art. 22; see also Levie 144-47, 153-55 (Haiphong harbor mine

Mine Warfare,

NWP

id.

n. 424, 32-34;

11

11

blockade); Swayze, n. III.322, 163 (same); Parts IV.B.3-IV.B.4.

LOS

698.

Annotated 11

Convention,

9.2.3; 2

Remo Manual H

87(2);

art.

Oppenheim

§

High Seas Convention,

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2.3; NWP 9A
German World War I practice, Allied reprisals); San

art. 2;

182a (commenting on contrary

& cmt. 80. 1; Tucker 303; fcuf 5ee Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 426, 34-42; Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 611,
(LOS due regard), V.58, 62 (LOAC due regard) and accompanying text; Part F.2. The Seabed

80

31-32; see also nn. IV. 75

Arms Control Treaty
high seas mining, but

does not apply to conventional mines. See
this

may

lead to "exhortation.

UN Charter, art. 2(4); Hague VIII, arts.

699.

Remo Manual

11

1-2;

Stone 584

n. 683.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

85; Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 142-43; see also

LOS

11

The 1907 conference that produced Hague VIII

700.
n.

696 and accompanying

Hague

701.

VIII,

mining). There

art.

Other

and accompanying

Hague

considered but did not adopt a prohibition on

might apply.

UN Charter, arts.

51, 103;

Hague

varies); Bring,

VIII, arts. 4-5; Levie,

San Remo Manual

V.696 and accompanying

Commentary,

103;

Mine Warfare,

n. III.848,

842; nn.

III. 10,

47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

n.

426, 47-51;

NWP

1-14M Annotated

text.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

One

705.

Cf.

Hague

706.

Cf.

Hague VIII, art.

11

9.2.2;

NWP 9A Annotated

11

9.2.2; Clingan,

NWP

9A

Submarine

ODIL 255,267 (1987);

Cf.

is

availability of

and providing of alternate

San Remo Manual HH 88-89.

and accompanying

text.

Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 22; Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 46-48,

1

12, 147-48; see n.

693 and

text.

707.

See nn. 685-96 and accompanying

708.

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated U 9.2.2; see also Parts IV.B.1-V.B.2.

709.

E.g.,

text.

LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. IV.75 (LOS due regard analysis,
(LOAC due regard analysis) and accompanying text. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty does not apply to

conventional mines or nuclear mines in a high seas water column. See n. 683.
710.

9.2.2;

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10,47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25,

necessity and proportionality factor

VIII, art. 3; see also n. 688
5;

11

H 86, cmt. 86.2.

convenient routes for neutral shipping.

V.58, 62

to

Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); see also Parts IV.B.4-IV.B.5.

but see Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 611, 31-32;

accompanying

mining.

11

Mines, n. III.840, 356; A.G.Y. Thorpe, Mine Warfare at Sea—Some Legal Aspects of the Future, 18

safe,

straits

VIII, art. 4;

11

art. 25(3);

UN Charter, arts. 51,

704.

inland

(same); Parts IV.B.3-IV.B.4.

text; Parts IV.B.4-IV.B.5.

Convention,

U 9.2.2;

arts. 2, 8 (territorial sea,

arts. 1, 5

Colombos § 568;
NWP 1-14M Annotated 9.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated 9.2.2; 2 Oppenheim § 363a;
also Stockholm Declaration, art. 2(2) (denial of warship access to mined areas,

treaties

Nordic inner waters; wording

703.

NWP 9A Annotated H 9.2.2; San

4 (notice for mines laid off neutrals' coasts, does not require notification for inland waters

Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 144; see

Annotated

forbid

text.

Levie,Mine Warfare^. 426, 47-49;

LOS

Hague VIII does not

no customary requirement, except necessity and proportionality principles applicable

is

self-defense, for notice.

702.

9.2.2;

Convention,

waters part of coastal State sovereign territory); Territorial Sea Convention,

See

says

"

Cf.

San Remo Manual HH 88-89;

see also n.

698 and accompanying

text.

.

Law

711.

of

Armed

Conflict
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LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. IV.75 (LOS due regard analysis),
(LOAC due regard analysis), 709 and accompanying text. Oxford Naval Manual, art. 20, would forbid

E.g.,

V.58, 62

UN Charter, art. 51, 103 supersede this

automatic contact mines "in the open sea." State practice and the authority of
general aspiration. See also nn.

III. 10,

47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

712.

UN Charter, arts. 51,

713.

See generally Parts B-D.

714.

See,

e.g.,

nn. 11.260, 361, 373, 393-94, 412, 421, 446, 469, 519 and accompanying

715.

See,

e.g.,

nn. 11.179, 233, 250, 334, 354, 357, 359, 368, 420 and accompanying

716.

Cf.

Hague

717.

See

n.

718.

Hague

719.

UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103; Hague VIII, arts. 1-2; NWP 1-14M Annotated HI 9.2.2 n. 23, 9.2.3 n. 26; n. 699 and

VIII, arts. 1,3; see also nn. 688, 690-92

692 and accompanying

accompanying
720.

103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

Hague

and accompanying

and accompanying

text.

text.

text.

text.

text.

VIII, arts. 3, 5; nn. 688, 693

and accompanying

text.

text.

VIII, art. 1(2);

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2.3 n. 27; n. 690 and accompanying text.

There may have been agreements between belligerents and mine removal forces, but there is no published
Hague VIII, art. 5; Levie, The Nature, n. 109, 903-06; nn. 109, 688 and accompanying text. Levie, Mine
Warfare, n. 424, 88 notes that as a practical matter parties who must remove mines may not be able to do so because of
lack of resources or internal political conditions. Undoubtedly that was the case with the Tanker War belligerents.
721.

record. Cf.

722.

See n. 700 and accompanying text;

723.

Hague

724.

Hague VIII, art.

VIII, art. 2; see also n. 697
3;

see also Levie,

Mine Warfare,

and accompanying

n. 426, 168-69.

text.

LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2.3
IV.75 (LOS due regard), V.58, 62 (LOAC due regard analysis),

n. 34; see also Levie, Mine Warfare,^ 426, 168-69; nn.

698, 709, 711

and accompanying

text.

nn. 11.436, 442, 454-56, 493 and accompanying

725.

See,

726.

There were apparently no such threats during the Tanker War.

e.g.,

text.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10,

47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.694-95 and accompanying text.
727.

See nn. 11.264, 384 and accompanying

728.

UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51, 103; Hague VIII, arts.

accompanying
729.

text.

1-2; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

and

text.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 11.368-72, UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18,

968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
730.

See nn. 693-98 and accompanying

731.

See generally Parts A-G. 1

text.

The Ottoman Empire, predecessor sovereign of the area that is now Iraq, and Persia, now Iran, signed Hague
it. Most Tanker War participants were parties. See Signatures, Ratifications and Accessions,
Schindler & Toman 807, 808; TIF 441-42.
732.

VIII but never ratified

733.

A
LOAC context). Standards and criteria for necessity and proportionality are different,

See nn. III.485-630 and accompanying text (necessity, proportionality in self-defense context); Part

(necessity, proportionality in

depending on whether the situation

accompanying

is

a self-defense

response or an attack during war. See nn. 21-22 and

text.

734.

See Parts B-D.

735.

See Part E.

736.

See Part F.

737.

See Part G.

738.

See nn. 11.153-56 and accompanying

739.

Hague XIII, arts. 5, 8; Third Convention, art. 4A(5); see also n. 347 and accompanying text; these mariners did

text.

not have Second Convention protections because their ships were not at

sea.

See Second Convention,

arts. 12-21; 2
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Pictet 84-153;
1

see also

NWP

1-14M Annotated 11

see

NWP 9A Annotated HI 7.10.2, 11.3-11.4,
-5. For analysis,
NWP 1- 14M Annotated
at

7.10.2, 11.3-11.4, 11.7;

San Remo Manual Ml 161, 165-66; Stone 566-67, 674-75; cf.
nn. 740-41 and accompanying text.

1.7;

11

Fourth Convention, art. 4; Protocol I, arts. 50 (presumption

740.

for civilian status), 75

1 1 .4,

(fundamental guarantees);

Bothe et al., 293-96, 456-66; NWP 1-14M Annotated 1 11.3; NWP 9A Annotated
Pilloud, Commentary 610-12, 863-90; San Remo Manual 11 166(c), 167; Stone 704-05.

see also

See generally Fourth Convention,

741.

NWP

1-14M Annotated 11

arts. 7,

12-108; Protocol

11.4-11.5, 11.7-11.7.4;

NWP

I, arts.

44-45; see also

9A Annotated

1 1

1 11.3; 4 Pictet 45-51;

Bothe et

al, 243-58, 260-62;

1 11.4-11.7.4; 4 Pictet 65-72, 113-455;

Pilloud, Commentary 520-42, 544-59; Stone 446, 686-88, 695-706.

Stone 660-62;

746 and accompanying

742.

Third Convention,

arts.

743.

Third Convention,

art.

744.

See nn. 11.489-90 and accompanying

745.

A Detaining Power is the country that has responsibility for a prisoner of war. Third Convention, art.

also 3

109-10; see also 3 Pictet 508-20;
118; see also 3 Pictet 541-53;

n.

text.

Stone 662-65.

text.

12; see

Pictet 128-39; Green 196-201; Stone 655-56, 666.

746.

A

Detaining Power wilfully causing great suffering or inhuman treatment of prisoners of war

is

guilty of a

grave breach of the Third Convention; wilful unjustifiable delay in repatriating prisoners of war or civilians

breach of Protocol

1-14M Annotated

I.

Third Convention,

1 6.2.5 n.58;

130; Protocol

art.

NWP 9A

Annotated 1

I, art.

is

a grave

Bothe et al. 511-13,517-18; NWP
Pictet 626-28; Pilloud, Commentary 991-92,

85(4)(b); see also

6.2.5 n.51; 3

999-1001. Keeping prisoners of war 10 years after a war ends without a legitimate reason for doing so can be
characterized as wilful action causing great suffering or
clear

inhuman treatment

whether Detaining Power actions were wilful and unjustifiable

to persons so detained.

The record is

not

in not repatriating these persons, but 10 years'

confinement under the circumstances comes very close to being aperse violation.
747.

See nn. 739, 741 and accompanying

text.

748. Fourth Convention, arts. 8, 13-34, 47-131; Protocol I, arts. 72-76; see also Bothe et al. 441-73; NWP 1-14M
Annotatedl 11.8; NWP9A Annotated 1 11.8; 4Pictet73-80, 118-231, 273-510; Pilloud, Commentary 841-96; Stone

446, 686-89, 695, 700-06.
749.

Fourth Convention,

accompanying
750.

arts.

35-36; see also 4 Pictet 234-42;

n.

745 and

11.8;

4 Pictet

Green 196-201; Stone 688-90;

text.

Fourth Convention,

art.

NWP

132; see also

1-14M Annotated

NWP 9A Annotated 1

1 11.8;

510-14.
751.

See nn. 742-47 and accompanying

752.

Fourth Convention,

753.

Protocol

754.

See nn. 11.358, 368-72 and accompanying

755.

See nn. 11.431-33 and accompanying

756.

See nn. 11.179 (mines), 233 (mines) 250 (mines), 260, 334 (mines), 354 (mines), 357 (mines), 359 (mines), 362,

I, art.

arts.

text.

133-34; 4 Pictet 514-17.

85(4)(b); see also nn. 745-46, 749

and accompanying

text.

text.

text; see also Levie,

The

Status, 31

VJIL,

368 (mines), 373, 393-94, 412, 420 (mines), 421, 446, 469, 519 and accompanying

755 and accompanying

757.

See

758.

Second Convention,

n.

also nn. IV.816, V. 198-200

n. 11.410, 611-12.

text.

text.

art.12; Protocol

33;

I, art.

and accompanying

LOS Convention, art.

98;

High Seas Convention,

art.12; see

text.

759.

See nn. 755, 757 and accompanying

760.

LOS Convention, art.

761.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

762.

Second Convention,

763.

If this is the proper analysis, the

Convention,
764.

See

art. 87(1);

n. III. 10

98;

text.

High Seas Convention,

art. 12;

Protocol

I, art.

LOAC

High Seas Convention,

and accompanying

text.

art. 12; see also n.

IV.816, V.758 and accompanying text.

33; see also nn. IV.816, V. 198-200, 758

applied through the

art. 2; see also

LOS

and accompanying

other rules principle. See,

e.g.,

nn. 111.952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying text.

text.

LOS

Law

Armed

of

477

Conflict

Hague V, art. 1 1 Hague XIII, arts. 3, 21 24; Second Convention, art. 1 5 Convention on Maritime Neutrality,
Hague Air Rules, arts. 42-43; see also 2 Pictet 107-12; Stone 675; Schindler, Commentary, n. 62, 218-19.

765.

;

;

,

arts. 6, 17,

UN Charter, arts.

766.

51, 103, the latter stating that Charter law is

including Hague V, Hague XIII and Second Convention. See also nn.

and accompanying
high

text,

supreme over

III. 10,

all

international agreements,

47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.760-63

the last citation advancing a similar view in the context of rescuing these personnel on the

seas.

See nn. 760-63, 766 and accompanying

767.

768.
38(1),

text.

Corfu Channel (UK v. Alb.), 1949 ICJ 22; Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 46-48,
Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03, n. 9 and accompanying text.

Second Convention,

769.

art. 12;

also nn. IV.816, V.198-200, 758,

Hague

770.

Annotated H

A

771.

Protocol

IV, Regulations, arts. 22-24;

O'Connell,

12.1; 2

I, art.

LOS

33;

760 and accompanying

AFP

Law of the Sea

Convention,

98;

12, 147-48; see also

High Seas Convention,

110-31 HH 8-3a, 8-3b;
§

NWP

211; San

1-14M Annotated

Remo Manual

through water would render ineffective any attempt to display markings

Hague Air

Rules, arts.

3, 7;

art. 12; see

NWP 1-14M Annotated HH

11

12.1;

NWP

9A

HH 109-11.

from warships has been explained that

generally cannot change markings before attack as a warship can. Aircraft approach speed

8-4b(5);

ICJ Statute, art.

text.

1140; 2 Oppenheim

different rule for aircraft as distinguished

art.

1

aircraft

once flying

compared with ship speed

at the instant of attack.

12.3.1-12.3.2, 12.5.1-12.5.2;

AFP 110-31

HH 7-4,

NWP 9A Annotated HH

Oppenheim § 211; San Remo Maw AL,Preliminary Remarks 184 & 110; Stone337 n.10;
& n.43; Mary T. Hall, False Colors and Dummy Ships: The Use of Ruse in Naval Warfare, NWC Rev. 52,
53-54, 57-59 (Summer 1989). AFP 1 10-31 H 8-3d recognizes the general rule but errs in not adding the special warship
12.3.1-12.3.2, 12.5.1-12.5.2; 2

11

Tucker 142

false flag rule. 2

down

O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 1 140 recognizes the special rule but does not add that a warship must haul

false colors,

and hoist

true colors, before

its

it

attacks.

Hague IV, Regulations, art. 24; Hague VII, art. 2; Protocol I, art. 37(2); AFP 110-31 HH 8-4a-8-4b; Bother al.,
NWP 1-14M Annotated H 12.1.1; NWP 9A Annotated H 12.1.1; 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 1140
(recognizing admissibility of ruses but not distinguishing unlawful ruses); Pilloud, Commentary 430-32, 439-44;
772.

202-03, 206-07;

San Remo Manual H 110, cmt. 110.1; Hall, False Colors, n. 771, 57-59; see also Part IV.C.4; nn. 770-71 and
accompanying text. Modern deception tactics are often classified. NWP 9 A Annotated H 12.1 .1 n. 2. International law
does not require that these

lists

be published.

773.

AFP H

774.

Hall, False Colors, n. 771,56-51; see

110-31 H 8-5.

some of which may apply
775.

AFP 110-31 H 8-6 for examples of unlawful ruses or perfidy in air warfare,

in naval contexts.

San Remo Manual HH

1

10(a)-l 10(c),

1

10(e)-l 10(g)

& cmt.

1

10.3, a list reflecting vessels

See nn. 110-11, 113, 258,261-63, 265 and accompanying text; see also nn. IV.807-10 (UN,

ICRC

exempt from

attack.

flagged vessels) and

accompanying text. Any listed exempt vessel may lose protection if it contributes to the war effort. See nn. 274-76 and
accompanying text.
776.

San Remo Manual HH

110, cmt. 110.3.

777. Id. HH 47(i), 111; see also n. 267 and accompanying text for surrendered vessels analysis, nn. 110-13, 257'-73 and
accompanying text for analysis of other vessels exempted from attack. There is no cross-reference to H 1 1 1, on the next

page, or other Manual provisions in H

1 1

0;

only thorough reading ofthe Manual leads to this material. Unlawful ruse

or perfidy claims have great potential for exacerbating emotions during war and in peace discussions; thorough
cross-referencing would have helped. See n. 788 and accompanying text.
778.

Cf San Remo Manual HH

aircraft

exempt from

aircraft

may

110(a)-l 10(c), 110(e)-110(g)&cmt. 110.3.

attack. See nn. 278-80; see also nn. 775-76

lose protection if it contributes to the

779.

See nn. 776-77 and accompanying

780.

See n. 771 and accompanying

781.

San Remo Manual H 110(d)

war

As in the case of vessels,

this list reflects

and accompanying text. As with vessels, a listed exempt

effort.

See nn. 274-76, 281 and accompanying

text.

text.

text.

& cmt.

110.3, citing Protocol

I,

art.37(l)(d); see also

Bother al., 202-03, 206-07;

NWP 1- 14 M Annotated H 2.4 (application of art. 37[ l][d] standards for UN flag to sea warfare as matter of US policy);
NWP 9A Annotated H 12.4 (same); Pilloud, Commentary 430-32, 439; nn. IV.807-10 and accompanying text.
1

IV.809 and accompanying

782.

See

783.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text.

n.

text.
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784.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 41, 48,

785.

See

786.

San Remo Manual, Preliminary Remarks 184

787.

Cf.

n.

103; see also Part E.l.

439 and accompanying

NWP 1-14M Annotated

12.4;

I, arts.

authorizations,

788.

37(l)(d), 38 (2), as agreeing with

1

10-31

and accompanying
789.

art.

23;

These

8-3a.

11

103;

11

12.4,

and accompanying

art. 5;

which say "The flag of the United Nations and

US policy and that the United States extends application of this

UN authorization referred to is a Security Council decision, since other

Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03;

policies are also

behind

arts. 17(3)-17(4);

n.

IV.57 and accompanying

arts. 18,

Hague IV, Regulations,

20-22; Protocol

I, arts.

37(1), 38(1);

arts. 23(b)-23(c), 23(f), 27, 32, 34;

arts. 30,

34-35, 41, 45; Third Convention,

Roerich Pact,

202-06, 208-1

12.6-12.7.1;

NWP 9A Annotated 1 12.1.2-12.2; 12.6-12.7.1; 2 Oppenheim §§ 211, 223;

1;

Hague Radio Rules, art.

179-81, 189-98, 226-32, 247-52; 3
111;

Toman

id.

186-90; 4

10;

Lieber Code,

art.

117;

141-53, 157-77; Pilloud,

id.

arts. 1, 3;

AFP

110-31

11

8a;

NWP 1-14M Annotated IM 12.1.2-12.2,

Bother a/.

II

text.

LOAC necessity and proportionality principles. See n. 26

Second Convention,

First Convention, arts. 21-22, 35-36;

Fourth Convention,

Manual

text.

text.

Cultural Property Convention,

Hague V,

110; see also n. 771

Council recommendations, are nonbinding unless they recite prior law, under the traditional

e.g.,

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48,

AFP

It

NWP 9 A Annotated

policy to operations at sea. Presumably the

view. See

&

may not be used in armed conflict for any purpose without the authorization of the United Nations,"

the letters 'UN'
citing Protocol

11

text.

1

PICTET 200-05, 280-93; 2 id.

Commentary

185-94; Hall, False Colors, n. 771,56-57; Matheson, .Remarfo 425.

430-39, 446-59; San

It is

Remo

not perfidy to feign, e.g.,

It is perfidy to gain the enemy's confidence and when the "body"
enemy custody, rising to attack a custodian while backs are turned. NWP 1-14M Annotated H 12.7 n.24; Pilloud
This, of course, draws fine lines, and individual fact situations, like offers to surrender, may vary legal analysis.

death, and then to rise and fight an attacking enemy.
is

in

438.

See Robertson, The Offer,

n. 267.

NWP 1-14M Annotated 12.6; NWP 9A Annotated
12.6 n.21; NWP 9A Annotated
12.6 n.21.

790.

AFP

791.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

792.

Before the Gulf became a hot spot,

110-31

H1I

4-2d, 5-lg;
11

11

11

12.6.

11

it

was traditional

for

US

naval vessels permanently stationed there to be

painted white with dark pendent numbers to give crews protection from solar heat. Probably for the same reason, and

during peacetime steaming, US warships were painted white with black and tan trim before
During wartime they were repainted haze grey, and this legacy of the Confederate States Navy became
nearly universal during and after World War I. Submarines are painted black today, but they have been painted other
to increase visibility

World War

I.

colors for camouflage protection.
793.

Military aircraft have been painted camouflage colors since the

794.

See nn. 775-80, 788-89 and accompanying text. This design did not avail Vincennes in Iran's speedboat attacks,

whose crews

relied

on eyesight

795.

UN Charter, arts.

796.

Hague

VII,

accompanying

text.

art. 2;

for final approach. See nn. 11.459-68

and accompanying

LOS

Convention,

See nn. 11.153-56 and accompanying

798.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48,

799.

See San

Remo Manual

art.

29;

High Seas Convention,

110(f); n.

art. 8(2); see also

text.

nn. 771-72, 780 and

text.

103; see also nn. IV.57, V.781-87
II

text.

and accompanying

51, 103; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

797.

and accompanying

775 and accompanying

decision on the point, the decision would have supplied the rules.

accompanying

days of aviation.

first

text. If

text.

the Security Council had approved a

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also n. IV.57 and

text.

800.

See nn. 11.425-28 and accompanying

801.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48,

802.

See nn. 797-99 and accompanying

803.

See

n. 11.412

and accompanying

text.

804.

See

n. 11.363

and accompanying

text.

805.

See generally Part C.

806.

UN Charter, arts. 51,

807.

Hague

VII,

art. 2;

text.

103; see also nn. IV.57, V.781-87, 799 and

accompanying

text.

103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

LOS

text.

Convention,

art.

29;

High Seas Convention,

and accompanying

art. 8(2); see also

text.

Part IV.D.4.

Law

808.

See Part D.

809.

Opposing belligerents' warships and naval

of

Armed

auxiliaries are legitimate targets

or in belligerents' territorial waters. See n. 151 and accompanying

Conflict
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wherever found on the high seas

text.

810.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

811.

2

812.

Id. §

813.

See nn. 11.482-88 and accompanying

814.

See nn. 11.489-90 and accompanying text; Part H.3.

815.

See nn. 11.393-95 and accompanying

816.

See

817.

See Parts A-I.

818.

See Part

819.

SeePartsA.l-A.2.

820.

See nn. IV.75

821.

The problem is common to many languages and linguistic contexts. E.g., C.S. Lewis, The Four Loves (1960)

Oppenheim

§

262.

263; Levie, The Nature, n. 109.

n.

IV.678 and accompanying

text.

text.

text.

A for further analysis.

(LOS due

regard analysis), V.58, 62

discusses multiple definitions of the

had different words

word "love"

(LOAC

due regard

analysis).

in the biblical context as translated

from original languages, which

for each context.

822.

See Part E.

823.

UN Charter, art.

824.

See nn. 58, 62, 818-819 and accompanying

825.

See Part A.4.

826.

See Part A.3.

827.

See,

e.g.,

LOS Convention, art.

87(2); nn. IV.75, V.58, 62

828.

See,

e.g.,

LOS Convention, art.

87(1); see also nn. 111.952-67, IV. 10-25

829.

See Parts B-C.

830.

See Part

831.

See Parts A.l-A.2,J.l.

832.

See Part

D for further analysis.

833.

See Part

E

834.

See Part E.l.

835.

See Part

F

836.

See Part

G for further analysis.

837.

See Parts A-G.

838.

See Part

H for further analysis.

839.

See Part

I

840.

See Chapter

841.

E.g.,

103; see also nn. 7-20

and accompanying

text; Part A.4.

text.

and accompanying

text.

and accompanying

text.

C for further analysis.

for further analysis.

for further analysis.

for further analysis.
III for analysis

of

UN Charter law, particularly in the self-defense context.

1990-91 Gulf War ship intercepts, which initially had a blanket

UN Security Council decision allowing

interception of all goods, presumably including humanitarian supplies. See Walker, Crisis Over Kuwait 35-36.
842.

UN Charter, arts. 51,

843.

See

844.

UN Charter, art. 103, trumping, e.g., LOS Convention, arts. 87-88 (art. 87 includes one of many "other rules"
See,

and accompanying

text.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 41, 48, 103; Part E.

clauses in that treaty)
845.

103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

e.g.,

and the 1958 Conventions;

LOS Convention, art.

see also

nn. 111.952-67, IV.10-25, 68 and accompanying

87(2); nn. IV.75, V.58, 62

and accompanying

text.

text.
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846.

Se<?

847.

See Chapter

848.

See nn. 11.210-14 and accompanying

II.

text.

Chapter

VI

THE TANKER WAR AND THE MARITIME
ENVIRONMENT
Persian

Gulf armed conflicts during 1980-88 (the Tanker War) and 1990-91

(the Gulf War between Iraq

and the Coalition after Iraq's invasion and occu-

pation of Kuwait) resulted in environmental degradations of Gulf waters and the

land and airspace over States party to the conflicts. Perhaps the worst of these was

what a Time writer called a "Man-Made Hell on Earth" when Iraq dynamited over
550 of 684 producing Kuwaiti

oil wells in early

1991 during the Gulf War.

This Chapter does not address the oil well destruction and other environmental
issues related to land warfare

and

conflict in the skies over the lands of countries

involved during either conflict, nor does

analyze the 1990-91 Gulf War's mari-

it

time aspects. Rather, this Chapter explores conflict

Tanker War,

Iran-Iraq conflict, the
stances the

same

in

its

at sea

during the 1980-88

environmental contexts.

issues arose in both conflicts, but the facts

In

some

in-

may point to different

analyses for the overland air and land battles of both wars or the 1 990-91 sea war.

In 1983 Iraqi rocket attacks hit Iran's
ing a 20-million barrel

had equalled the

oil spill into

size of

Nowruz offshore

drilling facilities, caus-

the Gulf. Although early reports that the slick

Belgium and had caused permanent ecological damage

were later discounted, it was big enough to threaten Bahraini, Qatari and Saudi desalination plants before strong

Fish imports into the

winds blew

it

offshore

and

partially dispersed

it.

UAE were stopped because of oil contamination in fishing

grounds. Iraq rejected Iran's request for a partial truce so that oil cappers could try
to stop the 2000-5000 barrels per

nine months.

day flow. The result was that the leakage lasted for

US diplomacy may have been behind eventual capping of the flow.

The Nowruz attack may have been
nals

in response to Iran's attack

on

Iraqi oil termi-

and ports early in the war, which resulted in their closure. There are no reports

of significant pollution of the Gulf resulting from these attacks.

In 1986 Iraq

bombed Iran's Sirri, Lavan and Larak oil terminals, and Iran attacked the neutral
UAE's Abu al-Bakoush oil installations. There were also reports of attacks on Kuwaiti territory.

these cases.

There were no reports of significant spillage into the Gulf in any of

Nor was there any report

mining episode. In 1987

of oil slicks resulting from the 1984

Red Sea

US naval forces attacked Iranian offshore oil rigs used as

an Iranian gunboat base in response to Iran's Silkworm missile strike on a
reflagged tanker, S.S. Sea Isle City, in Kuwaiti waters. There

leum

spillage

on the high

seas resulting

is

from these responses.

no report of petro-
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Tanker War shipping

losses

from attacks by both belligerents were another

source of marine pollution during that conflict. Although most tankers traveled in
ballast to the Gulf, they

and incoming cargo

vessels

had bunkers aboard. All out-

bound ships had bunkers aboard, and nearly all tankers

leaving the Gulf departed

with a full load. These vessels as well as inbound and outbound cargo ships were attacked by the belligerents. Iraq and Iran laid mines, either initially set adrift or

which came loose from moorings. Several merchantmen, some of them neutral
flagged,

were mined. Iraq attacked tankers escorted by Iranian warships, and both

countries conducted land-based air attacks on neutral-flag merchant ships, pri-

marily tankers, some of which were convoyed by neutral warships. Iran's navy
tacked these vessels as well. Iran saw
Iraq.

its

at-

attacks as justified because of aid afforded

The UN Security Council twice condemned the attacks and the result on the

An Iraqi aircraft mistakenly launched two missiles at and seriously
damaged another US warship, the frigate U.S.S. Stark. An Iranian-laid mine seriously damaged U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts, also a US frigate. Another marine polluenvironment.

tion source

came from

losses of naval vessels, principally Iran's, hit as self-defense

US naval vessels or after being caught laying mines,
Iran saw the US attacks as aggression. Undoubtedly there was con-

measures following attacks on
the Iran Ajr.

e.g.

tamination of the Gulf from petroleum cargoes and bunkers, although there

is

no

The conflict was a major war, not a small one, particularly when the
commitments of Iran and Iraq were measured. For the only time since World War
report of such.

II,

deliberate, sustained operations

were carried out against merchant ships. Iran

and Iraq attacked more than 400 merchantmen, sinking
total losses.

Write-off losses stood at nearly half the
Q

Over 200 merchant mariners
for all

died.

(World War

31 with 50

World War

II

II lasted for just

more declared
tonnage sunk.

under

six years

combatants except the United States and other States entering the war in

USSR, and China, which had been Japan's object of aggression before 1939. The Iran-Iraq war ground on eight years. The reason for the disparity between the relatively small number of ships lost and huge tonnage losses is
merchant vessels' relatively larger displacement in the Eighties.) The possible result when a tanker was attacked during 1980-88 was the risk of a considerably
larger oil spill for each ship attacked than during World War II. There were also
1941 or

later, e.g.,

the

aircraft losses over the Gulf,

notably the Airbus tragedy;

however, there are no

reports of aviation fuel pollution.

who initiated tactics resulting in environmental degradation
hoped to improve their fortunes by these tactics, they were mistaken. The IranIraq war wore on for five more years after the 1 983 Nowruz attack before ending in
mid-1988. The Iraqi attack on Nowruz was not a war-stopper; leakage from
If the belligerents

stricken

merchantmen did not even

receive

media

attention, except

could observe in occasional videos of burning vessels.

what viewers
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This survey does not include

sent overboard in deballasting or from

oil

land-based sources not connected with armed conflict in the Gulf. Worldwide figures for this pollution rose from about a million metric tons annually in the 1960s
to nearly 7 million tons in 1973,

with over half from land-based sources and 35 per-

cent from ships. Two-thirds of the latter have been said to be from "routine tanker
operations."

Part A. Not a

New Phenomenon

Environmental degradation during war, or international armed conflict
use of force by one State against another

phenomenon. Pollution of the
largely

sea

on

a

is

commonly

styled today,

is

measurable scale during war

been an aspect of Twentieth Century

as the

not a

new

at sea

has

conflicts, particularly after oil re-

placed coal as a primary source of energy for steam-powered ships, and the world

began

to

consume petroleum

for heating

been

as a

primary

fuel for transportation, a

major source

and an ingredient for plastics and other products. The Persian Gulf has

a particularly busy highway for transporting petroleum; a

high percentage of

the Earth's proven reserves are within States bordering the Gulf. The ocean pollu12
f
r
tion problem is not new
or confined to the Gulf, however; the Tanker War

merely underscored issues that have arisen on a world-scale

basis, usually in the

context of accidents through tanker collisions or groundings. These accidents, like
loss of R.M.S. Titanic in
at Sea,

1912 and the resulting 1914 Convention for Safety of Life

have been catalysts for

treaties or other action to

prevent recurrences.

The world little noted warnings of the potential for environmental degradation
of the seas before, during and after the Tanker War.

when

many claimed

the world focused attention on Iraqi actions that

international environmental norms,
tions

After the 1990-91 Gulf War,

there were calls for action in the United Na-

and other quarters for more treaties, e.g., a Fifth or "Green" Geneva Conven1

tion to protect the

came

violated

environment during armed

to naught, primarily because

damage during

remains as a possible source of rhetoric,
the International Committee of the

These

efforts largely

most participants concluded no new agree-

ments were necessary if existing ones were enforced.
culpability for environmental

n

conflict.

if

18

The question of belligerent

international

armed

conflict at sea

not law, in future wars. Publication of

Red Cross Guidelines

(1994), the

San Remo

Manual (1995) and TVtt^P 1-14M (1997) demonstrates that the issue remains alive
20
within governments and in commentators' minds.
This Chapter limits its coverage to the LOS, the oceans environment and how
these sometimes overlapping bodies of law relate to the LOAC and self-defense at
sea.

Except

as concepts spill over physically or legally, land-based aspects of envi-

ronmental issues

(e.g.,

transborder air pollution), problems related exclusively to

land warfare or war in the air or space above the land, are not discussed.
air

war from the sea, i.e.,

air strikes

from land-based Iranian or Iraqi

Thus

aircraft

the

flown
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over the sea, or from neutrals' warships in the Gulf, are analyzed, but principles of
air-to-air

combat over land or attacks on land

targets

from the land without

flight

over the Gulf are outside the parameters.
Part B. 1 attempts to place the law of the maritime environment in the context of
the
to

UN Charter; the law of the Charter was analyzed in more depth in Chapter III,

which reference

LOS

will

be made. Part B.2 reviews the LOS, particularly the 1982

and other conventions' relationship with the law of the
maritime environment and the LOAC; this was explored in more depth in Chapter
Convention and

its

LOAC, discussed in the
general context of the war in Chapter V, as it relates to Tanker War environmental
IV, to which reference will be made. Part B.3 discusses the

issues. Part B.4,

drawing on current thinking in the Restatement

Relations Law of the United States,

(Third), Foreign

US conflict of laws and recent publications on the

LOAC appearing since the Tanker War, offers an analytical method for the comamong

plex relationship

these bodies of law.

Part B. Charter Law, the

Law

Law of the Maritime
Armed Conflict

of the Sea, the

Environment, and the Law of

There is an enormous volume of law related to the maritime environment, most
of it in treaties appearing since the 1958

ments related

to

LOS conventions. If international agree-

marine resources conservation

sidered, insofar as observing these standards

environment, there were scattered

21

•

or maritime safety

would promote

efforts at protection of the

22

are con-

a better oceans

oceans well before

The same is true with respect to the LOAC, where treaties negotiated to regu-

1958.

late aspects

of warfare or humanitarian principles to be observed during war deri-

vatively benefit the environment.

Agreements of

this nature include the 1907

Hague Conventions dealing with shore bombardment and mine warfare; the
1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, whose prohibitions on gas and bacteriological warfare

human and nonhuman inhabitants of the environment;

affect

Pact

25

tions;

monuments,

protecting

ashore; parts of the 1949

and the 1954 Cultural Property Convention,

safe sealift of protected objects

tion

etc.,

and Protocol

I

to the

the 1935 Roerich

Geneva Conven-

which provides inter alia for

during war. More recently the

ENMOD Conven-

1949 Geneva Conventions have included provisions that

are protective of the environment.

The 1996

International Court of Justice Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear

Weapons advisory opinion ruled 8-7 that threat or use of nuclear weapons would be
contrary to international law except in self-defense situations where a State's survival

28
is at

stake.

In so deciding the Court said environmental considerations are

an element to be taken into account in implementing the LOAC

29

and considered

the impact of some of the foregoing international agreements in the nuclear war30
r
tare context.
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There is thus

as

deep a legacy of what today are called environmental concerns

in the law of armed conflict as those agreements dealing with pollution or species

protection,

/.

which today might be lumped under the same

rubric.

UN Charter and the Environment

The

Not surprisingly, given the era when it was drafted, negotiated and signed, the
UN Charter has no direct reference to protection of the environment. Environmental protection might be subsumed under Articles 1(3)-1(4) and 55-56, particularly if the

environment

is

considered a

human

involved. Article 55 has been the linchpin for the

UN

established through

right or if protection of health

is

UN Environmental Programme,

General Assembly Resolution 2994 (1972).

General Assembly resolutions, Resolution 2994 as a recommendation

Like
is

all

not law-

making in and of itself, although it can restate existing law and thereby strengthen
it,

or contribute to development of custom.

resolution

is

32

However, if the UN Security Council

a decision, that resolution binds

UN Members; if the Council passes

other resolutions, e.g., recommendations, those are not binding on Members.
latter resolutions
33

The

may also contribute to development of law, like General Assem-

bly resolutions.

During the Tanker War no Security Council resolution directly addressed environmental issues. The Council did pass resolutions, nonbinding like decisions,
on the belligerents

calling

demning gas warfare,
in the

LOAC

analysis,

better environment.

35

to observe international humanitarian law

and con-

As will be noted
would have promoted a
condemning attacks on

the latter a feature of the land campaigns.

implementing these resolutions
Council Resolution 552 (1984),

ships exercising freedom of navigation and reaffirming the right of free navigation
in international waters

and shipping lanes en route to and from

States not party to

the conflict, likewise could have promoted a better environment.

The

resolution

did decide to revisit the problem, but no further Council action on the freedom of
navigation issue was taken.

would not have been the
attacks.

The
nty

38

oil

If belligerents' attacks

on ships had ceased, there

pollution problem associated with leakage after

37

inherent right to self-defense and the respect due States' territorial integ-

was also implicated in Tanker War environmental issues. Neutrals exercised

the right to self-defense of their warships and aircraft in responding to belligerent
attacks
tacks),

by sea (e.g., mines, speedboat attacks) and the

air (e.g., missiles, aircraft at-

including belligerent attacks on neutral convoys. Articles 2(4) and 5 1 of the

Charter, like the rest of the Charter, do not speak to environmental protection in

affirming the entitlement of States to respect for their territorial integrity or the inr

herent right to self-defense.
ples of necessity

39

However,

parties are obliged,

under general princi-

and proportionality and admitting of no other alternative

in the

context of anticipatory self-defense, to have due regard for the potential for
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Observance of States' enti-

environmental degradation in self-defense responses.

tlement to their territorial integrity necessarily involves respect for what is on that
territory,

i.e.,

its

Iran's attack

environment.

on neutrals' coastal facilities was an Article 2(4) violation, unless it

was somehow excused,

e.g.,

by mistake

as in the case of the

Airbus tragedy.

Whether States observed due regard for the maritime environment in self-defense
responses

is less

than clear from the war's history, which has no record of spills in-

cident to these situations. However, in the absence of binding Charter law, i.e., Security Council decisions, States responding in self-defense should have had due

regard for the environment in those decisions, such due regard being conditioned

on information available
2.

the time of decision.

at

The 1982 LOS Convention and Environmental Protection

The 1982 LOS Convention

is

the

worldwide multilateral agreement

first

at-

tempting to deal comprehensively with maritime environmental problems. For
those countries that are or become parties,
the 1958

LOS

With

conventions.

War, Bahrain and Iraq

and the UAE, were

ratified

signatories.

respect to countries involved in the

Thus some

States

France

However, other countries with prominent

roles in

in 1985,

e.g.,

others were

in 1986; others,

the United

were obligated not

and purpose during the war;
stated.

and Kuwait

Tanker

e.g.,

it

the war were not signatories or parties,
States.

LOS Convention will replace

the 1982

Kingdom and

to defeat the

the United

Convention's object

bound by custom the Convention

re-

46

The LOS Convention has different provisions dealing with the welter of custom and treaties affecting the maritime environment; it continues 1958 convention provisions stating the relationship between the

LOS

and the

LOAC and its

component, the law of naval warfare. Part B.2.a analyzes the relationship among
the 1982 Convention, other

LOS conventions and other treaties related to protect-

ing the maritime environment. Part B.2.b discusses exceptions to applying the

Convention during armed

conflict. Part B.2.c analyzes the

Convention's provi-

sions governing environmental protection. Part B.2.d offers general

comments on

these relationships.

a.

The Relationship Between the 1 982 LOS Convention and Other Environmen-

tal Treaties.

much
ties,

as

The LOS Convention

be an effective

if

mild trumping device

UN Charter, Article 103 declares that the Charter supersedes other trea-

for

force or to

agreements related to environmental protection, whether already in

come

carried out in a
[the]

will

into force,

manner

Convention."

48

which may have

special terms but

which "should be

consistent with the general principles and objectives of

This

is

slightly different

from

^eneral supersession provision, which declares

it

art.

31 1(2), the Convention's

does not alter existing rights

,
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"which

arise

do not

affect

from other agreements compatible with
enjoyment of other

parties' rights or

this

Convention" and which

performance of their obliga-

The upshot is that all agreements in place or to be negotiated, if related to

tions.

Convention environmental norms, must conform generally

Reading of Part XII of the

LOS Convention,

more

norms.

as well as environmental stan-

dards scattered elsewhere throughout the Convention,
ics are

to these

52

demonstrates that specif-

often found in other agreements, perhaps bilateral but frequently

regional in recent years.

The latter have been often sponsored by the UN Environ-

ment Programme (UNEP), which developed after the Stockholm 1972 UN Con53
ference on the Human Environment. Examples of these include two particularly
relevant to this analysis, the Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol (1978)
and the Red Sea Convention and Protocol (1982). (Although the Persian Gulf
was the theater of maritime military operations during the Tanker War, Libyan
mines were discovered in the Red Sea in 1984. US and other States cooperated in
removing them. ) In many instances administrative bodies established by the
57
treaties develop detailed regulations.
The LOS Convention contemplates this
procedure.

There is the possibility that a parallel but contradictory custom or other source
59

may develop alongside Convention-based norms. The
tomary norm might be the same as, and thereby strengthen,
of law

norm.

If in opposition, the

treaty,

will

weaken the

treaty

the Convention

norm.

However, no

and probably no custom, can supersede the UN Charter, mandatory norms

developed under

b.

custom

developing cus-

or jus cogens norms.

it,

"Other Rules" Clauses in the Conventions.

The 1958 and 1982 LOS Conven-

tions include clauses, sometimes overlooked in analysis or

commentary, stating

that rights under these agreements are subject to "other rules of international law"
as well as

For example, LOS Convention, ar-

terms in the particular convention.

ticle 87(1),

declaring high seas freedoms, also says that "Freedom of the high seas is

exercised under the conditions laid

down by this Convention and by other rules of

Four conclusions can be stated.
First, the overwhelming majority of commentators including the International

international law."

Law Commission
perts,

(ILC), a

UN General Assembly agency of international law ex-

have said the "other rules" clauses in the 1958 and 1982

refer to the

LOAC,

a

component of which

is

Conventions

the law of naval warfare. Therefore,

provisions such as 1982 Convention Article 88 state a truism,
reserved for peaceful purposes,

LOS

i.e.,

the high seas are

but high seas usage can be subject to the law of na-

val warfare when Article 87(1 )'s other rules clause is read

with Article 88. As in the

case of the 1958 conventions,

That provision does not preclude
aggressive purposes, which would

.

.

.

.

.

use of the high seas by naval forces. Their use for
.

violat[e]

.

.

.

Article 2(4) of the

[UN] Charter

.

.
.
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is

forbidden as well by Article 88 [of the

LOS Convention]. See also LOS Convention,

Article 301, requiring parties, in exercising their rights

under the Convention,

to refrain

and p[er]forming their duties

from any threat or use of force in violation of the

Charter. 68

This analysis

is

buttressed by the Charter's trumping clause; no treaty can super-

Thus the

sede the Charter.

LOS Convention provisions
cle 2(4),

peaceful purposes language in Article 88 and other

70

cannot override Charter norms, e.g., those in Arti-

but also those in Article
71

5 1,

i.e.,

the inherent right of individual and collec-

Naval forces of neutral and belligerent States

tive self-defense.

seas for military purposes

(e.g.,

may use the high

for formation steaming) as part of the

freedom of

may be restricted in other maritime zones, e.g., the
may also restrict high seas usage in the immediate vi-

the seas, although these forces
territorial sea. Belligerents

cinity of naval operations

over the high

armed

72
seas.

and establish other kinds of zones, e.g., war zones, on and

The other rules

clauses

come into

force for States

engaged in

conflict.

Second, there

LOS Convention

no indication that the

is

drafters

thought that

the other rules clauses referred to anything else, and particularly to a customary

law of the environment. International environmental law was a gleam in academics'

and

when

futurists' eyes

the 1958

patchwork of treaties on the subject,

73

LOS

Conventions were signed, with only a

and there is no indication the International

Law Commission considered the environment issue. By contrast, there was established law dealing with

armed

conflict situations, including naval warfare, at the

time.

Third, other agreements dealing with protecting the maritime environment include clauses exempting, or partially exempting, their application during armed
conflict or similar situations.

need

Some speak

to protect vital national interests.

75

armed conflict or the
This includes the North Atlantic Free
of war,

others

This tends to confirm the view of applying the LOAC as a sep-

Trade Agreement.

body of law in appropriate situations. To the extent that treaties dealing with
77
the maritime environment do not have such clauses,
such agreements must be
arate

read in the light of the
extent the 1958

LOS

Seas Convention,

78

79

conventions, which include such provisions.

conventions today recite customary norms,

To

the

e.g.,

the

High

LOAC as a separate body of law in appropriate sitnorm must also be considered with LOAC treaties and

applying the

uations as a customary

other sources

LOS

when analyzing environmental

Fourth, principles of the law of treaties

,

issues in this context.

e.g.,

impossibility of performance;

80

Ol

fundamental change of circumstances;
8?

considerable time;

desuetude, or lack of use of a treaty for a
•

or war, the last applying only to parties to a conflict;

suspend operation of international agreements during

83

a conflict or other

may

emer-

gency situation, or may terminate them. Armed conflict does not suspend or

ter-

minate humanitarian law conventions or treaties governing conduct of hostilities,
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The other side of the coin is pacta sunt servanda, i.e.,

including rules for neutrals.

should be observed;

treaties

85

manifestation of this principle is that States signing

should not behave so as to defeat their object and purpose.

treaties

ten-amorphous law of treaty succession

87

must be considered,

older agreements, including those stating the
ties are

is

terms are subject to the

Since the

LOAC,

High Seas Convention

other rules clause

is

is

doubly bound.

88

inescapable that the 1958 Conventions' other rules clauses,

conventions carried forward into the 1982

c.

particularly for

not customary law today. If treaties restate custom, and are subject to suc-

The conclusion

armed

of-

LOAC, to the extent that such trea-

cession principles as to a particular country, that State

ties'

The

is

LOS Convention, mean that these trea-

of which the law of naval warfare

is

a part.

generally regarded as restating custom,

part of the customary

89
its

norms governing oceans law during

conflict.

LOS

The

Convention and Provisions Governing the Maritime Environment.

Although the

LOS

Convention

is

prolix

on the subject of the environment, the

changes it proposes are neither great nor radical;

it

takes a holistic approach.

90

The

core of marine environmental standards are in Part XII, which establishes for the
first

time a comprehensive legal framework for protecting and preserving the ma-

rine environment under the law of the sea.

Other parts of the Convention

state

91

Part II.B.3.c.i summarizes these rules.

environmental principles for ocean areas;

92

among
and the Red

Part II.B.3.c.ii discusses these. Part II.B.3.c.iii explores the relationship

two regional

treaties,

the Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol

Sea Convention and Protocol, the 1982 Convention and the LOAC. Part II.B.3.c.iv
gives general observations,

and Part

II.B.3.c.v discusses the

Tanker War and the

environment.

i.

Part XII of the Convention. Part XII begins by declaring that "States have the

obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment."

93

The Convention

does not define "marine environment," but the drafters generally understood that
the atmosphere
rine ecosystems

is

included where relevant.

and sea water quality.

marine environment;"

95

94

It also

includes living resources, ma-

The Convention defines "pollution of the

it

means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy
which results or is likely to result
in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate
uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of
.

.

.

into the marine environment, including estuaries,

amenities. 96
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The Convention also declares that States'

"sovereign right to exploit their natural

resources" pursuant to national environmental policies in, e.g., the
to a

"duty to preserve and protect the marine environment"

EEZ, is subject
9R

97

against significant

damage.

must act individually and jointly to prevent, reduce and control polluof the marine environment from any source, using the best practicable means

States

tion

at their disposal, in

tional policies,

i.e.,

accordance with their capabilities. They must harmonize na-

national laws, with this requirement.

99

In doing so, they must

ensure that they do not damage other States or their environment by pollution, or
that pollution does not spread

the

EEZ

beyond their areas of sovereignty or control,

Required measures include those designed

or the territorial sea.

minimize

e.g.,

to the greatest possible extent releasing toxic,

stances, especially those that are persistent,

through the atmosphere or by dumping;

102

to

harmful or noxious sub-

from land-based sources, from or

pollution from vessels, including ac-

cident prevention measures, dealing with emergencies, safety at sea, preventing
discharges,

and regulating the design, construction, equipping, operating and

crewing of vessels; pollution from installations for exploring or exploiting natural
resources of the seabed and subsoil; and pollution from other installations operat-

ing in the marine environment.
fiable interference

103

r

In so acting States must refrain from unjusti-

with other States' exercising their Convention rights and

Measures taken must include those necessary

duties.

to protect

and preserve

rare or fragile ecosystems

and habitats of depleted, threatened or endangered spe-

and other marine life.

In combatting pollution, States must not act to trans-

cies

damage or hazards from one area to another, or to transfer one type of pollution
into another.
Technologies that alter or harm the environment, or introduce
new or alien species that would significantly harm the environment must be
107
r
avoided.
There are two distinct duties: avoiding use of harmful technologies,
and "maintaining] the natural state of the marine environment," the latter an infer

novation in international law.

The Convention
bases.

109

108

requires environmental cooperation on global

Other provisions require cooperation in

scientific research

and regional
and

lishing scientific criteria for rules for pollution prevention, reduction

in estab-

and con-

must monitor, publish and assess the marine environment and
provide scientific and technical assistance, with preference for developing States.
States also

trol.

A

State

(e.g.,

must

notify other countries

and competent international organizations

IMO) of actual or imminent pollution damage to the environment.

cation

is

a rule of customary international law.

tified State

States

must

may wish
jointly

113

112

Notifi-

Notice "also envisages that a no-

."
damage to itself
develop and promote contingency plans to combat pollution,

to take preventive action to avert

.

.

.

cooperating with international organizations within limits of their capabilities.

Maritime Environment

491

The Convention establishes standards for international rules and national laws
must adopt measures at least as effective as international rules and standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution from
land-based sources; seabed activities, artificial islands and installations subject to
117
"national jurisdiction;" the Area; and vessels of their registry or flag.
The
to

combat pollution.

States

phrase "national jurisdiction" includes internal waters, the territorial

EEZ,

the continental shelf and archipelagic waters.

Similar principles govern ocean dumping.

119

sea, the

118

Dumping in another State's terri-

torial sea,

EEZ or continental shelf waters requires the coastal State's express prior

approval;

it

may regulate such dumping after consulting with other affected coun-

120
tries.

Although some drafters thought that emergency

fuel discharge

from

aircraft

might not be an exception to prohibitions on ocean dumping without prior express
approval, eventually the drafters concluded that general international law allows

such on force majeure or distress theories
ance.

121

as

an exception to Convention compli-

What is true for aircraft is also true for ships; distress andforce majeure the-

ories are recognized for innocent passage

and

straits transit

Distress and force majeure can be valid claims during

armed

passage regimes.

conflict situations,

with different rules applying in relationships among States not party to a conflict,
relationships between belligerents

ships between belligerents.
States

and

States not party to a conflict,

and relation-

122

must harmonize national

and must work

policies at regional levels

the global level to establish rules, standards and

at

recommended practices and pro-

cedures.

ii.

Controlling Pollution and Protecting the

Ocean Environment

in Specific

The 1982 Convention, Part XII, recites standards related to specific ocean
areas, e.g., the territorial sea. In some instances, e.g., the contiguous zone, there is
Areas.

no reference in Part XII.

The Convention

has special rules for controlling pollution from vessels in the

may publish rules for foreign-flag ships' entry into port or internal waters after due notice. These can be cooperative arrangements. States may
territorial sea. States

adopt rules for foreign-flag vessels in their
cent passage.

territorial sea,

No rule can hamper innocent passage.

1

including ships in inno-

2^

These provisions are consistent with the Convention's navigational articles,
which declare that passage is considered prejudicial to the coastal State's peace,

good order or security if a foreign-flag ship "engages in

.

.

.

any act of wilful and seri-

ous pollution contrary to [the] Convention [,]" and which allows the coastal State
to adopt regulations, "in

conformity with

.

.

.

ternational law, relating to innocent passage
living resources of the sea [and]

.

.

.

this
...

Convention and other rules of in-

in respect of.

.

.

conservation of the

preservation of the environment of the coastal
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State

and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof.

notice of the rules. Foreign ships

must comply with these

.
.

"

with due

Tankers, nu-

rules.

clear-powered ships and vessels carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or

may be

noxious substances or materials
lanes established

by the

littoral State.

required to confine their passage to sea

These ships must

cautions stated in international agreements.
States cannot

127

As

also observe special pre-

in other circumstances, coastal

hamper innocent passage except pursuant to the Convention;

plying regulations adopted in accordance with

it,

in ap-

the practical effect cannot be to

deny or impair innocent passage. There can be no discrimination

in

form or

fact

against any State's ships or against vessels carrying cargo to, from or for any
128

State.

However, coastal

States

may act to prevent breach of conditions attached

to port calls or passage to internal waters,
129

anti-pollution regulations.

and some countries already have

Moreover, States

may

cent passage in specific areas of their territorial sea

temporarily suspend inno-

if essential for
1 30

While this might arguably

security after duly published notice of a suspension.

allow suspension for "environmental security" reasons, such
tition

from the Territorial Sea Convention
1

history

between

32

point to a different view.

and the

LOS

133

nocent passage regime.
is

not the case. Repe-

is

Convention drafting

right of temporary suspension balances

a coastal State's right to protect its territorial integrity

self-defense measures

analysis

The

131

protecting their

through legitimate

and rights of navigation, etc., under the

territorial sea in-

How protecting a coastal State's environment fits into the

a different issue.

The same territorial sea rules for criminal and civil jurisdiction, and for immunity of warships

and other government ships operated

poses, also apply to environment-related claims.

for

non-commercial pur-

For example, warships not

complying with valid coastal State environmental regulations can only be asked to
leave the territorial sea immediately. Flag States are responsible under international

law for loss or damage caused by their warships or other noncommercial vessels.

The Convention innocent

passage rules, insofar as they concern environmental

protection, are also subject to "other rules of international law,"
val warfare.

i.e.,

the law of na-

135

Straits passage or

innocent passage through

straits is

nonsuspendable.

Al-

though coastal States may take appropriate enforcement measures against vessels
"causing or threatening major damage" to the

have violated navigational
transit passage (the

safety,

maritime

regime for most

straits

traffic or

straits), this
1 27

other vessels entitled to sovereign immunity.

environment because they

environmental laws while in

does not apply to warships or

"Heavily used sea lines of ap-

proach, such as the Straits of Hormuz or the Malacca Straits are likely candidates
for

onerous environmental restrictions."

may be,

they are subject to

LOS

1

38

However onerous

these restrictions

Convention rules on nonsuspendable

transit or
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innocent passage, sovereign immunity and other rules of international law, i.e., the

LOAC,

and the inherent right of self-defense.

Convention Article
ronmental protection.

33,
It

permitting a contiguous zone, does not mention envi-

EEZ has

allows declaring a contiguous zone, which, if no

been claimed, is a high seas area contiguous
miles from territorial sea baselines.

to a territorial sea

but no wider than 24

A coastal State may exercise control in the zone

to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,

immigration or sanitary (i.e., health

or quarantine) laws and to punish violations committed within the territorial

Environmental protection claims might be made in connection with health

sea.

law enforcement, but this has not been a traditional view of the zone's purpose.
Article 33

is

torical objects

tied to Article 303,

found at sea.

which

sets standards for archeological

and his-

"Found at sea" seems to have a more comprehensive

scope than "found in the marine environment." Another problem with Article 303
is

that there

is

no agreed definition of the terms "archaeological" and

Article 303 says that its terms are also "without prejudice to other interna-

cal."

tional agreements
jects

and

rules of international law regarding the protection of ob-

of an archaeological and historical nature,"

clauses that
tions.

make

a variant

the Convention subject to the

LOAC

on the other

rules

in appropriate situa-

In internal waters, the territorial sea and archipelagic waters, coastal State

law governs for
trols

"histori-

artifacts

found there; beyond, out

but does not accord sovereign rights.

to the Area,

Article 303 con-

Objects found in the Area must be

preserved or disposed of for humankind's benefit, with "particular regard" for a
State of origin,

149
if it

can be determined. As noted above, the latter principle does

not apply to the Persian Gulf, which because of its depth has no Area.

As in the case of the territorial sea, coastal States may adopt special laws for their
EEZs;
this is consistent with the LOS Convention's navigational articles.
Although there is no explicit cross-reference to Convention continental shelfprinciples in this Part XII provision, a coastal State has the same environmental rights
and responsibilities for its continental shelf activities where shelf sovereignty has
153
been declared but there is no EEZ claim.
States often declare common EEZ and
continental shelf boundaries; there can be a continental shelf without an EEZ, but
l

there can be no

the

EEZ

EEZ without a corresponding continental

and the continental

shelf, coastal States

shelf.

However,

must have due regard

oceans users' high seas rights, including navigation and overflight.
subject to sovereign

immunity exceptions

for, e.g.,

for

for other

Both are

warships and the other rules

principle in connection with environmental regulation.

Provisions allowing coastal State regulation of pollution from vessels in the
ritorial sea, the

for the general

ter-

EEZ and above the continental shelf are considered "innovative]

law of the sea," which usually has looked to

control pollution from ships.

157

Whether considered

flag or registry States to

established law or progres-

sive development, these provisions are subject to qualifications.

There must be

a
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balance of due regard for others' high seas rights,

e.g.,

freedoms of navigation or

overflight; warships

and other noncommercial vessels retain sovereign immunity;

and any attempt

environmental regulation of these areas

at

subject to

is

LOAC

principles in appropriate situations through other rules clauses.

The 1982 Convention

also provides for enforcing

environmental standards.

Countries must adopt laws implementing international norms for land-based pol-

from seabed

lution, pollution

from the atmosphere.
States in
rial

158

activities,

A pollution

ocean dumping and pollution through or

hazard must be significant.

whose port a ship suspected of polluting that

waters or

State's internal or territo-

EEZ in violation of international standards may investigate, detain

or begin enforcement against that ship. These rights are subject

through State

vessels,

to, e.g.,

notice to a

nondiscriminatory enforcement and enforcement only

flag or registry State,

e.g.,

Enforcing States

vice.

159

warships or vessels on authorized government

may not endanger navigational

safety, create a

ser-

hazard to

an accused ship, bring it to an unsafe port or anchorage, or expose the marine envi-

ronment

to

A

"unreasonable risk."

detaining State

is

liable for unlawful en-

forcement measures, excessive "in the light of available information"

LOS

time.

Convention Article 221

at the

also provides:

Nothing
prejudice^] the right of States, pursuant to international law, both
customary and conventional, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea
proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related
interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following upon a
maritime casualty or acts relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be
expected to result in major harmful consequences.
2.
"[Mjaritime casualty" means a collision of vessels, stranding or other
incident of navigation, or other occurrence on board a vessel or external to it resulting
in material damage or imminent threat of material damage to a vessel or cargo.
1.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Measures that

may be

These provisions,

also in other widely-accepted pollution prevention conven-

may be close to

tions,

already

taken under Art. 221(1) include destruction of the vessel.

so.

acceptance as customary international law,

Such an intervention right would have

ing to prevent oil pollution damage from attacks on

during the Tanker War,
tion

if there

justified

oil

if such is

not

Gulf countries'

act-

terminal

facilities

or vessels

was a threat within the LOS Convention defini-

and leakage resulting from the attacks was a "casualty" within Article 221(2)'s

meaning, i.e., an "occurrence on board a vessel or external to

minent threat

of,

material

damage

to a vessel or cargo."

have applied to Iran and Iraq in 1980-88 because of the
rules clauses, applicable at least as

customary law,

party to the conflict and either belligerent, or as
belligerents, the

in using

LOS applied in

it

The

LOS

resulting in, or im-

provisions

may

not

conventions' other

but as between Gulf States not

among other neutral States and the

this context. Neutrals

would have been

justified

LOS intervention standards to deal with vessel spillages and, if "maritime
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casualty"

is

construed to include the platforms, action to deal with situations like

Nowruz.
In the context of the Convention's enforcement provisions, here too warships,
naval auxiliaries and other vessels or aircraft on government noncommercial service

may not be detained. They have sovereign immunity;

this is qualified

by

re-

quiring flag States to ensure, by adopting "appropriate measures" not impairing
operations or operational capabilities of such ships or aircraft, that they operate
consistently, so far as
icy repeats other

I

.

.

reasonable and practicable, with the Convention. This pol-

Convention immunity rules except for the "appropriate mea-

sures" qualification.

.

is

en

It

acknowledges that military vessels and aircraft are unique platforms not always

adaptable to conventional environmental technologies and equipment because of

weight and space limitations, harsh operating conditions, the requirements of
long-term sustainability, or other security considerations.
limit compliance with disclosure requirements. 1

.

.

.

^

[S]ecurity needs

Some regional environmental protection agreements either omit
of the customary immunity rule or do not append

and requirements

for appropriate measures.

tions are examples of the latter.

170

LOS

a declaration

Convention limitations

The Kuwait and Red

Sea Conven-

To the extent the Convention binds parties in a

given context, those treaties must be considered modified to that extent.
the

may

171

Since

LOS Convention's navigational articles restate custom,
the longstanding cusTo
1

tomary rule of warship and naval auxiliary immunity

is

a powerful factor for its

application in these contexts as well.

Other

LOS

Convention divisions providing for environmental protection

in-

dependently of Part XII include those dealing with vessel accidents on the high
seas,

high seas fishing, and the Area, also a part of the high

tific

research.

1

The Convention's high

and marine scien-

seas,

seas fishing provisions follow in part the

95 8 conventions, but Area rules are unique to the 1982 Convention. Because there

has been

little

technology capable of exploiting that part of the ocean, and because

the Convention has only recently come into force, these provisions are largely theoretical in nature. Nevertheless, they

restate concepts in other

may have impact in the 21st Century; many

LOS

ocean areas the

Convention regulates.

The LOS Convention requires more of flag States as to ships under their registry

and operating on the high

seas.

Flag States must ensure "that the master,

cers and, to the extent appropriate, the

crew are fully conversant with and required

to observe the applicable international regulations
173

duction and control of marine pollution
States to "cause

an inquiry to be held

.

.

.

.

.

.."

concerning

.

.

.

serious

.

.

.

prevention, re-

The Convention

also requires

into every marine casualty or incident of

navigation on the high seas involving a ship flying
alia]

offi-

its flag

and causing

[inter

damage ... to the marine environment. The flag State and the other
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State shall co-operate in the conduct of any inquiry

.

.

.

into

any such marine casu-

alty or incident of navigation."

States bordering semi-enclosed areas^

two or more States and connected

i.e.,

to another sea

the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz,

body surrounded by
or ocean by a narrow outlet, e.g.,

a gulf or other

must coordinate managing, conserving,

exploring and exploiting oceanic living resources and coordinate implementing
their rights

and duties for protecting and preserving the marine environment.

The 1982 LOS Convention
1

recognizes marine scientific research as a high seas

nc

must comply with relevant regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention, including those protecting and preserving the mathese operations

right;

nne environment.
Although high
catch,

under

LOS
and

178

the

177

seas fisherfolk retain the traditional

freedom

LOS Convention seines in that right to a certain extent, as it has been

earlier treaties

and

practice. It has never

been an unfettered

Convention subjects high seas fishing rights

stocks and conserving high seas living resources.

impose environmental controls, the high
is

seas

right.

179

The

to treaties limiting the right,

to cooperation in achieving agreements, as well as rules

same

to seek their

180

To

freedom

it

sets for certain fish

the extent these treaties

The

to fish is curtailed.

true for conservation measures coastal States or agreements impose.

The LOS Convention

declares the Area, the seabed, ocean floor

and subsoil be-

181

yond national jurisdictional limits,
and its resources are declared the common
182
heritage of humankind.
There is no Area in the Persian Gulf as stated in the
Convention;

its

waters are relatively shallow.

therefore nonexistent for

iii.

Tanker War

LOS

Regional Treaties, the

gional Convention, to

which

all

183

Area environmental issues are

analysis.

Convention and the

LOAC. The Kuwait

Gulf countries are party including Iran and

covers the entire Gulf except bordering State internal waters. Similarly, the

Sea Convention's geographic sweep includes the
again excepting bordering State internal waters.

Red Sea and
185

Re-

Iraq,

Red

the Gulf of Aden,

r-

Both define "marine pollu-

tion" in nearly identical terms:
introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine
environment resulting or likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living
resources, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities including fishing,
impairment of [the] quality of use for use of [the] sea and reduction of amenities[.]^^

Parties pledge cooperation to prevent, abate

and combat pollution of the marine

environment in the Gulf or the Red Sea, whether caused by ships, dumping from
ships or aircraft, from exploring and exploiting the territorial sea and

and the continental

shelf,

or land reclamation activities.

187
'

its

subsoil

The Convention
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The latter broadly define "marine emergency" to

Protocols amplify this pledge.
trigger application;

it

means

any casualty, incident, occurrence or situation, however caused, resulting in
imminent threat of substantial pollution to the marine
environment by oil or other harmful substances and includes, inter alia, collisions,
strandings and other incidents involving ships, including tankers, blow-outs arising
from petroleum drilling and production activities, and the presence of oil or other
harmful substances arising from the failure of industrial installations^] 1 ^
.

.

.

substantial pollution or

These Conventions and Protocols do not provide
against

imminent pollution

cols appear to

LOS

threats, as the

for anticipatory self-defense

Convention does.

190

The

Proto-

contemplate such by allowing "every appropriate measure to combat

pollution and/or to rectify the situation," provided that other countries are

of emergency responses, defined as "any activity intended to prevent,

notified

mitigate or eliminate pollution by oil or other harmful substances or threat of such
pollution resulting from marine emergencies."

192

tempered by the limitations of proportionality,

This broad authority must be

etc.,

in the

justifies,

principles, anticipatory reaction to

imminent

threat.

tion

and Protocol did not apply

principles in the
195

incident, in
principles,

during the Tanker War. The Red Sea Conven-

to the 1980-88 war, except to support

which Libya

which

are

had

direct application to the 1984

laid mines.

common

States' shores.

States, perhaps in cooperation

Red Sea

if they

They supported self-defense actions
1

Gulf of ships that

laid mines,

Red Sea mining

The Conventions and LOS Convention

took to clear mines from the Gulf and the

EEZs or

common

with the Intervention Convention and Protocol,

were justification for actions coastal
trals,

194

Kuwait Convention and Protocol, which did pertain, geographi-

to the Persian Gulf. It

cally,

193

And if this be so, might this

support anticipatory self-defense in the Charter context?
treaties applied

Convention.

subject to notice and proportionality

This Convention language further

These regional

LOS

e.g.,

with other neu-

threatened coastal

States took to rid the

07

Iran Ajr.

There were two belligerents in the Tanker War, Iran and Iraq. The Kuwait
Convention and its Protocol may not have applied as between them, either because
of the

1

LOS

other rules principles,

98

or because of law of treaties principles,

impossibility of performance, fundamental change of circumstances or
conflict

between them, may have been grounds

for

e.g.,

armed

suspending international

agreements. These treaty rules did apply if the treaties were part of customary law,

however.

199

Except as these grounds applied as between belligerents and other Gulf

States party to the

combat pollution
was in

Convention and

vention.

To

Protocol, their pledges to prevent, abate

and

of the marine environment remained in force. Undoubtedly

this context that Iran
201

its

claimed that the 1983

it

Nowruz attack violated the Con-

the extent that the agreements' terms restated customary norms,

1
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these too remained in force. Iraq's claim that the Convention

not apply during the war

202

and

its

Protocol did

may have been correct as to Iran, but it was not the case

as to other States party.

Given drafting of the

LOS

Convention with

its

paramount and terms

clauses

Kuwait Convention and Protocol, together with terms
of other treaties around the world virtually identical with the Convention and the
Protocol by 1983, there was at least a developing customary norm, and perhaps a
customary rule, alongside treaty principles stated in the Kuwait Convention and
virtually identical with the

its

Protocol, by

1

983.

203

If this is so, the belligerents

pollute, or act to cause an

imminent

interests of countries using

for

time of decision was likely to be a substantial

flow.

its

and

to

Gulf States'

when the result at the
Under the Kuwait Conven-

facilities

spill.

rights to ask for an opportunity to stop the out-

For the same reasons, there may have been Convention and Protocol

violations with respect to spillage resulting from Iraqi

ping during the war,
tial risk to

record

interests,

freedom of navigation, through actions

such as attacks on the Nowruz and other terminal

205

to

threat, to other

Gulf waters

tion Iran was arguably within

were obliged not to act so as

if such

and Iranian attacks on ship-

could have been foreseen to have resulted in substan-

other States' environmental interests, and such risks occurred.

is less

The

than clear on this point.

The LOS Convention and the Law of the Maritime Environment. This
summary of Convention terms for protecting the marine environment demoniv.

strates that Part

XII and those in other parts of the treaty are indeed prolix and

comprehensive; there
related to the

is little

that

is

new law or unanticipated. Indeed, provisions

environment often repeat principles seen in other contexts: the due

regard concept where there are two or more oceans uses at stake; confirming sover-

immunity of warships, naval auxiliaries and other government vessels on
non-commercial service and State aircraft; confirming application of the LOAC in
the context of environmental protection through the other rules clauses, which do
207
not include customary law of the environment as part of "other rules;'"
the same
208
Ap"peaceful purposes" language for the Area as on the high seas generally.

eign

proval of the use of anticipatory self-defense against an environmental threat, previously stated in earlier treaties,

is

some precedent

for applying anticipatory

self-defense in the context of the inherent right to self-defense

Charter.

v.

The Tanker War and

serted

tacks
oil

mentioned

in the

209

the Environment. Other Gulf States might have

as-

EEZ or continental shelf claims during the Tanker War if belligerents' at-

on Gulf shipping caused slicks that threatened their interests, or if attacks on

terminals, including that on

lar analysis obtains for

Nowruz in

1

983, raised the

same threat.

the Kuwait Convention and Protocol.

21

210

A simi-

Similarly, neutrals
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could have raised these claims in connection with other neutrals' self-defense

re-

sponses, and the belligerents could have raised the issue with the responding neutral

No

as well.

environmental deprivation claims appear to have been raised in con-

nection with self-defense responses;
cessity
its

had, the law of self-defense and

if they

its

ne-

and proportionality standards, or the law of anticipatory self-defense with

similar qualifying factors,

principles,

213

ward other

212

and not

LOAC

necessity and proportionality

would have been at issue. Any issues relating to neutrals' conduct toby the law of self-defense or the LOAC, would

neutrals, not covered

have been resolved under the LOS.

As more
claims

States ratify the

may be raised in

tion rules are

Convention, or

it is

accepted as custom, these

the future, particularly if the Convention

similar terms in regional

norms trump any

LOS

and

bilateral agreements,

to the contrary in these treaties.

is

buttressed by

LOS Convention
To the extent LOS Convenalthough

customary norms, however, the customary rules

will apply without

the encumbrance of treaty interpretation principles. Custom, however, has
set of

derogation principles,

e.g.,

the persistent objector rule.

its

own

215

This review of a complex body of law raises the two issues of the relationship be-

tween the law of the maritime environment and the general LOS, perhaps under a

"due regard" analysis, and the relationship between the law of the environment

and the LOAC, perhaps also on

a

"due regard"

basis.

(The Convention

carries for-

ward and solves a third side of the problem by incorporating the other rules clauses
of the 1958 LOS conventions.
) The response to the two remaining issues is complicated

by the Convention's publishing some environmental norms

the general standards, and sprinkling others throughout the treaty.
these bodies of law, the law of the maritime environment, the
interrelate?

The LOS Convention

gives

no

in Part XII,
217

How

do

LOS and the LOAC,

clear answer.

General Conclusions on the Law of the Sea, the Law of the Marine Environment, and the Law of Naval Warfare. If the LOS Convention is a "constitution"

d.

for the

LOS where the LOAC is not involved, its provisions for protecting the ma-

rine environment could be said to be a seagoing "bill of rights" for the environ-

ment. Treaties varying from Convention environmental protection provisions are
218

Custom may compete with the Convention in the future, and jus cogens and UN Charter norms may supersede part of it as
subject to

well.

its

terms for States party to it.

219

Customary norms, first codified in the 1958

LOS conventions, confirming sov-

immunity for warships, naval auxiliaries and other vessels on government
non-commercial service and State aircraft, are affirmed in the LOS Convention
and have been repeated in regional agreements. Similarly, recognition of the
LOAC and its component, the law of naval warfare, as applicable in certain situations, is confirmed in
the Convention's navigational articles and its

ereign
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environmental provisions. The due regard principle for competing oceans uses,

LOS Convention.

particularly on the high seas, has been carried forward into the

What is new is a complex, prolix protection for the maritime environment. The
fundamental issue has become the relationship of this relatively new body of law
with the general law of the sea and the law of armed

conflict.

Environmental Standards During Armed Conflict at Sea

3.

Although the 1990-91 Gulf War raised media attention and advocacy
tecting the oceans environment, the
for years. Treaties first stated these

they were not already thus, in

during the Charter

era,

for pro-

LOAC has dealt with aspects of the problem

norms, and they have become customary law, if

many instances. Decolonization, countries' breakup

and the resultant

effect

of the law of treaty succession,

220

may bind many new States. Analysis begins with the 1 907 Hague Conventions and

ENMOD Convention and
to the Geneva Conventions, to more recent treaties. Lately the UN Secu-

runs through the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977
Protocol

I

rity Council,

with

its

cent compilations of the

The

a.

make binding decisions, has been
may be influential in the future.

authority to

Law of Naval

ment. Earlier treaties

LOAC

Warfare as Part of the
(e.g.,

the 1899

ment-related issues; the 1907

LOAC; Protection

Hague Conventions)

i.

Re-

of the Environ-

dealt with environ-

Hague and other conventions have superseded

them. This sub-Part examines the 1907 Conventions,

norms surrounding them,

221

active.

in the

Tanker War

later treaties

and customary

context.

The Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Oxford Naval Manual. Two among

the 1907

Hague Conventions

deal with environmental problems in the maritime

context; others arguably have rules that could raise these issues in particular
situations.

Hague VIII and Mine

(I)

Warfare.

Hague Convention VIII
222

(1907) on automatic

r

and could affect environmental quality, in
that mines improperly laid under the treaty might have implications for the oceans
environment. Mines cannot discriminate between ships and the environment
contact mines reflects customary law

when they explode, although "smart" mines can differentiate among types and sequences of vessels.

223

Countries laying mines can try to determine the effect on the

environment, however.

If a State publishes

quired by international law,

may therefore be

22S

where

it

has placed mines as re-

other States are on notice of their location, etc., and

obliged to undertake protecting the environment by rerouting,

etc.

Iran, Iraq

and some

States involved in the

Hague VIII. Its terms applied as custom

Tanker War were not

parties to

and under principles of the law of treaty

Maritime Environment

some
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moored mines that broke from
their moorings, drifted down the Persian Gulf, and damaged neutral shipping
when they detonated during the 1980-88 war, and Iraq deployed them and bottom
mines, with the same result in 1990. In some cases Iraq may have deliberately set
some mines adrift to damage Coalition ships or to disrupt naval operations. Some
228
mines laid during the Tanker War also may have been set adrift.
Drifting
mines, unless deactivated within an hour of loss of control over them, and moored
mines that do not deactivate when they become unmoored, violate the Convention
and customary law. If Iran and Iraq laid automatic mines off enemy coasts with a
sole object of intercepting commercial shipping, or extensively mined high seas areas and thereby interrupted freedom of navigation, there were Convention and
succession for

States.

customary law violations.

Iran and Iraq used

229

Although Iran and Iraq deployed many mines during the war, there were no ac-

damage attributable to them, even though there must
have been spillage from mined vessels; there is no record of environmental damage
claims from this source. The same is true for the 1984 Libyan mining of the Red
Sea. This is not to say that environmental damage did not occur; no reports seem to
cusations of environmental

have surfaced. However, as Levie has perceptively observed,
possibility of damage,

their

maybe

huge cargoes, or the

significant damage, given

size of ships

230

there

modern

is

always the

tankers' size

and

and their large bunker capacity.

Hague IX and Bombardment. Although Hague IX, stating rules for naval bombardment of undefended shoreside ports and facilities,
does not recite environ(II)

mental protection principles as such,

if Convention rules

cover sensitive areas, the

treaty will contribute indirectly to preserving the environment.

things,

Hague IX

...

In

232

Among other

says:

bombardments

.

.

.

necessary measures must be taken by the

commander to

spare as far as possible sacred edifices, buildings used for artistic, scientific, or

monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and
on the understanding that they are not used at the same time

charitable purposes, historic

wounded are

collected,

for military purposes. 2

The

^

commander must "do his utmost" to warn local authorities of the area
before beginning bombardment if the military situation permits. In no case may a
town or place be pillaged, even if taken by storm.
Thus if shore parties or manaval

bombardment, they are subject to the same rules on pilIK
lage as forces approaching from the land.
The 1 946 Nuremberg Judgment held
Hague IV, dealing with pillage during land warfare, had become customary
rines follow

norms.

236

up on

a naval

Where Hague

ered customary law also on this account.
lates general principles

Hague IV's, they can be considMost importantly, Hague IX articu-

IX's provisions parallel
237

of military objective, necessity and proportionality,

738
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which when observed should take into account the environment

bardment occurs.
Iran, Iraq and some neutrals

in

which bom-

Tanker War were not Hague IX parties;
the treaty bound all in both wars as custom
or perhaps through treaty succession
Iran and Iraq did not conduct shore

principles.
sels

in the

bombardments from naval

during the Tanker War. However, Iraq struck Iranian coastal

from the

air,

notably Nowruz, and Iran

from attacks on Nowruz, there
ever, given the

tionality

Nowruz

spill's

is little

bombed

ves-

oil facilities

neutrals' coastal facilities. Apart

evidence of environmental damage.

How-

magnitude, Iraq did not take into account propor-

and necessity that would have afforded protection

to the

environment.

Iranian attacks on neutral facilities violated those States' territorial integrity; Ira-

nian observance of Charter norms would have protected the environment.

(Ill)

Exempted

Vessels

and Cargoes. The Paris Declaration (1856), Hague XI and

rules stated in the 1909

London Declaration

environmental protection.

If

an environmentally valuable object sent in postal

correspondence as Hague XI provides
practice governing contraband,
as

within contraband exemptions stated

if pursuing

under Hague XI;

and

the Paris Declaration or

or is in a neutral ship's hold in a neutral warship

provided in the London Declaration,

tected. Coastal fishing boats

capture

is

London Declaration or other agreements, e.g.,

in the 1909

convoy

also offer the potential for incidental

their catch,

and

they would have been pro-

coastal traders, are

enemy war effort

those occupations and not contributing to an
there

is

no protection

where they fish.

for offshore areas

environmental study vessels could be characterized

exempt from

as ships

on

If

scientific or phil-

anthropic missions under Hague XI, they too would be exempt from capture unless collecting data

protection be extended to
tion control.)

248

hospital ships,

Remo Manual proposes that
environmental cleanup vessels when engaged in pollu-

of military application. (The San

The Manual and

current military manuals

exempt from capture or possible destruction

list

as

other ships,

e.g.,

long as they do not

enemy war effort.
Iran, Iraq and some other countries involved in the Tanker War were not parties to the Paris Declaration or Hague XI; they were bound, insofar as these treaties

contribute to the

state

customary norms, by custom developed independently of treaties, and per-

haps by the law of treaty succession.

250

Claims arising during the Tanker War con-

cerned Iraq's declaration of contraband; mining of neutral flag vessels while under
neutral flag warship convoy; destruction of Iran Ajr, an Iranian ship laying mines

on the high

seas, a vessel that

was not engaged in

its

might be characterized

as a coastal trader

but which

usual occupation; and occasional mistaken attacks on fish-

ing vessels. Although there was

some

oil

and perhaps other pollution from ships

damaged during the Tanker War, no environmental deprivation claims have been
reported.

251

However,

to the extent these rules,

whether

as treaty or

customary
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norms, would have been observed, observance would have benefited the maritime

environment through minimization of oil

spillage

from attacked ships or

loss of

environmentally valuable objects.
Protections for the Environment. Besides rules common
252
the law of land warthe law of naval warfare on bombardment and pillage,

Hague IV and Other

(IV)

with

fare in

Hague IV

offers protections for

an enemy

State's

occupied territory; these

have an environmental component today. The right of belligerents to adopt means
of land warfare

is

not unlimited. Private property except for transportation sys-

tems cannot be destroyed or confiscated, pillage
State

is

forbidden, and the occupying

regarded as only administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real

estate, forests

and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile

the occupied country."
ties,

is

An

State, if "situated in

occupier must "safeguard the capital of these proper-

and administer them [under] the rules of usufruct." Properties of municipali-

ties; religious,

charitable

and educational

institutions;

and institutions of the arts

and science, even if State property, must be treated as private property. "Seizure of,

damage done to[,] such institutions, to histori253
cal monuments, works of art or science, is prohibited[.]"
Some Hague IV provisions, e.g., those exempting monuments, are directly related to environmental
and destruction

[of],

or intentional

protection; attacks on a country's cultural heritage are forbidden, unless they are

used for military purposes. Others, such as the rules on private property or
usufruct,

may

give incidental protection to the environment if these properties

would be considered environmentally sensitive.
There were no Hague IV issues on these points, insofar as maritime warfare is
concerned, during the Tanker War, although Hague IV's provisions on protecting
cultural, etc., monuments would have supported the sea warfare rules on the same
subject if that issue

had arisen during 1980-88.

(V) Martens Clauses; Other Possible Rules for Environmental Protection.
tions'

Martens clauses,

i.e.,

for cases not covered

by the

The conven-

treaties, parties

consider

themselves bound by international law principles resulting from usages established among civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of

the public conscience, can operate to carry forward customary norms related to en-

vironmental protection during war.

A commentator has suggested that humanity

and the public conscience could include environmental concerns.

255

There

is

no

suggestion of claims under these clauses related to environmental protection dur-

ing the Tanker War, however.

(VI) The Oxford

Naval Manual

(1913). Besides restating rules,

mostly those in

Hague IX,

that can afford environmental protection if they are observed, the Ox-

ford Naval

Manual would apply

this rule to naval warfare:
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Occupation of maritime
territorial waters, exists

territory, that is of gulfs, bays, roadsteads, ports

when

only

there

is at

continental territory, by either a naval or a military force.

only

if there is

thority

The

occupation, in that

and usages of war on land. 2 ^6

case, is subject to the laws

Verri says that this applies

Hague land warfare rules to a hostile coastal waters area

simultaneous occupation of adjacent land territory; he

on whether

and

the same time an occupation of a

this is a

customary norm.

257

If a

cites

no au-

customary norm, the result

is

that protections for occupied land territory, e.g., apply to coastal waters such as the
territorial sea.

The Manual did not restate a customary rule for that era. The 1 899 and 1 907 negotiators

were careful

different treaties in

to separate principles applicable to land

most cases.

fully specify naval warfare rules

where they intersect with the law of land war-

Moreover, the status of the

fare.

coastal State's sovereign territory

were negotiated, being
Conventions.

territorial sea

during peacetime as part of a

was not certain when the Hague Conventions

finally resolved, according to

If such

and sea warfare into

Land warfare rules for occupied territories care-

"

some, only by the 1958

was the situation during peacetime, such

a

LOS

requirement

is

armed conflict. These treaties went into force decades after the
Hague Conventions, and thus Hague law could not apply per se to these waters, unless a contrary custom could be argued, and that may be the case today for this
Manual provision, at least in terms of general protections, e.g., for cultural objects.
Although Iran and Iraq occupied their opponents' land territory and perforce
territorial sea areas adjacent to it during 1980-88, there is no record of environmental deprivation claims related to this Manual provision.
also illogical for

The record of claims of environmental deprivations during the
scanty, the Nowruz attack being the only exception. However,

(VII) Conclusions.

Tanker War is
Hague norms, and those recited in customary law flowing from other sources, e.g.,

London Declaration and

the

the Oxford Naval Manual,

show

that observance of

these rules, and general principles of the military objective, necessity and proportionality,

would have enhanced protection of the maritime environment. Invoca-

tion of these principles in future wars should afford protection to the environment.

ii.

Between the Wars. After World War I and before World War II's outbreak, re-

flecting the Great War experience,

commentators prepared draft rules, and treaties

were negotiated, that have direct or tangential impact on protecting the maritime

environment during war.
(I)

Rules for Aerial Warfare. Rules for air warfare, reflecting Hague principles (now

also

customary law) for bombardment from land and
7fO

1923.

sea,

were published in

Whether these rules articulate customary law today is debatable.

7fvK

States
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have, however, declared that

some of the Rules

will

be followed in practice.

Thus, the Rules are analogous to the London Declaration;

Hague

particularly if they parallel

provisions,

some restate custom,

and others may

time to give the Rules a decent burial and rely on general
military objective, necessity

Hague IX.

and proportionality,

as

not.

Perhaps

it is

LOAC principles,

i.e.,

Robertson recommended for

266

Neither Iran nor Iraq had the capability to launch

air attacks

from the

attacked land targets after overflying the Gulf, including Iran's attack on
stallations.

for the

•

sea;

they

UAE in-

There is no record of environmental damage from these attacks, except

Nowruz facility. Since the applicable Air Rules restate general principles of

necessity and proportionality incident to any modality of attack, the same result in

terms of legal analysis, whether from a general
tal

a

law, applies here. Iran's attack

LOAC perspective or environmen-

on facilities in neutral territory raised the issue of

UN Charter, Article 2(4) violation. 267

(II)

Two treaties of the interwar era have

The Geneva Gas Protocol; the Roerich Pact.

implications for the maritime environment.

The

1925 Geneva Gas Protocol,

fare affecting

humans, has environmental implications. Anthrax,

for example,

other mammals besides humans.

The same is true for some gases; gases lethal
269
The Protocol has no territorial limitathe environment can afflict humans.

kills

to

while banning gas and bacteriological war-

270

While Iraq used gas during the land campaigns of the 1980-88 war and
271
there was no apparent use of gas
was condemned for it by the Security Council,
or bacteriological weapons during the sea war. Wanton use of gas in the land camtions.

paigns,

and

a possibility of use of these

forms, suggests the Protocol

may

use of toxic gas

outlawed indiscriminate weapons in new

may be invoked

in naval warfare in the future.

Any

degrade the maritime environment as well.

The Western Hemisphere Roerich Pact, which includes the United States
among its parties, declares protections for historic monuments, museums and scientific, artistic, educational and cultural institutions and their personnel. The
must be recognized "in the entire expanse of
The Pact might be implicated in inshore operations

Pact's "neutrality" for these facilities

the territories of parties."

272

bombardment or air operations if such

involving naval

However, because of the

sites are close to

territorial sea's uncertain status in 1935,
273

whether the Pact covers objects in it.

ter the Pact.

came with the 1958 and 1982

The Pact

is

not clear

Unless contrary custom obtains, its princi-

ples could not apply to archipelagic waters, the continental shelf or

delimitations

it is

the coast.

EEZs, whose

LOS Conventions, concluded years af-

effective in peace

and war,

and therefore applies

in

military operations other than war.

As

a regional

not apply of

agreement among Western Hemisphere countries, the Pact could

its

own

force to the 1980-88

war except

to reinforce treaty

and
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Hague IX or the
As analyzed under Hague IX bombard-

customary norms in conventions of worldwide application,
later Cultural

Property Convention.

e.g.,

ment principles, there do not appear to have been any issues related to destruction
277
of cultural objects or sites during the Tanker War.

The

iii.

1949 Geneva Conventions; Cultural Property Convention; Other Cul-

tural Property

Conventions. After World War II treaty negotiators sought

scribe excesses of that conflict through four

new humanitarian law

to pro-

treaties, the

Geneva Conventions of 1949; the nearly contemporaneous Genocide Convention,
278
which did not present any issues during the Tanker War;
and the 1 954 Cultural
Property Convention. The 1972 World Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention

(I)

279

may

also raise issues related to environmental protection during war.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, although pri-

marily directed toward humanitarian law, have provisions protecting the environ-

ment directly or indirectly. The Conventions were in force for all States during the
280
Tanker War.
The Fourth Convention, supplementing the 1899 Hague II and 1907 Hague IV
281
Conventions,
restates other customary rules and declares new standards in
some cases, enlarging protections for civilians and property in occupied territory
•

or an occupied country. "Territory" or "country"
that it would include the territorial sea, which

is

not defined.

282

To the extent

by 1 949 was moving toward recogni-

LOS as subject to coastal State sovereignty, 283 there is a strong possibility the Convention applies to naval warfare in the territorial sea. On the other
tion under the

hand, since continental shelf sovereignty rights were in
not resolved until the 1958
until the 1982

LOS

LOS

Conventions, and

Convention and

284

thereafter,

a state of flux in

EEZ

law was not established

the Fourth Convention could

not apply to those sea areas except through custom; there

is

no record of such

claim. States cannot derogate from humanitarian treaties during

but questions of territorial application of such law

To

1949 and

may arise.

armed

a

conflict,

285

the extent that Fourth Convention hospital and safety zones and localities

for protecting the

wounded,

sick, aged, children,

of young children or other noncombatants,

expectant mothers and mothers

coincide with areas suitable for en-

vironmental protection, the Fourth Convention will contribute to saving the quality

of the environment during armed conflict. While protected areas might be

some could be located in coastal areas subject to naval bombardment, many
more might be within the range for air attack, and still others might be aboard vesinland,

sels in territorial or

part of, e.g., a park,

inland waters. Similarly, a Convention-protected hospital

287

might support protecting a surrounding area by its presence.

similar principle protects sick

and wounded armed

A

forces in hospitals or hospital

ships in territorial or inland waters in previously-agreed neutralized zones.

288
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These buildings or vessels might be located near areas or objects otherwise deserving environmental protection. When wounded and sick armed forces members are
convoyed through environmentally sensitive water areas pursuant
Convention,
law.

289

These provisions

similar considerations apply.

to the

restate

Second

customary

290

The Fourth Convention,
.

.

Article 53, also prohibits:

Power of

destruction by the Occupying

.

.

.

.

property belonging ... to private

persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative

organizations

.

.
.

,

except where such destruction

is

rendered absolutely necessary by

military operations.

Article 147 declares that extensive destruction

grave breach of the Convention.

scope of naval operations and

would have

291

is

To the extent that such property is within

law

well as

a

the

a collateral effect of protecting the environment.

The

prohibition

is

292

Many of those provisions are customary
and therefore were binding on belligerents in the Tanker War as custom as
by

however.

treaty law.

The

during occupation.
296

There

is

no evidence regarding application

story was different in the 1990-91 Gulf War.

The Convention
tion.

is

environmentally sensitive, Articles 53 and 147

broader than in earlier conventions.
293

and appropriation of property

also gives limited protection to civil defense

295

Unless performing hostile

The corollary to

certain facilities,

this is that if such

acts,

in this context,

294

(CD) personnel

they are entitled to protec-

personnel are

and these are environmentally sensitive

known

to operate

areas, the

from

environment

may thus be protected collaterally. No Tanker War incidents invoked these princibombardment from the sea.
The Falklands/Malvinas War Red Cross Box innovation, not grounded

ples for naval warfare at sea or

treaty or

customary law

similar zones,
i.e.,

298

297

in

r

and First and Fourth Convention rules for hospital and

suggests belligerents might agree on "Green Boxes" during war,

for environmentally sensitive areas not protected

by existing law or

areas not

readily recognizable through intelligence or other sources. Areas or buildings fly-

ing prescribed warning flags or emblems

would be small comfort
ing, disproportionality,

(II)

not be discernible from

to protest destruction later,
etc.,

afar; it

even though adequate warn-

claims might succeed. These agreements should be in

writing, definite in area, description

ing

may

and duration and adequately noticed, follow-

Red Cross Box and 1949 Convention
The Cultural Property Convention.

was drafted with war at sea in mind

standards.

The

299

Cultural Property Convention (1954)

and supplements 1 899 Hague II, Hague IV,

Hague IX and the Roerich Pact on coverage, substituting its protective symbols for
emblems in the earlier treaties. Unlike them, the Convention has no Martens
301
clause.
It applies to declared wars or other armed conflicts between two or more
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parties,

even if a state of war is not recognized by one or more parties.
even

to partial or total occupation of a party's territory,

tance. Like the 1949

tion party,

Geneva Conventions,

if a

if

there

party to a conflict

remains in force for Convention parties;

it

Convention terms, the acceptance binds Convention
Cultural property is defined broadly;
erty, refuges for

it

is

if a

parties.

It also

applies

no armed

is

resis-

not a Conven-

nonparty accepts

302

includes movable and immovable prop-

movables, and buildings or building complexes housing it.

Pro-

tection of Convention-covered property also includes safeguarding of and respect
for

304
it.

Convention parties undertake
against foreseeable effects of

Refuges, "limited

armed

number,"

[in]

to prepare for safeguarding cultural property

by taking appropriate measures.
movable property and centers containing

conflict

for

monuments, "and other immovable cultural property of very great importance,"
may be designated. However, refuges must be "at an adequate distance" from large
industrial centers or "any important military objective constituting a vulnerable

point,

[e.g.,] ...

a port

.

.

.

of relative importance

can be established anywhere

if built to

an important military objective

—

"

Refuges for movable property

withstand bombing. Cultural property near

may be put under

special protection if the State

asking protection undertakes not to use the objective during armed conflict. For
ports and other transportation hubs, this

Centers containing

monuments

are

would mean diverting traffic from them.

deemed used

moving military personnel or materiel, even

purposes

for military

if they are in transit.

Use

if used for

for military

purposes includes activities directly connected with military operations, station-

There are procedures

ing personnel, or producing war goods, within the center.

improvised refuges during war by

for designated

filing

with

UNESCO. 307

The Convention provides for transporting cultural property to third States and
from occupied
platform,
ture.

e.g.,

territories.

aircraft, is

The Convention

vention

is

silent

Transported property and the carrying vessel or other

immune from

preserves a right of visit and search.

308

/-<

Although the Con-

on the point, customary law permits diversion instead of visit and

search; aircraft, ships

and cargo involved in transporting goods that are not

tural property within the Convention's
visit

seizure, being adjudicated a prize or cap-

meaning are subject to the law of prize after

and search or diversion. In appropriate situations these ships or

would

also

be

liable to capture

cul-

and perhaps destruction.

309

aircraft

If cultural property is

transported on a vessel devoted to scientific or philanthropic missions that does

not contribute to an enemy's war

effort, that vessel

has the same protections as

other ships engaged in scientific or philanthropic expeditions.

310

The Convention also provides for a UNESCO-maintained International Register of Cultural Property Under Special Protection. Although States where property

is

located usually register

for parties' objections that

it,

occupying powers can do

an item

is

so.

There is a procedure

not Convention-protected cultural property

1

Maritime Environment

509

or that property does not comply with Convention conditions. Registrations can

be cancelled

if a State

where the property

is

requests

it,

or

where objection

property's nature as cultural property or for Convention noncompliance

firmed.

31

During war parties must appoint

to the

is

con-

cultural property representatives, in-

eluding ones for occupied territory, who will work with Protecting Powers

and

21 2

a

Commissioner-General

for cultural property to administer protection.

Convention parties agree

to respect cultural property within their territories

and in other parties' territory by refraining from using property and its immediate
surroundings or
it

its

protective appliances protection for purposes likely to expose

damage during war.

to destruction or

Parties agree to refrain from hostile acts

against the property, particularly that registered under the Convention, unless

"military necessity imperatively requires"

and stop

thefts, pillage or

315
it.

Parties agree to prohibit, prevent

misappropriation of and vandalism against cultural
21

f.

property. Reprisals against cultural property are forbidden.

assume

Parties

these obligations even though another State does not take protective measures before war.

317

States occupying another party's territory

must support authorities in

occupied territory in safeguarding and preserving cultural property. If these authorities

cannot act to preserve it, an occupying power must cooperate closely with
V

them

to take "the

210

most necessary measures of preservation.'

If cultural property is considered part of the

tion applies of its

human environment, the Conven-

own force; given the broad definition of cultural property, which

includes scientific collections and buildings or centers to house

them

as well as

property of great importance to people's cultural heritage, sometimes this
the case.

319

If the

may be

environment is considered not to include cultural property, wan-

ton destruction of the environment also risks violating the Convention.

though most Convention issues involve land warfare, the Convention is
cases of cultural property close to a shoreline

bombardment

Al-

a factor in

and therefore susceptible

to naval

or missile or air attack. Provisions requiring location of cultural

property away from transportation hubs such as ports could involve naval planners.

321

sealift

Rules for transporting movable cultural property, which might include

or ocean overflight, also implicate naval warfare planning. Because the Con-

vention predates the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, which settled the issue of
territorial sea sovereignty, there

Convention coverage extends

may be an

issue as to whether Cultural Property

to territorial sea areas

where

it

does not declare ap2TT

plicability, for those States that did

not claim territorial sea sovereignty then.

The same problem may arise for coverage for the continental shelf, but not as to an
EEZ; the 1982 LOS Convention resolved those issues well after 1954. 323 As with
humanitarian law generally, there can be no derogation from the 1954 Convention
because of war.

The Tanker War
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Iran, Iraq

and many countries involved

Convention and Protocol.

325

in the

Tanker War were

parties to the

Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and

other States that were not parties observed

it

in practice.

There is no evidence of claims related to destruction of or moving cultural property during the

Tanker War.

If cultural property

is

considered part of the environment, the Green Box con-

cept suggested earlier might be considered in conflicts where countries,

United
in the

States, are not party to the

Convention

is

sites

tural property conventions
if a

328

that

327

UNESCO has sponsored two more cul-

may have

ramifications for environmental pro-

broad definition of the environment,

humankind and

property as defined

if cultural

and property could be considered.

Other Cultural Property Conventions.

tection

the

not considered part of the environment, defining a Box to in-

elude nearby cultural

(Ill)

Convention. Even

e.g.,

to

include creations of

esthetics, is accepted.

In 1970 the Convention on

Means of Prohibiting and Preventing Illicit Import,

Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property was opened for signa329

ture.

Iran and Iraq were parties in 1980, and Australia, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi

Arabia, Syria and the United States,

War, had

ratified

among other countries involved in the Tanker

330
it.

Primarily designed to operate during peacetime,

331

the Convention seeks to

prevent illicit import, export and transfer of cultural property.
cultural property definition
ticle 1.

333

The Convention

broader than the Cultural Property Convention, Ar-

Each 1970 Convention

property.

with

is

332

State

may

designate what

it

considers as cultural

The Cultural Property Convention requires property to be registered

UNESCO according to its criteria.

Article

1 1

of the 1970 Convention can

apply to armed conflict: "[E]xport and transfer of ownership of cultural property

under compulsion arising directly or indirectly from the occupation of a country

by a foreign power shall be regarded
applies only to

as illicit."

The Cultural Property Convention

armed conflict and covers only export of property.

335

Toman claims

that because the 1970 Convention defines illicitness in relation to national legislation for transfers,

etc.,

in situations other than

armed

conflict, "Article

the illictness arising from occupation without linking
336

tional law."

under the Convention, Article

1,

by

States

is

is

defines

with or referring to na-

This is one possible reading; the other is that Article

the same as Article 3 illicitness, i.e., that only that which
erty

it

1 1

1 1

illicitness is

defined as cultural prop-

subject to Article 11. Besides the

obvious application during war as to States not party to the conflict,

i.e.,

their re-

sponsibility under the Convention to refuse to accept import or transfer of Article
1 1

property from belligerents, the Convention would also seem to require refusal

to accept

import or transfer of this property from third States

perhaps unknowingly accept

it.

who wrongfully or

Maritime Environment

Do obligations to "undertake ...
fort to
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to participate in a concerted international ef-

determine and to carry out the necessary concrete measures, including the

and imports and international commerce in the specific [cul337
include use of force? Is use of
tural patrimony affected by potential pillage]"
vigilance,
force contemplated in the Convention obligation "to restrict by
movement of cultural property illegally removed from any State Party to this Concontrol of exports

.

vention

.

.

."?

338

.

.

Recent analysis does not interpret the Convention to include this

option in either case, but in an extreme situation, might use of force,

high seas to interdict Article

e.g.,

on the

or other property shipments, be considered a Con-

1 1

vention obligation?

There is no report of removal of Convention-covered property by sea during the

Tanker War. The Convention

is

a treaty obligation of major maritime

powers and

339

may be invoked for seaborne shipments in future wars, however.
The 1972 World Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention also has possible
ramifications for the LOAC. Although also designed to operate only in peaceThe Conventime,
it has been advocated for application during war as well.
must protect sites considered as cultural or natural heri"Territory"
tage, and designated by them as such, within their territories.
The Convention
presumably includes the territorial sea and inland waters.
broadly defines "cultural heritage" and "natural heritage." Objects properly desigtion provides that States

nated by States are considered "world heritage for whose protection it is the duty of
the international

community

deliberate measures

.

.

.to

cooperate." Parties undertake "not to take any

which might damage

directly or indirectly the cultural

natural heritage," as defined in the Convention, "on the territory of other
Parties ....

and
.

.

.

" 344

While the Cultural Property Convention primarily protects

cultural property

with perhaps peripheral coverage for the natural environment,

the 1972 Con-

vention goal

is

to protect the natural

environment in areas States designate

as the

Some have urged this for protecting these areas during
war.
The Convention's World Heritage Committee has adopted an emblem,
348
reminiscent of those required for Cultural Property Convention sites;
this may
Convention provides.

be prophetic for the future.

Perhaps because no designated sites were involved, there appear to have been no
claims concerning the Convention in either Gulf conflict.
all

States involved in the

countries were party,

norms.

352

affected.

Tanker War were party
pushing

its

to

it

Iran, Iraq

by 1988;

350

and nearly

by 1998, 148

terms close to recognition as customary

Planners must take the Convention into account, particularly

if

the

deemed to apply to armed conflict situations. If so, war in the terrimay implicate it; shore bombardment and air operations will also be

Convention
torial sea

351

349

is

:
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iv.

(ENMOD)

Environmental Modification

ENMOD Convention and Protocol
1977, have direct and indirect

Convention; Protocol

I.

The

Geneva Conventions, signed in
implications for the LOAC and the maritime
to the 1949

I

environment.

The ENMOD Convention

is

primarily a disarmament treaty but has environmental implications insofar as

it

(I)

The 1977 Environmental Modification Convention.

limits risks of intentional environmental damage.

perhaps ratified with Kuwait's no

first

353

The Convention,

use reservation,

Article

1,

prohibits "military or

any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having wide-

means of destruction, damage or injury
The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,
to any other State Party."
which prepared the Convention at the UN General Assembly's request, appended
spread, long-lasting or severe effects as the
355

an understanding for Article

.

.

.

1

[F]or the purposes of this Convention, the terms "widespread"; "long-lasting"

and "severe" shall be interpreted
(a)

.

.

.

:

"widespread": encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred
square kilometres;

(b) "long-lasting": lasting for a period of months, or
(c) "severe":
life,
.

is

.

.

approximately a season;

involving serious or significant disruption or

harm

to

human

natural and economic resources or other assets.

[T]he interpretation

.

.

.

above

intended exclusively for this Convention and

is

not intended to prejudice the interpretation of the same or similar terms

if used in

connexion with any other international agreement.^
Article 2 defines "Environmental modification techniques" as "any technique for

changing

— through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes— the dy-

namics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere, or of outer space."

understanding to Article

.

.

.

[These] examples

.

357

The Committee appended an

2:

.

.

[illustrate]

.

.

.

phenomena that could be caused by the use

of environmental modification techniques as defined in article

II:

earthquakes;

tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns

and tornadic storms); changes in
ocean currents; changes in the state of the ozone layer;

(clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types

climate patterns; changes in

and changes in the state of the ionosphere.
[P]henomena listed above, when produced by military or any other hostile use
of environmental modification techniques, would result, or could reasonably be
expected to result, in widespread, longlasting or severe destruction, damage or injury.
Thus, military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques as
defined in Article II, so as to cause those phenomena as a means of destruction,
damage or injury to another State Party, would be prohibited.
.

.

.
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.

.

.

[T]he

.

.

.

examples set out above

[are]
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not exhaustive. Other phenomena, which

could result from the use of environmental modification techniques as defined in
Article II could also be appropriately included.

the

list

does not

.

.

.

imply that

.

.

provided the criteria ... in that

The Convention

.

article

The absence of such phenomena from

would not [apply]
were met.^8

Article

I

...

to those

phenomena,

allows using these techniques for peaceful purposes, subject to

"generally recognized rules of international law concerning such use."

359

Among

360

'

these recognized rules

is

the overriding principle of self-defense.

The Convention has worldwide application but is
insofar as there are

no

first

subject to limitations. First,

use reservations, the Convention will not be in force as

Secamong reserving countries and those States not accepting the reservations.
Iran and Iraq, e.g., were
ond, it applies only as a treaty among treaty partners;
-if.")

Therefore the Convention could not apply as treaty law for the

not parties.

Tanker War. However, both countries signed the Convention and were bound

And if it restates customary law, as

do nothing to defeat its object and purpose.

some

argue,

its

norms applied

The most critical

issue

is

ventional or customary law,

to the

to

Gulf conflicts.

Whether ENMOD, whether stated
could have applied to the Tanker War.

the third:

as con-

ENMOD standards are triggered when there is a "deliberate manipulation of
natural resources"

by

simple negligence

a State, according to Article 2;

is

not

enough, but gross negligence or wanton conduct might establish a potential for liability.

Examples of deliberate manipulation are in the Article 2 understanding; the
367

must be resulting "widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury"
list is illustrative,

not all-inclusive.

Article

1

says there

ENMOD intends that there be nine alternatives for results because of

to a State.

the double disjunctive in Article

1,

ranging from widespread destruction through

severe injury. However, the understanding to the Article says that "widespread"

means an

area of several

hundred kilometers; "long-lasting" means an

effect last-

ing months, or about a season of three months; and "severe" means "serious or sig-

harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other
Thus Article 1 as amplified by the understanding means that a result of

nificant disruption or
369

assets."

a deliberate attack

must extend over

a considerable area,

must

last at least three

months, but maybe harmful to humans, the natural environment, or "other assets."

Commentators have said the environmental modification, not the technique, must
cause the damage.

370

Convention parties have expressed a different view, however,

stating that an environmental modification technique
its

direct object modification of the environment.

damaged.

372

outer space,
kind,
ing,

However, Article

373

2's

the latter then and

371

is

any technique having

as

Moreover, a State must be

general language, speaking of the Earth and

now part

of the

common

heritage of human-

indicates a broader view, particularly because of the Article 2 understand-

which

illustrates

with examples of phenomena having no boundaries.

375
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If a

narrow view is taken, no ENMOD violation could occur on the high seas be-

yond

a State's sovereignty, unless high seas freedoms, e.g., freedoms of navigation,
376
are within the meaning of "economic resources or other
overflight, fishing, etc.,

assets" in the Article

1

understanding.

377

The

postulated view, that no

claim can arise because of impact beyond a State's sovereignty,

There

a financial cost for

is

is

ENMOD

too narrow.

being deprived of rights to shipping lanes,

air traffic

rights, or established fishing grounds, including deprivation offish that

thrown back, because of pollution. Similarly, navies have
on the high seas whether

cises

a right to conduct exer378

in belligerent status or otherwise;

High

tions are not without cost.

suspending them can trigger an

must be

these opera-

seas pollution resulting in ending,

changing or

ENMOD violation claim. Finally, since the un-

derstanding also defines "severe" as "involving serious or significant disruption or

harm

to

lution

.

.

.

natural

379

.

.

.

resources,""

regardless of economic factors, high seas pol-

where ocean quality is diminished might also support an ENMOD violation

claim. In each situation other

ENMOD

criteria

must be

satisfied. If

ENMOD

claims can include high seas deprivations, damage to continental shelf, fishing
zone,

EEZ waters, contiguous zone and territorial sea rights 380 through pollution

otherwise covered by Convention criteria will also support an

To

the extent that an

ENMOD claim. 381

ENMOD claim involves damage to areas over which sover-

eignty or jurisdiction obtains under the
the continental shelf or the

EEZ,

382

LOS conventions, e.g.,

the territorial sea,

ENMOD clearly applies without resort to the

To different extents under the LOS, these areas are considered
part of sovereign territory as much as the land.
Although Kuwait and many States involved in the Tanker War were ENMOD
foregoing analysis.

parties, Iran

and Iraq were

not; as signatories they were

the Convention's object and purpose.

383

committed not

to defeat

Therefore, liability for maritime pollu-

must be grounded primarily in custom parallelling the Convention. If
ENMOD restates custom, and evidence points to that; 384 if the Convention covers
385
techniques as well as environmental modifications;
and if States were damaged
tion

'

(e.g.,

threatened with damage because of concern over closing desalination plants,

or by not being able to exercise high seas navigation or other rights,
ing),

then the Nowruz oil

severe damage,

i.e.,

spill

during the Tanker War resulted in widespread or

nine months as a commentator claimed,

requirement was also met; nine months
if the

is

387

longer than a season.

this

ENMOD

On

the other

388

pollution did not last three months, failure to meet the "long-lasting"

criterion is not critical, since Article

bombing met ENMOD Article
to

Conven-

serious or significant disruption or harm, under the

tion. If the slick lasted

hand,

e.g., fish-

1

1

speaks in the disjunctive; the

standards.

389

Nowruz

However, Article 2 requires intent

manipulate the environment, or perhaps gross or wanton conduct; mere negli-

gence does not support an

ENMOD claim.

Iraq probably attacked

Nowruz with

a goal of depriving Iran of use of the facility for transshipping petroleum to support

Maritime Environment

its

war

effort. If

there was

no deliberate attempt

to

harm

515

the maritime environ-

ment, or if Iraq's action was not gross negligence or wanton conduct, the Article 2
standard was not met. For the Nowruz operation, the verdict must be "not proven"
as to Iraq's liability, unless

it is

argued that Iraq, as a major oil-producing State

with similar terminals, knew or should have

known that indiscriminate attack on

Nowruz had a high probability of producing a major spill. If this amounted to wanton or grossly negligent conduct, there was an

dence of the extent, duration or

behind them.

ENMOD violation. There is no evi-

effect of attacks

on other terminals, or the intent

391

Although there was spillage from Iranian and Iraqi attacks on vessels during the
392

there does not appear to have been widespread, long-lasting or seTanker War,
vere damage to any State (except perhaps shipping losses, which were big, but
393
or the environment generally; thus
these were largely covered by insurance)
394
the Article 1 threshold was not met.
There is no evidence either State deliberately sought to manipulate the environment, the Article 2 trigger.

hand,

it

395

On the other

could be argued that both were wanton or grossly negligent in attacks on

shipping, by mines or other methods, and that the Article 2 criterion was thus sat-

no evidence of Article 1 durational requirements'
having been met, there was no Convention violation as to belligerents' attacks on
isfied.

However, since there

shipping. There were

is

LOAC violations as to neutral merchant shipping not carry-

ing war-fighting or war-sustaining cargo or contraband for either belligerent or

not taking active part on behalf of a belligerent,

396

however. Belligerents' observ-

ing these principles would have contributed to a cleaner Gulf environment.

There

is

no record of widespread, longlasting or severe

effects

on the environ-

ment, or an attempt to deliberately manipulate natural processes when Libya

sowed mines
nature,

in the

Red Sea

in 1984.

397

However, Libya's conduct was wanton

and but for the requirement that both criteria be met (Article

2 standards),

398

there

would have been an

Tanker War neutrals acted pursuant

1

in

and Article

ENMOD violation.

to rights of self-defense,

and

this Char-

ter-stated norm superseded treaty or customary norms, e.g., those in the Conven399
tion,
in defending neutral shipping or in responding to belligerents' attacks

that

employed mines,

aircraft or surface

combatants. If the Convention could be

said to supply customary norms for self-defense, there

under ENMOD

no evidence that neutrals'
standards. There is no evidence that
is

conduct resulted in

liability

oil slicks resulting

from self-defense responses resulted in "widespread, long-

lasting or severe effects," or that neutrals deliberately
cesses,

or

acted wantonly or with

self-defense. States cooperating in

these standards.

gross

manipulated natural pro-

negligence,

in

responding in

removing the Red Sea mine threat also satisfied
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Protocol I to the 1 949 Geneva Conventions. Protocols

(II)

I

and II to the Geneva Con-

Many States involved in

Tanker War were
not then Protocol I parties, e.g., France, Iran, Iraq, the United Kingdom and the
United States.
Protocol I did apply if it restated customary law.
Although
ventions were also signed in 1977.

Protocol

and Protocol

does not generally apply to naval warfare,

I

only non-international conflicts, e.g.,

the

II

governs

some principles in these agree-

civil wars,

ments apply to war at sea; others restate customary norms. Some Protocol I principles

might be adopted by analogy.

Other Protocol I provisions, if applicable to a

conflict, offer indirect protection to the

overtones for application of Protocol
tocol II use the

don.

I

environment.

There are thus

several

If parts of Pro-

principles to sea warfare.

same language as in Protocol I, they should have similar interpreta-

408

(A) Protocol I and Customary Law.

Some Protocol

I

provisions declare environ-

mental protection standards; others restate principles for
these

may protect

the environment

when

armed

all

conflict,

and

applied.

Article 35(1) declares the customary rule that "the right of the Parties to the

methods or means of warfare is not unlimited." This restates a
general principle for all modes of warfare.
Article 35(1) could be invoked separately from Article 35(3)'s terms and thereby offer protection to the environment
conflict to choose

through its general principle. For example, if a State uses projectiles causing super-

would be indamage the en-

fluous injury or unnecessary suffering, Article 35(2)'s principle

along with Article 35(1). If use of this weapon would also

voked,

vironment,

its

protection would be enhanced by observance of Articles 35(1) and

35(2) without reference to Article 35(3) necessarily.
(1)

Protocol I Environmental Protections. Protocol

directly to the

I,

Articles 35(3)

and

55, speak

problem of environmental degradation during international armed

conflict.

Article 35(3) "prohibit[s]

.

.

.

methods or means of warfare

.

.

.

intended, or

may

be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural enviArticle 35(3)'s preparatory works reveal definitions for these re-

ronment."

quirements, which must be satisfied conjunctively, and which are therefore
different

from those in the

ENMOD Convention, which has similar but disjunc-

tively-stated requirements in

its

Article 1(1).

To come within Article 35(3), all

three factors, widespread, long-term and severe as the Protocol defines them,

must

be present.

Unlike

an area

ENMOD, Protocol Fs geographic definition, "widespread," can mean

less

than several hundred kilometers. "Long-term" has been defined as a

time of a decade or more, and "severe" means damage prejudicing over a long term
(i.e. ,10

or

more years) continued survival of a civil population or risking causing it

major health problems.
fine

it, is

relatively high.

The Article 35(3) standard, as its preparatory works de414

"The two

texts

[ENMOD, Article

1(1)

and Protocol

I,

Maritime Environment

Article 35(3)] should not be seen as redundant, but rather as distinct

mentary, since one
tocol

I]

and comple-

[ENMOD] deals with geophysical warfare, and the other [ProDespite the difference in the two

with environmental warfare."
a State could

purpose,
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wage environmental warfare

that

is

treaties'

geophysical in na-

which ENMOD would be invoked, and could mount a geophysical attack
degrading the environment and violate Protocol I, thus calling into question apture, for

plying both treaties for the same situation.
Article 35(3)

may or may not restate a customary norm.

The contemporane-

ENMOD Convention states the same three criteria, widespread,
long-lasting, severe, but disjunctively. Even if ENMOD declares a customary
418
419
Protocol Fs lumping them together conjunctively may not.
If ENMOD
norm,
ously-completed

does not restate custom, as some argue, the debate remains as to whether Protocol

Fs Article 35(3) does,

as

some

However, in a given context, com-

believe.

monly-accepted definitions of Article 35(3)'s terms
conflict scenario

from

fers to

I

seems

to repeat Article 35(3);

methods and means of warfare, while Article

warfare,

1.

exclude a given armed

coverage.

its

Article 55 of Protocol

may

however, Article 35(3)

55, dealing

re-

mainly with land

part of the Protocol declarations for protection of civilians:

is

Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against

widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of
the use of methods or means of warfare

.

.

.

intended or may be expected to cause such

damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of
the population.
2.

Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited. 423

The Netherlands and the United Kingdom filed declarations to Article 55, stating
commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon or
executing attacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of the information from all sources
available to them at the time,"
these
interpretations
meaning that hindsight review of decisions covered by Article
55 is not admissible. Presumably the same interpretations of "widespread, longterm and severe" apply to Article 55(1) as to Article 35(3).
that "military

.

Although
A

T7

it

.

has been argued that Article 55(1) applies generally to naval warA

most commentators,

fare,

.

")

O

and the Protocol's terms,

refute this. Protocol

Article 49 provides:

... 1.

"Attacks"

mean

acts of violence against the adversary,

whether in offence or

in defence.
2.

The

provisions of this Protocol with respect to attacks apply to

all

attacks in

whatever territory conducted, including the national territory belonging to a Party to
the conflict but under the control of an adverse party.

I,

.
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The provisions of this Section [i.e., Articles 48-67] apply to any land, air or sea
may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian
objects on land. They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against
3.

warfare which

objectives
in

armed

conflict at sea or in the air.

The

4.

on land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable
provisions of this section

[i.e..

Articles 48-67] are additional to the rules

concerning humanitarian protection ... in the Fourth Convention, particularly in
Part

II

[i.e.,

Arts. 13-26] thereof,

and in other international agreements binding

.

.

Parties, as well as to other rules of international law relating to the protection of

civilians

and

on land,

civilian objects

at sea or in

the air against the effect of

hostilities. 429

"Territory" and "national territory" in Article 49(2) are not defined, but this could

mean

the territorial sea as well as inland waters are covered,

particularly be-

cause Article 49(3) declares that Articles 48-67 of the Protocol "further" apply to
"attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land but do not otherwise
affect

.

.

.

armed conflict at sea or in the air."

are included within the Protocol,

it is

If attacks

from the sea against the land

consistent that territorial seas bordering

land attacked are also covered; they are part of the area subject to States' sovereignty.

On the other hand, the EEZ, continental shelf, etc., are not part of a State's

sovereign territory.

Beyond this, Article 55(1) does not apply to the law of naval

warfare.

The

question remains as to whether either Article 35(3) or Article 55(1) stan-

dards, if applied as customary

norms and however erroneously with

val warfare in the case of Article 55(1),

were violated during the Tanker War.

Both provisions require environmental degradation
spread, long-term and severe, in the conjunctive.

an

effect

respect to na-

to be

intended and wide-

Both define "widespread"

covering several hundred square kilometers, "long-term" as 10 years or

more, and "severe" as damage likely to prejudice, over a long term, a
tion's

as

civil

popula-

continued survival or risking causing major health problems.

As to the 1983 Nowruz spill, there is no question that the effect was widespread
and would have been severe if the slick had fouled the desalination plants or would
have destroyed aquatic life upon which the Arabian peninsula depended. The record on results from other attacks on oil terminals during the Tanker War is not
But did Iraq intend

clear as to size, duration, severity or intent.

environment? As noted in the

to destroy the

ENMOD analysis, more likely than not this was a

military operation against a permissible target, petroleum production facilities,
that resulted in the potential for environmental degradation. Resolution of the intent issue

Even

is

not easy, since most hard evidence is undoubtedly in classified files.

if intent is

of "long-term."

proven, the slick did not

Thus

the

last a

Nowruz attack will

decade or more, the interpretation

not support a claim under a custom-

ary standard applying Articles 35(3) or 55(1), assuming the latter applies to naval
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warfare, nor could other attacks

on terminals

raise Article 35(3) or Article 55(1)

issues.

Leakage from damaged merchantmen or warships Iran or Iraq attacked during
the Tanker
spill,

War would not support Article 35(3) or 55(1) claims. Like the Nowruz

undoubtedly these attacks were military operations against shipping, in

some cases unlawful under the LOAC, and may not have been intended to degrade
the environment. There

also

is

no evidence that pollution was widespread,

long-term and severe within the Protocol's meaning.

There

Neutrals' self-defense responses involve different law.
that oil slicks
face ships

is

no evidence

from these responses, on oil platforms, aircraft downed at sea, or sur-

damaged

or sunk at sea, was intended to degrade the environment or

caused pollution that was widespread, long-term and severe within the Protocol's

meaning,

if that

standard would be assimilated to the law of self-defense, which

governed these situations.
(2)

ment.

Other Protocol I Provisions Whose Standards May Protect the Maritime Environ-

Many Protocol I provisions, if observed, may protect the maritime environ-

ment through

application, even though

most of the Protocol

is

concerned with

land warfare, a major exception being air and missile attacks from the sea.

common

they restate custom
(a)

to all warfare.

Protocol I Provisions Applicable

ticle 35(2)

Often

A s Customary Law to A

11

Modes of Warfare. Ar-

prohibits weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare

causing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. This principle, derived from
the

Hague Regulations,

is

mate in one context have
though

environmental quality,

affect

legiti-

a potential for

being used unlawfully in another.

Al-

all

warfare.

normally applies as between combatants,

this principle

on certain weapons,

Weapons

customary law applying to

it

could affect

just as specific application of it, like specific prohibitions

e.g.,

gas and bacteriological weapons and warfare, which can

animals and plants as well as humans,

has environmental implications. If

dum-dum projectiles intending to injure the enemy, this violates Article 35(2) and customary rules.
The projectiles would not
discriminate among combatants, civilians, animals and plants in the fire zone, and
culpability would lie for the attack on humans. The deterrence value of denying
a belligerent fires at

an area with

use of these weapons will accrue to civilians and the environment.

There is no indication

that

weapons used in the 1983 Nowruz or other terminal

attacks caused superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.

may have experienced
I's

purpose

conflict

is

i.e.,

fish,

superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, but Protocol

to protect combatants, civilians or victims of international

and not

wildlife.

armed

However, since the Nowruz attack threatened water

supply from neutrals' desalination plants,
suffering to

Wildlife,

a claim of a potential for unnecessary

humans could be made. As to risk of injury to civilians through loss of

water supply, however, Article 35(2)'s history

is

that

it

applies

only to

:

The Tanker War
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Although there was

combatants.

a risk to neutral civilian water supplies, there

could be no claim under Article 35(2).

With

respect to merchant ship attacks during the

was deliberate

firing at a

crew when an attack's purpose was to stop a

There were reports, e.g., of deliberate firing into crew areas when a ship could

ship.

have been stopped by other well-placed shots.
as to

whether these

among

attacks, including

However, the record

not clear

combatants.

platforms, warships and military aircraft.

tacks

is

mine attacks, caused unnecessary suffering

Charter law governed neutrals' self-defense responses,
oil

Article 35(2)

on vessels that were legitimate targets (and many were

principles applied to attacks
not), if there

Tanker War,

on

The same is

neutrals' firing on

true for belligerents' at-

which were subject

neutrals' petroleum facilities,

If Article 35(2) principles

ples.

i.e.,

to Charter princi-

would be incorporated by reference into Charter

law analysis, there are no reports of unnecessary suffering in these situations under
Article 35(2) standards.

Other Protocol Terms, Applicable

(b)

Restatement ofNorms Applicable

to

Land Warfare As Restated Custom, Or Asa

to All Modes

of Warfare. Other Protocol

I

provisions

besides Articles 35(1) and 35(2) recite customary rules of general application; like

other Protocol
ties

I

provisions, they have force as custom for two reasons: (1) for par-

bound by the Protocol as a treaty, they apply only in respect of land warfare and
from the

attacks

belligerents,

and

sea;

were not Protocol

could only apply as custom
volved in the Tanker War.
eral

I

(2)

because

many

parties during the

among

countries,

including the

Tanker War, and the Protocol

those States, including the belligerents, in-

However,

to the extent these principles repeat gen-

customary rules for naval warfare, Tanker

War

participants were obliged to

observe them.
(i)

Protocol

I,

Article 48: Basic

Rule of Distinction. Article 48 states a "basic

of distinction

rule"

.

[T]o ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian

.

.

objects, the Parties to the conflict shall

.

.

.

distinguish between the civilian

population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives

and
t-i_

.

.

.

shall direct

.

•

This

restates custom.

.

.

operations only against military objectives.

457

Tanker War attacks on neutral merchantmen, or ships otherwise
protection from attack, offer examples of the customary

norm

entitled to

Article 48 restates

for naval warfare. If Iran and Iraq had observed this principle as to legitimate ob458
jects for attack,
protected vessels would not have been hit, and the environment

would have been that much cleaner from less oil leakage into the Gulf from
stricken or sunken ships. The Nowruz and other Iranian terminals were legitimate
targets,

but one might ask whether collateral damage,

in terms of impaired
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high seas navigation rights, fishing, and risk to desalination plants after the

Nowruz

attack,

the attack.

was not excessive given the advantage expected

Nor was

at the

time by

proportionality observed in Iranian and Iraqi use of drifting

mines during the Tanker War.
Article 48 could not apply as a

LOAC customary rule for belligerent attacks on

neutrals' oil facilities, or for neutrals' self-defense responses to belligerents' attacks

on neutral shipping. Charter law governed, and there

is

no indication that neu-

self-defense responses were other than proportional

trals'

under the Charter.

On

the other hand, belligerents' attacks on oil facilities in neutral territories was a violation of the Charter.

Other Protocol provisions following Article 48 protect specific objects of attack.

Depending on how the environment is defined, some or all of these objects might
be said to be part of the environment. Even if not considered part of the environment, their proximity to environmentally sensitive objects
tive protection, as has been seen in analysis of Hague

may result

in deriva-

and Geneva Conventions law,

other treaties, custom and general principles.
(ii)

Protocol I, Articles 51, 52, 57: Protection for Civilians and Civilian Objects. Arti-

and 57 of Protocol I state protections for the civilian population, individuals, and civilian objects. Articles 51-52 and 57 in part restate custom, some of it
cles 51-52

longstanding and applicable to

and commentators
Article 5 1
less

all

armed

conflict,

including naval warfare; States

on whether other provisions restate custom.
declares that the civilian
population and individual civilians, undiffer

they take direct part in hostilities, cannot be objects of attack. Acts or threats of

violence, primarily intended to terrorize the civilian population, are prohibited.

Indiscriminate attacks,

i.e.,

those not directed at a specific military objective,

which employ methods or means of combat that cannot be directed

at a specific

which employ methods or means of combat whose effects
cannot be limited as the Protocol requires and thus are likely to strike military obmilitary objective, or

jectives, civilians or civilian objects

criminate attacks include

without distinction, are prohibited. Indis-

bombardment

treating as a single military objective

clearly separated, distinct military objectives

concentrated, e.g., in

cities.

where civilians or civilian objects are

They include attacks that may be expected to cause in-

cidental loss of life or injury to civilians,

damage to civilian objects, or a combination

of such, excessive relative to a concrete, definite military advantage anticipated.
Reprisal attacks against civilians are prohibited, as are use of civilians as

human

shields for military operations or military objectives.

Four countries filed declarations to Article 5 1
itary

commanders and

,

stating understandings that mil-

others responsible for planning, deciding

upon or execut-

ing attacks necessarily must reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of

information from sources available to them at the relevant time,

i.e.,

a

judgment

.
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cannot go against planners,

etc.,

based on hindsight.

Three defined "military

advantage" as advantage gained from an attack as a whole.
Article 52

1

all

a general rule for protecting civilian objects:

Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or reprisals. Civilian objects are

objects
2.

is

which are not military objectives

as defined in

paragraph

2.

Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are

concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use

make an effective contribution

to military action

and whose

capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling

total or partial destruction,

at

the time, offers a definite military advantage.
3.

such
it

In case of doubt whether an object

house

as a

shall

.

.
.

,

is

.

.

.

normally dedicated

to civilian purposes,

being used to make an effective contribution to military action,

be presumed not

be so used. 468

to

As in the case of Article 5 1 four States interpreted Article 52 to mean that a planner
,

or

commander of an

attack

available to the planner or

responsible only for information from

is

commander at the relevant time;

mation does not apply. Three States interpreted Article 52
cific area

of land as a military objective

specified in Article 52,
fers definite military

its total

if,

i.e.,

all

sources

hindsight infor-

to allow attack

on

a spe-

because of its location or other reasons

or partial destruction, capture or neutralization of-

advantage, in circumstances ruling at the time.

Article 57 requires constant care to be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians

and

conducting military operations.

civilian objects in

Those planning

or deciding on attacks must

(i)

do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither
nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are
military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it

civilians

(ii)

(iii)

not prohibited by

them;
take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with
a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause inis

.

.

cidental loss of civilian

.

this Protocol to attack

life,

injury to civilians,

damage

to civilian objects, or a

combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
472
military advantage anticipated[.]

Attacks must be canceled or suspended

not a military one or

is

if it

to the concrete

becomes apparent that the objective is

subject to special protection, or that the attack

may be ex-

pected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a

combination of these, excessive relative to the concrete and direct mil-

itary advantage expected. Effective

advance warning must be given for attacks that

may affect the civilian population, "unless circumstances do not permit." If there
is a choice among several military objectives to attain a similar military advantage,

Maritime Environment

commanders must
and

select the

one that

will cause the least

danger to civilian

objects. In naval or air operations parties to a conflict

take reasonable precautions to avoid loss of civilian
property.

life

lives

must, consistent with

and duties under international law applicable during armed

their rights

523

and damage

conflict,

to civilian

473

Six States filed reservations or declarations to Article 57. Austria's reservation
said, "Article 57(2)

decision

is

of Protocol

determinant

I shall

available a military commander to reach

which may have

[sic],"

lost

meaning

any

in translation but

seems to imply that the commander's determination is binding, which seems to be
close to the Swiss declaration, that Article 57(2) obligations can only be

on commanders

at battalion or

group

levels,

imposed

and those of higher rank.

other countries added understandings identical with theirs for Articles 51

Four
and 52,

commanders must decide on the basis of information from sources available to
them at time of decision, and that "military advantage" refers to advantage
expected from the totality of the attack and not just part of it, in assessing

i.e.,

proportionality.

and 51(5) prohibitions on attacks on civilians, absent exceptions,
those who take up arms, restate customary law.
Civilians may not be used as

Article 51(2)
e.g.,

human shields, nor may they be a subject of attacks intended to terrorize them, although otherwise legitimate attacks that happen to terrorize them are permissible.

The

Article 52

specific intent to terrorize civilians gives rise to culpability.

states a general

customary norm, except the prohibition on reprisals against

ian objects in Article 52(1), for
tinction, necessity

which there

and proportionality

is

a division of view.

erally restate

customary norms.

479

civil-

The

dis-

principles, with the concomitant risk of

damage inherent in any attack that are stated in Articles

collateral

478

51

and

57, gen-

These do not protect the environment by their

terms, but observing protections for civilians and civilian objects can result in protection of environmentally sensitive objects

and areas around them.

During the Tanker War neither belligerent observed distinction principles for
attacks on neutral and other protected vessels. The collateral result was increased
leakage of petroleum, bunkers and cargo, into the Gulf with higher potential for

A clear example of lack of distinction was the Iraqi mis-

environmental damage.

on U.S.S. Stark in 1987. The same is true about indiscriminate mining
of U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts and merchant tankers.
The Nowruz facility was a lesile

attack

gitimate military target,
ciples, in

482

but query whether Iraq observed proportionality prin-

terms of loss of freedom of navigation rights, fishing catches, and threats

to desalination plants.

terminals.

The

record

is

not clear as to belligerents' attacks on other

However, Iran's attack on neutrals' shore facilities, if Iran was otherwise

seeking a proper target, totally lacked discrimination.
Neutrals' self-defense responses were governed by Charter law, not the

There was no reported

significant spillage

from

US

LOAC.

naval responses to Iran's
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Silkworm missile attack on

The US

Iranian gunboats.

a

US

reflagged tanker, on oil rigs serving as bases for

operation was proportional and necessary, in that the

source of attacks on neutral shipping was removed.

485

Similarly,

US proportional

self-defense responses to the Roberts mining, the Iran Ajr minelaying,

and

to at-

tacking Iranian naval units were justified. There was no reported major pollution
of the Gulf resulting from these operations either, although there necessarily had
to

have been
(in)

loss of bunkers.

Article 53: Protection of Cultural Property. Article 53 declares,
487
prejudice to the Cultural Property Convention
and "other relevant in488

Protocol

without

I,

ternational instruments,"

commit any

(a) ...

places of worship
(b) ... use

the Roerich Pact,

it

restates a general

491

effort;

to the

law of naval warfare, e.g., in

customary norm applicable to

Toman, "States which

if

492

since Article 53

is

are not parties to the [Hague}

right of recourse to military necessity

Granted

may

subject to

war-

it.

also claim

According to

Convention do not have the

and must apply Article

this interpretation,

all

they support en-

Cultural Property Convention parties

imperative military necessity,

cumstances."

monuments, works of art or

exception that such objects lose protection

military effort.

493

not

objects the object of reprisals.^ 9

shore bombardment,

emy

may

cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples;

Although Article 53 applies in some situations
fare, subject to the

that belligerents

acts of hostility against the historic

which constitute the

such objects in support of the military

make such

(c) ...

e.g.,

...

which assumes

53 ... in

all cir-

that a customary

norm of military necessity could not apply, it would appear that Article 53 must be
read in the context of Article 52, the general rule for protection of civilian objects,

and that since, e.g.,

a

house of worship

objective under Article 52(3), the

may be attacked if it is a legitimate military

same house of worship

if a

cultural object

under

Article 53(a) could likewise be attacked.

These

rules have little relevance for high seas operations, except for oceanic

may be

transport of cultural objects. There
operations.

considerable application for inshore

495

Although cultural property issues abounded in the 1990-91 war, there appear to
have been none connected with the Tanker War, the naval warfare aspects of the
1980-88 conflict.
(iv)

Protocol

I,

Article 54: Sustenance of the Civilian Population. If the environ-

ment includes sustenance of human
1.

2.

beings, Protocol

I,

Article 54 applies:

method of warfare is prohibited.
attack, destroy, remove or render

Starvation of civilians as a
It

is

prohibited

to

useless

objects

indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs,
agricultural areas for [producing]
installations

and supplies and

.

.

.

foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water

irrigation works, for the specific purpose of

denying

.
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them

for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party,

whatever the motive, whether to

.

.

.

starve out civilians, to cause

them

to

move away,

or for any other motive.
3.

The prohibitions in ... 2 shall not apply to such of the objects covered by it as are

used by an adverse Party:
(a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or
(b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, provided, however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be
taken which may be expected to leave the civilian population with
such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its

movement.
These objects shall not be made the object of reprisals.
5. In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in the
defence of its national territory against invasion, derogation from the prohibitions
in ... 2 may be made by a Party to the conflict within such territory under its own
control where required by imperative military necessity. 496
4.

.

way per se

Article 54 applies in a limited

to naval warfare,

ment, although inshore operations might involve

of

497
it.

to shore

bombard-

The law

of block-

a high seas operation during armed conflict, could contribute to conditions

ade,

covered by Article 54, but
ered per se by Protocol

I,

is

another example of the law of naval warfare not cov-

although some of its provisions, e.g., relief convoys, may,

in the future, be invoked by analogy.
ticle 54(1)

499

Some countries and commentators say Ar-

does not restate custom; they also disagree as to whether Article 54(2) re-

custom. All agree that Articles 54(3)-54(5) articulate customary norms.

states

These might be cited
territorial sea

survival

1983

all

e.g.,

.

if belligerents

attack fisheries or aquaculture areas in the

where the catch or product

is

essential to the civilian population's

and other Article 54 criteria are met. This may have been at stake in Iraq's

Nowruz attack, if fishing grounds

necessary to sustain populations were de-

The record is not clear on
and in other attacks on Iranian oil facilities.
this point, and it is therefore unlikely that Iraq violated custom stated in Article 54.
stroyed,

Attacks on neutral

502
facilities

were Charter violations; Article 54 could not apply

except perhaps to supply a standard in considering the situations.
Protocol I, Article 56: Attacks Resulting in Releasing Dangerous Forces. Article

(v)

56(1)

is

perhaps the most controversial provision in this part of Protocol

rules for attacks

.

.

.

Works

on works or

installations containing

made

objects are military objectives, if such attack

dangerous forces:

and consequent severe

losses

among

the object of attack, even where these

may

cause the release of dangerous

the civilian population. Other military

objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be

the object of attack

works

or

It states

or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and

nuclear generating stations, shall not be

forces

I.

if such

installations

population.*^

attack

and

made

may cause the release of dangerous forces from the
severe losses among the civilian

consequent
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These protections end

if installations are

support military operations,
acting as a

moat between

used for other than normal functions, to

impounded water behind a dam

i.e.,

and

belligerents,

if attack is

support of a belligerent. Nuclear power stations

power

in regular, significant

tack

the only feasible

is

and

or power station

way to end

the only feasible

may be

attacked

if

they supply

and

if at-

at or

near

direct support of military operations,

way to end

it.

Other military objectives located

such installations may be attacked if they regularly, significantly and directly support military operations and if such attack

is

the only feasible way to end such sup-

Four countries filed

These installations cannot be an object of reprisals.

port.

declarations interpreting Article 56 to say that a decision on whether to attack can

only be based on assessment of information from

decisionmaker

at the relevant time;

considering whether Article 56

is

507

all

sources available to the

hindsight judgments are not admissible in

violated.

Article 56 does not apply to wartime defensive measures,

flooding of a State's

own territory to deny access to its advancing enemy,

the majority view does

do not

to deliberate

e.g.,

it

state

customary norms.

ratify Protocol I or accept

it

cessity principles apply to attacks

as a

509

However, for those

508

nor by

States that

customary norm, proportionality and ne-

on these

installations.

Article 56 has slight relevance to the law of naval warfare, except for air or other
attacks

from the sea on shore

installations.

plants powered by nuclear fuel or tidal

dams

It

might be invoked

to generate electricity

for floating

and located

the territorial sea, since the Protocol appears to apply in territorial waters.
cessity

tacks

in

Ne-

and proportionality, which must be observed in all warfighting, apply to at-

on these

installations too.

513

Article 56 does not apply to oil refineries

presumably other petroleum production
jectives.

facilities;

and

these are natural military ob-

514

Article 56 could not have applied to Iraq's
threat to the desalination plants, during the
state a

512

customary norm. Second, even

Nowruz

attack

Tanker War.

if it did,

with a resulting

First, Article

by its terms

it

56 does not

did not apply, unless

there was a risk of explosion or similar reaction to oil being sucked into intakes.

Third, and most importantly, the risk of damage was to neutrals, not Iran;
neutral facilities that were at risk.

Any

threat to neutral facilities

(vi)
ities.

own

was

was covered by

Charter law; Article 56 might have supplied the criteria for determining

but Article 56 could not apply of its

it

liability,

force.

Protocol I, Articles 59, 60, 62, 65: Undefended Localities,

If undefended localities, demilitarized

zones

(DMZs)
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DMZs, CDFaciland CD

facilities

coincide with environmentally sensitive areas, Articles 59, 60 and 62 will protect these areas.

commit

Such

or are used to

localities,

commit

DMZs and CD facilities lose protection if they

acts

harmful to the enemy, outside their proper

usage. Conversely, if an area loses, e.g.,

its

Article 59 protection,

it

retains other

Maritime Environment

Protocol

I

or custom-based protections

it

may

have.
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Undefended

527

localities

DMZs must fulfil these conditions:

and

(a) all

combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment must

have been evacuated;

no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments;
no acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the population; and
no activities in support of military operations shall be undertaken.

(b)
(c)

(d)

For DMZs, military
parties to a conflict

activity linked to the military effort

must agree on interpretation

those persons to be admitted to the

emy in

to

must have

be given

this

ceased,

and

requirement and

DMZ. Acts not considered harmful to the en-

the case of CD facilities include:

(a) ... civil

defense tasks are carried out under the direction or control of military

authorities;
(b)

.

.

.

civilian civil defense personnel cooperate

performance of civil defense tasks, or

.

.

.

some

with military personnel in the

military personnel are attached to

civilian civil defense organizations;
(c) ...

performance of civil defense tasks

particularly those

CD

personnel

may

some protection

.

.

.

may incidentally benefit military victims,

hors de combat.

carry light weapons.

to these persons.
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The Fourth Convention

also gives

520

Hague rules

521

bombarding undefended localities;
522
it is a customary norm today.
Cities or towns behind enemy lines are not consid52?
ered undefended; military objectives within them may be attacked.
Immunity
of agreed-upon DMZs from attack is a customary rule.
Customary law also protects CD personnel and facilities so long as they do not engage in activity hostile to525
ward the enemy.
Absent Protocol I protections for these areas and activities,
they are covered by customary norms, some longstanding. And as with hospital or
Protocol

I clarifies

against

previously- agreed neutralized zones under the 1 949 Conventions,

526

environmen-

tally-sensitive areas or objects within or near these facilities, zones or areas protects

them

for another reason. Protocol I principles for

DMZs

were used by

analogy during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War when the belligerents agreed on
527

"Red Cross box" on the high seas for transfer of sick and wounded.
During the Tanker War none of these areas were involved in the conflict at sea.
However, as suggested previously, the Red Cross Box concept for sick and
a

wounded at sea might be considered for establishing Green Boxes
ronmentally sensitive areas.
(B)

to protect envi-

528

Summary: Were Protocol I Protections Related to Protecting the Environment, or

Related to the Law ofNaval Warfare and Peripherally Related to Environmental Protection,

Violated During the Tanker

War? The response

to the first issue is clearly

No,

The Tanker War
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since the Protocol did not apply to this conflict as a treaty.

Iran and Iraq and

Protocol

I

During the Tanker War

many Tanker War neutrals were not parties to it. To

restated custom, they were

bound by

these principles.

the extent

529

Assuming that Article 35(3)'s prohibitions against attacks involving damage to
the environment restate customary norms, it was not violated during the Tanker
War. To be sure, the environmental damage of the 1983 Nowruz attack was widespread and severe within the meaning of Article 35(3), but did it have a "longterm" effect? Moreover, did Iraq intend to disrupt the environment? Could Iraq
have anticipated, at the time, that its attacks would produce the spill? If the effect
was not long-term within the meaning of Article 35(3), then the conjunctive statement of requirements (widespread, long-term and severe) defeats its application.
Even if that hurdle is cleared, the question of Iraqi intent at the time arises. If intent is the same under each article, then application of Article 35(3) as a customary
norm fails, unless wanton or grossly negligent conduct suffices to trigger liability.
Here too the record is less than clear. As an alternative to intent, Article 35(3)
would predicate liability on Iraqi conduct at the time of decision that "may be expected" to cause environmental harm. Here too the record is less than clear, with
part of the answer lying with documents and witnesses that are not available.
As to attacks on merchant shipping, including bulk petroleum carriers, the response is clearer. There is no evidence that the spills caused severe environmental
degradation, were long-term, or were widespread, or that there was an intent to

damage the environment, or that belligerents could have expected the environment would be damaged when decisions were taken. Thus there was probably no
Article 35(3) violation during the Tanker War.
Similarly, there was no Article 55(1) violation, for the same reasons, but also because Article 55(1), and any customary norm flowing from it, does not apply to
maritime warfare.
Belligerents' attacks

waiti

and

on neutral petroleum

States,

on Ku-

UAE installations were governed by UN Charter law, where there were

violations of the prohibition
530

facilities, e.g., Iran's attacks

on

threats to or attacks

on the

territorial integrity

of

and Protocol I standards might be used in determining liability in those

situations. Similarly,

by Charter law;
in that context.

US and other neutrals' self-defense responses were governed

any claims of damage covered by Protocol I must be considered

There are no known environment-related claims

related to these

responses.
It

might be argued that Iraq's Nowruz attacks, which might have disrupted neu-

trals'

desalination plants, violated Article 54, as several have argued with respect to

Iraq's attempt to disrupt the desalination plants

by flooding the Gulf with

oil

dur-

ing the 1990-91 war, in that fouling the plants would deprive the civilian population of an adequate water supply.
First, neither Article

54 in

There are two

its entirety,

difficulties

with this claim.

nor Article 54(2), which deals with

529
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materials essential to the civilian population's survival, restate customary law. Sec-

ond, even

if Article

54 does recite applicable custom, these norms apply only to the

LOAC; Charter law governs attacks on neutrals; 533 Article 54 could apply only as a
standard for possibly informing the content of Charter law.

Could Article 56's terms, dealing with assaults on nuclear power generating sta-

condemn

The

tions,

be invoked

First,

most commentators say Article 56 does not now state customary norms. Sec-

to

these seaborne attacks?

ond, as in the case of Article 54 and most of Protocol
tacks

on neutrals;

this is

governed by the Charter.

I, its

response

is

threefold.

terms do not apply to

at-

Third, unless an explosion of

the plants could have released radioactive material or otherwise have triggered Article 56's

On

standards, Article 56 could not apply under

its

own

terms.

the other hand, Article 48, 51-52 and 57 standards, which restate general

principles of the military objective, target distinction,

and proportionality were vi-

olated by both States in their indiscriminate mine and surface ship attacks on mer-

chant shipping. Charter law governed neutrals' self-defense responses,
there

is

535

and

nothing in the record to indicate that these responses were not necessary

and proportional under the customary law of self-defense.

With Protocol Fs continuing acceptance as

treaty law, albeit with reservations

and declarations and applicable as it is mainly to land warfare or air and missile attacks from the sea, the Protocol

may come closer to restating custom for aspects of

LOAC except for persistent objectors. Perhaps further in the future, or alongside this development, the LONW as a separate component of the LOAC may feel
the

Protocol Fs influence,

some
v.

if

not

its

displacement of traditional

LONW standards in

instances.

Other Applicable Law. Since 1977 other

LOAC

treaties related to the

have

same kind of issues as Protocol I. The other development has been revitalization of the Security Council as a law-making institution, especially since the USSR's collapse.

been

ratified; these present the

The 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention and Its Protocols. Arguments for ap-

(I)

Weapons Convention, with its preamble language, "recalling that it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare
intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural

plying the Conventional

.

environment," and
536

its

.

.

land mines and incendiary weapons protocols in particu-

may be advanced in future wars.
Iran, Iraq and most States involved in the Tanker War were not parties to the Conlar,

as

customary law governing naval warfare,

vention or

its

Protocols at that time.

The United

537

States ratified the 1980

Convention and 1980 Protocols

I

and

II

with four reservations or understandings in early 1995, and a condition rejecting
applicability of the preamble language, which tracks Protocol

538
I, art.

35(3).

Many

.

The Tanker War
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US allies have also ratified the Convention and its Protocols.
tial

for review conferences

means

Moreover, a poten-

that the law of naval warfare

may be implicated

in the future.

but most Protocol provisions
The Convention governs all modes of warfare,
state norms for land warfare or the law of bombardment and not armed conflict at
5^2
coo
sea.

The Mine
inter alia,

Protocol to the Conventional

"mines

laid to interdict beaches,

mines

to the use of anti-ship

Protocol has

little

at sea or in

Weapons Convention

applies only to,

waterway crossings, but does not apply

inland waterways."

By

terms this

its

or no application for oceans warfare, except insofar as a com-

mander might consider

a mine-infested

beach for amphibious landing, perhaps a

factor leading to the faked shore landings during the

The

Gulf War.

Protocol

would affect those operations and arguably could embrace mines, including those
aircraft launched, laid at low tide ashore and covered by higher tides that push
coastal waters over the

"ground or surface area"

where mines are

laid.

The Protocol's statement of principles of proportionality, the illegality of indiscriminate weapons, and reasonable warnings under the circumstances,
cent of customary

... It is

norms

prohibited in

recited in the

all

is

reminis-

Hague Conventions and Protocol

I:

circumstances to direct weapons to which this Article

applies in offence, defence or

by

.

.

.

reprisals, against the civilian population as

[3]

such

or against individual civilians.
.

.

[Indiscriminate use of weapons to which this Article

.

Indiscriminate use
(a)

(b)

is

[3]

applies

is

prohibited.

any placement of such weapons:

which is not on, or directed against, a military objective; or
which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed
at a specific military objective; or

(c)

which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of
weapons to which this Article [3] applies. Feasible precautions are those precautions
which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances
ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.
... It is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article [4] applies in any city,
town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians in which
combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not appear to be imminent,
.

.

.

unless either:
(a)

they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective or under
the control of an adverse party; or

(b)

measures are taken to protect civilians from their

effects, [e.g.,]

.

.

post-

ing of warning signs, the posting of sentries, the issue of warnings or the
provision of fences.
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Protocol defines "military objective" as

.

.

.

any object which by

its

nature, location, purpose or use

makes an

effective

contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military

advantage.

"Civilian objects" are objects not defined as military objects in the Protocol.

The Amended Mine

Protocol has similar provisions, adding with respect to the

military objective a presumption, from Protocol

I,

that in case of doubt an object

normally dedicated to civilian purposes is not being used for effective contribution
to military action.

548

There are no provisions on mine warfare's environmental impact. However, the
Protocol's statement of military objective, indiscriminate weapons, proportionality,

and notice principles reinforce those rules in other conThese principles, if observed, indirectly protect the environment as in the

military necessity,

texts.

case of Protocol

I

standards and customary law defining the military objective and

proportionality.

Although the Incendiary Weapons Protocol applies
of attacks on civilians,

to

war at sea in the context

incendiary weapons, remain, in the

mate means of warfare against combatants
rarely seen in naval warfare.

The

US view,

a legiti-

However, these weapons are

at sea.

Protocol repeats, in slightly different lan-

guage, principles of military objective, civilian objects, necessity and proportion-

found in Protocol

ality

I

but has no warning requirements.

552

The Protocol also prohibits "mak[ing] forests or other
plant cover the object
of attack by incendiary weapons except when such
are used to cover, conceal, or
.

.

.

.

.

.

camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives."

553

This has been characterized as not imposing a severe restriction on

gitimate military use of incendiaries.

It

applies to shore

le-

bombardment or air or

While such plant cover is a feature of traditional landor subtropical shores have mangroves or other trees extend-

missile attack from the sea.

ward

forests, tropical

ing into otherwise navigable territorial waters, particularly during high tides.

The Protocol's approach, banning attack on a specific part of the environment,
forests, unless
tive,

used for military purposes or

if

the forest itself is a military objec-

might be compared with the general standard of Protocol Fs controversial Ar-

ticle 56,

forbidding attack on dams, dikes and nuclear power generating stations

unless they are used for military purposes or are military objectives.

might be contrasted with Protocol

I,

Article 35(3)'s

These

banning methods or means of

warfare causing "widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment,"
or the

ENMOD Convention prohibition on "military or any other hostile use of

environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe
effects as the

means of destruction, damage or injury

to

any

.

.

.

Party."

The

The Tanker War
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generalized approach

is

better.

During the 1990-91 Gulf War commentators

at-

tempted

to analogize Protocol I provisions, of doubtful standing as custom, to
558
cover situations its drafters did not contemplate.
Will this be the fate of Incen-

Weapons Protocol Article 2(4), the forests provision? What is a forest?
Would claimants try to extend it to grasslands which have occasional coppices or
trees along water courses? Does Article 2(4) protect a considerable acreage of
young saplings, on the way to becoming a forest, on land formerly farmed but now
reverting to woodland? These kinds of definitional problems may make Article
diary

2(4)

unworkable in

practice.

The Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols are a restatement of,
and therefore an enhancement
objective, necessity

customary definitions of principles of military

for,

and proportionality, and the prohibition on indiscriminate

some respects
they do not state customary norms, and for these provisions they must await ratifi-

weapons, applying

to all warfare.

This

is

their principal value. In

cation by major military powers.
Iran, Iraq, the

War were
States

United States and many other countries involved in the Tanker

not parties to the Convention and

had

ratified

them.

559

its

Protocols; by 1987, twenty-eight

r

Therefore; they could have applied only as customary

law for the Tanker War.

Tanker War is concerned, the Mine Protocol did not apply, by its
own terms; there is no record of amphibious landings to which it might have applied. It did not apply to sea mine attacks. The Incendiary Weapons Protocol
might have applied to attacks on shore installations, but there is no record of use of
incendiary weapons in this context. There is also no record of weapons meeting
Fragments Protocol criteria. The technical terms of the Convention and its ProtoInsofar as the

cols did not apply to

However, insofar

norms of the

martime aspects

as the

Convention and

to the

Protocol

I,

its

customary law.

Protocols' recitation of customary

military objective, discrimination, necessity and proportionality

strengthened those principles for war

them

to the extent they stated

at sea; belligerents

same extent they would be said

to the extent that those

its

have violated the identical terms in

terms reflect customary law. The result

customary norms restated in Protocol
Since the Convention and

to

observed or violated

I

is

that

have been strengthened.

Protocols are in effect a supplement to the 1949

Geneva Conventions and Protocol

I

and therefore govern

LOAC

situations,

they could not have applied to self-defense scenarios during the Tanker War.

Charter law governed these,

although the general customary law of necessity

and proportionality might have informed the content of these Charter norms. In
any event, as noted in the Protocol
trals

I

and earlier analyses, the record indicates neu-

did not violate these standards in the self-defense context.
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(II)

Developments in

the

Law

UN Charter.

of Armed Conflict Under the
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Before the

Gulf War, UN interest in the relationship between war and environmental protection

had resulted in

treaties, e.g., the Cultural

Property Convention,

Convention, Conventional Weapons Convention and
Convention,

among

others. Action within

UN

LOS

principal organs was largely

through non-binding General Assembly resolutions,
ing the

and the

Protocols,

its

ENMOD

e.g.,

the Assembly's endors-

Stockholm Conference and its
UN Environment Programme after the 1972 to

Principles, which

found their way into later treaties,

and the 1992 Earth Summit.

Nature,

agreements subject to the
ing the Kuwait and

UNEP

World Charter for
has promoted many regional
the 1982

LOS conventions and their other rules clauses, includ-

Red Sea Conventions.

The Security Council, and later the Assembly during the Soviet veto era, voted
resolutions dealing with actual or potential

there was

little

However,

direct linkage with environmental protection in particular con-

For example, during the Tanker War, Council Resolution 598 called for a

flicts.

cease-fire, "deplor[ed]

tional

armed conflict situations.

.

.

attacks

.

on neutral shipping

humanitarian law and other laws of armed

belligerents "discontinue

.

,"

.
.

the violation of interna-

conflict,

and demanded that

military actions on land, at sea and in air." Prior Res-

all

olutions 540 (1983) and 552 (1984) had been in similar vein; 540 specifically called

upon belligerents

"to refrain

the region of the Gulf."

from any action that may endanger

If obeyed, these resolutions

.

.

.

marine

life

in

would have helped protect

the environment, in that if no further shipping attacks occurred, Gulf waters

would have been cleaner. To the extent that Resolutions 540, 552 and 598
incorporated by reference parts of the LOAC applying to belligerent naval operations in the
oil

Gulf that had ramifications

terminals such as Nowruz,

for

environmental quality, e.g., attacks on

they would have declared environmental protections

if heeded.

Coincident with the USSR's demise, the Council began to assume a more active
role in

world

During the Kuwait crisis and Gulf War,

affairs.

it

passed resolutions

with direct or indirect ramifications for the environment during war. These are be-

yond the scope of this book.

S70

Two

deserve particular attention, however.

Resolution 678, a Council decision authorizing the Coalition "to use

means

all

neces-

uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) [demanding Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait] and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore
sary

to

international peace

and security

such as 664-67, 670, and 674 into
content

is

examined,

conflict in treaties

it is

in the area[,]" incorporated earlier resolutions
its

binding mandate.

clear that the Council

S71

When these resolutions'

meant to include the law of armed

and custom, and the Fourth Convention specifically, and there-

and indirect environmental protection principles in this law. This
inclusion was subject to the resolution's "all necessary means" and "relevant resofore direct

lutions" clauses. Participating governments considered that Resolution 678

The Tanker War
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incorporated by reference all the relevant

LOAC applicable to the war.

consistent with the language, ambiguous as

it

This was

was, of Resolution 678. However, the

point remains, as noted with respect to the prewar resolutions, that the Council

might decide on action

to incorporate or supersede all or part of the established

LOAC.
This

is

not the case with Resolution 687, where the Council directly addressed

environmental degradation during armed conflict;

it

reaffirmed "that Iraq

... is li-

able under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental

damage and the depletion of natural resources, ... as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait[.]" It also invited Iraq to reaffirm its obligations
573
under the Geneva Gas Protocol.
As in prior Resolutions incorporating the
LOAC and international agreements, the Council appears to have done nothing
more than incorporate conventional and customary norms into Charter law, with575
out creating new liability, which may have been the case with other resolutions.

The Council

properly reaffirmed

its

position; Resolution 687

prior resolutions continued in full force and effect,

cept in principle

its liability

arising in regard to

and demanded

that Iraq "Ac-

under international law for any loss, damage, or injury

Kuwait and third

as a result of the invasion

had declared that

States,

and their nationals and corporations,

and illegal occupation of Kuwait" and "Immediately be-

gin to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq

,""576
.

.
.

thereby affirming cultural

property conventions' policies, which arguably are protective of the total

environment.

human

577

Resolution 687 continued the theme of Council resolutions with indirect effect

on environmental quality during war through inviting Iraq

to

renew

Geneva

its

Gas Protocol pledges. The same was true for Resolution 686's affirming prior reso-

would have afforded environmental protection
and other international law incorporated by refer-

lutions that, if complied with,

through observance of treaties

ence. Resolution 686's requiring Iraqi acceptance of liability under international

law for loss, damage or injury to Kuwait, other countries and their nationals can be
read as supporting liability for environmental damage as stated in international
law.

These resolutions did not decide ultimate liability; there are still issues of proof

and damages

for international liability for

The

They do, however, powerfully affirm
environmental damage during war.

in individual cases.

a potential

resolutions also demonstrate that belligerents risk a Council decision go-

ing beyond customary and conventional law if there is environmental damage during armed conflict. Moreover, the strength and quality of the law

than the factorial approach

common

resolution governing environmental
579

bers.

There

is

to international law analysis.

may be
578

If a

greater

Council

norms is part of a decision, it binds UN Mem-

also a possibility that these resolutions, intrinsically binding or
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•
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581

•

may approach or be declared jus cogens, trumping treaties and custom.
582
Resolutions may restate treaty or customary norms, thereby strengthening them.
Future wars may find the Council more vigorous, and at the least States can exnot,

pect

b.

more

activity

from

it

and the General Assembly.

Final Thoughts. Conclusions to the foregoing subparts demonstrate that there

apparently were few

LOAC violations, in terms of norms specifically addressed to

environmental protection, or where existing law

if observed

would give

protection to the environment. However, part of the reason for this

is

collateral

the relatively

meager record on environmental degradation during the Tanker War compared
with the 1990-91 Gulf War, where world media attention focused on environmental

outrages Iraq committed.

Geneva Convention or

War?

a

583

Is there a

need for a

"Green" Convention,

as

specific treaty,

some urged

i.e.,

sl

"Fifth"

after the

Gulf

584

For now, the response is No. As the long foregoing analysis demonstrates, there
are general terms in

two

treaties,

ENMOD and Protocol

I,

as well as

many other

agreements, many of whose terms are now also customary norms, that, if observed,
will protect the

environment through compliance with them: the 1907 Hague

Conventions, the Geneva Gas Protocol (condemning gas and bacteriological warfare),

the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the cultural property conventions, and the

Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols. These treaties, and customary norms paralleling them in

many cases, recite general terms (i.e.,

some
cases, discrimination, necessity and proportionality), limit or prohibit attacks on a
wide range of specific objects, or limit or prohibit methods of warfare, all of which
have the important tangential

effect

notice in

of safeguarding the environment. Moreover,

the General Assembly and the Security Council have been active in promoting

norms through resolutions for general standards or specific issues. Although
until recently most resolutions have been nonbinding unless they restated customary or treaty norms, this action has had the effect of strengthening these principles at the least. With the end of Cold War vetoes and revival of the Council so
these

that

it

can function as the Charter drafters intended, there

is

the prospect of

its

passing situation-specific resolutions, including binding decisions, in future
conflicts.
It

seems unnecessary to add yet another international agreement now.

eral standards in place

should suffice until time has had

its

opportunity to

out customary observance, perhaps with widespread acceptance of
Protocol

I.

585

Gensettle

ENMOD and

This is particularly true in the context of the LOS, since the 1982

LOS

Convention, the first major agreement to include norms to govern the oceans envi-

ronment,

would

is

now gaining wide acceptance as treaty law.

If a

new "Green"

recite technical rules, similar to administrative regulations

treaty

accompanying

US environmental legislation, there is the risk of their becoming outmoded before
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the ink would be dry.

587

Developing custom

will allow the flexibility that is help-

588

new area of law.
The 20 new States that have appeared in the
last five years may not have had time to assess policy positions with respect to
589
treaty succession,
let alone a complex new agreement. The sheer number of parties to a new multilateral agreement on a controversial body of law may promote
ful in a relatively

'

delay in negotiations, reservations or understandings that can cloud the treaty's

meaning,

590

and engender delays

in ratification.

There are counter arguments. Developing custom through
wartime rules

is

an awfully expensive way

State practice for

to write law. Treaties are favored

many new States, carry with them the pacta sunt servanda principle,
allel

and thereby augment custom

rules in the public

ministry

files

domain,

593

as a source.

592

591

by

and can par-

Treaties can publish black-letter

i

•

•

r

whereas custom remains in classified private foreign

and can be elusive

to research.

594

On balance, however, the time is not right for a general multilateral agreement,
Geneva Conventions, on environmental protection during armed conflict.

like the

The San Remo Manual; Other A nalyses of the Place of the Environment During War. The San Remo Manual (1995) may be influential in its attempt to
c.

recompile the law of naval warfare on the order of the 1913 Oxford Manual;

it is

not

London Declaration, although it could serve as a basis for fu595
ture diplomatic conferences.
The Manual refers to environmental protection
during armed conflict in several contexts. The ICRC developed Guidelines for
a draft treaty like the

protecting the environment during armed conflict, and these have had their influence.

The 1997 NWP 1-14M, successor loNWP 9A

and Coast Guard,

armed
i.

also refers to the

need

for

for the

US Navy, Marine Corps

environmental protection during

conflict.

A "Due Regard" Formula for Interfacing the LOAC and the LOS. The Man-

ual appears to endorse Robertson's view
conflict

and belligerents should be in terms of "due regard"

pay those

States'

LOS

critical difference;

tracted

that the relation of States not party to a

rights

and obligations

the

EEZ.

597

must

There may be

a

Robertson would apply a due regard formula, which he ex-

from similar principles in the

rules of international law,
fare, targeting,

in, e.g.,

that belligerents

e.g.,

LOS Conventions,

subject to preexisting

prohibitions on certain weapons or means of war-

treatment of civilian persons or objects,

as clear on the point in all cases,

there are no preexisting

598

LOAC

i.e.,

while the Manual

is

not

whether due regard should be applied where

rules, or

whether

it is

a separate consideration

along with the rules. In those situations where the Manual does not qualify its due

Manual provisions would appear to make it
clear that its drafters meant that due regard would be subject to other LOAC rules.
The Manual takes no position on how a due regard formula would factor into
regard formula, the context of other

Maritime Environment

situations Charter law governs,
that an analogous

e.g.,

Part B. 1 proposes

the right of self-defense.

due regard formula be applied in these

537

situations.

This sub-Part discusses the Manual provisions and comments on whether due
regard should be applied in the absence of preexisting
ertson's view, or

whether due regard

is

a factor to

LOAC rules, which is Rob-

be considered alongside the pre-

existing rules.

Due Regard Formula

ii.

Law

for Interfacing

mental Claims. The Manual uses

a

of Naval Warfare and Environ-

due regard formula

to describe the

duty

except for sensitive arowe for protecting the marine environment,
of special importance. For the latter, the Manual provides:

belligerents
eas

[P]arties to the conflict are

encouraged to agree that no hostile actions will be

conducted in marine areas containing:
(a) rare or fragile

ecosystems, or

(b) the habitat of depleted, threatened or

marine

life.603

This provision
guage.

endangered species or other forms of

is

hortatory, not mandatory,

and

reflects

LOS

Convention lan-

604

The environmental due regard formula must be integrated into
of methods and means of warfare, i.e., general
tive, necessity

LOAC principles of military objec-

and proportionality, and that weapons cannot be indiscriminate or

cause unnecessary suffering to humans,
stated in

the basic rules

to the extent specific rules are not

custom or treaties, e.g., hospital ships employed in their normal role

rules against gas

and bacteriological weapons.

or

The specific example of homoge-

method of naval warfare is the relationminelaying and neutral EEZ and continental shelf rights and

nizing environmental protection with a
ship of belligerent
duties

608

The Manual,
resolutions

and constitutional provisions

to protect the

number of treaty rules, international
laying down the obligation of the State

recognizing "the growing

environment," declares that "at the very

least

.

.

.

there

recognition of a need to protect the marine environment, and a duty
State to protect

and preserve the marine environment."

is

a general

upon every

However, proliferation

of sources, and the generality of those most in point, led the Manual drafters to rely

on
iii.

a

due regard formula in most

cases.

Limitations of and Omissions in the San Remo Manual;

Manual

is

not as specific as

it

might be

for sea areas the

nizes. Part of the reason is that the traditional

LOS

Its

Strengths.

Convention recog-

law of naval warfare recognizes only

two divisions of the seas high seas and coastal waters, i.e., the territorial sea,
:

The

the

The Tanker War
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when

situation in 1907

signed.
ties

the

Hague Conventions and

later

LONW treaties were

The result since then has been customary practice built around these trea-

and independently of binding agreements, the circumstance

the 1909

of, e.g.,

London Declaration. Thus there is no specific consideration of the relationship of
the law of naval warfare with environmental concerns, including conservation, in
the Area, high seas fishing areas, offshore fishing operations where the coastal

EEZ,

State has not declared an

f\]

7

EEZ,

the

To be

the continental shelf, the contiguous

some of these ocean zones, but not the
Area, a separate governance under the Convention,
are covered by the Manual's
zone, or the territorial sea.

high seas provision,

them

in terms of the

ual

not discussed.

is

but the relationship of the Convention's subtleties as to

environment and the law of naval warfare recited

Another limitation was the
the land,
part of

e.g.,

shore

sure,

in the Man-

drafters' decision not to include warfare related to

bombardment from

LOAC general principles.

the sea or the

There

is

air,

except as these rules are

no statement of the relationship of

the due regard formula generally applicable to environmental concerns in shore-

ward projection

situations.

On the positive side and somewhat apart from environmental issues, the Manual charts

new

self-defense

courses by including material on the ;ws ad helium,

the law of

i.e.,

and situations where the UN Security Council has acted;

ft]

7

recogniz-

ing without approving the possibility of nonbelligerency status between belliger-

ency and neutrality;
naval warfare;

introducing the military objective concept into the law of

rules applicable to exclusion zones;

l

clarification of whether

naval operations can be undertaken in certain sea areas under the law of the sea;

and principles of air war

at sea.

671

All could interface with environmental protec-

tion claims.

Conclusions with Respect to "Due Regard"; Problems with Analysis. In

iv.

general, both positions of the Manual,

between the
fare

There are three

caveats.

to specific customary,

The Manual recognizes this in several contexts,

custom or general principles based

treaties like the
tile

correct.

any general due regard standard should be subject

treaty or general principles norms.
e.g.,

using a due regard formula for interfaces

LOS and the law of naval warfare, and between the law of naval war-

and environmental concerns, are

First,

i.e.,

rules of proportionality,

etc.,

and

in citing

ENMOD Convention and its prohibition on military or other hos-

use of environmental modification techniques having "widespread, long-last-

ing or severe effects" as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other

Convention party.
ter;

this

is

Such standards must be subject

to law

under the

UN Char-

implied but not specifically stated.

Second, the Manual does not indicate the content of either due regard standard;
it

declares a standard of due regard for the relationship between the

LOS and the
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LOAC and its law of naval warfare component, and a second due regard standard
for the relationship between the LOAC and environmental norms. It does not discuss the content of due regard.

Third, the Manual does not say whether the two standards, or a due regard stan-

dard to be applied in situations governed by the Charter,

ds

should be considered

together as part of a general due regard principle, or whether they should be considered sequentially, i.e., applying due regard in the

LOS -LOAC context first, and

then applying environmental norms against the result of this analysis, or the other

way around,

i.e.,

applying due regard in analyzing the

norms, and then factoring
d.

The

ICRC

this result into analysis

LOS

with the

and environmental

LOAC.

Guidelines for Military Manuals. In 1994 the

ICRC

published

guidelines for military manuals and instructions on protection of the environment

during armed

conflict.

The Guidelines
fleet

626

publish a

of international agreements,

list

custom, observance of which would

many

assist in protecting the

of which re-

environment.

Besides specific rules, the general principles of international law applying to

armed

conflict,

e.g.,

distinction

and proportionality,

also provide protection for

the environment. "In particular, only military objectives

may be

attacked[,]

and

no methods or means of warfare which cause excessive damage shall be employed.
Precautions shall be taken in military operations as required by international
law."
International environmental treaties "and relevant rules of customary law

may continue

to

be applicable" during armed

to the extent that they are not inconsistent

conflict,

with the applicable law of armed

conflict.

Obligations relating to the protection of the environment towards States not party to

an armed conflict

(e.g.,

neighboring States) and in relation to areas beyond the limits

of national jurisdiction

armed
armed

(e.g.,

the

High

Seas) are not affected

by the existence of the

conflict to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the applicable law of
conflict. 629

In cases not covered by treaty rules, "the environment remains under the protec-

and authority of the principles of international law derived from established
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public contion

science."

The ICRC appears to recognize that some international agreements, but not all
of them, related to environmental protection, may apply during war. This is consistent with the general law applying to suspension or termination of treaties during

armed
tions,

conflict,

which

delares that

continue to apply during war.

rules principle of the

many provisions

LOS

some

treaties, e.g.

humanitarian law conven-

This also appears consistent with the other

conventions, which say that the

LOS, now including

protective of the peacetime maritime environment in the

LOS
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Convention,

may

apply during armed conflict.

In terms of the maritime envi-

ronment, the LOS Convention declares that all treaties related to the
generally consistent with

it,

and particularly those

If these factors are

tection.

sistent with the general

LOS must be

related to environmental pro-

taken into account, the ICRC Guidelines appear con-

LOS-LOAC

relationship contemplated

by the

LOS

The Guidelines do
that the San Remo Manual drafters

conventions and the general principles of international law.
not explicitly adopt a due regard formula like

developed almost contemporaneously, but they do seem to say that the environ-

ment shall be a factor to be taken into account for applying general principles of the
LOAC and specific rules. The Guidelines do not recommend principles for the^ws
ad helium, i.e., Charter law, which includes the right to self-defense.
e.

NWP 1-14M and Environmental Protection During Armed Conflict. NWP

1-14M, published nearly a decade after the Tanker War, has a slightly different approach to environmental protection during armed
It is

conflict:

not unlawful to cause collateral damage to the natural environment during an

However, the commander has an
affirmative obligation to avoid unnecessary damage to the environment to the
extent
practicable to do so consistent with mission accomplishment. To that end,
and as far as military requirements permit, methods or means of warfare should be
employed with due regard to the protection and preservation of the natural
environment. Destruction of the natural environment not necessitated by mission
accomplishment and carried out wantonly is prohibited.
[A] commander should
consider the environmental damage which will result from an attack on a legitimate
military objective as one of the factors during targeting analysis.
an attack on

.

.

a legitimate military objective.

.

.

This

reflects, to a certain extent,

Remo Manual,
tive

the

ICRC

.

.

Like the San

Guidelines approach.

NWP 1-14M appears to implicitly require compliance with a posi-

norm, a lawful military objective, but would qualify lawfulness of the objective

by the environmental

factor,

along with other factors, during target assessment.

NWP 1-14M does not appear to address the issue of due regard in the LOS-LOAC
context, nor does it consider the environmental factor in the context of Charter law
issues,

e.g.,

the right of self-defense.

The Tanker War; Proposed Resolution of Issues Raised by the San
Manual, the ICRC Guidelines and
1-14M
4.

Remo

NWP

The Tanker War ended in 1988. The ICRC published its Guidelines in 1994;
the San Remo Manual, developed contemporaneously with them to deal with environmental and many other issues in naval warfare, appeared in 1 995 NWP 1-14M,
;

also dealing with a
texts)

broad spectrum (LOS,

and VI demonstrate that there was little
or concern with, environmental issues during the Tanker War, the

was published in 1997. Chapters

reportage

of,

UN Charter issues, LOAC in all con-

II

Maritime Environment

Nowruz

being a conspicuous exception.

spill

The

541

1990-91 Gulf War raised these

problems to international attention, and the Guidelines, Manual and

NWP 1-14M

were among the reponses. Nevertheless, Tanker War scenarios can supply analysis
to help resolve issues these sources appear to raise.

This subPart attempts

to re-

solve those issues.

Any general due regard policy must give way to a specific norm from the Charter, e.g.,

norms,

the inherent right of self-defense

e.g.,

or other binding Charter-based

and jus

Security Council decisions,

treaties or other primary sources, e.g., established

cogens principles,

as well as

custom. Examples of established

norms include those under Hague IX relating to shore bombardment and general
principles of proportionality and distinction, and the Geneva Gas Protocol and its
no first use reservations, both of which are considered to state custom.
There should be one, general due regard analysis, throwing both LOS due regard concerns, e.g., those for an EEZ of a State not party to a conflict, and environmental concerns, into common analysis with other factors, if there are no binding
LOAC rules, or there is no binding Charter law, governing a situation. There
should be no seriatim analysis of the relationship of LOS standards and environmental concerns under a due regard rubric, followed by a second, similar analysis
of the relationship of environmental concerns and the LOAC, or the other way
around.
is

A similar analysis should apply in Charter law-governed situations. This

so for five reasons:

Some environmental principles are stated in treaties or custom whose geographic parameters may overlap but not coincide with LOS geographic coverage,
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention for example.
If such a
(1)

treaty applies during war,

it

would be legally ludicrous to say that protected spe-

would be subject to a double due regard standard, once
under a LOS-environmental law analysis and a second time under a LOACenvironmental law analysis, while these species' neighbors would not be analyzed
cies in the territorial sea

under
(2)

LOS principles because they were on dry land or beyond LOS ken.
The

degree of conflict between marine environmental protection treaties

LOS Convention has not been sorted out through practice under the latter.
The LOS Convention is not yet treaty law for some countries, including the
United States.
How analysis would proceed between the LOS Convention as
and the

custom and the environmental conventions, whether stating treaty norms or perhaps restating customary norms,
(3)

is

even more problematical.

There are environmental standards

provisions,

for

in the

which the Manual apparently

LOS Convention's navigational
states a separate

due regard

re-

„,„,„,, 647
quirement.
(4)

There

is

a

huge volume of recent

bilateral

and regional

treaties

with a

myriad of environmental norms. A double level due regard standard would further
complicate analysis.
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(5)

Applying

a single

due regard formula can be more

accomplished

as

even as rules of engagement (ROE)

part of the military planning process,

may be customized for particular military operations
a.

easily

or scenarios.

The Specifics of the Proposed Analysis. The Restatement (Third) ofForeign Rela-

tions

Law

of the United States factorial analysis, combined with an earlier, similar

method for deterapply where claims for applying the LOS, the LOAC, and in-

approach in the Restatement (Second) Conflict ofLaws,

offers a

•,

mining what law

to

ternational environmental law intersect.

The

Restatement (Third) approach to

prescriptive jurisdiction, i.e., a State's authority to apply its law to persons or activ653

65?
ities

outside

its territory,

is

particularly appropriate.

To be sure, the Restatement (Third) analysis in a transnational context has its deSome US courts and academic critics have rejected the Restatement
tractors.
Nevertheless, many US federal courts have adopted a Re(Second), Conflicts.
statement (Third) -style analysis for transnational litigation involving federal law;

these courts use analyses similar to the Restatement (Second), Conflicts or the Restatement (Third) for admiralty

and maritime

variant of the factorial approach,
658

(Second), Conflicts.

if

657
cases.

Many US

state courts use a

they do not accept verbatim the Restatement

Commentators and courts outside the United

States have

been less hospitable to US courts' extraterritorial reach under formulas like theRebut there has been a trend toward recognizing the effects doctrine in

statements,
all

but name.

However

660

that

may be, the Restatement analysis proffered here is submitted in a

different context,

i.e.,

terests, the interests

conflict of different countries' public international law in-

of international organizations in some situations, and the

interests of three different bodies of public international law, the

mental law and the
context and
sition in

its

some

LOAC. Moreover,

LOS, environ-

from the courtroom

as distinguished

necessarily after-the-fact interest analysis that has generated oppo-

quarters to the Restatements' factorial approaches,

analysis can be a valuable planning tool before military operations

this
66?

kind of

and may,

if

thoroughly and neutrally applied, be useful justification for the operation if claims
arise

during or after execution. In this regard the proposed methodology as a plan-

ning device
lines.

is

more akin

to

US NEPA

requirements

The latter note participation of other countries

eral negotiation processes

Antitrust Guide-

There

is

and

bilat-

view that this type of

indication that facto-

may be gaining acceptance, claims and commentators to the contrary
f.f.'j

in other contexts notwithstanding,

b.

its

in multilateral

to avoid friction; this supports a

planning has justification in international law.
rial analysis

or

particularly in the

Method ofAnalysis. Rather than proceeding

LOS

668

context.

directly to a factorial analysis to

determine the due regard formula in a given context, as might seem to be

Maritime Environment

recommended by the Restatement (Third),

the

first

Restatement (Second), Conflicts, whether positive

those

so,

norms should
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inquiry should be, by analogy to

norms govern the

situation.

If

control.

The first step is to determine whether UN Charter

670

671

or jus cogens

norms ap-

ply; if so, they should apply without regard to customary, treaty or general princi-

pies norms.

An

example

is

the inherent right of self-defense.

cogens based principles apply, they trump

the due regard principle

is

67?

If

Charter or jus

any due regard analysis unless, of course,

considered part of Charter law or jus cogens in a given

context.

Second,
673

States,
i.e.,

the

if a state

a balance

of armed conflict does not exist as between contending

must be struck between competing international law norms,

LOS and the law of the maritime environment. If positive principles gov-

ern this interface, e.g., a coastal State's right to regulate innocent passage through
its territorial

sea

or perhaps a regional or global agreement to protect part of the

marine environment that

lays

down rules or standards,

67S

those norms, including

those recognized in custom or general principles, would govern without recourse
to a

due regard formula. The analyst would employ the traditional

factorial ap-

proach generally used for public international law issues to balance among these

primary and secondary or evidentiary sources.
treaty format, prescribes

due regard

for the

676

If the applicable law, usually in

marine environment, then the pro-

posed due regard formula, or one like it, would be taken into account. Charter and
677

norms would prevail over the balancing process.
The only time that a
due regard formula would be employed in the absence of incorporation by either
the LOS or the law of the maritime environment would be where the two bodies of
law collide, and resolution cannot be had without a balancing process.
If an armed conflict situation exists, the same principles apply. If LOAC princi-

jus cogens

ples explicitly take into account environmental claims during war, those princi-

ples

must be applied. The LOS, as stated in the LOS conventions, declares that it is

LOAC and its LONW compoA traditional factorial analysis would be applied to sources of the LOAC

subject to "other rules of international law," i.e., the
678

nent.

bearing on the issue.

679

This would include sources protecting the maritime envi680

ronment during armed conflict, e.g., the ENMOD Convention.
Applying a due
regard formula would have no place unless incorporated as part of the analysis of
681

As with peacetime situations at sea, Charter and jus cogens
68?
norms will trump principles based on traditional sources.
As in the LOS-law of
marine environment context, due regard analysis would only be applied, absent
incorporation of due regard by positive law, where the LOAC and the law of the
marine environment directly conflict, and there can be no resolution without a
stated sources of law.

balancing process.
Belligerents
flict

must pay due regard

and have due regard

to

LOS rights of States not party to the con-

for those States'

marine environment rights and for the
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maritime environment.

States not party to the conflict,

i.e.,

neutrals

and

must pay due regard to

nonbelligerents (if this status in international law exists)

LOS rights of States not party to the conflict, and to such States' marine environment rights, and for the maritime environment, except insofar as the LOAC might
apply as between them and belligerents' claims.
These States must do the same
with respect to belligerents' LOS and environmental rights, and the maritime environment. However, as stated for other scenarios,
no due regard analysis would
be necessary if positive principles of law, e.g., the LOS, the law of the marine environment or the LOAC, require it, or if comparing these bodies of law produces a
conflict, and a more refined analysis must resolve the issue.
Charter or jus cogens
/TOO
norms will trump traditional sources and due regard analysis.

The reality of much of the foregoing is that, apart from Charter principles dealing with territorial integrity of States and the right of self-defense,

689
little

Charter

law will impact States' actions regarding environmentally- related issues unless the
Security Council issues a decision.

and perhaps small
mulas,

692

in scope.

Jus cogens

Apart from the

is

an amorphous concept

LOS

at best

conventions' due regard forr

no declarations of that sort in positive law have been found in the LOAC

more specifically, the law of naval warfare; the law of the maritime environment apart from the LOS conventions; or the law of the marine environment during war. The only other major source is the San Remo Manual, itself a secondary or

or,

693

evidentiary source

although purporting to recite established law most of the

There is a relatively wide potential for applying due regard (or reasonable-

time.

ness) principles in

LOS-law of the marine environment

belligerents in a naval warfare context, or in relationships
to a conflict

and

interfaces,

between

among States not party

belligerents.

The Content of Due Regard; Factors to be Considered. The
content of due regard, not discussed in the San Remo Manual.

c.

final issue is the

Factors for the

content of due regard, or reasonableness, a nonexclusive enumeration might include these, based on Restatement (Third)

(a)

§ 403(2):

Linkage of a belligerent's activity to the jurisdiction or sovereignty of a

State not party to a conflict,

i.e.,

the extent to which belligerent activity takes

place within that State's jurisdiction or sovereignty, or

is

perceived at the

time to have substantial, direct and foreseeable effect on sovereign or

juris-

dictional interests of a State not party to a conflict;

(b) Connections, e.g., flag State of vessels or aircraft, nationality of persons

involved on

e.g.,

offshore oil platforms or

on

vessels, or

economic

the time between a belligerent and a State not party to a conflict;

activity at
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Character of the activity of a State not party to the conflict to be cur-

(c)

tailed, regulated or

eliminated; importance of that activity to that State; the

extent to which other States have curtailed, regulated or eliminated that activity in the past;

and the degree

regulation or elimination

(d)

The

is

to

which

desirability of such curtailment,

generally accepted by other States at the time;

extent of justified expectations, by States not party to a conflict

and other interests, e.g., shipping interests and

their insurors, that

might be

protected or affected by a belligerent's actions at the time;

The importance

(e)

at the

time of a belligerent's action or interests of a

State not party to the conflict, to the international political, legal and/or eco-

nomic systems;
(f)

The extent to which a belligerent's action, or the response of a State not

party to the conflict,

is

consistent at the time with traditions of the interna-

tional system;

The

(g)

interest to

which other

States, or international

governmental or

nongovernmental organizations, may have in acting in the situation

at

the

time;

(h)

The likelihood of conflict with action by another

State or an interna-

tional

governmental or nongovernmental organization

at the time;

(i)

The

impact, from what

is

apparent at the time, that action by States,

whether belligerent or not party to a conflict, will have on other States' duties
or obligations with respect to the environment; and

(j)

The

impact, from what

is

apparent at the time, that action by States,

whether belligerent or not party to the conflict, will have on the environment
irrespective of any State's duties or obligations with respect to the environ-

™~«*
ment.

696

This proposed enumeration contemplates an armed conflict situation involving a

and therefore the LOS, the

LOAC

component the
LONW, and the law of the marine environment, are involved. However, the same
kind of analysis could be employed where contending States base claims solely on
the LOS and its interface with the law of the marine environment. Similarity of interests and factors considered for the latter situation becomes apparent when the
State as a belligerent

and

its

scenario of active intervention on the high seas to minimize pollution from a leak-

ing tanker, whether after a grounding or following attack during armed conflict,

is
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Assuming identical spillage in either case, the result for the environbe the same unless action is taken, including anticipatory action.

considered.

ment will
The factorial list has a two-State analysis in mind. Given a possibility of self-defense alliances,
ganizations,

e.g.,

arrangements,
will

698

interactions of States not party to a conflict through regional or-

those dealing with environmental problems, or more informal

e.g.,

the Gulf War Coalition, probably

be involved in armed conflict situations, where

many more

than two States

LOS and law of the marine en-

vironment issues mix with law of naval warfare problems, or scenarios involving
the

LOS and the law of the marine environment. For these circumstances, the law

of treaty reservations might be consulted for analogous analysis.

One

critical

refinement

Taken from

sis.

is

inclusion of the phrase "at the time" in the analy-

declarations to Protocol

I,

two Conventional Weapons Con-

vention protocols and the Second Protocol to the Cultural Property Convention,

702

and the San Remo Manual for naval warfare,

pability to

what is reasonably known

environment or others'
ble, are taken.

LOS

The same

703

to participants

the phrase would limit cul-

when

rights or responsibilities,

decisions involving the

and the

qualification should apply in self-defense situations;

planners or actors should be held accountable for what they

known at the time of decision.
factorial analysis

LOAC if applica-

knew or should have

Although the foregoing sources and the proposed

contemplate a war scenario, planners should not be liable for

more than they know, or with reasonable investigation should know, when only
the LOS and the law of the maritime environment apply.
d.

The Tanker War

Testing the Proposed Analysis.

offers

examples of

how

the

suggested factorial analysis might apply in future conflicts. With one exception,
the Iraqi attack on Iran's

Nowruz facilities, situations taken from the Tanker War

are largely hypothetical because of the incomplete factual record related to envi-

ronmental issues in other instances. Analysis follows the same nonexclusive
proposed above. Three scenarios have been selected to

might proceed:
attacks

on

its

(1)

Charter law,

i.e.,

self-defense,

illustrate

was involved in

how

list

analysis

US responses to

warships and other platforms, and attacks on US-flagged merchant

ships. (2) Belligerents' attacks

on neutral shipping involved application of the

LOAC in an LOS context. (3) Iraq attacked Iran's Nowruz facilities, resulting in a
massive

oil spill

threatening fishing grounds, neutrals' desalination plants, and

possibly high seas navigation; the

LOS, including LOS-based

treaty law,

and the

LOAC were involved in this situation as well.
i.

US Self-Defense Responses Against Iranian Warships. If due regard for the

environment is part of the self-defense norm, the record seems fairly clear that US
responses against Iranian platforms involved no significant

oil spillage.

There

necessarily was spillage in connection with sinking or disabling attacking Iranian
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warships. Because the Charter, Articles 51 and 103, have no criteria beyond state-

of self-defense and superiority of Charter law
ments of the inherent right
~
70^

the nonexclusive indicia listed above are considered,

over treaties,

at least

10ft

along

with other self-defense criteria, necessity and proportionality and, for anticipatory
self-defense, action that admits of no other alternative:

(a)

707

There was definite linkage of Iranian activity to a State not party to the
United States) when Iran began offensive naval operations

conflict (the

US warships. Threatening to fire, or firing, weapons against another
country's men of war had a substantial, direct, foreseeable effect on that
against

US) sovereign interests. Factor (a) clearly points to validity of
the US response. Since the attack occurred on the high seas, there were no en-

country's

(i.e.,

vironmental interests of other States to consider, except insofar as the resulting slick from damaged or sunken ships might have impeded high seas

freedoms or have fouled their shores. There
event Iran's action

is

no record of such, and in any

demanded immediate US response

in anticipatory

self-defense.

(b)

Connections to the flag were strong as to both actors: warships were in-

volved, and this factor

(c)

As

to character

is

evenly balanced.

and importance of the activity of a

State not party to a

United States had an inherent right of unit self-defense;

conflict, the

high seas freedom of navigation under the
strongly supports the

LOS was also at issue.

Factor

US
(c)

US action.

merchantmen carrying cargoes not destined for Iraq, clear violations of international law, and the near
certainty that these attacks would continue in the future, the balance of this
factor tips heavily in favor of the US action. Although leakage from damaged
(d)

Given

Iran's record of attacking neutral

warships could be expected to pollute the maritime environment, this could

be expected

to

be relatively slight compared with what could be expected

if

Iran hit just one fully-loaded large tanker.

(e) It

tries

was vitally important that the United States

assert the right of coun-

not party to the conflict to high seas freedom of navigation;

portant that the right of self-defense be vindicated.

It

it

was im-

was also important that

economic interests of ocean carriers, their consignees and insurers, which lie
behind the freedom of the seas, be protected. Factor (e) weighs strongly in favor of the

US

action.
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(f)

Iran's action

was

and the

not,

US

response was, consistent with tradi-

tions of the international system.

(g)

Other

States,

and international governmental organizations, had

ex-

pressed their policies by that time; the Security Council had passed resolutions deploring these attacks,

actions to protect shipping.

(h)

and other countries' navies were engaged

There was no likelihood of conflict with other

organizations' actions; if anything, the

might have expected

if

in
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attacks

States or international

US action was in line with what Iran

on other countries' warships had occurred.

The impact of US self-defense measures on other States' duties or obligations to the environment is not clear. The Iran-Iraq conflict ended soon af(i)

terward. This factor

(j)

The same

is

is

neutral in application.

true with respect to

what impact the

US

measures would

have on the environment irrespective of other States' duties or obligations to
the environment.

When these

10 nonexclusive factors are considered,

it is

relatively clear that envi-

ronmental deprivation claims based on pollution from sunken or damaged Iranian
warships would have been countered with strong policy arguments under the
Charter and the

LOS to justify US action and for finding that the United States ob-

served due regard for other States' environmental interests and for the environ-

ment

in its responses. If attacking Iranian warships

naval auxiliary tanker with potential for a large slick

had included
if

a deep-draft

damaged or sunk, naval

thinking and planning might have dictated different actions so long as
ships'

fundamental security was assured.
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For example,

if the

US

war-

tanker were not in

an immediate area of confrontation and was in the rear to replenish the Iranian destroyers,

and

it

was otherwise

militarily advantageous to

remove the tanker from

further participation as part of self-defense measures, disabling fire as distin-

guished from destruction might have been ordered. Towing the disabled tanker

back to port might have had a salutory political-military side effect of "delivering a
message" besides encouraging better law compliance.

ii.

Belligerents' Attacks

on Neutral Shipping.

A

second analysis from the

Tanker War may illuminate issues where there are no self-defense norms or other
Charter-based principles at stake. The record is not clear as to the extent of marine

on neutral shipping. If it had
the Kuwait Regional Convention and

pollution that accompanied Iranian and Iraqi attacks

been considerable, and no
Protocol

710

treaty,

e.g.,

or other customary standards were directly involved, either with
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respect to individual attacks or attacks taken as a whole, the 10-factor analysis

might proceed thus:

had clear and devastating effect on other coun-

(a) Belligerents' activities
tries'

sovereign or jurisdictional interests. In the case of warship,

Stark and U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts as noted in the
States involved were the belligerents

merchantmen, the

issue

is

nificant interests involved,

711

e.g.,

rights

and jurisdiction

ritorial sea;

and coastal

their coastal

(b)

hypothetical, the only
States. In the case of

sure, the

law of the flag

nationality of beneficial owners of vessels,

members, cargo owners, cargo consignees and

and other high

U.S.S.

applied to the ships, but there were other sig-

Moreover, there were seafaring
tion, fishing

and the United

more complicated. To be

from the law of naval warfare
charterers, crew

first

e.g.,

States' interests

seas rights
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using the Gulf for naviga-

and freedoms; and

EEZ, continental

insurers.

coastal States'

and

ter-

States' interests in protecting desalination plants

and

in the

shelf, fishing zones,

environment in general.

The same sort of connections were at stake with respect to these States'

associations or

economic

activity.

This

is

an example of the overlap of

factors.

Freedom of navigation and high seas fishing without concern for environmental factors such as polluted seas that would force curtailment of naval
operations, diversion from regular shipping lanes or from some fishing
(c)

grounds; the right of seafarers to pursue occupations in a clean environment;
the right of coastal States and their peoples to potable drinking water and a
clean environment; were

(d)

all

important interests.

The interests in Factor (c) were justified in expectations for a clean en-

vironment, and these were affected by belligerent actions.

(e)

The

apparent justification of the attacks was to curtail shipment of

goods to finance opponents' war efforts and to intimidate other Persian Gulf
users.
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On the other hand, interests of States not party to the conflict were

strong, based

(f)

on the LOS.

Iran and Iraq did not act consistently with traditions of the interna-

tional system, including Charter principles such as those in Article 2(4),

nor

LOS rights of freedom of
navigation and fishing, or equally well-established LOAC principles. On the
did they behave consistently with well-established

other hand, States not party to the conflict were within their Charter rights
(e.g.,

the Article 51 inherent right of self-defense), the

LOS, and

the

LOAC.

8
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This weighs strongly against the belligerents in terms of significant environmental deprivations incident to their actions against Gulf shipping.

Other

(g)

States' interests,

In addition, Council Resolutions 552 and 598 con-

has been described.

demned these attacks
ual

whether individually or in groups, in acting

in 1984

and 1987.
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Although these actions, individ-

and collective, by other States did not state environmental concerns, this

strong manifestation of interest would be weighed against belligerents for

any ensuing environmental damage.
(h)

Based on the record summarized in Factor

conflict with actions

by other

(g),

there was

little if

any

States or international organizations at the

time.

There was some potential

(i)

for serious

impact on coastal States' duties or

obligations with respect to the natural environment, e.g., obligations to protect their coastal areas or their obligation to

peoples, livestock

Finally,

(j)

it

and

provide potable water for their

plants.

may have been apparent, at the time, that these attacks, indi-

vidually or taken as a whole,

would have deleterious

effects

on the

environment.
In summary,
tacks

if significant

environmental degradations occurred in belligerent at-

on Gulf shipping during the Tanker War, and no norms based on

treaties

such as the Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol had applied, evaluation under an expanded due regard analysis would have found the belligerents guilty of

not having given due regard to environmental considerations for this aspect of the
conflict.

iii.

The

factors

would have weighed strongly against them.

The Iraqi Attack on

in the

wake of Iraqi

spects: there

was

Nowniz Facilities. Analysis for the massive spill
on Iran's Nowruz facilities was different in three re-

Iran's

attacks

a definite threat to the

fishing grounds and desalination plants,

high seas environment and to neutrals'
71

ft

the Security Council did not act, and

the Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol, treaties governing offshore pollution,
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were involved with respect

to neutrals; they

may have been suspended or

terminated between Iran and Iraq, and perhaps as to neutrals.

71

If the

Convention

and Protocol did not apply because of treaty termination or suspension factors, any
custom, perhaps based on the treaty or the general LOS, continued to apply.

The

10-factor

due regard analysis might proceed thus:
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(a)

Although Nowruz was an Iranian

eignty, the Iraqi attacks

had

facility

551

and subject to Iranian sover-

clear linkage to States not party to the conflict

through threats to their fishing

interests, desalination plants

freedom of navigation and other

LOS

rights.

Whether

and high

seas

Iraq could have

known at the time that its attacks would result in substantial, direct and foreseeable effects

is

not known, but there

almost a conclusive presumption

is

that Iraq as a major oil-producing country knew, or should have known at the

time, that its attacks would likely have some or all of these effects. This factor

weighs heavily against
(b)

Iraq.

There was a connection between Iraq and neutrals, i.e.,

at least

the cus-

tomary LOS and perhaps the Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol if it
continued to apply. This cuts against Iraq.

(c)

As in the case of high

seas attacks

on neutral shipping, there were very

important interests of neutrals involved, including interests in having potable water

and a source of food (fish), laying aside the additional

trals to trade

not

act,

with Iran

at

the terminal. Although the Security Council did

the record indicates that neutrals,

concern and

may have

right of neu-

e.g.,

the United States, expressed

tried to help curtail the spill.

This factor weighs

against Iraq.

(d) Neutrals' justified expectations

attacks as
tor

were as high

at the

time of the Nowruz

when their merchantmen were attacked on the high seas. This fac-

weighs against

Iraq.

As in the second scenario, neutrals' interests were high in being able to
exercise freedom of navigation, to feed their peoples, and to have sufficient
drinking water. On the other hand, depriving Iran of Nowruz, a legitimate
target under the LOAC, was very important to Iraq. Without having the full
(e)

facts for Iraq's or neutrals' positions, this factor is

even in strength of

policies.

Iraq's actions,

(f)

and neutrals'

reactions,

were both consistent at the time

with traditions of the international system. In terms of factorial analysis,
Iraqi sovereign interests in prosecuting its
total

war

(g)

for the belligerents.

Other States had interests in acting in the situation at the time. Besides

loss of an

in

war effort was very strong; it was a

opportunity for legitimate trade at Nowruz, neutrals had interests

freedom of navigation in the Gulf, feeding their peoples, and preserving

their water supplies,

all

threatened by the result of Iraqi attacks. There was
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official

IGO or NGO

action with respect to the attack. Nevertheless, this

factor inclines toward the neutrals.

(h)

Apart from Iran's attempts to defend Nowruz, at the time of the attack

there seemed to be

little

likelihood of conflict with actions taken by another

State or an international organization, although the Security Council or

other international organization could have reacted to the attacks. This factor favors Iraq.

(i)

Iraq's action

had strong impact on other

States' duties or obligations

with respect to the environment, particularly those States' coastal environ-

ment. This factor cuts against Iraq.

(j)

There was no impact, apparent

at

the time, of other States' action that

would have involved the environment.

Thus under the

10-factor analysis

Iraqi action (a, b,

c, d, g, i),

and two (e, j) were neutral.

that Iraqi action was unlawful

the

first

two factors favor Iraq (f, h), six would oppose the

two scenarios, the

under

a

A nose-count vote would say

due regard standard. However,

as

noted in

must be considered.

relative strengths of each policy

Here too the interest in a clean, safe Gulf environment outweighs the perceived advantages Iraq had in successfully attacking Nowruz. Seen as a proportionality
analysis under the

LOAC,

the attack was not proportionate

factors are taken into account.

e.

Conclusions.

The

foregoing analysis

factors are not exclusive in

in solving issues
as stated in the

when environmental

720

is

quite tentative; the Restatement-based

enumeration and are submitted

as a first brief to assist

made more knotty by confluence of four bodies of law: oceans law

LOS Convention with its major contribution of guiding principles

with respect to the martime environment; international environmental law,

and incorporated

tively in its infancy

particularly the law of naval warfare,

corporated in the

LOS

in part in the

most of which

Convention,

its

Convention; the

is

rela-

LOAC and

customary and which

is in-

predecessors and parallel customary

norms, through the other rules clauses; charter law. Further thinking might apply
this

methodology to other events of the Tanker War or to other armed conflict sit-

uations, particularly
available. In

when

concrete facts related to environmental conditions are

any event, multifactor

analysis, already a feature of modern military

planning, should take environmental concerns into account.
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Part C. General Conclusions

it

and Projections
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for the Future

Ocean pollution is not a new phenomenon, nor has been the attempt to prevent
through international agreements and customary law. Oil largely replaced sail

and coal as the propellant of choice for oceangoing vessels, and navies also became
dependent on it early in this century. The motor vehicle and aircraft became the
transportation of choice on land, and transoceanic flights were harbingers of the
future.

The world's largest oil reserves were discovered in the Middle East. During

World War II the lifeblood of the combatants was petroleum, not only to fire ships'
boilers but to propel aircraft and increasingly mobile armies and to lubricate the
sinews of mechanized armed forces.
Since World War II, however, a veritable explosion in use of petroleum has occurred. Although nuclear power has replaced oil for some warships, petroleum remains the primary fuel for most navies, including countries with nuclear-powered
warships,

e.g.,

China, France, Russia, the United

Kingdom and the United States.

Motor vehicle use and numbers have grown exponentially worldwide. Airlines
have absorbed much of overland mass transit demands and have largely replaced
ocean
this

liners,

To satisfy

except for the cruise line industry, for transoceanic travel.

demand, steamship companies have built ever

larger tankers, not necessarily

more of them, to transport oil more cheaply in bulk. Although pipelines frequently
carry oil across national borders, they must stop at the water's edge or perhaps offshore terminals built to accommodate huge tankers. Other types of merchant ships
have also grown larger in tonnage, and the cargoes they carry sometimes include
consignments as toxic to the environment as before the Second World War but are
greater in relative size.

gation or attack
the War,

ment.
size
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by

The result is that each accident, incident of negligent navi-

belligerents can result in

more massive pollution than before

when typical tankers ranged between 5,000 and 10,000 tons displaceThe same is true to a lesser extent for warships, which have also grown in

and therefore voracity and capacity for fuel, and the supply trains accompany-

ing mobile task forces also include larger supply tankers.

The result, as in the case

of negligent navigation or accidents that befall merchant tankers,
larger slicks

The law
plexity.

is

a potential for

from damaged or sunken ships of war.

applicable to the ocean environment has also

While agreements concluded early in

grown

in size

this century occasionally

and com-

attempted

more often than not treaties tried to deal with prinSOLAS or COLREGS, which, if observed, would contribute to a cleaner

to regulate oil pollution at sea,
ciples,

e.g.,

environment. Since ratification of the Charter in 1945, however, there has been a
sea change in environmental regulation.

SOLAS

and

The

old themes, represented by newer

COLREGS versions, continued, but multilateral treaty responses to

maritime disasters as they occurred, e.g., losses of Amoco Cadiz and Torrey Canyon,

began

to

promote environmental

controls.

The 1958 LOS conventions
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represented a parallel development, restating in international agreements major

components of the law of the

sea, until

then largely customary in format.

The UN

General Assembly began promoting a cleaner environment through nonbinding
resolutions, particularly those resulting

since then the

from the 1972 Stockholm Conference, and

UN Environmental Programme has promoted negotiation and rati-

fication of many regional agreements for protection of the

The

maritime environment.

1958 conventions and regional environmental treaties preserved longstand-

immunity of warships, naval auxiliaries,
State vessels on noncommercial service, and State aircraft, or crystallized new cus-

ing customary norms in most cases,

tomary norms,

e.g.,

e.g.,

the continental shelf.

The

1958 conventions' other rules

clauses declared that these treaties were subject to the

warfare component in appropriate situations.

LOAC and its law of naval

The Vienna Convention on the Law

of Treaties recognized traditional grounds for treaty suspension or termination,
impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances but did not include rules
for suspension or termination
723

during armed

conflict, the latter

being

left to

cus-

tomary norms.

A

major watershed came in 1982 with the

force in 1994,

LOS

Convention, which went into

and which has found increasing acceptance by

ratifications

and

ac-

LOS conventions, much of
which had become customary law by then, the 1982 LOS Convention recognized
and regularized rules for innocent passage, straits passage, the EEZ (now a customcessions since. Besides consolidating terms of the 1958

ary norm), the continental shelf and archipelagic waters while expanding the per-

missible reach of a territorial sea to 12, and a contiguous zone to 24, miles.

The

Convention's major innovations were rules for the deep seabed through terms
tablishing and governing the Area, and

many

es-

provisions, including Part XII, to

regulate the maritime environment. Countries such as the United States that have

not ratified the Convention have recognized the customary nature of
tional articles

Much of Part XII of the Convention, the principal re-

pository of environmental principles, repeats custom and
is

naviga-

and therefore many provisions affecting the maritime environment

encased within these terms.

same

its

is

not innovative.

The

true of other Convention provisions; the principle of immunity for war-

ships, naval auxiliaries,

government ships on noncommercial

service,

and

State

aircraft is repeated, as is the other rules concept.

The LOAC as it relates to the environment has followed a similar pattern. The
1907 Hague Conventions, and before them the 1899 conventions, provided for
protecting historic monuments, universities,

etc.,

thereby codifying custom in some cases. Today

customary norms binding all

States.

mental concerns any more than the
sea,

but their

effect, if

not connected with conflict,

many more Hague principles

are

These agreements did not articulate environfirst treaties

governing navigation or safety at

observed, protects the environment. This trend continued

through the mid-Twentieth Century with development of customary norms and
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agreements, some of which limited or forbade means of warfare, observance of

Geneva Gas Protocol); or further protected areas, objects or classes of persons {e.g., the Roerich Pact, Hague
Cultural Property Convention, Genocide Convention, and 1949 Geneva Convenwhich promotes environmental protection

tions, particularly the

{e.g.,

the

Fourth Convention), which also contribute to environmen-

Most of these treaties affected land warfare or
aerial bombardment, perhaps from the sea. For the most part, the law of naval warprotection if observed during war.

tal

fare has

remained customary in nature.
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Several developments late in the Twentieth Century pointed toward direct interest in regulating naval warfare as

col

it

relates to the

environment, however. Proto-

includes provisions related to environmental protection, stated generally and

I

perhaps not yet customary in nature, and the

ENMOD Convention, probably ac-

cepted as custom today, relates directly to the oceans environment. Protocol

I

and

the Conventional Weapons Convention and its protocols restate customary principles applying to

all

warfare: discrimination, proportionality

and

necessity,

Navies began revising their operational law manuals to reflect these

opments

and

LOAC devel-

LOS, chief among them NWP 9, and its successor, NWP
1995 the San Remo Manual, the first compilation of rules of naval war-

as well as the

1-14M. In

fare since the 1913 Oxford Naval Manual, included

environmental protections dur-

ing war at sea and advanced a concept of requiring belligerents to have due regard
for the

environment and due regard for obligations and rights of States not party to

the conflict with respect to the law of the sea. These ideas were taken from the

LOS

The ICRC Guidelines (1994) and NWP 1-14M

conventions' due regard principles.

(1997) also publish principles for environmental protection during war.

The Manual did not expand on
this

the due regard principle.

A principal

focus of

Chapter has been to advocate that due regard principles governing relation-

ships between the

LOS and the LOAC, and the LOAC and the law of the marine

environment, should be considered together and not seriatim or separately.

Due re-

gard should be defined through a factorial approach similar to those used in the

American Law

Institute's Conflict of

Laws

{Second)

and Foreign

(Third) Restatements, unless there are positive rules of

cogens or sources such as treaties or

Relations

Law

law from the Charter, jus

custom establishing

a standard.
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The UN Charter, and development of law under it, has been another phenomenon of the second half of this century. This can have major implications for the
LOS and the law of the marine environment, and the LOAC. After a Cold War hiatus since 1950, use of Security Council decisions
ticles

binding UN Members under Ar-

25 and 48 has been revived, particularly with respect to the 1990-91 Gulf

War. Council and General Assembly resolutions may also be non-binding
ture,

i.e.,

as calls for action or

recommendations, but they can

restate

in na-

and therefore

strengthen other sources of law, e.g., custom or treaties. This process was used during the Tanker

War when

Council resolutions condemned attacks on merchant
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The Gulf War

shipping. Council resolutions also superseded the traditional law.

marked the first time that the Council specifically condemned a country, Iraq,
for environmental pollution and held it liable for damages. Other recent crises and
conflicts, e.g., the 1990-91 Gulf War
and crises in the former Yugoslavia
and
730
Haiti
have also been influenced by Council resolutions, some binding and some
hortatory. The Assembly has a long and strong record of activity related to environmental protection and the LOAC, the 1972 Stockholm Conference being a watershed. Assembly resolutions are nonbindingper se, but they can restate custom or
treaty norms or influence later primary sources. This has been apparent in, e.g. the
1982 LOS Convention and treaties stating rules for armed conflict.
Besides the Council and Assembly, UN specialized agencies, such as IMO,
which sponsors environment-protective treaties for oceans travel and safety, and
nongovernmental agencies, e.g., the ICRC, sponsor of the Geneva Conventions
and their Protocols, have contributed significantly to the legal milieu.
Yet another phenomenon since the end of World War II has been a worldwide
communications and media revolution, particularly the use of television, and increased attention of national and worldwide publics on the environment. There is
731
also near real-time coverage of wars.
Worldwide use of the Internet promises
even more intense public interest in environmental affairs and armed conflict.
The US Congress passed NEPA in 1972, and there has been a flood of more specialalso

y

ized national environmental legislation since then,
tion of the oceans.

732
"

As

this practice

statutes can also contribute to

grown

too,

much of it related to the condi-

becomes more worldwide, these national

customary standards. Media war coverage has

beginning with the Viet

Nam

conflict.

As

yet technical capacity

and

shipboard space and security have limited media reporting of ongoing environ-

mental casualties at sea, especially during armed conflict, which
of minutes, not days, as in the case of land warfare. There
smaller naval vessels,

dard

e.g.,

for

is

usually a matter

is little

media passengers, and during the Tanker War

US NOTAMs and NOTMARs warned away

vessels

and

aircraft

might have been hired by media looking for a story) because of the
attacks

on

room aboard
stan-

(which

risk of suicide

US warships. One result has been lack of public sources to assess the na-

ture of environmental disasters at sea; often these are locked in classified govern-

ment

files

or reports, other unpublished sources,

e.g.,

arbitrations or otherwise

unreported litigation results because of lawyer-client privilege related to private-party litigation or the national security exception to evidence disclosure, or in
private

company files. Moreover,

cur, but

in earlier instances massive pollution

media focus was on other aspects of the tragedy,

a recent

might oc-

example being

merchant ships attacked during the Tanker War. There were print reports and occasional television

there was

sound

bites of flaming ships

and dying merchant

no statement of the extent of pollution. Even the Nowruz

ceived only scant attention.

Whether

this will

change in the future

is

sailors,

but

oil spill re-

a matter of
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technology, national security, the rules of evidence and interest of readers, viewers
or Internet users.
If the

impact of media coverage and public interest in pollution

from merchant ship accidents or negligent navigation,
the result of conflict,

oil

whether

pumping blowouts,

conjectural, there are other factors that

is

at sea,

or

must be considered

for the future.

1.

The Proliferation of Players
Although planners have been aware of the possible impact of Council decisions

and the influence of other Council resolutions or those of the Assembly, and of the
ICRC promotion of the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, there is also a
wide range of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations
would be connected with the law of the sea, the international law of the
environment, and the law of armed conflict. These range from IMO, a UN specialthat are or

Kuwait

ized agency; regional organizations of countries such as those party to the

Regional Convention and its Protocol; the UN Environment Programme, sponsor
of such agreements; Greenpeace, an environmental advocacy group that has urged

Geneva Convention to protect the environment; to the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, which sponsored the San Remo Manual. Some of these,

a fifth

e.g.,

IMO, can develop

rules

All can produce policy

custom or

binding on member countries like the United

documents and

treaties in the fluid legal

rules that

may

States.

influence development of

environment. There are comparable groups

within countries, such as the Maritime

Law Association within the United States,

analogous to the American Bar Association, composed of maritime lawyers, judges

and academics and linked to the Comite Maritime Internationale in Brussels, Belgium, which sponsors

treaties related to

maritime law, or the Sierra Club, a

US-based environmental advocacy group.

A recent phenomenon has been another spurt in newly independent States, primarily in Europe, matching the post- World

This
sion.

may promote
733

War

II

decolonization movement.

controversy because of the amorphous law of treaty succes-

Moreover, to the extent these countries have coastlines and navies and

therefore interests in the

naval warfare, there

is

LOS, the law of the maritime environment and the law of

a potential for further uncertainty in these subjects because

they may not have sorted out policies on these complex matters. This

is

one reason

why the time is not ripe for a treaty on the environment during war.
The sheer number of States today (there are over 180 UN Members,
from tiny Andorra, Liechtenstein and San Marino
Russia and the United States),

to

when coupled with

ranging

powerful giants like China,

the development of regional

agreements and perhaps varied custom around the world, raises the further prob-

lem of unanimity within the context of a particular military operation. For example,

during the 1990-91 Gulf War, some States were parties to Protocol

I;

others,

The Tanker War

558

e.g.,

meant

the United States, were not. This

plied only as custom.

While

problem of

conflict, the

that issue seems to have been resolved for that short

if the

LOS, environmental

may provoke

to

ROE for each

human

rights

operation.

worldwide

specifically in

norm.

perhaps as customary law,

737
"

738

ventions concerned with a

or regional

is

That trend

not

is

in its infancy;

clear. International

safe, healthful

general policy has been creating a

workplace

739

Labor Organization conarguably could be seen as

to the

becomes

common labor market, has been held to require

law, the next issue

LOAC. Humanitarian

sources, applies during

armed

law,

and

Political Rights

is

the relationship of

whether grounded in

conflict.

cantly from those of human rights law.
Civil

Union law, whose

women.

If this trend

norms

human

how it will develop,

requiring a safe, healthful labor environment, even as European

equal pay for

must consider

commentators have urged recognizing a decent environ-

rights conventions as such,
as a

re-

a Clean Environment as a Human Right

Although not mentioned

ment

and the LOAC,

questions. Military planners

these factors in drafting clear, workable

The Right

law,

as to

law is the same on paper, how it is interpreted or practiced in the

multinational context

2.

and practices

different national or regional views

three intertwined bodies of law, the

mains. Even

that Protocol standards could be ap-

Its

requirements

Some human

human

rights

treaties or other

may

differ signifi-

rights conventions,^., the

Covenant, include derogation clauses limiting their

scope to core rights during "time of public emergency."

Others

may

not.

While all human rights conventions are subject to Charter law,jws cogens norms
and principles of the law of treaties, e.g., impossibility, fundamental change of circumstances and armed conflict, there is the problem of a human right seen as a jus
cogens

norm balanced

fense,

perhaps also recognized as a jus cogens norm. If a convention-based

rights

norm ascends to jus cogens status, treaty suspension rules cannot apply. This

against Charter

norms such

as Article 51's right of self-de-

human

could have important ramifications for applying humanitarian law and the law of
naval warfare, whether in treaty or customary format, during armed conflict.

many human
agreements as other nations, some of which may have incorporated human

Some
rights

countries,

e.g.,

the United States,

may

not be party to as

norms into their national constitutions, thereby binding them to these standards in practice. There maybe issues of conflicting norms among regional treaties,
a problem mostly eliminated for environmental law because of terms' commonality in UNEP-sponsored treaties for the most part.
In any event, planners must be aware of a potential for human rights violation
claims by opponents, or conditioning of responses by allies or coalition partners
due to national human rights commitments. If a right to a safe, healthful
rights

Maritime Environment

environment becomes

a

human

right,
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another factor must be added to a decision

matrix for conducting naval operations and naval warfare.

3.

its

The Carryover of Land Warfare Concepts, Particularly from Protocol I
Some provisions of Protocol I and the Conventional Weapons Convention and
Protocols, restate custom applying to

tion, necessity and proportionality,

all

modalities of warfare, e.g., discrimina-

although there maybe disputes as to definition

or scope of custom. However, there has been a trend, rejected by
tors, to incorporate

There
4.

is

more of these treaties' norms

some commenta-

into the law of naval warfare.

always a possibility of a reversal of direction.

A New Treaty to Protect the Environment During Armed Conflict?
During and after the Gulf War, there were calls from commentators and within

new international agreement directed toward protecting
the environment during armed conflict. The ICRC advocated rejection of such a
move, stating that the problem was not so much lack of law, but lack of observation
The ICRC was
and enforcement. Ultimately the United Nations took no action.
the United Nations for a

correct, as this

Chapter demonstrates with respect to the law of the sea and the law

of naval warfare as related to environmental protection. However,

if there are

in the future with significant environmental damage, whether covered

law or not, there

may be further calls

for another treaty if there

wars

by existing

no enforcement

is

against perpetrators of military or other actions degrading the environment.

A

principal factor here is availability of a veto-free Security Council as one vehicle for

meaningful action.

5.

Final Thoughts
This Chapter demonstrates that the environmental protection factor is a real is-

sue for those who plan naval operations in peace and in war today and in the foreseeable future.

While there are few bright navigational beacons to guide the way in

terms of applicable law during armed conflict at sea, there is also a real opportunity
to develop

workable norms to assure

maximum

permissible use of the Earth's

oceans, protect the maritime environment, and security to countries through lawful

use of force at

sea.

Perhaps the factorial approach this Chapter suggests for

cording due regard to environmental concerns

is

ac-

a step in that direction.
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vitality);

Brownlie, International Law 12-19; Anthony D' Amato, The Concept of Custom in International

104-06,

14, 136,

1

Law

164 (1971); Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations 23 (5th ed. 1986) (principles as gap-filler);

1

Oppenheim § 11, 33-36; Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03 (principles primarily a gap-filler); Oscar Schachter,
International Law in Theory and Practice 49-65, 74-81 (1991) (same); Sinclair 6, 9-10, 102-03; Akehurst, Custom,
n. IV.56, 49-52; Robertson, Contemporary, n. III. 358, 91-94. The High Seas Convention has been generally recognized
as stating

customary rules. See id., preamble;

they stand on quite firm ground. This

is

n. IV.3.

Where these principles carry forward into the LOS Convention,
among the LOS, the LOAC, and

particularly important for the relationship

the law of the environment applying to high seas operations.
51.

LOS

52.

See generally,

Convention,

arts.

192-237.

e.g., id., arts.

21(l)(f), 22(2), 23, 28(2), 33, 39(2)(b), 42(l)(a)-42(l)(b), 42(2)-42(5), 43(b), 44,

56(l)(b)(iii), 56(3), 60(1), 61-72, 80, 94(4)(c), 94(7), 116, 122-23, 145-46, 147(1), 147(2)(b), 147(c), 149, 233, 303,seealso 2

Nordquist HH 22.1-22.9, 23.1-23.9, 39.1-39.10(1), 42.1-41.10(1), 43.1-43.8(e), 44.1-44.8(c), 61.1-61.12(k), 62.1-62.16(1),
63.1-63.12(f),

64.1-64.9)(f),

65.1-65. 16(i),

71.1-71.9(c), 72.1-71. 10(h), 303.1-303.10; S.

461, cmt.

e;

512; 523(l)(b)(ii)

Fishery Convention,
53.

& cmt.

arts. 1-8, 13;

d.

67.1-67.8(e),

66.1-66.9(g),

Doc. 103-39,

68.1-68.5(b),

n. IV.3, 23, 25-28, 51;

69.1-69.17(h),

Restatement (third)

Some LOS Convention provisions echo the 1958 LOS

High Seas Convention,

70.1-70.1 1(d),

§§ 457, r.n.7;

conventions. See,

e.g.,

arts. 10, 11(1).

The Conference "had a great influence for later deliberations on the protection and preservation of the marine

UN Committees and in the LOS Convention drafting. Introduction, H XII. 11, 4 Nordquist 8-9;
Restatement (Third), Part VI, Introductory Note, at 99; id. § 602, r.n.l; see also Birnie & Boyle 39-53; Petsonik, n.
11.62, 351. The Conference Report (Stockholm Conference Report) included a Declaration on the Human
Environment (Stockholm Declaration), with 26 Principles, an Action Plan for the Human Environment, and various
resolutions. See 1 1 ILM 1416 (1972). Principle 6 states in part that "[Discharge of toxic ... or other substances and the
release of heat in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them
harmless, must be halted ... to ensure that serious or irreversible damage is not inflicted on ecosystems." Principle 7
declares that "States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances
liable to create
hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other
legitimate uses of the sea ..." Principle 21 says States must achieve a balance between exploiting their resources and
responsibility so that exploitation does not harm others' environments:
environment" in

.

.

.

[UN Charter] and the principles of international law, the sovereign right
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure

States have, in accordance with the
to exploit their

that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
areas

i.e.,

beyond the

damage to the environment of other States or of

limits of national jurisdiction^]

the high seas. Principle 22 would require "States [to] co-operate to develop further the international law regarding

liability

and compensation

for the victims of pollution

their jurisdiction or control of such States to areas

and other environmental damage caused by

beyond

their jurisdiction.

.

.

."

activities

within

Principle 26 protested against

nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction, with a plea for agreements to eliminate and destroy them. Id.
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at

1418, 1420-21. United Nations Environmental

Stat. 713,

declared

"

global and international concern

ILM

Programme

Participation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-188, §

2,

87

US Congressional policy "to participate in coordinating efforts to solve environmental problems of
G.A. Res. 3281, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,

arts.

29-30,m 14

251 (1975) reiterated nations' duties to use the sea for peaceful purposes to preserve the environment. These

resolutions, unless they restate customary or treaty law,

IV.57 and accompanying

Kuwait Regional Convention,

54.

were

Kuwait Protocol,

n. 11.63;

Kuwait,

parties: Baharain, Iran, Iraq,

related Protocol

do not bind U.N. Members.

UN Charter, arts. 10, 14; see also n.

text.

Oman, Qatar, Saudi

on Pollution Resulting from Exploration

bordering the Persian Gulf

n. 11.63. All countries

Arabia,

UAE.

See n. 11.64 and accompanying

text.

A

& Exploitation of the Continental Shelf, Mar. 29, 1989, has

been signed. Brown 355-56.

Convention

55.

for

Conservation of the Red Sea

& Gulf of Aden Environment, Feb.

(Red Sea Convention); Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation
Substances in Cases of Emergency, Feb.

14,

in

14, 1982, in 2

Combating Pollution by Oil

1982 (Red Sea Protocol), in

id.

Wallace 2282

& Other Harmful

2293. Signatories include Jordan, Palestine

Liberation Organization for Palestine, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and

Yemen Arab Republic, all bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden; any Arab League member can accede to it. Red Sea
Convention, preamble,

art. 26(2), id.

2282, 2291.

56.

See nn. 11.264, 384 and accompanying

57.

E.g.,

Kuwait Regional Convention, n.

Red Sea Convention,

text.

11.63, arts. 16-18,

140

1

n. 55, arts. 16-20, 22, 24, 2

5-13,

id.

202-06;

5-13,

id.

2295-98. Another recent example, involving

UNTS 159-60; Kuwait Protocol, n. 11.63, arts. 3,

Wallace

2287-90;

of the South Pacific Ocean. Convention for Protection of Natural Resources

Region, Nov. 24, 1986,

Dumping, Nov.

ILM

26

in

24, 1986, in

id.

58.

See,

e.g.,

Protocol, n. 55, arts.

3,

&

Environment of the South

Pacific

38 (1986); Protocol for Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific Region by

65 (1986); Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution Emergencies in

the South Pacific Region, Nov. 24, 1986,

also 5

Red Sea

US participation, is an agreement package governing protection

LOS Convention, arts.

59 (1986);

in id.

see also

US

understanding,

S.

Treaty Doc. 101-21, 53.

23, 39, 41(5), 43(a), 94(4)(c), 94(5), 197, 200-02, 207-12, 217, 221-22, 303; see

Nordquist HH 311.8.m, 311.11.

59.

Vienna Convention, preamble,

see also n. HI. 10

and accompanying

arts. 38,

43; see also ICJ Statute arts. 38, 59;

Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03;

text.

60.

Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 31 -38, 91 -1 35; Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 22;seealso n.

61.

Akehurst,

n. IV.56, 49-52.

LOS Convention, art.

anticipatory action to ward off pollution threats.

Article 309 does not preclude a State,

when

.

.

.

this

10

and accompanying text.

221(1) seems to anticipate this possibility for proportionate

Id., art.

310 provides:

signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from

declarations or statements, however phrased or

and regulations with

III.

named, with

a view, inter alia, to the

making

harmonization of its laws

Convention, provided that such declarations or statements do not purport to

exclude or to modify the legal effect of

.

.

.

this

Convention in

[its]

application to that State.

Convention and is the reason for the agreement to amend the
and
accompanying
text. Such statements, taken collectively, arguably could
Convention, Part XI. See n. IV.3
articulate custom apart from the Convention. However, occasional presence of clear, contradictory authorizations for
custom, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 221(1), plus "obscurity and uncertainty" of art. 310's meaning, cf. 5 Nordquist 1
Art. 309 forbids reservations or exceptions to the

310.5, suggest

custom and other sources can be considered alongside Convention norms. This

Convention and the 1958
art. 2; see also

62.

is

true for the largely

LOS
LOS conventions are replete. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention,

customary law of naval warfare, which enters through

LOS

Convention' other rules clauses, with which the

nn. 111.952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying text.

UN Members must comply with Security Council decisions under UN Charter, arts. 25, 48; these supersede

treaty obligations. Id., art. 103.

The Council or the General Assembly may also recommend action or call upon

for action pursuant to

10, 14, 39-41,

may

restate

63.

custom or

id., arts.

treaty

Jus cogens theorizes

international law stated in,

norms and thereby strengthen them. See
a

e.g.,

fundamental norm overrides rules in
ICJ Statute,

States

but these resolutions do not have the binding force of decisions, but they

arts. 38, 59;

n.

IV.57 and accompanying text; Part B.l.

treaties

Restatement (Third)

and custom, two primary sources of
§§ 102-03. Its contours are vague and

depend on commentators' views, ranging from expansive {e.g., those of the former USSR, whose jurisprudence may
have influence) to totally deprecatory. See n. III. 10 and accompanying text. National sovereignty is a competing
factor. If UN Members give up freedom to make treaties to the measure of UN Charter, art. 103, that does not

still

Maritime Environment

necessarily
2(1), 2(7);

mean they gave up

Compare,

64.

LOS

e.g.,

(straits transit passage),

45

custom that may contradict

a sovereign right to build

LOS Convention, art.

157(3); nn. III. 10

and accompanying

Convention, preamble,

norm.

a treaty

e.g., id., arts.

text.

arts. 2(3) (territorial sea), 19, 21,

31 (innocent passage), 34(2)

innocent passage, incorporation by reference of arts. 19, 21,

(straits

See,

565

31), 52(1) (archipelagic

sea lanes passage), 58(1), 58(3) (EEZs), 78(2) (continental shelf; coastal State cannot infringe or interfere with

"navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States as provided in this Convention"), 87(1) (high seas), 138 (the

and

Area), 303(4) (archaeological, historical objects found at sea; "other international agreements

international law regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological

Convention,

art. 2;

Territorial Sea Convention, art.

1.

and

historical nature"), with,

e.g.,

rules of

High Seas

Although two 1958 conventions do not have other rules clauses,

they state that they do not affect status of waters above as high seas in the case of the continental shelf, or other high
seas rights in the case of high seas fisheries. Continental Shelf Convention, arts.

For citations

65.

analyzed in Chapters

to these conclusions, recited in this

and W,see nn.

III

III. 10,

1, 3;

Fishery Convention, arts.

1-8, 13.

Chapter for the reader's convenience but previously

952-67, IV. 10-34 and accompanying text. Citations in this Chapter are

limited to necessary primary sources.
Ill, 192, 267-68. A few commentators miss the point, but those who say the other rules clauses
LOAC are in the majority. See also nn. III. 955-56 and accompanying text.

ILC Report, n.

66.

mean

the

67.

LOS

Convention,

art. 88.

Area use

conducted for peaceful purposes. Id.,

and accompanying

reserved for peaceful purposes; marine scientific research must be

is

arts. 141, 143(1), 147(2)(d), 155, 240(a), 242(1), 246(3).

See also nn. III.956, IV.15

text.

68. Restatement (Third) § 521, cmt. b, citing UN Charter, art. 2(4); LOS Convention, arts.
Restatement (Third) § 905, cmt. g; see also nn. III. 958, IV.16 and accompanying text.
69.

UN Charter, art.

70.

See nn.

71.

UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51, 103; see also S. Doc.

self-defense, as
era.

103; see also n. IV. 57

III. 957-60,

IV.15-18 and accompanying

text; Part B.l.

text.

103-39, n. IV. 3, 51.

There

is a

debate on whether anticipatory

opposed to "reactive" self-defense, where an aggressor strikes the first blow, is permitted in the Charter

The US view, supported by many commentators, is that anticipatory self-defense is permissible in the Charter era.

Iran and the

USSR had

the opposite view. See generally Chapter III and Part B.l.

72.

See nn. IV.16, 67 and accompanying text; Part V.F.

73.

Cf. nn. 12-14,

74.

E.g.,

21-22 and accompanying

1969 Civil Liability Convention,

freedom of action during war and
also n. IV.20
75.
n.

and accompanying

88, 301; referring to

E.g.,

and accompanying

text.

ICAO

art. 3(1).

for a state of emergency if the

Convention,

89 says

art.

it

does not affect parties'

country declaring the emergency notifies ICAO. See

text.

1954 Oil Pollution Convention, art. 19; Treaty of Rome, n. III.819, arts. 223-26, 298

UNTS 88-89; see also

IV.21 and accompanying text.

76. NAFTA, n. III.949, art. 2204, in 32 ILM 702 (1993). NAFTA has many environmental protection provisions.
NAFTA, arts. 104, 709-24, 901-15, 1101, 1114, 2005, 2014-15, 2101, id. 297-98, 377-83, 386-92, 639, 642, 694-97, 699,

analyzed

in

NAFTA & the Environment: Substance and Process ch.

Daniel Magraw,

NAFTA,

After the

27 Int'L Law. 765, 769 (1993); Jack

I.

Under the NAFTA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment,

Language

(1995); Stewart A. Baker,

NAFTA: Reconciling Free Trade and Environmental Protection, 27 Int'L Law.
NAFTA: Trade, Competition, Environmental Protection, id. 751 (1993). NAFTA

in the

Stewart, The

exception, stating inter alia that nothing in

considers necessary to protect
relations, or to prevent a party

security.

1

NAFTA, arts.

its

—

Law and Quality of Life Dispute Resolution
89 AJIL 439 (1995); Raymond B. Ludwiszewski, "Green"

Garvey, Trade

NAFTA may

be construed to prevent

"essential security interests," during

a

691 (1993); Richard B.
has a national security

party from taking actions

war or other emergency

it

in international

from acting pursuant to its Charter obligations for maintaining international peace and

2102(l)(b)-2102(c), 32

ILM 699-700. See also nn.

Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol,

77.

E.g.,

78.

High Seas Convention, preamble; see also nn.

navigational articles also reflect custom. See nn.

n. 11.63;

and accompanying

and accompanying

Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03;

text;

text.

see also n. III. 10

The LOS Convention's

and accompanying

ICJ Statute,

80.

Vienna Convention,

art.

61; see also nn. III.928, IV.26

and accompanying

text.

81.

Vienna Convention,

art.

62, see also nn. III.929, IV.27

and accompanying

text.

text.

Protocol, n. 55.

Chapter IV.

79.

arts. 38, 59;

and accompanying

Red Sea Convention and

III.962, IV. 24

III. 963

111.949, IV.22

text.
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82.

See nn. III.930, IV.28 and accompanying

83.

See nn. 111.938-51, IV.29 and accompanying

84.

See nn.

85.

UN Charter, art. 2(2); Vienna Convention, art. 26; see also nn. III.934, IV.31

86.

Vienna Convention,

87.

See Symposium, State Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.

88.

ICJ Statute,

89.

High Seas Convention, preamble. The LOS Convention navigational
numerous other rules clauses. See n. 78 and accompanying text.

III. 948,

text.

IV.30 and accompanying

art. 18; see also n.

text.

text.
text.

IV.32, 60, VI. 45 and accompanying text.

Restatement (Third)

arts. 38, 59;

and accompanying

§§ 102-03; see also n.

and accompanying

III. 10

text.

custom;

articles are also said to reflect

these have
90.

"In at least one respect

[its

the territorial sea." 2 O'Connell,

Doc. 103-39, n.IV.3,

91.

S.

92.

E.g.,

LOS

Convention,

terms] are

more restrictive than customary international law, namely in the case of

Law of the Sea

994; see also Charney, The Marine Environment,

n.

IV.49, 887.

19.
arts. 1(1)(4)-1(1)(5), 21, 23, 39, 41, 43, 54, 56(l)(b)(iii), 60(3), 63,

66-67, 94(7), 116,

123(b), 145-47, 155(2), 162, 165.
93.

LOS Convention, art.

Nordquist 36-43. The

mandate

Stockholm Declaration,

192; compare

US Department

to ensure responsibility for

of Defense and the

n. 53,

US Navy

Principle 7,

ILM

1 1

view Convention

art.

1418 (1972);

see also

4

236 and Part XII "as a

environmentally sound practices." William J. Schachte, Jr., The Value of the 1982

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Preserving Our Freedoms and Protecting the Environment, 23 ODIL 55, 61 (1992). See
also

NWP

94.

1-14M AnnotatedH

8.5.1; nn. 19-20

and accompanying

text; Part B.2.

See generally 2 Nordquist H 1.23, arguing for an evolving conceptual definition; 4

id.

H 192.11(a); Daniel

Tolbert, Defining the Environment, in Environmental Protection, n. 2, 259.
95.

96.

means
97.

S.

Doc. 103-29, n.IV.3,

LOS Convention, art.
the environment

is

19.

1(1)(4); 2

human and

LOS Convention, art.

Nordquist Ml

1.1-1.15, 1.22-1.24, 1.26-1.31.

nature centered. See Tolbert,

193; compare

Stockholm Declaration,

The LOS Convention

definition

n. 94, 259.

n. 53,

Principle 12,11

ILM

1419 (1972);

see also

4

Nordquist 45-49. Jose Luis Vallarta, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment and Marine Scientific Research
at the Third United Nations Conference on the

Law

of the Sea,

in

Symposium, The Law of the Sea: Where Now, 46 L.

Contemp. Probs. 146, 149 (1983) said the duty to preserve and protect the environment is
III. 10, VI. 63 and accompanying text.
98.

This part of the

a jus cogens

&

norm. See also nn.

LOS Convention does not state "significant" as part of the duty, but other LOS Convention

provisions, regional agreements, and commentators have added terms like "major," "serious," "significant" or
"substantial." E.g.,

Protocol, n. 55,

Hodgkinson,

Oppenheim
99.

LOS

2

n. 2, 422-23.

§ 10, 28;

LOS

Convention,

art. 1(2),

Restatement (Third)

Convention,

7, 11

ILM

art.

194(1); see also

LOS

101.

4 Nordquist H 194.10(e);

102.

LOS

Convention,

n. 11.63, art. 1(2),

1140

UNTS 201;

arts.

Red Sea

Low &
Law 5; 1

§§ 601(l)(b)-601(3), 603(l)(a), 603(2);

Restatement (Third)

§ 603(2).

The "prevention" theme was

partly

24-25, and limitation to "capabilities" from Stockholm Declaration, n. 53,
11H

194.1, 194.10(b). Diligent prevention

and control are probably

& Boyle 95.

100.

Convention,

Kuwait Protocol,

§ 102(3).

1418 (1972). 4 Nordquist

binding norms. Cf Birnie

233;

Such sources, combined, can evidence custom. Brownlie, International

derived from High Seas Convention,
Principle

arts. 94(7),

Wallace 2294; Restatement (Third)

art.

194(2);

Restatement (Third) §§

see also Parts

art. 1(1)(5)

defines

601(l)(b), 601(2), 603(l)(a), 603(2).

IV.B.2-IV.B.3.

dumping;

see also 2

Nordquist Ml

1.1-1.15, 1.24, 1.26-1.31.

LOS Convention, art. 194(3); compare MARPOL 73/78, art. 2(2), Annex II, defining "harmful substance," not
LOS Convention. 4 Nordquist 194.10(j). Art. 194(3) sweeps more broadly than MARPOL 73/78.
Language in MARPOL 73/78, Annex II, art. 2(2) defining pollution is the same as LOS Convention, art. 1(1)(4).
MARPOL 73/78 parties represent 92 percent of world merchant tonnage. Bowman & Harris 293 (11th Cum. Supp.
1995). It is fair to assume that its terms represent custom; similar terms used in similar circumstances in the LOS
103.

explained in the

Convention also
102(3).

The

Ships, 33

11

restate custom.

Brownlie, International

Law

5; 1

Oppenheim

§ 10, 28;

Restatement (Third)

§

injury must be significant, however. See n. 98 and accompanying text. Act to Prevent Pollution from

USC

§§ 1901-08, implements

MARPOL

73/78 for the United States, imposing greater environmental
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obligations on warships than do the treaties. William H. Wright, Naval Warfare and the Environment, in Protection of

the Environment

35, 38.

LOS Convention, art. 194(4), restating custom. 4 Nordquist HI 94. 10(n); Restatement (Third) § 601 &cmt.a,
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 19(3)(d), Report of the International Law Commission,
2(2) YB Int'L L. Comm-n 96, 31 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 10, 226 (1976).
104.

r.n.l, citing inter alia

105.

LOS

Convention,

art. 194(5).

Ice-covered areas, governed by

environment. 4 Nordquist H 194.10(o), noting International
IV, H 312,

§

C, item 2,

art.

22, Commentary,

11

.

.

The LOS Convention

function as a community."

UN GAOR, Supp. No.

45

(2),

(1990) defines "ecosystem" as "an ecological unit

.

art.

id.,

234, are an example of a sensitive

Law Commission, Report on the Work ofthe 42d Session, ch.
10 (1990), in 2(2)

YB Int-l L. Comm-n

does not define the term.

106.

LOS Convention, art.

107.

LOS

108.

4 Nordquist Ml 196.1, 196.7(a).

109.

LOS Convention, art. 197, partly based on Stockholm Declaration, n. 53, Recomm. 92, 1 1 ILM 1456-57;

Convention,

Dumping Convention.
110.

603(2).

LOS
High

195; see also 4 Nordquist

4 Nordquist

Convention,

LOS

1972

200-01; see also 4 Nordquist Ml 200.1-200.6, 201.1-201.7; Restatement (Third) §

arts.

High

conduct

under other

scientific research, subject to

high seas users'

rights, coastal

LOS provisions and the due regard principle. LOS Convention,

seas oceans research

is

generally accepted as a customary right.

Brown

1

429.

It is

LOS other rules principle, however. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2;

see also nn. 111.952-67,

111.

195.2, 195.6.

197.3.

11

seas freedoms include a right to

87; see also Part IV.B.l.

subject to the

11H

art. 196.

State continental shelf and other rights,
art.

57

of living and non-living components that are interdependent and

IV.10-25 and accompanying text; Part B.2.b.

Convention,

ILM
USC § 4332 (NEPA). 4 Nordquist Ml 201.1 -202.6(b), 203.1 -203.5(c),

202-06, based in part on Stockholm Declaration, n. 53, Principles 16, 21, 11

arts.

1419-20; National Environmental Policy Act, 42

At the time of the Tanker War NEPA was not applied extraterritorially
& Michael E. McGregor, International Environmental Law Considerations During

204.1-204.8(d), 205.1 -205.6(c), 206.1 -206.6(c).

except in Antarctica. Bruce A. Harlow

Protection of the Environment 315, 326, citing Environmental Defense Fund
14, 3 CFR 356 (1979) requires environmental impact

Military Operations Other than War, in
v.

Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Exec. Order No. 12,1

analysis for certain federal actions affecting the environment of the global

Quinn,
112.

n. 2, 88-89;

LOS

Harlow

Convention,

art. 198.

"IMO

protection of the marine environment
113.

4 Nordquist

11

198.1; see also

—

is

as

important in

as is the

Restatement (Third)

114.

This "to some extent anticipates"

115.

LOS Convention, art.

1

its

5,

601, cmt. e

§

LOS Convention, art.

116.

This "to some extent anticipates"

117.

LOS Convention, arts.

—maritime

safety

and

r.n.4, citing inter alia

UST

2521, 1274

Memorandum

of

UNTS 235.

221. 4 Nordquist 1 198.1.

99; see also 4 Nordquist H 199.1, noting that

The LOS Convention

&

1980, Can.-US, 32

competent international organizations

seas or airspace over them.

particular fields of interest

UNEP at global level." Birnie & Boyle 53.

Intent Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, Aug.

States to cooperate with

commons or of foreign nations. DeMarco &

& McGregor 326.

High Seas Convention, art.

to prevent radioactive materials

25(2), requires

contamination of the

covers a wider spectrum of required cooperation.

LOS Convention, art.

221. 4 Nordquist H 198.1.

207(1 )-207(2), 208(1-208(3), 209(2), 211(2); see also 4 Nordquist Ml 207.7(a)-207.7(b),

208.10(a)-208.10(d), 209.10(a), 211.15(f);

Restatement (Third)

§ 603(l)(a).

As

id.

r.n.7

shows, the United States like

many nations has marine pollution legislation that may need amendment to align with LOS Convention standards. If
enacted worldwide, such laws can evidence custom. Brownlie, International
118.

4 Nordquist

11

208.10(a).

internal waters, territorial seas

and the high
119.

LOS

Convention,

Oppenheim

120.
art.

11

1.4;

5; 1

Oppenheim

§ 10, 26.

NWP 9 A Annotated H 1.4 define "national waters" as

and archipelagic waters, and "international waters"

as contiguous zones,

EEZ waters

seas.

National laws, e.g., those in
5; 1

NWP 1-14M Annotated

Law

arts.
id.

210(1)-210(3), 210(6); see also 4 Nordquist U 210.11(b);

r.n.7, if similar

Restatement (Third)

§ 603.

around the world, can evidence custom. Brownlie, International Law

§ 10, 26.

LOS Convention, art. 210(5); see also 4 Nordquist 111 210.1 l(c)-210. 1 1(g), noting

1972

Dumping Convention,

4 requires prior approval.

121.

4 Nordquist H 210.11(g)

&

n.14, citing inter alia International

Thirty-First Session: Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 32,

Law Commission,

UN Doc. A/34/194 (1979), in

Report on the Work of Its
18

ILM

1557, 1568, 1576

The Tanker War

568

(1979), saying these are not defenses if an offending country contributes to a situation of material responsibility. See
also

Commentary

to Draft Articles

Thirty-First Session,
is

on State Responsibility in International

UN Doc. A/34/10 & Corr.

that air-jettisoned fuel dissipates quickly

Restatement (Third)

NWP

& r.n.8

603 cmt. g

LOS Convention, arts.

122.

and

§

1

(1979), in 2(2)

Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its

YB Intl L. Comm-n

37;

18(2), 39(l)(c); see also Territorial Sea

&

n.14.

Convention,

art. 14(3).

As

NWP 9A Annotated

LOS norm follows
Hague VI, art. 2; Hague XIII, art. 2 1 Convention on Maritime Neutrality, art.
Stockholm Declaration, arts. 4, 7, 11 ILM 1418; Oxford Naval Manual, arts. 31,34,

1-14M Annotated 11

demonstrate, this customary

1.4.1, 2.3.1, 3.2, 3.2.2, 7.3.2, 7.3.7,

;

Nyon Arrangement, art. 5;
San Remo Manual IH 21 (Hague XIII

168.6

1 210.11(g)

and noise emissions.

discuss aircraft noxious

different principles during war. See also
17;

122-36 (1979). Practical experience

and does not present an emergency. 4 Nordquist

(Hague XIII

also nn. IV.494-506, V.16,

LOS Convention, art.

rule); 136, cmt. 136.2

Commentary,

rule); Schindler,

20 and accompanying

87(1);

n.

(Hague VI considered

to

be in desuetude); 168, cmt.

V.87, 22 1 (Hague XIII restates custom with minor exceptions); see

text.

This

High Seas Convention, art.

is

an example of the other rules principle in operation.

2; see also

nn.

III. 952-67,

Cf.

IV.10-25, V.2-3 and accompanying

text; Part B.2.b.

LOS

123.

Convention,

207(4) (seabed activities subject to national

207(3) (land-based pollution),

arts.

jurisdiction).

124.

LOS

125.

Id.,

Convention,

arts.

arts. 207(4), 208(5), 209(1), 210(4),

211(3)-211(4); see also

21 1(1), 212(3).

Restatement (Third)

§

604(3).

LOS

Convention negotiating history

demonstrates that coastal States cannot require warships to give notice or get prior consent before entering the
territorial sea

on innocent passage. For

and warships, except

this

and other innocent passage principles, applying equally

submarines must navigate on the surface and show their

that

flag, see

LOS

to

merchantmen

Convention,

arts.

& Waterways Safety Act, 33 USC §§ 1221-36 regulates safety and environmental
measures enforcement in the US territorial sea. A worldwide pattern of these laws can evidence customary standards.
17-26, 45, 52(2); Part IV.C.3. Ports

Brownlie, International
126.

These

Law

5;

Oppenheim

1

§ 10, 26.

rules cannot apply to foreign ship design, construction,

LOS

generally accepted international rules or standards.
19.1-19.11, 21.1-21.12, noting

between
is

some

States'

id., art.

expansively. See 2 Nordquist H

has accepted this statement;

19(2)(1)
1

9. 11,

NWP

unless they effectuate

arts. 19(2)(h), 21; see also 2

Nordquist

1111

continued opposition to warships' right of innocent passage and linkage

LOS Convention, art. 21(l)(f), and id., art.

exclusive, although

manning or equipment

Convention,

192, analyzed nn. 93-94

and accompanying text. The art.

19(2)

list

("any other activity not having a direct bearing on practice") could be read

citing Joint Interpretation,^ IV. 341, art. 3, in 28

1-14M Annotated

11

2.3.2.1; nn.

ILM 1446 (1989), noting Russia

IV.337-50 and accompanying

text.

Aside from a

special rule for fishing craft, Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 4-5, uses a general reasonableness rule to define

innocent passage. See

also nn. IV. 301-13

and accompanying

text.

For other rules clause

analysis, see nn. 111.952-67,

IV.10-25, V.2-3 and accompanying text; Part B.2.b.

LOS Convention, arts. 22(2), 23; see also 4 Nordquist 111
LOS Convention, arts. 24(l)(b), 25(3), 227; Restatement (Third) § 513(2)(b) &
cmt. d. Joint Interpretation, n. IV.341, arts. 5, 20, 28 ILM 1446 (1989), clarify LOS Convention, art. 22's Russian text;
127.

These ships must carry

special documentation.

22.1-22.9, 23.1-23.9, noting link with

coastal States

may

designate sea lanes and traffic separation schemes "where necessary to protect the safety of

navigation." 2 Nordquist
128.

11

22.9.

LOS Convention, art.

Convention,

24; see also 2 Nordquist

arts. 25(3), 42(2), 52(2),

111

24.1-24.8, noting parallel language ("form or fact") in

LOS

227; see also nn. IV.337-50 and accompanying text.

129.

Wright,

130.

LOS Convention, art. 25; see also 2 Nordquist 111 25.1-25.9, noting that Joint Interpretation, n. IV.341, applies
from Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 16(1)- 16(3); Restatement (Third) § 513(2)(a) & cmt. c,

n. 103, 38.

to art. 25, taken directly

which say there should be no discrimination among
should apply to ships of all

Nordquist

flags; see also nn. IV.337,

25.1, citing Territorial Sea

131.

2

132.

See generally 2 Nordquist

133.

UN

Charter,

accompanying
134.
c, e,

h

II

arts.

51,

111

25.1-25.9;

different countries' vessels during temporary suspension;

439 and accompanying

Convention,

it

text.

art. 16(3).

Restatement (Third)

§§ 513, cmt.

c.

103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.21, VI.38-40 and

text.

LOS Convention, arts. 27-18, 30-32; see also Restatement (Third) §§ 457, r.n.7; 461, cmt. e; 513(2)(b) & cmt.
& r.n.2.
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Maritime Environment

LOS

135.

Convention,

accompanying

art.

2(3); see also Territorial

Sea Convention,

1(2); nn. III. 952-67,

art.

IV.10-25 and

text; Part B.2.b.

LOS Convention, arts. 38(1), 45(l)(b), 52-54; id., art. 54 incorporates by reference id., arts. 39-40, 42, 44. LOS

136.

Convention nonsuspendable

straits

LOS Convention, art.

137.

passage rules reflect custom. See generally Part IV.B.6.

233, incorporating by reference

id., arts.

42(l)(a)-41(l)(b), 236,

would appear

to apply,

42; the straits innocent passage regime

strictly speaking, to straits transit passage

regimes because of references to

and provisions governing

innocent passage have no similar intervention provisions, although such

territorial sea

art.

coastal State authority to enact environmental laws that

might be inferred from

might include authority to intervene.

Warships, naval auxiliaries,^., have sovereign immunity as in the case of transit passage. See generally
45, 236; S. Doc. 103-39, n. IV.3, 11-15, 23, saying that

Navy has

the position that a straits passage regime also applies to approaches to

mode

operating in their normal

conduct air operations
is

by extension these principles apply

(i.e.,

as incidental to

submarines traversing these

straits),

straits.

id., arts.

to straits passage.

17-32,

The US

This view, that warships

may employ formation steaming and

normal navigation practices, so long as there is no threat to the coastal

State(s),

consistent with the transit passage regime. Alexander, n. IV. 523, 92; Clove, n. IV. 597, 105; Schachte, International

Straits, n.

IV.558, 184-86; n. IV.585 and accompanying text; but see Lowe, The Commander's, n.

operations in transit

straits. If this is

The

passage applies to this area too.

preserved by the

III. 318

on naval

accepted as practice, an environmental protection regime appurtenant to
issue of straits passage for belligerents illustrates the

LOS-LOAC

straits

interface

LOS conventions' other rules clauses. See generally NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 2.3.3-2.3.3.2, 2.5.1.1;

NWP 9A Annotated

111

2.3.2-2.3.3.2, 2.5.1;

San Remo Manual HH 23-33; Akira Mayama, The Influence of the Straits
ODIL 1 (1995); nn. III. 952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying text; Part

Transit Regime on the Law of Neutrality at Sea, 26

B.2.b.and accompanying

text.

138.

Wright,

139.

See nn. 136-37 and accompanying

140.

UN

Charter,

accompanying
141.

LOS

n. 103, 38.

arts.

51,

text.

103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.21, VI.38-40

Convention,

art. 33;

compare Territorial Sea Convention,

contiguous zone outer limit means States asserting a territorial sea

less

providing for a 12-mile zone.

art. 24,

may

convention in force for them. See

324-27 and accompanying

142.

See generally 2 Nordquist

143.

LOS Convention, arts.

also nn. IV.296-300,
111

The

LOS Convention allows, 12

than the extent the

miles, or under custom for 1958 Convention parties,

1.

and

text.

declare a contiguous zone up to limits permitted by the
text.

33.1-33.8(1).

303(l)-303(2) provide:

States have the duty to protect objects of

an archeological and

historical nature

found

at sea

and

shall

co-operate for this purpose.

[T]o control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may, in applying article 33 [of the

2

permitting a 24-mile contiguous zone, n. 141 and accompanying

contiguous zone

.

.

.

text],

presume

without its approval would result in an infringement within

LOS Convention,

that their removal in the

its territory

or territorial sea

of the laws and regulations referred to in that article.

144.

See generally 5 Nordquist Ml 303.1-303.10.

145.

Art. 303 also does not affect identifiable owners' rights, salvage law or other admiralty rules, or cultural

exchange laws and practices.

LOS Convention, arts. 303(3)-03(4). Under admiralty law shipwrecks and objects found

at sea are finders' property, unless their national

law or the law of the salvor provides otherwise. See generally

Restatement (Third) § 52 1 r.n.6; Schoenbaum ch. 14; S. Doc. 103-39, n. IV.3, 5 1 citing US legislation that may alter
these rules. Warship or government aircraft title is never lost until a flag State officially abandons or relinquishes it. If
an aircraft or ship is captured, title vests in the captor State. See nn. IV.793-96 and accompanying text; see also
Agreement Concerning Wreck of CSS Alabama, Oct. 3, 1989, Fr.-US, TIAS No. 11687.
,

146.

,

See nn. 136-37 and accompanying

conflict in the environmental context, see,
147.

LOS

common
11.66-69,

Convention,

arts.

For analysis of

treaties protecting cultural property

is

during armed

nn. 272-77 and accompanying text; Part B.3.a(III)(B).

136-37 define the Area as the abyss beyond the continental slope;

humankind. There
IV.240 and accompanying text.
heritage of

text.
e.g.,

no Area

in the Persian

Gulf because of

its

it is

declared the

shallow depth. See also nn.

The Tanker War

570

Nordquist

303.10.

148.

5

149.

LOS

150.

See

151.

LOS Convention, art. 21 1(5). A qualification to this rule is id.,

11

Convention,

art. 149.

n. 147.
art.

234: Coastal States

may adopt and enforce

nondiscriminatory laws for preventing, reducing and controlling pollution from ships in ice-covered areas to their

EEZ

limits

where particularly severe climatic conditions and

ice create obstructions or exceptional navigational

hazards, "and pollution of the marine environment could cause major
ecological balance."

environment

.

.

.

.

Such laws must have "due regard

to navigation

" Antarctic Treaty, n. III. 957, art. 4, 12

claims for Antarctica. Until the next Ice Age,

concerned, Canada, the former

USSR and

art.

harm

to or irreversible disturbance of the

and the protection and preservation of the marine

UST 796, 402 UNTS

234 only applies

74 froze

to Arctic Sea States,

the United States, negotiated

art.

234

to

and

territorial
e.g.,

provide

territorial sea

the United States. States
a basis for

implementing

provisions for commercial and private vessels in the 1970 Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act
consistent with

art.

234 and other

in Arctic navigational rights

LOS

152.

Convention,

LOS Convention provisions while protecting "fundamental U.S. security interests"

and freedoms.

S.

Doc. 102-39,

n. IV. 3, 24.

O'ConnellXawoftheSea

See also 2

EEZ

57-58 (defining the

arts. 55, 56(l)(a), 56(l)(b)(iii)-56(c),

as

1022-25.

extending 200 nautical

miles from territorial sea baselines, providing that coastal States have "sovereign rights for

conserving and
living or non-living, of the waters subjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and
managing their natural resources,
its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, [e.g.,].
production of energy from the water, currents and winds; [and]
jurisdiction as provided for in
this Convention
[for]
protection and preservation of the marine environment; [and] other rights and duties provided for in this
Convention"). See also id., art. 60 (coastal State exclusive rights and jurisdiction over artificial islands, other EEZ
installations), arts. 61-72 (standards for conserving, use of living resources; stocks occurring within two or more
countries' EEZs; various kinds of sea life; landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States' rights), art. 73
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

(standards for enforcing coastal State

EEZ

laws).

See also 2 Nordquist

55.1-55.1 1(d), 56.1-56.1 1(e), 57. 1-57. 8(b),

1111

60.1-60.15(m), 61.1-61.12(k), 62.1-62.16(1), 63.1-63.12(f), 64.1-64.9(0, 65.1-65.16(1), 66.1-66.9(g),

58.1-58.10(f),

67.1-67. 8(e), 68.1-68.5(b), 69.1-69.17(h), 70.1-70.11(d), 71.1-71.9(c), 71. 1-71. 10(b), 73. 1-73. 10(h); S. Doc. 103-39, n.

As of 1992 86

IV.3, 25-27.

States

had EEZs; 20 more claimed fishing zones. The

part of general international law." 2 Nordquist U V.33;

generally follows Convention criteria as to
instead of "jurisdiction," because the

Part V.C.

Id. §

seas." Note,

EEZ sovereignty and

Restatement

jurisdiction,

514, cmt.

§

514, cmt. b's declaration, the Convention "does not explicitly designate the

however, that

LOS Convention arts.

EEZs, but other

LOS

a.

While

id.

55,58, specifically referring to

arts.

id.,

[EEZ]

514(1)

§

Source Note says "authority"

id.,

characterizes jurisdiction differently in other contexts;

high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply in the EEZ.
their

EEZ "is now widely considered to be a

Restatement (Third),

used

is

see, e.g.,

as part of the

high

87-115, declare inter alia that

Some countries would prohibit naval operations in

Convention terms allow these maneuvers. Wartime operations are permitted under the

Convention's "other rules" principle. States therefore cannot exclude warships on environmental grounds from their

EEZs. Stephen A. Rose, Naval
IV. 147-57
153.

same

and accompanying

See

n.

Activity in the

is

152 and accompanying

text.

See also

greater, but not over 350 miles); 2

2 Nordquist

11

LOS

EEZ, along

(adaptation of Continental Shelf Convention,
154.

Waters Ahead?, Nav. L. Rev. 67, 73-76 (1990); nn.

text.

distance, 200 nautical miles, as the

whichever

EEZ— Troubled

Convention,

arts.

76-78, 80, (shelf can extend outward the

the ocean bottom, or to the edge of the continental margin,

Nordquist HH 76.1-76.18(m), 77.1-77.7(d), 78.1-78.8(d), 80.1-80.9

arts. 2-5);

Restatement (Third)

§

515; see also Part IV.B.2.

57.8(b), citing Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 ICJ 13, 33; Delimitation of Maritime

Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. US), 1984 ICJ 245, 294; Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada and
France (Can.

v.

Fr.), 31

Proclamation No. 2667, 3

ILM 1145, 1163 (Arb. 1992). E.g., the United States claimed continental shelf rights,
CFR 67 (1943-48) in 1945, before asserting fishery management rights in what eventually
the FCMA n. IV. 143, or claiming full EEZ rights, n. IV.3. The United States had claimed

became its EEZ through
some offshore fishing rights in 1945 along with the continental shelf. See nn. IV. 143, 193-94 and accompanying text.
155.

LOS

Convention,

arts. 55, 56(l)(b)(iii), 56(2), 58(3), 60(3), 60(7),

unjustifiable interference" formula for shelf and high seas rights interfaces

impede" rule

for interfacing shelf and

submarine cable and pipeline

58.10-58.10(0, 60.15(0, 60.15(j), 66.9(d), 78.8(c), 79.8(e), 80.9;

regard" or similar phrases also appear elsewhere in the
seas rights

and freedoms, Area

activities);

LOS

78-80, also stating a

and

a

"reasonable exploration"

rights. See also 2

Nordquist

Restatement (Third) §§

Convention,

Continental Shelf Convention,

impede"; no "unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing,"

e.g., art.

arts.

etc.);

"must not infringe
H11

-

-

"may not

56.11(e)-56.11(0,

514, cmt. e; 515(2).

"Due

87(2) (due regard for others' high

4-5 ("reasonable measures

High Seas Convention,

("reasonable regard" for others' high seas freedoms); Territorial Sea Convention,

art.

.

.
.

arts.

,

may not
2,

26(2)

19(4) (balancing navigation

Maritime Environment

committed in

interests with right of arrest for crimes

Kolodkin,

Stability in the

Law of the Sea,

LOS Convention, arts.

156.

in

58(l)-58(2), 78, referring to

id., arts.

Oxman &

See also Bernard H.

territorial sea).

Beyond Confrontation,

n. III.358, 165,

86-115;

571

Anatoly L.

175-76, 181-82.

High Seas Convention,

arts. 2, 8; see also

nn. 111.953-67, IV. 10-25, 794 and accompanying text; Part B.2.b.

Oxman &

Kolodkin,

n. 155, 176-79.

157.

4 Nordquist H 21 1.15(b);

158.

LOS Convention, arts. 213-14, 216, 222; see also 4 Nordquist HH 213.1-213.7(1), 214.1-214.7(c),216.1-216.7(d),

see also

222.1-222.8.
159.

Restatement (Third)

160.

LOS

21(1X0,

Convention,

arts.

§

217-20, 223-24, 226-31, expanding on rules in the navigational articles,

223.1-223.9(c),

230.1-230.9(c), 231.1-231.9(c);

162.

603; see also n. 98 and accompanying text.

28(2), 56(l)(b)(iii), 56(3), 60(1), 80; see also

220.1-220.1 l(n),

161.

§

LOS

Convention,

art.

226.1-226.1 1(e),

224.1 -224.7(e),

id., arts.

4 Nordquist HI 217.1-217.8(j), 218.1-218(9)(h), 219.1-219.8(d),

Restatement (Third)

227.1-227.7,

228.1-228.1 1(h),

229.1-229.5,

§§ 457, r.n.7; 461, cmt. e; 512.

225; see also 4 Nordquist HH 225.1-225.9;

Restatement (Third)

§

513, cmt.

e.

LOS Convention, arts. 232, US; see also 4 Nordquist HH 232.1-232.6(c), 235. 1-235. 10(g); Restatement (Third)
Oxman & Kolodkin, n. 1 55, 176-79. Art. 235 was derived from the Stockholm Declaration, n. 53, Principle
ILM 1418. 4 Nordquist H 235.1. The knowledge standard is the same as for self-defense and LOAC attack

604, r.n.3;

56, 11

situations. See Parts III.A.l.b(IX), V.A.2.

163.

LOS

Convention,

art.

221; Charney, The Marine Environment, n. IV.49, 892 n.79; see also 4 Nordquist HH

Restatement (Third) § 603, r.n.3 (similar provisions in 1969 Intervention Convention, art. 1;
Intervention Protocol, to which many countries are party), see TIF 400-01; Declaration of Principles Governing the
Sea-Bed & Ocean Floor, & Subsoil Thereof, Beyond Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749(1972) H 13(b),m
221.1-221.9(h);

10

ILM 220, 223 (1973) (Seabed Declaration).
164.

Birnie

Cf.

102(3), cmts.

f, i,

&

Boyle 286; Brownlie, International Law

165.

See nn. 4-8 and accompanying

166.

See nn.

167.

Compare

Nordquist HH
law

LOS

169.

E.g.,

4

id.

accompanying

Oppenheim

§ 10, 28;

Restatement (Third)

§

236 with

art.

text; Part B.2.b.

id., arts.

42(5), 96; see also

High Seas Convention,

arts. 8(1), 9;

3

4 id. HH 236.1 -235.6(f). Warship and naval auxiliary immunity is an accepted international
H 236.1; see also Part IVC.4.

n. IV.3, 24.

Convention on Protection of the Environment, Feb.

among Denmark,
170.

Convention,

95. 1 -96.6(c);

Doc. 103-39,

S.

1

text.

IV. 10-25 and

III. 952-67,

rule. 3 id. H 95.1;

168.

5;

r.n.5.

Finland,

19, 1974, arts. 1, 13,

1092

UNTS

280, 296, 298,

Norway and Sweden.

Kuwait Regional Convention, n.

11.63, art. 14, 1

140 UNTS 1 59; Red Sea Convention, n. 55, art. 14, 2 Wallace

2287.
171.

See

LOS

Convention,

arts.

237, 311(2). Other regional treaties are subject to the

Convention for Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb.
protocols. See nn. 48-50

and accompanying

102

Convention,

e.g.,

UNTS 27, 46, and

text.

172.

See n. IV.3 and accompanying

173.

Compare

LOS Convention, art.

94(4)(c) with

174.

Compare

LOS

94(7) with

Convention,

LOS

16, 1976, art. 3(1), 1

text.

art.

High Seas Convention,

High Seas Convention,

art. 10.

art. 11(1).

See also 3 Nordquist H 94.8(k);

Part IV.B.2.
175.

LOS Convention, arts.

Regional Conventions, nn.

Kolodkin,

122-23; 3 Nordquist 344; see also

11.63, VI. 55

among

id.

H 123.12(e), listing inter alia

Kuwait and Red Sea

regional coordination treaties for semi-enclosed areas;

Oxman &

n. 155, 179-81. See also Part B.2.c(III).

LOS Convention, art.

High Seas Convention,

176.

Compare

177.

LOS Convention, art. 240(d). Id., art. 87(l)(f) declares that the right to conduct scientific research is subject to

87(1) with

art. 2; see also

Part IV.B.l.

the Convention, Parts VI and XIII. Part VI declares continental shelf rules; Part XIII states general marine

environmental protection principles. See Part IV.B.2 and accompanying
necessary to

text.

Subject to other

LOS

Convention

must give other countries reasonable opportunity to obtain information
prevent and control damage to human health and safety and to the- marine environment. LOS

provisions, States conducting research

.
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Convention,

art.

242. Research installations

and equipment are subject

to rules for

conducting research.

Id., art.

258.

The LO AC protects enemy ships collecting scientific data from capture
during war; if engaged in data collection for likely military application, they are not protected. Hague XI, art. 4; see also

See also 2 O'Connell,

Law of the Sea ch.

26.

nn. V.264, 274-76 and accompanying text.

Compare

178.

LOS

Convention,

116 with High Seas Convention,

arts. 87(l)(e),

art. 2;

Restatement (Third)

§

521(2)(c); see also Part IV.B.l.

Doc. 103-39,

n. IV.3, 27.

179.

S.

180.

LOS Convention, art.

13; see also

116, incorporating

Restatement (Third)

high seas fishing.

LOS

§

Convention,

Charney, The Marine Environment,

n.

arts. 56,

63(2), 64-67,

18-20; compare Fishery Convention, arts. 1-8,

1

523( 1 )(a) recites custom "[N]o state
:

61-73 regulates

EEZ

appropriate any part of that area

.

.

1.1-1.19, 1.26-1.31;

.

.

Restatement (Third)

"Id., § 523(1 )(b) states the

.

unless prohibited by international agreement, a state

.

exploration for and exploitation of that area, provided

§

for the right of other states or persons to
.

.

minerals extracted

.

National jurisdiction means,
airspace above the Area
also
1

.

.

.

its

US

inter alia, a

§§ 521, cmt.

LOS Convention, arts.

1

mineral resources, and no state or person

.

.

activities are

conducted

engage in similar

activities

36. 140(

and

that deep seabed
is

mining was

183.

See Part II.A.6.

184.

LOS

Convention,

art.

.

.

.

S.

Doc. 103-39,

1 ).

with reasonable regard

freedoms of the high

state or person.

The Antarctic Treaty, n. III. 957, began the "common heritage" concept;

"Id. § 523, cmt.

.

.

.

&

"common

important

.

.

.

sea-bed mining regime

Id., arts.

5;

and procedures

.

.

.

may

Oppenheim§ 10,28;

1

156-91 are the Authority's

would modify them in amending
rules

it

position

heritage" Convention view. If the

e.SeeakoBROWNLiE, International Law

The Authority must adopt

US

adopted the then

r.n.2

states, the

137(2) vests Area governance in an Authority.

n. IV.3, 34-43.

.

523.

constitutive provisions; the Convention protocol, n. IV.3,

XI. See

.

it.

i;

accepted generally, "without dissent by

become effective also as custom
Restatement (Third) § 102(3).

(ii)

to engage, in

without claiming or

declared EEZ or continental shelf. Legal status of the water column or
LOS Convention provisions dealing with LOS Convention, art. 135; see

high seas freedom, rejecting the

a

(i)

to exercise the

has been copied in treaties on outer space. Restatement (Third) § 523, cmt. b

Convention

id., §

view of the law:

may engage, or authorize any[one]

become the property of the mining

not affected by

is

Restatement (Third)

82.

.

116. 1-1 16.9(g);

523, cmt. b, declaring that

exercising sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights in any part of that area, and

seas;

1111

may claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights over any part of

the sea-bed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, or over

may

Nordquist

fishing. See also 3

IV.49, 896-901.

M, art.l(l)(l);see 2 Nordquist 111

181.

id., arts.

521, cmt. e; S. Doc. 103-39, n. IV.3, 27-28, listing treaties regulating or prohibiting

LOS

Convention, Part

to prevent, reduce

and control

pollution and hazards to the marine environment, including coastlines, that interfere with that environment's
ecological balance, with particular attention being paid to protection from harmful effects of activities,

e.g.,

drilling,

dredging, excavation, waste disposal, building and operating or maintaining installations, pipelines and other
devices.

These rules must

the marine environment.
protect

human

life

also protect

and conserve Area natural resources and prevent damage

The Authority must

in connection with

take necessary measures, which

LOS

Area operations.

Convention,

to flora

may supplement

arts. 145-46.

There

is

and fauna of

existing treaties, to

also

an obligation to

preserve objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the Area, with particular regard paid to
preferential rights of a State or country of origin,

agreements dealing with

and which incorporates by reference other

artifacts protection. Id., art. 149.

rules of law

and

Area activities must be undertaken "with reasonable regard

marine environment." Area installations, like those in the EEZ and on the continental shelf,
must not be established "where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to international
for other activities in the

navigation or in areas of intense fishing activity

.

.

.

Other

with reasonable regard for activities in the Area." The

The

activities in the

LOS

marine environment

shall

Convention has an other rules clause

be conducted

for the Area:

general conduct of States in relation to the Area shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Part

[XI], the principles

embodied

in the

[UN] Charter

.

.

.

and other

rules of international law in the interests of

maintaining peace and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding.

As in the case of the high seas, the LOS Convention declares the Area shall only be used for peaceful purposes. Compare
id., art.

LOS

141 with

id., arts.

Convention and

88, 240(a).

its

The same interpretations should apply for these articles as under other parts of the
LOAC may be applied in certain contexts; the

1958 antecedents. "Other rules" means the

;

573

Maritime Environment

means no

peaceful purposes provision
activities

State

can include military operations,

may

commit

act, e.g.,

aggression, in violation of the Charter. Area

naval maneuvers. States

e.g.,

The

185.

treaties disclaim intention to affect parties' rights or claims to

Convention, n. 55,

arts. 2, 15, 2

and lagoons for a "marine emergency," defined broadly, and

implement

LOS

UNTS

201, 204.

Convention,

arts.

Red Sea

UN

Parts. V.B.1-V.B.2.

maritime jurisdiction "established in

n. 11.63, arts. 2, 15,

if a particular State so decides.

Protocol, n. 55, arts. 1(2), 4, 2

122-23; see n. 175 and

Compare Kuwait Regional Convention, n.

186.
1(2), 2

1140

act in self-defense in the Area.

1 MOUNTS 156, 159; Red Sea
Wallace 2284, 2287. The protocols allow application to ports, harbors, estuaries, bays

conformity with international law." Kuwait Regional Convention,

arts. 1(2), 4,

may

and accompanying text;

Charter,arts. 51, 103;^a/xonn.III.10, 47-630,916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

accompanying

11.63, art. 1(a),

1

140

Wallace

Kuwait Protocol, n.

11.63,

2294, 2296, are similar. These

text.

UNTS 156,with Red Sea Convention, n. 55, art.

Wallace 2283.

187.

Kuwait Regional Convention, n. 11.63, arts. 3(a), 4-7, 1140 UNTS 156-57; Red Sea Convention, n. 55, arts.
Wallace 2284-85, which adds a pledge to prevent, abate and combat pollution "resulting
from other

3(1), 4-8, 2

human

.

.

.

activities."

188.

See generally Kuwait Protocol,

189.

Compare Kuwait Protocol,

Wallace

n. 11.63,

UNTS 201;

1140

n. 11.63, art. 1(2),

1140

Red Sea

UNTS

Protocol, n. 55, 2

201, with

Red Sea

Wallace 2293.

Protocol, n. 55, art

.

1(2), 2

2294. (Italics in original.)

190.

See nn. 160-65 and accompanying

191.

The Marine Emergency Mutual Aid

Protocol, n. 11.63, arts. 3, 10,

1

text.

Centre, an administrative agency, also must be notified. Kuwait

140 UNTS 202-03, 205;

Red Sea Protocol, n. 55, arts. 3, 7(2), 2 Wallace 2294-95, 2297.

UNTS 202;

192.

Kuwait Protocol,

193.

See nn. 160-72 and accompanying

194.

Cf.

195.

See n. 185 and accompanying

196.

See nn. 11.264, 384, VI. 185 and accompanying

197.

See nn. 11.368-72 and accompanying

198.

Iran and Iraq were not parties to the 1958 or 1982

n. 11.63, art. 1(4),

1140

Red Sea

Protocol, n. 55,

art. 1(4),

2

Wallace

2294.

text.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part B.l.
text.

text.

restated in these agreements did apply, however. See,
see also nn. 111.952-67,

text.

e.g.,

IV.10-25 and accompanying text; Part B.2.b.

199.

Vienna Convention,

200.

See nn. 185-89 and accompanying

201.

See

and accompanying

text.

202.

See n. 11.214 and accompanying

text.

203.

Brownlie, International Law 5; 10ppenheim§

n. 11.213

LOS Conventions. The customary other rules principle
LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2;

arts.

61-62; see also nn.

III. 928-29,

IV.26-27, VI. 80-88 and accompanying text.

text.

10, 28;

Restatement (Third)

§ 102(3);

Okorodudu-Fubara,

n. 11.210, 197.

204.

LOS

Convention,

accompanying

arts.

232, 235;

Kuwait Protocol,

n. 11.63, art. 1(2),

1140

UNTS

201; see also n.162 and

text.

205.

See nn. 11.212 and accompanying

206.

The

UN

text.

Security Council deplored attacks on merchant shipping and violations of

LOAC

principles. If

obeyed, these would have resulted in no more attacks on these vessels and therefore no more pollution of the Gulf from
this cause.

These resolutions covered

a specific point,

i.e.,

freedom of navigation, and therefore should not be

construed as applying special Charter law to the exclusion of conventional norms, to environmental situations. See nn.
34-37 and accompanying

text.

207.

See Part B.2.b.

208.

See

209.

UN Charter, arts. 5

n.

184 and accompanying
1

,

text.

103; see also nn.

nn. 194, 197 and accompanying text.
210.

See nn. 4-8 and accompanying

text.

III. 10,

47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part B. 1
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211.

See nn. 198-202 and accompanying

212.

UN Charter,arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630,916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part B.l.

213.

See Parts V.A.1-V.A.2, VI.B.2.b.

214.

See Part B.2.a.

215.

E.g., the

United

text.

LOS variances

States' active policy of objecting to

in practice

by other

States.

See generally

Chapter IV.
216.

See,

e.g.,

accompanying

LOS

Convention,

art.

High Seas Convention,

87(1);

art. 2; see also

nn.

III. 952-67,

IV.10-25 and

text; Part B.2.b.

217.

Compare Part

218.

&?<?

219.

E.g.,

B.2.c.(I) with Part B.2.c(II).

Part B.2.a.
self-defense.

accompanying

UN

Charter,

51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

arts.

220.

See Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.

221.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48,

222.

Hague VIII

223.

See

224.

Levie,

same can be

arts. 1-6; see also

Mine Warfare,

and accompanying

103; see also n. IV. 57

n.

text.

Part V.G.2.

V.686 and accompanying

n.

and

text; Part B.l.

text.

V.426, 137 predicts environmental protests

said for conventional mines, particularly if pollutants escape

if

nuclear mines are detonated.

from mined ships, or mines are

The

laid in

environmentally sensitive areas and locations are not published.

Hague

225.

See

226.

See Part V.G.2.

227.

Iran, formerly Persia,

VIII, arts. 3-5; Part V.G.2.

ratify Hague VIII. Iraq was
The Empire, of which Turkey is a successor State, signed but
The United Kingdom did not accede to Hague VIII while serving as Iraq's mandatory

part of Turkey, formerly the

did not ratify

Hague

VIII.

was an independent country in 1 907 and signed but did not

Ottoman Empire,

in 1907.

Power. See Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration;
228.

C/ Melia,

229.

See Part V.G.2.

230.

Seen. 224.

231.

Hague IX,

n.

V.732 and accompanying

text.

n. 11.6,119-27.

arts.

1-4,

forbidding naval

bombardment

of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings or

buildings. If automatic submarine contact mines are anchored off a harbor, the place cannot be considered a defended

Military targets

site.

immediate

may be

destroyed but only after warning, unless surprise or other "military reason" dictates

undefended places may begin

action. Shelling

requisition requests proportionate to local resources.

money

due notice
places

if local

may

authorities

fail to

comply with

not be bombarded for failure to pay

contributions. See Part V.G.I.

232.

Hague

after

Undefended

E.g.,

environmentally sensitive beaches or parks might be close to ports or be within towns to

fall

within

IX's scope.

Hague IX, art.

233.

20, 36, or

5 also

Roerich Pact, arts.

Roerich Pact but not

1

provides for visible signs for these structures; Cultural Property Convention,
-3

to the

supersede art.

Convention.

5 for

TIF

some countries. E.g.,

350, 442.

The

the United States

Pact does not have

a

is

party to

arts.

16-17,

Hague IX and the

supersession clause like the

Convention; law of treaties later in time principles govern. Vienna Convention, art. 30; see also nn. IV. 32, 60, VI.45 and

accompanying

text.

Hague IX, arts. 6-7. Protocol I, art. 57(2)(c) repeats the notice to civilian population principle as a precaution
when the situation permits; it is considered a customary rule. NWP 1 -14M Annotated 8.5.2 & n.126; NWP

234.

in attacks

9A Annotated
.

.

.

11

11

Where

8.5.2

&

n.106, refine the rule:

the military situation permits,

commanders should make every reasonable

civilian population located in close proximity to a military objective targeted for

effort to

warn the

bombardment. Warnings

may be general rather than specific warnings lest the bombarding force or the success of its mission be placed

.

Maritime Environment

575

Warnings are relevant to the protection of the civilian population (so the civilians will have an
when they are unlikely to be affected by the attack.

in jeopardy

opportunity to seek safety) and need not be given

NWP 1-14M Annotated f 8.5 and NWP 9A Annotated
enemy
235.

targets

on land with conventional weapons. See

Compare Hague IX,

Regulations,

arts. 23(g),

cultural property

Oxford Manual,

arts. 1-7

11

bombardment

8.5 define

Hague IV, Regulations,

with

arts. 23(g),

25-28; their terms differ slightly. Second Protocol,

and

air

bombardment of

Hague

25-28, superseding 1899

II,

declares theft or pillage of

art. 15(l)(e)

Oxford Naval Manual,

"serious violation" of the Protocol. Compare

is a

as naval

also Part V.G.I.

25-29, with 1880

arts.

32-34, 53; Brussels Conference of 1874, Project of and International Declaration Concerning the

arts.

Laws and Customs of War, arts. 15-18 (1874), in id. 27, 29; Lieber Code, arts. 19, 34-36, 38. Military codes criminalize
pillage, e.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice, arts. 103, 109, 10 USC. §§ 903, 909, strengthening the customary norm.
Brownlie, International Law 5; 1 Oppenheim § 10, 26. See also Toman 7, 10-11,73,91, 196 (Lieber Code, 1899 Hague
II, Hague IV cultural protection aspects).
236.

International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg),

(1949); accord,

AFP

110-31

Oppenheim

5-2b; 2

11

110-13; LeGrand, n. 12, 26; Lijnzaad

NWP 1-14M Annotated

11

§ 68,

& Tanja, n.

& Sentences (Oct.

1946), in 41

1,

AJIL

172, 248-49

183-84; Plant, Legal Aspects, n. 17, 222-23; Sharp, n.

2,

NWP 9A Annotated

8.1;

Judgment

229; Stone 551; Diederich, n. 17, 141, 146-47; Edwards, n.

11

8.1;

McNeill, Protection,

n. 2, 539;

Harlow

2,

2,

10-42; cf

& McGregor, n.

Ill,

318.

237.

See Part V.G.I.

238.

See

239.

1980

240.

See nn. 231-38 and accompanying

241

See Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.

242.

To

id.

347.

that extent

also Part B.l.

243.

TIF

LOAC bombardment principles were integrated into Charter law. UN Charter, art.

They can be

different,

Hague XI,

arts. 1-2; see also

244.

See Paris Declaration,

245.

London

246.

Hague XI,

247.

But see Parts

248.

Hague XI,

249.

See

Declaration,

arts.

Declaration,

customary

even

if sent

through

27-29; Part V.D.3.

arts.

rules; see also nn. V.l 13, 265, 274-76

(Hague IV; Oxford Naval Manual,

San Remo Manual HU

I, arts.

arts.

and accompanying

arts. 1-4;

text.

art. 88).

47(h), 136(g); see also nn. 264, 266

Hague IX,

art. 23(c);

Third Convention,

12, 14; Protocol

is lost

61-62; see also Paris Declaration, arts. 2-3; Part V.B.3.

Hague IV, Regulations,

Convention, arts.

London

B.3.a(I)(D), B.3.a(I)(F)

29-30, 32-33, 38, 43, 47;

2(4); see

103; nn. IV.57; Part B.l.

nn. V.112, 257, 271 and accompanying text.

arts. 1-3;

arts. 3-4, stating

arts. 3-4;

UN Charter, art.

depending on circumstances.

contraband or aiding the enemy war effort, its exemption

If an object is considered

the mail.

text.

and accompanying

Second Convention,

arts. 12, 18,

text.

21-22, 24, 26-27,

70-77, 118; Fourth Convention, arts. 107-13; Cultural Property

8(b), 22-23, 41 ; see also nn. V. 1 10,

1

13, 240, 258-69,

274-76 and accompanying

text.

250.

See Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration. Iran (formerly Persia), Iraq and the

United States were not Paris Declaration
Declaration and
251.

See nn. 4-8 and accompanying

252.

See nn. 231-42 and accompanying

253.

Hague

IV, Regulations,

53, 55-56; see also

parties.

Hague XI. Schindler & Toman

Turkey,

a Coalition

789, 823-24; 1980

member, signed but did not

ratify the

348.

text.
text.

arts. 22, 23(g),

46-47, 53, 55-56, superseding 1899

Hague

II,

Regulations,

arts.

46-47,

& Tanja, n. 2, 174-76; Evan ].Wa\lach, The Use of Crude

1880 OxfordManual, arts. 51-55; Lijnzaad

Oil by an Occupying Belligerent State as a Munition de Guerre, 41

ICLQ

287 (1992); Edward R. Cummings, Note, Oil

Wash. J. Intl L. & Econ. 533
Hague IV standards have been customary law since the end of World War II. See n. 236 and accompanying text.

Resources in Occupied Arab Territories Under the
(1974).

TIF

254.

See nn. 231-42 and accompanying

255.

Plant, Introduction, n. 2, 17

402, 450 and

accompanying

Law

of Belligerent Occupation, 9 Geo.

text.

and Plant, Legal Aspects,

n. 17,

IX, preamble, does not have the

Hague IV or 1899 Hague

II

222 suggested this for Protocol

Hague

text. If so, this analysis applies to

IV, preamble; 1899

language but recites:

Hague

I, art. 1(2).

II,

See nn.

preamble. Hague

..
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Whereas it is expedient that bombardments by naval forces should be subject to rules of general application
which would safeguard the rights of the inhabitants and assure the preservation of the more important
buildings, by applying as far as possible to this operation of war the principles of the Regulation of 1899 [i.e.,
Hague II] respecting the laws and customs of land war
.

This might or might not be
inconsistent with

Considering

Martens

a

.

Hague XI, preamble,

clause, but

incorporates prior law to the extent

it is

not

Hague XI's norms:

... it is

expedient, in giving up or,

if necessary,

commence

conflicting practices of long standing, to

in

harmonizing

common interest certain

for the

codifying in regulations of general application the

commerce and legitimate business, as well as the conduct of hostilities by sea; that
down in written mutual engagements the principles which have hitherto remained in the

guarantees due to peaceful
it is

expedient to lay

uncertain domain of controversy or have been

That, from henceforth,

.

.

.

certain

.

.

.

rules

regard to the matters which that law has

For trends analysis perhaps leading
of Cultural Property

in

Armed

to

Conflicts,

the discretion of Governments;

may be made, without affecting the common law now in force with

left

unsettled

.

.

custom before negotiation of these conventions, see Pietro Verri, The Condition
1985 Int'l Rev.

256.

Oxford Naval Manual,

257.

Verri, Commentary, n. IV. 71, 337.

258.

See Part V.B.3.

259.

An exception is Hague III, not relevant

Red Cross

art. 88.

to this analysis

E.g.,

Hague

IV, Regulations,

and partly superseded by the Pact of Paris,

superseding Hague

art. 53,

systems, including steamers and other publicly or privately

by naval law,

i.e.,

Means of

LONW.

the

1880 Oxford Manual,

transportation (railways, boats,

art.

etc.), as

51

They

necessity.

Whether "boats"

refers to

Colombos

when peace

are restored

is

made

oceangoing vessels, and

§§ 95-121;

O'Connell,

1

Law

if

Regulations,

II,

owned

n. III. 160,

precise:

and landing-cables, can only be

well as land telegraphs
is

forbidden, unless

in the condition in

so which,

of the Sea

is

declaring transportation

art. 53,

ships, are subject to seizure, except cases covered

is less

appropriated to the use of the occupant. Their destruction

261.

67.

UN Charter.

and the
260.

left to

.

.

.

demanded by

which they then

military

are.

not clear.

ch. 3;

Restatement (Third)

resolved until Territorial Sea Convention ratified generally after 1958). There

is a

§

512

&

r.n.l (issue

not

presumption against retroactively

treaties. Vienna Convention, art. 28; Restatement (Third) § 322(1), cmt. a, r.n. 1.; but see Namibia, 1971 ICJ
Today coastal State sovereignty includes the territorial sea and inland waters on the landward side of a baseline,

applying
1

6, 3 1

.

usually the low water line, marking the beginning of the territorial sea.

Convention,

arts. 1-13.

LOS Convention, arts.

2-16; Territorial Sea

See also Part IV.B.4.

arts. 22-26 with Hague IV, Regulations, arts. 23(g), 25-26, (land warfare) and Hague
Hague Declaration (XIV) Prohibiting Discharge of Projectiles & Explosives from
Balloons, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439; Hague Declaration (IV.l) to Prohibit for Five Years the Launching of
Projectiles & Explosives from Balloons, & Other Methods of a Similar Nature, July 29, 1899, 32 id. 1839, also bear on
5-2a; Toman 15, 178; Bierzanek,
the issue, but most do not consider them as stating custom. AFP 110-31

262.

IX,

Compare Hague Air Rules,

arts.

1-5 (naval warfare).

II

Commentary,
263.

n.

Compare,

See,

e.g.,

Rules, art. 21);

town

e.g.,

AFP

1

10-31, n.254, H 5-2(c) ("they do not represent existing customary law as a total code") (italics in

NWP 1-14M Annotated

original) with

264.

V.197, 396-97; Verri, Commentary, n. IV.71, 133-35.

AFP

NWP

1

110-31
-

HI!

7.3.7 n.82

(Hague Air Rules represent custom);

5-3(b)(2), 5-17 n.22 (citing inter alia

Hague Air

Rules);

11

see also n. V.679.

5-6, at 5-19 n.33

(Hague Air

14 Annotated UK 8.5.1.1 (Hague Air Rules, art. 24[4], declaring military objectives within a city,

may be bombarded

village

11

if

required for the enemy's submission with

minimum

expenditure of time,

life,

physical resources; exception to the general rule that wanton or deliberate destruction of areas of concentrated civilian

habitation

is

prohibited); 8.5.1.2 (Hague Air Rules,

NWP 9A Annotated
8.5-8.5.2; NWP 9A Annotated
forbidden);

1111

1111

265.

See,

e.g.,

art.

22;

8.5.1.1, 8.5.1.2 (same).

8.5-8.5.2 for air

Part V.D.3 (contraband).

bombardment only

See generally

bombardment

AFP

for terrorizing civilian population is

110-31 ch. 5;

NWP 1-14M Annotated HU

rules; see also Part V.G.I.

.
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Maritime Environment

266.

Robertson, Commentary,

267.

See Part B.l.

268.

Iran, Iraq

and most

if

Protection of the Environment 170;

in

not

all

States involved in the

Tanker War were

through treaty succession principles to the Geneval Gas Protocol. 1980
reservations are considered part of customary law.

see also

McDougal &

A

Warfare:

either ratifying parties or were

TIF 294-95. The Protocol and

Feliciano 634;

NWP 9A Annotated H 10.3.2.1; George Bunn, Banning Poison Gas and Germ
1969 Wis. L. Rev. 375, 384-85; John Norton Moore, Ratification of

Part V.G.I.

bound

no-first-use

its

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 10.3.2.1;

Warfare: Should the United States Agree?,

Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological

the

Legal and Political Analysis, 58 Va. L. Rev. 419, 447-52 (1972); Hays Parks, Classification of

Chemical-Biological Warfare, 13 U.

Toledo

L. Rev. 1165, 1167 (1982); Elizabeth A. Smith, Note, International

Regulation of Chemical and Biological Weapons: "Yellow Rain" and Arms Control, 1984 U. III. L. Rev. 1011, 1048-56.

and most States involved

Iran, Iraq

in the

Tanker War were

bound by the Convention on Prohibition of

also

Development, Production & Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) & Toxin Weapons, Apr.

UNTS 163.

1015

1980

TIF 268. See AFP

110-31

11

6-4(b);

10, 1972,

26

U ST 583,

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 10.4; NWP 9A Annotated H 10.4;

Moore 447-52 (any use of biological weapons is a customary law violation). Mark D. Budensiek, A New Chemical
Weapons Convention: Can It Assure the End of Chemical Weapons Proliferation?, 25 Stan. Intl LJ. 647 (1990), 39 Nav. L.
Rev. 15 (1990), traces developments leading to the Convention on Prohibition of Development, Production,

& Use of Chemical Weapons & on Their Destruction, Jan.

Stockpiling

13, 1993,

— UST —

,

32

ILM 800 (1993), being

worldwide. Convention parties agree not to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or retain these weapons; to

ratified

transfer

them

to

anyone; or to use or engage in military preparations to use them. States pledge to destroy these,

Helping combat chemical terrorism is a
Geneva Gas Protocol, will also protect the environment.
See generally Panel, Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention: Progress and Challenges, 1994 ASIL Proc. 12, 37-40
( 1 995). Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1 996( 1 ) ICJ 248 held the Protocol had been interpreted to apply
to poison and asphyxiating gases; States had not treated it as referring to nuclear weapons. But see id., 508-12
(Weeramantry, J., dissenting). For reservation principles, see Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; n. III.621 and
accompanying text; for treaty succession issues, see Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and
production

facilities

Convention

goal.

and weapons abandoned on another

Implementing these conventions,

party's territory.

like the

Disintegration.

269.

(1971);

See Diederich, n. 17, 146; L. Craig Johnstone, Ecocide and the Geneva Protocol, 49 Foreign Affairs 711, 718

Okorodudu-Fubara,

n. 11.210, 158-59;

Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 230. Wil D. Verwey, Comment:

Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict

Environment
270.

Hence the

territorial sea issue the

Protocol. See n. 261

27 1

— Do

We Need

Additional Rules?, in Protection of the

558, 563 did not consider this possibility.

and accompanying

See generally Chapter

1958 Territorial Sea Convention settled does not arise with respect to the

text; Part IV.B.4.

II.

may fly a distinctive flag over monuments and institutions to identify them. Roerich Pact, arts. 1-3;
The Netherlands presented the Preliminary Draft International Convention for Protection of Historic
Buildings & Works of Art in Time of War, Oct. 1938, Toman 403, developed through the International Museums
Office, to governments in 1 939; it was never accepted due to World War II. UNESCO developed the Cultural Property
Convention, analyzed nn. 300-27 and accompanying text, after the war. Toman 19, 22; Introductory Note, Schindler &
Toman 741.
272.

TIF

States

350.

261 and accompanying text; Part IV.B.4.

273.

See

274.

SeePartsIV.B.l-IVB.2.

275.

Roerich Pact,

276.

Brownlie, International

277.

See nn. 231-42 and accompanying

278.

The Genocide Convention was

n.

art. 1;

Toman

386; see also nn. III.948, IV.30, VI.84 and

Law

5,

13-14;

1

Oppenheim

§ 10,

text.

Restatement (Third)

§ 102(3).

text.

not invoked during Tanker

Genocide Convention addresses a different problem: intentional
national, ethnic, racial or religious group.

28;

accompanying

War

acts

aspects of the 1980-88 conflict.

during peace or war designed

The 1948

to destroy a

However, some of this international crime's components, e.g., "Deliberately

[a group's] physical destruction," Convention on Prevention
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, arts. 1, 2(c),
UST
78 UNTS 277, 280 (Genocide
Convention), might raise environmental issues. Restatement (Third) §§ 404 & r.n.l, 702 & cmt. c declare the
Convention definition of genocide is a customary norm for a universal jurisdiction crime. The Convention is

inflicting

.

.

.

conditions of life calculated to bring about

—

&

implemented

for the

—

USC § 1091. See also Nuremberg
& Judgment, 3 Tr. War Criminals Before

United States by Genocide Implementation Act of 1988, 18

Judgment, n.253, in 41 AJIL 172-75, 220-21 Justice Case (Case
;

3),

Opinion

,

The Tanker War
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Nuremberg Milit. Tribunals under Control Council L. No. 10, 954, 955, 970-72, 974-75, 979, 983-84 ( 195 1 ). Nearly all
States including Iran, Iraq and other Tanker War participants were parties by ratifying it or through treaty succession
principles, or were bound not to act to defeat its object and purpose. TIF 367; Vienna Convention, art. 18; Symposium,
Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration

and Disintegration; nn. IV.32,

have reserved to the Convention, including the United
1987); 28

ILM

754 (US reservations). The result

reservations. See

Vienna Convention,

of Genocide, 195 1 ICJ 19-30;

environment that is

a

n.

arts.

may be

60, VI.45

and accompanying

See generally Schindler

States.

Many countries

239-49

(list as

text. If naval

warfare

is

conducted

condition of life for a group covered by the Convention, there

& Punishment of Crime

is

to deliberately destroy

in

environmental destruction as well; one

3(c).

may

Deliberate and public incitement to

recall destruction of

synagogues before

A

group.

a

to

may result
and during World War II. A

commit

landed naval or marine force could be held accountable for such behavior, by destruction

such

an

potential for genocide as well as

environmental deprivation claims. The same could be said of genocide through "Deliberate and public incitement

commit genocide." Genocide Convention, art.

of

law patchwork because of the law of treaty

a treaty

19-23; Reservations to Convention on Prevention

III.621and accompanying

text.

& Toman

of, e.g.,

the crime

houses of worship of

genocide issue could also arise during psychological warfare, where naval personnel engage in

broadcasting or leafleting that incites to violations. Most genocide issues involving use of the military to inflict

damage by

force will arise in the land warfare context, but

involvement

is

more

likely.

targeting. See nn. 231-42

claims.
a

If, e.g.,

if

Naval aviation and land-based

and accompanying

the prospect
air forces

text; Part V.G.I.

An

is

for close inshore operations, sea services

stand on an equal footing in this regard as to

operation might or might not involve genocide

enemy fishing communities or their environment are ordered destroyed with

group because of national, ethnic,

racial or religious attributes, a

genoide issue

intent to destroy

arises. If

enemy

them

as

coastal craft are

enemy through gun running, and not because of ethnic, etc., composition of
Hague XI, art. 3, and not the Genocide Convention, See also nn. 243-51 and accompanying
text. Either scenario might raise environmental issues. The Convention has no territorial limitation; issues related to
the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, continental shelf and EEZ can arise. As with humanitarian law, no derogation
from the Convention during armed conflict is permitted. See nn. III. 948, IV. 30, VI. 84 and accompanying text. There
is no evidence of practices amounting to genocide during the Tanker War; Iraq has been condemned for violations,
<?.£., during the 1990-91 war. See generally S.C. Res. 674(1990), 677 (1990), 686 (1991), 687 (1991),m Wellens 536, 539,
540-41 DOD Report, n. II.8, 609, 623; John Norton Moore, War Crimes and the Rule ofLaw in the Gulf Crisis, 31 VJIL
destroyed because of suspected aid to the

crews, an issue arises under

;

403 (1991); William V. O'Brien, The Nuremberg Precedent and
Coalition used psychological tactics, perhaps

These did not

beamed from

incite to genocide or otherwise violate the

or incited to, genocide. Legality of Threat or

Convention,

the

Gulf War,

id.

391 (1991). During the Gulf War the

the sea as well as the land and

air.

DOD Report 536-38.

Convention; no one has suggested the Coalition committed,

Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996(1) ICJ 240, after
would be pertinent in

definitions, pointed out that the prohibition of genocide

art. 2

situation only if the element of intent toward a group as such was present

and declined

to

reciting

Genocide

a nuclear

weapons

conclude on the issue absent

specific circumstances.

279.

Convention

(World Cultural

&

TIF

for Protection of World Cultural

& Natural Heritage, Nov.

15, 1972,

27

UST 37, 1037 UNTS

151

Natural Heritage Convention).

280.

1980

281.

Fourth Convention,

282.

See Fourth Convention, arts. 4-6,

338-39, 342-43, 349.
art.

154, citing 1899
1 1,

Hague

II,

Hague IV;

see also

4 Pictet 613-21.

35-37, 47-78; 4 Pictet 45-64, 99-1 13, 233-43, 272-369, does not elucidate

the point.

261 and accompanying text; Part IV.B.4.

283.

See

284.

See Parts IV.B.MV.B.2.

285.

See nn. III.948, IV.30, VI.84 and accompanying

286.

Fourth Convention,

n.

arts.

text.

14-15; 4 Pictet 119-33 focuses

on these areas

for

purposes stated in the Convention

and mentions Henry Dunant's hospital town proposals during the Franco-Prussian War and

for refuges

during the

Commune uprising. The ICRC administered neutralized zones in Madrid, Shanghai and Jerusalem before
and after World War II. Argentina and the United Kingdom agreed on a zone in the Falkland Islands capital in 1982
1

871 Paris

and

a

Red Cross Box

at sea, a

concept not mentioned in the Second Convention, during the Falklands/Malvinas War.

Truth 487 (1995) reports Speer's attempt to have
Heidelberg declared a hospital city late in World War II. These cities are known for cultural artifacts and buildings. If

See Part V.F.4. Gitta Sereny, Albert Speer: His Battle with

a hospital area or

zone

is

established near cultural sites, a result

is

protection for cultural property and therefore the

urban environment.
287.

These

lose protected status if used for acts harmful to the

enemy,

e.g.,

antiaircraft

sheltering troops, storing arms or ammunition, as observation posts or liaison centers.

weapons on the

They may be

roof,

attacked after

.

Maritime Environment

warning about
8.5.1.4;

288.
287.

their illegal use.

Fourth Convention, arts. 18-19. See also

AFP 110-31

H 5-5;

579

NWP 1-14M Annotated H

NWP 9A Annotated H 8.5.1.4; 4 Pictet 141-56; Part V.F.4.
First Convention, art. 23.

These hospitals

lose protected status if used for acts

harmful to the enemy. See

n.

The same is true for hospital ships in the territorial sea or inland waters. Second Convention, arts. 22-35; see also

Pictet 206-18; 2

1

154-98; Part V.F.4.

id.

289.

Second Convention,

290.

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 8.5.1.5; NWP 9A Annotated H 8.5.1.5.

291

Fourth Convention, arts. 53, 147; see also 4 Pictet 300-02 (art. 53 reinforces, broadens Hague IV, Regulations,

arts. 46, 56; id.,

Regulations,

Lijnzaad

292.

arts.

38-40; see also 2 Pictet 212-25.

art. 23(g),

more comprehensive

in scope).

& Tanja, n. 2, 178; Plant, Legal Aspects, n. 17, 223; Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 230-31; see nn.

231-42, 252-54 and accompanying text.

See nn. 231-42, 252-55 and accompanying

293.

The 1949 Conventions, through

text.

Martens clauses

their

continuing rules of humanity and the public conscience, incorporate and carry forward principles related to direct or
indirect environmental protection. First Convention,

Fourth Convention,
id.

art. 158.

Earlier treaties'

art.

Martens

63;

Second Convention, art. 62; Third Convention, art. 142;

clauses, similarly carry forward earlier law. See

282; 3 id. 648; 4 id. 625-26; Morris, n. 17, 780; n. 255 and accompanying text. Plant, Introduction, n.

Aspects, n. 17, 222, argue the

Martens clause of Protocol

I

Convention clauses might apply

Pictet 413; 2
Plant, Legal

could be interpreted to incorporate environmental concerns

humanity and the public conscience. See nn. 402, 450 and accompanying

as matters of

1

2, 17;

text. If this is so,

the 1949

too.

294. Michael Bothe, Remarks, in Panel, Criminal Responsibilities for Environmental Damage, in Protection of the
Environment 499, 501 Ariane L. DeSaussure, The Role of the Law ofArmed Conflict During the Persian Gulf War: An
Overview, 37 Air Force Review 41, 57 (1994); Edwards, n. 2, 130; McNeill, Protection, n. 2, 540-541; Okorodudu-Fubara,
;

n. 11.210, 191; Roberts,

Convention,
terminal.

It

art.

Environmental

53 did not apply to

250; Terry, n. 17, 63. Plant, Legal Aspects, n. 17, 224 says Fourth

Issues, n. 2,

some

discharges,

did apply to discharge of Kuwaiti

oil

i.e.,

Iraqi-owned

oil in

the tankers and from the

295.

Fourth Convention,

296.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

297.

See Part V.F.4.

298.

See Part V.F.4; nn. VI. 281-93 and accompanying

299.

See Diederich, n. 17, 159; Part V.F.4; nn. VI.281-93 and accompanying

art.

was

university

would be spared from

a tacit

al

Bakr

63; see also 4 Pictet 333-34.
11

11.3

& n.16; NWP 9A Annotated, n.33, H

11.3

attack,

& n.17;

Matheson, Remarks 427.

text.
text.

agreement between the United Kingdom and Germany that

that there

Mina

from the Sea Island Terminal.

Oxford and Cambridge would

be.

Part of World

if Heidelberg

War II lore may be

and another German

What has been proposed would follow this

idea.

Immediate incentives were looting of

300.

art

during the Nazi occupation, removal of important works from

private and public collections, and intentional destruction of culturally significant movables and immovables,

including

Toman

21-22; Prott, n. V.110, 582.

Cultural Property Convention,

301.

States

cities.

is

Convention;

many

if

not

succession. See Schindler
Integration

and

art. 36,

or has been party to the latter treaties
all

citing

and

is

Hague IV; Hague IX; 1899 Hague II; Roerich

a signatory but not a

other States involved in the Tanker

Convention

War were

party. Iran

parties

Pact.

The United

and Iraq ratified the

through ratification or treaty

& Toman 769-75; TIF 350, 441-42; Toman 318-20; Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker,

and Disintegration. Although the United States

is

not a Convention party,

NWP 9A Annotated H 8.5.1.6 condemn the sort of destruction

it

NWP 1-14M Annotated

denounces, unless property

is

used

11

8.5.1.6

to further

an

enemy war effort. Id. publish orders from US higher commands that ordered preservation of cultural property during
previous wars where the United States was a belligerent. The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), a UN specialized agency like IMO, sponsored the Convention. Toman 21-24. The United States
withdrew from UNESCO in 1984; Singapore and the United Kingdom followed in 1985. See 23 ILM 218 (1984); 24 id.
489 (1985). See also Birnie & Boyle 59-60. Toman 322-23 explains why no Martens clause was included. The Second
Protocol to the Cultural Property Convention also has no Martens clause. The Protocol, opened for signature in 1999,
will come into force 3 months after 20 States ratify it. Second Protocol, art. 43. For Martens clause analysis, and
possible application to environmental concerns, see nn. 255, 293, 402, 450 and
302.

Toman

Compare Cultural Property Convention,

art.

18 with,

e.g.,

accompanying

Fourth Convention,

text.

art. 2; see also

4 Pictet 17-25;

Theodor Meron, Comment: Protection of the Environment During Non-International Conflicts, in
Protection ofthe Environment 353, 354; Prott, n. V.l 10, 587-88. The Roerich Pact applies at all times; see n. 275 and
195-206;
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accompanying

Second Protocol,

text.

relationship between

id., arts.

arts. 2-4, states its

10-14,

supplementary

status, declares its scope of operation

and the

and other provisions of the Cultural Property Convention and the Second

Protocol.

Cultural Property Convention,

303.

art.

1,

states that cultural property, irrespective of origin or

ownership,

includes:

movable or immovable property of great importance

(a)

monuments of

to the cultural heritage of

every people, such as

architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of

buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other
objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections

and important

collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property described above;
(b) buildings

in

.

.

.

(a)

whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural property defined

such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the

event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property defined in
(c)

centres containing a large

.

amount of cultural property as defined

.

(a);

.

in

.

.

.

(a)

and

(b), to

be

known as "centres

containing monuments."

This definition covers cultural resources, £.£., underwater
historic shipwrecks

Kingston, Jamaica,

Tyre

Lebanon.

off

and buildings,

is a

Id.

sunken town

now under

etc.,

lost to

sites

of archaeological or historical importance, including

Toman 45-46; Prott, n. V.110, 582-83. Port Royal off
There are many sites in the Mediterranean Sea, e.g., ancient

water.

earthquake.

584-85. For comparative analysis between Convention

art.

1

and Protocol

II, art. 16, see

Daniel

Smith, Protections for Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts: The Proposed Ratification of Protocol II by the United States,
120 Mil. L. Rev. 59, 72-75 (1988); see also Diederich, n. 17, 147. Second Protocol, arts. 1(e), 10-14, declare an "enhanced
protection" regime for cultural property
is

if the

property

highest level of protection, and

made by

"cultural heritage of the greatest importance for humanity",

is

Cultural Property Convention,

304.

art. 2; see also

observance and respect for

Toman

all

Armed

306.

deemed
see also

307.

not be so used.

57-58; Second Protocol, arts. 1(e), 10-14, establishing an

armed

forces or publishing military regulations to insure

and

Toman

Armed

forces

must

Convention

establish a service or

to cooperate with civil authorities responsible for safeguarding

The property must be marked pursuant to the Convention.
arts. 5-9;

will

peoples' culture and cultural property.

specialists to secure respect for cultural property

Second Protocol,

it

n. 303.

Parties pledge instructing their

305.

exceptional cultural and historic value that insure the

its

not used for military purposes or to shield military sites and a declaration has been

the State having control over the property, confirming

enhanced protection regime;

it.

is

protected by adequate domestic measures recognizing

Cultural Property Convention,

arts. 3, 7, 10, 16; see also

59-66, 91-96, 141-42, 177-84.

custodians assigned to guard property are considered police responsible for public order and are not

part of a belligerent's

Second Protocol,

armed

arts. 5-9;

forces because of their status as guards. Cultural Property Convention, arts. 8-9;

Toman

96-112, 138-40.

Cultural Property Convention, Regulations,

art. 11; see also

Toman

113-15. Diederich, n. 17, 159 suggests

similar environmental sanctuaries.
308.

Cultural Property Convention,

309.

See generally Part V.B.

arts. 12-14;

Regulations,

The Convention's

arts.

17-19; see also

Toman

151-72.

implications for submarine warfare and reconnaisance "need

discussion," according to Prott, n. V.110, 585; he offers no solutions.
310.

Hague XI,

311.

The

Regulations,
312.

V.439;

art. 4; see also

Toman

171; n. 248

and accompanying

text.

Cultural Property Convention also provides for dispute resolution, including arbitration.
arts.

12-16; see also

Toman

Protecting Powers are States not party to a conflict

Toman

Id., art. 8;

97-112, 116-37.

who

safeguard interests of parties to the conflict. See n.

94, 222-27.

313.

Cultural Property Convention,

art.

314.

Cultural Property Convention,

art. 4(1); see also

315.

Cultural Property Convention,

arts. 4(l)-4(2), 9; see also

21; Regulations, arts. 1-10; see also

Second Protocol,

Toman

Toman

art. 6;

222-49.

Toman

68-69.

68-70, 72-79. This was included because of

UK and US delegations' strong advocacy; neither country has ratified the Convention, however. Toman 75-77; Prott,
n. V.110, 586.

316.

See also Second Protocol,

Cultural Property Convention,

art. 7.

arts. 4(3)-4(4); see also

NWP 9A Annotated, Table ST6-1; Toman 70-71.

,

Maritime Environment

Cultural Property Convention,

317.

accompanying

art. 4(5),

referring to

id., art.

3; see also

Toman

581

59-66, 71-72; nn. 305-13

and

text.

318. A party whose government is considered its legitimate government by a resistance movement shall if possible
draw its attention to the obligation to comply with cultural property conventions. Cultural Property Convention, art.
5; see also

Toman

83-89.

Cultural Property Convention,

319.

art. 1;

Toman 39-56 says coverage of sites of great natural beauty was rejected;

& Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 UST 37,
& Natural Heritage Convention), analyzed nn. 339-48 and accompanying text. See

they are covered by the Convention for Protection of World Cultural

1037
also

UNTS

151 (World Cultural

& McGregor, n.

Harlow

ODIL 433 (1991). McNeill, Protection,

nature preserves like demilitarized zones.

The Second

property subject to "enhanced protection;" see
responsibility

and jurisdiction of these

Protocol, arts. 15-21. Id.,

320.

Roberts, Environmental

321.

Cf. Prott, n. V.110,

303 and accompanying text.

n.

allow destroying cultural property

and extradition. Second

if

e.g.,

proportionality). Cultural Property

"military necessity imperatively requires"

it;

see

text.

323.

See Parts I V.B.I -2.

324.

See nn. III.948, IV.30, VI. 84 and accompanying

325.

Schindler

326.

DOD

text.

769-73, 780-82.

II. 8,

605-06; John H. McNeill, Remarks, in Panel Discussion, The Strategic Imperative,

Protection of the Environment

63, 80; Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 240;

(1990-91 war sources; assumption

is

that

same practice applied

for

327.

See Part V.F.4; nn. 297-99, 319 and accompanying text;

328.

See generally

329.

Convention on Means of Prohibiting

Toman

a special category of

Issues, n. 2, 231.

See n. 261 and accompanying text; Part IV.B.4.

Report, n.

would add

The Protocol also provides for criminal

to, e.g., riots.

322.

& Toman

543-44 notes discussions to protect

offenses, including international judicial assistance

583 (need to observe customary warfare rules,

arts. 4(l)-4(2), 9,

315 and accompanying

also n.

n. 2,

Protocol, arts. 1(e), 10-14

22 declares the Protocol will apply to armed conflicts not of an international nature

art.

within a party's territory but not

Convention,

Bernard H. Oxman, Environmental Warfare (Environmental Terrorism

Ill, 325-26, citing

During Wartime and Rules of War), 22

25, 258-59; see also n. 301

Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970,

— UST —

,

&

UNTS

Illicit

231

Harlow

McNeill, Protection,

and accompanying

Preventing

823

cf.

cf.

& McGregor, n.

1 1 1,

325

Tanker War).

text.

& Transfer of Ownership
& Transfer of Ownership

Import, Export

(Illicit

n. 2, 543-44.

Import, Export

of
of

Cultural Property Convention).
330.

Toman

465-67.

331.

Toman

25.

332.

Illicit

823

By 1998 90

Import, Export

States

parties.

TIF

350.

& Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property Convention, n. 329, arts. 2-3, — UST —

UNTS 236; Toman 362.
Compare Cultural Property Convention, art.

333.

Property Convention,

n. 329, art. 1,

— UST —

334.

Cultural Property Convention,

335.

Compare

UST —
336.
art. 3,

337.

823

were

,

Illicit

Import, Export

,

1

823

with Illicit Import, Export & Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
UNTS 234; see also Toman 359-60.

art. 8; see also n.

311 and accompanying

text.

& Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property Convention, n.

UNTS 242 with Cultural Property Convention, art. 4(3); see also Toman

823

Toman

361; compare

— UST —
Illicit

,

823

Illicit

UNTS 236

Import, Export

Import, Export
,

with

329,

art. 11,

—

361.

& Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property Convention, n.329,
— UST — 823 UNTS 242.

id., art. 1 1,

,

& Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property Convention, n.

329,

art. 9,

— UST —

,

UNTS 242.

338.

Id., art. 10(a),

339.

See

TIF

Symposium,
340.

— UST —

,

823

UNTS 242.

350; treaty succession principles

Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration

Toman

369.

may push

the total of States party to the Convention higher.

and Disintegration.

.

.

The Tanker War

582

I.U.C.N./I.C.E.L., Protection of Cultural and Natural Heritage Sites in Times ofArmed Conflict, 23 Envt'L Pol.

341

Toman

L. 259 (1993) (Convention, although concluded for times of peace, also applies during war); see also

Verwey,

&

369;

269, 563.

n.

342.

World Cultural & Natural Heritage Convention, n. 3 1 9, arts. 3-5, 27 UST 4 1

343.

Cf LOS Convention,

Territorial Sea Convention,

art. 2;

art. 1; see also n.

,

1

037

UNTS 1 54; Toman 369.

261 and accompanying text; Part

IV.B.4.
344.

World Cultural

345.

Toman

346.

Verwey,

&

Natural Heritage Convention, n. 319,

arts. 1-2,

UST 40-42,

27

1037

UNTS

153-55.

53-55; see also Part B.3.a(HI)(B).

The 1954 and 1982 Conventions

n. 269, 563.

Natural Heritage Convention,

lists

can be and are different.

The World

Cultural

&

319, covers only fixed objects; the Cultural Property Convention protects

n.

immovable and movable property. Toman

54, 110, 117-18.

347.

LeGrand,

348.

Compare Toman 373-75 with Cultural Property Convention,

349.

E.g.,

350.

Cf Toman

351.

TIF 468-69;

n. 2, 30.

DOD Report, n.

II. 8,

605-07, does not cite

art. 20.

World Cultural

&

Natural Heritage Convention,

n. 319.

487-90.
treaty succession principles

may push

that total higher.

Symposium,

Treaty Succession; Walker,

and Disintegration.

Integration

352.

Brownlie, International

353.

Daniel Barstow

Law

Magraw &

5;

1

Oppenheim

§ 10, 28;

Restatement (Third)

§ 102(3).

Beyond Confrontation,

Sergei Vinogradov, Environmental Law, in

n. III. 358,

193, 199.

& Understanding of Kuwait, Jan. 2, 1980, in Schindler & Toman 174: "This Convention
Kuwait only towards States Parties thereto. Its obligatory character shall ipso facto terminate with respect to
any hostile State which does not abide by the prohibition
therein. ..." (emphasis in original). See also Vienna
Reservation

354.

binds

.

.

.

.

Convention,

19-23; n.

arts.

III. 621,

.

.

and accompanying

VI. 268, 278

text.

Another interpretation

is

that

it

restates

principles on the effect of fundamental change of circumstances, war and possibly impossibility of performance. See

Vienna Convention,
355.

arts.

Art. 1(2) bars

61-62; nn.

III. 928-29,

any party from

assisting,

IV. 26-27, VI. 80-81

and accompanying

encouraging or inducing any

State,

text.

group of States or international

organization from engaging in environmental modification techniques the Convention condemns.

Convention,
356.

art.

1

"[This Understanding

is]

not incorporated into the Convention but

[was] included in the report ... by the Conference of the

September 1976." Schindler
Disarmament,

UN GAOR,

1

& Toman

understanding binds the United
nn.

III. 621,

States.

ENMOD Convention, art. 2.

358.

"[This Understanding

&

is

is]

accompanying
359.

UN Doc.

Restatement (Third)

.

...

to the

.

.

.

text; see also

[is]

.

.

.

interprets the

.

it.

The
The

Vienna Convention,

"

and

Schindler & Toman

(emphasis added). The understanding interprets the

Vienna Convention,

it.

The understanding binds

arts.

the United

19-23; nn. III.621, VI. 268, 278 and

text (multilateral treaty reservations).

.

whether

... a

given use of environmental modification techniques

part of the negotiating record
.

General Assembly in

part of the negotiating record

General Assembly

not a reservation purporting to exclude, limit or modify

recognized principles of international law." "[This understanding

Assembly

.

§§ 313 cmt. g, 314 cmt. d; see also

ENMOD Convention, art. 3(1). The Committee appended an understanding:

not deal with

.

A/31/27 (1976) (Report of the Conference).

not incorporated into the Convention but

356 and accompanying

States. See n.

.

not a reservation excluding, limiting or modifying

n.l, citing Report of the Conference, n. 356, 91-92
is

to the

168 &n.l (emphasis added), citing Report of the Conference of the Committee on

[was] included in the report transmitted by the Conference

168

and

part of the negotiating record

VI. 268, 278 (multilateral treaty reservations).

357.

Convention and

[is]

Committee on Disarmament

31st Sess., Supp. No. 27, 91-92,

understanding interprets the Convention and

arts. 19-23;

ENMOD

(emphases added).

"

Schindler

and [was] included

& Toman

Convention and

is

168

&

is]

is

"... [T]his Convention does
in accordance with generally

not incorporated into the Convention but

in the report transmitted

by the Conference ...

n.l, citing Report of the Conference, n. 369, 91-92.

not a reservation purporting to exclude, limit or modify

it.

to the

[is]
.

UN Charter, arts. 5

1

,

1

03; see also nn.

III. 10,

.

The understanding binds

the United States. See nn. III.621, VI. 356, 358 and accompanying text.
360.

.

The understanding

47-630, 916-18, 968-84, 1 V.6-25 and accompanying text; Part B. 1

.

.

583

Maritime Environment

190-23; see also nn. III.621, VI.268, 278 and accompanying text.

361.

Vienna Convention,

362.

ENMOD Convention, art. 1(1); see also Okorodudu-Fubara, n. 11.210, 182-83; nn. 354-56 and accompanying

text.

arts.

Terry, n. 17, 64 makes this point but does not inquire whether

accompanying

it

might

restate

custom;

see n.

365 and

text.

363.

TIF

364.

Vienna Convention,

364-65.

accompanying

Schindler

art. 18;

& Toman

170; Sharp, n. 2, 19; see also nn. IV.32, 60, IV.45

and

text.

San Remo Manual H 44, cmt. 44.4 (ENMOD Convention standards "the threshold indicated"); cf. Arkin,
Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 430; cf. Okorodudu-Fubara, n. 11.210, 171-72, 179; Ivan Shearer, The Debate to
Assess the Need for New International Accords, in Protection of the Environment 546, 547; contra, Edwards, n. 2, 129.
365.

E.g.,

n. 2, 121;

ENMOD

Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996(1) ICJ 241-42, discussed

but appeared to take no

position:

.

.

[T]he issue

.

not whether the treaties relating to the protection of the environment are or are not
armed conflict, but rather whether the obligations stemming from these treaties were

is

applicable during an

intended to be obligations of total restraint during military conflict.

The Court does

not consider that the treaties

State of the exercise of its right of self-defense

.

.

.

.

.

must take environmental considerations

State

.

[including

ENMOD] could have intended to deprive a

because of its obligations to protect the environment ....
into account

when

assessing

what

proportionate in [pursuing] legitimate military objectives. Respect for the environment
[in] assessing

See also
I

whether an action [conforms]

.

.

.

is

necessary and

is

one

.

.

.

element

.

.

with necessity and proportionality.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; n. III. 10 and accompanying text. Paul C. Szasz, reviewing the Convention, Protocol

and the World Charter

principle

.

for Nature, said that "[I]t can be safely

—that nature

concluded that the principle expressed in

—

all

these

way to becoming an accepted
." Panel, The
Gulf War: Environment as a Weapon, 1991 ASIL Proc. 215, 216-17. World Charter for Nature,

instruments
.

G. A. Res. 37/7 (Annex),

is

no longer

fair

game

in

mankind's conflicts

UN GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 5 1, at

1 7,

is

on

well

UN Doc. A/37/5

its

1 1HI 5,

20 ( 1 982) (World Charter for

ILM 455, 457, 459 (1983), declared that "Nature shall be secured against degradation caused by warfare

Nature), in 22

or other hostile activities;" "Military activities

damaging

to nature shall

be avoided."

PaulC. Szasz,Comment: The Existing Legal Framework, Protecting the Environment During International Armed Conflict, in

Protection of the Environment 278, 279, characterized "these statements,

.

.

.

merely declarations of leading

representative international bodies, ... at best constitute international 'soft law' [but] their adoption by the votes or

with the concurrence of representatives of a majority of countries lend some weight to the suggestion that they
represent, if not yet well-established customary law, at least

Howard

S.

.

.

.

lege ferenda."

See also G.A. Res. 35/8 (1980), discussed in

Levie, Comment: Criminal Responsibilities for Environmental Damage, in Protection of the Environment,

491, 494-95.
366.

ENMOD Convention, art. 2; see also Sharp, n. 2, 22.

367.

See n. 358 and accompanying

368.

ENMOD Convention, art.

369.

See

n.

text.

1(1)

356 and accompanying

(emphasis added).

text.

370. Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 432; Leslie C. Green, The Environment and
CYBIL 222, 226-27 (1991); Roberts, Environmental Destruction, n. 2, 544.

the

Law

of Conventional Warfare, 29

37 1
Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 432, citing Final Declaration of Second Review Conference of Parties to Convention
on Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, Sept. 14-18, 1992,
art. 2, in U.N.I.D.R Newsletter 60 (1993). Low & Hodgkinson say Convention preparatory works support this; they
accept this view. Id. 432-33.
372.

ENMOD Convention, art.

373.

Id., art. 2.

374.

Cf,

e.g.,

International
375.

See

376.

LOS

n.

1(1).

Space Treaty n. III.957,

Law 267-71;

357 and accompanying

Convention,

art.

1,18

UST 2411, 610 UNTS 207; see also AFP 110-31

NWP 1-14M Annotated 1

art. 87(1);

1.9;

NWP 9A Annotated

11

1.9.

text.

High Seas Convention,

art. 2; see also

Part IV.B.l.

11

2-3(a);

Brownlie,

The Tanker War

584

356 and accompanying

377.

See

378.

See nn. III.958, IV.16, VI.68 and accompanying

379.

See

380.

See Chapter IV for development of these

n.

n.

text.

356 and accompanying

text.

text.

boundaries, historical analysis of norms that

may

LOS
or

ENMOD

norms. Since the

may

Convention has no

not apply to given treaties has no bearing.

territorial

It is like

the

Geneva Gas Protocol and the Genocide Convention, which also apply worldwide. See nn. 270, 278 and accompanying
text.

The World

381.

UN

Meteorological Organization and

Environmental Program Informal Meeting on Legal

Aspects of Weather Modification Draft Principles (Apr. 1978),in Aviation
1204-05, declares States

at

must take

"all

& Space Law: Meteorology, 1978 Digest § 7,

reasonable steps to ensure that weather modification activities under their

jurisdiction or control

do not cause adverse environmental

Agreement Relating

Exchange of Information on Weather Modification

UST

26

to

See Parts IV.B.1-IV.B.3.

383.

Vienna Convention,

384.

See

385.

See nn. 370-71 and accompanying

386.

.

.

.

outside their national jurisdiction." See also
Activities,

Mar. 26, 1975, Can.-US,

art. 7,

540, 545.

382.

plants;

effects

n.

The

art. 18; see also

365 and accompanying

record

is

nn. IV.32, 60, VI.45 and accompanying

text.
text.

not clear; presumably neutral ships diverted around the

Gulf fishing grounds were damaged, however. See

n. 4-5

387.

See nn. 4-5 and accompanying

388.

See

389.

Low & Hodgkinson,

390.

See nn. 367-68 and accompanying

391.

See

n.

392.

See

n. 8

393.

See nn. 11.65, 215, 221, 519, VI.9 and accompanying

n.

356 and accompanying
n. 2,

text.

avoid fouling engineering

spill to

and accompanying

text.

text.

text.

434; Okorodudu-Fubara,

6 and accompanying

text.

and accompanying

text.

n. 11.210, 179.

text.

text.

395.

ENMOD Convention, art. 1; see also nn. 355-56 and accompanying text.
ENMOD Convention, art. 2; see also nn. 357-58 and accompanying text.

396.

See generally Walker, State Practice 158-70; Parts V.C-V.D.

397.

See

398.

ENMOD Convention, arts.

399.

UN Charter,arts. 51,

400.

See

401.

Schindler & Toman 701-03 (1987 list). The United States has declared it will not ratify Protocol I; Protocol II

394.

n.

6 and accompanying

402.

Cf.

1-2; see also nn.

US

1-2; nn.

355-58 and accompanying

Senate for advice and consent. See

n. III.622

222. See also n. 450

Protocol

and accompanying

I, art.

49(3);

Naval Warfare 760-62;
Hodgkinson, n.

2,

text.

as a matter of

and accompanying text; Part B.l.

text.

and accompanying

DOD Report, n. II. 8, 606-07. The Martens clause, Protocol

and perhaps environmental concerns

403.

355-58 and accompanying

03; see afro nn. 111.10,47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

ENMOD Convention, arts.

has been sent to the

law,

1

text.

I, art.

1(2) carried

text.

forward other humanitarian

humanity and public conscience.

Plant, Legal Aspects, n. 17,

text.

Bothe et al.

290; Pilloud,

Commentary 605-06; Michael Bothe, Commentary, in Law of

Fenrick,Mt/irary Objectives, n. 11.202, 23-24; ¥tm'\ck, Legal Aspects, n. 11.501, 264-65;

441 ; van Hegelsom,

n. III. 623,

Low &

8-10 (noting, criticizing two commentators' opposing views); see also

nn. 427-31 and accompanying text.
404.

Protocol II, art.

173 cites Protocol

1

.

II, art.

Confusion in applying the Protocols has crept into secondary literature. E.g., Edgerton, n. 2,
14 instead of Protocol I, art. 54 in analyzing deliberate attempted destruction of Saudi

Arabia's desalination plants during the 1990-91 war. Whatever one might think of Iraq's arguments for

and trying

to

annex Kuwait

as a long-lost province, rejected

by the

UN

its

invasion

Security Council, see Walker, Crisis Over

Maritime Environment

Kuwait

on Saudi Arabia was part of an international armed

34, its assault

Protocol

by Protocol

and not

I

II.

The 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War

405.

conflict, covered

585

demilitarized zones protected by Protocol

Manual

analogizes Protocol

belligerents agreed on a

standards, particularly

I

Red Cross Box on the high

60 for transfer of sick and wounded;

I, art.

if

seas,

analogous to

The San Remo

see Part V.F.4.

they restate general customary norms, to the law of naval

warfare.

Philippe Antoine, International Humanitarian

406.

32 Int'l Rev.

Conflict,

Law

in

and

the Protection

of the Environment

Time of Armed

in

517, 527 (1992).

Louise Doswald-Beck, The Principle of Humanity

407.

Hors de Combat,

ASIL

Red Cross

in the

Law of Sea

Warfare: The Protection of Civilians and the

War

Panel, Neutrality, the Rights of Shipping and the Use of Force in the Persian Gulf

(Part

II),

1988

Proc. 599, 600-01 (1990).

Low & Hodgkinson, n.

408.

Cf Edgerton,

409.

Protocol I, art. 35(1), restating the principle of Hague IV, Regulations, art. 22; 1899 Hague II, Regulations, art.

22; G. A. Res. 2444, 23
6-3(a);
1-1

Bother al.

n. 2, 173;

UN GAOR Supp. No.

1 8,

50,

2, 441.

UN Doc. A/72

193-95; Final Protocol, Aug. 27, 1974,

1 8,

art. 12, in

in

Schindler & Toman 263; see also

Schindler & Toman

4M Annotated H 8. 1 n.2 (citing inter alia Lieber Code, art. 30); NWP 9A Annotated

Manual,

1880

art. 14;

Oxford Manual, art.

551; Fenrick, Military Objectives, n. 11.201,
Technology, n. V.173, 363, 370;

Additional

to the

projectiles or

1;

4;

11

8. 1 n. 1

(same);

NWP

Oxford Naval

Remo Manual 38 & cmts.; Stone
& Tanja, n. 2, 180; Matheson, Remarks 424; Robertson, Modern

Pilloud, Commentary 390; San

Lijnzaad

AFP 1 1 0-3 111

25, 29 (never ratified);

11

William G. Schmidt, The Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts: Protocol I
I, art. 35(2) denounces weapons,

Geneva Conventions, 24 Air Force L. Rev. 189, 213 (1984). Protocol

means of warfare intended,

or

may be

expected, to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.

rule, applicable to naval warfare, is analyzed at 442-52

This customary

customary norm;

nn. 442-52 and accompanying

410.

Protocol

I, art.

35(2), a

411.

Protocol

I, art.

35(3) (emphasis added).

412.

See nn. 354-56 and accompanying

413.

Report of Committee III, Second Sess., in 2 Howard

see also

and accompanying

text.

text.

text.

Levie, Protection of War Victims:

S.

1949 Geneva Conventions 276 (1980); Pilloud, Commentary 416; Antoine,

n. 406, 525;

Protocol I to the

Low & Hodgkinson, n.

2,

429; Schmidt, The Protection ,n. 111.623,215-16. Levie, The 1977 Protocol I and the United States, 38 St. Louis U.L.J. 469,

478 (1993), describes the
the 1977 Protocol

I

ENMOD Convention distinctions and says "it would be extremely difficult for a

to assert that the

414.

Low & Hodgkinson, n.

415.

Antoine, n. 406, 526.

416.

Compare

Commentary
417.

ENMOD

2,

words so used had

a different

.

.

.

party to

in the Protocol ..."

429.

Convention, preamble with Protocol

I,

preamble;

see also

Bothe

et al.

33; Pilloud,

27-28.

Birnie & Boyle 210; Green 123 ("new 'basic rule'"); John

Rule of Law

meaning

81 (1992);

cf.

San Remo Manual,

11

44

& cmt.;

cf.

Norton Moore, Crisis in the Gulf: Enforcing the
Arkin, n.

2,

121;

cf.

Fleck, Protection, n. 17, 530;

cf.

Gasser, The Debate, n. 17, 523; Frits Kalshoven, Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use ofMethods and Means of Warfare, in

Dekker & Post 97, 100; Levie, The 1977 Protocol I, n. 413,479 (United States has no valid reason to object to substance
of art. 35[3]); Glen Plant, Comment,
n. III.623,

134 (1986); Terry,

n. 2, 440,

n. 17,

Matheson, Remarks 424 (US view

is

441 (emerging norm); cf. Shearer, The Debate, n. 365, 547; Solf, Protection,

65 (replication of Hague IV standards); contra,

Low & Hodgkinson,

n. 2,

427;

that art. 35(3) does not state a customary norm); McNeill, Protection, n. 2, 540-41

(treaty norms); cf. Bernard H. Oxman, Comment: Developing the International Law ofArmed Conflict, in Protection of
the Environment 576, 577; L.R. Penna, Customary International Law and Protocol I: An Analysis of Some Provisions, in
Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles 200, 210 (Christophe Swinarski
ed. 1984);

cf.

Roberts, Environmental Issues, n.

Protection, n. III. 623, 214-17;

that

art.

cf.

Verwey,

2,

235; Robertson, Modern Technology, n. V.173, 363; Schmidt, The

n. 269, 560-61.

Low & Hodgkinson 427-28 seem

35(3) "do[es] not apply to conventional warfare"

to miss the point in saying

and therefore would not apply

to the Iraqi oil spills.

Authorities id. cites do not speak of inapplicability but lack of significant limitations on belligerents, i.e., that

art.

35(3)

would not be triggered by damage incidental or peripheral to conventional warfare. See, e.g., Bothe et al. 348; George
H. Aldrich, Progressive Development of the Laws of War: A Reply to Criticisms of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, 26 VJIL 693,
n. 17, 152; Report of Committee III, Second Sess.
(CDDH/215/Rev. 1; XV, 263), in 2 Levie, Protection, n. 413, 276-77 (Protocol I preparatory works), cited by Low &
Hodgkinson 417-18, notes Art. 35(3) has been criticized as being insufficient, unworkable or unrealistic; Lijnzaad &

711 (1986); Green, The Environment, n. 370, 228; Diederich,

Tanja, n.

2,

182;

Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War:

The Case Against Ratification ofAdditional Protocol 1, 26
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VJIL

109, 148 (1985); Christopher

Greenwood, Customary International Law and the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 in

the

The Gulf War 1990-91 in International and English Law 63, 86-87 (Peter Rowe ed. 1993) (Art.
35(3)'s equivocal status.)- The United States appears firm in opposing the art. 35(3) standard. A condition of its
ratifying the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Fragments and Mine Protocols was: "The United States

Gulf Conflict,

in

considers that the fourth paragraph of the Preamble to the present Convention, which reproduces the subject of
provisions of Article 35

.

.

[3]

.

and Article 55

those provisions[.]" Levie, Prohibitions,

may have
.

.

.

agreed that Protocol

[T]hese provisions

.

embody

.

of Additional Protocol

[1]

1,

applies only to States

which have accepted

Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996(1) ICJ 242,

and 55 do not

arts. 35(3)

I,

.

n. III. 627, 666.

restate

custom:

a general obligation to protect the natural

environment against widespread,

long-term and severe environmental damage; the prohibition of methods and means of warfare which are

may be

intended, or

environment by

.

.

.

expected, to cause such damage; and the prohibition of attacks against the natural

reprisals.

These are powerful constraints

One

implication

for all States

having subscribed to these provisions.

that those countries that have not "subscribed" to these provisions

is

by Protocol

ratification or

acceptance of them as custom are not bound.
418.

Commentators divide on

419.

Compare Protocol

420.

See n. 417 and accompanying

421.

See nn. 413-16 and accompanying

text.

422.

See nn. 403, 427-31 accompanying

text.

423.

Compare Protocol

whether they

I, art.

I, art.

this point; see n. 365

35(3) with

and accompanying

ENMOD Convention, art.

text.

1(1).

text.

35(3) with

id., art.

55.

Most commentators lump the two provisions together in arguing
n. 417 and accompanying text. See also Harlow & McGregor, n.

customary international law. See

restate

Ill, 318 (Art. 55 does not restate custom); Verwey, n. 269, 561-63 (same).

424.
id.

Netherlands Declaration, June 26, 1977, in Schindler

& Toman 713, 714; UK Declaration, Dec.

12, 1977, in

717.

425.

Declarations have the same legal effect as understandings, as distinguished from reservations, which

introduce new terms for a treaty. See Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; nn.
426.

See nn. 413-14 and accompanying text; but see Lijnzaad

principles of the declarations. See n. 424 and

accompanying

III. 62

& Tanja, n. 2, 18

See van Hegelsom, n. HI. 623, 8-10, referring to two commentators.

428.

See

429.

Protocol

403 and accompanying
I, art.

armed

.

Second Protocol, art.

1(f)

echoes the

text.

49, incorporating

international law applicable in

1

VI. 268, 278 and accompanying text.

text.

427.

n.

,

1

by reference id.,

conflict'

means the

arts.

48-67 and Fourth Convention,

rules applicable in

armed

arts. 13-26. '"[R]ules

of

conflict set forth in international

agreements to which the Parties to the conflict are Parties and the generally recognized principles and rules of
international law

which are applicable

to

armed

conflict[.]" Protocol

General Assembly recommendations under UN Charter,
id., art.

430.

51.

Bothe et

Under the

al.

54-55; Pilloud,

LOS

Commentary

arts. 10, 14,

9, 21, 88;

4;

Robertson,

2(b).

This does not include,
e.g.

e.g.,

UN

Charter law under

60-61.

The
Nyon

the territorial sea and inland waters are part of sovereign territory. See Part IV.B.4.

LONW and arms control law also make this distinction. See generally
Arrangement, art.

I, art.

or the law oijus ad bellum,

Seabed Arms Control Treaty,

Nyon Supplementary Agreement; London Declaration, art.
New LOS 274-75; San Remo Manual 1H 10(a), 14, 20-21.

431.

See Parts. IV.B.1-IV.B.2.

432.

Moore,

Crisis, n. 417, 81 says Iraq violated Protocol

1990-91 sea and land campaigns;

see also

I, arts.

Low & Hodgkinson, n.

433.

See nn. 411, 423 and accompanying

434.

See nn. 413-15 and accompanying

435.

See nn. 4-6 and accompanying

436.

See nn. 353-91 and accompanying

437.

See Parts V.B-V.D; nn. VI. 8, 41 1 -34 and accompanying

2,

text.

text.
text.
text.

Oxford Naval Manual, arts.

35(3), 55, without differentiating

430 (same).

text.

37;

art. 4;

1,

between the

Maritime Environment

See

438.

B.l; n. 429
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UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 9 16- 18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part

and accompanying

text; Protocol I,

preamble,

art. 2(b);

Bothe et al.

32-33; Pilloud,

Commentary 25-29,

60-61.

41 1-34 and accompanying

439.

See nn. VI.5,

440.

UN Charter, arts. 51,

441.

Protocol

8,

103; see also nn. 429, 438 and

accompanying

and accompanying

49(3); see also nn. 430-31

I, art.

text.

text.

text.

Hague IV, Regulations, art. 23(e); 1899 Hague II, Regulations, art. 23(e); AFP 1 10-31 HH 6-2, 6-3(b); Bother
Green 131; Lieber Code, art. 16; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 9.1-9.1.1; NWP 9A Annotated HH 9.1-9.1.1;
Oxford NavalManual, art. 16(2); Pilloud, Commentary 409; San Remo Manual 42(a) & cmt. 42.2; Stone 558; US
Department of Defense General Counsel letter, Sept. 22, 1972, in 67 AJIL 122 (1973); Fenrick, Comment, New, n.
442.

al.

195;

II

III. 627,

233; Lijnzaad

& Tanja, n. 2, 180; Matheson, Remarks 424; Henri Meyrowitz, The Principle ofSuperfluous Injury

or Unnecessary Suffering,
n.

1994Int'lRev.RedCross 98; Roach, Certain,

V.173, 363; Schmidt, The Conventional,

n. III.627,

443.

See nn. 268-71 and accompanying

444.

Cf.

445.

See nn. 4-5 and accompanying

446.

Cf. Protocol

447.

See

n.

4 and accompanying

448.

See

n.

446 and accompanying

449.

See

n. 8

450.

See generally Walker, State Practice 164-66 and sources cited.

Hague

IV, Regulations,

I,

preamble,

Robertson, Modern Technology,

text.

442 and accompanying

art. 23(e); n.

text.

text.

art. 1; see also

and accompanying

n. III. 627, 69-72;

308-12; Schmidt, The Protection, n. III.623, 213-14.

Bothe et al.

33, 37-45;

Pilloud, Commentary 27-28, 34-40.

text.
text.

text.
It

has been argued that the language invoking

"principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience," in the Martens clause includes a requirement to avoid
unjustifiable

Protocol

damage

to the

Be that

I, art. 1(2).

merchantmen. However,

environment. Plant, Introduction,
as

it

Art. 1(2)

may,

n. 2, 17; Plant,

Legal Aspects, n. 17, 222, referring to

this language supports culpability for States ordering attacks

on innocent

commentaries do not mention environmental degradation. See Bothe

et al.

44;

Pilloud, Commentary. 38-39.
451.

UN

Charter,

accompanying

text;

arts. 51,

103; Protocol

art. 2(b); see also

I,

nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and

Part B.l; n. VI.429 and accompanying text.

452.

See nn. 6-8 and accompanying

453.

UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103; Protocol

454.

Protocol

455.

See n. 402 and accompanying

456.

Bothe et al.

I, art.

text.

49; see nn. 403, 429

I, art.

2(b); see also Part B.l.

and accompanying

text.

text.

282.

457. Id. 282; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 8.1-8.1.2; NWP 9A Annotated HH 8.1-8.1.2; Pilloud, Commentary 598;
San Remo Manual H 39 & cmts.; Kalshoven, Prohibitions, n. 417, 100; Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 235;
Robertson, Modern Technology, n. V.173, 363, 370; Schmidt, The Protection, n. III.623, 221-25; Solf, Protection, n.
III.623, 129; see also G.A. Res. 2444, n. 409; see also

458.

See generally

47-52, 59-61, 67-69
459.

668-69;

art. 1(f).

NWP 1-14M Annotated HI 8.2-8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated HH 8.2-8.4.1;

San Remo Manual HH

& cmts.

Bothe et al. 324-25; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 8.1.1; NWP 9A Annotated H 8.1.1; Pilloud, Commentary
US Department of Defense General Counsel letter, n. 442, 123-24; Burrus Carnahan, Protecting Civilians Under

the Draft

460.

Second Protocol,

Geneva

Bothe

Protocol:

et al.

A Preliminary Inquiry,

309-11, 359-67;

NWP

18 Air

Force L. Rev.

1-14M Annotated HH

32, 47-48 (No. 4, 1976).

8.1.2.1;

NWP 9A Annotated H

8.1.2.1;

Matheson,

Remarks 426.
461.

See nn. 4-6 and accompanying

462.

See Part V.G.2-V.G.3.

463.

UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51,

accompanying

text; Part B.l; n.

text.

103; Protocol

I, art.

2(b); see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

VI.429 and accompanying

text.

and
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464.

Protocol

I,

50 defines "civilian" as anyone not belonging to categories in Third Convention,

art.

4(A)(1)-4(A)(3) or 4(A)(6), or Protocol

I, art.

43,

i.e.,

members of armed

forces, militias, volunteer corps,

arts.

an organized

who spontaneously take up arms to resist invaders and not members of
armed units if they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war, and organized armed forces, etc.
under command of a party whose government or authority is not recognized by an adverse party if these forces are
under an internal disciplinary system enforcing compliance with the international law of armed conflict. If a party
incorporates paramilitary or armed law enforcement agencies into its armed forces, it must notify other parties to a
resistance, inhabitants of unoccupied territory

regular

conflict. In case
I, art.

43(1);

of doubt, a person

Belgium

filed

Belgium Declaration,
sea

them

is

considered

a civilian.

for art. 43(3). See

Thus wounded,

n. III. 626, 706.

Protocol

I, art.

50.

Argentina

Argentina Declaration, Oct.
ill

filed declarations for

or shipwrecked mariners at sea

Protocol

Schindler & Toman 704-05;

6, 1986, in

and

civil air

crews downed

at

remain subject to the Second Convention and become prisoners of war under the Third Convention, if they do not

more favorable treatment under other rules. Second Convention, art. 13(5); Third Convention. See
Bothe et al. 293-96; 2 Pictet 93-104; 3 id., n. 320, at 44-65, 67-68; Pilloud, Commentary 506-18, 610-12.

benefit by

465.

Protocol

466.

Belgium Declaration,

714;

n. III. 626,

Belgium Declaration,

707; Italy Declaration, n.

n. III. 626, 707;

For these declarations' impact,

468.

Protocol I, art. 52; see also

469.

Belgium Declaration,

714;

Bothe et al. 299-318; Pilloud, Commentary
III. 626,

615-28.

712; Netherlands Declaration, n.

UK Declaration, n. III. 626, 717; for these declarations' impact, see n. III. 621

467.
717.

51; see also

I, art.

Bother/.

470.

art. 1(f), is to

the

same

and accompanying

n. III.626,

714;

III. 626,

text.

UK Declaration, n. III. 626,

text.

320-27; Pilloud, Commentary 630-38; Second Protocol, arts.

For these declarations' impact,

1(f), 5-9.

712; Netherlands Declaration, n.

see n. III. 621

and accompanying

text.

III. 626,

Second

effect.

Italy Declaration, n. 111.626,713;

For these declarations' impact,

Netherlands Declaration,

see n. III. 621

Protocol

472.

Protocol I, art. 57(2)(a); see also

57(1); see also

and accompanying

n. III.626, 714;

Bothe etal.

UK Declaration, n. III.626, 717.

text.

Bothe et al. 359-62; Pilloud, Commentary

471.

I, art.

and accompanying

n. III. 626, 707; Italy Declaration, n. III. 626,

UK Declaration, n. III.626, 717.

Protocol,

Netherlands Declaration,

see n. III. 621

also

678-80.

362-65; Pilloud, Commentary 680-85; Second Protocol, arts.

1(f),

5-9.

473.

Article 57 cannot be construed to authorize attacks against civilians, the civilian population or civilian

objects. Protocol

I, arts.

57(2)(b)-57(5); see also

Bothe et al.

365-69; Pilloud,

Commentary 686-89; Second

Protocol,

arts. 1(f), 5-9.

474.
716.

Austria Reservation, Aug. 13, 1982, in Schindler

For these reservations' impact,

see

& Toman 705; Switzerland Declaration, Dec. 12, 1977, in id.

Vienna Convention,

arts.

19-23; nn.

III. 621

,

VI. 268, 278 and

accompanying

text.

475.

Belgium Declaration,

n. III. 626, 707; Italy Declaration, n. III. 626,

712; Netherlands Declaration, n. III.626,

UK Declaration, n. III. 626, 717. For these declarations' impact, see n. III. 621 and accompanying text.
476. AFP 110-31,ch. 14; Bothe etal. 299 & n. 3; NWP 1-14M Annotated 111 6.2.3.2 (protections also under Fourth
Convention, art. 33), 11.2 n.4, 11.3; NWP9A Annotated 1M 6.2.3.2 ,11.2 n.3, 11.3 (same); 4 Pictet 224-29; San Remo
714;

Manual

11

39;

Stone 684-732; Mallison

& Mallison, Naval

Targeting, n. III.262, 260;

Robertson, Modern Technology, n. V.173, 363; Schmidt, The Protection,

Matheson, Remarks 423, 426;

n. III.623, 225-32; Solf, Protection, n. III.623,

130-31.
477.

1

NWP 1-14M AnnotatedHH 11.2 (noting protections also under Fourth
NWP 9A Annotated Wl 1 1.2, 1.3 (same); Hans-Peter Gasser, Prohibition of Terrorist Acts

Levie, Protection, n. 413, 217-18;

Convention, arts. 28, 33),
in International

1 1.3;

Robertson, Modern Technology,
478.

1

Humanitarian Law, 1985 Intl Rev. Red Cross 200; Hague Air Rules, art. 22; Matheson, Remarks 426;
n.

V.173, 363; Schmidt, The Protection, n. III.623, 227.

NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 6.23 & n.36,

See generally Bother/. 320-27; Colombos §§ 510-1 1, 524-25, 528-29;
some civilians from reprisals under Fourth Convention,

6.2.3.2 (protections for

position that Protocol

I, art.

n.12 (same); 2 O'Connell,

52[1] creates

new law);

Lawofthe Sea

36 rejects applying

art.

& n.9, 8.1.2 & n.12 (US

1105-06; 4 Pictet 227-29; Pilloud, Commentary 630-38;

Matheson, Remarks 426; cf. Roberts, Environmental Issues,
III.624, 17 n.

art. 33), 8.1.1

NWP 9A Annotated Ml 6.2.3 & n.33, 6.2.3.2, 8.1.1 & n.9, 8.1.2 &
Toman

384-85;

n. 2, 235; Soli, Protection, n. III.623, 131. Russo, Targeting, n.

52(2) to naval warfare.

on the Waging of War 99-100
(1987) (reviewing Protocol I declarations); McDougal & Feliciano 525; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 5.2 & n.7, 8.1.2.1;
479.

See generally Bothe

et al.

309-11, 359-67; Frits Kalshoven, Constraints

Maritime Environment
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NWP 9A Annotated HI 5.2 & n.6, 8.1.2.1; San Remo Manual HH 39-42 & cmts.; Stone 352-53; Fenrick, The Rule, n.
III.623, 125 (questioning

whether proportionality accepted

Meeting of the Madrid Plan ofAction Held

as

Protection, n. III.623, 233-38; Soli, Protection, n. III.623, 131;

480.

See n. 8 and accompanying

text.

481.

See

and accompanying

text.

482.

See nn. 4-5 and accompanying

483.

Iran's attacks

n. 8

on the

van Hegelsom,

UAE Abu

UN

484.

UN Charter, art.

Charter,

accompanying

arts. 51,

al-Bakoush

103; Protocol

103; Protocol

text; Part B.l; n.

BSFHV

170-71 (1991); Schmidt, The

n. III.623, 18-19.

text.
oil installations

discrimination, proportionality and necessity, also violated
situations. See also

custom); Matheson, Remarks 426; Results of the First

Bochum, F.R.G., November 1989, 7

in

I, art.

I, art.

UN

and Kuwaiti

Charter,

2(b); Part B.l; n.

art. 2(4).

facilities,

besides lacking in

Charter law governed these

429 and accompanying

text.

and

2(b); see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

429 and accompanying

text.

485.

See

and accompanying

text.

486.

See n. 8 and accompanying

text.

487.

See nn. 300-27 and accompanying text. Presumably Protocol I's statement of its being without prejudice to the

n. 8

Cultural Property Convention includes the 1999 Second Protocol,

The Second
between

it

Protocol provides for relationships between

and,

e.g.,

Protocol

I.

See Second Protocol,

it

when it is in force 3 months after 20 States ratify it.

and the Convention but does not define relationships

arts. 2-4, 43.

Interesting law of treaties analysis problems

may

ensue.
488.

See nn. 272-76 and accompanying

text.

489.

Protocol I, art. 53; Protocol

16 repeats general Protocol I,

II, art.

arts. 53(a)-53(b)

prohibitions against attacks

on historic monuments, works of art or places of worship constituting the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, and
prohibiting use of them to support the military effort, without prejudice to the Cultural Property Convention. There is
no saving clause for other relevant international instruments as in Protocol I, art. 53, a curious omission, because even
if there were no such treaties when the Protocols were negotiated, there may be in the future, and incorporation might
avoid interpretation problems. See generally Vienna Convention, art. 30; nn. IV.455, VI.47 and accompanying text.
490.

491.
8.5.1.6;
1 33

See nn. 403, 429-30 and accompanying

text.

Netherlands Declaration, n. III.626, 714-15; UK Declaration, n. III.626, 717; NWP 1-14M Annotated H
NWP 9A Annotated H 8.5.1.6; 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 105; Toman 385-97; Solf, Protection, n. III.623,
1

("it is

not yet clear whether customary international law is as broad as article 53 seems to be"); see also n. 111.62 1 and

accompanying

text.

492.

Cultural Property Convention,

493.

Toman

494.

Compare Protocol

495.

The Cultural Property Convention

389; see also

id.

art. 4(2); see also n.

315 and accompanying

394-95.

I, art.

52 with

id., art.

53; see also nn. 468-70, 478-79

14

theme

496.

Protocol

497.

See nn. 403, 429-30 and accompanying

498.

See Part V.E.

499.

See nn. 502-03 and accompanying

500.

Bothe el al.

is

similar in

to Protocol

text.

1(f), 5-9,

I, art.

also speaks to the military necessity issue.

54.

text.

text.

336-42; Pilloud, Commentary 652-59 (arts. 54(l)-54(2) de lege ferenda).

as to art. 54(1) but maintains art. 54(2) is lex lata but
8.1.2

and accompanying

provides for transoceanic carriage of cultural property. See generally nn.

300-27 and accompanying text. The 1999 Second Protocol, arts.
II, art.

text.

might in due course ripen into custom.

The United States agrees

NWP 1-14M Annotated

11

& n. 15; NWP9A Annotated H 8.1.2 & n. 15, citing inter alia US Department of Defense General Counsel letter, n.

442, 1300; Matheson, Remarks 426; Solf, Protection, n. 111.623, 133

(art.

54 establishes substantially new principle not

yet custom).

501.

See nn. 4-6 and accompanying

502.

See n. 6 and accompanying

503.

UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103; Protocol

text.

text.
I, art.

2(b); see also Part B.l; n.

429 and accompanying

text.

The Tanker War

590

504.

Protocol

505.

Belligerents

56(1). Protocol II, art. 15 repeats Protocol

I, art.

must avoid locating military

I, art.

56(1 )'s first sentence.

objectives in these installations' vicinity.

Weapons used

solely to

defend them cannot be a basis of attack. Civilians around these installations keep civilian protections. Protocol

I, arts.

56(2)-56(3), 56(5).

506.

Protocol

507.

Belgium Declaration,

714;

Bothe

of these qualifications appear in Protocol

n. III.626,

is

et al.

707; Italy Declaration,

II.

712; Netherlands Declaration, n. III.626,

n. III.626,

149-50;

militarily unacceptable to the

n.104 (same); Pilloud,

AFP

510.

Annotated
(art.

11

110-31
8.5.1.7;

56 differs

11

5-3(d);

.

.

.

NWP 1-14M Annotated

United

Commentary

from customary

"differs little

States), 8.5.1.7

&

1111

text.

& n.14 (provision would create new law

8.1.2

NWP 9A Annotated UU 8.1.2 & n.14 8.5.1.7 &

n.124;

668-74; Matheson, Remarks All; but see Solf, Protection, n. III.623, 134

(art.

56

law.")

Green

149-50, 184; Bothe

355-56;

et al.

NWP

Pilloud, Commentary 672, citing inter aha Protocol

little

and accompanying

Commentary 669.

353; Pilloud,

Bothe et al. 348-57; Green

509.

134

None

UK Declaration, n. III.626, 717. For the effect of these declarations, see n. 621

508.

and

56(4).

I, art.

1-14M Annotated HH

I, arts.

8.5.1.7;

NWP 9A

51, 57-58; Solf, Protection, n. III.623,

from customary necessity, proportionality norms).

511.

See nn. 403, 429 and accompanying

512.

See nn. 430-31 and accompanying

text.

513.

See nn. 456-79 and accompanying

text.

514.

See

515.

See nn. 4-5 and accompanying attack.

516.

UN Charter, arts. 2(4),

517.

Neutralized and hospital zones are protected under the First and Fourth Conventions. See Part V.F.4; nn.

459 and accompanying

n.

281-99 and accompanying

text.

text; see also

103; Protocol

Kalshoven, Prohibitions,

I, art.

2(b); see also Part B.l; n.

See Part V.F.4; nn. 281-99 and accompanying text;

519.

Protocol

I, arts.

text.

59-60, 62-63, 65; see also

Bother al.

cf.

Toman

393.

375-78, 380-85, 387-92, 400-03, 405-06; 410-15; Pilloud,

697-98, 700-06, 708-16, 738-58, 770-78.

520.

See nn. 295-96 and accompanying

521.

Compare Protocol

Regulations,

429 and accompanying

text.

518.

Commentary

n. 417, 106-07.

art.

accompanying

25;

text.

I, art. 59 with Hague IV, Regulations,
Oxford Naval Manual, art. 27; Hague

art.

25;

Hague IX,

Air Rules,

art.

art. 1; see also

1899 Hague

24; Part V.G.I; nn. 231-42

II,

and

text.

522.

See nn. 238-42, 252 and accompanying

523.

Bothe

524.

NWP

et al.

text.

382.

1-14M Annotated H

85.1.3;

NWP

9A Annotated

H 8.5.1.3;

Matheson, Remarks All. This

parallels

customary rules for hospital and neutralized zones. See nn. 517, 520 and accompanying text.

NWP 9A Annotated

525.

NWP

1-14M Annotated

526.

See

517 and accompanying

527.

See Part V.F.4.

528.

See nn. 297-99, 327 and accompanying

529.

See nn. 468-69 and accompanying

530.

UN Charter, art. 2(4), 103; Protocol

531.

Id., arts.

532.
Treaties

n.

51, 103; Protocol

Edgerton, n.

During

H 11.3;

2, at 173;

the Persian

UN Charter, arts. 2(4),

534.

Id.

103.

Matheson, Remarks All.

text.

text.
I,

an. 2(b).

2(b).

Kelly, Declaring

War on the Environment: The Failure ofInternational Environmental

Gulf War, 1 Am. U.J. Intl L.

533.

11.3;

text.

I, art.

K.M.

11

& Pol.

921, 929 (1992).

.

.

Maritime Environment

591

535.

Id., arts. 51, 103.

536.

Conventional Weapons Convention, preamble; Fragments Protocol; Mine Protocol; Incendiary Weapons

Protocol. See

Toman 24-30; Burrus M. Carnahan, The Law ofLand

Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations Convention

on Certain Conventional Weapons, 105 Mil. L. Rev. 73 (1984); Fenrick,

Roach, Certain,

n. III.627;

n. III.627;

Schmidt, Conventional,

n. III.627.

Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Certain Conventional
Injurious or to

Have Indiscriminate

Comment, New,

n. III.627; Levie, Prohibitions,

to

Convention on

to

be Excessively

Conference of States Parties

Weapons Which May be Deemed

Effects negotiated Protocol

on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Mines,

Booby-Traps and other Devices (Protocol II) as Amended, May 3, 1996,

— UST —

,

in

35

ILM 1209 (1996) (Amended

—

—

in 35 ILM 1218
on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), Oct. 13, 1995,
UST
(1996) (Laser Protocol). For analysis of and comments on negotiations on Amended Mine Protocol and Laser
Protocol, see generally Panel,/! Look at Current Action on the Conventional Weapons Convention of 1980, 1996 ASIL Proc.

Mine

Protocol) and Protocol

,

381.

& Toman

537.

Schindler

538.

See Levie, Prohibitions, n. III.627, 666; Protocol I, art. 35(3).

Toman

191-92.

196, says prohibitions

and

restrictions in the

The US Declaration, Apr. 8, 1982, in Schindler &

Convention and

Protocols were

its

"new contractual

rules"

except provisions stating existing international law, and that these new rules would bind States only upon ratification
or accession to the Convention and consent to be

The United

States

.

.

.

bound by the

The US

Declaration also says in part:

welcomes the adoption of this Convention, and hopes that all States will give the most

serious consideration to ratification or accession.
in efforts to

Protocols.

We believe that the Convention represents a positive step

minimize injury or damage to the civilian population in time of armed

conflict.

Our signature

.

.

.

.

the general willingness of the United States to adopt practical and reasonable provisions

reflects

concerning

.

.

military operations, [to]

.

.

.

.

protect

.

.

noncombatants.

.

At the same time, we want

to emphasize that formal adherence by States to agreements restricting the use of
would be of little purpose if the parties were not firmly committed to taking every
to ensure compliance with those restrictions after their entry into force. It would be the firm

weapons in armed
appropriate step

conflict

intention of the United States and,

by

this

we trust, all other parties to utilize the procedures and remedies provided

Convention, and by the general laws of war, to see to

obligations under

The United

it.

it

that

all

parties to the

States strongly supported proposals

Convention meet their

by other countries during the

[negotiating] Conference to include special procedures for dealing with compliance matters,

right to propose at a later date additional procedures

and remedies, should

this

and reserves the

prove necessary, to deal with

such problems.

.

.

.

[T]he United States

.

.

.

reserves the right, at

the Convention, [which provides, 1342

.

.

UNTS

.

ratification, to exercise the option

164-65, that ratifying countries

provided by article 4(3) of

may opt not

to

consent to be

bound by any Protocol, provided that the Depository, the UN Secretary-General pursuant to art. 10(1), id. at
167, is notified,] and to make statements of understanding and/or reservations, to the extent that it may
deem
necessary to ensure that the Convention and its Protocols conform to humanitarian and military
.

.

.

requirements.

See also

.

.

NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.7 n.44; NWP 9A Annotated

11

9.6 n.33;

Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23, nn. III.621,

VI.268, 278 and accompanying text (reservations principles). China Declaration, Dec. 13,1981;

Apr.

8,

& Toman

1982, Schindler

192, 195,

may imply

a

Romania Declaration,

view that the Convention and Protocols do not state

customary norms.
539.

By 1998

540.

Conventional Weapons Convention, art.

III.627, 312.

541.

there were 70 Convention parties, most of which had ratified
8; see also

The Conference produced Amended Mine

Conventional Weapons Convention,

art. 1,

i.e.,

Convention,

and situations in Protocol

2,

Protocols.

First Convention, art. 2;

Second Convention,
I,

TIF 464.

Roach, Certain, n. III.627, 38-44; Schmidt, Conventional, n.

Protocol and Laser Protocol, n. 536,

noting applicability to situations in

Geneva Conventions,
art.

all

art.

1(4)

art. 2;

now being ratified.

common article 2 of the

Third Convention,

art. 2;

(armed conflict involving peoples'

1949

Fourth

fights

for

Weapons
Fenrick, Comment,

self-determination against colonial domination, alien occupation or racist regimes). See also Conventional

Convention,

New,

art. 7;

Roach, Certain,

n. III. 627, 230, says the

targets at sea or in the air
art. 1 refers to all

.
.

.

n. III.627, 18-30;

Schmidt, Conventional,

n. III.627, 298-304.

Convention does not apply to nuclear weapons or "weapons used exclusively against

" It

is

not clear from the Convention or

its

Protocols

how his interpretation was derived;

1949 Geneva Conventions, and, as seen nn. 543-45, the Protocols to the Convention state limitations

The Tanker War

592

in application,

common

e.g.,

for

mine

Bothe et al.

45-46; Pilloud,

Fragments Protocol

542.

warfare; that aside, the Convention and Protocols seem to apply across the board. For

article 2 analysis, see

which

injure by fragments

1

Pictet 27-37; 2

Commentary
is

id.

26-31; 3

id.

19-27; 4

id.

a single sentence: "It is prohibited to use

in the

human body

ILM

the Protocol was drafted,

it

effect of which is to

was accepted unanimously because no

Comment, New,

n. III. 627, 242; Levie,

These weapons were not used during the Tanker War. Laser Protocol,

weapons

1218, prohibits laser

1(4) analysis, see

does not codify custom but develops

It

negotiating State had such weapons or foresaw future use for them. Fenrick,
Prohibitions, n. III. 627, 654.

I, art.

any weapon the primary

escape detection by X-rays."

When

basic rules. Roach, Certain, n. III.627, 69.

For Protocol

17-25.

41-56.

specifically designed to blind

n. 536, arts. 1, 3,

35

permanently unenhanced vision; the prohibition

does not cover blinding as incidental or collateral effect of legitimate military use of laser systems.
543.

UN, ICRC or other humanitarian missions or peacekeepers is its primary goal. Mine
Amended Mine Protocol, n. 536, arts. 1(1), 12,
UST ,35 ILM 1209, 1213-15. See also Toman
Carnahan, The Law, n. 536, 76-77; Fenrick, Comment, New, n. III. 627, 244-46; Schmidt, The Conventional, n.
Protecting civilians and

Protocol, arts.

28-29;

—

1, 8;

—

III.627, 313.

DOD Report, n. 11.8,213-21.

544.

See

545.

Mine

546.

Carnahan, The Law,

III. 627,

547.

Protocol, an. 2(1);

Amended Mine

n. 536,

Protocol, n. 536,

77-79; Fenrick,

— UST —

art. 2(1),

Comment, New, n.

III. 627,

ILM

35

,

1209.

244-45; Schmidt, The Conventional, n.

315; see also Part V.G.I; nn. 456-69 and accompanying text.

Compare,

Protocol

I,

e.g.,

Mine

Protocol, arts. 2(4)-2(5), 3-4 (applying to mines,

See also Levie, Prohibitions, n.

arts 51(2), 51(4)-51(6), 52.

III.

booby

traps, "other devices"), with

Mines

627, 656-57.

are defined as

any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed

to be detonated or

exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle, and "remotely delivered mine" means

any mine so defined delivered by

Mine

Protocol,

art. 2(1).

Booby

any device or material

when

.

.

.

artillery, rocket,

aircraft.

traps are defined as

designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure and which functions unexpectedly

an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe

a person disturbs or approaches

Id., art. 2(2).

mortar or similar means or dropped from an

"Other devices" are defined

act.

as

manually-emplaced munitions and devices designed

to kill, injure or

damage and

.

.

.

actuated by remote

control or automatically after a lapse of time.

Id., art. 2(3).

accord,

548.

Fenrick,

Comment, New,

Schmidt, The Conventional,

Compare Amended Mine Protocol,

2(4)-2(5), 3-4; Protocol

— UST —
549.

n. III. 627, 246,

,

ILM

35

I, art.

viewed the Mine Protocol as a "modest advance in the law;"

n. III.627, 338.

52(3).

The

— UST —

n. 536, arts. 3(8)-3(9),

definitions

list

,

35

ILM

has been expanded; see

1210, with Mine Protocol, arts.
Amended Mine Protocol, an. 2,

1209-10.

Incendiary Weapons Protocol,

art. 2,

which does not

restate

military objectives within a concentration of civilians. Fenrick,
Conventional, n. HI. 672, 342-44. Fourth Convention,
civilians in occupied territory.

art.

customary law with respect to reprisals or

Comment, New,

n. III.627, 249;

Schmidt,

Schmidt 342. The Fourth Convention commentary does not speak

77t*

enemy

33 forbids using any weapons reprisals against

specifically of

incendiary reprisals, either. 4 Pictet 227-29.
550.

NWP

1-14M Annotated

11

9.7 n.44;

NWP 9A Annotated H 9.6 n.33;

cf.

Harlow

&

McGregor,

n. Ill, 318;

Schmidt, The Conventional, n. III.627, 341. Some oppose using incendiaries against combatants; there was support for
this at the Incendiary

551.

Israel's attack

Weapons Protocol
on U.S.S.

negotiations. See Fenrick,

Comment, New,

Liberty is a rare example. See James Ennes,

n. III.627, 248.

Assault on the Liberty 67-68, 70,

152 (1980); Walter L. Jacobsen,/! Juridical Examination ofthe Israeli Attack on the USS Liberty, 36 Nav. L. Rev.

Since Liberty was a warship, the Incendiary

Weapons Protocol

did not apply;

it

deals with attacks

on

1

civilians.

Neutrality, military objective, necessity and proportionality principles did, and Liberty, if not so disabled that

not return

fire,

could have exercised the right of self-defense. Other

the Protocol addresses
103; Protocol

I, art.

81, 92,

(1986).

it

could

US forces also could have responded. Moreover,

LOAC situations, and Liberty's case was covered by the law of self-defense. UN Charter, arts. 51,

2(b); see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

and accompanying

text; Part B.l; n.

429

593

Maritime Environment

and accompanying
injuries

Mallison

text;

on Liberty and damage

&

Mallison, Naval Targeting, n. III.262, 267. Israel agreed to pay for deaths and

to the ship without admitting liability. See 58 Bulletin

Agreement Concerning Claims Arising from Damage

UST 4434,

1268

I,

arts. 51(2), 51(4)-51(6), 52, 57(2).

arts. l(2)-2(3)

See also

Toman

Prohibitions, n. III.627, 664-65, criticizing arts. 2(2), 2(3);

nn. 464-83 and accompanying text. Harlow
Protocol's substantive provisions in saying

Incendiary Weapons Protocol,

553.

same language

as Protocol

Fenrick,

554.

799 (1968); 59

United States Ship "Liberty," Dec.

id.

473 (1969);

17, 1980, Israel-US,

32

UNTS 33.

Compare Incendiary Weapons Protocol,

552.

Protocol

to

I, art.

&

it is

Mine Protocol, arts. 2(4)-2(5), 3(2)-3(4), 4(2) and
Comment, New, n. III.627, 249; Levie,

29; Fenrick,

Schmidt, The Conventional,

McGregor,

n. Ill,

n. III.627, 341-421;

Part V.G.I;

318 probably refer to the Incendiary Weapons

not accepted as customary law.

art. 2(4). Id., arts. 1(3)-1(4)

48. See nn. 456-63

Comment, New, n.

with

III.627, 250;

define "military objective" and "objective" in the

and accompanying

text.

Schmidt, The Conventional,

n. III.627, 345.

Harlow

& McGregor, n.

Ill, 318 say the forests provision does not represent customary law.

The low-water

555.

provided.

line is recognized as the

mark from which the

territorial sea is

measured unless otherwise

LOS Convention, art. 5; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 3. Traditional warships (e.g.,

destroyers, frigates)

cannot navigate that close to shore, except areas like the Bay of Fundy where tidal differences are great, but hovercraft

and small boats use only a few inches of water. Moreover, the Protocol protects

bombardment by

forest cover

from

air,

missile or shore

vessels well outside these waters.

Compare Incendiary Weapons Protocol, art. 2(4)with Protocol I, art. 56; see also nn. 505-16 and accompanying

556.
text.

Compare Incendiary Weapons Protocol, art. 2(4)with Protocol I, art.

557.

also Protocol I, art. 55; nn. 411-37,

558.

See,

e.g.,

n.

504-16 and accompanying

532 and accompanying text (Protocol

35(3);

ENMOD Convention, art 1(1). See

text.

I, art.

54).

& Toman 191-92, reporting that 28 countries ratifying the Convention had ratified the three
The United States has ratified the Convention, and its Fragments and Mine Protocols but not the
Incendiary Weapons Protocol, maybe the only State in this status. See TIF 464.
Schindler

559.

Protocols by 1987.

The Convention cannot derogate from other principles of international humanitarian law, i.e., norms stated
Weapons Convention, preamble, arts. 1-2, 7.

560.

in custom. Conventional

UN

561.

Charter, arts. 51, 103; Protocol

accompanying

text; Part B.l; n.

I, art.

2(b); see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

429 and accompanying

562.

See n. 31 and accompanying

563.

World Charter

and

text.

text.

for Nature, n. 365, HH 5, 20 in 22

ILM

455, 457, 459 (1983), declaring that "Nature shall be

secured against degradation caused by warfare or other hostile activities"; "Military activities damaging to nature
shall

be avoided," another "soft law" source. See

n. 365.

The Summit closed June 14, 1992 and resulted in some nonbinding documents, inter alia Agenda 21, UNDoc.

564.

A/CONF.151/6/Rev.

1

(1992) (Agenda 21), in 31

ILM 876 (1992), an action plan for sustainable development to guide

national policies for this and the next century. See Edith

repeated points in the Stockholm Declaration, n. 53.

Brown Weiss, Introductory Note, id. 814-15 (1992). Agenda 21
Agenda 21's Principle 24, 31 ILM 880, said: "Warfare is

inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international law providing
protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in

means

May 9,

its

further development, as necessary."

880, admonishes "States [to] resolve their environmental disputes peacefully and by appropriate
" Two treaties were signed: Framework Convention on Climate Change,
in accordance with the Charter

Principle 26,

1992,

id.

— UST —

(1992). Birnie

in id. 849 (1992); Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, — UST — in id. 822
& Boyle 545 say the Summit Declaration on Environment and Development "can best be seen in part
,

,

and as having gone "significantly beyond what could be achieved at Stockholm in
where a similar conference produced, inter alia, the Stockholm Declaration. See nn. 11.62, VI.53 and
accompanying text.
as a codification of the subject,"

1972,"

565.

Kuwait Regional Convention

185-206 and accompanying

&

Protocol, n. 11.63;

Red Sea Convention,

n. VI. 55; see also

nn. VI. 169-70,

text.

UN Members if stated as a "decision" under UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103;
may also pass non-binding resolutions, and all General Assembly resolutions are non-binding. These
resolutions may reinforce preexisting customary or treaty law, however. See n. IV.57 and accompanying text; see also
566.

Security Council resolutions bind

the Council

Chapter

III.

The Tanker War

594

567.

See generally Walker, State Practice 122-23, 125-26, 128, 133-37, 141-44, 153-54, 158-67, describing impact, or

lack of it, of Council

and Assembly actions

wars and confrontations

for

at sea, 1945-90.

Wellens

568.

S.C. Res. 540 (1983); S.C. Res. 552 (1984), S.C. Res. 598 (1987), in

569.

See nn. 4-5 and accompanying

570.

S.C. Res. 660-62, 664-67, 669-70, 674, 677-78 (1990), 686-87 (1991) in

451, 454, 473.

text.

Wellens

527-42, referring inter alia to

the Fourth Convention, Geneva Gas Protocol, and, in S.C. Res. 687 to Iraq's liability for environmental damage.

Michael Bothe, Remarks,
aggression, cf.

in

Protection of the Environment

17, 18,

viewed Resolution 687 as dealing with

UN Charter, art. 2(4), and not the laws of war. See also San Remo Manual HI

1

16-19, 121-24, 135, 138-40,

571.

S.C. Res. 678 (1990), incorporating by reference S.C. Res. 664-67, 670, 674 (1990),m

Wellens 530-31, 534,540.

572.

Cf.

573.

S.C. Res. 687, in

574.

See

575.

E.g., S.C. Res. 665, in

576.

S.C. Res. 687, in

577.

See nn. 300-52 and accompanying

578.

ICJ Statute,

579.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48,

580.

Other Council actions, e.g.,

146-49, 151-52.

DOD Report, n. II.8, Appendix O.
n.

Wellens

542.

570 and accompanying

decision under

id.

id.

Wellens

text.

Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03;

calls for action or

see also n. III. 10

and accompanying

103; see also n. IV. 57

n.

and accompanying

text.

text.

recommendations, do not bind Members unless construed

Assembly resolutions
IV. 57 and accompanying text.

48, 103. Nearly all General

strengthen norms stated in them. See

as a

are non-binding, although they can

and accompanying

text.

IV.57 and accompanying

text.

583.

See nn. 1-16 and accompanying

text.

584.

See n. 17 and accompanying

585.

Accord, Fleck, Comments, n. 17, 532; Gasser, The Debate, n. 17, 524; Conrad Harper, Opening Address, in

581.

See

n. III. 10

582.

See

n.

Protection of the Environment 8,
in

530.

542.

arts. 38, 59;

arts. 25,

text.

text.

13;

LeGrand, n.

12, 30;

Protection of the Environment 630-32; Morris,

Comment,

n. 365, 280; contra,

approach; de Guttry

&

Verwey,

Ronzitti,

n.

McNeill, Protection,

n. 17,

n. 2,

544; Moore, Concluding Remarks,

780; Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 258-59; Szasz,

269, 572. Shearer, The Debate, n. 365, 554-55, suggests a

n. 11.210, 14,

586.

Seen. IV.3.

587.

Cf.

588.

Walker, State Practice 190-91.

589.

See Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.

590.

See Vienna Convention,

591.

UN Charter, art. 2(2); Vienna Convention, art. 26; nn. III. 934, IV.31, VI. 85

592.

Cf.

593.

Exceptions

referring to

Robertson, Modern Technology,

ICJ Statute,

arts. 38,

arts.

59;

n.

102,

7.

III. 621,

VI. 268

Restatement (Third)

may be treaties classified

UN Charter, art.

V.173,

19-23; nn.

Restatement

advocate "codification."

and accompanying

§§ 102-03; n.

for security reasons.

which requires

III.

text.

and accompanying

text.

10 and accompanying text.

Restatement (Third)

treaty registration before an

§

312

r.n.5; see also

id.

agreement can be cited before

r.n.3,

a

UN

organ.

See generally Walker, State Practice 190. Roach & Smith is a rare example of a government's position in one
The last complete digest of US practice, Whiteman, appeared over 25 years ago. The annual digest of practice
following Whiteman ends with 1979, with partial publication of the 1980-88 series since then.
594.

source.

595.

San Remo Manual, Introduction

to the

Cmts. 62.

595

Maritime Environment

Robertson submitted this

596.

as a

Law Round Table

paper to the International Institute of Humanitarian

LOS and the law of naval warfare; it was later published as a Newport Paper
the last version is cited. See Robertson, New LOS 302-03 & n.l.

considering the relationship between the

and

in

Moore

& Turner;

597.

San Remo Manual

598.

LOS

599.

600.

34.

11

art.

87;

High Seas Convention,

Robertson,

New LOS

302

& n.207.

Compare

with San

Convention,

id.

Remo Manual

art. 2; see also

carrying out operations; no qualification as Robertson,

belligerents'

due regard

for neutral coastal States'

for those neutrals' legitimate rights

New LOS

EEZ, continental

by other

rules of

LOAC), 36 (due

and duties

302 recommended), 34 (requiring

shelf rights, duties, including those States'

obligations toward the marine environment, and particularly due regard for artificial islands,
neutrals; qualified

text.

HH 12 (where neutrals have sovereign rights, jurisdiction, other rights

under general international law, belligerents must have due regard

when

Part IV.B.l; n.l 10 and accompanying

etc.,

established by

regard for neutrals' exploring, exploiting seabed, ocean floor

resources beyond national jurisdiction; no qualification as Robertson 302 recommended), 88 (minelaying

must pay due regard

belligerents

to legitimate

high seas uses by

inter alia

providing safe alternate routes for neutral

shipping; no qualification as Robertson 302 recommended), 106(c) (in declaring exclusion zones, belligerents must
exercise
also

id.

to legitimate ocean uses; no qualification as Robertson 302 recommended). See
must "take care" to avoid damaging cables, pipelines on the seabed that do not exclusively
no qualification as Robertson 302 recommended). The IIHL group rejected "respect" for the

due regard for neutrals' rights

H 37 (belligerents

serve other belligerents;

environment and others'

LOS

601.

See,

e.g.,

LOAC, and

rights; "respect"

Remo Manual

preserve this distinction. San

San Remo Manual

11

3

&

not jus ad helium, with which,

11

is

often used in humanitarian law treaties; the

44, cmts. 44.6-44.10; Fleck,

cmts., noting the

e.g.,

Manual

UN Charter, arts.

& cmts., 34.2, 34.4;

& cmts.

is

Comment,

Manual wished

primarily concerned

withes

603.

Id. H 11 (italics in original); this

604.

San Remo Manual U

11, cmts. 11.1-11.7, citing inter alia

605.

San Remo Manual

44; accord, Diederich, n. 17, 158; compare similar provisions in Protocol

II

the

& cmts. 44.6-44.10.

San Remo Manual HU 34

accords with the

in hello,

51, 103 is concerned.

602.

35

to

n. 17, 530.

44

35.2-35.4;

first alternative

LOS

proposed by Diederich,

Convention,

n. 17, 156.

arts. 192, 194.
I, arts.

35(1),

35(2), 51(4), 51(5), 57.

606.

San Remo Manual

607.

See Geneva Gas Protocol; using chemical and biological weapons, subject to a no-first-use rule, also violates

1111

47(a), 48-50.

customary law. Depending on agents employed, chemical and biological weapons can degrade many aspects of the
environment. See nn. 268-71 and accompanying
608.

San Remo Manual H

609.

Id.

610.

See

11

1 1,

id.

35, in

cmt. ll.l; see also

H 11, cmt. 11.1;

11

id.,

id.

11

Part

II,

text.

Regions of Operations.

44, cmt. 44.4.

44, cmt. 44.4, citing the

LOS

Convention;

ENMOD Convention; Protocol

I, arts.

35(3), 55.

611. San Remo Manual 10 preserves the distinction while recognizing the place of the continental shelf and the
EEZ; see also Robertson, New LOS 274 (three divisions, internal waters, territorial waters [territorial sea], high seas).
11

612.

For LOS and

LOAC rights and obligations in these areas at stake in the Tanker War, see generally Chapters IV

See generally

LOS

andV.
613.

Convention, Part XI

seabed beyond the continental shelf, as part of the

as

modified by the Boat Agreement, declaring the Area, the deep

common heritage of humankind; see also n. IV.3 and accompanying

text.

614.

San Remo Manual

Although

it

11

36.

See also

id.

H 12. Id. H 12, cmt. 12.1 says:

was recognized that the most crucial areas where

neutrals' rights]

[the interface of belligerent operations

might occur would be in the [EEZ] or the continental

participants] developed that the principle should be stated in general terms

whether neutral rights were based on jurisdictional claims

(for

shelf, a

and

consensus [of

and

IIHL

for all areas, regardless of

example, [EEZ], continental shelf) or

universal rights flowing from the general law of the sea (for example, the high seas). Such rights also included

those involving activities in the "Area" [as defined by

LOS Convention, Part XI]

[S]ome States had not
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formally claimed [EEZs] but

may have established exclusive fishery zones or the like.

[San

Remo Manuali H

12 reflects this consensus.

Manual does cover these areas, perhaps obliquely, as in the case of contiguous zones, presumably if they are
The relationship with the Area Authority is not clear. Presumably reference to the
Convention, Part XI would include subsequent protocols such as the Boat Agreement, n. IV.3. However, the Manual
Thus

the

"like" exclusive fishery zones.

intends that the due regard formula apply across the board for the relationship between the law of naval warfare and

ocean areas recognized by the law of the sea, whether in the

law. Therefore, in situations the Manual does not cover, those following

concerns wherever occurring on the ocean, unless there

is

it

should accord due regard to environmental

specific law to the contrary.

615.

San Remo Manual,

616.

This kind ofomission was a shortcoming of the Oxford NavalManual. Verri, Commentary,

Introduction to the

617. San Remo Manual,
accompanying text.

San Remo Manual, Introduction

618.

Commentaries 64;

Introduction to the

to the

all

LOS Convention, the 1958 LOS conventions or customary

see also

Part V.G.I.

Commentaries 67-68, referring

Commentaries

68, referring to

id.

to

H

id.

n. IV. 7 1,339-40.

3-9; see also n.

IIU

589 and

13(d)&cmts. 13.11-13.14; seealso

Walker, Maritime Neutrality 142-48.
619.

San Remo Manual, Introduction

620.
621.
622.

141-45,

to the

Commentaries

68, referring to

id.

IW 38-111;

San Remo Manual,

Introduction to the

Commentaries

69, referring to

id.

1111

105-08; see also Part V.F.2.

San Remo Manual,

Introduction to the

Commentaries

69, referring to

id.

11 11

14-37.

Id.,
1

Introduction to the

rules of humanitarian law,

623.

ENMOD

69, referring to,

e.g.,

e.g.,

targeting. See also Part V.G.I.

Convention,

UN Charter, art.

625.

See Part B.l.

art.

1,

cited in

San Remo Manual

626.

International

103; see also Part B.l; nn. IV. 10, 57

44, cmt. 44.4; see also nn. 353-400

and

Committee of the Red Cross, Guidelines

for Military

(ICRC

text.

Manuals and Instructions on the

Guidelines), in

NWP

1-14M Annotated,

8A-1.
1111 8-20, in NWP 1-14M Annotated H, 8-21-33, citing these agreements related to international armed
Hague IV, Regulations, arts. 1, 23(g); Hague VIII; ENMOD Convention, arts. 1-2; Fourth Convention, arts.

Id.

conflict;
1,

11

and accompanying

Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict (1994)

627.

IM 53-58, 62-66, 70-77, 112-13, 115-18, 125-34,

text.

624.

Annex

Part V.G.I.

The Manual does not address air operations and land targets, except for general principles and

53-68, 174-80.

accompanying

Commentaries

see also

53, 63(2), 144, 146-47; Cultural Property

Convention; Protocol

I, arts.

1(1), 35(3)-36, 51(4)-51(5), 52, 54-56, 61-67,

Mine Protocol; Incendiary Weapons Protocol. Chapters W-Vlpassim have discussed all of these treaties and
others, e.g., Roerich Pact. Some treaties are not in force for some countries, e.g., Protocol I for the United States, and
some provisions the Guidelines cite are not recognized as customary law by some countries.
83, 86-87;

628.

ICRC

629.

Id.

630.

Id.

11

Guidelines, n. 626, H 4, at 8-30.

5, at 8-30.

H 7, at 8-31, reflecting language in humanitarian law treaties' Martens clauses; see also,

e.g.,

First

Convention, art. 63; Second Convention, art. 64; Third Convention, art. 142; Fourth Convention, art. 158; Protocol I,
art. 1(2);

nn. 255, 293, 402, 450 and accompanying text.

631.

See nn. 111.938-51, IV.29-30, VI.83-84 and accompanying

632.

E.g.,

LOS

accompanying
633.

LOS

Convention,

art.

text.

High Seas Convention,

87(1);

art.

2; see also

nn.

III. 953-67,

10-25 and

text; Part B.2.b.

Convention,

arts.

237, 31

1

;

see also

Parts IV.A.2, VI.B.2.a.

634. ICRC Guidelines, n. 626, 1, at 8-30 refers to armed conflict, and all cited treaties deal with jus in hello, i.e., the
LOAC. Unlike San Remo Manual H11 3-9, which recognize the possibility of applying different rules for jus ad helium,
II

see n.

647 and accompanying

text,

the Guidelines are only concerned with protection of the environment and the

LOAC.
635.

Compare ICRC Guidelines,

n.

NWP 1-14M Annotated 8.1.3, citing inter alia UN General Assembly
NWP 9 A Annotated has no comparable provision.

626with

Resolutions A/47/37 (1992), A/49/50 (1994).

11

d

Maritime Environment

636.

See

637.

UN

597

NWP 1-14M Annotated IH 4.3.2-4.3.2.1; compare NWP 9A Annotated Ml 4.3.2-4.3.2.1.
Charter,

accompanying

103; Protocol

arts. 51,

text; Part B.l; n.

I, art.

and

2(b); see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

429 and accompanying

text.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text.

638.

639. Jus cogens overrides treaties

accompanying

and custom, two primary sources of international law. See

640.

See nn. 231-42, 268-71 and accompanying

641.

See nn. 340-47 and accompanying

642.

Impossibility of performance, fundamental change of circumstances or

text.

text.

claiming suspension during war. Vienna Convention,
VI. 80-81

and accompanying

arts.

armed conflict are among reasons

61-62; see also nn.

III. 928-29,

for

938-51; IV.26-28, 29;

text.

Waters landward of baselines establishing the

643.

and

n. III. 10

text.

territorial sea are subject to coastal State sovereignty; the

does not govern for internal waters pollution except ship pollution. See generally

LOS

8(2)-9, 10(4), 18(1), 25(2), 27(2), 27(5), 28(3), 35(a), 50, 111(1), 21 1(3), 218; Territorial Sea

Convention,

LOS

arts. 2(1), 7(3),

Convention, arts.

1,5, 7(4), 8,

13, 14(2), 16(2), 19(2), 20(3); Part IV.B.4.

644.

See Part B.2.a.

645.

See

646.

See Part B.2.c(II).

647.

See nn. 596-600 and accompanying

648.

E.g.,

n. IV. 3

and accompanying

text.

text.

Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol, n.

11.63, a

product of the

UN Environmental Programme; see

also Part B.2.c(III).

649.
the

See,

Frank M. Snyder, Introduction,

e.g.,

Law of the Sea:

(No.

in

Sound Military Decision (1992); George K. Walker, Sea Power an

The Needfor a Contextual Approach, 7

ODIL 299 (1979), 83 Mil. L. Rev. 131 (1979), 30 NWC Rev. 88

4, 1978).

Part V.A.3.

650.

See,

651.

Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws (1971

652.

Other categories of jurisdiction recognized by Restatement (Third) besides prescriptive jurisdiction

e.g.,

&

1995 Supp.) (Restatement (Second), Conflicts).
(also

known as legislative or regulatory jurisdiction or jurisdiction to prescribe), are jurisdiction to adjudicate (also known
and defined

as judicial jurisdiction)

and jurisdiction

as a State's authority to subject particular persons or things to its judicial process,

to enforce (occasionally stated as executive jurisdiction), or a State's authority to use

resources to induce or compel compliance with that State's law.
IV, 231.

Restatement (Second), Conflicts,

jurisdiction for conflict of laws,
offers a

653.

more

i.e.,

n. 657, §

6

is

Restatement (Third) § 401

an analogous approach to the problem of prescriptive

private international law,

among

elaborate analysis of judicial jurisdiction than does

Restatement (Third)

§

conduct

that,

§

wholly or in substantial part, takes place within

conduct outside

§

Id. chs.

3-4

421.

403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to

(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present
(c)

the 50 states of the United States.

Restatement (Third)

402 enumerates these bases of jurisdiction to prescribe:

Subject to [Restatement (Third)]

(1) (a)

governmental

& Introductory Note to Part

its territory

that has or

is

within

its

its territory;

territory;

intended to have substantial effect within

its

territory;

(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as

within

its territory;

and
(3) certain

conduct outside

its

territory

by persons not

its

nationals that

is

directed against the

security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.

This recitation of bases of prescriptive jurisdiction

is

concerned with transnational assertions of the right

to prescribe national standards of conduct outside a prescribing

State's borders.

These jurisdictional bases have

also

similar to that of

been labeled

Restatement (Second)

§§ 7, 17-18, 40 and

as territorial jurisdiction, events occurring

within
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the territory of the prescribing State; sometimes "floating territorial jurisdiction" with respect to jurisdiction over

events aboard ships, aircraft and spacecraft registered by the prescribing State; objective territorial jurisdiction (the
"effects" doctrine),

concerned with acts outside the territory of the prescribing State that have impact within that

on nationals of a prescribing

State; jurisdiction based

State; jurisdiction based

on nationality of the victim (passive

norms of conduct related to a prescribing State's vital interests.
See generally Restatement (Third) § § 402, cmts. a-h; 502(2) & cmt. d. The ensuing analysis is more concerned with the
rule of reasonableness to which these bases are subject; see Restatement (Third) § 402. Id. § 403(1) declares these rules
of reasonableness as limitations on jurisdiction to prescribe:
personality); the protective principle, i.e., prescribing

.

.

.

Even when one of the bases for

jurisdiction under § 402

is

present, a state

may not exercise jurisdiction to
when the exercise of

prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state

such jurisdiction

Id. §

unreasonable.

is

403(2) supplies examples of factors of reasonableness:

(2)

Whether

exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity

unreasonable

is

is

determined by evaluating

all

relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a)

the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state,

takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct,

i.e.,

the extent to which the activity

and foreseeable

upon

effect

or in the

territory;
(b) the connections,

such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state

and the person principally responsible for the activity

whom
(c)

the regulation

is

to

be regulated, or between that state and those

designed to protect;

the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state,

the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of

such regulation

is

generally accepted;

(d) the existence of justified expectations that
(e) the
(f)

importance of the regulation

the extent to which the regulation

(g) the extent to

which another

state

might be protected or hurt by the regulation;

to the international political, legal or
is

may have an

interest in regulating the activity;

by another

(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation

and

state.

Analogous reasonableness factors are the heart of the proposed analysis

LOS

economic system;

consistent with the traditions of the international system;

to

Convention and the San Remo Manual. Restatement (Third)

expand on the "due regard" rubric

§ 403(3) adds that

when

it

in the

would not be

unreasonable for each of two States to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction, but the prescriptions are in conflict, "each
state has

an obligation to evaluate

its

own as well as the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the

relevant factors, including those set out in Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state
clearly greater."

654.

See,

e.g.,

This principle of deference also has

Laker Airways Ltd.

v.

utility in the

Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909, 948-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984);

Reinsurance Co. of America v. Administrata Asigurarilor de
J.,

if that state's interest is

ensuing analysis.

concurring); Robert H. Bork, Introduction, 18 Stan.

J.

Stat,

902 F.2d 1275, 1283-84 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook,

Int*l L. 241, 244 (1982); Stephen B. Burbank, The World in

OurCourts, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1456, 1463-64(1991); Eleanor J. Fox, Extraterritoriality, Antitrust, and the New Restatement:
Is

Reasonableness the Answer?, 19 N.Y.U.J. Intt. L.

International

Declining

Law Restraints

&

Pol. 565, 592-93 (1987); David

on the Reach of National Laws, 10

to Exercise Extraterritorial Antitrust Jurisdiction

the Judicial Abstention Doctrine,

Yale

J.

I.

Gerber, Beyond Balancing:

Int'l L.185, 208 (1984); James

on Grounds of International Comity:

M. Grippando,

An Illegitimate Extension of

23 VJIL 395,400 n.22 (1983); Steven A. Kadish, Comity and the International Application

of the Sherman Act: Encouraging Courts

to

Enter the Political Arena, 4

Nw.

J.

Int'L L.

& Bus.

130, 156-66 (1982); Larry

Kramer, Extraterritorial Application ofAmerican Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld
and Trimble, 89 AJIL 750, 755 (1995); Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 Am. J.
Comp. L. 579 (1983); Karl M. Meessen, Conflicts ofJurisdiction Under the New Restatement, 50 L. & Contemp. Probs. 47,
53-69 (No. 3, 1987); James A. Rahl, International Application ofAmerican Antitrust Laws: Issues and Proposals, 2 Nw. J.
Int*l L.

&

Bus. 336, 362-64 (1980); Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International

Law: The Demise of

Restatement Section 403, 89 AJIL 53 (1995); Michael G. McKinnon, Comment, Federal Judicial and Legislative
The Long-Arm of US Antitrust Law and Viable Solutions Beyond the
Jurisdiction Over Entities Abroad:

Timberlane/Restatement Comity Approach, 21 Pepp. L. Rev. 1219, 1300-11 (1994); Note, Beyond
Comparative

Interest

Balancing:

An Alternative Approach to Extraterritorial Discovery Conflicts,

50 L.

the Rhetoric

of

& Contemp. Probs.

95, 101 (No. 3, 1987).

655.

E.g.,

Boudreau

of Laws §2.14 (2d

v.

Baughman, 368 S.E.2d

ed. 1992).

849, 853-56 (N.C. 1988);

Eugene

F. Scoles

& Peter Hay, Conflict

Maritime Environment

See Restatement (Third)

656.

§

403

Timberlane Lumber Co.

r.n.6, citing inter alia

597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976), opin. after remand, 747 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984);

595 F.2d 1287, 1297-99 (3d Cir. 1979).

v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,

The Restatement (Second) had espoused a similar approach. See id.

citing inter alia United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.Supp. 835, 878 (D.N.J. 1953).

Restatement (Third)

403 and Restatement (Second)

§

§

599

40

is

A

§

40

r.n.l,

difference between the

that the former "is understood

.

.

.

not as a basis for

requiring states to modify their enforcement of laws that they are authorized to prescribe [essentially the position of

Restatement (Second)

§ 40],

but as an essential element in determining whether, as a matter of international law, the

may exercise jurisdiction

state

to prescribe."

Restatement (Third)

§

403

The ensuing analysis

r.n.10.

is

closer to the

Restatement (Second) and its intellectual debt to Restatement (Second), Conflicts, n. 65 1 than to the Restatement
(Third), although the latter's more elaborate articulation of factors is more helpful.
The Supreme Court of the United States has never passed on the Restatement (Third) analysis. In re Insurance
Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 933-34 (9th Cir.1991) applied Timberlane factors, but the Supreme Court of the United
States found no conflict between US antitrust law and UK law and therefore no need to pronounce whether a factorial
test

was appropriate

for resolving conflicts of prescriptive jurisdiction. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509

764, 797-99 (1993); compare similar analysis in British Airways Bd.

Laker Airways, Ltd., 1985 A.C.

US

58, 78-86, 95-96

Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application ofAntitrust Laws: A Postscript

(H.L.). For Hartford Fire analysis,

see, e.g.,

on Hartford Fire Insurance Co.

California, 34

v.

v.

VJIL 213 (1993); Case Two: Extraterritorial Application of United States

Law Against United States and Alien Defendants, in Symposium, Conference on Jurisdiction, Justice, and Choice ofLaw for
the Twenty-First Century, 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 517, 577 (1995); Kramer, n. 654; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict,
Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise ofJurisdiction
(1995);

654;

McKinnon,
E.g., Oil

657.

to Prescribe: Reflections

Low enfeld, International Litigation and the

AJIL 42

on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89

RCADI

Quest for Reasonableness, 245

9,

49-58 (1994); Trimble,

n.

n. 654.

Shipping (Bunkering) B.V.

Sonmez

v.

Denizcilik

VE Ticaret A.S.,

1993), citing Restatement (Second), Conflicts, n. 651; Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345

because Restatement (Second), Conflicts drafters relied on

10 F.3d 1015, 1019-20 (3d Cir.

US 571 (1953). This is not surprising,

inter alia Lauritzen

and Romero

v.

International Term.

US 354 (1959) for choice of law principles for torts. Restatement (Second), Conflicts § 145 & cmts. b-d,
referring to id. § 6. Neely v. Club Med Mgt. Serv., Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 186-98 (3d Cir. 1995) {en banc) applied

Op. Co., 358
r.n.,

Restatement (Third) factors in a Jones Act and general maritime law context, also citing inter alia Lauritzen. Federal
courts, sitting in admiralty under 28 USC. § 1333(1), must apply federal choice of law rules. Schoenbaum § 18-1 1. The
federal

common law of conflict of laws governs unless supplanted by federal legislation or a treaty of the United States.

The Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 USC
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
Vessels at Sea, Sept. 23, 1910,

art. 15,

illustrates the point of Restatement

choice of law principles, displace
Const.,

when

art.

§

2370(e)(2)

is

an example of the former, partly superseding Banco

US 398 (1964). Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Salvage of
37 Stat. 1658, 1672

is

an example of treaty-dictated choice of law principles. This

(Second), Conflicts

common

VI requires the courts of the

§ 6(1),

states of the

Union

by extension

that statutes, and

law factorial analysis in

US

treaties establishing

conflicts analysis involving federal law.

US

to apply federal conflicts principles, including treaties,

658.

adjudicating federal law issues.

States,

659.

Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws

§ 2.2.3,

74-75 (2d ed. 1995); Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law

in the

United

38 Hastings L.J. 1041, 1169-79 (1987).
E.g., British

Nylon Spinners, Ltd.

v.

Imperial Chem. Indus., [1953]

Otto Kahn-Freund, English Contracts and American Anti-Trust

Law

—

1

Ch.

19, final judgment, [1955]

1

Ch. 37;

The Nylon Patent Case, 18 Mod. L. Rev. 65

(1955); Meessen,n. 654.
660. This is particularly true in the European Union. Wood Pulp Case, Case 89/85, [1988] E.C.R. 5193; see also
Restatement (Third) § 41 5, r.n.9. Nevertheless, these countries' and others' blocking or clawback statutes and others
represent contrary policy in recognizing extraterritorial effect of US multiple damages awards, particularly in
antitrust cases, and reach of US discovery requests abroad. See generally British Airways, n. 656 (Lord Diplock, J.); Rio
Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547; Restatement (Third) § 442, r.n.4; A.V. Lowe,

Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading
661.

See nn. 654-46 and accompanying

662.

This

is

Interests Act,

75

AJIL 257

(1981).

text.

the approach required in the

US

military planning process, which has been in operation over a

century. Undoubtedly other States use similar decisionmaking. Diederich, n. 17, 160, argues for environmental

planning in the context of military operations planning.

and accompanying

and accompanying

663.

See

664.

US Department

n.

1 1 1

NWP 1-14M Annotated

1111

8.1.3 directs this; see also n.

649

text.

of Justice

Operations 20-22 (Apr. 1995), in 34

text.

& Federal
ILM 1080,

Trade Commission,
1

102-04 (1995).

Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
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Id. 10-11,

665.

US

major

34 ILM 1092-93, chinginteralia

trading partners; see also nn.

NAFTA, n. III.949 and treaties with the European Union and other

949, IV.22, VI. 76 and accompanying text.

III.

and bilateral treaties with the same or similar terms can lead to custom. Brownlie,
Oppenheim § 10, 28; Restatement (Third) § 102(3).

Practice under multilateral

666.

International

Law

5;

1

667.

See nn. 654-55 and accompanying

668.

LOS Convention, art. 91(1); High Seas Convention, art. 5(1), declaring in identical terms that there must be a

text.

genuine link between a flag State and a ship. See also Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, n.
V.C.3. Since the

LOS

Convention's navigational

articles

11.61

and the High Seas Convention are generally thought

Part

;

to

be

declaratory of customary international law, this provision, implicating use of a factorial analysis not unlike that of

US 571 (1953) and similar cases, argues for its use in other maritime contexts. See n. IV. 3 and
On the other hand, it might be submitted that the holding of S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No.
12-32 argues against it, i.e., that the law of the flag is the only concern. See LOS Convention, art. 97; High Seas

Lauritzen

Larsen, 345

v.

accompanying texts.
10, at

Convention,

art. 11; see also

Convention

for Codification of Certain

May

Collision or Other Incidents of Navigation,

10, 1952, arts. 1-2,

Rules Relating to Penal Matters in Matters of

UNTS

439

233, 235-37. Lotus and these treaties

dealt with States' applying municipal law to conduct aboard ships flying other flags

an international norm; what

stake here

is at

is

customary rules, e.g., the flag a neutral merchantman
flying an

enemy

flag is

V.D.I. As with the

flies is prima facie

See Restatement (Second) Conflicts,

669.

Code

its

§

own state's statutory directive on

1-105

n.

651

in this context. See generally Part

approach. See Part V.B.

reject a factorial

§ 6(1),

choice of law;

and commonplace, example

typical,

is a

requiring a court, subject to constitutional restrictions, to

see also

Robertson,

New LOS

United States;

in the

all

302-03.

whether the treaty would govern over

670.

UN Charter, art.

all

Uniform Commercial

but one of the states have enacted

Judge Weis' Mannington Mills opinion, 595 F.2d 1297-99, lists a relevant treaty as a factor
clear

LOAC

indication of a ship's nationality, or that a ship

enemy character, are also of no consequence

conclusive of its

seas in the absence of

LOS and rules governing collisions at sea, these principles concern rights of visit, search, diversion

and capture and destruction of merchant ships and do not

follow

on the high

technique of analysis, not extraterritorial reach of laws.

a

to be considered, but

it is

it.

not

factors if the treaty prescribed choice of law.

103, declares that if there

is

conflict

between Members' Charter obligations and obligations

Member obligations under
US Const., art. VI. The
Constitution, US treaties and federal legislation prevail over laws of the states of the United States. The same is true in
under other international agreements, Charter obligations
Security Council decisions pursuant to

id., arts.

prevail.

This applies

25, 48. Art. 103's rule is

whether in statute or case law, are subject

conflict of laws, or private international law; states' conflicts principles,

to

Wortman, 486 US 717 (1988); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts,472 US 797
Hague, 449 US 302 (1981). Restatement (Second), Conflicts, n. 651 § 6(1) recognizes the

the Constitution. See generally
(1985); Allstate Ins. Co.

to

analogous to

v.

Sun Oil Co.

Constitution's primacy; this heirarchy

is

v.

proposed by analogy for public international law

issues,

the Charter and;ws cogens, and secondarily treaties or custom, with a factorial approach used only

i.e.,

if none

first

applying

of these recite

rules.

10 and

accompanying

671.

See

672.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103

673.

Analysis proceeds under the simplest model,

n. III.

situation, analysis
III. 621,

accompanying

674.

LOS

675.

Cf.

676.

ICJ Statute,

analysis

see also nn. III. 10, 47-630,916-18, 968-84,

might proceed by analogy

VI. 268 and

Convention,

LOS

;

text.

arts.

Convention,

arts. 38, 59;

two States in

accompanying

UN Charter, art.

678.

See,

e.g.,

nn.

text.

see also Part IV.B.4.

197; see also Part B.2.c(III).

Restatement (Third)

Vienna Convention,

LOS

103; n. III. 10

Convention,

text; Part B.2b.

application principles,

§§ 102-03; see also n.

arts.

61-62; see also nn.

e.g.,

As

and accompanying

III. 10.

Treaties might be subject to
if there is a

III. 928-29,

natural disaster

IV.26-27, VI.80-81 and

art. 87(1);

in the

text.

High Seas Convention,

arts.

art. 2; see also

nn. 111.932-67, IV.10-25 and

LOS — law of the maritime environment contexts, treaty interpretation and

impossibility, fundamental change of circumstances

Although war may suspend or end many agreements' operation,
Convention,

a multilateral

arts. 19-23;

text.

677.

accompanying

it is

Vienna Convention,

under impossibility of performance or fundamental change of circumstances, e.g.,

affecting the environment.

679.

bilateral confrontation; if

to treaty reservation rules. See

21(1X0, 21(2)-21(4);

art.

i.e.,

IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part B.l.

it

and war, may

cannot affect humanitarian law

affect analysis.
treaties.

Vienna

61-62; see also nn. 111.928-29, 938-51; IV.26-27, 29-30; VI.80-81, 83-84 and accompanying text.

ICJ Statute,

arts. 38, 59;

Restatement (Third)

§§ 102-03; see also n. 111.10

and accompanying

text.

;

Maritime Environment

680.

ENMOD Convention; see also Part B.3.a(IV)(A).

681.

The San Remo Manual and Robertson, New LOS 302

accompanying
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advocate this approach. See nn. 583-655 and

text.

682.

UN Charter, art.

683.

See

684.

See n.

685.

This sort of quadrilateral confrontation might occur where two belligerents are engaged in armed conflict in

103; nn.

III. 10

588 and accompanying

n.

III. 874

and accompanying

text.

and accompanying

waters that are part of the

text.

text.

EEZ of a State not party to the conflict, through which pass other States' vessels exercising

high seas navigational rights in the EEZ, or are engaged in fishing with coastal State authorization in that State's EEZ.
In the former situation, passing vessels would exercise

LOS due regard for coastal State EEZ operations but would be

obliged to stay clear of the immediate area of belligerents' naval operations.

immune from

capture even

if

flagged under an opposing belligerent

obliged to depart an immediate area of naval operations

if a belligerent

The fishing boats, if coastal craft, would be

pursuing usual occupations, but would be

if

required

it.

Fishermen and passing

vessels

exercising navigational rights would observe due regard for each other while in their normal occupations. However,
a belligerent

if

warship legitimately suspected that the fisherman or the navigating vessel were engaged in unneutral

LONW principles would apply, and the belligerent would observe these as well as the LOS and the marine

service,

environment.
See nn. 678-82 and accompanying

686.

Multilateral treaty reservation principles

687.

VI. 268

text.

and accompanying

may be

helpful. See

Vienna Convention,

UN Charter, art. 103; see also n. III. 10 and accompanying text.
UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 5 03; see also nn. III. 0, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84,

688.
689.

arts.

19-23; nn.

III. 621,

text.

1, 1

1

1 V.6-25

and accompanying text; Part

B.l.

690.

UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text.

691.

See

692.

E.g.,

693.

ICJ Statute,

694.

San Remo Manual

695.

See nn. 580-653 and accompanying

696.

Compare Restatement (Third)

Romero

v.

n. III. 10

LOS

and accompanying

Convention,

High Seas Convention,

art. 2; see also n.

IV.75 and accompanying

Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03;

see also n. 111.10

and accompanying

87(2);

art.

arts. 38, 59;

text.

text.

5.

§

text.

403(2); see also,

International Terrain. Op. Co., 358

651-68 and accompanying

text.

US

e.g.,

Restatement (Second), Conflicts,

354, 382-83 (1959); Lauritzen

v.

Larsen, 345

US

n. 651, § 6(2);

571 (1953); nn.

text.

697. Compare anticipatory action permitted under, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 221; 1969 Intervention Convention,
and regional treaties, e.g., Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol, n. 11.63 with the doctrine of anticipatory
self-defense as part of an inherent right of individual

and

collective self-defense; see

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also

nn. 111.10,47-630, 916-18,968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Parts B.l, B.2.c(III); n. 163 and accompanying text.

A

right of anticipatory self-defense to major environmental threats tends to confirm a right of anticipatory

self-defense to threats to a State's right to territorial integrity

and

political

independence, confirmed by

art. 2(4), in

that if affirmative action against a major environmental threat has received such widespread acceptance, anticipatory

action

is

2(4), that

proper

if a

and accompanying
698.

State protects

much more

than the environment,

i.e.,

political existence

and freedom under

Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 100, held customary law approaching the character ofjus cogens. See

art.

also n. III. 10

text.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part B.

and accompanying
699.

Vienna Convention,

700.

See nn.

701.

Protocol

III. 61 7-27

I,

1

text.
arts.

19-23; see also nn.

and accompanyint

arts. 51, 52(2), 57(2),

III. 621,

VI. 268 and accompanying text.

text; Part V.A.2.

dealing with planning attacks during land warfare. States appended

declarations to the Protocol, stating their interpretation that arts. 51-52 and 57(2) standards could only apply to

information available to planners

at

the time of decision. See nn. 111.620-26, V.42-43 and accompanying text.
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—

—

702. Mine Protocol art. 3(4); Amended Mine Protocol, n. 536, art. 3(10),
UST
in 35 ILM 1210; Incendiary
Weapons Protocol, art. 2(3); Second Protocol, art. 1(f); see also nn. 111.620-26, V.42-43 and accompanying text.
703.

San Remo Manual HH 40

704.

See nn.

705.

UN

III. 617-27

Charter,

accompanying

text;

& cmts. 40.10-40.1 1, 46 & cmt. 46.3.

and accompanying

arts. 51,

103; Protocol

text.
art. 2(b); see also

I,

See nn. 695-704 and accompanying

707.

UN

Charter,

arts. 51,

text.

103; Protocol

text; Part B.l; n.

I, art.

2(b); see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25

429 and accompanying

and

text.

708.

See generally Parts II.B-II.C.

709.

This very scenario could have occurred in connection with maritime interdiction operations against the

former Yugoslavia. See James R. Stark, Welcoming Remarks,
2,

nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and

Part B.l; n. 429 and accompanying text.

706.

accompanying

,

The Kuwait Regional Convention and

710.

Nowruz

oil facility.

in

Protection of the Environment 6-7; see also Arkin,

Gulf War that resulted

120, for similar situations in the 1990-91

in

some

n.

spillage.

Protocol, n. 11.63, were invoked after Iraq's attack on Iran's offshore

See nn. 185-206 and accompanying text.

711.

See generally Part V.D.

712.

See generally Part IV.C.2.

713.

See nn. 11.239-40 and accompanying

714.

See generally Parts II.B-II.C.

715.

See nn. 11.250-59, 376-78 and accompanying

716.

See nn. 11.210-15 and accompanying

717.

See nn. 185-206 and accompanying

718.

Vienna Convention,

arts.

text.

text.

text.

text.

61-62; see also nn. 111.928-29, 938-51; IV.26-27, 29; VI.80-81, 83 and accompanying

text.

719.

Brownlie, International

720.

Cf.

721.

Cf.

722.

Cf. J.H.

Law

5;

1

Oppenheim

§ 10, 28;

Restatement (Third)

NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 8.5.1; see also ICRC Guidelines, n. 626,
NWP 1-14M Annotated 8.5.1.

4, 7 at

8-30

-

8-31.

1IH

Capabilities, in

Doyle,

Jr.,

Comments on James

Service's Paper: Targeting Realities: Platforms,

Weapons Systems and

Grunawalt 242, 245.

723.

Vienna Convention,

724.

See Chapter IV; Parts A-B.

725.

See generally Chapter V; Part B.2.a.

726.

See Parts B.3.a(IV)(A)-B.3.a(IV)(B), B.4.

727.

See Part C.

728.

See,

e.g.,

arts.

61-62; see also nn. 111.928-29, 938-51; IV.26-27, 29-30; VI.80-84.

Special Issue: Iraqi

Symposium,

15 Sou. III. U. L.J. 411 (1991);

and the Rules of War: The Crisis Over Kuwait, 1991 Duke J. Comp.
in the

111

§ 102(3).

& Int'l L.

1;

Symposium on

International

Law

Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law

Gulf Conflict, 85 AJIL 452 (1991).

729.

See,

e.g.,

Mark Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

86 AJIL 569 (1992).
730.

See,

731.

Cf.

e.g.,

Lori F. Damrosch

Colin L. Powell,

in the Satellite

el

al, Agora: The 1994

US Action

in Haiti,

89

id.

58 (1995).

My American Journey 528-29 (1995); Ralph Bergleiter, Media and International Affairs

Age, in Panel, The Impact of the Media on International Law and Relations, 1995

732.

Other values may be invoked

733.

See Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.

734.

See nn. 583-94 and accompanying

as well. See Diederich, n. 17, 153-54.

text.

ASIL

Proc.

1

19.
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735.

See generally

UN Charter, arts. 1(3), 55-56; Civil & Political Rights Covenant; Economic, Social and Cultural
UN Doc. A/810, at 71

Rights Covenant, which together with Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217,
(1948), are the core of this

&

party to the Civil

Convention.
736.

UNTS

E.g.,

TIF

body of law.

Covenant and

to treaties protective of

to Part VII.

human

The United

rights,

e.g.,

States

is

the Genocide

377-78, 382-83.

European Convention

Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 id. 123; African Charter on Human &
ILM 58 (1982) (Banjul Charter).

for Protection of

221; American Convention on

Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, in 21
737.

Restatement (Third), Introductory Note

Cf.

Political Rights

See,

A.A. Cancdo Trinidade, The Contribution of International

e.g.,

Human

Environmental Change, Environmental

Protection, with Special Reference to Global

Rights

Law

to

Environmental

Change and International Law:

New Challenges and Dimensions ch. 9 (Edith Brown Weiss ed. 1992); Richard Desgagne, Integrating Environmental
Values into the European Convention on Human Rights, 89 AJIL 263 (1995); Cynthia Giagnocavo & Howard Goldstein,
Law Reform or World Re-form: The Problem ofEnvironmental Rights, 35 McGill L.J. 345 (1990); W. Paul Gormley, The
Legal Obligation of the International Community to Guarantee a Pure and Decent Environment: The Expansions of Human
Rights Norms, 3 Georgetown Int*l Envt'l L. Rev. 85 (1990); Alexandre Kiss,/1« Introductory Note on a Human Right to
Environment, Environmental Change ch. 1; Magraw & Vinogradov, n. 353, 210-12; R.S. Pathak, The Human Rights
System as a Conceptual Framework for Environmental Law, in Environmental Change ch. 8; Dinah Shelton, Human
Rights, Environmental Rights

and

the

Right

to

Environment, 28 Stan.

J.

Int'L L. 103 (1991); William

Andrew Shutkin,
VJIL

Note, International Human Rights Law and the Earth: The Protection of Indigenous Peoples and the Environment, 31

479 (1991); Melissa Thormc, Establishing Environment as a HumanRight, 19Den.J. Int'lL. &Pol. 301 (1991).

UN

commentary on
environment,

Charter,

the

i.e.,

UN

does not

1(3), 55-56,

arts.

human

the environment as a

list

Environment Programme, and areas peripheral

to the

rights

environment,

e.g.,

A recent

norm. The

permanent

sovereignty over natural resources, food shortages, population, natural disasters, have been subjects of
resolutions.

Simma

UN

55-56, 770-75.

738. National constitutions may grant protection of environmental rights. Edith Brown Weiss, Fairness to
Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony and Intergenerational Equity, app. B (1989)
compiles these, which can be indicative of custom, which can also be derived from common patterns of national
legislation, e.g., NEPA. Brownlie, International Law 5; 1 Oppenheim § 10, 26. The list for which a State is culpable

human rights is short but includes "consistent
human rights." Restatement (Third) § 702.

for violating international

internationally recognized
739.

E.g.,

patterns of gross violations of

Convention Concerning Liability of Shipowner in Case of Sickness, Injury or Death of Seamen (ILO

Convention No.

54

55), Oct. 24, 1936,

US

Stat.

1693,40

UNTS 169, held by Warren v. United States, 340 US 523 (1951) as

The United States has been a member of
ILO, another UN specialized agency, for all but three years. TIF 394; Note, U.S. Assaults ILO, 65 AJIL 136 (1977). See
also Birnie & Boyle 56-57.
coinciding with

740.

1978

Defrenne

ASIL

v.

admiralty law maintenance, cure and wages standards.

SABENA,

1976 E.

Comm. J.

Rep. 455, 473-76; Symposium, The Emerging European Constitution,

Proc. 166, 169 (Eric Stein remarks).

741.

See nn. III.948, IV.30, VI.84 and accompanying

742.

E.g., Civil

8(l)-8(2),
15,

213

1 1,

text.

& Political Rights Covenant, art. 4, limiting applicability to circumstances stated in id., arts. 6-7,
European Convention for Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, n. 736, art.

15-16, 18;

UNTS 232-34, excluding application "during war or public emergency" except arts. 3, 4(1), 7, id.

227; see also

Law in a State of Emergency 12-13, 22-29, 59, 121-25, 210-11(1989) (analyzing
International Law Association Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency [1984]); Joan
Fitzpatrick, Protection Against Abuse of the Concept of "Emergency," in Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next
Subatra Roy Chowdhury, Rule of

Int'L L. Stud, in Transnatl Pol., Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds. 1994);
Henkin, International Human Rights as "Rights," 1 Cardozo L. Rev. 446-47 (1979). Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear

Century 203 (Am. Socy

Weapons, 1996(1) ICJ 239-40, observed
that the protection of the [Civil

Article 4 of the

& Political Covenant]

Respect for the right to

life is

not

applies also in hostilities

applicable lex specialis, ... the

.

.

such a provision

[W]hat

is

.

.

does not cease in times of war, except by operation of

[LOAC]

...[,]

of life contrary to

.

.

.

in a

time of national emergency.

[T]he right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's

an arbitrary deprivation of life

particular loss of life, through use of a certain

Covenant

.

Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from

.

.

.

then

falls to

life

be determined by the

designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a

weapon

in warfare,

the Covenant, can only be decided by

.

.

.

is

the

to

be considered an arbitrary deprivation

[LOAC] and

not

.

.

.

from the terms of the
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This analysis would seem

to apply if a right to a clean

environment

is

considered a

human

right,

an issue the case did

not address in the majority opinion.
743.

E.g.,

Banjul Charter,

n. 736.

The Genocide Convention does

not have a derogation clause;

emphasizes that it, like the humanitarian law treaties, applies in all places and at all times. See nn.
278 and accompanying
744.

See

its

background

III. 948,

IV.30, VI. 84,

text.

UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Protocol

I,

art. 2(b);

Vienna Convention,

arts.

61-62; see also nn.

III. 10,

47-630,

916-18, 928-29, 938-5 1 , 968-84, IV.6-27, 29-30 and accompanying text; Part B. 1 ; nn. 80-84, 429 and accompanying text.
745.

Some have

746.

See generally Part B.3.a.(III)(B).

747.

See nn. 16-18 and accompanying

already begun to advocate animal rights. See Birnie

text.

& Boyle 422-24.

Chapter

VII

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND
APPRAISAL: POLICY AND LAW

The Tanker War
Iraq,

it

is

represented the maritime aspects of total war. For neutral Persian

Gulf States the war was
e.g.,

important for many reasons. For the belligerents, Iran and

a

the United States, at

major
first

if

not a dominant factor. Other neutral countries,

treated the conflict as a policy matter,

e.g.,

by pro-

claiming the need to maintain freedom of the seas and free access through the
Strait of Hormuz,

although they may have had naval or other forces in the area on

routine or special operations.

By the war's end in

1988, however,

many countries,

including the United States, were involved in the conflict in direct military action,
e.g.,

convoying, accompanying or escorting neutral merchantmen, or indirectly

through mine clearance and similar operations, as well as continuing statements of

and the right of straits passage. States aligned with
the belligerents, e.g., some Gulf countries, Arab League members, and other nations, e.g., much of Western Europe, the USSR and the United States, dependent

policies of freedom of the seas

on Gulf oil or concerned with law of the sea, self-defense and law of armed conflict

became increasingly involved politically and economically. In some instances involvement came through individual States' actions, and in other cases
issues,

through collective statements or actions through intergovernmental organiza-

Economic Community, the formerly
moribund Western European Union, or the Group of Seven. Gulf States formed
the Gulf Cooperation Council initially for internal security; the GCC assumed an
economic and national security posture as the war continued. The Cold Wargridlocked UN Security Council also became increasingly involved as the Tanker
tions,

War

e.g.,

the Arab League, the European

continued, passing resolutions condemning belligerents' deprivations of

high seas freedoms, violations of the
eral.

The war ended with

LOAC, and

continuation of the war in gen-

Iran's accepting Council Resolution 598, establishment

of UNIIMOG to supervise a ceasefire, and neutrals' individual and collective
forts to clear the

ef-

Gulf of mines.

Although some commentators date the Tanker War from 1982 or perhaps 1984

when belligerents' interceptions of and attacks on merchant ships accelerated, the
war at sea actually began with the initial land battles in 1980 near the Shatt al-Arab

when 70+ merchantmen were bottled up in the

The belligerents' exclusion
traffic came soon thereafter. By

Shatt.

zone proclamations and attempts to route neutral

1988 seafaring countries had suffered major tonnage losses in their merchant
fleets, particularly

tankers, but a worldwide glut of available bulk petroleum
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carriers partly offset these losses.
tive total losses,

was

World War

Nevertheless,

relatively

The number of ships

lost,

or declared construc-

low because of merchant ships' growth in

size since

more merchant mariners lost their lives during
1980-88 than at any time since that War; again, the number was low because of
smaller-sized merchant crews on most ships. Iraqi attacks on Iran's Nowruz facilities

II.

produced a major

oil spill in

the Gulf; spills probably also resulted from

on other enemy facilities and neutral countries' shoreside pe-

belligerents' attacks

troleum production or pumping

facilities.

Undoubtedly

oil slicks

resulted from

on merchantmen or after neutral navies responded

belligerents' attacks

in self-de-

fense to belligerents' maritime attacks.

Chapter

II

discusses these developments in

analyzes the Tanker

adbellum under the

more detail. And while Chapter III

War in the context of self-defense and other aspects of the jus

UN Charter, and Chapters IV (LOS issues), V (LOAC issues)

and VI (law of the maritime environment) analyze LOS and;ws in hello (i.e.,

LOAC)
problems during the war, a summary of important legal aspects of the Tanker War
and projections

for the future are useful here.

Part A. Self-Defense, Charter
After the Nicaragua Case and

which

is

a treaty (albeit the

its

Law and

Neutrality Issues

1

applying customary law alongside the Charter,

most important of the post- World War

II

agreements

because of its Article 103 trumping provision for other treaties and the possibility
that parts of it

may now have;ws cogens

status), a principal issue arising

war is the definition and scope of the right of self-defense.

from the

First, it is arguable, fol-

lowing the Case, that a parallel customary law of self-defense travels alongside
Charter-based principles deriving from Article
self-defense

may be different in

5

1

.

Second, this customary right of

content and scope from Charter-based norms and

therefore subject to the balancing of sources of law usually employed in determin-

ing norms to be applied in a situation. Third,
cogens

norm,

as

some

claim,

it

if

has priority over

the right of self-defense

all

Article 2(4). (If self-defense

jus cogens norms,

e.g.,

The Tanker War
if

a jus cogens

norm,

it

e.g.,

the law under the Char-

must be balanced with other

those under Article 2(4).)

did not resolve these issues. Indeed, belligerents' claims and

counterclaims of aggression

quandary,

is

a jus

other rules (custom, treaties,

general principles, etc.) except other jus cogens norms,
ter,

is

one subscribes

at

the beginning of the war

left

neutrals in a legal

to a view, characterized as nonbelligerency

during

when the United States was officially neutral, that under the Charter
States may aid victims of aggression. Unlike the 1990-91 Coalition buildup against
1939-41

Iraq where Iraqi aggression was blatant, the 1980-88 war's record

However, practice since 1945 seems to point to a right of countries
aggression, the position of the International
interpretation of the Pact of Paris (1928),

is far

from

clear.

to aid victims of

Law Association's Budapest Articles

still

in force for the

United States and
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many countries when
demns

The Falklands/Malvinas War

is

neutrals' response to aid a target of aggression, the

The Tanker War supplies
which continues

Pact con-

an example of aggression

United Kingdom.

several examples of informal collective self-defense,

to exist during the Charter era as a valid response, provided ade-

quate notice of actions
States

The

the use of war as an instrument of national policy, subject to the inherent

right of self-defense.

and

treaty succession principles are considered.
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is

given. Unlike the 1990-91 conflict,

where the United

had self-defense agreements with Kuwait and perhaps other Gulf countries

and the

NATO involvement if Iraq had moved against

possibility of multilateral

Turkey to the north, there was no formal treaty arrangement proclaiming a right of
collective self-defense like the soon to be defunct Warsaw Pact, the

NATO treaties,

many nations have negotiated since
World War II. To be sure, the GCC pledged collective action in many respects, but
it does not have a formal statement of collective self-defense. Nevertheless, it may
be argued that the GCC engaged in informal collective self-defense actions among
or bilateral agreements the United States and

its

members during the Tanker War.
Neutrals' cooperating to clear the Gulf of mines,

and the Red Sea

in the case of

the 1984 Libyan mining, are other examples of informal collective self-defense. Insofar as the record indicates, there were

no formal treaties proclaiming self-defense

arrangements among Gulf and other States for this and similar purposes. Nevertheless,

when these countries worked together to clear the seas of mines, they were

in effect acting collectively to defend coastal States' shores,

and

countries' mer-

chant shipping plying these waters, from the potential for mine attack.

The same might be
belligerents' air

said for cooperation to protect neutral shipping from

and warship attacks. The US declaration that it would extend pro-

tection to foreign-flag neutral
belligerent,

upon

self-defense.

merchant ships not carrying goods destined

that neutral's request,

The United

States

had

was

a third

example of informal

a right to defend US-flag

der longstanding rules of international law; this included
waiti tankers reflagged

only

US

under

US

its

for a

collective

merchant ships un-

Ku-

right to defend

law and the LOS. However, in those situations

flagged vessels were involved; issues of collective self-defense, formal

through treaty or informal through other arrangements, did not

arise.

When

United States published

upon

request,

legitimately acted

its

policy of defending foreign-flag ships

under a right of informal self-defense

as

the
it

long as the policy was

published, was clear, and did not otherwise violate Charter principles,

e.g.,

aiding

an aggressor.
Belligerents' attacks

ing

facilities,

on neutral

territories,

oil

production or pump-

were violations of Article 2(4), and could have triggered a right of in-

dividual or collective self-defense.
attacks

including

The same could be

said about belligerents'

on neutral flag shipping where there were no LOAC violations (e.g., fleeing

legitimate belligerent attempts to exercise visit

and

search).
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The United States claimed rights of self-defense in its responses to attacks on its
warships and US-flag merchant ships. In most cases these responses were reactive

coming after a belligerent's attack. In some cases a response came
while a belligerent was attacking or threatening attack; this invoked anticipatory
self-defense issues. Commentators agree that self-defense responses, whether reactive or anticipatory, must be necessary and proportional under the circumstances.
Commentators disagree on whether a right of anticipatory self-defense, which apin nature,

pends

requirement of no other alternative besides the response, exists in the

a

Charter

i.e.,

era.

Given the nature of modern weaponry and

its

delivery systems,

it

would seem that a right of anticipatory self-defense, whether delivered individually by a State or collectively by countries acting in formal concert (i.e., pursuant to
treaty) or informally,

is

admissible during the Charter era.

anticipatory self-defense

is

subject to limitations,

e.g.,

To repeat: This right of

necessity, proportionality,

admitting of no other alternative, and prior consultation (perhaps agreed in advance) for collective response. Responding States are

bound by what

their leader-

ship knows, or would be reasonably expected to know, at the time of decision.

Necessity and proportionality principles for self-defense responses

not necessarily, the same as those to be observed during

ample, during war belligerents

may

dictate a different rule

(e.g.,

tionality principles).

a warship far

an

while self-defense proportionality

from an area of attack invoking

Although under the majority view the right of

through use of force in peacetime

e.g.,

area),

(e.g.,

a

may or may not be a proper target under self-defense propor-

self-defense response

tries

LOAC situations. For ex-

attack any legitimate military target

enemy warship far from a war operations

may

may be, but are

is

no longer an option

reprisal

in the Charter era, coun-

may respond through nonforce reprisals (proportional acts that are unlawful,

trade sanctions in violation of trade treaties, seeking to compel an offender to

observe the law) or retorsions (unfriendly

acts, e.g.,

naval forces operating on the

high seas off a State's coasts). There is nothing in the US actions during the Tanker

War to indicate that it violated principles of necessity and proportionality, or that
there were viable alternative actions the United States could have taken in antici-

patory self-defense situations, during the Tanker War, based on what the United
States or

its

military

commanders knew

at the

time of response. This

is

why, e.g.,

the Airbus response was legitimate; based on what the Vincennes commanding officer

knew at the time, he thought an attack was coming from an Iranian fighter. The

response was necessary, proportional and admitting of no other alternative,

thereby meeting the Caroline Case criteria, from what the
It

was

a tragic mistake for

admitting

States paid

compensation while not

liability.

In terms of

law on

which the United

commander then knew.

UN Security Council lawmaking,

i.e.,

Council decisions binding as

UN Members through Charter Articles 25 and 48, there were none that af-

fected the war at sea.

However, the Council's increasing interest in and resolutions
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on the war was apparent. The Council passed Resolutions 540 and 552, confirming
as a matter of supportive "soft law," rights of freedom of navigation and access to
neutral ports. Resolution 598 (1987), the basis for the 1988 ceasefire, was the first

Council resolution specifically referring to a breach of the peace and Articles 39-40
of Chapter VII of the Charter.

The Tanker War also illustrates the relationship between rules of engagement
and the law of self-defense. US ROE, then and now, instruct commanders that regardless of options listed in the rules, the first duty
unit.

This

is

is

coincident with the law of self-defense in

give options that

command or
the Charter era. ROE may

defense of the

may be more restrictive than what international law might per-

mit in a given situation.
Part B.

The Law

of the

Sea and the Tanker War

The Tanker War illustrated two fundamental principles applicable to armed
conflict and the LOS: (1) the primacy of self-defense over norms in the LOS conventions; (2) the LOS, whether stated in treaties or customary law, is subject to
other rules of international law, i.e., the

LOAC, in situations involving armed con-

flict at sea.

As
trals'

to specific

protests

neutral ports.

LOS

issues, Security

Council Resolutions 540 and 552 and neu-

and actions confirmed customary high seas freedoms and entry into

The

straits passage,

i.e.,

right of neutrals, including neutral warships, to

through the

Strait of Hormuz,

was

unimpeded

also confirmed.

The straits passage controversy is but one more argument for ratifying the 1982

LOS Convention by major maritime powers, e.g., the United States. Others on the
periphery of the war include strengthening customary warship immunity rules,
for which there is a

gap in the 1958

LOS conventions; standards for warship inno-

cent passage in the territorial sea; maritime environmental standards; and rules
delimiting ocean areas like the

EEZ, continental shelf, contiguous zone and terri-

torial sea.

Although more of an issue of admiralty and maritime law and only indirectly an

LOS issue, the war demonstrated the relationship of national decisionmaking, and
perhaps decisions at international
their unions

levels,

with private interests, e.g., seafarers and

and the complicated web of

parties (vessel owners, charterers,

subcharterers, cargo interests, marine insurance) engaged in ocean trade, whether
in

war or peace. Arms suppliers might operate contrary to national policies, or per-

haps with overt or covert governmental assistance.
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Part C.

The Tanker War and the Law

of

Armed

Conflict

The Tanker War raised many issues relevant to modern warfare at sea. While
Parts V.A-V.J analyze these in more detail, this Part offers summaries of important
points.

1.

Basic Principles: Necessity and Proportionality;

ROE;

the Spatial Dimension.

The general
observed

factual record

is

not clear as to whether the belligerents generally

LOAC principles of necessity, proportionality and distinction in attacks

during the Tanker War, based on information they had or should have had when
deciding on attacks. However,

it is

reasonably certain that these principles were

not observed in specific situations, e.g., mine warfare, discussed below and in Parts
V.B-V.I.

The war is an example of the difference between necessity, proportionality, etc.,
must be observed under the LOAC and principles employing the
same names, e.g., necessity and proportionality, that must be observed in self-defense responses. What is necessary and proportional in a self-defense response, and
principles that

what

is

necessary and proportional under the

LOAC, may

be entirely different.

The United States observed these principles in its self-defense responses where its
warships and military aircraft were under attack, or were reasonably believed to be

under attack, and in

its

responses to attacks on merchant shipping. Whether these

responses would have met
lesser response

LOAC standards, or whether a different and greater or

would have been

in order if the

United States had been

at

war with

Iran or Iraq, would have required different analysis. For example, the United
States responded proportionally in self-defense in shooting to destroy Iranian na-

The United

would not have been required to wait for an Iranian attack, or threat of attack under anticipatory
self-defense principles, if the United States had been at war with that country.
The war also demonstrates differences in ocean spatial dimensions under the
val vessels

and platforms attacking

it.

States

LOAC and the LOS. The LOAC recognizes only two divisions of ocean areas: the
high seas and territorial waters, today equated to the territorial sea. The LOAC
also differentiates
trals,

while the

subject to other
etc.)

on the high

between belligerents'

LOS

territorial seas

has no similar differentiation.

and

territorial seas

of neu-

A belligerent may wage war,

LOAC principles (e.g., rights of neutrals, principles of humanity,
seas, in its territorial waters, in its allies' territorial waters

and in

enemy territorial waters. It may not wage war in neutral territorial waters. To do so
violates the

LOAC.

It is also

a violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, if directed

against the neutral coastal State, and would therefore be subject to that State's right
to exercise individual

LOS

and

collective self-defense. It

would

also

be a violation of

innocent passage rules. Thus belligerents' attacks on neutrals' coastal

1
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LOAC violation, an LOS violation to

the extent that belligerents did not exercise innocent passage rules or overflew
neutral territorial waters without coastal State permission, and a violation of the

Charter.

LOAC and Charter law are not the same in this context, either. For exam-

The

ple, a belligerent
territorial seas

leave
that

may attack an enemy ship, e.g.,

a submarine, lurking in neutral

where that neutral either cannot or will not cause the submarine

LOAC, under principles

under the

submarine unless threatened by

it

of necessity.

to

A neutral could not attack

under principles of self-defense, and the

standards for either attack might be the same or different.

No such incidents oc-

curred during the Tanker War, however, but this again illustrates the point of the
difference between self-defense principles and

and the
tral

LOAC principles. Nor are the LOS

LOAC necessarily the same under the circumstances.

For example, neu-

warships are subject to the LOS innocent passage regime for territorial sea pas-

LOAC rules applicable
to them through the LOS other rules principle, to the LOAC during war. If a belligerent's warship within neutral territorial waters and subject to the LOAC for
sage, while belligerents' warships are subject, under special

such passage threatens or attacks a coastal State, that coastal State has inherent
rights of individual or collective self-defense besides rights

the
its

it

might have under

LOAC governing belligerent warship passage. Conversely, the warship retains
rights of individual

and

collective self-defense.

warships legitimately exercising

LOS

The same

is

true for neutral

rights of innocent passage. If a warship

transiting under innocent passage rules attacks or threatens a coastal State, that
State

may respond in self-defense in addition to whatever claims it might have un-

der the

LOS. Conversely, the warship retains its rights of individual and collective

self-defense.

As noted above,

LOS

divisions of the sea

(e.g.,

high seas fishing areas, EEZs,

continental shelf waters, contiguous zones, or the Area) are high seas areas for

LOAC purposes. Robertson advanced a view, which the San Remo Manual accepts,
must observe due regard for neutrals' rights in these areas, including neutrals' high seas rights of, e.g., freedom of navigation and overflight, pipeline
and cable laying, etc., so long as there is no positive LOAC rule governing a situathat belligerents

tion.

LOS high seas freedoms

used in

e.g.,

of the

EEZ, may be

LOAC situations as rules for belligerent operations, but the two need not

coincide.

may be confusion as the sometimes muddled
Falklands/Malvinas War demonstrate. Thus it was proper for

Where they

claims of the 1982
Iran

definitions of ocean areas,

do, there

and Iraq to declare maritime exclusion zones, analyzed under the name of war

zones in this volume, whose boundaries sometimes coincided with

LOS lines, as in

the case of Iranian territorial sea claims, and sometimes stretched over the high
seas far

beyond

during the war

belligerents'
is

EEZ

claims.

Whether use of these zones was

a different story, however.

lawful
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The war also raised issues of neutrals' straits passage rights during war. As Part
IV.B.6 demonstrates, the LOS recognizes many varieties of international straits,
depending on special treaty regimes in
erations,

e.g.,

situations.
ies,

whether a

The

strait

a

few cases and geographic or

LOS consid-

connects two high seas areas or otherwise, in other

Strait of Hormuz,

one of the Earth's great sea transportation

or choke points in geopolitical terms,

arter-

may have been a high seas passage strait

when the war began in 1980 and a three-mile territorial sea limit, although waning
as a customary norm, was in force for many countries including the United States.
As such, Iran had no right to close the strait, any more than it had a right to close
high seas areas for other than limited times incident to belligerent naval operations.

By the war's end, however, it was reasonably clear that coastal States could

validly claim

1

2-mile territorial seas, the result being that except for perhaps a nar-

row sliver of high seas, unusable for navigation of all shipping but dhows, the Strait
was governed by the 1982
customary law.

States'

LOS

Convention

transit passage

regime as a matter of

continued protests over perceived Iranian threats

to close

the Strait, and the majority view of commentators since 1980, combine to declare
that

no belligerent may close international

shipping.

2. Visit

straits

...

and Search; Capture, Destruction

like

or Diversion.

Hormuz

to neutral

12

Iran conducted visit and search operations involving neutral merchant ships

suspected of carrying goods to Iraq to sustain
fort.

Iran was within

its

merchantmen incident
less the

its

it

war-fighting or war-sustaining ef-

rights to conduct these operations, but attacking neutral
to otherwise lawful visit

merchant ships were attempting

to

and search was inadmissible un-

evade

visit

and

search. Iran could

em-

ploy military aircraft for these operations, but these aircraft could not attack
neutral

merchantmen involved

were attempting

to escape.

in visit

and search operations unless these

Both belligerents legitimately flew

Gulf for general surveillance as

a

dition to warships for visit

The United

States

aircraft over the

high seas freedom, but these aircraft could not in-

discriminately attack neutral merchantmen.
principle that belligerents

vessels

The Tanker War strengthened

may use military aircraft,

the

including helicopters, in ad-

and search operations.

and other neutrals were within their

rights to convoy, es-

accompany neutral merchant ships that did not carry goods sustaining
belligerents' war efforts. A neutral could convoy, escort or accompany a merchantman flying that neutral's flag, and that neutral could convoy, escort or accompany
cort or

merchant vessels with other neutrals'

registry if the

two States agreed on

cedure. Belligerents' attacks on these formations could be

this pro-

met by self-defense

re-

sponses. Neutrals could clear mines belligerents laid indiscriminately on the high
seas, particularly

those laid in shipping lanes, also under self-defense principles.
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3.

Belligerents Seaborne

3

Commerce; Belligerents Convoys.

Apparently the belligerents did not attack platforms the
gets unless they contribute to the
liners.

On

enemy war effort, e.g.,
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LOAC exempts as tar-

hospital ships or civil air-

the other hand, Iran and Iraq did not always discriminate between

merchant ships carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining cargo for the enemy under

enemy

flags

and innocent merchantmen with other cargoes. While

for Iraq to attack
it

was not lawful

it

was lawful

merchantmen, regardless of flag, under Iranian military convoy,
for Iran or Iraq to attack independently-steaming

merchantmen

bound for neutral ports and not carrying goods for the enemy war effort. It was also
not lawful for Iran to attack neutral flag merchant ships accompanied, escorted or

convoyed by neutral warships.

As noted

in Part C.l,

it is

also questionable

were necessary and proportional when

visit,

whether Iranian and Iraqi attacks

search and diversion were options,

and whether under the circumstances belligerents observed humanitarian law
standards in caring for merchant ship survivors after attacks, particularly in the
case of Iranian surface ship actions.

Neutral-flag warships could respond in self-defense to belligerents' attacks on

merchant ships flying their flag, and to attacks on other neutrals' merchant ships if
the flag State requested protection. Although these responses were governed by
the law of self-defense and not the

LOAC, LOAC and LOS principles for succor-

ing survivors applied in these situations, even though necessity and proportionality principles

these attacks.

might have been different from

The same

LOAC

principles applied to

standards for responses to

what were perceived

to

be bel-

on neutral warships. There is no evidence
responses were other than necessary and proportional, or admitting

ligerents' attacks, or threats of attack,

that neutrals'

of no other alternative in the case of anticipatory self-defense, or that neutrals did
not apply humanitarian standards after responding.

4.

Neutral Flag Merchantmen:

Enemy

Character; Reflagging; Contraband.

Neutral flag merchantmen that Iran convoyed

down its coasts acquired enemy

character by being convoyed. War-fighting or war-sustaining goods aboard neutral flag

merchant ships preceding to or from

belligerents' ports

and under bellig-

erent direction or control would also have resulted in characterization as flying an

enemy flag and therefore being subject to belligerents'
sides liability to visit, search, diversion

attack

and condemnation

and destruction be-

as prize.

On

the other

hand, goods destined to or from neutral ports, invoiced under other than a belligerent's title, did not give a neutral flag
sels

were not subject

to attack

During the war neutral

this account.

merchantmen were reflagged under US or other
neutral flag merchant ships under the LOS, under

States'

registry. Besides qualifying as

the

on

merchant ship enemy character. These ves-

LOAC these vessels were considered as flying a neutral flag. Unless, e.g.,

they
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carried war-fighting or war-sustaining goods destined to or from a belligerent port

while under belligerent direction or attempted to evade legitimate visit and search,
they were not subject to attack on this account.

The law of contraband did not impact the war; it could have applied only to inbound cargoes destined for a belligerent. Therefore, this law did not apply to outbound shipments, nor did it apply to pipeline shipments to neutrals, even though
there may have been later transshipment to neutral flag ships for sealift. The law of
contraband could not have applied until 1988, when Iran published a list; contraband lists must be published before the law of contraband may be applied. That list
comported generally with modern principles, allowing diversion and prize court

condemnation of ships carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining cargoes destined

and later condemnation before a
prize court, or current concepts of contraband, which tend to ignore publication of
from an enemy, instead of high

to or

seas seizure

of absolute or conditional contraband and which only

lists

ered contraband,

free goods, or

i.e.,

list

goods not consid-

humanitarian cargoes. Although systems like

navicerts or clearcerts have been used during the Charter era, e.g., during the 1962

Cuban Missile Crisis, there is no evidence of employment of this option during the
war.

5.

The Law of Blockade and the Tanker War.
There is no formal record of either belligerent's declaring a blockade, although

commentators loosely mentioned blockade

in their accounts, as similar sources

would during the 1990-91 Gulf War. Even if these commentators reflected government sources, neither belligerent observed well-established rules for blockades,
which must be noticed, be definite in area, and state a time when a blockade begins
and a grace period for neutral ships to leave a blockaded area. It is doubtful whether
Iraq could have maintained an effective blockade, since it had no appreciable naval
assets to

conduct one; paper blockades have been unlawful since the 1856 Paris

Declaration. Although Iraq might have declared a blockade to be enforced by air-

provided those

craft,

ade,

e.g.,

aircraft

could have functioned as surface ships do in block-

communicating with merchant

ships, diverting

them

as appropriate, or

boarding them for visit and search, Iraq did not declare such a blockade. Iran's

at-

tempts to inhibit Kuwait or Saudi Arabia-bound merchant traffic by mining, warships or aircraft attacks could not have been characterized as a blockade; the

LOAC does not permit blockades of neutral coasts. Thus the UN Security Council
was

fully justified in

condemning this action

in Resolution 552, in addition to the

Resolution's explicit invocation of LOS principles of freedom of the seas and free-

dom

to enter neutral ports.

Iraq refused to allow passage of trapped merchant ships out of the Shatt al-Arab
at the

beginning of the war.

If it

had done so, this would have been permissible as a
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matter of international law by analogy to cartel ships passing through blockade, if a
legitimate blockade of nearby high seas areas

had been declared.
y

6.

Zones: Excluding Shipping, Aircraftfrom Area ofBelligerents Naval Operations;

High Seas Defense Zones; War Zones; Air Defense Identification Zones; Ocean
Zones Created for Humanitarian Law Purposes.
Although customary law, recently confirmed in publications like the San Remo
Manual and NWP 1-14M, allows belligerents to exclude neutral shipping and aircraft

this

from an immediate area of belligerent naval operations, there

is

no record of

during the Tanker War.

The United

States published warnings of risk of self-defense responses if ship-

ping or aircraft came within stated ranges of US forces operating in international
waters.

Although proclaiming these self-defense zones (SDZs) was admissible,

there

no obligation

in

is

to publish

them. They are like warnings, usually published

NOTAMs and NOTMARs, that States may legitimately publish for peacetime

naval maneuvers, which Iran published during the Tanker
States

War for this purpose.

may use the seas beyond territorial waters for naval maneuvers if they have

due regard

for others'

flight. States

high seas/EEZ uses,

i.e.,

freedoms of navigation and over-

conducting peacetime high seas naval maneuvers

may

not exclude

other shipping and aircraft from the areas of these maneuvers as they can for belligerent naval operations during war. If there

is

a belligerent naval operation during

war that includes what would usually be considered peacetime naval operations,
e.g.,

high seas refueling in the course of war measures against an enemy, the right of

exclusion applies to the ocean area(s) affected insofar as the areas and times for the
operations coincide. States also have a right of self-defense at sea, for which an

warning is
requisite.

or plans,

notice. Exercise of self-defense does not require an

SDZ

SDZ notice as a pre-

A State's ROE or other national rules, perhaps stated in operation orders

may require it, but this would be a national policy or national law require-

ment and not a rule of international law.
The belligerents published war zone notices. Although these zones were not
"paper" zones, were reasonable in geographic scope and gave notice of times of application, they could not be used to justify free-fire

on all shipping in these areas.

If

not a paper zone, (i.e., a zone that a State proclaims when that State has insufficient
military assets to enforce the zone)

and

if noticed

with stated times of application

and if reasonable in geographic scope under the circumstances, a war zone may be
proclaimed under the

LOAC. LOAC principles, e.g.,

rules for visit

and search, ap-

ply within the zone. States proclaiming a zone must have due regard for neutrals'

LOS rights, e.g., of freedom of navigation and overflight, and must have due regard
for the

maritime environment, within the zone. Neutrals' rights to respond in

in-

dividual and collective self-defense also apply within a zone. Belligerents also have
self-defense rights against neutral States within a zone.
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Saudi Arabia proclaimed an
its

rights

ADIZ over the Gulf during the war;

under international law

to

do

so.

tive,

and

was within

Actions against intruding aircraft were

governed by the law of self-defense, i.e., responses had
tional,

it

to

be necessary and propor-

in the case of anticipatory self-defense, admitting of no other alterna-

under the circumstances of each

situation, based

on what the responsible

commander, which might have been a single aviator in the case of solo flights to investigate an intruder, knew or should have known at the time.
7.

Weapons and Weapons Use; Mine Warfare.

17

There were two principal issues connected with weapons and weapons use during the Tanker War; shore bombardment from the sea and mine warfare at sea. Although Iraq used poison gas against
there

is

no record of its use

its

opponent

in the land

war during 1980-88,

in the sea war. Intermediate range ballistic missiles

were employed during the War of the Cities, but these were land-launched and hit
land-based targets, an issue outside the scope of this volume.

There were attacks delivered from over the sea against land-oriented
e.g.,

enemy

belligerents' strikes against oil platforms in

offshore zones and shore
Gulf,

facilities.

Shore-based

and perhaps belligerents' naval

territorial seas

aircraft,

targets,

and other

perhaps flying over the

assets, delivered these attacks.

The record is

not clear as to the lawfulness of these operations in terms of compliance with rules

given;

bombardment from the sea or air. Whether notice if appropriate was
whether Hague IX and Hague Air Rules standards, articulating general ne-

cessity

and proportionality standards; whether civilian

for naval

tic, scientific

where the

and did

or hospital sites were involved; whether belligerents attacked areas

civil

population was concentrated; whether attacks were designed to

terrorize the civil population; or

principles of necessity

whether attacks followed general

and proportionality;

is

land-based aspects of the war are indicators, there

is

War of the Cities and other

a high likelihood that

of these principles were at issue, and that there were LOAC violations.

likely, e.g., that general principles

LOAC

not clear from the available evi-

dence. If the nature of attacks on Gulf shipping or the

all

objects or historical, artis-

some or

It is

quite

of necessity and proportionality were violated,

an example being the result of attacks on Iran's Nowruz

facility in 1983, resulting

We do not know with certainty, from the available
record, whether and when LOAC violations occurred. These principles for shore
in a large oil spill into the Gulf.

bombardment, whether from

aircraft or warships, applied to the

Tanker War,

however. Possible charges of LOAC violations are not proven in most cases.

The record of mine warfare during the war is better documented. In unleashing
some cases unrestricted mine warfare, e.g., employing mines that did
not deactivate after becoming unmoored or laying mines in neutral shipping lanes
and perhaps neutrals' territorial waters, the belligerents violated general LOAC
principles of discrimination, necessity and proportionality. Failure to publish

what was

in
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minefield locations or to give alternative routes around a minefield were also

LOAC violations, as was Iran's laying mines off neutral coasts solely to intercept
shipping. Iran's mining the Strait of Hormuz in an attempt to deny international
straits

passage to neutral vessels also violated the

LOAC. 18

During the war neutral navies engaged in mine countermeasures. International
law permitted sweeping of unlawfully laid mines in international waters, and in
neutrals' territorial seas with approval of the neutral coastal State.

self-defense also authorized these actions.

8.

Other Humanitarian Law Issues.

The law

of

19

20

V.A-V.G and VII.C.1-VII.C.7 have analyzed LOAC questions that arose,
or may have arisen, during the Tanker War. There were also humanitarian law issues related to merchant ship crews trapped in the Shatt al-Arab in 1980, rescuing
those in peril on the sea, and neutral repatriations of belligerent armed forces
members.
If crew stranded in the Shatt al-Arab were aboard vessels that had not acquired
enemy character, they were protected persons under the Fourth Convention and
were entitled to be returned home promptly. If aboard vessels that had acquired
enemy character, they had prisoner of war status. However, these PW mariners
were entitled to repatriation at cessation of hostilities in 1988, and not 10 years
later, when many PW's were repatriated. If seriously ill or wounded, they should
Parts

have been repatriated long before 1998. If internees under the Fourth Convention,
they should have been returned

at the

end of hostilities.

US forces rescued surviving crew of the minelayer Iran Ajr after the US self-defense response. These crew members

Omani Red
also picked

Crescent

officials,

up Iranian Revolutionary Guards boat crew members

overboard during another
ships; the remains
cials,
oil

and remains of dead crew were turned over to
who repatriated them to Iran. The United States

US

self-defense response.

Two

after they

died aboard

went

US Navy

and the survivors were turned over to Omani Red Crescent offi-

who sent them to Iran. After the US self-defense response against the Rostum

platforms, Iranian tugs were allowed to pick up survivors.

As a technical matter,

the law of self-defense covered these situations, but the United States acted properly,

following

cued.

To

responses,

LOAC principles in rescuing survivors, or allowing them to be res-

the extent that other mariners were in peril after other self-defense
e.g.,

the

US

response to Iranian warship attacks, the same principles

applied.

These situations might be contrasted with a US rescue of an Iraqi pilot whose
plane was shot down by an Iranian air-to-air missile; the basic rule of assisting
those in peril on the sea, common to the

LOS and the LOAC, applied. (The United

States turned the pilot over to Saudi Arabian

ated

him

to Iraq.)

The same

Red Crescent

officials,

who

repatri-

principles applied in other rescues of merchant
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mariners in peril after belligerents' attacks on merchant ships; there

is

no positive

record of this, but LOS and LOAC principles applied to these situations as well.

Although under humanitarian law the neutral Red Crescent

officials

and Saudi Arabia should have detained the Iranian crews and the

of Oman

Iraqi pilot until

the end of hostilities, the opposing belligerents did not protest any of these actions.

Therefore,

it

can be argued that the opposing belligerent acquiesced in their pre-

mature repatriation.
9.

Deception During Armed Conflict at Sea: Ruses and Perfidy.

21

There are no reported ruses of war, lawful or unlawful, adopted by belligerents
during the war. There are no reports of perfidious conduct. Other neutrals' actions

may have been

deceptive in nature, but they could not be considered ruses, since

employed them. These included warships' painting pendent numbers
black instead of white on black in the case of US warships to minimize reflective
neutrals

surfaces attractive to missiles.

the

As long

as a

warship displays

its

pendent number,

LOAC is indifferent to its coloration. The same is true of nonreflective paint

for general hull coating or hull configuration to
to missile radar, or emission control to

make the vessel relatively invisible

minimize electronic radiations that might

attract missiles or invite attack.

Although there were situations where ships might have flown
those of their registry States (the proposal to use the

flags other

than

UN or ICRC ensign to extract

merchantmen trapped in the Shatt early in the war, and the proposal late in the war
for a UN flotilla), these possibilities did not come to fruition. False flags issues
therefore did not arise.

No perfidy issues arose when merchantmen began tailing neutral naval convoys
or simulating convoys during the night. This might have put the neutrals at
greater risk.

However, since they were neutral flagged, and perfidy applies

belligerents' conduct,

no perfidy

issue arose. Similarly, neutral

that were painted grey like warships did not raise a

Part D.

The Tanker War and the Law

merchant

to

vessels

problem of perfidy.

of the Maritime

Environment

22

The Tanker War's impact on the Gulf maritime environment is less than clear.
The only recorded major environmental disaster occurred when Iraq attacked
Iran's Nowruz offshore oil installations in 1983. Even if it could be argued that the
Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol did not apply between the

parties be-

cause of law of treaties principles like suspension or termination during war, the

law of treaties says that the Convention and Protocol continued to govern relations

between belligerents and neutrals unless suspended or ended under theories of impossibility of performance or

fundamental change of circumstances.

23

However,

there were necessarily petroleum spills from vessels' bunkers or tankers split open

or sunk by belligerents' attacks or during neutrals' self-defense responses. Thus,
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largely theoretical

dia coverage of Iraq's outrageous
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when applied to the Tanker War, as me-

and unlawful behavior during the 1990-91 Gulf

War demonstrated, environmental issues are likely to arise and become major considerations in future conflicts.

The law of the environment as
wait Convention and Protocol,
treaties, like all international

ples, e.g., the right

LOS

subject to important qualifications. First, these

agreements, are subject to the Charter and its princi-

of self-defense.

with general

sistent

is

Second, regional agreements cannot be incon-

Convention standards.

principles affecting navigation,

etc.,

25

Third, like general

they are subject, through the

tions' restatement of the other rules principle, to the

LOS

torn.

Fifth,

LOS

Conven-

LOAC in certain situations.

Fourth, any treaty-based norms must be balanced against other sources,
27

Ku-

expressed in regional agreements, e.g., the

cus-

e.g.,

any attempt to declare the right to a clean, healthful environment as a

human right is subject to the human rights conventions' derogation clauses and to
general law of treaties provisions dealing with

LOAC situations, e.g., impossibility

of performance, fundamental change of circumstances, and the impact of armed
conflict

on

treaty obligations.

Although there

is little

28

positive law governing environmental protection dur-

ing war, many LOAC norms offer incidental but important protection to the envi-

ronment

if

many

observed. These include rules,

of which are also customary

Hague Conventions, the Hague Air Rules, the
Geneva Gas Protocol, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, cultural property treaties like
the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, ENMOD, Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, and the Conventional Weapons Convention and its protocols. Although these treaties are often site, object or warfare method specific, many
(e.g., Hague IX, Protocol I, Conventional Weapons Convention) restate customary
norms, stated

in, e.g.,

the 1907

rules applying to all warfare, e.g., military objective, necessity, proportionality

limiting actors' liability to what they

knew

or should have

known when

and

they di-

rected an attack. There seems to be no need for international agreements to govern

environmental protections during naval warfare.

Modern

military manuals analyzing the place of the

LOS

and environmental

considerations during war at sea say due regard should be paid to neutrals'
rights

and obligations and

to the

environment without specifying whether there

should be one or two due regard applications,

and another
count

LOS

for the

LOS

i.e.,

one governing

LOS obligations

environment, or a single due regard analysis taking into ac-

and environmental

policies

and

law. In

some

cases there

is

no

statement of the place of positive rules of law, e.g., in treaties governing the

clear

LOAC,

As Robertson persuasively argues,
the first step is to apply positive rules; if there are none, a due regard principle
should govern for environmental considerations. Chapter VI advocates a single due
in connection with environmental protection.

regard principle, taking into account

LOS issues and environmental principles. A
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single

due regard principle, not necessarily the same one

as in

LOAC situations,

should also apply in self-defense situations where LOS and/or environmental considerations are at issue. Chapter

VI

also offers a factorial analysis for defining

due

regard.

Part E. Projections for the Future

With the USSR's demise and the breakup of other countries, e.g., Czechoslovaand Yugoslavia incident

kia

to the

end of the Cold War, many trends portend

for

the future of armed conflict situations at sea and the law governing them. As Chapters II-VI

demonstrate and McDougal and his associates have theorized, the law

governing these situations

is

interactive with

stake; participants with different

from the individual

many

factors,

including values at

and perhaps multiple perceptions that range

to the intergovernmental organization; situations that in-

clude time, geography, the degree of organization, and relative crisis level; what assets

can be brought to bear on a situation; coercive or persuasive strategies that

include military force, diplomacy, ideology, or financial strength; short-range out-

comes and long-range effects

to

be achieved,

after

which goals should be clarified,

past trends described, conditions affecting those trends evaluated, future trends

predicted, and policy alternatives at that point reviewed.
sis

29

This multifactor analy-

should be no stranger to national or international planners or defense analysts,

who have used variants for years.

30

Part E. 1 discusses

some geopolitical and other

trends emerging during the Tanker War; Part E.2 follows with trends in the law related to them.

/.

Geopolitical

and Other Trends Emerging During

The separatist

disintegration of the

the

Tanker War.

USSR into Russia and the USSR's compo-

nent republics, and a possibility of further spinoffs from Russia, today a federation
of semiautonomous areas, and dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia,

have been echoed in other countries. These include, e.g., Canada (the Quebec

movement, establishment of a separate Inuit province), China (Tibet),
India and Pakistan (the festering Kashmir dispute), Indonesia (East Timor and
other parts of that archipelago), Iraq and Turkey (Kurds), Italy (tensions between
northern and southern Italian cultures), Mexico (native Americans in southern
separatist

Mexico), Spain (Basque areas), the United

Kingdom (separate legislatures in Scot-

land and Wales) and all across Africa, where colonial boundaries often divide territories in

on

which native populations of sometimes very different ethnic origins

different sides of lines.

If the

end of the Cold War ended

fears of Soviet

live

domi-

nance and a perceived need for association with the United States while remaining
a cohesive State or

nonalignment but with

a cohesive facade for possible unified

opposition to the USSR in the case of Yugoslavia and maybe other countries, and if
Soviet dominance,

now removed, has been a catalyst for expressing pent-up desires
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USSR itself, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia), the re32

some areas has been clustering around other ideologies, e.g., tribalism,
messianic and sometimes fanatic or fundamental religion (a factor in the 1980-88
Iran-Iraq war ), or political separatism, which continues to bedevil Russia today,
suit in

even

after the

On

breakup of the Soviet Union.

the other hand, Europe, including countries beset with internal separatist

movements {e.g., Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom) has been moving through the
European Union toward greater economic and political integration that may prevent international wars that have ravaged

it

during the Twentieth Century.

In

the Western Hemisphere the United States, emerging in political, economic and
military strength as the only superpower, has joined

American Free Trade Agreement,

a northern

its

neighbors in the North

hemisphere

free trade

zone with a

promise of developing even stronger economies for its members and a potential for
expansion to Central and South America.
force for cohesive action, as does the

Today

The Arab League remains

GCC,

the United Nations has over 180

Earth except Switzerland. If it

is

a potential

formed during the Tanker War.

Members,

virtually all countries

on

too early today to determine whether the United

Nations, acting through Security Council decisions

36

to

maintain international

peace and security, the Cold War era ( 1 947-9 1 ), with the risk of a Permanent Council

Member

veto,

37

was certainly no measure of the UN's

potential.

However,

Council resolutions promoting freedom of navigation were a positive indicator of
the

UN's

potential for the future.

38

The result of these developments may lie in an even more pluralistic world society, in which even the smallest and relatively weakest countries may choose to go
their own way rather than being coerced or guided by the more powerful. Add to
that the possibility of ethnic or religious fanaticism,

decisions not guided

by political, economic or

and the possibility of national

legal considerations emerges.

And

although certain areas of the Earth are relatively stable and prosperous due to eco-

nomic integration (the EU, NAFTA), or are relatively prosperous, e.g., the United
States, budget expenditures for defense, and therefore naval forces, are down
worldwide.

With the Soviet threat gone, a rationale for maintaining large and expensive
armed forces is not as strong for many countries, including the United States. This
comes when the potential for use of armed forces is more multipolar than at any
time since 1945.
the Cold

War

Many similar situations involving use of forces

as before

39
it,

but the principal thrust of national policies has

changed dramatically since 1991.

"From

One indicator of this

has been the

US Navy's

the Sea" emphasis on littoral warfare as distinguished from a blue water

may be
The newer and economically weaker States may

high seas confrontation with the Soviet Union.
called

occurred during

upon

to

do more with

less.

decide to employ cheaper weapons, as

One result is

that navies

distinguished from

the

relatively
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weaponry that nations

sophisticated (and expensive)

like the

United States have.

The United States and other major naval powers will be called on to counter these
threats as well as more sophisticated weaponry, including adversaries' use of the
42

Internet

The beginnings of this were apparent during
Although the mechanisms
available

the

for formal collective

Tanker War.

enforcement of the peace were

from 1980 through 1988, ending the war was

belligerents'

mutual exhaustion

as

as

effect; there

was no

and

war.

The Arab League was

though

militarily weak,

legal authority

resolutions, but these

behind them. The

sometimes divided on which side

cally

a result of the

any outside pressure. The European Economic

Community, now the EU, and the Group of Seven passed
were of no

much

GCC was politi-

to support

similarly divided, at least until the

during the

end of the war. Al-

NATO and WEU countries cooperated with each other and other nations,

including GCC countries, Gulf naval operations were geographically "out of area"
for

both organizations. In the main the result was individual State action, or infor-

mal cooperation,
States, the

for or against belligerents, with

some countries

{e.g.,

the United

USSR) seemingly tilting either way, depending on circumstances. The

United Nations, with

its

potential for Security Council action that

ended the war sooner, did

little

until 1987,

when Resolution

might have

598, passed under

Chapter VII of the Charter, called upon the belligerents to end the war but did not
decide
flareups

on

action.

Given the end of the Warsaw Pact, and the

around the world where established alliances, e.g.,

do not apply, might

this

possibility of

NATO or the Rio Pact,

be the trend for future crises?

Iranian Islamic fundamentalism was a factor in starting the war in 1980;
well have been a factor in prolonging

it

until that country

was

totally

it

may

exhausted in

terms of its economy, national morale and military forces. Planning for suicidal
tacks

late in the war,

and

The amended US SDZ

an-

on Gulf shipping apparently was part of Iran's strategy

this factor

was echoed in

nouncements

at least neutral responses.

for a cordon sanitaire

around

US

clearly the reason for the Airbus tragedy lay in

crash on a

forces

US

at-

was one manifestation, and

fears of a kamikazi-siyle aerial

US warship analogous to the Beiruit truck bombing of the Marine bar-

racks in Lebanon.

The media

carry almost daily accounts of ethnic or

reli-

gious-based violence; unquestionably this sort of advocacy may influence national

decisionmaking involving future naval wars.

Although the USSR, many European powers and the United States ordered na-

augmented forces already there, it became apparent that no
single naval power, not even the United States, had the kind of forces to meet all
contingencies. US lack of mine countermeasures ships and forces and dependence
val forces to the Gulf or

on Western European navies is one example; acceptance of US offers for defense of
other countries' merchantmen is another. Even at the Cold War's height and as the

USSR and its navy and merchant marine began declining, there were not enough
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The same was true for the contemporaneous
when neither belligerent could bring over-

naval forces available to go around.

Falklands/Malvinas

War

(1982),

whelming naval

force to bear. This

(1950-53) or the

Cuban Missile Crisis

might be compared with the Korean War
(1962),

where there were plenty of naval

as-

sets to prosecute policy.
It is virtually

impossible to negotiate a treaty to regulate specific weaponry in an

age of rapid technological development. At the same time, for those countries with
robust economies or defense budgets, there

less

discriminate weapons,

e.g.

sea

is

the option of cheaper, often in-

mines whose technology may date back 100

years.

For countries, e.g., the United States, with economic potential and industrial bases
for relatively sophisticated
to

and expensive systems, there is the dilemma of having

meet sophisticated threats while maintaining the capability

for countering

more traditional but equally deadly weapons. The close-in rapid fire gun as a final
defense against missile or suicide aircraft attacks on warships

is

an example of a re-

sponse to a threat as old as World War IPs kamikazis, where the proximity fuse and
the 3-inch rapid-fire gun responded to these attacks. Lack of adequate

termeasures forces during the Tanker War
tively sophisticated

archaic,

navy

to

is

mine coun-

an example of the inability of a

meet and overcome

rela-

one might say

a traditional,

weapon threat. One further problem for the future might be marrying tracomponents,

ditional technology with inexpensive but sophisticated

the Internet to trigger traditional devices at great distance and
try, either in

little

e.g.,

using

cost to a coun-

manufacturing the device or means of communicating it. Fortunately

Tanker War, this variant did not occur.
Another factor that became apparent in the Tanker War was the interest of par-

for neutrals involved in the

ties

other than States or international organizations. These included arms suppli-

ers, seafarers

of

many

and others involved

nations, their unions, ship owners

in

ocean carriage (charterers, subcharterers, cargo interests, marine insurers), that

might involve still more countries'

interests in a conflict.

tion of behind the scenes situations in earlier conflicts.

War

II

For example, the US World

Lend-Lease program of supplying arms began before Pearl Harbor. The

pattern of parties involved in oceanic cargo transport

been

This was really a repeti-

for years, the

is

nearly the same as

it

has

major changes being the advent of larger and more automated

merchantmen, smaller crews, and

a greater use of

open registry

nience) shipping. This trend will continue in the future and

(flag

of conve-

may become even

more complicated with the growth of large transnational companies.
2.

Developments

in the

Law: Trends for the Future.

Invoking the inherent right of self-defense, particularly unit and individual
countries' claims for a right of anticipatory self-defense,

is

more

likely in the plu-

ralistic

world of the next millenium. This is so for several reasons.

lateral

and

bilateral self-defense alliances

First, the multi-

developed during the Cold

War had

a
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goal of containing the potential opponent(s),

NATO, ANZUS,
States

and

i.e.,

the

bilateral treaties like those

and Korea and the United

States, or their

USSR and the Soviet bloc by

between Japan and the United

complimentary opposites, the

Warsaw Pact and a web of bilaterals between the USSR and its satellites, the latter
now all defunct. Second, navies the world over are downsizing, in part due to the
Cold War's end and in part because of the spiraling cost of modern naval vessels.
The era of large fleet exercises as contemplated during the Cold War may be over.
Naval vessels that remain to patrol the world oceans, and merchant ships as well

They are also quite vulnerable to attacks,
particularly by missiles that kill with the first strike. This new technology suggests
that countries are more likely to act preemptively, at displays of hostile intent
for that matter,

remain expensive

assets.

rather than hostile acts, to protect these scarce
sets.

and increasingly valuable naval

as-

An increased concern for human life, including the lives of military personnel

threatened by these kinds of attacks,

is

also a

major factor. As long as principles of

proportionality, necessity and the availability of no other alternative are observed,

based on information known or what should have been known
tries

at the time,

coun-

may successfully invoke anticipatory self-defense to justify responses in these

situations.

As long as new permanent Security Council Member veto issues do not arise, increased Council lawmaking through its decisions may be the order of the day in
future conflicts, perhaps started with assertions of the right of individual or collective self-defense.

Whether this will be true is less than clear. An

active General As-

sembly, where there is no veto but also no authority to enact positive rules of law in

may contribute to lawmaking through supporting resolutions asserting principles of law. The same may be true in other international organizations, e.g., IMO, a UN specialized agency, and the ICRC, a nongovernmental
these situations,

organization.

Law of the sea issues will continue to arise. A major contributing factor to this
may be US failure to ratify the 1982 LOS Convention. Although the Convention's
navigational articles largely restate customary

norms

today, as the United States

delared nearly 20 years ago, custom can change through practice accepted as law.

However,

if the

LOS

Convention becomes

a

worldwide treaty-based norm

as the

1949 Geneva Conventions have for humanitarian law during war, the number of
sources for applying the Convention's terms as law has doubled.
fication

is

And while rati-

not an absolute assurance that the law will not change, since a contrary

custom can develop
evolving custom

to

outweigh treaty-based norms, the risk of change through

may be halved, particularly since many nations stress the impor-

tance of treaties. For issues related to potential naval warfare situations,

ship innocent passage and straits passage, the difference could be
particularly true

where there

is

an interface between

e.g.,

critical.

war-

This

is

LOAC standards and LOS
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principles that are relatively hazy because of the nature of custom in a world of over

180 countries, most of them with seafaring capability.
If future wars at sea involve ever

more

sophisticated naval assets opposing so-

phisticated military assets, the result necessarily will be resort to traditional general

LOAC principles, e.g., target discrimination, military objective, necessity and

proportionality.

For these kinds of conflicts, present

to specify particular

treaty law or other attempts

weapons use under particular circumstances

will almost al-

ways be outrun by human inventiveness. The same can be said about wars involving less sophisticated weapons, whether opposed by technologically advanced

systems or more traditional devices.
that are
will be,

will

Some

warfare methods, particularly those

by nature indiscriminate, e.g., poison gas or bacteriological weapons, are,
and should be, outlawed. Beyond this, however, the law of naval warfare

remain

as

it

has been for centuries, largely a corpus of custom and general

principles.

The maritime environment

be an important factor in naval

will continue to

warfare considerations. Although there was one reported environmental catastro-

phe during the Tanker War, the 1983 Nowruz spill, it was the 1990-91 war that resulted in massive destruction of the environment at sea, in the air and on the land.
Given greater public awareness through the media and today the Internet, the environment may become a major force in national and international decisionmaking. Here too widespread ratification of the

comprehensive terms

for protection

LOS

Convention

will help; its

should promote due regard for the maritime

environment, in connection with due regard for neutrals'

LOS Convention rights,

by belligerents. Moreover, many LOAC treaties, most of which restate customary
norms, offer protection for the environment if States observe these standards.
3.

Final Thoughts.
Future conflicts

at sea, like the

Tanker War and

in reality all wars, are likely to

be multidimensional in terms of participants, levels of participants, organization
of participants, interests of participants (economic or otherwise), relative sophistication of participants

pants (perhaps based

{e.g.,

in

weapons available

on ethnic or

to them), perspectives of partici-

religious persuasions instead of nationalism or

communism), and factors participants must consider (e.g., Charter
aw, neutrality or shades of it, the general LOS, LOAC principles, the maritime environment). Despite a growing number of international organizations and new
:ountries which may attempt to harness the worst or best intentions of humanity,
he beginning of the next millenium may be more pluralistic, more integrated and
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